1   MARJORY STONEMAN DOUGLAS HIGH SCHOOL
              PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISSION MEETING
2

3   BB&T CENTER
4   CHAIRMAN'S CLUB
5   1 PANTHER PARKWAY
6   SUNRISE, FLORIDA 33323
7

8   April 10, 2019
9   8:00 A.M. - 6:30 P.M.
10

11   APPEARANCES:
     COMMISSION MEMBERS/ATTENDEES:
12   SHERIFF BOB GUALTIERI - CHAIR
     JASON JONES - PSC GENERAL COUNSEL
13   CHRIS NELSON - CHIEF OF POLICE, CITY OF AUBURNDALE
     BRUCE BARTLETT - CHIEF ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY,
14   SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
     RICHARD SWEARINGEN - COMMISSIONER FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
15   OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
     MAX SCHACHTER - VICTIM PARENT
16   LARRY ASHLEY - SHERIFF, OKALOOSA COUNTY
     MELISSA LARKIN SKINNER - CEO, CENTERSTONE OF FLORIDA
17   MARY MAYHEW - SECRETARY AHCA
     CHAD POPPELL - SECRETARY DCF
18   DAVID MICA - DCF CHIEF OF STAFF
     SOMONE MARSTILLER - SECRETARY DJJ
19   JACOB OLIVIA - EVC OF K-12 PUBLIC SCHOOLS
     MIKE CARROLL - FORMER SECRETARY DCF
20   JAMES HARPRING - UNDERSHERIFF/GC, INDIAN RIVER
     COUNTY
21   PAM STEWART - COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
     GRADY JUDD - SHERIFF, POLK COUNTY
22   DOUGLAS DODD - SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, CITRUS COUNTY
     LAUREN BOOK - SENATOR, DISTRICT 32 (ABSENT)
23   RYAN PETTY - VICTIM PARENT
     MARSHA POWERS - SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, MARTIN COUNTY
24   KEVIN LYSTAD - PRESIDENT, FLORIDA POLICE CHIEF ASSOC
     CHRISTINA LINTON - COMMISSION STAFF, FDLE
25

1   (Thereupon, the meeting is called to order:)

2   CHAIR: Good morning, everybody. Welcome

3   back to day two. Before we get started here

4   this morning, I want to recognize Mr.

5   Schachter, and he'd like us to have a moment of

6   silence. So, Mr. Schachter.

7   COMM. SCHACHTER: Yes, thank you, Sheriff.

8   As we, you know, are conducting our second day

9   here, I'd like all of the Commissioners to

10   keep, keep in their hearts, and remember the

11   victims of the Columbine shooting. The

12   anniversary is coming up this month. It is

13   April 20, 2013. Beautiful souls lost their

14   lives that day, and another twenty were

15   wounded. And also, we have another,

16   unfortunately, horrible anniversary of the

17   Santa Fe High School massacre. April 18th is

18   the one-year anniversary, so I want to keep

19   those victims in our hearts, and also the

20   families. Ten people died, and thirteen were

21   wounded that day. So twenty years that we've

22   been doing this, so hopefully our efforts will

23   prevent that from happening again. Thank you

24   very much, Sheriff.

25   CHAIR: Okay, thank you, Mr. Schachter.

1   I'd like to welcome DCF Secretary Chad Poppell

2   here today. We said he couldn't be here

3   yesterday because of his confirmation hearing,

4   but we appreciate you being here today, and

5   thank you. And I know Commissioner Dodd has a

6   school board meeting yesterday and couldn't be

7   here, so thanks for making it down today. I

8   know that Commissioner Powers will be here,

9   she's just running a little bit late this

10   morning.

11   A couple things to get us started here

12   this morning. The first thing I just want to

13   follow up on from yesterday, Sheriff Judd, it's

14   a question you had, and I just want to make

15   sure that we're all clear on this. Harold, if

16   you would go to -- and here's the question we

17   had, and it's an excellent point and question,

18   as I said in all of this presentation yesterday

19   is that all of this is paraphrasing, and it's,

20   as when you read any Bill you've got to read it

21   in total, and you've got to read the different

22   parts, and sometimes if you just read one

23   section by itself, or if you're just reading

24   one line, especially when it's paraphrased, it

25   doesn't give you a full and complete

1   understanding.

2   And that's what happened here, because the

3   issue was between Lines 136 and 179, and the

4   concern was about the Guardian Program, and the

5   Sheriff certifying the guardians, and then the

6   superintendent being able to assign people, and

7   whether it was conditioned upon them, the

8   guardians successfully completing and the

9   sheriffs certifying, and it absolutely is, but

10   I want, it's important enough just to clarify

11   it so that this doesn't need to go back to the

12   legislature, and it's all where it needs to be

13   in the Bill, but again here it appears to be,

14   it could have been a problem.

15   Here -- and I want to just quote it for

16   you, because on Line 140 it uses the term

17   complete, and throughout that it uses

18   successfully complete, so what that means is,

19   is that the people have to complete, and

20   successfully complete the Guardian Program, and

21   of course the training entity, which is the

22   Sheriff, is responsible for making that

23   determination. And there are specific

24   standards in there about qualification, and the

25   percentage which they have to qualify, and the

1   other exit points, which would be defensive

2   tactics, and all the requirements of the

3   training.

4   And then what it says on Line 178, and

5   this gets to the crux of this, it says any such

6   certified school guardian may be appointed by a

7   superintendent, so the superintendent doesn't

8   get to appoint to a school unless the Sheriff

9   certifies, and you have the discretion not to

10   certify if they don't meet the training

11   requirements. So that's what it says in there,

12   but I wanted to clarify that. And I know we

13   got some inquiries yesterday because members of

14   the legislature and their staff are watching

15   and wanted to know if that needed to be fixed,

16   and it doesn't need to be, it's clear. So I

17   just wanted -- Sheriff, I just want to point

18   that out.

19   SHER. JUDD: Okay. That still doesn't

20   complete my concern, because the way the system

21   is now we can look at the backgrounds of the

22   individual and say we're not going to put them

23   in the certification process, but at, when you

24   take 179 literally, and maybe, maybe to your

25   point you can't do that, it says at the

1   superintendent's discretion a guardian may be

2   appointed to a school.

3   Now, of course, it's already a guardian --

4   CHAIR: No.

5   SHER. JUDD: No, no, by, by 179 it is.

6   CHAIR: Yeah, don't -- don't read that.

7   In fact I probably shouldn't have put that up

8   there, because you got to go read the Bill.

9   And so I was just pointing out what we were

10   talking about, because that unfortunately is

11   just a paraphrase, and you really got to read

12   the Bill itself.

13   SHER. JUDD: Okay. But my point is you

14   said that we have to certify them, but what if

15   the school board sends us somebody we disagree

16   with, but they can appropriately complete the

17   training? They can complete the training, but

18   we look at that individual and go -- I look at

19   their background that we complete in addition

20   to --

21   CHAIR: You don't have to put anybody in

22   your training you don't want to put in the

23   training.

24   SHER. JUDD: That's correct.

25   CHAIR: Right.

1   SHER. JUDD: But does -- but does it give

2   us that latitude, because if they give us

3   someone and say this is our employee, they

4   passed our background, we're sending them to

5   you to be put through the training, and they

6   can pass the training, do we have the latitude

7   to look at the extended background from our

8   perspective and say, that's great, but we're

9   not putting them in the training?

10   CHAIR: Nothing in that respect that is in

11   the law now has changed. The only thing that

12   it's saying is, is that if, if you accept them,

13   and if you put them into the training, and if

14   they successfully complete and then you certify

15   them, so all those ifs come to fruition, then

16   the decision about what school they go to is

17   not your decision, or mine, or anybody else,

18   it's the superintendent if they go to X school

19   or Y school.

20   SHER. JUDD: Yeah, and I couldn't agree

21   with that more because it's the

22   superintendent's employee at that point.

23   CHAIR: Exactly. So that's the only thing

24   this changes.

25   SHER. JUDD: My -- my only concern is

1   that, because we had some, and it was well

2   meaning, there was no sinister motive, but we

3   had some that the school board said, well, what

4   do you mean you're, you know, their fine, their

5   fine, and we go, no, they're not fine, and

6   we're not going to put them into the training.

7   So I just want to make sure that we don't lose

8   that ability to say they may be fine to you,

9   they may be able to pass the training, but I

10   can't be forced to train them if I look at them

11   and go I'm not going to certify them to have a

12   gun on a campus near a kid.

13   CHAIR: And of course I wholeheartedly

14   agree with that. I don't see anything in this

15   Bill that changes that, so I think that's a, I

16   think that's a very important component of

17   this, because I think that the reason that the

18   Guardian Program has been so successful, and

19   there's close to 800 people around the state

20   that have been trained as guardians, and very

21   few if any incidents, is because of the

22   selection process and the training process.

23   If it wasn't a rigorous process where we

24   are weeding people out, and doing our due

25   diligence on the front end, we wouldn't have

1   the success that we're having. And it's a

2   credit to that selection and decision making

3   process, and the training process, and not

4   everybody that gets into the training passes.

5   It's certainly not a rubber stamp. And so we

6   want to continue that, because we want the

7   program to maintain, and even enhance its

8   quality, so I think that this, that's an

9   absolute essential component of it.

10   So, Commissioner Dodd, go ahead.

11   COMM. DODD: Once the Sheriff certifies

12   the guardian then it's the superintendent's

13   decision as far as the assignment in the --

14   CHAIR: Yes, that's what we're saying.

15   And we all concur with that, as it should be.

16   And this just makes it clearer. And this --

17   this modification request came I believe from

18   FADS, from the Florida Association of District

19   Superintendents, because they wanted to make

20   sure that they had that discretion within their

21   district as it, as it relates to their

22   employees, which I don't think anybody quarrels

23   with that, is that once, once they get the

24   person back, and the person has been certified,

25   and gone through the process, that they get to

1   decide whether it's School A or School B, and

2   that's all that, that's all that comes down to.

3   SHER. JUDD: Well, even if you read 179 on

4   its face, they're not a guardian until we

5   certify them as a guardian.

6   CHAIR: Correct. Correct. Correct,

7   absolutely. They are not a guardian until you

8   certify them. If you don't certify them -- if

9   you don't certify them --it's very clear in

10   reading the, in the reading of the Bill, if you

11   don't certify them there is nobody for the

12   superintendent to assign any place, so. All

13   right, so I think we're good with that. I know

14   that, again, that Bill will be up tomorrow in

15   the Senate, in appropriations.

16   As far as school goes for today, we're

17   running behind as far as the training

18   presentation we didn't get to yesterday because

19   of the robust discussions that we had, and the

20   worthwhile time spent on, on a number of

21   issues, including the 911 issue, so unless

22   there's any objection here's my thought, is, is

23   that we cut lunch short, down to a half hour,

24   just do it more or less of a working lunch, so

25   we'll break for lunch from 12:30 to 1:00, take

1   a break, get lunch, come back, and be back at

2   1:00, and we'll begin with the FDLE

3   presentation on reunification from 1:00 to

4   1:30, Captain Francis from Seminole on those

5   best practices from 1:30 to 2:00, and then

6   we'll do that training presentation from 2:00

7   until 3:00.

8   If you need to take a break at all just

9   take it on your own. We'll go from 3:00 to

10   about 4:30 with the mental health presentation,

11   and then we'll wrap things up around 4:30,

12   still getting us out of here at 5:00. So we'll

13   try and keep it on that schedule, if things

14   change then we'll have to adjust, but that's

15   the plan unless I hear any objection to that.

16   Okay.

17   The last thing before we get started this

18   morning, just the follow up from yesterday, and

19   just again I'm going to take time on it, but I

20   think it's worth getting out here for a second,

21   and have some brief discussion about it, is, is

22   that -- and I don't think we're ready to, for a

23   motion on this, or to really make a strong

24   recommendation on it, but in -- after the

25   discussion yesterday, and some discussion with

1   others last night who are stakeholders in this

2   community down here, and what I have seen over

3   the last year plus and recently with some of

4   these interviews, and some of the discussions,

5   the biggest, or one of the big issues that is

6   causing problems operationally within ORCAT and

7   its relationship with the cities, and with the

8   Sheriff's Office, is the management, the

9   management structure, and the governance

10   structure of ORCAT itself.

11   See, you've got a county entity that is

12   not a law enforcement entity, a fire entity, a

13   first responder entity that has no operational

14   responsibility at all, and as it was described

15   is, is that if you plug it in, it's theirs, but

16   if it breathes then it belongs to the, the

17   operating entity, which is the Broward

18   Sheriff's Office. And I don't think that there

19   can be any dispute that those lines are very

20   convoluted and blurred, and at least on the

21   sense of the people on the operations side, the

22   management company if you will, is dipping into

23   some water it shouldn't be dipping into, and

24   they are overextending their bounds and getting

25   into operational issues.

1   And it seems that this maybe ripe for a

2   restructuring if that governance, and that the

3   entire operation of it should go to the

4   Sheriff, and dissolve this ORCAT model where

5   you've got the county that is dabbling in areas

6   that by pretty much all accounts, from the Fire

7   Chiefs, the Police Chiefs, et cetera, the

8   operational side of it, that they have no

9   experience, and they shouldn't be in, and that

10   they're meddling in the operations that are

11   causing frustrations for everybody.

12   So if there is will it seems to me that

13   that would resolve a lot of this, and you'd

14   have again one entity that is ultimately

15   responsible, and I think generally speaking

16   it's good to have somebody that is accountable,

17   and somebody that's responsible, and an elected

18   official that's accountable in the Sheriff, and

19   to change those governance structure down here

20   to eliminate a lot of what is going on. And as

21   I sit and try and figure out what the next few

22   weeks are going to look like with discussions

23   with a whole bunch of people trying to, you

24   know, get this put together, is that it just

25   seems that it could be streamlined by retooling

1   the governance structure.

2   So I don't know if anybody has any

3   thoughts on that. I think it's premature at

4   this point for us to take a motion or make any

5   -- I think we need to hear from others in June.

6   As we said we're going to bring everybody in,

7   but after that it's something that would be

8   very ripe if there's concurrence, because

9   there's no question something has to change.

10   This cannot keep going the way it is and be

11   successful. People need to change,

12   personalities need to change, attitudes need to

13   change, perspectives need to change, or, and/or

14   the governance structure needs to change, and

15   by keeping it the way it is is not going to

16   produce a successful result.

17   We've been at this now for over a year,

18   I've seen the dynamics, the landscape, the

19   letters that are going back and forth, the

20   op-eds that are flying back and forth, and when

21   you're using words like distrust, and people

22   aren't getting along, something has to give,

23   and I would suggest that governance structure

24   is ripe for change. Sheriff, go ahead.

25   SHER. JUDD: We have a, and maybe most of

1   the law enforcement does, we have a system, a

2   training system in our county where I chair the

3   training committee that, that reports to not,

4   or recommends to the state college, our

5   different classes. Now, it's the state college

6   that owns it, but I chair it, and then every

7   criminal justice entity from the state attorney

8   to the public defender, to all the police

9   chiefs, sit on the committee, so we sit around

10   and have those kinds of discussion.

11   If we had a model similar to that, where

12   the Sheriff chaired it, the different police

13   chiefs that had a stake in it actually sat on

14   as a voting member, and then, so you get

15   everybody on board, everybody is responsible

16   for it so it's no longer parochial, the chief

17   making the vote in one city is equal to the

18   chief in another city, and the Sheriff chairs

19   the board, then whoever owns the equipment, you

20   know, whether or not they want to move that

21   over into the Sheriff's budget and hold them

22   accountable, or the committee has the authority

23   then to go to the board of county commissioners

24   and say, okay, you own the equipment, and we

25   need 100 radio replacements this year, we need

1   tower updates this year, the CAD system is due

2   for upgrade and maintenance, or whatever, you

3   know, and it's binding that the board of county

4   commissioners has to listen to that, then

5   you're good to go.

6   But I think if you get these chiefs on

7   board, and they have the authority, and the

8   Sheriff being the umbrella of having the county

9   wide authority chairs it, and everybody has a

10   stake in the game, and they can't point fingers

11   at each other because now they're all involved

12   in the process, I think it, I think it would

13   work. And -- and then you have -- and when I

14   say chiefs don't let me exclude fire too, I

15   mean they're --

16   CHAIR: Right. Oh, absolutely.

17   SHER. JUDD: Fire and -- fire and EMS.

18   But you -- you create a team from that, that

19   all has a stake, and they're all accountable

20   for it.

21   CHAIR: They've got something to that

22   affect now, and you heard Sergeant Suess talk

23   about it a little bit yesterday, called the

24   ORT, the operational review team. And so

25   they've got -- there are some components to

1   that governance structure that are good, and

2   go, Sheriff, to your point, and so the whole

3   thing doesn't need to be blown up and rebuilt,

4   but the overall accountability at the top I

5   think does, is my take at this juncture, and

6   that that should be something that those down

7   here should be giving some serious

8   consideration.

9   And discussion should be had on that

10   issue, because, you know, as we go through this

11   over the next month and half, and we all come

12   back together here in early June, and they're

13   all here, is, is that this thing has, this

14   thing has to get figured out, and we don't need

15   to be going through the rest of the summer, and

16   the rest of the year. This Hollywood radio

17   issue has to get figured out. Again, it's a

18   tied in issue, but it's a different issue, and

19   we've got to bring all this in for a landing,

20   and because it is affecting operations, it is

21   affecting public safety, and it's a real, real

22   issue and a problem.

23   So anyway those are just thoughts on it.

24   That's the message I want to get out there, is

25   that they need to start having that discussion,

1   and start thinking about that, and thinking

2   about a different way of doing business,

3   because the existing way is broken, it's not

4   working, and, you know, either change or fix

5   it. And I don't think that under the current

6   governance model, and the amount of animosity,

7   and tension, and resentment that I see, that it

8   can be fixed with the current model, and so I

9   think they can do it differently.

10   And that's my thought on it, and my

11   message is, to them is to start thinking about

12   it, and we'll be in touch here in the next week

13   or so, and we need to have some discussions

14   about this. And we're going to ask all these

15   people to come in here in June so you all can

16   hear from them, and you can ask your questions

17   directly of them, so. Anybody else got

18   anything before we move on?

19   SHER. JUDD: One thing. I suggested

20   yesterday that if the city commissioners in

21   Hollywood didn't fix this tower issue that we

22   should bring them in one at a time and ask them

23   why they don't want to serve their community,

24   to keep them safe. I read in the morning paper

25   that actually the board of county commissioners

1   with a eight of nine can make that designation,

2   so we may need to modify our letter to send it

3   to the board of county commissioners, and

4   invite them in one at a time to explain to us

5   why it is that it's more important to not have

6   a tower in a particular location than it is to

7   keep people safe.

8   The one commissioner who obviously spoke

9   for his self said he seemed to recognize it was

10   a sense of urgency, so maybe the, the people

11   that we need here that can ultimately make the

12   decision is, in addition to, or in place of

13   Hollywood, is the board of county

14   commissioners. But the people have a right to

15   know that the commission is -- and up to this

16   point the money is there. I'm told now, I read

17   the morning paper, $59 million, and yet we're,

18   we're squabbling over a tower site in order to

19   make sure that we can save people's lives in

20   Broward County, and their current pace is

21   unacceptable. So whatever mechanism you need

22   --

23   CHAIR: Yeah, I agree. And we'll look at

24   that and, and we'll leave it here, is, is that

25   people also have a right to know, and should

1   know, and there should be know -- and I got

2   questions from the media yesterday about this,

3   and I was kind of surprised because it shows

4   that there is a lack of knowledge about this,

5   and one of the questions I got yesterday was so

6   you mean, and it was right here, right in the

7   back of the room during one of the breaks, so

8   you mean that if there's another incident today

9   that radio throttling could happen again, it is

10   absolutely yes.

11   The public needs to know that. You know

12   that adage, and I've used it a few times, of do

13   what you've always done get what you've always

14   got, couldn't ring truer because nothing has

15   changed. And so if there is -- we don't want

16   there to be, of course, but if there is another

17   mass casualty event today in Broward County,

18   and you have a mass response from the Broward

19   County Sheriff's Office, the Broward County

20   Sheriff's Office deputies who are responding

21   will run into the same problem, there will be

22   throttling, there will be capacity issues, and

23   they won't be able to communicate, because it's

24   going to replicate itself. Why, because

25   nothing has changed since the airport shooting

1   in '17, or since Stoneman Douglas last year, so

2   how can you, how can you have a different

3   result. You can't.

4   And again like so many things when it's

5   not at the forefront, and that fire isn't

6   burning hot, is people tend to forget, and that

7   level of concern dissipates. We need to keep

8   that intensity there, and because the whole

9   idea was, remember originally this whole radio

10   replacement thing wasn't going to be until 2020

11   and later on, and because of concerns that we

12   raised and others they said, oh, we can move

13   this up, and we can get it done in 2019, then

14   you got the Tamarac roadblock, and now you got

15   the Hollywood roadblock.

16   But if something happens here people

17   shouldn't be surprised if you have another

18   debacle because nothing's changed on the radio.

19   And if SWAT teams and other first responder, if

20   they can't communicate, they are going to be

21   hampered, and hindered, and they're not going

22   to have as affective response as they need to,

23   it's just a fact, so we have instilled the

24   sense of urgency. And they can do it. Where

25   there's a will there's a way. We need to make

1   sure they got the will, because the way is

2   there, they just got to have the will to do it,

3   so.

4   SHER. JUDD: Well, one thing has changed.

5   The radio system is older now than it was then.

6   CHAIR: Right. That's true.

7   SHER. JUDD: And we have clearly seen a

8   lack of sense of urgency from the school

9   superintendent, the school system, the Broward

10   Sheriff's Office, and that's turned around with

11   the new Sheriff, and the board of county

12   commissioners, and Hollywood PD. And Tamarac

13   got on board, but what, what the message needs

14   to be, and it needs to be clear, is what are

15   you thinking. You've got first responders at

16   risk with the current system, you've got the

17   community at risk, you've got the, a situation

18   where the first responders with all their

19   training, and all their energy, and all their

20   will, cannot appropriate serve and protect, and

21   keep the people safe, and save lives in Broward

22   County, and you're sitting around wondering how

23   you can slow walk and stop a radio tower from

24   being placed.

25   It is 2019, and there needs to be a date

1   certain. And if the Motorola engineers say the

2   contract is signed, and we can get the radio

3   system in in 90 or 120 days, then someone at

4   the board of county commissioners, IE., the

5   chairman, needs to get a unanimous vote to say

6   do what you got to do to keep the people of

7   Broward County safe. It's not rocket science,

8   but it's much more important.

9   CHAIR: Commissioner Carroll, go ahead.

10   COMM. CARROLL: Just -- just to follow up,

11   because I think this community does have an

12   opportunity to regionalize this, but that

13   opportunity is slipping away from them. If

14   they don't upgrade technology, if they don't

15   build these towers, and if they don't fix the

16   governance structure, you're going to see this

17   system fractured, and fractured pretty quickly.

18   You already have Coral Springs not in, and you

19   already have Plantation not in, and they have

20   systems that are clearly better.

21   You have two other jurisdictions that now

22   want to contract with the folks that have

23   better systems. If they don't fix this, and

24   fix it now, you're going to end up with two, or

25   three, or four different systems in this

1   community, and the whole emphasis around

2   regionalization, and the opportunity to do

3   that, and have the people at the table, will be

4   gone.

5   So if folks in this community don't start

6   acting with the sense of urgency around these

7   issues, I don't think they're going to have an

8   opportunity to have a regionalized system a

9   year from now.

10   CHAIR: Good point. All right, so -- go

11   ahead, Sheriff.

12   SHER. ASHLEY: Off the subject. I was

13   going through some notes. During our

14   discussions about the guardians yesterday at

15   any point did we or the staff reach out and see

16   how many other states allow for school

17   personnel to be armed?

18   CHAIR: It's been done. It's out there.

19   I don't -- I don't know that number off the top

20   of my head.

21   SHER. ASHLEY: But -- but it's been

22   published somewhere that --

23   CHAIR: It's out there.

24   SHER. ASHLEY: Okay, thank you.

25   CHAIR: All right, so we're going to move

1   on with the first presentation we have this

2   morning, and it's an update on the Florida Safe

3   School Assessment Tool. Just to brief recap,

4   and for the new commission members, the Florida

5   Safe School Assessment Tool is now the

6   instrument that is to be used to assess

7   physical site security on every campus of every

8   K-12 school in Florida. And there's also a

9   district wide tool.

10   If you recall the legislature allocated

11   funding back in 2014 for an automated

12   instrument, and DOE contracted with a vendor to

13   come up with that automated instrument. When

14   we reviewed the instrument last year, it is a

15   confidential document for obvious reasons,

16   because it documents what's being done, and

17   also exposes vulnerabilities, is, is that we

18   know that there are certainly voids within

19   those documents, and within the structure of

20   those documents. And not only in the FSSAT

21   itself, but in the way that it was responded to

22   by the districts, and there were a whole bunch

23   of districts that just didn't do them, they

24   just didn't respond.

25   And if you recall the district wide one

1   was mandatory, but the school specific one was

2   optional, and you had a whole bunch of

3   districts that just weren't doing the school

4   specific one. I think in the last year before

5   it became mandatory there like 16 who did it

6   out of 4,000. And then you had some districts

7   that just weren't complying, even with the

8   district wide one. So in 7026 it became

9   mandatory for both, for the school specific one

10   and for the district wide one.

11   And even last year after it became

12   mandatory there were some issues about

13   compliance, so the legislature put into 7026,

14   they put in the funding for DOE to contract

15   with a consultant to evaluate the FSSAT, so the

16   first report that we're going to hear this

17   morning is from Simie Raiford with MGT

18   Consulting Group. They're the ones that did

19   that report of the current tool, and she's

20   going to talk about the results of that

21   assessment.

22   And then we're going to hear from Sylvia

23   Ifft with DOE, who is responsible for this

24   program with the FSSAT, and where it is going

25   to go in the path forward, and what the

1   districts can expect, and what improvements and

2   enhancements we're going to see with the FSSAT.

3   So with that we'll turn it over to you all and

4   hear your presentation.

5   PRESENTATION MGT CONSULTING GROUP - FSSAT

6   MS. RAIFORD: Good morning. I'm going to

7   begin by just sharing with you what our

8   presentation format will be, which first we'll

9   give you details on the process that we used to

10   conduct the study, and then we will share with

11   you the results, or our findings, and the

12   recommendations that resulted from them. So to

13   begin, we structured our approach to look at

14   three specific areas with regards to the tool.

15   One, the technical usability of the tool, the

16   user friendliness of it, and how well it

17   functions technologically.

18   Also the content of both the tool and the

19   content of the data that was collected through

20   the tool. And then finally we looked at the

21   implementation of the tool, and its use

22   throughout school districts and schools in

23   Florida. We also looked to see if the tool was

24   in alignment with current Florida law and

25   statutes, as well as a comparison of the tool

1   with national school safety standards and

2   security best practices.

