Organizational Change in Law Enforcement Intelligence Operations: A Post 09/11/2001 Analysis

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Abstract

The terrorist attacks on the United States on 09/11/2001 thrust law enforcement intelligence operations into an unprecedented era. A gap was created by organization's failures to properly identify, control and direct their operations with local, state and federal entities. Emphasis had been placed on emerging technologies to track threats and the necessary human factor was becoming less prevalent. Agencies needed to utilize existing resources and identify new avenues that would allow for intelligence driven policing. On many different levels, agencies were forced to create and accept change in their mindset, operations and policies. This change takes many forms, from the perceptions and attitude of an individual officer to the command philosophy of an entire police department. This research measures the impact of this change to the law enforcement intelligence operations.

Introduction

Research Problem

The role of intelligence operations in law enforcement agencies can be a critical one that is all too often underutilized or in some cases not properly defined or managed. Through its development, the role is often misunderstood to the point that it is no longer used as originally intended. Intelligence should drive operational decisions and should remain a tool of the operational leader, but not just another component that is driven by perception of operational need.

Multiple new resources have emerged since 09/11/2001 that are available for law enforcement agencies to utilize. Some of these resources come in the form of directed funding from the state and federal governments. Other resources are technologically oriented and perhaps the most important new resource is a renewed mindset and approach to intelligence operations. Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Office of Statewide Intelligence (OSI) Chief Mark Zadra stated that the "changing mindset of law enforcement" is the most important element in creating change for law enforcement intelligence operations (M. Zadra, personal communication, March 09, 2005).

In some ways, the answer to the research question that is being asked is painfully obvious. Certainly all would agree that law enforcement in general and more specifically intelligence operations have undergone a forced metamorphosis. Measuring the impact in specific areas such as policy and operations will provide a consistent view of operational and philosophical changes. It is believed that an analysis of how agencies currently use their existing and new resources since the 09/11/2001 tragedy will assist in determining our strategic decisions for future growth in this area and prevent similar mistakes from occurring.

Another area this research will attempt to address will be to measure the effectiveness of our change. In reacting to the attacks upon our country, certain measures were put in place almost immediately to ensure we were not attacked again in a similar fashion. The true gauge of our effectiveness will be to determine how we work together to detect, deter and prevent another equally significant, yet operationally different, attack against the United States. This research being what it may, can only truly provide indicators of future performance. Given the inevitability of another attack, the genuine measure of change will be determined the day this attack occurs.

While it understood that change has already occurred and is continuing to occur in law enforcement intelligence operations, this research will attempt to answer several following specific questions. (1) What is necessary to create effective change in law enforcement intelligence operations that will allow for a seamless network of valid information sharing? (2) What tools or technology is needed to accomplish these changes and are these technologies already being embraced? (3) Policy guides the operational makeup or personality of a law enforcement agency. What policy implementations have been made that have created change, with either intended or unintended results? (4) How have agencies organizationally re-aligned their most visible asset-manpower?

This research will attempt to answer these questions as effectively as possible in an effort to determine how law enforcement intelligence operations have organizationally, conceptually and operationally changed since 09/11/2001.

Background

During the 1950s, intelligence collection, dissemination and methodology were being developed by the United States military in its race to stay ahead in what is commonly referred to as the Cold War. The models for military intelligence were fairly straightforward, being based on information flowing up and decisions on that information being made in a downward direction. The most significant component of this intelligence model was its reliance on the human factor. During this development of how we collected intelligence information, the human element was the most important, and in most cases, the only factor.

As technology for gathering signal and electronic based information emerged, governments seeking this information began to rely heavily upon it. In 1957 after the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the United States Air Force began an aggressive campaign to launch their own satellite for photo reconnaissance. This, along with other developments such as the U-2 spy plane, allowed the United States to continue their growth and dependence on technology to gather intelligence. The human factor in intelligence gathering had already begun to decline.

For a period of time, decisions would be made on electronic intelligence after they had been verified by human means. Through the decades, the military and government entities that comprise the intelligence community began to slowly rely less and less on that human interaction and confirmation. In addition, a cumbersome set of rules was developed for the classification and dissemination of intelligence that made simple requests for information a daunting task. Former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft stated, "I think there is no question that we classify too much. It is a bureaucratic tendency that needs to be fought..." (Aftergood 1996).

Law enforcement intelligence took its cues from the military system, especially with many of its members coming from the ranks of military and seeking jobs in a civilian populace that would be similar to their former military roles. Law enforcement intelligence worked in a similar fashion. Information was gathered through human means and information flowed “up” in a traditional model. If the intelligence information was deemed to be credible, the information itself drove the decisions of law enforcement, thus creating intelligence based operations.

Law enforcement began to see the benefits of increased technology, but still allowed the human influence to be involved in the collection and utilization of intelligence. Video and audio tapes tell a certain story, but it is the testimony of the officer that makes the conviction. Law enforcement agencies continued to rely on human based intelligence with a mixture of the amazing technologies available today to enhance their capabilities.

Law enforcement suffers from one additional, critical factor. Because there is no national police agency, and subsequently no single blueprint for how we operate, individual states, municipalities and locales operate independently of each other. This independent operation is not necessarily often wrong as it is what makes our communities unique, but it does create differences in operations and priorities that are difficult to overcome.

Additionally, this organizational change creates a yet to be determined stress to the individual officer and agency.

> Law enforcement agencies are in an era of change. The needs of communities and constituencies, rapid technological growth and enhancements, and the changing capabilities and structure of law enforcement organizations demand that agencies regularly examine and improve their ways of operation. According to some futurists, changes in a society occur in several major areas, directly affecting law enforcement and compounding the stress inherently associated with the profession. (Sewell, 2002)

Through the history of the national intelligence community, military and law enforcement intelligence groups rarely, if ever, collaborated with one another. There existed a failure to communicate information with each other and with civilian authorities in a timely and reasonable manner. This may have occurred because of the mistaken belief that their missions, paths and ideologies did not correlate.

This failure due to secrecy could be related to our relationship with and the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union. The original rationale for the indiscriminate secrecy of U.S. intelligence was the challenge of a superpower adversary in a high state of military readiness with an aggressive, large and capable intelligence service aiming at international subversion and global domination. In this context, disclosure of the smallest tidbit of information was perceived to be a potential liability and perhaps an incremental threat (Aftergood 1996). Some might describe this as the point in which we began not talking to one another.

Since the attacks on the United States on 09/11/2001, a great deal of discussion has occurred regarding how we came to find ourselves in this situation. It could be argued that our tendency to engage in community oriented policing helped to set the stage where operations began to drive intelligence as opposed to intelligence being used to help make tactical and strategic law enforcement decisions. Conversely, it has been argued that community oriented policing is a key part of gathering intelligence on a local level. In addition, our inability to communicate effectively with one another is hindered not only through our mindset of cold war non-disclosure, but in many cases was statutorily hindered by inane legislation.

These factors are compounded further by the thing that Americans seek most-our personal freedoms and individuality. With multiple disciplines and locations conducting their own intelligence gathering operations, coupled with non-communicative operating rules, failure was soon to follow. With 75% of police agencies in the United States having less than 24 members, intelligence gathering may not even be anywhere on the priority of operations for most agencies (Office of Justice Programs (OJP) 2004). Of course, this line of thinking is very easy to portray three years after the tragedy has occurred. But perhaps, what blinded us the most was our sheer arrogance that nothing of this magnitude could occur to us.

This research will not only seek to measure the change that has occurred since 09/11/2001, but will also assist in gaining insight as to why we failed to detect such an attack.

Methods

A review of available documentation from the Department of Justice (DOJ) was completed along with information available from their public websites. Interviews of persons with pertinent information and experience were conducted. A survey of the membership of the Florida Intelligence Unit (FIU) was conducted via Surveymonkey.com, a commercially available service that caters to research projects requiring survey information and support.

Interview Procedures

Interviews were conducted with two key individuals relating to law enforcement intelligence operations and policy in Florida and the United States. Chief Mark Zadra of the FDLE OSI was interviewed to determine his opinions on the changes that have occurred in Florida and what was necessary to continue in a successful manner. Chief Zadra was one of the first seven Special Agent Supervisors to lead a Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF) squad in Florida. His office provides leadership to not only FDLE in terms of intelligence support, but to all law enforcement in Florida as well as to state and federal partners outside of Florida.

Chief Zadra’s area also covers the maintenance and administration of two key networking pieces in Florida’s intelligence network, the Threatnet investigative database and the Threatcom notification system. Both of these systems came about after 09/11/2001 and are important when measuring or discussing the change that has occurred in how Florida law enforcement intelligence operates.

Ms. Diane Ragans of the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR) was interviewed to determine the impact of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) on law enforcement intelligence operations and to specifically determine if this program has fostered any change in Florida. IIR is a Florida-based nonprofit research and training organization, which specializes in law enforcement, juvenile justice, and criminal justice issues. IIR provides local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies with assistance needed to implement changes that promote greater governmental effectiveness.

Ms. Ragans is a Senior Research Associate with IIR and her primary function is to support the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) and specifically two of its components, the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) and the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC). (See Appendix A). Global’s mission is to support the development and implementation of standards-based electronic information exchange, providing the justice community with timely, accurate, complete and accessible information in a secure and trusted environment. The Global mission was a key objective when developing the NCISP in 2003. The value of a Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative capability is that it benefits all operational justice officials (IIR Website 2005)

Prior to coming to IIR, Ms. Ragans spent over 17 years employed at FDLE. Much of her professional career has been spent actively working or in support of law enforcement intelligence operations. Her input regarding the Global project and how it has begun to initiate change and will continue to foster change within law enforcement intelligence operations will illustrate the overall impact to intelligence in Florida and the United States.

These interviews will not be documented in their entirety. Portions of the interviews will be referenced throughout the research project. Questions for the interviewees were developed based on their individual experience and expertise and were intended to illustrate the impact of change to organizations tasked with law enforcement intelligence operations.

Survey of Florida Intelligence Unit Membership

Beginning in January 2005, the membership of the FIU had access to web-based survey that asked approximately 40 questions relating to law enforcement operations at their individual agency. (See Appendices B and C). The survey closed the week of the FIU conference in Tallahassee on March 04, 2005. A presentation on the survey, its intent and the methodology was given to the conference attendees on March 01, 2005. Agencies that had not completed the web-based survey were provided paper copies to complete prior to the close of the conference.