3   So, in our findings, again, we will have

4   three areas, technical, which means we just

5   looked at the functionality of the platform;

6   when you opened it up does it work, can you

7   move through the tool without glitches, and so

8   forth. Two, the content of the tool itself,

9   the specific types of questions that were posed

10   in order to assess the security, and planning

11   related to school security, as well as other

12   data that was collected. And then also

13   implementation, related to how the tool was

14   actually used in schools, and from the

15   implementation of the training programs, as

16   well as the actions related to oversight and

17   accountability in terms of the legal

18   requirements for reporting.

19   So on the technical review our findings,

20   our positive findings, we did find that overall

21   the tool was very robust, and the

22   infrastructure supporting it was. We didn't

23   have a lot of reports of glitches or crashes

24   with the program. It did meet the Florida

25   Department of Education and end user

1   requirements. It did allow schools in

2   districts to give a lot of detailed

3   information, both on their schools, with a

4   fairly simple process. There is abundant

5   information that is collected by the tool, and

6   when we compare to what best practices would

7   dictate being the information that is collected

8   it did align with best practice, and that, that

9   information is very useful in preparing,

10   mitigating, preventing, and responding to

11   school events, and also for generating reports

12   very easily.

13   The tool is easy to navigate, in that you

14   can go in and there are search functions where

15   if you want to narrow your focus in terms of

16   one particular area of school safety you can

17   pull that out very easily without having to go

18   through the entire report. And it has a number

19   of helpful features and alerts built into the

20   system. And also there are a variety of very

21   useful applications for entering, and storing,

22   and analyzing, and referencing school and

23   district data. Again, the search ability, if

24   you want to quickly go through and look for a

25   specific school within a district you can do,

 1   you can find that information very easily and

 2   quickly.

 3   Adversely, under our technical review we

 4   found that there were some issues and some

 5   deficiencies that needed to be addressed in

 6   terms of information security with the tool,

 7   also in terms of the survey construction and

 8   response control. That led to the next issue,

 9   which was consistency in the data collected.

10   In some ways with the way the tool was

11   structured the what it was being requested can

12   be interpreted differently by different

13   readers.

14   The filter options, while they are robust,

15   the users reported that there were other

16   features that they would have to have seen

17   incorporated there. The automatically

18   generated content was lacking, as well as some

19   overall functionality. Again, once everybody

20   began to use the tool there were other ideas

21   that came up around how it could best be

22   utilized that, that were not currently within

23   the capability of the tool.

24   One of the common findings that we found

25   in terms of adverse findings was a requesting

1   for there to be a central repository and

2   storing of shared best practices, so each

3   school was uploading tools and, and forms, and

4   instruments, that they were using very

5   effectively in their districts, and as those

6   security officials talked to one another they

7   said, wow, we wish there was a way within the

8   tool that we could access this information from

9   across other systems, and currently there is

10   not that capability of doing so. And then we

11   also found a lack of a collaborative support

12   forum, again to share plans, to share

13   templates, because in many districts separate

14   from the tool, they had instruments that they

15   found very useful in their planning process.

16   So our recommendations were, one, to

17   increase the platform security systems and

18   protocols, and to revise the structure of the

19   survey so that they can gather more accurate

20   and robust data. To improve the user

21   experience, and the tool functionality, as well

22   as pre-populating boiler plate sections of the

23   assessment, meaning that information that does

24   not change from year to year to year, have that

25   remain in the tool so that they don't have to

1   supply it every year. And then create a

2   knowledge management system for sharing and

3   storing critical safety and security

4   information, so again it can also be a tool to

5   share best practices across the state.

6   So our next area of review was in terms of

7   the actual content of the tool, and we found

8   through our reviews is that officials reported

9   that it really does help them identify threats

10   and vulnerability and identify what the

11   appropriate safety controls should be in those

12   situations. The content is aligned with

13   Florida laws and statutes, as well as industry

14   standards throughout the country, and it does

15   provide an adequate explanation of its purpose

16   and the laws that govern it.

17   The risk assessment questions that we

18   reviewed met the concept of an all hazards

19   approach, and met all four parts of the USDOE

20   guidance, and it does contain best practices in

21   terms of practical information on crisis

22   planning.

23   The adverse findings. We didn't find that

24   there was a consistent number of questions for

25   given aspects of the tool, so it gave a false

1   sense that if there more questions in that

2   section that that section was more important

3   than other sections of the tool. There was

4   some content that was repeatedly reported by

5   local officials, that they fell outside of

6   common safety and security assessment

7   questions. There was some content that was

8   just repetitively collected in other reports,

9   and that would typically remain consistent year

10   to year. And then there was a lack of

11   collaborative content, or a collaborative

12   library, a comprehensive library of best

13   practices and templates.

14   So our recommendations for our content

15   review was to revise the content to collect

16   more robust information on safety and security

17   details of schools, so fewer questions, but

18   more in-depth questions, and include an

19   introductory explanation briefs to provide

20   users with the rationale for questions at each

21   section, because one of the things that, again

22   that we heard consistently, was the need for

23   explaining why this particular information is

24   collected, what's the use of it, and so forth,

25   so just to have that expressly written within

1   the tool.

2   CHAIR: Can you explain, when you're

3   talking about these findings and

4   recommendations are you talking about both the

5   district wide and the school specific, or is

6   there a differentiation?

7   MS. RAIFORD: No, it's the school reports

8   and the district reports. These

9   recommendations and findings go with both.

10   CHAIR: Okay, thanks.

11   MS. RAIFORD: So our recommendations on

12   content was to revise the content, I'm sorry --

13   and our final area was our implementation

14   review, and the positive findings that we had

15   there was that the tool did provide a snapshot

16   of where the schools currently are, the schools

17   and districts currently are in their state of

18   readiness for security incidents. The Office

19   of Safe Schools maintains a very robust open

20   lines of communication with the school district

21   personnel and is very responsive to requests.

22   That was a particularly strong finding here.

23   And that the Florida DOE Office of Safe Schools

24   also maintains close and regular contact with

25   the FSSAT provider Haystax in order to ensure

1   technical problems are addressed in the tool as

2   soon as they arise.

3   So our recommend -- the adverse findings

4   in terms of implementation was, consistently it

5   was reported a lack of sufficient training and

6   guidance for responding to questions that may

7   be subjective or open to multiple

8   interpretations. Currently there was no

9   apparent set process for providing feedback on

10   assessment results. In other words once the

11   information went, was submitted, districts

12   didn't get feedback, whether, you know, how to

13   assess how well they had responded to the

14   survey items.

15   There currently is not a provision for an

16   annual audit of the tool at the school level,

17   and again the opportunity to for feedback on

18   the tool is limited, so it requires currently

19   for the district or the school to e-mail

20   questions or concerns they may have, and it's

21   dependent on the users seeking out the

22   information. And also Haystax, the provider of

23   the tool, really their focus is on addressing

24   technical issues, not necessarily feedback or,

25   or issues around improvement of the tool, and

1   so forth.

2   So our implementation recommendations are

3   to provide user training and support that

4   offers new users just in time and ongoing

5   professional development on the use of the

6   tool, to make sure that the tool includes

7   formal training regarding all security

8   standards and protocols so that the rationale

9   is clearly communicated, so those being trained

10   on the tool have a very clear sense of the

11   purpose of the questions contained within the

12   tool.

13   And then to conduct an annual review to

14   make sure that the tool is staying abreast of

15   current laws and statutes, and to make sure

16   that it consistently aligns with national

17   standards and best practices. And then also to

18   conduct a yearly audit of the tool at the

19   school level, either comprehensively or through

20   a sampling of the schools.

21   Other recommendations, establishing a

22   feedback loop between the DOE and the schools

23   for both the school and district level reports,

24   and to provide some district generated

25   guidelines and templates, and oversight to

1   their schools regarding the development and

2   implementation of the plans. We also recommend

3   that there is an annual schedule established

4   regarding submissions, reviews, and feedback.

5   So one of the things that we heard was

6   that in the current scheduling there may be

7   things that are in process that should be done,

8   but maybe a week, a month, two months later,

9   those things are now complete, so they said

10   that if we had multiple ways of submitting so

11   that any time you're looking at the information

12   it reflects what is actually live time

13   occurring within the schools.

14   So this gives a recommendation of the new

15   implementation that be adopted, that starts

16   with new user training, that goes into then

17   looking at the school level reports and their

18   self- assessment, then moving into the review

19   of the district reviews with an appropriate

20   feedback loop, and then finally moving into a

21   review by the DOE, again continuing that

22   feedback look on the information that's being

23   submitted through the tool, and then providing

24   support when there are questions, or either

25   with regards to the tool itself in terms of

1   content, or the tool itself in terms of its

2   functionality.

3   Okay, questions.

4   CHAIR: How many -- I know you did field

5   work on this. Approximately how many different

6   schools in the state did you visit when you did

7   your field work on this?

8   MS. RAIFORD: We did twenty-two schools in

9   twenty-two school districts around the state,

10   all the way over from Pensacola in the

11   Panhandle down to the Keys down both east and

12   wests coasts, and up through central Florida.

13   CHAIR: So in a non-scientific answer, but

14   I know it's hard for you probably, but just out

15   of, out of, you know, a 1-10 scale is, is that

16   from the field work and talking to the people,

17   or the users and consumers, both ends, that

18   were the consumers of this, and, and the ones

19   that are reporting is, with the existing tool,

20   and we're going to hear from Sylvia here in a

21   second about where it's going, 1, 1 being poor

22   and 10 being great, their level and familiarity

23   and comfort with the tool, and how they felt

24   the tool benefited them.

25   MS. RAIFORD: Overall, they were 8-9 on

1   terms of being very, very familiar with the

2   tool. The biggest benefit that we consistently

3   heard from them was that it provided with them

4   to really sort of hold up a mirror and

5   self-reflect, so if they had not already formed

6   response teams, or if they were not doing

7   drills with a certain level of frequency and

8   robustness, the tool showed them, oh, okay,

9   these are things that we should, if we're not

10   already having them in place we should have

11   them in place, and if we do have them in place

12   it helped to refine their processes.

13   It also helped to really point out the

14   need for a very robust coordination across

15   between the school systems, between first

16   responders, between law enforcement, all making

17   sure that that, that all those connections

18   were, were very well connected, if you will, so

19   that prior to, in the face of, and following

20   events, everyone would know exactly what to do.

21   CHAIR: Was any of your field work done

22   here in Broward County?

23   MS. RAIFORD: Yes.

24   CHAIR: How many schools, do you remember?

25   MS. RAIFORD: We did one school.

1   Twenty-two schools, twenty-two school

2   districts, so one school per district.

3   CHAIR: And -- and they -- and you say a

4   high number found it, they were using it to

5   assess physical site security that was driving

6   their decisions and process?

7   MS. RAIFORD: Yes.

8   CHAIR: Do you have a sense whether that

9   -- and your field work was done this past Fall?

10   MS. RAIFORD: Actually we did it in

11   January of 2019.

12   CHAIR: In January, okay. Do you have a

13   sense as to, at all if you do, whether the use

14   of the FSSAT and how it was impacting

15   decisions, and that self-reflection as you

16   described it, whether that was always the case,

17   or is that more because of recent events; do

18   you have any sense of that?

19   MS. RAIFORD: Most of the districts said

20   that they had, if, even prior to the tool they

21   had systems set up to collect data, to monitor,

22   and so forth, so they would, those districts

23   that had that in place used the tool to check

24   what they already had. Those that didn't have

25   an assessment tool of some sort in place used

1   it to create systems in addition to what they

2   did with the FSSAT. So, yes, it definitely

3   drove decisions. It also drive, in addition to

4   practices there were policies that they

5   realized they probably needed to update and

6   improve, so both.

7   CHAIR: Is there -- is there more use of

8   it after it became required? Is it more

9   important, or did you not get a sense of that?

10   MS. RAIFORD: I -- that I can't actually

11   say.

12   CHAIR: Okay. What did you find in

13   districts as far as oversight is concerned?

14   Who -- who is responsible for doing this, did

15   it stop at the principal level or was it, was

16   there somebody at the district office, did the

17   superintendent have to sign off on these

18   things? Did you -- did you find that in any of

19   your field work?

20   MS. RAIFORD: The --t here were security

21   -- there are point people in every district.

22   And Sylvia can speak more to those. Those were

23   the folks that I made initial contact with to

24   set up the reviews, but that varied by

25   district.

1   CHAIR: Yeah, they -- yeah, it's the

2   people you contacted, but do you know the -- in

3   most districts -- what -- we had -- we saw here

4   in Broward is, is that, and the reason why I'm

5   asking these questions is, is we saw here the

6   ones that were done and we reviewed, that there

7   was just bad information in them, it was

8   inaccurate information, some of it was even

9   false information. And there was no district

10   oversight, it was done, and there was a lot of

11   perfunctory responses, and there was no

12   oversight, and they didn't care other than the,

13   you know, the blanks were filled in, and they

14   shipped them off.

15   So what I'm trying to get as is, is that

16   if you visited twenty-two different districts

17   is, is that was that a Broward problem, or is

18   that across the state of Florida?

19   MS. RAIFORD: It varied, in terms of who

20   the actual point person was, in terms of

21   responsibility. Most districts reported that

22   because there was a very rapid timeline that

23   they had to get this information in, yes, that

24   the, the focus was on getting it in by that

25   deadline, and the focus on making sure that it

1   was as accurate as it could possibly be, they

2   felt given the time constraints that became

3   secondary to actually just getting it in.

4   CHAIR: So accuracy was secondary to just

5   making sure the blanks were filled in.

6   MS. RAIFORD: Making sure they had it in

7   by the deadline.

8   CHAIR: All right. And you saw that

9   across the state?

10   MS. RAIFORD: That was multiple places

11   throughout the state.

12   CHAIR: Yeah. And -- and I want to be

13   clear though, even though you found that is

14   that they're, your, your review was not an

15   audit, so you didn't go response by response

16   and verify anything, correct?

17   MS. RAIFORD: Right.

18   CHAIR: So it was more of a processor

19   system, but you did come across that issue. So

20   that wasn't limited to Broward, that was across

21   Florida.

22   MS. RAIFORD: Yes.

23   CHAIR: Okay. All right, does anybody

24   have any other questions? Commissioner Dodd.

25   COMM. DODD: I want to make sure I

1   understand the feedback loop, is that, is that

2   after it's been submitted to the Department of

3   Education?

4   MS. RAIFORD: Correct.

5   COMM. DODD: So when I look at your

6   implementation review recommendations in this

7   graph, and the introduction to school self-

8   assessment, the district review feedback

9   oversight and support, it's after that is when

10   it goes to the DOE for review? So they're

11   going to have -- is there any feedback loop at

12   the district level prior to it being submitted,

13   and is that tracked in any way?

14   MS. RAIFORD: That's our recommendation,

15   is that before it goes off to the State that

16   they have that internal review time, because

17   again as we mentioned earlier this first was

18   just like get it in and get it done and meet

19   the deadline. What we're proposing is that

20   they make sure that all of those accuracy

21   checks, and that process happens locally. And

22   they already have a great conduit to contact

23   the Office of Safe Schools so that if even as

24   the district is looking at it, they still have

25   questions they can contact the State.

1   But, yes, that first feedback loop is

2   local. Then once it goes to the State the

3   State feeds back to them as well.

4   CHAIR: Sheriff Ashley, then Commissioner

5   Carroll.

6   SHER. ASHLEY: Thank you. And I may be

7   mistaken here, but the positive findings on the

8   content review, it says helps officials

9   identify threats, vulnerabilities, and

10   appropriate safety controls. And that was what

11   you found through your survey, because that is

12   totally contrary to what this Commission has

13   found throughout this entire process, that, you

14   know, threat assessments really haven't worked?

15   I don't know how you measure through this tool

16   that they've been using whether school is safe

17   or not.

18   I mean there is no grade for school

19   safety. There is -- you know, what is the

20   outcome when it's not safe, who, who determines

21   that? If there's no district oversight on the

22   actual schools, and the Department of Education

23   at that time had no teeth to do anything about

24   it, so we're just doing a perfunctory role of

25   filling in the blank, and it never gets any

1   action.

2   MS. RAIFORD: Right. Our -- in this we

3   were not making a declaration as to whether the

4   school, declaring the schools safe. What they

5   reported that it helped them do is to better

6   identify things that were threats, and then

7   from there begin to make, to improve their

8   processes, not that they were all at that level

9   where they necessarily wanted them to be.

10   SHER. ASHLEY: And I think that's the

11   point I'm trying to make, is, you know, we keep

12   saying identify the threat, communicate the

13   threat, act on the threat, and we may be able

14   to identify it, and even communicate it, but

15   nobody is acting on it, and so I think that's

16   where we have to improve upon. Thank you.

17   CHAIR: Commissioner Carroll, go ahead.

18   COMM. CARROLL: I have a little bit

19   different point of view because I actually

20   think that this review supports what the

21   Commission found. I have no doubt the people

22   using this tool believe that it helped them

23   identify issues, but I also know in the

24   findings that the questions, the way they were

25   constructed were open to multiple

1   interpretations, so while they thought it was

2   helping them their interpretation of that was

3   significantly different across the board if you

4   looked at the way different school districts

5   did it.

6   You talked about a lack of sufficient

7   training for the folks doing it, because not

8   only is it different in each school district on

9   who does it it's different in each school, and

10   some of the folks had absolutely no training,

11   and they were answering questions that were

12   open to multiple interpretations in terms of

13   what it was looking for. There was no feedback

14   for anything they did, no oversight, no audit,

15   and no collaborative type materials that they

16   could look at to even give them a hint. So

17   while I have no doubt that the folks doing this

18   felt as though it opened their eyes, I think it

19   probably did, whether it did what it was

20   intended to do as a tool is a whole different

21   matter because they don't know what they don't

22   know.

23   And what we found in looking at the tools

24   here was the inconsistency was, was so great,

25   and the interpretation of some was so lacking,

1   that the reports weren't an accurate reflection

2   of what school, the level of school safety was

3   at individual schools. And I do like the

4   recommendation in terms of how these things, A,

5   people should be trained on how to do it, the

6   questions are to be more concrete so that folks

7   know exactly what's being asked for, and there

8   has to be some type of feedback or audit loop

9   to bring these things into consistency.

10   So I actually think that this supports

11   what we found in our review of the school

12   safety assessment tools that were done in what

13   we looked at. People may feel good about them,

14   but my sense is they don't know what they don't

15   know because there's so much inconsistency in

16   the way this thing was deployed and

17   implemented, and even in the tool construct

18   itself.

19   CHAIR: All right, Commissioner Harpring.

20   UNDER SHER. HARPRING: Thank you, for your

21   work. I'd like to ask you just a question

22   about what you might have seen from district to

23   district. And I know the size of the district

24   could have an effect on the response that you

25   provide. Relative to any types of system

1   that's in place within a district, either at

2   the district level individually down to the

3   schools and back to check on the fidelity of

4   the responses, in other words is there a best

5   or better practice that you saw that was taking

6   place in some schools as opposed, or in some

7   districts, and in some schools as opposed to

8   others?

9   In other words, if the principal didn't

10   fill out the school evaluation did the

11   principal check it, and then I realize that

12   there's a very big difference in the number of

13   schools in the different districts, but can you

14   tell us what you saw in that regard, in order

15   to try to ensure that there was some level of

16   credibility to these? And we know that, at

17   least in our experience, that there is, was

18   very little credibility in a lot that we saw.

19   MS. RAIFORD: Right.

20   UNDER SHER. HARPRING: And then secondly,

21   real briefly, is the current tool salvageable?

22   MS. RAIFORD: As far as your first

23   question, it did vary very much by district

24   size, and their internal capacity, so for

25   example in larger districts they had some

1   version of an assessment already in place, and

2   so some of the information they had already

3   gathered through that tool, and so they were

4   readily able to convert what they were already

5   collecting into this tool.

6   In smaller districts it was everybody had

7   to kind of pitch in from the district level to

8   get this information, to reach out to schools

9   and make sure, so everywhere we looked there

10   was an effort to get the best information

11   possible, but it varied in terms of the

12   capacity, given again that short time span that

13   they had to get the information in. So the

14   places where they did have some similar process

15   in place, it was much easier for those

16   districts to do that, as opposed to other

17   places for which they took was really the first

18   time in a formal way they were gathering that

19   information.

20   And then tell me your second question

21   again.

22   UNDER SHER. HARPRING: Is the tool

23   salvageable? And I know there's always a

24   positive with certain things, and there's some

25   negatives with them. Is it a start from

1   scratch or, you know, can the system be fixed?

2   MS. RAIFORD: It's a build up from where

3   it currently is, and Sylvia is going to talk

4   about where they are, where the Office of Safe

5   Schools is now in terms of revisions and

6   upgrades. Thank you.

7   CHAIR: All right. Chief Lystead.

8   CHF. LYSTEAD: Thank you, Mr. Chair. So

9   as I see your report -- thank you for the

10   presentation today. As I see your report it's

11   more of a critique of the tool itself as

12   opposed to the veracity or accuracy of the

13   data; is that correct?

14   MS. RAIFORD: Correct.

15   CHF. LYSTEAD: And so you surveyed twenty-

16   two districts and twenty-two schools, and the

17   question I would like to ask is of the, of the

18   schools that your survey, the twenty-two, how

19   did you come to pick those schools?

20   MS. RAIFORD: Okay, we followed the SEDNET

21   and, help me with SEDNET -- I can't remember

22   the acronym. But there are fifteen regions

23   that the DOE already divides the state into, so

24   for, because what we wanted was, of the sixty

25   seven school systems we wanted to be as

1   representative as, the sampling to be as

2   representative as possible, so we wanted to

3   make sure that we covered every region of the

4   state, we wanted to cover the extreme, in terms

5   of location, so far west, far south, down to

6   the Keys.

7   We wanted to make sure we had a range of

8   very large system, like Broward, Miami-Dade.

9   We wanted to make sure we had small systems, so

10   we had Holmes County. We had a number of other

11   smaller systems represented. And we wanted

12   medium sized districts represented, because we

13   knew that the capacities of districts would

14   vary, you know, again, based on size. And then

15   so we -- and then in terms of selecting the

16   schools we had teams going out, so we needed

17   schools that had a relatively close

18   geographically, so that our goal was to make

19   sure that we were able to two schools each day,

20   so that's where they fell.

21   It wasn't, as we told the schools they

22   weren't, you know, on a, on a list that we

23   picked from, it was purely a matter of

24   geographically how can we get to the schools.

25   And then we had a good cross representation of

1   elementary and secondary, with a higher

2   percentage of our schools that were middle and

3   high schools, as opposed to elementary.

4   CHF. LYSTEAD: So you picked the school,

5   or the district told you which school to go to?

6   MS. RAIFORD: No, we picked the schools.

7   CHF. LYSTEAD: You picked the schools.

8   MS. RAIFORD: Yes. We worked

9   collaboratively with Sylvia's office to select

10   the schools.

11   CHF. LYSTEAD: And so out of the

12   twenty-two schools you looked at do you believe

13   that that's, the results and the information

14   gathered, so you believe that would be

15   consistent across the state, since that's a

16   very small sampling of schools?

17   MS. RAIFORD: Right. It's a small -- it

18   is a small sampling of schools, so we don't

19   necessarily make the statistical representation

20   that you could extrapolate across all of the

21   districts in Florida, but within each district

22   we had personnel beyond just the school level.

23   We had district personnel, and then first

24   responders and police from the district, so

25   within each district we got more of a district

1   view than just a school view. But, no, with

2   the sampling we used I can't say that you can

3   pull from that and say yes, that is that you

4   can extrapolate the findings from these

5   twenty-two to all sixty- seven.

6   CHF. LYSTEAD: All right, thank you.

7   CHAIR: Commissioner.

8   SEC. MAYHEW: Thank you, Ms. Raiford. I

9   -- yesterday we heard from the school safety

10   specialists from across the state, and I

11   noticed that one of the positive findings was

12   that the tool meets the concept of an all

13   hazards approach, but we heard from them that

14   that's one thing they don't like. For

15   instance, they don't like answering about the

16   size of a generator.

17   MS. RAIFORD: Yes. Yes, they don't like

18   the utility questions. Yeah.

19   SEC. MAYHEW: Yeah. So I'm -- I'm

20   wondering is it best practice to having a tool

21   that has an all hazards approach, or I think it

22   sounds to me like they would rather have their

23   physical site, safety, and security a

24   completely separate tool so that they're not

25   districted by the other questions.

1   MS. RAIFORD: Correct. Correct.

2   SEC. MAYHEW: So I'm just wondering what

3   is the best practice.

4   MS. RAIFORD: Well, the -- the gathering

5   that all hazards is definitely a best practice.

6   What they -- but again that's interpretation,

7   so they were like, well, how is that -- the

8   question we got was how is that safety, and so

9   that was where their disconnect was, and how is

10   gathering information about generators, and who

11   provides your gas, and who's your phone

12   carrier, seeing that, that that was a bit of a

13   disconnect, so that's why one of our other

14   recommendations was to provide that rationale

15   in there to explain to them, because again we

16   had the good fortune of having Sylvia come with

17   us for a sampling, and they, and she definitely

18   heard directly from them about that, and so

19   when she explained to them what the State

20   envisioned in collecting that, and that it was

21   supportive of the all hazards best practice,

22   and they were like, oh, okay, now we see why,

23   why we had it. But again, without that

24   explanation then it was just seen as why am I

25   answering questions about who's our gas

1   provider.

2   CHAIR: Okay, thank you. Sylvia. So as

3   you're getting ready for your PowerPoint, to

4   come up here, I was going to ask this question

5   at the end, but given some of the questions

6   that you all had, and Sylvia knows this

7   question is coming, you know, I -- maybe I get

8   it from some of your questions, maybe some of

9   you feel this. I was a little surprised that

10   the, that the consultant's report didn't come

11   back a little bit stronger on some of the

12   things that we saw, to be honest with you.

13   And where I thought this would end up is,

14   is a major, major overhaul, and as yet to see

15   of this, and perhaps even a new vendor. But

16   the intention now the way I understand it is

17   from DOE is to continue with -- we're going to

18   hear from Sylvia on this, but know this up

19   front as you hear her presentation, is the

20   intention is to stay with the same vendor, and

21   to modify the existing tool, and not go out to

22   any type of procurement process for a new

23   instrument.

24   With what we saw with the school specific

25   one, and especially the district wide one, was

1   extremely concerning. And we spent a lot of

2   time on this last year, you know, and we went

3   through these in detail. So, you know, we need

4   to, in fairness we need to hear from you, and

5   we need to see the product that isn't yet ready

6   that you're going to explain to us, but just

7   keep in mind as hear this is, is that, for any

8   of you like me that originally thought that

9   this was going result in a new instrument, and

10   a totally restructured process, is, is that

11   that's not the plan, it's to take this -- and

12   maybe that's a good thing. And maybe you got a

13   way to make it so that it is useful, it is

14   better, because what we saw last year was to me

15   much worse than what is reported in the

16   consultant's report, so, you know, with that,

17   that's, you know, that's my take on it, so.