The FIU is a statewide intelligence and resource-sharing organization comprised of over 160 agencies throughout the State of Florida. These agencies include municipal police departments, sheriff's offices, state and federal law enforcement agencies. Their goal is to provide a seamless network of criminal justice and criminal intelligence information to all Florida law enforcement officers. FIU is the largest and longest running intelligence organization in the state and has been in existence since 1961. The author has served in various leadership positions with FIU and is currently a member of its Executive Board.

The survey was presented to the Executive Board of the FIU and was subsequently approved by them for distribution to their membership. In the past, FIU has participated in and supported similar research projects of their membership and of their individual intelligence committees. Results of the survey and this research project will be made available for the membership and will be discussed at future intelligence sharing conferences.

The survey was intended to be completed by any member of a respective agency that has knowledge or command of their intelligence operations. Additionally, it was not a requirement that the respondent's agency be a member of FIU. It was not a requirement that an agency have an intelligence unit to complete the survey, only that they were affected in some way by the events of 09/11/2001. It could be argued that any law enforcement agency in Florida was operationally and philosophically impacted, so all agency responses were accepted.

The survey was targeted towards first-line employees assigned to intelligence duties. The questions were structured to assist the survey participant in completing the survey. Surveys that require great amounts of technical or fiscal data or require research on the part of the survey participant tend to go unfinished.

The survey focused on intelligence policy as well as those policies that could have organizational impact on an agency that were a result of 09/11/2001. Questions were also designed to measure change when compared to pre and post 09/11/2001 policies and practices. The survey also measures actual manpower allotments in an attempt to determine an overall impact to the individual agency and to law enforcement in general. Other questions about task force membership and use of available resources were also included. These were used to illustrate how law enforcement is operating differently and more cooperatively since 09/11/2001.

Both of these research methods have strengths and weaknesses associated with them. By choosing specific persons to interview that have specific expertise, questions can be answered by the most credible and reliable sources available. Interviews can create bias in terms of questions and answers and by what information is reported in the final project. Surveys are effective in that questions can be asked to a specific targeted group in a pre-determined order. Another weakness of the survey method was identified in that the survey device was not designed to require that all questions have a mandatory answer.

Results

80 law enforcement agencies responded to this survey, 93.4% of which were members of the FIU. All of the respondents were state, county or municipal agencies. Because of the reorganization of numerous federal law enforcement agencies, federal agencies did not participate in the survey. Not all fields in the survey required mandatory responses, so the total number of responses per question had the potential to vary based on how many respondents chose to answer that question. However, the lowest number of respondents for any of the questions being discussed was 76.

Manpower/Organizational Re-alignment

41.8% of the agencies responding were either below 50 sworn personnel or more than 500 (19% and 22.8% respectively). Of the reporting agencies, 73.4% indicated that as of the time of the survey, their agency had a structured intelligence unit/function or group. 23.4% of the responding agencies did not have this function in place prior to 09/11/2001. Additionally, 39.7% of the respondents indicated the function existed prior to the attacks, but had grown through the addition of either sworn or non-sworn personnel.

The average number of sworn personnel per agency assigned to these functions prior to 09/11/2001 was 6.83 full-time employees (FTEs). Non-sworn personnel represented 5.29 FTEs per agency. After 09/11/2001, reporting agencies indicated their sworn personnel increased an average of 2.36 FTEs per agency for a total of 9.19 FTEs per agency. Non-sworn increased an average of 2.54 FTEs per agency for a total of 7.83 FTEs per agency. This does not necessarily reflect new positions, but rather those assigned to criminal intelligence or analysis functions. Additionally, an average of 10.54 FTEs were impacted per responding agency (32) due to of agencies realigning or reallocating their resources as a result of 09/11/2001.

Budget

The survey contained two specific questions relating to the budgets of the responding agencies. Survey participants were asked if their agencies had either a full-time (paid employees) or reserve (volunteer) program that focused on domestic security issues. Because domestic security functions are driven by intelligence, these units are considered to have an intelligence mission unto themselves. 46.8% of the responding agencies have some type of full-time unit and 10.7% had a volunteer or reserve unit.

When asked how these units are funded, 78.1% of the respondents indicated that their existing budget was used to staff the full-time unit. 66.7% of those with volunteer units used their existing funding means to support that unit. Other funding sources for both types of units included re-allocation of existing grants, which is a further extension and use of existing resources.

Policy

76.3% of agencies responding indicated that their agency had amended or updated one or more policies as a direct result of 09/11/2001. 55.2% of the agencies indicated their policy regarding criminal intelligence was changed in some fashion. 57.3% of the agencies indicated that they created one or more totally new policies as a result of the above listed conditions. Prior to 09/11/2001, 68.4% of the respondents indicated their agency had some type of policy or directive relating to criminal intelligence. After 09/11/2001, that rose to 82.1%.

The next largest category of new policy being created was those relating to equipment usage and issuance with 59.1%. 70.7% of the remaining respondents indicated their equipment usage policy was modified. While the survey did not gather specifics about the policies, this is believed to be a result of the need for policies relating to special equipment such as personal protective equipment.

Finally, criminal investigations policies were modified by 37.9% of the responding agencies and new policy in this area was created by 38.6% of the agencies.

Task Force/Cross-Designation

33.8% of responding agencies indicated they provided one or more members to one of the FDLE RDSTF throughout the state. 41% of the agencies have one or more members who are cross-designated as an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Agent. This is also indicative of the number of agencies engaging in memorandums of understanding (MOU) with either FDLE or ICE.

Prior to 09/11/2001, only 23.1% of reporting agencies indicated they were at that time participating in a FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The number of agencies indicating they were participating in either a JTTF or the RDSTF (or both) after 09/11/2001 was 71.4%.

Discussion

As previously stated, very little doubt remains that some type of change has occurred with law enforcement intelligence operations since 09/11/2201. The purpose of this research was to attempt to provide a gauge that will show how significant these changes were.

In Florida, the most identifiable change came with the implementation of the RDSTF. Individual agency commitment to these groups is recognizable in that 33.8% of the respondents indicated their agencies provided one or more full-time member to the RDSTF. Even if only one member has been tasked, the impact to the agency can be major. For any law enforcement agency to provide a full-time member to any task force, the agency must have conceptual buy-in and commitment to the mission and purpose of the task force. Given that the RDSTF system was not in place prior to 09/11/2001, major ideological change has occurred by virtue of participation.

With the unveiling of the Threatnet system, an entire new way of tracking case assignments and raw intelligence was developed. The technology and platform for the software already existed, but for the first time in Florida a system that allowed multiple users to input data and would also allow for supervisors to track tasks and assign follow-up duties was developed. 80.0% of the respondents in the survey indicated they were trained in the use and had access to this system.

According to Chief Zadra, there are approximately 700 Threatnet users representing approximately 250 agencies (M. Zadra, personal communication, March 09, 2005). (User numbers for all FDLE systems will be reported as approximations. Not only are their systems dynamic in that users are added and deleted based on need, security concerns over exact numbers prevent their release.)

The existence of such a system is considered to be a major departure in how law enforcement intelligence is disseminated and stored. Various databases such as Gangnet and Drugnet were in existence, yet none provided the case management and data capabilities that Threatnet does. Additionally, this was the first database of its kind to allow the multiple functionalities to include placing a piece of intelligence into the system in one region with the capability of notification and follow-up in another region. At any point in time, all intelligence information relating to domestic security in Florida will pass through Threatnet.

The implementation of policy is another measure of effective change in law enforcement intelligence operations. Prior to 09/11/2001, 68.4% of the respondents indicated their agency had some type of policy or directive relating to criminal intelligence. After 09/11/2001, that rose to 82.1%. This indicates agencies recognized the need to formalize the process for how intelligence is collected and disseminated. 58 of the 80 respondents to the survey indicated that their agencies amended one or more policies as a direct result of 09/11/2001. Equipment issuance and usage was the number one policy change with 70.7% of these respondents indicating a change. Physical security issues were reported changed by 58.6% of the respondents and intelligence and task force membership policy changes were each reported as being changed by 55.2% of the agencies.

Newly created polices were affected similarly. 44 out of 80 agencies indicated they had newly formed policies with 63.6% reporting that criminal intelligence was one of their new policies. Task force membership and equipment usage followed with 59.1% and 47.7% respectively.

Policies guide the agency in their operations. Any change or addition to policy has the potential to create subtle and even major attitude and perception changes for the individual officer and for the agency. Law enforcement officers draw their cues regarding the philosophy of the agency from policy and leadership of its command. If policy reflects the importance of an issue, that weight will be carried down to the elements completing the missions of the agency.

Information sharing is key to the intelligence process. However, the information has to be timely, vetted and relative to the dissemination. Perhaps the largest problem facing law enforcement intelligence operatives prior to 09/11/2001 was the perception of how information should be handled. Agencies tended to hold on to a piece of information because of several misguided ideas. First, many agencies did not fully understand the intelligence process and how it can be utilized to drive operations. Secondly, they did not understand the vetting process that must occur to ensure information is accurate before being released. An agency may have the concern that their information may be held against them if it is found to be inaccurate. Finally, the networks for dissemination of this information simply did not exist to the levels that they do today.

Chief Zadra echoed these concerns when he discussed the Threatcom notification system in place at FDLE. He stated there are approximately 3,000 users currently subscribed to the Threatcom system that have access to instant messages that are delivered via the Internet and to other wireless devices that the user can adapt to their needs (M. Zadra, personal communication, March 09, 2005).

Chief Zadra indicated it was important that information be subject to the vetting process prior to release, and it is more critical that it be timely and easily accessible. He stated there are currently between 600 and 700 daily recipients of the Domestic Security Task Force Daily Brief who then in turn, re-release the information based on their individual agency needs and policies. He indicated that information flow has and will continue to be one of the largest changes we have witnessed, especially in Florida. (M. Zadra, personal communication, March 09, 2005)

With the implementation of the NCISP, for the first time the United States has a comprehensive plan that provides a blueprint for best practices within the law enforcement intelligence community. This plan does not provide absolutes for how an individual agency chooses to handle intelligence, but rather a common set of standards and guiding principles that create a foundation. (See Appendix D).