18   PRESENTATION - STATUS OF FSSAT

19   MS. IFFT: Yeah, and well understood.

20   Thank you, Mr. Chair, and members of the

21   Commission. Before I get into this, just to

22   address that question specifically, so the tool

23   itself technically in nature, and we'll go

24   through some of the technical findings and the

25   recommendations here, but a lot of the, the

1   findings, both from this body as well as from

2   the evaluator, and some of the other

3   recommendations that we've been getting, was

4   specifically to the content of the tool.

5   Now, with the way that the tool is

6   structured we can put anything that we need to

7   put into the tool, so if we want to put a

8   question in there, why is the sky blue, we can

9   certainly put that information in there, as

10   well as the helpful information that is

11   recommended by the valuator. And I'll go

12   through that in a little bit more detail, but,

13   going through a new tool we felt like would be

14   completely disruptive considering the data that

15   we already have into the tool. But what we are

16   doing is looking at all of the content, the

17   question sets, the answer choices, and making

18   sure that we do a complete question by question

19   revision of each of those, analyzing all of the

20   information that is asked, all of the response

21   options that are provided, and making sure that

22   we're gathering more robust data, and also

23   providing enough information to the schools and

24   the school districts on how to answer the

25   questions.

1   So what I'm going to do is essentially I'm

2   going to follow the structure of Ms. Raiford's

3   presentation. So as she already mentioned the

4   valuation covered three aspects of the tool,

5   the technical, which is essentially the use,

6   the features, and the functionality, I'll talk

7   a little bit about that. The content,

8   specifically the type of questions, as Ms.

9   Raiford mentioned, that address security and

10   related planning, as well as any other data

11   relevant to best practices and safety and

12   security standards. And then the big piece

13   too, also in addition to the content, is the

14   implementation of the tool, our training

15   program, as well as actions and oversight, and

16   accountability in meeting the legal

17   requirements of reporting.

18   So just a couple of things before I

19   actually get into the recommendations that I

20   want to go over. First of all I do want to

21   remind everybody that, as it was mentioned, the

22   data and information related to the school

23   security risks assessments is confidential

24   information, so what I'm going to provide to

25   you all is a high-level overview. I also want

1   to briefly orient you on the tool to give you a

2   little bit of perspective as we go through the

3   recommendations and talk a little bit about the

4   evolution of the capabilities in the tool.

5   So currently on this slide there are eight

6   applications in the tool, plus some advanced

7   search features in the tool, that Ms. Raiford

8   mentioned, all of which the tool's provider is

9   continuously improving. So back in 2014 when

10   we initially constructed this DOE and the

11   provider worked together to develop the tool.

12   It launched in January of 2015 with two primary

13   applications that you see highlighted here.

14   Assets, which is essentially an inventory of

15   the schools, as well as the facilities within

16   the district. And then of course the

17   assessments, which houses all of school and the

18   district assessments completed in the system on

19   those schools and facilities in the district.

20   So when we were putting this together, we

21   built the tool out in 2014, and then in the

22   Fall of 2014 we conducted a statewide pilot, so

23   we went across the state and sat with some

24   different districts and we went over the tool.

25   And then after that we had some feedback, and

1   we continued to implement some improvements

2   before we eventually launched in 2015, and what

3   we ended up with was two assessment templates,

4   the district best practice self-assessment,

5   which at the time was required by statute, is

6   the OPPAGA assessment, and then we had the

7   school based risk assessment, which was

8   provided as the proviso language had required

9   us to do, but it was not required by the

10   schools to complete.

11   So in 2017 DOE began working with the

12   provider to expand the capability of FSSAT to

13   include some additional functionality. We kind

14   of refer to these as our incident management

15   tracking applications. In August of 2017 the

16   expansion was approved by DOE leadership, and

17   in October the maintenance agreement went into

18   effect to include the additional capabilities.

19   A little bit later in the presentation I'll

20   talk a little bit about a project we started

21   right after the new incident management

22   tracking applications came online, late 2017,

23   early 2018, to incorporate some of the state's

24   incidents reporting features in FSSAT.

25   Another thing that I want to mention

1   before we get into the recommendations is

2   although there are a number of reports that the

3   tool can produce with some aggregate data based

4   on the assessment responses DOE was not

5   designed to be a database, it is not a database

6   in the technical sense of the term, it was

7   designed to be a self-assessment tool, which

8   that original OPPAGA assessment was, it was a

9   self-assessment tool.

10   All right, so to go through the technical

11   recommendations, a lot of these were either in

12   progress already, or we have completed these

13   since the evaluator has submitted their report.

14   The first one is implement a session

15   termination, that Simie mentioned earlier.

16   That is already completed, and it is in

17   alignment with financial and banking security

18   standards.

19   I also wanted to note that the FSSAT

20   provider also worked with a number of K-12 and

21   public safety agencies across the US, not just

22   us here in Florida, and they are fully

23   compliant with criminal justice information

24   security standards.

25   The next one is implement single sign on.

1   Chief Newman during the panel discussion

2   discussed it a little bit yesterday, or he

3   alluded to it. For those of you that are not

4   familiar with single sign on, or SSO as we call

5   it, it's a user authentication service that

6   permits a user to use one sent of credentials

7   to access multiple applications. And on the

8   back end SSO is also helpful for us to log user

9   activities and monitor accounts, so by

10   integrating with DOE single sign on it will not

11   only allow districts and school users to access

12   FSSAT through their district SSO portal, but it

13   will also create automated environment for the

14   districts to authenticate users, and more

15   importantly disable users after they've left

16   the district.

17   So this is a phase process we actually

18   started last May. We anticipate having full

19   SSO authentication in place by the end of May,

20   early June of this year. Right now the

21   districts are managing their users through the

22   FSSAT single sign on authorization application

23   that we put in place back last year, but then

24   what happens on our end is the manual process,

25   so we receive a daily report from the

1   districts, and then we'll go in and go into the

2   system and make those changes on our end, so

3   implementing this would, basically would

4   automate that process.

5   So the next set of recommendations deals

6   with the construction of this assessment, and

7   the questions in them. The first one there,

8   eliminate the ability to skip questions; this

9   one is actually complete. So the provider has

10   already implemented the ability for their

11   clients to designate specific questions in the

12   tool that require a response prior to

13   submitting the assessment, and this will be

14   implemented for the 2019/2020 assessments.

15   This was not an option that was available to us

16   prior to this year.

17   So even though these next set of

18   recommendations come from the evaluators

19   technical team they really have to do with the

20   construction of the assessment template rather

21   than actual technical functionality, so as I

22   mentioned earlier, we can specify the questions

23   asked in the tool, as well as the survey

24   responses. I also want to mention anywhere

25   where we talk about updates to the template

1   content or the training, the plan for

2   completing those updates is May, and we hope to

3   start pushing out the training that's currently

4   under development towards the end of May, early

5   June. Any of our planned completion dates

6   should be on the slides as well for your

7   reference.

8   So I'm going to take these first three

9   bullets -- so revise and split multiple survey

10   items -- I'll provide you an example a little

11   bit later in the presentation to show you what

12   our process is when we're going through these

13   questions, and kind of deconstructing them to

14   make them a little bit more robust in the tool.

15   The next one kind of follows suit with that,

16   revise the survey options. What they're

17   looking at is specifically the answers that

18   we're provided, whether we've provided the

19   correct answer choices, the number of drills,

20   looking at our rationale for not applicable and

21   in progress responses, or some of those yes/no

22   responses.

23   And then providing, the next one,

24   providing specific text entry boxes for

25   supporting remarks, essentially prompting the

1   respondent, or the assessor, and requiring them

2   to provide further explanation on certain

3   response choices. Currently in the tool every

4   single question in the tool has an option for

5   the respondent to provide remarks. The

6   district assessment has some specific

7   unstructured text fields, so we're going to

8   incorporate that into the school assessments as

9   well.

10   And this next one, revising the assessment

11   findings section and eliminating multiple

12   choice options, so this one has to do with the

13   assessment finding section, which is the very

14   last section at the end of the school

15   assessment. So the valuator's suggestion to

16   eliminate the multiple-choice options from the

17   assessment findings and require text only

18   responses, it's a very valid argument, that

19   requiring those folks to actually go in and

20   explain what it is that their vulnerabilities

21   are, what it is that they need.

22   The drawback to that is, is that we at the

23   state, and also at the district, you can't pull

24   aggregate data from text only responses, and

25   this to us is the most valuable part of the

1   assessment from a planning perspective,

2   especially when you're looking at evaluating

3   the strengths and the opportunities for

4   enhancement. So what we're doing is we're

5   addressing this by integrating the findings

6   throughout the tool at the end of each

7   subsection and having the ability to pull a

8   report from each of those, rather than just

9   having the assessment section at the end that

10   covers all of the categories.

11   What we found after our experience from

12   last year is having those assessment findings

13   at the end of the assessment, what it does is,

14   it requires the assessor to actually go back

15   through their assessment and try to recall or

16   recapture the elements from each section after

17   the fact. Usually by the time you get through

18   that long report you're fatigued, you're tired,

19   you just want to get the report finished, so,

20   or if you're picking up the assessment at a

21   later date you're doing in a phased process,

22   then you may inadvertently omit some important

23   considerations. So this was some feedback that

24   I heard both when I shadowed Simie on some of

25   their, some of their field work that they were

1   doing, and also some feedback that I heard from

2   the school safety specialists when we were

3   going through kind of our after action for the

4   tool.

5   So these are just some technical

6   considerations regarding the ability to batch

7   up, load supporting documents and photos, so

8   this was a recommendation that came out of the

9   field. The provider was already working on

10   this enhancement, and this essentially has to

11   do with going through and adding a file, or a

12   supporting document, to the assessment. Since

13   the evaluator's report the provider has

14   implemented kind of a drag and drop feature,

15   and there's a phase process to enhance this

16   further.

17   The next one, restrict the user's

18   capability to create custom filter options,

19   this kind of has to do with some of those

20   enhanced applications. So currently users have

21   the ability to create incidents, or events in

22   the system, and Chief Newman during his panel

23   discussion talked about how they're using FSSAT

24   to track their threat assessments in their

25   schools, so this is one of the areas where

1   that's done.

2   And in regards to the custom filter

3   options, right now it's unstructured text, so

4   when you go through, when you create an event

5   or an incident you name it whatever you want

6   to, and the issue is, is if you go in and

7   create an incident for a bomb threat and you

8   have one user that uses a capital B and a

9   capital T, and the next user comes along, uses

10   capital B, a lower case T, then the system sees

11   those as two different events, and so it makes

12   it a little bit different to go back and do

13   analysis on the back end. So what we're

14   looking at doing is implementing some templates

15   in for the specific event, so if you have, you

16   know, your bomb threats, your drills, all of

17   those things, we'll preload those into the

18   system, and have some drop down options, so

19   it's not just unstructured text.

20   So the next one, connecting the FSSAT

21   incidents application to the school incident

22   notification system, I mentioned earlier that

23   after we started, after we added our incident

24   management tracking applications to the tool

25   DOE and FSSAT provider started working with the

1   Division of Emergency Management in late 2017,

2   early 2018, to incorporate some of these same

3   recommendations suggested by the evaluator.

4   The project was put on hold after February of

5   last year, so we're really excited about the

6   opportunity to pick this project back up again.

7   And also of note, I mentioned that the

8   provider works with a lot of K-12 and public

9   safety agencies across the US, and some of

10   those other clients, they integrate some of

11   their CAD feeds, video feeds, things like that.

12   So that is a current capability that the

13   provider can, can do, we just need to identify

14   the feeds. As long as there is an API we can

15   bring it into the tool.

16   So the next recommendation, to refine the

17   threat stream's filters, it takes a little bit

18   of understanding of how that particular

19   application works. So what you see on the

20   screen here is a sample threat stream page from

21   our training account. The threat stream

22   filters are actually customized by the end

23   user. They are user defined, so you would

24   think of it as each user having their own

25   bucket, and then they determine what goes into

1   the bucket. In other words, the users define

2   how broad or narrow the filters will return.

3   The example here is set up to pull some

4   RSS or open source feeds based on the filter

5   criteria set up by the user, keywords, phrases.

6   The three streams set up here are filtered to

7   return results from bus crashes, bullying, 2017

8   wildfires, which was what, a filter that we put

9   in place when we were piloting the

10   applications. And then I also wanted to

11   mention that while this application is not

12   meant to serve as a social media monitoring

13   tool the user does have some capability to set

14   up some open source media monitoring functions

15   within the tool. It's fairly limited, but the

16   functionality is there.

17   The great thing about this particular

18   application is that from each of these returns

19   the user can create an incident and link it

20   directly to their school. So if there were a

21   bus incident that involved students from a

22   particular school, or a wildlife removal that

23   showed up in the news, a user could go in and

24   create an incident directly from this feed and

25   link it to their school. So it's just meant to

1   be a tracking mechanism for different incidents

2   that are occurring at or around the schools.

3   All right, this is the last couple on the

4   technical review. The last one, again there

5   was some discussion earlier about prepopulating

6   the boiler plate information, so to us this one

7   is a little bit of a double-edged sword. Going

8   back to the finding about the users having the

9   ability to skip questions, we were concerned

10   that if users, if this boiler plate information

11   is added to the tool continuously every year

12   then the users may skip over those questions

13   that are prepopulated, so we really don't want

14   to do that unless we can incorporate some sort

15   of an accountability mechanism into the tool

16   that says, okay, yes, I have, I have read this,

17   this is still correct information. And again

18   part of this stems from the pushback that we

19   originally received regarding the utility

20   information, and why that's in the tool. So we

21   recognized that, and we're going to address

22   that in training, and the supporting rationale

23   that we're going to add to the tool.

24   And the very last one here, creating a

25   knowledge management system for sharing and

1   storing critical safety and security

2   information. So again, after we completed our

3   assessments last year we had actually discussed

4   doing something similar to this with the

5   provider as a solution, to have a secure

6   self-service website specifically for training

7   Florida schools and school districts, not only

8   just on how to use the FSSAT but as Ms. Raiford

9   had mentioned providing a place where the

10   school districts can collaborate with one

11   another, they can share templates, they can

12   share lessons learned, and best practices.

13   So getting into the content review, and

14   the recommendations, the first one here,

15   revising the content to reflect current best

16   practices and national standards of school

17   safety and security. So going back to the

18   template revisions I mentioned earlier, what

19   we're doing is we're going through the district

20   and the school assessment templates question by

21   question. And we're also, while we're doing

22   that we're reviewing the guidance from not only

23   the findings from this commission, certainly

24   the recommendations provided in the evaluator's

25   report, we're also looking at the Federal

1   Commission on School Safety's final report, as

2   we got a lot of recommendations from the school

3   safety specialists that we're incorporating, as

4   well as other federally recognized applicable

5   guidance and documents that are produced by

6   different organizations, such as the Partner

7   Alliance for Safer Schools.

8   So while we're talking about the contents

9   revisions, I want to specifically speak to both

10   the concerns raised by this commission, as well

11   as some of the elements from the evaluator's

12   report, specifically some of those long

13   seemingly arduous questions that are in the

14   district assessment. So up until last year

15   Florida law required school districts to use

16   the safety and security best practices

17   developed by the Office of Program Policy

18   Analysis and Government Accountability, or

19   OPPAGA, to complete their district safety and

20   security best practices self- assessment.

21   While the old OPPAGA assessment did ask

22   some very relevant questions, we agree that the

23   format was a bit difficult to deal with, so I'm

24   going to walk through an example here and

25   explain how we're looking at these questions as

1   part of the revision process for the district

2   assessment, as well as the school assessment.

3   Everything on this slide that you see here

4   is either currently in statute or part of

5   published best practices, but this is a good

6   example of the kind of question that we are

7   trying to remedy such things, as eliminating

8   those double barrel questions, or questions

9   that ask for more than one thing but just

10   require a yes or no response, revising the

11   response options to gather more robust data,

12   and requiring text responses, and just making

13   sure that the assessment is easier to read, and

14   easier to go through for the end user.

15   So looking at the old OPPAGA assessments,

16   they were laid out in an outline format, so you

17   had a general area -- there were seven general

18   areas, so it covered efficiency and

19   effectiveness, school climate, facilities,

20   transportation, and in this case health and

21   safety planning. So under each general area

22   was a series of best practices, and those are

23   highlighted here in the grey bar. So for this

24   particular one, I know it's kind of hard to

25   read, it says the district has implemented a

1   school safety plan that includes district wide

2   emergency and safety procedures, and it

3   identifies those responsible for them.

4   So you would have that best practice, and

5   then under each best practice you would have an

6   indicator, a series of indicators, ABCD, so

7   these are the things that you would look at to

8   determine whether or not you're meeting this

9   particular best practice. And then here it

10   says the district has implemented a

11   comprehensive school safety plan that

12   established emergency and safety procedures for

13   school and district employees, and students, to

14   follow. And then underneath that you may have

15   some supporting elements.

16   So this is a lot of information for, for

17   one question, for you to try to absorb, and

18   determine whether or not after reading all of

19   this the answer is yes or no, right? So when

20   you get to the end of all of these indicators

21   then there's an opportunity that says, you

22   know, yes or no, do you meet the best practice,

23   the information in the grey bar, and then

24   provide some unstructured text regarding

25   strategies and actions to be taken to either

1   meet the best practice, or continue meeting the

2   best practice, as well as any fiscal impacts

3   and timelines associated with meeting, or

4   continuing to meet that best practice.

5   CHAIR: Yeah, and what we found was

6   everybody just answered yes just to get through

7   it.

8   MS. IFFT: Correct.

9   CHAIR: It's self-serving, it's

10   perfunctory, it's check the box, get me through

11   this thing.

12   MS. IFFT: Yeah, absolutely, absolutely.

13   And it's -- you know we have wanted to

14   restructure this for quite some time, to be

15   honest with you, the challenge is we were kind

16   of held to this assessment up until last year,

17   so now we're empowered to actually go through

18   and kind of deconstruct these questions.

19   So looking at this particular question, so

20   what is it we're actually trying to get at?

21   Does the district wide school safety plan

22   address the following; school performance,

23   roles and responsibilities, mechanism for at

24   risk students, arrangements for working with

25   your response agencies, school sponsored

1   events, communication to parents and local

2   community.

3   So what we're doing is we're actually

4   pulling these elements out, so you may have

5   questions in the school assessment under

6   emergency planning that asks, you know, when is

7   the last time you had a familiarization day

8   with your local law enforcement agency that

9   would respond to your school, and you provide

10   that information. Do you have agreements in

11   place with your local emergency management for

12   sheltering operations? Do you have agreements

13   in place for community planning? Does your

14   emergency operation plan outline roles and

15   responsibilities for, and then we would provide

16   a list that they would need to check off? So

17   that would actually provide more robust

18   information, both at the district level for the

19   schools as well as us trying to get a good

20   understanding of where the schools are at for

21   planning.

22   So those school level questions would

23   inform a district assessment questions like,

24   what percentage of your schools conduct a

25   familiarization day with your local law

1   enforcement. So that's how we're attacking

2   this, going through each of this, and so trying

3   to provide very specific concise questions that

4   are going to give us very specific concise

5   answers.

6   Another good recommendation, and we talked

7   with the provider about how we would actually

8   implement this, is including those introductory

9   explanatory briefs to provide users with the

10   rationale. The concern that was brought up, it

11   was brought up last year, is why are you asking

12   me this question, it doesn't seem necessary, so

13   what we're going to do at the beginning of each

14   section is provide that explanation of, you

15   know, the why, the rationale, what it is that

16   we're looking for. And not only that, the

17   respondent will have to acknowledge that

18   they've read that statement and they

19   understand.

20   Each question in the tool already has the

21   capability for us to add information and help

22   references. Most of those that are in the tool

23   right now are statutory references, or Florida

24   administrative code, or a website that you can

25   go to to get additional guidance, so we're

1   going to revisit how we're providing those

2   additional help information for the individual

3   questions.

4   And the last thing we're doing is we're

5   providing a -- or putting together a companion

6   guide as we're going through the assessment

7   that will augment the training, that I'll talk

8   about here in just a moment, and provide a step

9   by step resource that will actually walk the

10   users through the assessment.

11   All right, another set of recommendations

12   here, the evaluators recommended that we expand

13   our training program. I concur with that.

14   That not only includes the live webinars that

15   we already do, in addition to the district

16   summer workshop that we actually started last

17   year. So we're working on our training

18   guidance documents. We're putting together

19   assessment revisions at the same -- as we're

20   putting together the assessment revisions, at

21   the same time, for May release, and we're going

22   to go be going over with the districts during

23   our summer workshop all of those training and

24   guidance documents so that they will filter

25   down to the schools a little bit more.

1   And a big thing is going to be this Just

2   In Time training that the schools will be able

3   to access, so that they can go through. And

4   we're just planning on putting together little

5   short little snippets that are going to be

6   easy, easily digestible for those end users at

7   the school level.

8   And then I kind of already talked about

9   how we're going to address putting the

10   rationale behind each of the assessment

11   questions. Again we're addressing that in

12   training, and as well as the guidance documents

13   that will be put in place, as well as embedded

14   in the tool. The other one right above that,

15   information security standards and protocols,

16   so we already cover handling guidance right

17   now, we've been doing so since 2015, when we do

18   our webinars with the districts, and so it's

19   easy for us to, to add some additional security

20   related training as far as information security

21   standards and protocols.

22   All right, looking at the implementation,

23   conducting an annual review to ensure that it

24   follows current law, statutes, and make sure

25   that it aligns with the latest in safety and

1   security national standards, so they've got a

2   couple of recommendations here, implementing

3   that annual audit of the tool content, and

4   develop an annual improvement poll. So as Mr.

5   Raiford mentioned earlier the feedback is

6   currently collected by the provider and DOE

7   year-round, it's a bit ad hoc.

8   DOE does discuss these items on our

9   regular conference calls as these suggestions

10   come in. We've been conducting those about

11   every two to three weeks since we started back

12   in 2014, so on those calls we'll usually

13   determine if the issues, or the suggestions,

14   are technical in nature, or they're training

15   issues, and then we begin working on whatever

16   corrective actions are necessary. The provider

17   has in the past initiated some formal feedback

18   sessions, which they call You-point

19   assessments. Again, those are not standard

20   year to year assessments. And then we at the

21   Department, we also send the templates out

22   annually to a select group of law enforcement,

23   emergency management, and internal DOE program

24   areas, as well as some representatives from the

25   domestic security working groups in the past.

1   We do agree that an annual user poll would

2   be very helpful in determining where the

3   training and the technical needs are, so we'll

4   be looking at implementing something like that

5   at the end of the 2019/2020 reporting period,

6   probably about December.

7   And then next on the implementation, the

8   evaluator has also recommended that DOE

9   establish a feedback loop for the submitted

10   FSSAT school and district reports. There was

11   good discussion on that earlier. So as part of

12   that what the evaluator is suggesting is the

13   district would review the school level data and

14   provide district generated guidelines,

15   templates, support, and oversight to their

16   schools regarding the development and

17   implementation of the improvement plans. DOE

18   would then be responsible for reviewing the

19   district level data and performing district and

20   school audits. So what we're doing right now

21   is we're evaluating the resources required to

22   implement an audit program. This would require

23   some quality and assurance capabilities for the

24   tool itself, as well as staff support to

25   actually conduct the audits.

 1   Number five there establishes that annual

 2   schedule for FSSAT submissions. So right now

 3   we have a fairly fluid schedule that we do

 4   maintain from year to year. We anticipate that

 5   there may be some scheduling direction coming

 6   out of the legislature this year, and we'll

 7   certainly align with that.

 8   So these next couple of slides come

 9   directly from the evaluator's reports; that's

10   why you saw them earlier. Remembering that

11   2018 was the first full round of those school

12   assessments and district assessments statewide,

13   the Summer, in the summer the school

14   assessments are completed, late Summer to Fall.

15   Districts review the school assessments, and

16   their district wide policies and procedures.

17   They complete their district assessments.

18   District assessment findings are then presented

19   to the school board, and then submitted in

20   FSSAT with certification of school board

21   actions. And then DOE simply collects the

22   submitted reports and the certification of

23   school board action.

24   So the proposed process, it adds a few

25   layers. Schools would still submit their

1   assessments, as well as their school level

2   improvement plans for the districts to review

3   and approve. The district ensures completion

4   of the assessments and provides feedback to the

5   schools regarding their assessments and their

6   improvement plans. The districts would also

7   follow up with the schools regarding their

8   improvement plans and provide support. And

9   then DOE would also, DOE would follow up with

10   the district level reports and the improvement

11   plans and provide support and guidance there.

12   And DOE would also use the data from the

13   reports and the improvement plans when

14   considering any new policies or guidance.

15   So this is our current reporting plan

16   starting next month. We hope to kick off the

17   year having our templates available. We'll

18   send those out to our district leads. A side

19   note here; we will need to make sure that all

20   of the reporting requirements align with state

21   statute, particularly the questions that are in

22   the assessment that deal specifically with

23   statute, so we won't have the assessment

24   templates finished until session is over with

25   and we know exactly what those requirements are

1   going to be.

2   June, we hope to have our school safety

3   specialists workshop again. We're working

4   through some scheduling internally, just to

5   make sure that we have that in place. And in

6   the Fall would be the district review and

7   revision of both the district level

8   assessments, and the school assessments.

9   October, the district should be wrapping up

10   their school board presentations and providing

11   the reports to the Department. In November the

12   Department would conduct their review in order

13   to get ready for the report to the Governor and

14   the legislature that is due in December.

15   As far as system updates this is where

16   we're at right now. We already talked about

17   the single sign on authentication project.

18   That's a March through May development period.

19   Right now we're working on drafting those

20   contract amendments, not only for the 2019/2020

21   assessment template uploads, but also

22   deliverables for the additional enhancements

23   that were outlined in the evaluator's report.

24   Our current contract, we're wanting to

25   extend that to September so it would align with

1   our maintenance renewal, and then in October

2   our three-year maintenance renewal will be up.

3   All right, I'm ready for questions.

4   CHAIR: So right now as it stands today

5   with no changes the school specific assessments

6   would be due on August 1st; is that correct?

7   MS. IFFT: That would depend on what comes

8   out of the legislature.

9   CHAIR: No, I'm saying as we stand, forget

10   about it, right now, today, as we sit here

11   today, if nothing changes, they'd be due on

12   August 1st?

13   MS. IFFT: So there's no requirement

14   currently in the statute that they be due

15   August 1st. If it were to stay that way then

16   we would have our, we would have them due after

17   the beginning of the school year.