Ms. Ragans indicated the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) through OJP has created 28 recommendations and action items for how criminal intelligence information can be more evenly shared. This is truly the first comprehensive document of its type. She created the analogy that the NCISP and its components are similar to that of a building code. It creates standards as to how the building is built so that all are buildings are essentially similar in their construction. What goes on the outside is up to each individual who is part of that system. If all partners build their building to the same standard, then a level of security is created which in turn fosters trust and promotes communication. (D. Ragans, personal communication, March 09, 2005)

One final indicator of how intelligence operations have begun to change is the implementation of the DOJ Global Justice Extensible Markup Language (XML) Data Model (Global JXDM). The Global JXDM is a comprehensive product that includes a data model, a data dictionary, and an XML schema that together is known as the Global JXDM.

The Global JXDM is an XML standard designed specifically for criminal justice information exchanges, providing law enforcement, public safety agencies, prosecutors, public defenders, and the judicial branch with a tool to effectively share data and information in a timely manner. The Global JXDM removes the burden from agencies to independently create exchange standards, and because of its extensibility, there is more flexibility to deal with unique agency requirements and changes. Through the use of a common vocabulary that is understood system to system, Global JXDM enables access from multiple sources and reuse in multiple applications (OJP website 2005).

The Federal government acknowledges the importance of the Global JXDM. In fact, it was recently announced that local agencies that are creating information/intelligence systems using grant funds from DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security, must conform to the standards of the Global JXDM, as part of the grant criteria. Never before has there been the requirement to do this. Agencies are not resisting this requirement as they had in the past and are actually embracing the technology and leadership. Even in the early stages of this program, numerous success stories already exist documenting the power of sharing information via this XML standard (D. Ragans, personal communication, March 09, 2005).

Conclusion

The attacks of 09/11/2001 provided law enforcement with a daunting task- to change or be changed. Never before had such a series of crimes been perpetrated on American soil. Both federal and local law enforcement officials were caught unaware by these attacks and change was not only necessary, it was inevitable. It is unfortunate that the dynamic and sweeping changes made in law enforcement intelligence operations will always have the connotation of being born from this tragedy. Conversely, the ideas and technology that have guided us through this re-creation of thinking will be with law enforcement for years to come.

If we measure change only by the one single most important idea of mindset of officers and agencies, then no doubt exists as to the breadth of change that has occurred since these attacks. Without the necessary openness to accept change, the successes in networking, intelligence sharing and cooperative efforts such as RDSTF in Florida could not have been possible.

In terms of cooperative efforts, the NCISP and the development of the Global Project are monumental in the necessary steps to create and maintain positive change. In May 2004, former Attorney General (AG) John Ashcroft formally announced and endorsed the NCISP. AG Ashcroft also formally established the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council in May 2004 to provide recommendations and advice in connection with the implementation and refinement of the NCISP. The CICC members serve as advocates for local law enforcement and support their efforts to develop and share criminal intelligence for the purpose of promoting public safety and securing our nation. In addition, President George W. Bush has recommended $6.2 million in his 2006 budget for implementation of the NCISP.. Being recognized by the President and having funds appropriated specially for the NCISP, is an important step towards realizing permanent change. (D. Ragans, personal communication, March 09, 2005)

Currently, Global is working towards further developing the Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards for United States Law Enforcement and Other Criminal Justice Agencies. These standards are being developed to create training components for all levels of law enforcement as identified in the NCISP, to include chiefs, officers, analysts and trainers.

As previously stated, the true measure of our change in this arena may not be realized until our preparedness is tested again. Ms. Ragans stated that one of the guiding principles behind their work is the idea that "knowledge is power" (D. Ragans, personal communication, March 09, 2005). The power of the knowledge is truly created only when it is shared.

The productive steps taken in evaluating our intelligence process have been widespread and in some instances, painfully simple. Previously, oversights that we failed to realize were occurring around us. The attitude and mindset of how we do business continues to be the primary tool that has affected our change. Change will continue to occur and grow in a positive manner as long as we do not once again allow our complacency to become our arrogance.

Captain David Pate is a 17 year veteran of law enforcement, having served with both state and local agencies. He is currently assigned to the Office of Inspector General with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission. His assignments have included criminal investigations, intelligence, special operations and domestic security. He currently serves on the Executive Board of the Florida Intelligence Unit and has remained active in domestic security and intelligence issues facing the state of Florida. David has a Bachelor's degree in Public Administration from Barry University.

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Appendix A



Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative Organizational Structure

U.S. Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative
Global Advisory Committee (GAC)
Global Executive Steering Committee (GESC)
Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG)
Connectivity/ Systems Committee
Training/Outreach Committee
Policy/Standands Committee
Privacy Committee
Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC)
Global Security Working Group (GSWG)
Global Security Architecture Committee
Global Web Services Security Committee
Global Infrastructure/ Standards Working Group (GISWG)
Global XML Structure Task Force (GXSTF)
Services Committee
Registries Committee
Standards Committee
Global Privacy and Information Quality Working Group (GPIQWG)
Global Special Events and Projects
Global Outreach Committee
Rev. 1/14/05

Appendix B

Membership Survey Florida Intelligence Unit
January-March, 2005

These questions relate to law enforcement intelligence operations. For the purposes of this survey, the terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on 09/11/2001 are simply referred to as “09/11/2001.” This survey deals with operational, organizational and policy change and development, and this date will be referred to regularly throughout the survey.

This survey is intended to be completed only by local and state law enforcement professionals who are assigned to agencies that may have been affected by the events of 09/11/2001. The survey is designed so that it may be completed by line employees through command level personnel. Please forward this survey to the most appropriate division/section/unit in your agency so that your agency may be included. It is requested that only one representative from your agency complete the survey.

If you represent a federal law enforcement agency, please do not complete this survey.

If you need assistance with the survey, or have questions about the applicability of the survey to you or your agency, please contact David Pate at david.pate@myfwc.com.

Thank you,

Captain David Pate
Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission

1) What type of law enforcement agency do you represent?
    a. Municipal
    b. County
    c. State

2) Agency Name

3) Agency Size (sworn members only)
    a. 0-50
    b. 51-100
    c. 101-200
    d. 201-300
    e. 301-400
    f. 401-500
    g. 500 or more

4) Does your agency have a structured criminal intelligence unit/function/group?
    a. Yes
    b. No

5) How many sworn personnel are assigned to this unit/function/group?

6) How many non-sworn personnel are assigned to this unit/function/group?

7) Did this unit/group exist prior to 09/11/2001?
    a. Yes
    b. No

8) Has this function grown since 09/11/2001?
    a. Yes
    b. No (Skip to Question # 11)

9) If your intelligence unit/group/function has increased, what is the number of sworn personnel?

10) If your intelligence unit/group/function has increased, what is the number of non-sworn personnel?

11) Does your agency provide any full-time personnel to one of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF)?
    a. Yes
    b. No (Skip to question # 13)

12) What is the total number of personnel (sworn and non-sworn combined) assigned to a RDSTF by your agency?

13) Does your agency have one or more members who are cross-designated as an Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agent?
    a. Yes
    b. No

14) Does your agency participate in a RDSTF or Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) on a full or part-time basis?
    a. Yes
    b. No

15) Did your agency participate (on either a full or part-time basis) on a JTTF or similar task force prior to 09/11/200?
    a. Yes
    b. No

16) Prior to 09/11/2001, did your agency have a policy, procedure or general order relating to the collection, dissemination and maintenance of criminal intelligence information?
    a. Yes
    b. No

17) Does your agency currently have a policy, procedure or general order relating to the collection, dissemination and maintenance of criminal intelligence information?
    a. Yes
    b. No

18) Post 09/11/2001, were any additions made to your policy, procedure or general order relating to criminal intelligence?
    a. Yes
    b. No

19) Prior to 09/11/2001, did your criminal intelligence policy conform to CFR 28 Part 23?
    a. Yes
    b. No
    c. N/A Did not have a policy prior to 09/11/2001

20) Does your agency have a Homeland Security, Domestic Security or other related unit that has one or more full-time members?
    a. Yes
    b. No (Skip to question #23)

21) If yes, how many full-time members are assigned to this unit?

22) If your agency created/formed a Domestic Security/Homeland Security unit post 09/11/2001, where did the funding originate from to create/staff/maintain this unit? (Select all that apply.)
    a. Existing budget
    b. Non-recurring grant
    c. Re-allocation of block or other grants
    d. Donations
    e. Private/Public partnership
    f. Other (specify)

23) Does your agency have a volunteer/reserve/auxiliary Domestic/Homeland Security or other related unit that has one or more members?
    a. Yes
    b. No (Skip to question #25)

24) If this volunteer unit was created post 09/11/2001, where did the funding originate from to create/staff/maintain this unit? (Select all that apply.)
    a. Existing budget
    b. Non-recurring grant
    c. Re-allocation of block or other grants
    d. Donations
    e. Private/Public partnership
    f. Other (specify)

25) Since 09/11/2001, has your agency received funding from any source that was used for any issue relating to domestic security? Issues relating to domestic security can include, but are not limited to; target hardening; staffing; equipment and training.
   a. Yes
   b. No

26) Provide the total number of new sworn and non-sworn employees that have been added to your agency as a result of issues arising from 09/11/2001. If your agency has not added any new employees under these conditions, please answer "0."

27) Has your agency made any organizational shifts or changes to existing personnel that can be directly attributed to 09/11/2001?
   a. Yes
   b. No (Skip to question #30)

28) If an organizational change occurred relating to personnel movements, shifts or reassignments, how many total employees were impacted?

29) If an organizational change occurred relating to personnel movements, shifts or reassignments, what is your estimation of the percentage of employees affected within your agency? (I.E.-10 employees affected in a 200 person agency = a 5% rate of affected employees.)