18   CHAIR: Last year they were due on August

19   1st.

20   MS. IFFT: Correct.

21   CHAIR: And that was a directive that was

22   given out by the Governor, correct?

23   MS. IFFT: Correct.

24   CHAIR: So -- and then -- and then you all

25   modifies, or because -- anyway, the, the

1   district ones were due on October 31st,

2   correct?

3   MS. IFFT: That's correct.

4   CHAIR: All right. So, and right now the

5   thought, the preference from you all, and from

6   the school safety specialists in the districts,

7   is to have them due, when we say them, the

8   school specific ones at least on October 1st?

9   MS. IFFT: That's correct. And that would

10   allow us, allow the schools a couple of things.

11   So first of all, you know, new school

12   administrators are coming online, they're

13   shoring up their policies and their practices.

14   So the other side of that too is you've got to

15   remember to do a good thorough assessment.

16   Yes, you want to be able to have those

17   assessors and those reviewers look at their

18   school campuses while there's nobody there, but

19   you also want to look at the school while it's

20   in full operation and make sure those security

21   policies and procedures are effective.

22   CHAIR: But I -- I get it. And so -- and

23   in 7030 right now it has them due by law on

24   August 1st. So we conveyed yesterday, you

25   know, we were talking about this, we conveyed

1   it back to the Senate staff yesterday that we

2   would ask that that date, based upon

3   everybody's feedback, for those reasons that

4   you said, and we'll see, but we've asked that

5   that be moved to October 1st. So -- and it

6   sounds like there's sound reason for doing

7   that, from all the discussions.

8   MS. IFFT: Yes, sir.

9   CHAIR: The next question is, is that with

10   the school specific, and with the district wide

11   changes, and while the technological side of

12   it, the technology side of it is important, and

13   certainly the implementation, side, at least

14   for me the, the, the thing that I am most

15   interested in, and I think that this commission

16   has spent the most time on, and is most

17   concerned about, is the content itself of both

18   of those instruments, and not diminishing the

19   importance of the other aspects, but with

20   what's being worked on now my question to you

21   is this, is that who within DOE is going to be

22   the approving authority for the new content?

23   MS. IFFT: So that would go to our

24   director. Director Kelly is certainly going to

25   review, and we've had several, several meetings

1   where we've sat down and we've gone through the

2   content, and a lot of the recommendations, and

3   then it would be ultimately approved by our

4   Commissioner's office, and then put out.

5   CHAIR: Okay, so if -- in time frame wise

6   in order for them -- if let's say, okay, and I

7   don't know what they're going to do, but if the

8   legislature does not move that deadline of

9   August 1st then -- this is under a very

10   aggressive timetable, are you all going to be

11   able, would you all be able to meet that, and

12   get, and get it out to them in time, get this

13   approved internally and get it out so that they

14   have a new updated useful instrument to use by

15   August 1st; is that --

16   MS. IFFT: So the second that we're going

17   to have those assessment templates ready those

18   are going to go out to the districts, so -- and

19   I don't anticipate any hold up --

20   CHAIR: When -- when -- when do you think

21   those are going to be ready to go out?

22   MS. IFFT: So we're hoping to get those

23   out next month. So that's our goal --

24   CHAIR: In May. In May.

25   MS. IFFT: -- is to get those out in May.

1   Yes, sir.

2   CHAIR: Get them out in May, all right.

3   And you're actively working on those now with

4   --

5   MS. IFFT: Absolutely. Yes, sir.

6   CHAIR: -- the updated data elements, and

7   everything you're discussing, discussing here.

8   MS. IFFT: Yes.

9   CHAIR: Okay. All right, so another thing

10   I would strongly encourage you all to encourage

11   the schools, because I don't think there's

12   anything in, in the law, but there has to be

13   district oversight of this process, and the,

14   the districts in what we saw here in Broward

15   County, I can tell you for sure we saw it in

16   other parts of the state, is the

17   superintendents just push this down, and it

18   went to the principals, the principals pushed

19   it down to others within the schools, they just

20   completed these things, and in many places, not

21   all but in many, the only thing that was done

22   was to make sure there were no blank lines.

23   They submitted it up to you all, and of

24   course as we know you have no oversight

25   authority, and no compliance authority, and

1   there was no review process. And many of these

2   up to this point have been marginal, and some

3   useless, companies that don't contain accurate

4   information. And I would encourage you to do

5   everything that you can within DOE to make sure

6   that it is a meaningful useful document,

7   especially, it depends which version of these

8   Bills passes, but safe school allocation money

9   will be contingent up submitting these, and if

10   all people are doing, because they want the

11   dollars, is just sending something in, and it

12   doesn't have meaningful information in it, all

13   of this is useless for naught, and we're not

14   accomplishing anything. So, you know, that --

15   the -- the data elements themselves are the

16   absolute crucial part of this in making sure

17   they're done right, and there just has to be

18   accountability measures in place with it, so.

19   MS. IFFT: Yes, sir.

20   CHAIR: Commissioner Swearingen.

21   COMM. SWEARINGEN: So I want to echo

22   something you said earlier, Sheriff. I'm a

23   little shocked at the, the consultant's report.

24   Based on what was presented before this

25   commission previously I thought this tool would

1   have to be blown up and just literally start

2   from scratch. The content of the questions,

3   the formatting, the effort that was put into

4   completing those forms was abysmal, and so I do

5   have some concerns, and you've got an

6   aggressive timeline. Is it possible that we

7   could see the, the new format before it's sent

8   out and implemented? Could -- could we see

9   these new questions, the way they're structured

10   and, and have some input on the new form?

11   And my other follow up to exactly what the

12   Chair said is there has to be some fidelity.

13   We keep saying that in, in all these, there has

14   to be some fidelity checks here, because we saw

15   what happens when this is just left to the

16   school, schools and school districts. Minimal

17   effort was put into completing these things, it

18   was checking a box. I see that you're going to

19   add some, some place for comments, but I wonder

20   unless somebody is providing those fidelity

21   checks how many are actually going to take time

22   to put anything in those, in those boxes. So

23   that's a couple of concerns of mine.

24   MS. IFFT: Yes, sir. And we would

25   certainly appreciate any feedback from the

1   commission, and we can certainly --

2   CHAIR: So one of the things, you know, we

3   could do, is, is assuming, and I hope they do

4   listen, and that the legislature does move that

5   date to October 1st. If they move that date to

6   October 1st then it gives us time, and what we

7   could do, and ask you all to work against this,

8   is we could have a closed session in the June

9   meeting, and you could submit ahead of time, we

10   could have a closed session, because that would

11   have to be done in a closed session because

12   this is statutorily confidential, and you could

13   share, and then all of you could see, and we

14   could send it out ahead of time if we had it

15   available to everybody, you all could review

16   it, and then we could have a good reviewing

17   discussion to give them your feedback on that.

18   So I think that that would be an ideal

19   situation, and give everybody here an

20   opportunity to do that, Commissioner, so let's

21   hope that the legislature listens, and we'll

22   follow up with them. And it's better to be

23   right than fast, and we see what fast got us,

24   which is a pile of nothing, that it, has, is

25   limitedly meaningful, and some useless in the

 1   way they did it, so we want to avoid that. So

 2   if that -- if that timetable works, October

 3   1st, I think that plan could work, you know.

 4   Commissioner Carroll.

 5   COMM. CARROLL: Just a quick -- on the --

 6   on the audit piece, I got the sense that the

 7   audit you're talking about is a systems audit,

 8   and not necessarily a safety audit, we would

 9   look at the actual information that was done on

10   a school basis; is that true?

11   MS. IFFT: So there's two recommendations

12   that come out of the evaluator's report.

13   Number one is to actually review the content of

14   the tool annually and make those revisions as

15   it's a living document. The second piece is

16   actually reviewing the information that is

17   submitted, both by the district assessments,

18   and then providing a robust review at the

19   district level, as well as the Department

20   looking at those, some of those school

21   assessments, and finding some red flags, and

22   digging into those a little deeper.

23   COMM. CARROLL: Because I truly believe

24   that implementation of this, you're going to

25   encounter some of the same issues in terms of

1   the consistency of information included in

2   these documents unless you have audit process

3   that goes out and looks at the specific

4   information that's being entered by schools,

5   and whether it accurately reflects the

6   condition of that school. And that will then

7   give you the information you need to put

8   together, Just In Time training, or give you

9   the information you need to, to improve the

10   document even more. But I just think if you

11   don't have that audit process in place that

12   looks at the actual tools that are filled out

13   by the school for accuracy, on whether it

14   reflects the condition in that school, then

15   we're going to end up in the same place

16   regardless of what tool, or how many

17   improvements you make to this tool.

18   MS. IFFT: Yes, sir.

19   CHAIR: Commissioner Petty, and then

20   Commissioner Harpring.

21   COMM. PETTY: I want to echo Commissioner

22   Swearingen's comment. I think disruption was

23   actually what was needed here, and so I think

24   we've made it easier to get the same garbage in

25   for the schools, so I'd like to see us take a

1   different approach. I agree with some of the

2   comments that have been made here, but I would

3   add, I think at least from a process

4   perspective, and I don't know that we need to

5   wait for the legislature for this, I think

6   these school assessments should be reviewed,

7   signed off by the safe school officer, the

8   superintendent of schools, and, and the school

9   board. At a minimum I think that should be

10   part of the process.

11   We need to drive accountability in the

12   districts to take this seriously and, and to

13   have a chain of accountability all the way,

14   that goes all the way to the school board. So

15   I'm not sure if that is something that can be,

16   can be implemented quickly, but until that

17   happens, I think we still get the same sort of

18   non-answers regardless of how great we make the

19   tool.

20   CHAIR: So -- so Sylvia, correct me if I'm

21   wrong, but the -- I know now -- and is the

22   district wide has to be approved by the school

23   board because it goes up on the district wide

24   -- the school specific one currently in the

25   statute doesn't; is that correct?

1   MS. IFFT: That's correct. Yes, sir.

2   CHAIR: Right. So there already is an

3   accountability measure for the district wide,

4   but as we saw with the district wide, I mean,

5   sorry but in my view it's junk. It has these

6   long rambling questions that you just got a

7   bunch of perfunctory self-serving yes answers

8   to, they didn't tell you anything, but the

9   school boards were approving those, and they

10   were going up, and they didn't do anything. So

11   but in order to require that tiered approval

12   is, is that it's either by self-governance by

13   each district that imposes it, and the

14   superintendent saying we are going to have some

15   accountability protocols, and that the

16   principals are going to do it, and I'm going to

17   sign off on it, or I'm going to delegate it to

18   somebody else, and you're going to have that,

19   or the legislature has to mandate it.

20   Those are the only two ways that it could

21   happen, and you know, I -- and there's even

22   nothing in the, in the current Bills that I see

23   that would allow -- DOE is going to have

24   whichever version, the House version or the

25   Senate version, they are going to have

1   additional authorities and more teeth, the

2   question is it more directly with the

3   commissioners or somewhere else, but I don't

4   even see anything in there now that would allow

5   DOE to require a type of process that you're

6   articulating.

7   COMM. PETTY: Well, I would argue then

8   that we, we should make a recommendation as a

9   commission to change that process, because

10   until there's accountability I think people are

11   just going to fill it out, they're going to

12   fill it out, and everybody is going to say,

13   well, it's not my responsibility.

14   ASA BARTLETT: Mr. Chairman, who has the

15   authority to withhold the funding? You said

16   Safe School funding is dependent on these

17   things being filled out and submitted. Who

18   pushes that button and says this is not right,

19   you can't have the money?

20   CHAIR: Right. And it depends upon,

21   again, which version. And it could be the DOE

22   Commissioner, it depends upon which version of

23   the, of the proposed laws. It depends on the,

24   on, it's different in the different Bills, so

25   who, who ultimately has that, so. One of them

1   puts a lot of direct authority with the DOE

2   Commissioner, which personally I support, and,

3   and some of it puts it down a different lane, a

4   different path. Commissioner Harpring, go

5   ahead.

6   UNDER SHER. HARPRING: I'm skeptical. I'm

7   pessimistic about the tool. Many of the

8   comments that I heard reflect my question of

9   Ms. Raiford early about the viability of the

10   instrument, the rating tool itself. I'm a firm

11   believer that it should not continue in its

12   current form, or even in the proposed form. I

13   have great concern about hearing the language

14   of continued inclusion of boiler plate language

15   that will be in every assessment. I understand

16   that there are certain things associated with

17   that, such as verifications of review,

18   certifications of review, and things like that,

19   but I do not believe that the current program

20   as we've seen relative to these assessments

21   does any good for the safety and security of

22   the students and the staff, and the teachers,

23   and administrators in the schools.

24   The important part, and, Sheriff, I echo

25   your, your sentiment relative to where the

1   authority should lie is probably with DOE

2   directly, in terms of not necessarily even just

3   Safe School funding, but when you start to

4   adversely affect someone's salary, their job,

5   their position, suspension, withholding of

6   salary, things like that, that's the only way

7   on some level I think that you're going to get

8   the type of action that you need.

9   And I will hasten to add that I do believe

10   that regardless of what form the assessment is

11   modified -- this is not critical to, to our

12   presenters, but whatever form this particular

13   assessment tool is modified to, at least based

14   on what I've seen, and we may need to see more

15   in the closed session, is probably going to

16   continue to be inadequate. And as someone

17   mentioned it's just going to be an easier way

18   to get a bad product, and to check a box, and

19   to say that it was done without any true

20   meaningful cause and effect, or evaluation and

21   results.

22   And I know Sheriff Judd is fond of talking

23   about checks and balances, and without those,

24   and without some authority external of the

25   district I think it, they're just going to

1   circle the wagons and continue with the same.

2   CHAIR: Commissioner Dodd.

3   COMM. DODD: You know I've got some

4   concerns too with the tool. I think there's a

5   need to require more written information. I

6   understand the concern over, you know, the data

7   collection, and the analysis, and that makes it

8   difficult, but I hope you do come up with a way

9   that you can have a way to collect data and yet

10   still require some explanation. I know in my

11   district talking about things, I want to see

12   things written explaining in a lot of ways what

13   we are doing, and, and looking at what we are

14   doing to protect students. And when I asked

15   the question why aren't we putting these in

16   there the response is, well, we're doing what's

17   required, we're doing what DOE wants us to do.

18   And I would like more written responses.

19   I was a little surprised, and I'd like you to

20   clarify, and I know you're just delivering

21   what, the message that you found, but you used

22   the terms that people were fatigued and tired

23   at some point in the, filling this report out,

24   filling this tool, so can you explain that? I

25   didn't really follow, were you saying that they

1   got to the point where their answers weren't

2   really spot on because they were tired; is that

3   what they had said?

4   MS. IFFT: So to, to clarify what I meant

5   was when you get to the assessment finding

6   section, it's the very last section of the

7   assessment, you've already gone through your

8   tour, you've gone through all of the different

9   elements, your access control, your physical

10   security, your planning, and then you're asked

11   at the end of the assessment to kind of recap

12   each of those sections, so by the time you get

13   to that section you may have some thoughts,

14   especially if you're going back and revisiting

15   that section at a later time, then you may

16   inadvertently omit some, some thoughts that you

17   had while they were fresh on your mind.

18   So by implementing those findings at the

19   end of each section then that's going to be

20   when you're in the middle of thinking about all

21   those elements of that particular security

22   feature, it's fresh on your mind, you will have

23   a better product. We will have some of those

24   comments added in there. It just seemed that

25   when folks were getting to the end of the

1   assessment, they were just hitting the radio

2   dials, and they weren't actually adding any

3   content, they say, well, we already put this

4   somewhere else in the assessment. So it made

5   us, trying and go back and evaluate those

6   assessment findings, made it a little bit

7   difficult to, to kind of recapture the,

8   basically like the executive summary of what

9   they were looking at, so.

10   COMM. DODD: So maybe in the training of

11   the, the part of what's important, I mean it's

12   all important, but how they fill it out. And I

13   mean, you know, I'd, I'd hate to hear that

14   excuse, of being fatigued and tired.

15   UNDER SHER. HARPRING: But it may be that

16   the bifurcated tool is better. I mean we had

17   some panel people yesterday that alluded to the

18   fact that maybe you take some of those things

19   that just deal with the physical plant and

20   those other things, and you separate those,

21   those could be done by different

22   administrators, and have a very narrowly

23   focused school safety tool.

24   CHAIR: So it seems -- and we've got

25   Commissioner Swearingen and then Sheriff

1   Ashley. It seems probably at this juncture the

2   best thing for us to do is, since you are at

3   whatever percentage into your work in revising

4   this, is for us to see it, and see where you

5   are, and see what you have, and be able to then

6   give you feedback, and let everybody -- because

7   right now we don't know exactly where you are.

8   We don't know the changes you've made. We

9   don't know whether we agree or disagree,

10   whether we have concerns, don't have concerns,

11   whether -- so I think at this juncture the

12   prudent thing to do is to let Sylvia and

13   Director Kelly, and that team, do their work,

14   and then let's see it, and then, and then have

15   follow up discussion on it, because right now

16   is, is that the instrument, the proposed

17   instrument is not what it is today, it is going

18   to be something else, and we just don't know

19   until we see your product.

20   So, Commissioner Swearingen, go ahead.

21   COMM. SWEARINGEN: I just want to comment

22   on, in support of Commissioner Petty's ask that

23   there be some, some level of accountability

24   here. We saw the pie charts yesterday, and

25   Chair, you pointed out some of the simple fixes

1   that cost absolutely nothing that over a year

2   later have not been done at some of these

3   schools. I think it was something like 29

4   manned gates. That's a simple fix.

5   So if they can't do, or won't do those

6   simple things, how can we have any confidence

7   that they're going to take any more time than

8   they previously took to fill out -- no matter

9   how great the form is I don't have any level of

10   confidence that they're going to put any more

11   effort into that than they ever did unless

12   there's some level of accountability above

13   them.

14   CHAIR: Sheriff Ashley, go ahead.

15   SHER. ASHLEY: For the Commission, it's, I

16   don't know, anecdotal that crimes and

17   discipline goes underreported in our schools,

18   and you can see from the tool that it's

19   probably accurate, because we're not collecting

20   the data. And it seems more like a

21   self-reporting, self-assessment rather than an

22   independent assessment on what's actually

23   occurring in our schools, and so I'm just

24   asking us to think about maybe having an

25   independent body actually collect this data,

1   and report on this data, rather than having the

2   school do that, because they do have a vested

3   interest in the outcome.

4   CHAIR: Yeah. Or I'd suggest to you

5   perhaps a multi-disciplinary team that it

6   includes a variety. Mr. Schachter, go ahead,

7   and then Commissioner Bartlett.

8   COMM. SCHACHTER: You know I echo all the

9   frustrations of all of the commissioners, and

10   you know, we've wrestled with how do we get

11   these districts to protect our students, and

12   our staff, and, you know, the one thing that we

13   have refused to do up to this point is create a

14   rating system to inform the public, to put

15   pressure on the school districts. I think

16   that, you know, coming at it from that angle --

17   we've seen how Broward County refuses to do the

18   necessary things they need to do in an, in an

19   urgency time frame, but when brought out into

20   the public, and exerted pressure on them, they

21   respond. I think all districts would do the

22   same.

23   CHAIR: Okay, we're going to try and wrap

24   this up here. Commissioner Bartlett, go ahead.

25   ASA BARTLETT: Just to go back to the

1   accountability, I think we all agree that there

2   should be some level of that with this tool or

3   it means nothing at all, and we've seen that,

4   and that's what our comments have been focused

5   on. And if Tallahassee is going to be making

6   in the next few weeks a decision as to who

7   would be the body to make that decision as to

8   accountability, and ultimately withhold those

9   funds, should we not go ahead and make a

10   recommendation to the committee, maybe through

11   a resolution that, that, Mr. Chairman, you can

12   carry up to Tallahassee and tell them that we

13   feel that it would be best with the Department

14   of Education, so that since they are the

15   originators of this tool, and they are the ones

16   who are going to implement it by having it

17   submitted, and ultimately reviewing it, they

18   should make that decision?

19   CHAIR: We can do that. I'm trying to --

20   as you say that I'm trying, you know, figure

21   out exactly, you know -- we have, you know, two

22   Bills that are pending. One -- and they just

23   filed a delete all this morning. Is there --

24   is there anything that -- it will be up

25   tomorrow morning, so I haven't had time to read

1   the delete all. Heather is looking at it, but

2   -- okay, so one of the things, and Senator Diaz

3   filed the delete all this morning. So this is

4   good. It does change, and we thank them for

5   that, it does change the FSSAT submission date

6   to October 1st, so that would give us the

7   opportunity that we're looking for, that we

8   could get ahead, ahead of time, hopefully for

9   June, we could do a closed meeting in June, and

10   we could all see the work and then give you

11   feedback on it, and see where that goes.

12   And it does say in here as well, and this

13   is what is in there, is that each school

14   specific, this is Line 791 of the delete all,

15   each school specific assessment must be

16   approved by the district superintendent, or his

17   or her designee, who must be the school safety

18   specialists or a deputy superintendent, any

19   superintendent who fails to comply with the

20   requirements of this subjection is subject to

21   the penalties, and it lists the statute, and

22   other sanctions that may be applied by the

23   commissioner or the state board.

24   So I think that that's exactly what we're

25   looking for, but again this is what's in the

1   Senate Bill, and the House Bill is very

2   different, so, you know, perhaps if you wanted

3   to, and we can do it by motion and consensus,

4   is to stress to the house that this commission

5   supports the accountability framework that's in

6   the Senate Bill, and encourages the House to

7   adopt these accountability measures that the

8   Senate Bill seems to have.

9   I don't want to put words in your mouth,

10   or make the motion, but --

11   ASA BARTLETT: No, no, I would make that

12   motion, absolutely.

13   CHAIR: Okay. I think that might be the

14   best way to go, is -- so if that's -- we can --

15   if the motion is, is to ask the House to

16   support the accountability measures that are in

17   the Senate Bill, and the framework in that, we

18   can certainly do that.

19   ASA BARTLETT: That would be my motion.

20   COMM. SCHACHTER: I would second that.

21   CHAIR: Second by Mr. Schachter. Does

22   anybody -- any of you have any other comment on

23   that?

24   CHF. LYSTEAD: And the timeframe for the

25   FSSAT.

1   CHAIR: Yeah, the time -- and the time

2   frame, and support, and ask the House to

3   support the timeframe of October 1st as well.

4   Okay. Any other discussion or comment on that?

5   So all in favor?

6   (AYE)

7   CHAIR: Any opposed, same? Okay, so that

8   motion carries, and we'll make sure that we

9   convey that to them. So, all right, as we wrap

10   this up -- so that's good news. So we just

11   ask, Sylvia, and for Director Kelly, if you all

12   would, you know, see what you can do to --

13   assuming that this passes this way, but

14   assuming it does see what you can do to bring

15   that in to give us time -- what I'd like to do

16   for efficiency and effectiveness is to be able

17   to have you all give us your proposed new

18   instruments at least a week before the June

19   meeting so that we can get it out to all the

20   commission members, you'll all have time to

21   review it, and then we'll schedule a closed

22   session during the June meetings so that then

23   we can review it, talk about it, and give you

24   all feedback on it.

25   Okay, so if that would work that would be

1   helpful.

2   MS. IFFT: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

3   CHAIR: Okay, Commissioner Mayhew, go

4   ahead.

5   SEC. MAYHEW: I just want to ask a

6   question, and I may not completely understand

7   the value of the tool as it relates to existing

8   statutory requirements, and my only concern

9   that I would express is I wouldn't want the --

10   I appreciate the need for the changes in the

11   tool. I wouldn't want that to distract from

12   the sense of urgency around existing

13   compliance, and often tools become the excuse,

14   well, the rules are changing, or the approach

15   to it is changing, and so I just would want to

16   continue to stress the accountability around

17   very clear existing statutory requirements, and

18   the need for accountability, and the sense of

19   urgency around that compliance, and not allow

20   changes to the tool to distract from that.

21   CHAIR: Point well taken. And, you know,

22   as opposed to doing it for the right reasons

23   they're going it, they're working toward the

24   tool as opposed to working toward proper

25   assessments and safety, I think is.

1   SEC. MAYHEW: And I would just say from a

2   past life and experience around issues around

3   hospital safety after a report on medical

4   errors, and the number of preventable deaths as

5   a result of medical errors, the process that

6   occurred around collecting data, the data was

7   garbage, it was a lack of integrity in the

8   information provided until money was attached,

9   and that's where the rubber met the road, and

10   all of the sudden the data improved, and

11   hospitals were concerned about public

12   accountability around their quality and safety.

13   Again, I understand the concerns about

14   shining a spotlight on vulnerabilities here,

15   but --

16   CHAIR: Yeah. All right, thank you.

17   Thanks, Sylvia. Thank you, Simie. So we're

18   going to have to again make some more

19   adjustments to the schedule, which is fine

20   because this is all worthwhile and necessary

21   discussion. So what we're going to do, it's

22   10:40. We're going to break for fifteen

23   minutes. We're going to come back sharp at

24   10:55, and we are going to postpone the

25   presentation on SESIR, and we're going to move

1   right into the family reunification panel. I

2   know some of our panels have schedules that

3   they're on.

4   And this is a new area that we weren't

5   able to cover last time. We'll kind of set it

6   up when we get back, but there were concerns

7   raised by the families about the reunification

8   process, process, we have a family member

9   panel, and then we have some presentations. So

10   we'll figure out the revised schedule, but

11   let's take fifteen minutes, and then when we

12   come back, we'll begin with the reunification.

13   (Thereupon, a brief recess is had.)

14   CHAIR: I think we're all set in trying to

15   figure out this schedule here for the rest of

16   the day. What we're going to do is do the

17   family reunification panel now, and we'll from

18   now until 12:15, and then at 12:15 we'll break

19   for lunch, and then we'll come back and we'll

20   figure out the rest of it this afternoon. So

21   to the family members who are here with us we

22   thank you for participating in this. The

23   purpose of this discussion, with your initial

24   start through this panel, is to address the

25   area of reunification and death notification.

1   There were a number of concerns that have

2   been raised in this event, and others, and one

3   of the things to set the stage as we begin to

4   this is that I want to, you know, make this

5   comment, having been involved in many of these

6   situations with death notifications and

7   reunification, and frankly being on both sides

8   of it, making them and receiving them, it's a

9   bad process for everybody, and it is a, to say

10   the least, an extremely emotional process, and

11   in many respects the success of the process is

12   driven by the individuals and their individual

13   feelings and emotions, and et cetera, and that

14   are happening at the time.

15   So I can say that I don't think there's --

16   and there is no one right way, but there is

17   definitely a wrong way. And the purpose of

18   this is to get your perspectives so that we can

19   hopefully, excuse me, we can hopefully make

20   some recommendations, and do things better in

21   the future. The purpose of this, at least from

22   my perspective, is we decided to do this, is

23   that in no way, shape, or form to lay blame, it

24   is to figure out what works, what doesn't work,

25   and to get individual perspectives on it.

1   I can tell you that the people I know, the

2   people on the ground, the boots on the ground,

3   the deputies the detectives, the personnel with

4   the Broward County Sheriff's Office who were

5   involved in this with you all are extremely

6   caring people who care about you all, who care

7   about the families, who care about the victims,

8   and care about their jobs, and they were trying

9   to do what they could with what they had to

10   work with. If there is room for improvement, I

11   would suggest that it's above them. This isn't

12   about the. This about either the lack of

13   policies, the lack of processes. To some

14   degree I think we'll hear the lack of command

15   and control, which we already saw in other

16   aspects of this.

17   And so we're going to hear today from the

18   family members, followed by a report from FDLE

19   on what happened at Pulse, and then followed by

20   Captain Francis from Seminole County Sheriff's

21   Office on some best practices. You're not

22   going to hear today from the Broward County

23   Sheriff's Office. And I've talked to Sheriff

24   Tony about it, and they will be invited in in

25   June, at the next meeting, to provide some

1   perspective on it, but you're not going to hear

2   from today. It's not that we're not going to

3   hear from them, but it is not going to be today

4   that we're going to do that.

5   So the way we're going to begin this is to

6   hear the individual perspectives of the family

7   members, and Detective Bonasoro, and Sergeant

8   Suess, and others, have had meetings and

9   discussions with the family members, and it was

10   decided that for the ease of presentation for

11   them is, is that Detective Bonasoro is going to

12   run through for you their -- the facts as they

13   have told their story, they have all seen

14   these, and agree that these facts are accurate,

15   and then we're going to hear from them

16   directly.

17   But the purpose in running through it in

18   the PowerPoint slide is just to get it out

19   there so they don't have to sit here and

20   recount all of this. So we're -- he's going to

21   run through it, and then we have a series of

22   questions. And I know, Mr. Guttenberg, I know

23   you have a plane to catch so we're going to go

24   first without with the questions, and then get

25   to the others, and hear anything and everything

1   you all want to tell us. I know this is hard

2   for you, to say the least, but we appreciate

3   you being here, and our goal is, is to make it

4   better for anybody else that may have to go

5   through this in the future.

6   So, Wally, why don't you go ahead and

7   start, and then we'll hear from the individual

8   family members.

9   PRESENTATION - REUNIFICATION AND INJURY/DEATH

10   NOTIFICATION

11   DET. BONOSARO: Thank you, Sheriff.

12   Before we get started, just introductions to

13   the new commission members. Fred Guttenberg,

14   parent of Jamie Guttenberg. Tony Montalto,

15   father of Gina Montalto. This is Debbie Hixon,

16   the wife of Christopher Hixon. And Gena and

17   Tom Hoyer, mother and father of Luke Hoyer.

18   Again, today I'm going to discuss the death

19   notification process as perceived by the four

20   families here today. I will be narrating a

21   synopsis of their experiences, discussing some

22   common perceptions, facilitating a question and

23   answer discussion from us and you all, and

24   lastly, the families will be provided with the

25   option to make a closing statement.

1   Tom and Gena Hoyer, parents of Luke Hoyer.

2   And that day Gena Hoyer was at home when she

3   was contacted by a friend, who told her to turn

4   on the television because there had been a

5   shooting at the high school. Gena describes

6   the news showing fire rescue working on what

7   appeared to be a student outside of the school.

8   Gena immediately contacted her husband Tom.

9   Gena tried to call Luke, but he did not answer.

10   She thought that Luke may have left his phone

11   inside of the school while trying to evacuate.

12   After not hearing anything she thought he might

13   have been injured and decided that she and Tom

14   would to go to local hospitals to try and

15   locate their son.

16   Tom called the Broward Hospital, and was

17   told by the charge nurse that she could not say

18   if Luke was at the hospital and did not provide

19   any further information to him at all. Tom

20   then drove to the hospital in an attempt to

21   locate his son but was denied entry because the

22   hospital was on lockdown. Tom had to enter

23   through the emergency room, and finally he was

24   able to speak to staff there. Gena responded

25   to the North Broward Hospital, where she was

1   told to respond to the Marriott for additional

2   information.

3   Upon arrival at the Marriott Tom and Gena

4   checked in with BSO personnel, who took their

5   names and asked for Luke's information. Tom

6   and Gena were then placed in a ballroom with

7   several other people and were called out to

8   smaller rooms outside of the ballroom to again

9   provide Luke's information several more times.

10   While waiting in the ballroom, the police asked

11   the families to provide pictures of their

12   children. According to Gena the families were

13   asked several more times to provide pictures of

14   the children after previously doing so.

15   Although there were many law enforcement

16   agencies present there it was unfortunate that

17   none were providing any information to the

18   families. Gena exclaimed that she had no idea

19   who was in charge. At approximately 1:00 a.m.

20   Tom and Gena were called to a separate room and

21   were advised that Luke had been shot and

22   killed. Gena was told that Luke was alone when

23   he was killed on the third floor of Building

24   12. She did find out several days later that

25   she had been provided with some misinformation,

1   and that Luke had actually been shot on the

2   first floor of Building 12 and was in close

3   proximity to Gina Montalto and Martin Duque.

4   Immediately after being told of their son's

5   death, Gina advised that she was asked to sign

6   some unknown type paperwork.

7   Fred and Jennifer Guttenberg, Guttenberg,

8   parents of Jaime. Fred received a call from

9   his son, who also attended the high school, and

10   told his dad that there had been a shooting at

11   the school. He said he could not find his

12   sister and was running because he had heard

13   gunfire. Fred instructed him to keep running.

14   Fred and Jennifer begin to text and call

15   Jamie's phone, with no response. Through some

16   sort of GPS app or locator they knew the phone

17   was still at the school.

18   At approximately 3:00 p.m. Fred made a

19   post on Facebook trying to locate Jamie.

20   Between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. he received a

21   message to go to the Marriott. Fred -- Fred

22   sent some of Jamie's dance friends and their

23   families to the hotel so that he could attempt

24   to locate Jamie, possibly at the hospital.

25   Jamie was not at the hospital. The hospital

1   staff also checked other databases as well but

2   could not locate her.

3   At approximately 5:00 p.m. Fred received

4   information via Jamie's friends that Jamie was

5   also not at the Marriott. At this point Fred

6   reached out to a personal friend who knew Jamie

7   and is also a detective who was at the scene of

8   the shooting. It was then Fred received

9   confirmation that Jamie had been killed. Fred

10   received this information while he was en-route

11   to the Marriott Hotel.

12   Fred had contacted his wife, and his wife

13   demanded to know what was going on. Fred

14   requested that they wait until they get to the

15   Marriott so he could give, provide her with

16   this information. She was insistent, so Fred

17   decided that he would tell his wife to pull off

18   onto the shoulder, and it was there he told his

19   wife that Jamie had been murdered.

20   The Guttenberg's did not respond to the

21   Marriott initially, and instead drove back to

22   their home to be with friends and family. The

23   media was there almost immediately. At

24   approximately 9:30 Fred and Jennifer decided to

25   leave their home to be with the other families

1   at the Marriott. They were there until

2   approximately 2:30 a.m. Upon their arrival

3   they were also placed in a room full of other

4   people, provided with little information and

5   little empathy.

6   Fred describes one of the victim's parents

7   is having a meltdown due to the lack of

8   information provided. He also stated that it

9   felt like a seven-hour vacuum, and did not

10   recall seeing any victims, or victim advocates

11   present. While at the hotel they received the

12   official death notification from BSO personnel

13   at around 1:30 a.m.

14   Tony and Jennifer Montalto, parents of

15   Gina Montalto. Tony Montalto found out about

16   the shooting, along with his wife, and his wife

17   immediately responded to the school. Upon her

18   arrival the students were coming out, but

19   Jennifer could not locate Gina. She called her

20   cell phone, but did not get an answer.

21   Jennifer thought that Gina may have left her

22   phone behind when trying to escape from the

23   shooting.

24   At some point Jennifer was told outside,

25   just outside of the school, that she needed to

1   go to the Marriott for additional information.

2   She saw the chaos there upon arrival and

3   decided not to go in. Tony and Jennifer

4   received information that a female matching

5   Gina's description was possibly at the

6   hospital, so they decided to head there instead

7   of going to the hotel. Actually Gina, I'm

8   sorry, Jennifer responded to the hospital while

9   Tony went to the hotel.

10   Tony was told that if he went inside the

11   hotel he would not be allowed to leave. He

12   decided not to enter, and instead headed to

13   meet Jennifer at the hospital. While at the

14   hospital Jennifer was not provided with any

15   information and was only asked what Gina was

16   wearing that day. Gina was then separated from

17   her family and friends who were there to

18   support her. She was instructed to sit in a

19   room by herself while she awaited Tony's

20   arrival.

21   Again, Jennifer was not given any

22   information when asked, and was only asked what

23   had, what Gina had been wearing. According to

24   Tony a priest, or some other religious

25   official, was present when a BSO detective, and

1   possibly a counselor, notified Tony and

2   Jennifer that their daughter Gina was deceased.

3   They were not provided with any additional

4   information, according to them. They asked to

5   see Gina, and were told no. Tony and Jennifer

6   were visibly shaken, but were not offered a

7   ride home, or any other assistance.

8   Debbie Hixon, wife of Christopher Hixon.

9   Debbie was working at her school when she saw

10   the news of a shooting at Chris' school. She

11   said she called Chris' phone around 2:42 p.m.,

12   and it was answered by security specialist

13   Kelvin Greenleaf. Mr. Greenleaf didn't say

14   anything. He passed the phone to Assistant

15   Principal Jeff Morford, who also didn't say

16   anything. Debbie was not provided with any

17   information at all based on that phone call.

18   Debbie left her school at 3:30 p.m. and

19   decided to go home. She was then contacted by

20   the Cadre Director for High School Principals,

21   who advised her that Chris had been shot, and

22   told her to go to the Marriott. Debbie arrived

23   at the Marriott around 7:30 p.m. She met with

24   somebody from the FBI who seemed ready to tell

25   her something, but instead directed her to

1   another room, where she felt that she was

2   forgotten.

3   She states the Red Cross was present at

4   the hotel, and Debbie felt that the FBI was in

5   charge. She was asked to provide pictures of

6   Chris. The FBI and other law enforcement

7   personnel repeatedly gave instructions for the

8   parents, but she was unsure what to do since

9   she wasn't a parent. Debbie received several

10   messages on her cell phone offering condolences

11   but hadn't yet been notified of Chris' death.

12   At around 10:00 p.m. she showed texts to

13   law enforcement officials and told them that

14   she needed answers. She was informed that she

15   would need to go to the hospital in order to

16   get any new information, and that she would be

17   able to meet somebody from BSO there. At

18   around 11:00 p.m. she arrived at the hospital

19   but did not find anyone from BSO. The hospital

20   staff said that at 3:00 p.m. they knew Chris

21   was deceased, and that law enforcement was

22   supposed to notify here.

23   At 2:00 a.m. BSO called Debbie to

24   officially notify her that Chris was deceased.

25   At this point Debbie was already home and knew

1   of Chris' death. In the following days a

2   detective came by to apologize for the

3   notification process taking so long.

4   At this time we're going to point out some

5   common concerns and perceptions of the, of the

6   families that we spoke to. Relating to

7   organization, there was a lack of communication

8   from officials regarding the unification site.

9   Again, this is understandable, this was at the

10   school, everything was happening real fast.

11   Word of mouth did spread very quickly, and it

12   did seem that everybody knew to respond to the

13   Marriott.

14   There was no indication that any entity

15   was in charge. There were multiple law

16   enforcement agencies present. It was

17   described, a lack of organization at the

18   reunification site. Families were isolated to

19   a room where they waited for hours and were

20   given little to no information. One family was

21   provided with misinformation. Families were

22   not provided with a single point of contact.

23   The media was allowed to be in close proximity

24   to the Marriott.

25   The families in the larger room could hear

1   the crying and screaming coming from the

2   smaller rooms, and it felt like it was, they

3   were waiting to be slaughtered, according to

4   one family. And this was during the

5   notifications, when they were being made.

6   Regarding support, it was described that

7   families were separated from their own personal

8   support groups, not aware of the presence of

9   any victim advocates, not shown appropriate

10   empathy, not given any transportation or

11   assistance after the notification, and not

12   provided with any information on what to expect

13   in the upcoming days.

14   So at this point what we'll do is we'll

15   transition into some questions for the

16   families, and this first question is for all

17   families. During the process what do you think

18   went well, and what do you think could have

19   been done differently; Tom and Gena?

20   MS. HOYER: I'm Gena Hoyer, Luke's mom.

21   Our experience, what went well, after we were

22   told of Luke's passing, they managed to get us

23   out of the building with no press. They let

24   all of our friends join us in the room where

25   they told us. We had a lot of people with us,

1   and I knew when they told us they could all

2   come with us. I knew it wasn't going to be

3   good news. They did let Luke's friends come

4   back there too. We were glad that they

5   separated us in the reunification ballroom,

6   kids were being reunited with their parents. A

7   volunteer did take Tom around in the beginning

8   to look for Luke privately.

9   Also in our experience the things that

10   could have been done differently, we would have

11   preferred to have known if they had suspected

12   someone matching Luke's description so we

13   wouldn't have been in the dark for so long. We

14   would have liked to have had a liaison to keep

15   us better informed what was going on at the

16   school.

17   DET. BONOSARO: Debbie.

18   MS. HIXON: My name is Debbie Hixon. What

19   went right really for us only was that the Red

20   Cross was there. My son was active duty in the

21   Marines and trying to get home, and they did

22   have to notify them with a Red Cross

23   representative, and she was very helpful,

24   really the only person in that room that day

25   that was helpful at all.

1   Things that I would recommend is that

2   there was a room full of officers that were

3   doing nothing really because they didn't have a

4   directive. It would have been nice if they

5   would have assigned on officer to each of the

6   families so that we only had to communicate

7   with one person, in that, you know, if we had

8   questions for them, or if they had questions

9   for us, because as they mentioned we numerous

10   times were brought into a smaller room and

11   asked for photos, date of birth, you know,

12   continually, and it -- I would have rather if

13   someone said, you know, we suspect that, that

14   Chris isn't here, and then later been told, oh,

15   we were wrong, than just sit through all of

16   those hours thinking that something was

17   different just to find out in the way that I

18   did that he was gone.

19   MR. MONTALTO: I'm Tony Montalto. I think

20   as Sheriff Gualtieri said the people that were

21   in the room that day did the best they could,

22   so anything we say that could be improved is

23   not a knock on them. We realize this was a

24   mass tragedy.

25   Jennifer and I were at North Broward

1   Hospital, and before I was able to get there,

2   because I was stuck in traffic, they pulled Jen

3   aside and left her in a small room without her

4   friends that were there to support her. That

5   was a terrible and isolating feeling for her.

6   We were on the cell phones as best we could,

7   but they were sporadic because of the overload

8   to the system, and the location where she was

9   in the hospital. Although they knew I was

10   coming there was nobody waiting at the door to

11   direct me where to go. I had to find a place

12   to get into.

13   I had met up with Jen, and they pulled us

14   into a small room off the cafeteria. You might

15   imagine it's never good when you get called

16   into the small room. In the time my wife was

17   there before I got there, I felt terrible that

18   she was alone during that process. Once we got

19   there, some, some people came in, and again, I

20   apologize for not having a total recall of the

21   situation, but I remember when they told us

22   here, we were in this glass room where

23   everybody could see us, everybody could see our

24   initial reaction. Not a good place.

25   When we tried to compose ourselves and

1   communicate to our other family members, we

2   couldn't make cell phone calls, we couldn't,

3   and that's, nobody was restricting us other

4   than the physical problems of cell

5   communication. When we tried to dial out from

6   the hospital phone it took a long time to get

7   anybody to give us the right process to get

8   help. Once we left, visibly shaken, nobody

9   walked us past the press, or anybody else that

10   was out in front of that hospital. It was up

11   to us to find a way just to avoid it. Nobody

12   gave us a piece of paper that said in the

13   coming days follow this process, and we'll be

14   reaching out to you as well.

15   We ran into a group of, a group of Jen's

16   friends, and they pulled her aside, and I tried

17   get her away as soon as possible to, to get us

18   where we needed to go. So it would have been

19   nice to have an escort to the car, to have

20   somebody else handle that duty. It would have

21   been nice to maybe be driven home after hearing

22   such terrible news, have some kind of escort at

23   least to get us where we needed to go. Without

24   that escort, as I tried to get home, we live

25   very close to the school, and we couldn't get

1 down the street to get to our home. We had to

2 turn around and find another way even though we

3 told the officer who stopped us that we had

4 just lost our daughter.

5   So then after this initial tragedy your

6 faced with, you know, I think they gave us the

7 Coroner's number to call the next day, and

8 that's all we had. There should be a

9 pre-planned, a form that's all ready to go,

10 that can be printed and distributed to families

11 of the deceased so they have an idea of what's

12 going on, or what to expect in the coming days.

13 Being involved in a crime is not like having

14 someone pass away from an illness, it's a whole

15 new process, as we learned when we were told we

16 couldn't see our daughter. That's it.

17   DET. BONOSARO: Thank you, Tony.

18   MR. GUTTENBERG: Fred Guttenberg. My

19 daughter was Jamie. My story is a little

20 different in that we, because we knew Jamie's

21 phone was still in the school, and I often joke

22 that if Jamie's shoelace got untied she would

23 text my wife to let her know, we knew if Jamie

24 has a way to reach, especially my wife, she

25 would have, and when we were not hearing we

1   quickly lost faith that maybe she just dropped

2   her phone and would try to reach us through a

3   friend's phone when all those friends started

4   reaching their parents.

5   So we made the decision early on, go to

6   North Broward Hospital. I will say very early

7   on in the process, and this is I think what

8   went right, and I don't remember how I heard

9   it, if it was through radio, TV, social media,

10   people were being told to go to the Marriott.

11   That news, that structure, that place, it got

12   known soon, so the ability to pick a place and

13   direct people quickly and in an organized way

14   was for me I think a right.

15   My wife and I chose not to go there

16   because we didn't think our daughter was going

17   there. We chose to go to the hospital, and as

18   we learned from the notes my friend who was a

19   police officer found my daughter, and so it was

20   on the way home from the hospital that we

21   learned, and we went straight home.

22   My perspective on the Marriott though, we

23   went there, we had already known, but my wife

24   and I and my son decided we just needed to be

25   with the other families, so went to the

1   Marriott. I'm going to say it was around 8:30,

2   9:00 at night. And without the trauma of

3   waiting to hear I got to look at what was

4   happening there from the perspective of a -- it

5   didn't make sense to me. And this isn't a

6   knock on any of the wonderful people who were

7   working there that night, because everybody was

8   working hard, but you had an active crime scene

9   with investigators who were at the Marriott,

10   but they were still engaged in the active crime

11   scene.

12   They were still communicating with the

13   Coroners. They were still trying to gather

14   information. That's what was going on in the

15   hallway, and then there was the big room with

16   all the families, and there was really nothing

17   going in there. And I walked into these

18   families who were struggling with nothing,

19   nothing, and they had already been there for

20   hours and they had nothing. And then I was

21   there for hours later, and that's why I

22   described it as like this seven- hour vacuum,

23   nothing.

24   To me that is the ultimate disconnect and

25   torture that was taking place. I this weekend

1   had an opportunity to spend the weekend,

2   actually with Max and some of the other

3   families in Pittsburg with the Temple families.

4   What we learned is their experience was exactly

5   the same, it wasn't different. And so I think

6   the lesson there is these tragedies, they're

7   happening, and maybe what could come out of

8   this commission is, is a template, a best

9   practices, a what to do.

10   And number one on that list needs to be

11   the families, and it needs to be having, it

12   needs to be a process where all the

13   investigators continue doing what they need to

14   do, the Coroner continues doing what he needs

15   to do, but there's also that team that is

16   focused on the families, getting the

17   information to the families, comforting the

18   families, and, and just making sure there isn't

19   the vacuum, because for me looking at what was

20   going on, that, other than the mistakes, it was

21   that complete and utter lack of information,

22   and that has to be a part of any best practice

23   going forward. So I thank you for your time.

24   DET. BONOSARO: Thanks, Fred. Did you

25   want to make a statement now? You can go ahead

1   and do that now, a closing statement, so that

2   way you can take off?

3   MR. GUTTENBERG: February 14th never

4   should have happened. That's what you guys

5   have been here for months, and we as a group of

6   families often say everything that could have

7   gone wrong before, during, and after, did. In

8   our most immediate time of need there were a

9   lot of good people who were also struggling

10   with what happened, and they had no bad

11   intention, but there was a command and control

12   issue. I think hopefully out of the best

13   practices, you know, we think of command and

14   control during the time of the emergency, but

15   it applies here as well.

16   So I just want to say somehow or another

17   in this process the families ended up last on

18   the priority of things that needed to be dealt

19   with, and again, now having just spent the

20   weekend in Pittsburg, it was the same there,

21   and so just as my closing statement, we

22   families who were the most affected that day,

23   and continue to be, I hope in any best practice

24   that goes forward everything that gets done,

25   that gets decided, starts with the families

1   first, you know, we don't get to change what

2   happened.

3   We all know it's going to happen again.

4   It's going to happen again, and so hopefully

5   before it does happen again you'll put a

6   priority on getting out the best practices on

7   how to deal with this part, so that whether it

8   be here in Florida, or somewhere else in the

9   country, they'll have the benefit of, of your

10   wisdom and knowledge on this. So thank you.

11   DET. BONOSARO: Thanks, Fred.

12   CHAIR: Yeah, thanks, Mr. Guttenberg for

13   being here. I know you have a plane to catch.

14   Do you have a few minutes? Do you got a couple

15   minutes yet?

16   MR. GUTTENBERG: Yeah, I still got a few.

17   Thank you.

18   CHAIR: Okay. All right, we'll try -- and

19   we can do this, because I know, and just in

20   case you do have to go are there any

21   commission, commission members have any

22   specific questions just for Mr. Guttenberg at

23   this point? Sheriff Judd, do you?

24   SHER. JUDD: Mine is just for the group.

25   CHAIR: What's -- I'm sorry?

1   SHER. JUDD: Mine -- mine is for, for the

2   group. The -- obviously the number one concern

3   is that we tell you that you've lost your loved

4   one, and then we come back seven hours later

5   and go, well, we made a mistake, and you go

6   you've tortured me for seven hours to think my

7   loved one is dead. The other issue that occurs

8   is when this horrific event occurs not only do

9   you have all the collateral issues that

10   occurring, but sometimes we don't know who's

11   there, and we've got literally, you know,

12   there's no identification on some of these

13   folks, so I would rather error on the side that

14   you think collectively we do.

15   Do we tell you early on there is a young

16   lady, there's a young man wearing, you know,

17   blue jeans and a red shirt, and a gold necklace

18   that says I love mom, and we don't know if it's

19   your daughter or not, but that's what we know,

20   and we think to -- because our big fear is that

21   we give this, quote/unquote notification, and

22   it's not that person. And we are taught in our

23   world, and this is why when you talk about best

24   practices in a new world, you are the subject

25   matter experts, unfortunately you're the

1   subject matter experts, tell us that you'd

2   rather have incomplete information, or not

3   totally accurate information quick, as opposed

4   to totally accurate information seven hours

5   later.

6   MS. HIXON: I personally would have

7   rather -- I would have rather had someone say

8   there's a chance, there's a likelihood. I mean

9   in my instance Chris was identified at 3:00 in

10   the afternoon, I didn't find out until 1:00

11   a.m., so those don't fall true. For me I'd

12   rather somebody said there's a chance so that I

13   could start to process, and when those texts

14   started coming in that it didn't completely

15   throw me off balance the way that it did.

16   I mean, I get what you're saying, because

17   you don't want to be, tell someone someone is

18   gone and then find out later, but some

19   information would have been better than none in

20   my, in my opinion.

21   MR. HOYER: Going what we went through I

22   would prefer that we had been told something

23   earlier rather than waiting all those hours. I

24   understand what you're saying, it's a trade

25   off, but, you know, being told that our son or

1   daughter, or husband might be dead, finding out

2   later they're not, you know, I'm going to

3   remember the happy moment of finding out that

4   they weren't dead.

5   The -- the hours that we spent in that

6   room are, I just think not knowing much harder,

7   I think than the other way around, where we

8   would just would have found something out

9   earlier, even if it was a maybe. Just like

10   Debbie said, been able to start processing it a

11   little bit, I think it would have been better

12   that way.

13   CHAIR: What about, Mr. Montalto, Mr.

14   Guttenberg, do you want to weigh in on that at

15   all?

16   MR. MONTALTO: Well, I wasn't at the

17   Marriott, except for my brief time, but I will

18   say that, you know, somebody needs to be in the

19   room with the families. Throwing a bunch of

20   people together who may or may not have lost

21   somebody in a smaller room, everybody knows

22   once you're isolated in the smaller room you're

23   in the pool, you're not going to get good news.

24   And I would agree that we would rather have

25   some time to begin to process it, or process it

1   together, rather than, than getting nothing.

2   But just as importantly we need to deploy

3   counselors and victim's advocates immediately.

4   I understand from law enforcement you're

5   looking at securing the scene, and doing many,

6   many things. There's got to be people, though,

7   on the back end of your command that look out

8   for the families and the experience that they

9   are suffering through. And I realize you're

10   learning, and everybody is learning as we

11   proceed unfortunately through these mass

12   tragedies, but, you know, in my business I've

13   got to take care of the back of the airplane as

14   well. I would suggest that to law enforcement

15   folks, they remember that the victim's families

16   in the community need to be taken care of as

17   part of these mass casualty events.

18   CHAIR: Go ahead.

19   SHER. JUDD: Let me wrap up with certainly

20   every agency should have protocols, have

21   systems and processes as they move families to

22   a reunification area, and have support staff

23   there. What - what I'm hearing here, and I'm

24   willing as an agency head to take that

25   liability, I would much rather give you bad

1   news and have you real angry when you find out

2   it's wrong, and that your loved one is alive,

3   than you sit here a year later and said we were

4   tortured beyond all understanding.

5   And I can reinforce that with my agency,

6   and we as a commission with a set of best

7   practices can say, listen, give them the best

8   information you have at the time, and if you

9   don't know say I don't know but we're, we're

10   trying to get clothing descriptions, and IDs,

11   and then on the back side of it we tell our

12   crime scene teams if, if they have

13   identification on them tell us that there's,

14   that there's identification, and let's move

15   that to reunification area immediately.

16   So I'm -- I am willing as an agency head

17   to say, look, I would rather error on the other

18   side, because my subject matter experts are

19   telling me please give us the best information

20   you have, if it's incomplete tell us it's

21   incomplete, but tell us this is our best

22   information now, we hope we're wrong but it

23   looks grim. Is -- is that what we're hearing?