30) Did your agency amend or update any existing policies/procedures/ general orders as a direct result of 09/11/2001?
   a. Yes
   b. No (Skip to question #32)

31) Check the policy areas that were impacted by these amended policies/procedures/general orders. (Select all that apply.)
   a. Patrol procedures
   b. Criminal investigations
   c. Crime prevention
   d. Intelligence operations
   e. Special operations (SWAT, EOD, Air, Mounted, Marine)
   f. Physical security
   g. Task force membership/MOU
   h. Equipment issuance and usage
   i. Other (Specify)

32) Did your agency create any new policies/procedures/general orders as a direct result of 09/11/2001?
   a. Yes
   b. No (Skip to question #34)

33) Check the policy areas that were impacted by these newly created policies/procedures/general orders. (Select all that apply.)
    a. Patrol procedures
    b. Criminal investigations
    c. Crime prevention
    d. Intelligence operations
    e. Special operations (SWAT, EOD, Air, Mounted, Marine)
    f. Physical security
    g. Task force membership/MOU
    h. Equipment issuance and usage
    i. Other (Specify)

34) Does your agency have any members who are subscribed to the FDLE Threatcom system?
    a. Yes
    b. No

35) Does your agency have any members who are trained in the use of and have access to the FDLE Threatnet system?
    a. Yes
    b. No

36) Are you aware of an initiative, or any of its components, within the federal government commonly referred to as "The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan?"
    a. Yes
    b. No (Skip to question # 38)

37) How did you hear of this initiative?
    a. Mainstream media
    b. DOJ website or information outlet
    c. Intelligence networking meeting (FIU, etc.)
    d. IIR/RISS training session
    e. Agency/survey respondent is a workgroup/focus group participant
    f. Other (Specify)

38) Is your agency currently a member of the Florida Intelligence Unit?
    a. Yes (skip to question #40)
    b. No

39) If you would like for a representative of the Florida Intelligence Unit to contact you regarding membership, please submit your e-mail address.

40) If you would like to receive the results of this survey via-e-mail, please submit your e-mail address below.

Appendix C


Agency size (sworn members only)
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
15
13
12
7
7
7
18
0-50
51-100
101-200
201-300
301-400
401-500
500 or more
▭ Agency size (sworn members only) Response Total


Does your agency have a structured criminal intelligence unit/function/group?
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
58
21
Yes
No (Skip to question #7)
▭ Does your agency have a structured criminal intelligence unit/function/group? Response Total


Has this function grown since 09/11/2001?
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
31
37
10
Yes
No (Skip to question #11)
N/A-This unit/function/group does not exist in our agency. (Skip to question #11)
▭ Has this function grown since 09/11/2001? Response Total


Did this unit/group exist prior to 09/11/2001?
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
45
18
14
Yes
No
N/A-This unit/function/group does not exist in our agency.
Did this unit/group exist prior to 09/11/2001? Response Total


Has this function grown since 09/11/2001?
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
31
37
10
Yes
No (Skip to question #11)
N/A-This unit/function/group does not exist in our agency. (Skip to question #11)
Has this function grown since 09/11/2001? Response Total


Does your agency provide any full-time personnel to one of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Regional Domestic SecurityTask Force (RDSTF)?
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
26
51
Yes
No (Skip to question #13)
Does your agency provide any full-time personnel to one of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Regional Domestic SecurityTask Force (RDSTF)? Response Total


Does your agency have one or more members who are cross-designated as an Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agent?
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
32
46
Yes
No
■ Does your agency have one or more members who are cross-designated as an Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agent? Response Total


Does your agency participate in a RDSTF or Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) on a full or part-time basis?
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
55
22
Yes
No
■ Does your agency participate in a RDSTF or Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) on a full or part-time basis? Response Total


Did your agency participate (on either a full or part-time basis) on a JTTF or similar task force prior to 09/11/2001?
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
18
60
Yes
No
■ Did your agency participate (on either a full or part-time basis) on a JTTF or similar task force prior to 09/11/2001? Response Total


Prior to 09/11/2001 did your agency have a policy procedure or general order relating to the collection dissemination and maintenance of criminal intelligence information?


Does your agency currently have a policy procedure or general order relating to the collection dissemination and maintenance of criminal intelligence information?


Post 09/11/2001 w ere any additions made to your policy procedure or general order relating to criminal intelligence?


Does your agency have a Homeland Security Domestic Security or other related unit that has one or more full-time members?
43
42
41
40
39
38
37
36
35
34
37
42
Yes
No (Skip to question #23)
Does your agency have a Homeland Security Domestic Security or other related unit that has one or more full-time members? Response Total


If your agency created/formed a Domestic Security/Homeland Security unit post 09/11/2001 where did the funding originate from to create/staff/maintain this unit?
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
25
2
3
0
0
1
3
Existing budget
Non-recurring grant
Recurring Grant
Re-allocation of block or other grants
Donations
Private/Public partnership
Other (please specify)
If your agency created/formed a Domestic Security/Homeland Security unit post 09/11/2001 where did the funding originate from to create/staff/maintain this unit? (Select all that apply.) Response Total


Does your agency have a volunteer/reserve/auxiliary Domestic/Homeland Security or other related unit that has one or more members?
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
8
67
Yes
No (Skip to question #25)
Does your agency have a volunteer/reserve/auxiliary Domestic/Homeland Security or other related unit that has one or more members? Response Total


If this volunteer unit was created post 09/11/2001 where did the funding originate from to create/staff/maintain this unit?
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
4
1
2
1
0
0
0
Existing budget
Non-recurring grant
Recurring Grant
Re-allocation of block or other grants
Donations
Private/Public partnership
Other (please specify)
If this volunteer unit was created post 09/11/2001 where did the funding originate from to create/staff/maintain this unit? (Select all that apply.) Response Total


Has your agency made any organizational shifts or changes to existing personnel that can be directly attributed to 09/11/2001?
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
30
45
Yes
No (Skip to question #30)
Has your agency made any organizational shifts or changes to existing personnel that can be directly attributed to 09/11/2001? Response Total


Did your agency amend or update any existing policies/procedures/general orders as a direct result of 09/11/2001?
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
58
18
Yes
No (Skip to question #32)
□ Did your agency amend or update any existing policies/procedures/general orders as a direct result of 09/11/2001? Response Total


Check the policy areas that w ere impacted by theses amended policies/procedures/general orders.
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
24
22
12
32
28
34
32
41
7
Patrol procedures
Criminal investigations
Crime prevention
Intelligence operations
Special operations
Physical security
Task force membership/MOU
Equipment issuance and
Other (please specify)
□ Check the policy areas that w ere impacted by theses amended policies/procedures/general orders. (Select all that apply.) Response Total


Did your agency create any new policies/procedures/general orders as a direct result of 09/11/2001?
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
43
32
Yes
No (Skip to question #34)
□ Did your agency create any new policies/procedures/general orders as a direct result of 09/11/2001? Response Total


Check the policy areas that were impacted by these newly created policies/procedures/general orders.
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
17
17
9
28
20
22
21
26
4
Patrol procedures
Criminal investigations
Crime prevention
Intelligence operations
Special operations (SWAT, EOD, Air,
Physical security
Task force membership/MOU
Equipment issuance and
Other (please specify)
Check the policy areas that were impacted by these newly created policies/procedures/general orders. (Select all that apply.) Response Total


Does your agency have any members w ho are subscribed to the FDLE ThreatCom system?
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
61
15
Yes
No
Does your agency have any members w ho are subscribed to the FDLE ThreatCom system? Response Total


Does your agency have any members w ho are trained in the use of and have access to the FDLE ThreatNet system?
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
60
15
Yes
No
Does your agency have any members w ho are trained in the use of and have access to the FDLE ThreatNet system? Response Total

Appendix D



10 Simple Steps

to help your agency become a part of the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan*

Revised November 2004

Working towards systematically sharing law enforcement information among local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies—large or small

1. **Recognize your responsibilities and lead by example**
Recognize the value of sharing intelligence information within your own agency, and encourage the practice of sharing information with other law enforcement and public safety agencies. Use the guidelines and action steps outlined in the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan* ("Plan") to implement or enhance your organization's intelligence function.

2. **Establish a mission statement and a policy to address developing and sharing information and intelligence data within your agency**
The Plan provides model policies and guidelines for implementing or reviewing an agency's intelligence function. Examples include Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies federal regulation 28 CFR Part 23, the International Association of Chiefs of Police's *Criminal Intelligence Model Policy,* and the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit's (LEIU) *Criminal Intelligence File Guidelines.*

3. **Connect to your state criminal justice network and regional intelligence databases, and participate in information sharing initiatives**
Many states provide access to other government databases, including motor vehicles, corrections, and others. Regional intelligence databases and sharing initiatives promote communication and collaboration by providing access to other agencies' and organizations' investigative and intelligence data.

4. **Ensure privacy issues are protected in policy and practice**
The protection of individuals' privacy and constitutional rights is an obligation of government officials and is crucial to the long-term success of criminal intelligence sharing. The Plan provides guidelines that support policies which will protect privacy and constitutional rights while not hindering the intelligence process. Implementing and supporting privacy policies and practices within your agency will also reduce your organization's liability concerns.

5. **Access law enforcement Web sites, subscribe to law enforcement listservs, and use the Internet as an information resource**
Many Web sites on the Internet and others on closed networks provide valuable intelligence assessments and news. Listservs provide instant and widespread communication for investigators. Listservs allow both the receipt and distribution of intelligence information. The Internet provides a wealth of open-source information, including government information and access to private agencies that share with law enforcement.

6. **Provide your agency members with appropriate training on the criminal intelligence process**
Some training models or modules are already found in Internet-based and interactive CD-ROMs, such as the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA), National White Collar Crime Center, and LEIU "Turn Key Intelligence." A listing of available intelligence training sources and specifically scheduled classes is found on the IALEIA Web site: www.ialeia.org. This listing allows individuals to directly contact training source agencies and organizations for more information on classes and schedules.

7. **Become a member of your in-region Regional Information Sharing Systems® (RISS) center**
RISS operates the only secure Web-based nationwide network for communication and exchange of criminal intelligence information by local, state, federal, and tribal participating law enforcement member agencies. RISS partners with other law enforcement systems to electronically connect them to RISSNET™, including High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Investigative Support centers and other federal and state agency systems.

8. **Become a member of the FBI's Law Enforcement Online (LEO) system**
The FBI's LEO system is a sensitive but unclassified, real-time information sharing communications system for all levels of the law enforcement community and available at no cost to its 33,000 users. LEO provides secure e-mail capability, a national alert mechanism, and access to over 125 special-interest groups for sharing information by providing access to other networks, systems, databases, and other services.

9. **Partner with public and private infrastructure sectors**
Regular communication with the entities that control America's critical infrastructures such as energy, agriculture, transportation, and shipping is critically important to ensuring the safety and security of the citizens in your community.

10. **Participate in local, state, and national intelligence organizations**
In most areas of the country, there are locally based intelligence organizations that welcome participation from all agencies and are often affiliated with state and national organizations.