24   MR. GUTTENBERG: 100%.

25   CHAIR: And is probably -- this one piece

1   of information is probably I'd say, and I'm not

2   sure what else we're going to hear here is,

3   while we ask you a few more questions, but it's

4   probably for us and our processes the most

5   important piece of information that we could

6   get from you out of this panel, because it is

7   so counter to all existing thought processes

8   and protocols. And the experts, whoever they

9   are, have always told us the opposite. And

10   this is extremely important that we get it

11   right, and that others don't go through the

12   angst that you all went through, because

13   frankly it seems like torment, of sitting

14   there, because you're hanging onto hope, that

15   glimmer, even though you may know because

16   you're in the bubble, and in that room that's

17   not, it's a horrific place to be, you're

18   hanging on because nobody has told you, and I

19   think that we have to take away from this and,

20   and absolutely rethink this entire process, and

21   get it out to people that -- we say this so

22   much it almost sounds like broken record, in

23   the last year that we've been here, but we need

24   to do it differently. This is yet another

25   thing that seems like it needs to be done

1   differently.

2   MR. GUTTENBERG: Can I?

3   CHAIR: Go ahead.

4   MR. GUTTENBERG: I got a question, because

5   it wasn't -- because I'm so in agreement with

6   everything that was just said here, and

7   directionally, but to go a step further it

8   wasn't even that there was good or bad

9   information, there was zero information.

10   CHAIR: Right.

11   MR. GUTTENBERG: So you're in a room --

12   you're just -- there's nothing, and, you know,

13   as a, as a part of rethinking, and I don't know

14   if this is feasible, once the families have

15   checked in and you know they're missing their

16   loved one, isn't it an option to say to them

17   would you rather go wait at home, and we'll

18   make sure that an advocate goes home with you,

19   and is there to handle any coordination, you

20   can be in the comfort of your home with people

21   you love, and we'll get you the information as

22   quickly as we can, and we'll keep you up to

23   date?

24   CHAIR: Well, the problem is, and it seems

25   like, and again another common theme to this

1   is, is that, you all touched on it, is, is that

2   nobody was in charge, and because nobody was in

3   charge nobody was giving the people there that

4   direction. And I can tell you that the people

5   who were there that are line level people are

6   not going to make that decision to tell you

7   anyway, they're not going to make that decision

8   to send you home. They're not going to make

9   those things because they're -- and we'll find

10   out, but it doesn't seem like that there was a

11   casualty policy, or that there was a specific

12   framework, and they didn't have an identified

13   incident commander.

14   I mean they didn't have an identified

15   incident commander at the scene of the

16   shooting, so what makes you think they're going

17   to have an identified incident commander at the

18   reunification site? So it seems to be that

19   that's, you know, a common theme. And I'm

20   going to say it again, because I know, and I

21   hope you all can appreciate this, that there is

22   concern on the part of some of those people who

23   were there, some of those deputies, detectives,

24   the homicide detectives, and others, there's

25   concern about what's going to come out of this

1   today, because I can tell you again that they

2   care very much about you all, and they were

3   trying to do the best that they could with what

4   they had available to them in the decision

5   making authority that was at their level, and

6   they didn't have much, so again, and you said

7   this, but I think it's important to reiterate,

8   that this isn't about them, this is about

9   higher level, Mr. Montalto, you mentioned that,

10   about higher level process and at the higher

11   level, so but it, given the people who were

12   there, and what they didn't have at their

13   disposal, it seems like they weren't equipped

14   to be able to make those decisions.

15   So let's get through some more. I know we

16   have more commission questions, but why don't

17   you go ahead and finish some more, the

18   questions you have, and --

19   DET. BONOSARO: Most of the questions had

20   already been answered through their

21   discussions. So I do want to touch one thing,

22   is social media is a huge part of society right

23   now, and, Debbie, you received condolences

24   before, several hours before you even received

25   official notification. Can you talk a little

1   bit about that?

2   MS. HIXON: Yeah, so when we were at the

3   Marriott, we were watching TV. I'm not -- I'm

4   old so I'm not really into the Facebook thing,

5   and I really wasn't even on my phone once we

6   got to the Marriott because I was desperate for

7   people to tell me what was going on, but my

8   phone started dinging, and dinging, and

9   dinging, and it -- I don't know if there was,

10   something came -- actually I think something

11   came out on Facebook, one of the ex-basketball

12   players that played at South Broward posted

13   something about Chris being gone, and then

14   everyone else started texting me, and I just --

15   I hadn't even really had an official

16   person tell me that he had been shot, and all

17   of the sudden all of these people that cared

18   about me were saying how sorry they were. And

19   I literally threw my phone across the room, and

20   I said I can't do this, I can't do it. And it

21   was not how I should have found out. I mean I

22   really didn't know -- I knew but I didn't.

23   That's not how it should have happened.

24   DET. BONOSARO: Thank you. And along the

25   lines of with information being provided, Gena

1   and Tom, you guys were told some information

2   about Luke during the notification. Can you

3   tell us what you were told, and what you kind

4   of found out later on?

5   MS. HOYER: Yes. When we were called to

6   the room for them to inform us that Luke has

7   passed away, I remember sitting at the table,

8   and my first question was, I asked if Luke

9   suffered, and was told they didn't think he

10   did. I asked where was he. They told me Luke

11   was on the third floor. I can't remember if

12   they said it or I asked who he was with, or was

13   he alone, and I distinctively remember them

14   saying he was alone, because I fretted over

15   that for days, because we were not told

16   differently until the night of Luke's wake when

17   a Coral Springs officer approached me and told

18   me that he had been with Luke, standing by him

19   on the first floor.

20   So I was very confused, but I decided to

21   stick with what we'd been told. And then after

22   Luke's funeral, which was February 19th, two

23   days later we were informed differently, that

24   Luke was on the first floor with Gina and

25   Martin.

1   DET. BONOSARO: Thank you. Sheriff, the

2   rest of the questions that we had planned out

3   were answered already throughout the

4   conversation, so if you want to open it up to

5   the commission --

6   CHAIR: Yeah, why don't we open it up to

7   the other commissioners, if you have any

8   questions of any of the panelists, anybody, you

9   know -- Commissioner Larkin-Skinner, go ahead.

10   COMM. LARKIN-SKINNER: I realize that

11   movies aren't very accurate, but there's always

12   this running thing in movies and TV shows about

13   the friction between the FBI and local law

14   enforcement, and I'm just wondering if that was

15   part of the issue, where there was no one in

16   charge. I mean what is the best practice for a

17   reunification center, who should be in charge,

18   who takes control, was it local law

19   enforcement, was it the Red Cross, was it the

20   FBI, because that is, I think, important to

21   what this Commission might recommend?

22   CHAIR: So you're going to hear, Captain

23   Francis from the Seminole County Sheriff's

24   Office is going to do, part of his presentation

25   is about that, and what are best practices.

1   You shouldn't have the impression at this point

2   that there are no best practices out there, and

3   some agencies do have policies, they do have

4   protocols, and a framework. Some don't. All

5   should. And so if you would save that for

6   Captain Francis, I think you'll get an idea of

7   what is out there, and we can have that

8   discussion about best practices because he's

9   going to touch on that. Sheriff Judd, do you

10   have something?

11   SHER. JUDD: I want to give an example of

12   your, your challenge there with the social

13   media that we're up against every day. We had

14   a fatality crash at the far end of our county.

15   Before our first responding deputies got there

16   someone at the scene had already taken a

17   picture and uploaded it to social media, to

18   include the tag number and the description of

19   the car, and we had deceased folks in the car.

20   Social media is so quick today; we're running

21   emergency mode and we can't get there before

22   it's all over Facebook, and many times it's

23   inaccurate too. So the challenge, you can

24   extrapolate that over an emergency such as

25   this.

1   So you understand our, our angst, and our

2   pain that we're suffering, it -- I don't -- I

3   don't want to insinuate it's anything compared

4   to yours, but our -- we don't want to -- we

5   don't want to add anymore hurt to a horrible

6   situation, and that's why as you alluded to, I

7   was told he was on the third floor, then I'm

8   told he's on the first floor, I can tell you

9   clearly in much, much, much, much more minor

10   emergencies we don't know at those early

11   stages, we just, because we are -- we arrive at

12   an event, and we're dealing with a group of

13   people we have never ever, ever, ever been in

14   touch with in our lives, under horrific

15   emergency, so that's why I ask from you, it, it

16   would not be unusual for you to be told one

17   thing immediately only to find out after, after

18   everything calms down, and all the people that

19   are investigating sit and a room and say, no,

20   Luke wasn't on the third floor, he was on the

21   first floor.

22   And so that's the kind of issue we bring

23   up, which creates the more stress, you know, or

24   which gives the most relief, because we want to

25   get this as right as we can at the time for you

1   knowing that our initial information absolutely

2   unequivocally can't be totally accurate.

3   Sometimes it's not even in the vicinity of

4   accurate.

5   CHAIR: Sheriff Ashley, go ahead.

6   SHER. ASHLEY: I noticed that you said

7   that other than the lack of information, that

8   the isolation was part of that. Would you

9   prefer to be notified in, in a group setting

10   rather than in a private setting? That was

11   something that I'm not clear on.

12   MR. MONTALTO: Well, I'll say this, you

13   should be isolated when you're told, but just

14   at that moment. You shouldn't be waiting for

15   hours, or an hour, as my wife was. We'd

16   prefer, I'll tell you as a, as a victim, that

17   it not be within sight or earshot of other

18   folks if possible. We understand that's not

19   only possible, but the agony that must have

20   been put upon these families that were at the

21   Marriott, to hear other people screaming from

22   the next room, you know what's coming.

23   Certainly that notification process needs to be

24   moved further away from the holding area. Any

25   privacy that can be afforded would be

1   appreciated.

2   And then, if possible, a place where you

3   have the opportunity to notify your other

4   family members. Some needed to be notified

5   immediately. Some, of course, could wait until

6   you're, you're out of the immediate vicinity,

7   but you have to be, in an ideal case, and again

8   we understand it's not always ideal, but

9   separated from your support system as late as

10   possible, told in a private setting, given

11   information on what next steps to expect. And

12   if you're given preliminary information try and

13   be told that, you know, try and tell them that,

14   you know, hey, three or four days from now

15   we're going to, we're going to give you an

16   update on this.

17   We understand that not everybody knows

18   everything right away, but I would say give the

19   preliminary information with a defined follow

20   up time. And then even if that follow up time

21   comes and you don't have more information show

22   up and talk to the families, tell them what you

23   do know, tell them you need more time to figure

24   it out. But not understanding the process of

25   being the victim of a crime, you know, most

1   people don't understand that. Most people's

2   experience with death is the passing of a loved

3   one through illness, old age, or whatever it

4   happens to be. Again, that's a totally

5   different experience than being the victim of a

6   crime. So I would ask that you take that into

7   consideration.

8   CHAIR: Commissioner Carroll.

9   COMM. CARROLL: My -- my -- as a parent my

10   heart goes out to you folks, and I apologize

11   for the experience that you had to go through

12   after, after the fact. I'm not law enforcement

13   so I don't understand all of the protocol, but

14   we went through an extensive review of what the

15   protocol on site, in terms of what procedures

16   are in the place to establish incident command,

17   and all that stuff, while the activity was

18   going on.

19   I just don't understand why it wouldn't be

20   normal protocol to have as part of that setting

21   up, and I don't want to confuse the

22   terminology, but there should be some type of

23   command structure that's immediately formed

24   when you know there's casualties, particularly

25   if there's mass casualties. And to me there

1   should be grief counselors on the spot before

2   these folks ever even arrive on the scene.

3   And I, you know, part of the issue, and

4   Sheriff Gualtieri, you referred to it, was

5   there was no incident command set up ever

6   throughout this, and so this just continued

7   that. But to me there should have been

8   somebody that the families could have had as a

9   go to person, and a conduit to information.

10   And even if they couldn't have been given

11   specific information of their loved one,

12   because you didn't have that information at the

13   time, information shared on the process, what

14   was going on, where were you in this, and that

15   information can be shared so that they

16   understand what's happening.

17   And I do think that this can be handled a

18   lot better than it was, and I fault no one who

19   was in the room at the time because I know that

20   this had an emotional impact even on those

21   first responders, but it sure would be nice if

22   you, if the protocols included the back end,

23   where there was a standard protocol to set up

24   that command, you had one conduit the families

25   could go through for information, you had grief

1   counselors on the scene as soon as you know

2   there's mass casualties, that there's grief

3   counselors on the scene even before the

4   families, and so, and that you're able to share

5   information in the process.

6   Most folks -- I don't have a law

7   enforcement background, I don't know what's

8   going on, and I would have some of the same

9   questions, you know, not even specific

10   necessarily, yes, I want to find out what

11   happened to my loved one, but if you don't know

12   that I want to know what you're doing so that I

13   have some information. And -- and that's what

14   I think was even more torturous, is that they

15   got no information; you could have seen more on

16   TV or through social media than you did in that

17   room, and that's unfortunate.

18   CHAIR: Well, what you're talking about

19   does exist, and you're going to hear it from

20   Captain Francis here. And there are model

21   policies, and best practices that are known and

22   available, you know, and the question is, and

23   you're going to have a chance, we'll find out,

24   I don't know the answer to this question, from

25   what I generally understand I don't think that

1   BSO at the time had a very robust, if at all,

2   I'll call it a casualty policy, that addresses

3   all of, all of these things.

4   And the question is, and we'll get an

5   answer to it in June, is, is that do they have

6   a policy and it wasn't followed, or do they not

7   have a policy, and that would have contributed

8   to this, because there was no specific

9   designation. I mean you'll hear from Captain

10   Francis there needs to be a specific incident

11   commander designated for just the notification

12   reunification site, and all those resources

13   you're talking about need to be in it.

14   So you'll hear about that, it does exist,

15   the question is was there not a policy that

16   would have been the impetus for the

17   implementation here or was there policy but it

18   fell apart. I don't know the answer to that,

19   but that will be a question that we can find

20   out. And, you know, in fairness to BSO they

21   need to be able to come in and provide that

22   perspective, and answer your questions in that

23   regard, and they'll be able to do that next

24   meeting. Mr. Schachter, go ahead.

25   COMM. SCHACHTER: I do want to add a

1   little something to, to the Detective's

2   testimony, presentation, and that is that

3   initially after myself and my wife arrived we

4   met with the FBI victim's advocate, and, in a

5   small room, and in that room we wanted

6   information, and it was so upsetting that she

7   couldn't even give us any information. You

8   know, we tried to find out where Alex was, and

9   if he was in the hospital. She couldn't give

10   us any information. It was just very, very

11   upsetting.

12   And then also to, to add that there was a

13   tremendous amount of, you know, pastors,

14   rabbis, those people were there, a lot of those

15   types of people were there for the families to

16   try to help us and talk to us, but the complete

17   lack of information as far as progress, and

18   what was happening, and identification, was

19   absolutely torture.

20   CHAIR: Commissioner Dodd, go had.

21   COMM. DODD: Commissioner Schachter, I had

22   a question about the victim advocates, and I

23   know you had mentioned that, I think some of

24   you had said that there wasn't a victim

25   advocate present, and I know you just said now

1   that the FBI victim advocate was there for you,

2   so my question though is, was there victim

3   services provided at some point in this

4   process, like to help you navigate, or

5   understand the system? Was there ever any

6   victim advocates that came, or contacted you,

7   or --

8   MR. MONTALTO: We did not experience, my

9   wife and I at least, any substantial victims

10   advocate services that we can remember. Again,

11   there might have been some kind of counselor in

12   the room when we were told, but we were so in

13   shock it's hard to remember exactly what

14   happened. But I will say that the, the

15   victims' advocates for the State's Attorney

16   Office did reach out to us over the following

17   week or so, along with the Detective from

18   Broward County, who was able to give us the,

19   you know, give us more information on what went

20   with the process.

21   But it's the immediate information, in

22   writing, something -- you can't depend on your,

23   your memory, when you're told that your, your

24   child has been killed, you know. We should

25   have been provided with some kind of list of,

1   here's the Coroner's Office, contact them, here

2   are, you know, some places to turn to for

3   additional counseling if you need it, here are,

4   you know, you know. Where do you go to find a

5   funder home, you don't know these things,

6   right?

7   It's hard enough when a person older than

8   you passes. When you're totally in shock, when

9   your, when your child is gone, it's, it's a

10   very difficult process, and again with the

11   whole criminal aspect, which is certainly new

12   to all of us, not understanding just, just

13   what's going on, and, you know. All the law

14   enforcement folks here, we know you've got a

15   process, and maybe you can't describe it, every

16   step of what's going on, but a broad overview

17   that was written, or able to be e-mailed

18   immediately after this, would certainly help

19   recollection, so then at least you could hand

20   it off to a friend or family member who is

21   helping you rather than you trying to rely on

22   your memory in such a difficult time.

23   CHAIR: Anybody -- go ahead.

24   COMM. SCHACHTER: Can you tell us who was

25   in charge, because -- can you tell us who was

1   in the charge that day? I don't know if you've

2   -- I don't know who you've, and what

3   conclusions you've made up to this point, what

4   we have heard was that the FBI showed up, they

5   thought they were in charge, but Sheriff Israel

6   told them he was in charge, and so --

7   CHAIR: Well, this is a local -- this is a

8   local law enforcement thing, I mean I -- and

9   again, you know, maybe save those questions for

10   BSO in June, but from my perspective BSO was

11   responsible for that. That would not be

12   something the FBI would be responsible for

13   unless there was some type of a delegation, or

14   a decision made that some other entity, but,

15   you know, that was something that most clearly

16   in my view would have been within the

17   responsibility of the Broward County Sheriff's

18   Office.

19   COMM. SCHACHTER: Why was the FBI even

20   there, what was their role?

21   CHAIR: Well, because -- well, when you

22   have a mass casualty like, event like that, or

23   a mass shooting event like that, everybody is

24   coming.

25   COMM. SCHACHTER: Got it.

1   CHAIR: Okay, the Calvary is coming. It

2   doesn't matter whether it's HSI, or whether

3   it's ICE, or whether it's DEA, Secret Served, I

4   mean everybody is coming, which, you know, gets

5   to that whole issue that we talked about about

6   self-deployment. So they're going to be there,

7   the question is, and their, everybody that's

8   coming, their role needs to be directed,

9   because you're going to have a tremendous

10   amount of self- deployment, on-duty and

11   off-duty, and you need to have that set up so

12   that they are tasked with certain things. So

13   that -- that's going to happen, and they're

14   going to be there, but the role in this for

15   notification, for reunification, for victim

16   advocate services, for follow up, is with the

17   investigating agency, and the agency primarily

18   responsible for that response, and that was the

19   Broward County Sheriff's Office.

20   COMM. SCHACHTER: When we were told were

21   all segregated into a room, and FBI victim

22   services was in this room, and BSO was in that

23   room, so I think that that, that was done well,

24   but leading up to that was --

25   CHAIR: Sure. Sure. And you're going to

1   need a resources. They may be helping, but

2   again, like anything else you have to have

3   somebody, or some entity that's in charge and

4   in control, and giving direction, and using all

5   that help, using all those other resources,

6   because with the number of casualties here, and

7   the number of victim advocates that are

8   available, no agency is going to have enough

9   victim advocates to assign one to each family,

10   you're going to need to draw resources from

11   others, so absolutely want to use those other

12   resources, but again you just have to have some

13   entity that is in control.

14   So, you know, save some of those questions

15   for, for BSO, and I think it would be

16   appropriate to pose some of those questions,

17   and see, you know, from their perspective what

18   they had, didn't have, why, and that will be

19   for the June meeting. So I think we're

20   reaching a point here, unless -- yes,

21   Commissioner, or Secretary Mayhew, go ahead.

22   SEC. MAYHEW: I just wanted to ask if

23   there were any recommendations about the

24   interactions with the hospital, any

25   communication protocols, on that front?

 1   MS. HIXON: I can tell you a little bit

 2   about my experience. I ended up at some point

 3   that night showing the texts that I had to a

 4   Major, and saying I can't stay in this room

 5   anymore, I have to do something, should I go to

 6   the hospital, and his answer was, if you know

 7   your husband was transported go to the

 8   hospital, that they'll have to talk to you,

 9   you're his wife. And when I got there I was

10   shut down. Immediately the people in the

11   emergency room were like, no, go back to the

12   Marriott. I said I am not going back there, I

13   can't go back there, they don't know what the

14   hell they're doing. And the nurse is like, we

15   just changed shifts, we don't know who's -- I

16   am not leaving this hospital until you tell me

17   what's going on.

18   And thank God eventually that charge nurse

19   took pity on me, because I was sobbing and

20   screaming in the middle of the emergency room,

21   and she called the Coroner's Office to find out

22   if Chris was there, because they really had no

23   information at the hospital because he had been

24   transported, and then, you know, it went from

25   there.

1   So she took pity on me, she clearly was

2   following her policy up to that point and just,

3   they were not speaking to us at all, they just

4   kept telling us they didn't know anything.

5   MS. HOYER: And I will say when I arrived

6   at the hospital there was a table set up in a

7   room, and I had to go give Luke's name, and

8   they just told, told me remain in the room.

9   And at that time I had gotten word that there

10   was a fifteen- year-old boy matching Luke's

11   description that was being operated on, so I

12   thought it was Luke. And I was able to get a

13   picture of Luke, and I'm not sure if -- I have

14   some pushy friends. I'm not sure if they

15   somehow got back there, but they were able to

16   get Luke's picture in the operating room to

17   tell me if it was Luke, which I was told it was

18   not.

19   Then thereafter I remained there, and then

20   a BSO officer came into that room and told us

21   that if we had not located our child, or

22   husband, to go to the Marriott immediately.

23   MR. HOYER: I actually went to a different

24   hospital. When I got there the doors were

25   locked. There was a guard behind the door, and

1   he wouldn't let anybody in. He would tell you

2   nothing, told me nothing. There was a group of

3   people outside. I eventually went around to

4   the back. I got in through the emergency room.

5   I basically had to lie my way into that

6   hospital; I had to tell them my son was there,

7   so they let me in.

8   At that point, a BSO deputy picked me up,

9   or took me upstairs to a room. I gave him

10   Luke's information. They went and they

11   checked, then came back and told me Luke wasn't

12   there, and then immediately escorted me back

13   down to the front door and asked me to leave.

14   I asked the lady what I should do, or where I

15   should go, and she said, you know, I wish I

16   could help you, but I can't, so I left, you

17   know, Gena called me shortly thereafter and

18   told me to go to the Marriott. That was my

19   experience at the hospital.

20   SEC. MAYHEW: So there are some

21   recommendations about better coordination with

22   the health care personnel that are going to be

23   getting the same questions from parents and --

24   MR. MONTALTO: Certainly there's a need

25   for improvement there. When my wife first

1   arrived, she was just directed to the

2   cafeteria, where they were holding people. I

3   don't recall her telling me, and I don't recall

4   seeing anybody from the hospital until after

5   the notification, nobody from the emergency

6   room, nobody to say there's nobody here

7   matching Gina's description, nobody to say

8   there is somebody matching your daughter's

9   description, it was all rumor and innuendo.

10   And, you know, we understand the

11   difficulties here, but it's kind of like we

12   said before, some information is better than no

13   information, and we'd rather start preparing

14   ourselves than the not knowing, and then if

15   you're wrong it's a happy day. If you're right

16   we've had that time to try and cope with the

17   information. But overall, you know, again I

18   haven't dealt much with, with hospitals in

19   these crisis, so I'm not going to pick on the

20   people that were on the lower levels, but

21   higher up, it would be nice if they had a

22   policy in place, and a procedure in place for

23   the unfortunate next time that we're all here

24   talking about.

25   CHAIR: Okay, at this point I think all

1   the Commissioners that want to have had a

2   chance to ask any questions. Is there anything

3   in final thoughts or comments that you all

4   haven't shared, anything you want to say in

5   closing to any of the family members, anything

6   that you want to add?

7   DET. BONOSARO: I believe they did prepare

8   a closing.

9   CHAIR: Okay, yeah, please do. Yeah,

10   please do --

11   DET. BONOSARO: Tom and Gena.

12   MR. HOYER: Yeah, I wrote something here.

13   We've already covered some of these things, but

14   I'm going to cover some of it again because

15   there's some new stuff I want to talk about.

16   You know that day February 14th there were many

17   good people in the BSO, Coral Springs Police

18   Department, the FBI, and the Red Cross, who

19   were trying to help the families, and many of

20   those people did help Gena and I, and we're

21   forever grateful to them for their help.

22   As we've mentioned there were also many

23   people standing around, especially at the

24   Marriott that night. I don't think they knew

25   what to do. There was obviously no plan or

1   preparation. I could tell the people who were

2   trying to help us were struggling. It seemed

3   like they were trying to step into a void,

4   which is why I think we had multiple people

5   asking us for Luke's information and picture.

6   That wasn't the fault of the people trying

7   to help us, or the people at the school trying

8   to figure things out, that was the fault of the

9   leader of the organization. You know I've

10   heard people say that they didn't think this,

11   this could happen here, that's why they weren't

12   prepared and were so surprised. You know that

13   thought gives me a knot in my gut. If you

14   spend just fifteen- or twenty-minutes

15   researching school shootings you'd realize that

16   our community is exactly where this kind of

17   things happens. Santa Fe, Sandy Hook,

18   Columbine, just to name a few, you know, they

19   are us.

20   I don't expect the general public to grasp

21   this threat, but for the people in charge of

22   keeping our community and schools safe that

23   kind of ignorance is just inexcusable. It is

24   not acceptable that the Sheriff, the School

25   Board, the Superintendent of Schools, and the

1   Principal, ignored threat, ignored this threat

2   just because they thought it couldn't happen

3   here. You can't wish this kind of threat away,

4   you have to face it, and you have to prepare

5   for the possibility of it. In this regards the

6   BSO leadership and school leadership failed

7   absolutely.

8   The BSO leaderships failure to prepare for

9   the possibility of this event, even in the wake

10   of the shooting at the Fort Lauderdale Airport,

11   added confusion, false hope, anxiety, and

12   frustration, to the worst day of our lives.

13   You know, that night in the Marriott, you know,

14   when we were sitting in the room for hours, you

15   know, Gena and I will always remember that as

16   an emotional endurance test from hell.

17   Whatever you can do here to make people

18   aware, police organizations, school districts,

19   that this can happen to them, and help them

20   prepare for the possibility of something like

21   this, would be a very good thing. Thank you.

22   MS. HOYER: First I would like to thank

23   the commission for all you all do. Your

24   dedication, endless hours of hard work and

25   determination, have been very impressive, and

1   from the bottom of my heart I'm so

2   appreciative. Tom and I shared the hardest

3   night of our life, to hopefully help improve a

4   process we hope and pray this community never

5   has to experience again, that tragic day was

6   brought upon all of us by a storm of failures

7   that came together.

8   I always say if one thing had worked, we

9   wouldn't be sitting here in front of you all

10   today. It is still hard to believe Luke did

11   not come home from school that day. I vividly

12   remember every part of that morning. I dropped

13   him off on the sidewalk, as I did every day.

14   Luckily, we told each other we loved each

15   other, and I remember looking back that day, I

16   don't know why, just to see him walk. That was

17   the last time I saw Luke alive, and the last

18   time I will ever hear his voice.

19   During the hours of trying to find Luke

20   there were a lot of people who did their very

21   best with all the chaos and frustration. I do

22   not hold anyone responsible for giving me any

23   type of wrong information, and I thank them for

24   trying their hardest to ease the hardest moment

25   of our life. Thank you.

1   CHAIR: Thank you. Debbie, did you have

2   anything that you wanted to --

3   MS. HIXON: All I really remember about

4   February 14th was complete confusion, and

5   really disregard for the terror and despair

6   that was on all of our faces, and our emotions

7   that day. You know we sat there for a long

8   time looking at police officers looking at us

9   -- and I'm not, as everyone else said, not

10   saying that they weren't -- they really just

11   didn't know what to do. I remember lots of

12   food being there. They were eating pizza, and,

13   you know, just seemed like enjoying their time

14   together while we were desperately just begging

15   for information and got none.

16   And as I alluded to earlier, we didn't

17   know how many victims there were, if they were

18   kids, or students, or, you know, teachers,

19   whatever, and they just kept saying all of the

20   parents come, come to the front. Well, I

21   wasn't a parent, so I kept waiting for a

22   directive, for someone to -- like I really

23   thought there was another group of us, and I

24   had to approach the officer and say, well, what

25   about me, and he just sort of was like, yeah,

1   yeah, the parents. I said I am not a parent.

2   And I know that gets lost in, in translation

3   sometimes, but if you're really not, it really

4   feels like it's not, that they're not talking

5   to you, you don't know what to do, and that

6   confusion was really hard. And I know three as

7   opposed to seventeen, there were not a lot of

8   us, but it was really confusing for us.

9   So I have a couple of things -- well, I

10   wanted to also mention when I was at the

11   hospital the security guard who was trying very

12   hard, like he was, give me Chris's birthdate,

13   we'll go upstairs and look at people's

14   wristbands and see if they're up there, he was

15   really trying to be helpful, but he said to me

16   he was mad, and he said I'm angry, when the

17   airport shooting happened this same thing

18   happened, this same confusion that you're going

19   through, and the anger, and BSO said they were

20   going to fix it.

21   And clearly they never reflected on that

22   aspect of what went wrong because a year later

23   we were all in the same situation, where nobody

24   knew what was going on, they didn't know how to

25   tell us what was happening, and the people in

1   the hospital were reliving the same experience

2   that they had had earlier, so that just leaves

3   me to believe that BSO just figured they never

4   had to think about it again, it happened once,

5   they were done, and they never reflected on it.

6   And that really was difficult.

7   As I said earlier, I have a couple of

8   suggestions that I would like to see you pass

9   along, and one is, as I mentioned before, there

10   should be a team that's responsible for

11   contacting the families. I was calling school

12   personnel, because I'm also a school teacher,

13   so I know, you know, what's going on, where

14   should I go, what do I need to do. I don't

15   live in Parkland. I wasn't part of that

16   community that was getting the Facebook

17   messages, and the social media, and all of

18   that. I wasn't told to go to the Marriott. I

19   kept saying where should I go, should I go to

20   the hospital, should -- and it was hours.

21   I, you know, I went home at 3:00

22   something. It was 7:30 before Allen Strauss

23   told me that, yes, Chris had been shot, I

24   should go to the Marriott, so it was four hours

25   of really confusion of what I should do.

1   Someone from BSO should contact the families

2   and say your loved one has been in an incident,

3   here's what you should do. That really would

4   have been helpful.

5   And then once you're at that location

6   there should be a liaison, as we've all said,

7   that's responsible for that family. Someone

8   asked the question would we have liked to have

9   said, you know, go home. I think once you're

10   told to go somewhere, you're not leaving,

11   you're not leaving until you know an answer.

12   And so they, they could have said go home. I

13   mean I chose to go to the hospital because I

14   was getting no answers at the Marriott, but

15   most people I don't think would leave once you

16   send them there, so there should be someone

17   that's just with that family.

18   You know I'm sure when it's a single

19   incidence there's someone that's with that

20   family that answers questions back and forth,

21   so instead of being shuffled into a room three,

22   four times, asked the same question, photo,

23   data of birth, what was he wearing, you know,

24   at a certain point you're just mad, you're

25   like, but I answered that question already, and

1   then when you're asking somebody to give you

2   information back you just get a I can't tell

3   you anything, and that was really hard.

4   If you had someone who felt personable,

5   gave you some empathy, as Tony was saying, you,

6   you would, some of the stress of that time

7   period would be a little less, and it wouldn't

8   feel so much like torture. And for me officers

9   should be more aware of who the victims are,

10   and more sensitive to the directive they're

11   giving families, so that they're not adding

12   confusion to that.

13   You know, we can't change what happened

14   that day, but we can speak up and try to make

15   changes so that no one else has to endure what

16   we did that day. And I would really like to

17   thank you for the opportunity to speak today,

18   and asking us what we thought, and what our

19   experience was, so that this topic, and this

20   issue that's really easily fixed can and should

21   be fixed as soon as possible.

22   DET. BONOSARO: Thank you, Debbie.

23   CHAIR: Thanks, Debbie. Tony.

24   MR. MONTALTO: I'll echo Debbie in terms

25   of thanking the commission for looking at this

1   subject. I'm not sure if that's been done

2   before, but it's a very important piece of this

3   puzzle in these mass casualty events. Walt had

4   originally asked me a question about empathy,

5   and how I felt, and again I'll say that the,

6   the people that were there did the best they

7   could.

8   I will say also that the leader of the

9   Broward Sheriff's Office at the time showed

10   zero empathy that night, the following days in

11   his numerous press conferences, and that was

12   very painful to the victims' families, to watch

13   the leader of that organization which should

14   have kept us safe, should have kept our

15   children and our loved ones safe, not react as

16   a human to the tragedy that occurred, but to

17   say there was amazing leadership involved.

18   We've seen through the testimony and the

19   report of this commission, and we'll see it

20   again through other venues, that that

21   leadership was horrible. There's a reason that

22   he is now the suspended Sheriff, and we are

23   thankful to have the new Sheriff here making

24   positive changes as quickly as he possibly can.

25   That's for the good of all the people in this

1   county, and we thank Governor DeSantis for

2   doing that.

3   Empathy from the School Board, another

4   piece of the puzzle that was lacking. Some

5   claimed, you know, oh, we showed up at the

6   wakes, and that was enough. We're not going to

7   remember the wake, that was a terrible time for

8   all of our families. We didn't hear, well,

9   I'll say the first time I heard from a

10   representative of Superintendent Runcie was

11   when they tried to hand me the Superintendent's

12   card as I was getting into the limousine after

13   the church service for my daughter's funeral,

14   and then nothing. Many of the school board

15   members, it was the same thing, nothing.

16   Empathy is a basic human feeling. Times

17   are difficult. In times like this, you may not

18   know what to say, but empathy goes a long way

19   to making the victims feel better. I hope you

20   guys on this commission show that empathy as

21   you continue your deliberations, and remember

22   that not only are we analyzing what went wrong

23   but the changes that need to be made, and

24   that's not only on the response side, which of

25   course was important, and you guy have

1   discussed, but it's on the softer side, which

2   is caring for the victims' families. Thank

3   you.

4   CHAIR: Okay. Well, certainly our thanks

5   to all of you for coming here today, and I know

6   it's hard, but it helps us to have a better

7   understanding, and we want the same thing that

8   you want, and that is a better result in the

9   future, because sadly, as we've said, and we

10   all recognize we don't want to, it's a very

11   hard thing to say, somewhere at some time this

12   is going to happen again, and the question is

13   when and where, and what we all want is a

14   different result, especially as it relates to

15   the topic that we're talking about.

16   So thank you for coming today, and we

17   appreciate it. And I know everybody on this

18   commission is dedicated to making sure that we

19   do everything possible to drive a different

20   outcome, so you have our assurances of that,

21   that we're all going to continue to work hard

22   to do that. So again, again, thank you very

23   much for being here.

24   So with that, it's 12:30, we'll start

25   again right at 1:00. So lunch is available --

1   so 1:00 p.m. we'll start again. Feel free to

2   bring lunch back in with you. Well just make

3   it a working lunch. But thirty minutes and

4   we'll start again. If you're not finished,

5   just bring it with you, please.

6   (Thereupon, the meeting is in recess.)

7   CHAIR: The next presentation we have is

8   from Special Agent Supervisor Jason Cook with

9   FDLE on lessons learned from the Pulse incident

10   on death notification reunification. So Jason,

11   thank you for being here, we appreciate it.

12   PRESENTATION - PULSE NIGHTCLUB NOTIFICATION

13   REUNIFICATION

14   SPA. COOK: Thank you. All right, so as

15   you said I'm Jason Cook. I'm a Special Agent

16   Supervisor with FDLE. I'm out of the Orlando

17   office. After the Pulse nightclub attack, I

18   was tasked with coordinating FDLE's response as

19   it pertained to the next of kin notification.

20   So just a quick overview -- I'll go over

21   the incident, because there's some details of

22   it that obviously affected our response. There

23   was the FDLE roles that we played. Obviously,

24   the key issues that we took away from it. And

25   I'll take any questions obviously. Just a

1   quick timeline overview of the incident that

2   began on June 12th in the early hours.

3   Approximately 2:00 is when the shooting first

4   occurred. Approximately thirty minutes later

5   the attacker made his intentions known by

6   calling 911. It was then almost three hours

7   later before the incident was brought to a

8   close, as far as the attacker being stopped

9   during the entry.

10   And just for perspective, that is not a

11   typo, it was almost twenty hours later before

12   all the homicide victims, so it was

13   approximately twenty hours later before all the

14   homicide victims were removed from the scene

15   and the identifications could begin, and I'll

16   kind of touch on why some of those things

17   happened for those of you that don't know, and

18   this has been made public during the

19   investigation. The attacker claimed to have

20   rigged both victims and vehicles with

21   explosives, so it took a very long to, one, to

22   make the scene safe, to get to the scene, and

23   then to start processing it. So that was, that

24   was part of the reason.

25   So just a -- we -- we talked about it

1   during the previous segment, but just to give

2   you again a perspective on the scope of the

3   response, you're talking twenty, twenty law

4   enforcement agencies, four fire rescue, three

5   emergency managements. Four hospitals were

6   involved. Luckily most of it was contained to

7   ORMC, which is the level one trauma center for

8   central Florida, and then also forty FEMORS

9   investigators, who work with the Medical

10   Examiner's Offices, and twenty public

11   information officers. And that all came into

12   play as well with our death notifications.

13   So with the FDLE response, just a quick

14   overview, obviously we handled the officer

15   involved shooting portion of the incident,

16   where law enforcement responded to the

17   attacker. We had a counter-terror

18   investigation going on for several weeks. We

19   handled dignitary protection. And those three

20   things are things that we do 24/7/365. Those

21   are things that we do all day long. The next

22   three, though, were something that were a

23   little bit out of our wheelhouse that we took

24   on to assist both the Orlando Police Department

25   and the FBI, and that was victim

1   identification, which we worked in conjunction

2   with the Medical Examiner's Office, next of kin

3   notification, which was partially my

4   responsibility, and then victim property

5   recovery from the scene and the surrounding

6   area.

7   So there were forty-nine total homicide

8   victims that were identified by the early

9   morning of June 13th, the day following the

10   incident. Just to note, if I accidentally just

11   say, if I refer to victims, I'm referring to

12   the homicide victims. I don't want to take

13   away from the surviving victims or the

14   families, but I only dealt with the 49 homicide

15   victims.

16   So the way we handled our next of kin

17   notifications, it was a coordinated effort

18   between the law enforcement personnel, a

19   victims' advocate, and then a clergy person who

20   if the, if the family requested. And we had

21   all those people on site, and they met in

22   person with that family group, and there was no

23   restriction put on who, who could be there. If

24   you wanted everybody that you had with you

25   that's, that's who got it. We were only

1   restricted by space at times.

2   This was an analytically heavy workload,

3   to both positively IDD the victims, and then

4   identify the next of kin, so that was another

5   thing that really helped, as far as FDLE

6   handling this section, because we are, we have

7   so many good investigative analysts and

8   analytical resources, that they were able to

9   jump in and, and handle that. And that was

10   done, as I put in there, a lot of open source

11   information, but as well as government

12   databases so that we could accomplish that

13   portion of it.

14   So again to give you a little perspective

15   of what we were dealing with, there were only

16   eleven homicide victims that were not inside

17   the crime scene, so for that first close to

18   twenty hours we really only had eleven victims

19   that we could do death notifications on. The

20   first few were done in the morning hours of

21   June 13th, or no, June 12th at the hospital,

22   because they were, they had been identified,

23   nine of those eleven had been identified very

24   early in the morning, and so we, we started

25   them as soon as we could.

1   The families were waiting at the hospital,

2   and so we, we found a private space to do it.

3   We had victim advocates from the hospital, and

4   I actually did the first couple just so we

5   could, could get that process going for those,

6   for those people. The remaining notifications

7   were then, from those, from those first few,

8   were done at a hospital, or at the hotel which

9   was directly across the street from the

10   hospital, which had been set up even prior to

11   our involvement. A lot of this process got

12   started very very early on by the City of

13   Orlando and the FBI.

14   And then what happened when we got to

15   that, that point that we had identified

16   everybody that we could, because the remaining

17   victims were still inside the crime scene and,

18   and just couldn't be accessed at that point,

19   we, we got to the point where we gave people

20   the option, we were going to have to move to a

21   secondary location because we were outgrowing

22   the one we had, and it was just going to be

23   such a large gap before we knew we could even

24   give them any information, we gave them the

25   option, if you want to stay you can, but or you

1   can go home, be with your loved ones, and we'll

2   come to you as soon as we know anything.

3   So that, that was an option we gave them.

4   And just hearing from the panel earlier, some

5   people would have liked that idea and some

6   people wouldn't, so that's why we, we offered

7   it, just to give them some information, some

8   choice as to how this, this process was going

9   to go. We also tasked other FDLE regions, did

10   some notifications statewide. There were

11   several that were done out of state. That was

12   done through our Fusion Center Network. And

13   then the final notifications were done at the

14   secondary location the following day. And I'll

15   go over the locations and stuff. So

16   approximately twenty-four hours from the time

17   we started to, to the time we got them

18   finished.

19   So the key issues we identified that would

20   probably parallel most incidents, even though

21   there's probably not a lot of comparables

22   between Pulse and, and a school shooting,

23   there's some. Obviously, our location

24   resources and security were some of our big

25   ones. So the initial location was a Hampton

1   Inn that was directly across the street from

2   ORMC, so we had obviously mass families coming

3   to the hospital, and they were able to direct

4   them across the street. That actually worked

5   out pretty well until it go to the point that

6   it was just, it was just completely

7   overwhelmed.

8   We then moved to a secondary location. It

9   was the Beardall Senior Center. That was a

10   City of Orlando property. It was an old

11   school. I'll show you pictures of it. And it

12   -- it worked out well, it had different areas

13   that were very useful. And then following all

14   the notifications, once they closed down the

15   Beardall Center they opened up a Family

16   Services Center at Camping World Stadium, which

17   is the large stadium in Orlando. I would think

18   it would be similar to what they have set up

19   here where you could, where the families could

20   come and get victims services. That was open

21   for actually several weeks afterwards. That

22   was facilitated by FBI Victim Services.

23   Just again for a little perspective,

24   proximity actually helped us to come degree,

25   probably in all honesty saved a lot of lives

1   for those that were injured. As you see on the

2   map Pulse is down at the bottom. ORMC, like I

3   said, is the level one trauma center for

4   Central Florida, and it was almost within

5   walking distance of the incident. The Hampton

6   Inn is directly across the street. And the

7   Beardall Center obviously too wasn't very far.

8   We -- we didn't want -- when we decided we had

9   to move it we didn't want people to have to go

10   too far.

11   So the Hampton Inn, you're probably

12   familiar with it, with a Hampton Inn, the two

13   spaces that I used the stock photos of, those

14   were literally the only two open spaces they

15   had, and those, those quickly filled up. So

16   the one benefit was, and that it was, like I

17   said, directly across the street from the

18   hospital. After doing the first -- I think we

19   did four at the hospital, I was able to walk

20   directly across the street with some of the

21   families as we were directing them to go over

22   there so that we could continue that process.

23   It did have an isolated environment. I

24   know that came up earlier. That first floor

25   was being used for getting everyone's

1   information, family information, possible

2   victim information, if they thought their loved

3   one could have been involved, or they thought

4   they had been in the club the night before.

5   And then Hampton Inn staff gave us any access

6   we wanted, as far as isolated rooms to where we

7   could do the notifications. That would be

8   separate from other families having to hear

9   things, and that kind of thing.

10   Like I said we had a hundred total

11   victims, including the wounded victims that

12   survived, so we were, we were quickly

13   overwhelmed in, in that location. Once we had

14   done the -- as I said once we had done the

15   notifications that were able to from the

16   victims that had been identified, that's when

17   along with the City of Orlando, Orlando PD, and

18   the hospital staff, it got to be into the

19   afternoon hours, we're several hours into the

20   incident now, we had to give these people some

21   information, we had to give them information on

22   who was injured, who were hospital patients,

23   and who we had yet to, to identify.

24   And we didn't even have a list of people.

25   Obviously, those are still unknowns, because

1   you're dealing with just a who may or may not

2   have been at the nightclub. So that, that

3   message was coordinated with us, and given by

4   the hospital, so that the people would know

5   whose loved ones were patients at the hospital,

6   and what their status was. And then at that

7   time we told them that the secondary location

8   would be opening, and that Orlando had arranged

9   for City buses to transport them to the

10   secondary location if they wanted to, or at

11   that time if they wanted to go home and be with

12   their loved ones let us know where, where that

13   is, and if we find anything out overnight we

14   will, we will come to you.

15   The secondary location I talked about,

16   again it was a, it's an old brick school

17   building used as a Senior Center now. It

18   actually, again, worked much better, ample

19   room, auditoriums, and old cafeteria style open

20   areas where victim advocates could interact

21   with the family, and then also some isolated

22   areas to where we could take them back and do

23   notifications without being exposed, or

24   exposing families multiple times to that,

25   again, kind of just going over what I just

1   said.

2   It also gave us some workspace, that we

3   could be separated too, so that way you didn't

4   have, like they talked about, just seeing law

5   enforcement sitting around. Our workspaces

6   were separated. The FEMORS people were doing

7   their own interviews to get background

8   information to help on the identifications.

9   That was being done in another area as well, so

10   it, that center worked out a little bit better.

11   As far as resources go, we as law

12   enforcement, as I've learned in my career over,

13   over some of these different things that I've

14   been involved in, we, we can't handle this

15   alone. This is an incident where even when

16   you're just talking about next of kin

17   notification, you're going to need your other

18   discipline partners involved, and luckily for

19   us we had that right from the beginning, almost

20   before I was even involved. And that's your

21   emergency management people. Whether that's

22   through law enforcement's mutual aid people, or

23   through your actual EM Directors at your cities

24   and your counties, because they have access to

25   everything we needed, whether it be facilities

1   and infrastructure, transportation.

2   Victim Services was on site even before I

3   made it to the hotel. They were handling all

4   of the registration of people who came in,

5   getting all their information, who their loved

6   one was, their contact information. All that

7   was being done by Victim Services. And they

8   also had obviously access to the crime

9   compensation going forward so they could start

10   that process if necessary. And also the clergy

11   network, we had just an abundance of

12   multi-disciplined clergy available.

13   And then our, probably our most important

14   piece that I touched on earlier was our

15   investigative analytical personnel. This was

16   a, like I said, a research driven mission. And

17   that's kind of how we, we tracked it, through

18   our incident management, was, was he had

19   forty-nine missions, and that was to identify

20   these, these victims, and then notify their

21   next of kin. So we had forty-nine mission

22   tracking needs that, that were going on.

23   One thing that came up was our

24   infrastructure, as far as connectivity and, and

25   communication. One of the drawbacks to the

1   Senior Center was it's just, it was an old

2   school building, so we just overwhelmed its

3   power capabilities to some degree. But it's

4   just something to keep in mind whenever going

5   forward, that these, these are the things that

6   are going to come up. Our communication

7   obviously was a challenge, but we didn't have

8   any, any major issues. Our -- our chain of

9   command from, from what we're doing on site, on

10   the notifications back to the command, and then

11   the joint information center, we never had,

12   really had any issues.

13   Security for us, for me was an issue that

14   maybe wouldn't come up in, here in, after the

15   shooting here, but I had to be very cognizant

16   that there was an ongoing terrorism

17   investigation with the possibility that the

18   incident wasn't over, and I had a very

19   attractive secondary target with a very dense

20   civilian crowd, so we have to worry about

21   security at these locations where we had all

22   these people.

23   It wasn't -- the hotel wasn't initially

24   advertised for that reason. As people came to

25   the hotel they were directed to -- as people

1   came to the hospital they were being directed

2   to the hotel, but we weren't putting out very

3   early about the hotel, just until we could get

4   our hands wrapped around the security issue as

5   well. And just, you know, as I said we kind of

6   overwhelmed internally our safety for the

7   amount of people we had at, at a Hampton Inn,

8   with just a lobby that probably shouldn't have

9   had more than, I don't know, maybe seventy five

10   people, is probably what the Fire Marshal would

11   rate it for. We probably had five hundred

12   people at that hotel, so it was -- and EMS

13   obviously was, was going to be, we had to have

14   them on standby as well. Again, we needed

15   uniform law enforcement presence as well, and

16   in the event we did have any incidents on

17   scene, and then our, as I said, EMS dedicated a

18   crew as we were doing notifications, and if

19   people were having health crisis.

20   So some of the key issues we found

21   afterwards that we hadn't thought of was our

22   public official notifications, and our media

23   release. Those like I said were handled

24   through our chain of command. We never really

25   had any issues, that as soon as a notification

1   was done it went to the command center, our

2   command post then let our state and local

3   officials know, because they wanted to also get

4   in touch with the next of kin and let them know

5   that we were releasing the victim information

6   to the press.

7   So and some of the things that we found

8   afterwards, we had very real critical incident

9   stress management issues that we needed to

10   internally, not only at ORMC but, but some of

11   the other ones, we were able to partner to

12   accomplish that mission, which I think is very

13   important. And then internally, we even did

14   our after action reports, ours were pretty

15   extensive just because we, we varied our roles

16   so much, but specific to this we came up with

17   more standardized forms and procedures to help

18   streamline our process as far as next of kin

19   notification goes, just in the event that that

20   would be a request of FDLE in the future.

21   So that was really it. I'll take any

22   questions you have.

23   CHAIR: So, you know, in this incident

24   there were seventeen deceased. You had

25   forty-nine deceased.

1   SPA. COOK: Correct.

2   CHAIR: And a little different, in that

3   you had an extended period of time, until 10:00

4   that night before all the bodies were removed.

5   So similar to here I assume that there was a

6   period of time before the official

7   notifications were made, so I'm just curious, I

8   guess did you deal with some of the same

9   challenges, you had to, about when n dhow, and

10   how definitive you were in the IDs before you

11   made the notifications, and how the families

12   reacted to that, and how you all dealt with

13   that.

14   SPA. COOK: Sure. Absolutely, and it was

15   a benefit to be here this morning and get to

16   hear that. And I'm sure we probably, if we had

17   a panel of the victims that, that I dealt with,

18   or the next of kin that I dealt with, there

19   would probably be some similar ones about our,

20   and my hesitancy to give out information unless

21   it's a hundred percent accurate. I know that

22   was addressed earlier, and Sheriff Judd

23   addressed it as well. So there was probably

24   quite a bit of time where people just didn't

25   get information, and that's why that

1   coordinated message, we needed to tell them

2   something.

3   But when I don't even know how the victims

4   are, I don't even know how many there are, I

5   can only do with that first group as quickly

6   as, as I could.

7   CHAIR: So what -- is -- in that situation

8   was it days before official notification, so

9   like forty-eight hours, seventy-two hours,

10   ninety-six hours?

11   SPA. COOK: It was -- so of the eleven

12   homicide victims that were not inside the club,

13   those, nine of those were positively

14   identified, and they were done with a few

15   hours.

16   CHAIR: Sure.

17   SPA. COOK: And then the next, overnight

18   as the identifications were being made agents

19   were, agents and victim advocates were going to

20   people's houses and doing them overnight. And

21   then as soon as they started coming in the next

22   day they were done within, within a couple of

23   hours. I know officially there was one not

24   done until the afternoon, but that's because

25   the gentleman --

1   CHAIR: Okay. So within the first twenty-

2   four hours they were, they were done, okay.

3   SPA. COOK: Absolutely. Absolutely.

4   CHAIR: I'm just trying to get an idea.

5   Okay, so that's -- okay. All right,

6   commissioners, does anybody have any questions?

7   Yes, Commissioner Larkin-Skinner, go ahead.

8   COMM. LARKIN-SKINNER: So who was in

9   charge?

10   SPA. COOK: So in -- in our incident this

11   was, the Orlando Police Department was the

12   initial responding agency. Once it became

13   clear that it was a act of terrorism the FBI

14   took the lead on the investigative part of it.

15   The Orlando Police Department asked FDLE to

16   handle the victim notifications, and so FDLE

17   was in charge of victim notifications. I hate

18   to take credit, and say I was in charge,

19   because there multiple FDLE supervisors on

20   scene that, that coordinated our effort. And

21   that's kind of why I put in there that, you

22   know, I don't have any -- FDLE doesn't have

23   facilities. FDLE doesn't have transportation.

24   So that's why we worked with the City, and

25   that's why we worked with uniform, OPD patrol,

1   and City of Orlando. So it was, it was a

2   coordinated effort.

3   COMM. LARKIN-SKINNER: So in hindsight to

4   you think that people knew who was in charge,

5   like they knew, so the other, the victims

6   services, the other law enforcement knew you

7   were in charge at the reunification center?

8   SPA. COOK: Yes. Yes. I don't know, like

9   victim services, when I had my meetings with,

10   with our victims services personnel, it was

11   clear that the Orlando Police had asked FDLE to

12   be charge of this, so whatever you need tell me

13   and we're going to make it happen to get this

14   mission accomplished.

15   COMM. LARKIN-SKINNER: Okay. And one

16   other question. So I run a behavioral health

17   organization, and I know that Aspire Health

18   Partners, for instance, was involved, they had

19   counselors on site. What I'm not clear about

20   is when and where that occurred. I mean,

21   actually where it occurred, I know, they were

22   at the reunification center, because I've seen

23   their presentations. But do you know when they

24   came in, and are you lumping them in with

25   victims' services, because I didn't see them

1   mentioned here, like counselors, mental health

2   counselors?

3   SPA. COOK: Yes, I would just -- I'm

4   lumping them in in the, in the sense that they

5   were victim advocates, to help with victim

6   services. They weren't law enforcement, and

7   they weren't part of the, my chain of command,

8   I guess.

9   COMM. LARKIN-SKINNER: Okay. I just

10   wanted to make sure because from the, the

11   families that we heard from today, that was

12   almost completely lacking, if not completely

13   lacking here in Broward, and I wanted to make

14   sure that that's highlighted, because I do

15   believe that was an important part of the

16   response after Pulse.

17   SPA. COOK: Okay, yeah. And -- and that's

18   my fault for not delineating that, but that's

19   all victim services to me, and, and when I say

20   they were there, I mean when I walked across

21   the street after doing the first couple at

22   10:00 a.m., when I got the hotel victim

23   services was handling all of the sign ins.

24   They -- they were already there before me doing

25   all those things, so the City of Orlando

1   engaged them very early on. And it wasn't a

2   detective, it wasn't a special agent sitting

3   there taking people's names down, it was a

4   victim advocate. And there were victim

5   advocates moving around in the crowd.

6   And any time we need to do to a

7   notification going forward, just as an example,

8   like at the Beardall Center the next day, hey,

9   we just got a positive identification, do you

10   know where, and the victim advocates knew

11   exactly where that person was sitting because

12   they had been dealing with them. So they, they

13   were, they were working with them very closely.

14   CHAIR: All right, anybody else have any

15   other questions? Commissioner Swearingen, and

16   then Mr. Schachter.

17   COMM. SWEARINGEN: Yeah, I just want to --

18   I just want to point out that it was a very

19   well organized and structured incident command

20   structure there, which was not present at MSD.

21   As -- as the Sheriff alluded to earlier, when

22   that happened every law enforcement agency in

23   that County, and the State, and the federal

24   agencies, all showed up, but everybody knew who

25   was in charge, and they knew what their role

1   was.

2   One other key point I want to point out is

3   when Jason talks about after action reports

4   this went very well from our perspective, our

5   response to this went, went very well, and we

6   did a very good job, but even in that there

7   were lessons to be learned from that; you have

8   to be willing to learn those lessons. So I

9   just want to point that out, if you don't do an

10   after action, and be willing to do a very

11   honest self-evaluation, and learn that things

12   can be done better, so for example he talks

13   about the standardized forms that we now have,

14   if you're willing to take a good hard look at

15   yourself and your response you can learn a lot

16   of good lessons after one of these incidents,

17   so.

18   CHAIR: Okay. Mr. Schachter, go ahead.

19   COMM. SCHACHTER: Thank you for your

20   presentation today. What information were you

21   giving the victims that were showing up, number

22   one, you know, were you giving any, any details

23   of what was happening? I know you said that

24   you wanted to make sure before you, you know,

25   definitively told them. You heard from their

1   testimony that, you know, they would like to

2   have more information rather than you erring

3   on, you know, waiting.

4   SPA. COOK: Sure. Honestly we didn't have

5   a lot of information to give them other than

6   letting them know the facts that, that there

7   were only so many people that made it out,

8   these are the names of the people who are being

9   treated at the hospital, if you think your

10   loved one was in the club -- they actually knew

11   more than, that we did. I mean this is such a

12   different scenario than a school, not knowing

13   who was in a club at night, you know, other

14   than the handful of horror stories, quite

15   frankly, that we heard from Pulse, where they

16   were talking to their parents, or they talked

17   to a loved one from inside the club. There

18   were people that just dropped their, you know,

19   dropped their phone and ran, so we didn't even

20   know who, who was in there, so I didn't have

21   the information to give them other than this is

22   what's going on, the crime scene is being

23   worked, we can't get to the crime scene yet, so

24   as soon as I know something I will tell you.

25   COMM. SCHACHTER: Was everybody at one

1   hospital, all the victims?

2   SPA. COOK: There were a couple people

3   that went to other hospitals. If I remember

4   correctly, I believe those were all self-

5   transported, because anybody who needed trauma

6   care went right down the street to ORMC, so the

7   vast majority was, was at ORMC. And it wasn't

8   anything like what I've, what I've heard about

9   here locally.

10   COMM. SCHACHTER: One of the major

11   deficiencies on February 14th is the lack of

12   information from hospitals. All of the family

13   members tried to get that information, and

14   there was zero information. So but you're

15   saying that you had a list from the hospital of

16   the people that they had admitted?

17   SPA. COOK: Correct. Correct. That list

18   was -- and that message, like I said, was

19   conveyed, was a coordinator between, between

20   FDLE, actually the commander at the time for

21   the Orlando Police Department who gave that,

22   who translated that message into Spanish for

23   the crowd, is not the Chief of Police. And

24   then the -- I think he was the COO of the

25   hospital, gave that message to, to everyone who

1   was present, as to who we have as, as patients,

2   and so that was, that was that was --

3   COMM. SCHACHTER: Was that -- was that

4   administered over a loudspeaker, or did you

5   have that on a paper, who communicated that to

6   the families --

7   SPA. COOK: The -- the hospital staff did

8   to everyone. That's -- it just got to that

9   point where we had to let everybody know. And,

10   yes, that was done in a, in a --

11   COMM. SCHACHTER: That would have been

12   extremely helpful. And that was -- it was very

13   very upsetting for me. When I sat with the FBI

14   victims' advocate, they had no idea, because we

15   went to multiple hospitals trying to find our

16   kids, or at least me. So if I -- if we had

17   known, if they had a list, I don't, you know,

18   it's inconceivable that they didn't, they

19   couldn't put a list together. But I would

20   definitely put some kind of, make sure that

21   that's done in our best practices.

22   Does OPD now have a, did they have prior,

23   you know, a next of kin notification best

24   practice, and if not do they now?

25   SPA. COOK: I'm not sure. They -- they

1   kind of turned it over to us, so that's, so we

2   kind of ran that. And we do have a, have a,

3   it's in our procedure about how we'll handle

4   that.

5   COMM. SCHACHTER: Yeah, but I mean next

6   time, you know, I don't know if you would be in

7   charge of that. I would certainly recommend

8   every law enforcement agency have such a

9   document. As far as notifying next of kin, I

10   know that at Marjory Stoneman Douglas they

11   basically waited until they had notified

12   everybody, and then they called us in

13   systematically, but the way you presented your

14   testimony as you found out you notified, right,

15   you didn't wait?

16   SPA. COOK: Absolutely. My -- I wanted to

17   do the notifications legally and ethically, but

18   I pushed those through just to do them fast and

19   let people know. I mean that, that was my

20   goal, and that's why when I had a victim

21   advocate and a family sitting on the floor in

22   hospital wanting to know I did it myself. I

23   brought them in, and we did it, and we let them

24   know. So I was -- I was doing them as fast as

25   I could.

1   COMM. SCHACHTER: Yeah, so in June when,

2   when BSO comes, I'd like to know why they

3   waited as opposed to doing it that way. I

4   would have preferred -- maybe we wouldn't have

5   had to wait until 1:00 or 3:00 in the morning.

6   Thank you for your testimony.

7   SPA. COOK: Absolutely.

8   CHAIR: All right, thank you, Jason.

9   Thanks for being here today, we appreciate it.

10   Next up is Captain Rick Francis from the

11   Seminole County Sheriff's Office, and you have

12   a presentation on what has been identified as

13   best practice of framework for a policy. And

14   we appreciate you bring here again, Captain

15   Francis, thank you.

16   PRESENTATION - REUNIFICATION BEST

17   PRACTICES SEMINOLE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE.

18   CAPT. FRANCIS: Thank you, sir. I

19   appreciate it. I promise this will not be

20   death by PowerPoint, and I'll be as short as

21   possible. I'm not going go too much into -- I

22   think everybody has a great understanding what

23   the reunification process is already. Our

24   simple priorities in Seminole County is to make

25   sure the students and staff safety and

1   well-being are being met, also the location and

2   condition of those, and include visitors, and

3   start that recovery process.

4   And obviously we're here because of what,

5   the tragedy that occurred in Parkland, but, you

6   know, we can reunify, have a large-scale

7   reunification for numerous reasons, and, you

8   know, infrastructure problems, flooding,

9   weather related, whatever the case may be.

10   Obviously when we were looking at best practice

11   for a reunification site capacity is one of the

12   things that we looked at. Historically in

13   Seminole County we use other schools for

14   reunification sites. This is one of the things

15   that I got away from because I didn't want to

16   impact another school, have two schools

17   impacted by the reunification process, so we

18   moved away from that process, unless it's very

19   minor that we can, and minimize.

20   Obviously it has to have -- we're looking

21   for buildings that have multiple, or a site

22   that we can control, has multiple buildings,

23   and large enough to cover our biggest school,

24   which is one of our high schools, about

25   thirty-five hundred students, and then you

1   couple that with, you know, your faculty

2   members and parents or guardians, so it has to

3   be very substantial. Parking is obviously

4   something that needs to be considered.

5   Being able to control the perimeter, and

6   I'll show you a slide later on, what we look at

7   as far as a radius and stuff. Again, getting

8   back from lessons learned in best practice, my

9   job every day is to plan for the worst-case

10   scenario and pray for the best, and that's how

11   I look at through my lens when we do this.

12   Most counties have MOUs with their

13   emergency managers for this type of stuff. We

14   took it a step further, and we had the school

15   district do MOUs, are doing MOUs with these

16   particular sites that were identified. And we

17   did it regionally, we have a couple of

18   different sites for every region within our

19   county. It may be a little bit of a travel to

20   the site, it meets our needs.

21   When it comes to -- sorry, I think I

22   skipped a slide. When it comes to the

23   reunification process, in a nutshell obviously

24   our job is that, reunify that child with their

25   parents. I'll show you a sample letter later

1   on. We set a tempo, at the beginning of the

2   year we send out a letter, a school safety

3   letter to our parents letting them know certain

4   aspects of our safety package, and also this

5   reunification, and explaining to them that it

6   could take hours for us to reunify your child,

7   especially in a tragic event, so we're setting

8   some expectations.

9   Obviously when it comes to best practices

10   you want to have that separation between the

11   parents and your students to avoid any

12   disruption in the process. We use electronic

13   fashion in order to speed up that process. We

14   have a digital process, where we have a

15   district set team that is cross trained on

16   multiple different levels. So we will take

17   that district from our school district office,

18   transport them to the reunification site, and

19   they are the subject matter experts. We will

20   use the impacted school staff to help us with

21   the process because they know a lot of the

22   custodial issues, and stuff like that, but we

23   have this set district team that is set. We

24   have tablets preloaded with all the program,

25   and this process is in order to speed up as we

1   move forward.

2   Obviously, and I'll show you a visual

3   display a little bit later on, when you get to,

4   when the parents arrive at this reunification

5   site, and I'll talk about notifications in a

6   second, we allow them to self-sort, and we have

7   greeters there to meet those parents, to help

8   them. They wear vests, so it's clearly, once

9   they park there's signage that leads them to

10   where they're supposed to be. There's greeters

11   there to help them, explain the process of what

12   to expect, get their ID out, their government

13   ID out, and stuff like that. Of course we have

14   secondary and tertiary procedures if someone

15   doesn't have their government ID with them, or

16   the case may be.

17   And we, we use this digital management

18   system. We -- it carries, it's a back-end

19   product to our current visitor management

20   system, so we have real time data who's on our,

21   from visitors and from students, who's on our

22   campus if this critical incident happens. So

23   if it's at, if it's in second period I can push

24   our real time rosters to each individual

25   teacher. And the nice part about it is that

1   teacher can open up the app, and they account

2   for all students. So if they were in the

3   middle of a class change and they took in three

4   additional students that didn't belong to their

5   class, they have a class roster, they can slide

6   check everybody that's in their class or not in

7   their class, and they can account for anybody

8   else they've taken in. We can also account for

9   injured or missing, et cetera, as moving

10   forward.

11   This digital process obviously helps

12   electronic, it imports data every night in real

13   time through our SIS messaging system, or our

14   school messenger and stuff. We have a real

15   time for the incident commanders. We have a

16   real time dashboard so we can, as soon as this

17   incident pops off, we're able to look at every

18   class as they're reporting in. And just like

19   our other electronic technology we're averaged

20   about eight seven percent participation on

21   that, so we still will have a few of those, you

22   know, people with flip phones, whatever the

23   case may be, that we're still having to do the

24   old-fashioned way, but eighty five percent that

25   will be digital.

1   Obviously, it's streamlined, and the nice

2   thing when this process works itself out, if

3   I'm in the reunification and I pick up my child

4   anybody else that's on that approved parent

5   pick up list is also getting an SMS messaging

6   saying that, hey, Rick has picked up Johnny.

7   So it helps with that anxiety, and stuff like

8   that, getting those processes detailed. And

9   again, for anything after action it time stamps

10   everything that's occurring as it moves

11   forward.

12   So in a nutshell, if an incident occurs,

13   we establish unified command, and it's been

14   talked about before. One of the things that we

15   emphasize is, especially if I'm a high-risk

16   incident commander, so who's in charge, it's

17   me, and there's no doubt about it when an

18   incident occurs. My first responding

19   supervisor, if it's a school related event will

20   be the incident commander until I get there,

21   and we're expecting that person to get on the

22   radio and say I'm in charge, I got the ball,

23   and all decisions are made there.

24   You know, one of the reasons why my

25   position was created in Seminole County three

1   years ago was we had an incident where it

2   occurred at a city school, and the

3   superintendent found the school at, at odds

4   with the city municipality, and they said it's

5   a law enforcement event, and the schools best

6   interests were not being met. So this is kind

7   of why my position was created, to help with

8   that. The nice thing about, for me, is I bring

9   the resources of the Sheriff's Office,

10   emergency management, and of course the best

11   interests of the schools.

12   So we're expecting that unified command

13   system to come together, and pretty much all

14   that is in a nutshell is I bring all the

15   decision makers under one umbrella right next

16   to me, so if I need something from fire rescue,

17   I tap that battalion chief on the shoulder and

18   say I need this. There's no calling on radios,

19   and stuff like that, it's all done right there,

20   the decision makers are there, including the

21   school principal, and we'll talk a little bit

22   more about that in a second.

23   As we move forward of course we mobilize

24   this reunification district team. Again, we're

25   going to us the impacted school administration

1   as much as we can. I'm of the belief that

2   they're just as much as a victim to this event

3   as someone that's hurt, injured, or deceased,

4   so we want to make sure we're very careful who

5   we're picking to be part of this from the

6   school, the impacted school team. That's why

7   we have this robust district team that's

8   trained and cross trained in different

9   responsibilities.

10   Again, we have these predesignated

11   reunification kits. We have ten tablets that

12   sit in a charger ready to go. We have all, you

13   know, all these supplies needed, vests, et

14   cetera, to open up this reunification site.

15   Again, this is something that we have, we

16   exercise, we drill, but I hope I never have to

17   use it. And then we do -- once we have -- so a

18   lot of the stuff is going on simultaneously.

19   The school is getting prepared for this, we're

20   getting all these master rosters memorialized,

21   and make sure that we're all on the same page.

22   There's a team, a preemptive team going to the

23   site, and then we're securing the site, and we

24   own the site. We'll do what we call a

25   protective sweep of there, we'll make sure

1   we'll run K-9s through, and then we will own

2   that location, block roads, and stuff like

3   that, and prepare for this reunification

4   process.

5   And again, you know, we'll move -- if it's

6   from the -- if the kids are sheltered in place

7   at a particular classroom they're going to

8   remove to, they're going to be moved to

9   transportation. There may be a decision,

10   because we're moving from a crime scene to a

11   controlled environment there may be a decision

12   for law enforcement to search, it depends on if

13   there's any questions, or anything like that.

14   But that's, that's the time that we're

15   verifying rosters and accountability before we

16   leave that particular impacted site.

17   Obviously, we have prearranged transportation.

18   Again, we can use our own transportation

19   through the school board, or we have MOUs with

20   other providers, like Links, to make that

21   happen on a large-scale event.

22   At the reunification, we have different

23   stations that we will man, and stand up. One

24   is obviously the team stage, where all the

25   teamers are coming and getting deployed from

1   there, parking, parent check-in, your student

2   assembly staging, again out of sight of the

3   parents, your parent waiting area,

4   parent/student reunification, victim assistance

5   group, which is your mental health or victim

6   advocacy you talked about earlier, and then any

7   missing person liaison, which is usually our

8   law enforcement investigative group.

9   And we've learned from other smaller

10   events even if we're doing investigative

11   interviews with students, did you see anything,

12   whatever the case may be, as soon as that

13   student leaves that investigative group, as

14   soon as they walk out of that room, they're met

15   with a mental health counselor, one on one

16   care.

17   Other resources are, that we need to be

18   keeping in mind, obviously transportation,

19   traffic control, message boards, PIO, public

20   information officer, uniformed personnel,

21   intelligence resources, emergency management,

22   child welfare, health department counselors,

23   medical, and investigative contingencies.

24   We had a small incident here recently, and

25   talk about lessons learned, we always do after

1   action reports, I don't care what event it is,

2   and one of the things that was exceptionally

3   effective for us when it came to this

4   investigative need to interview children that

5   were close to this incident was we printed off

6   student face sheets, so when the -- we used two

7   administrators from the school, the student

8   would give their name, they would print out a

9   student face sheet that has their biographic

10   information, so when they went into the

11   investigator we handed them a student face

12   sheet so they didn't have to, it saved a lot of

13   time writing a whole bunch of information, they

14   wrote their notes on that face sheet and they

15   kept it for their investigative report. We

16   found it very, very useful, and we'll use that

17   moving forward.

18   This is just a suggested ORG chart when it

19   comes to a reunification. In an incident like

20   Parkland, using that as an example, we'd have

21   an incident commander, and then for

22   reunification, we would have its own incident

23   commander for reunification that would report

24   to the incident commander. And this is kind of

25   just breakdown how that would work. Obviously,

1   some of these moving parts can be shared to

2   other locations, but this kind of gives you a

3   ballpark how that looked or should look.

4   This is a snapshot of I Love You Guys,

5   ours, obviously this is very simplified into

6   one particular picture, but, you know, in a

7   real scenario you would want multiple

8   buildings, and multiple offices, stuff like

9   that, but it kind of demonstrates, you know,

10   the, from your, going from right to left, your

11   parents showing up, they're get, they're

12   meeting, they're greeting, you have a law

13   enforcement contingency there, they're doing

14   parent check-in, they're self- sorting,

15   alphabetically, whatever the case may be, and

16   they're moving through this process.

17   And then of course the students are coming

18   the other side of the building, or other, or

19   another building, and then this reunification

20   process happens in another location, again out

21   of sight from other, because if you have a

22   tragic event you may not have parents that are

23   reunifying, and you need to be prepared for

24   that.

25   And this is kind of again a little bit

1   more of the detail, so there are your greeters,

2   and it's important for this greeter position

3   because you have parents that have anxiety, and

4   they're, they need questions, or they have

5   questions and they want answers, so it's, it's

6   important, that's why we use this district

7   model. Those greeters know what to say, what

8   they can say and what they can't say, based on

9   the information that's provided to, that the

10   incident commander is giving them.

11   And then we have this check-in process.

12   They're helping them get sorted. They're

13   making sure they have their government ID. And

14   again, for anybody who does not you have a

15   contingency plan, law enforcement on site to

16   help with that individuals who don't have

17   proper identification. And then we start the

18   process of reunifying.

19   Now, I think this is what you want to

20   hear, is best practices that we've found, and

21   we utilize. Thankfully I haven't had to fully

22   exercise this, but parents, and this goes back

23   to, and obviously the slide deck was made a

24   little while back, but parent and guardian

25   notification is a priority. I believe

1   information is power. You have to provide real

2   time information as often as you possibly can.

3   We've learned that having a proper

4   perimeter, even at the impacted site and your

5   reunification site, you can't just close the

6   gates at the school and expect that to be a

7   proper perimeter. Unfortunately no matter how

8   many times you say it you're still going to

9   have parents that are trying to get to the

10   school, you're going to have parents calling

11   the school. No matter how many times you say

12   not to do it it's going to happen, be prepared

13   for that.

14   Constant communication from your PIO and

15   all stakeholders, and that's through the media,

16   school messenger, whatever mechanism you have,

17   social media. And one of the changes that I

18   made after the Parkland incident, just putting

19   some thought to things that we did, and stuff.

20   Normally historically, and I think most

21   districts do this, their principal of that

22   school is in essence that school's IC, incident

23   commander.

24   I'm of the belief that they're probably

25   just as much affected as the, you know, the

1   child, or whatever the case may be, or the

2   adult on the campus that's been injured or

3   killed, and we if put the, we stand this

4   individual up for the super role, and I think

5   we're setting ourselves up for failure, so what

6   we've done in Seminole County is we've made the

7   executive, the school executives, we've spent a

8   little bit extra time training them on these

9   critical incidents, a lot of table top

10   exercise, et cetera, and they're, we're going

11   to get to that school, and they're going to tap

12   that principal on the shoulder and say I got

13   this.

14   They're not going to dismiss the

15   principal; they're going to maybe have them do

16   some other roles that are maybe less important.

17   But we're going to -- and don't get me wrong,

18   we have some superstar principals, and

19   unfortunately, we want to make sure we have the

20   right person with a clear mind making decisions

21   from the school level.

22   I talked about utilizing other sites other

23   than a school, again, have primary, secondary,

24   tertiary assignments for each role. I

25   mentioned the district teams. Drill and

1   training is very important to exercise this. A

2   parent letter before the school starts to set

3   expectations, and accounting for special needs.

4   What I mean by time of day contingencies,

5   you know, we have working parents, and you need

6   to be prepared for working parents not to be

7   able to respond to pick up their kids.

8   Obviously in a high school setting you may have

9   kids that can self-evacuate, and self-reunify

10   with their parents, but you need to have that

11   contingency plan in play.

12   Controlled area security sweeps, I

13   mentioned that before. This whole

14   reunification site has to be a controlled

15   environment from five miles out into the site.

16   Reunification kits, and I'll show you what we

17   have in ours, in the checklist. Unify commands

18   is, we strongly believe in that concept. You

19   have to have someone in charge, you know, you

20   know, there's a saying that if it's a, you

21   know, obviously if it's a crime it's a law

22   enforcement, if it's a fire it's a fire event,

23   if it's a school it's a school event, all those

24   teams, team members have to work together in a

25   unified approach. And that means that when I

1   turn my shoulder, I expect to find the

2   emergency manager, or that fire chief, whatever

3   the case may be, and I don't have to go looking

4   for them to make things happens.

5   Controlled lines of site for a lot of

6   communication, other issues, should be handled

7   with, diminishing drama and anxiety. Utilized

8   technology, we used a digital app for this.

9   Just keep in mind Wi-Fi access when you get

10   remote, outside of a school campus, or wherever

11   the case may be. Effective procedures -- it

12   was mentioned earlier you have to have

13   practices and procedures to make this thing

14   happen. I have a school critical incident

15   response list that dictates what that first

16   responding deputy or officer, all the way down

17   to supervisors, to the incident commander, and

18   it's a checklist, a punch list that they have

19   to follow, including messaging, and stuff like

20   that, so we expect that to be followed.

21   Plan for custodial issues, and plan for

22   Murphy, I'm a firm believer that Murphy will

23   show up that day, and you need to be prepared

24   for it. In Seminole County a couple years ago

25   we instituted a process called the family

1   liaison officer deputy. So if we had a

2   critical incident at ABC Elementary that

3   officer or deputy assigned to that school would

4   be that family's liaison. As soon as the

5   incident occurred, again if we had multiple

6   victims, we'd bring in additional school safety

7   personnel to help with this cause, but they're

8   assigned to that family until the family says

9   they don't need it any longer.

10   If it's an hour, if it's a day, if it's

11   two days, that is their job, they're the

12   liaison, they stay with the family until they

13   are no longer needed. They are the buffer

14   between the media, if the command needs a

15   question about a picture, or anything like

16   that, that the liaison that they're going

17   through. And that's how we do it in Seminole

18   County.

19   And then another lesson learned for us

20   was, and I'm sorry it's not on your slide, I

21   just thought about it earlier, is our crisis

22   team. You have to find ways or make means for

23   them to get to your site. If your school is on

24   lockdown that could affect traffic for a long

25   way, so you need to have primary and secondary

1   ways to get them on site. We have a rally

2   point for them, and they meet there, then we

3   escort them in, do a law enforcement escort.

4   We give them special badging, that they have

5   with school badges with the Sheriff's Office

6   logo that we've disseminated to all of our

7   municipalities, so if someone shows this badge,

8   or say I'm part of the crisis team, and they

9   have a school ID, and this badge, then they're

10   allowed access into the site, and then report

11   where appropriate.

12   Our map checklist, this is just kind of

13   what we look at when we are deciding what kind

14   of site we're going to pick, evacuation routes,

15   incident command. We pre-establish all these

16   things, from an LZ to staging area, media

17   staging, parent check-in location, sexual

18   offenders near that area, predators, how we're

19   going to control each entry, what we need to

20   properly secure that site, all of this is

21   pre-established.

22   This is just a quick little glimpse of

23   what's in our reunification kits, signage,

24   traffic cones, tablets, you know, if we lose

25   power, or whatever the case may be, we can go

1   old school, tape, clipboards, you name it,

2   tissue, movies. This is a protracted event.

3   You need to prepare for some type of ways to

4   keep people entertained, and stuff like that.

5   You'll find a parent -- this is just a snippet

6   of my last one, and it, again, we're still

7   going to -- this just sets the expectation, so

8   when a parent is denied entry into the impacted

9   school, not to say I told you say, but there's

10   a reason why we can't have, you know, six

11   hundred parents showing up at an impacted

12   school, because we have emergency management,

13   we have rescue that needs to get in and out,

14   crime scene, et cetera, so kind of set this

15   tempo, again fully expecting parents to still

16   show up, and still call the school, but we kind

17   of set the tempo, and hope that we'll have some

18   that will follow it.

19   Again, with any incident, we jokingly say

20   we have about ten seconds to get something out.

21   We got fifty one percent of the facts; we're

22   going to start pushing some information out

23   because we're trying to get ahead of that

24   social media curve. Questions?

25   CHAIR: Mr. Schachter, go ahead.

1   COMM. SCHACHTER: Thank you very much. Do

2   you guys use the I Love You Foundation as your

3   reunification method, or did you develop your

4   own?

5   CAPT. FRANCIS: We use some of it. We've

6   used some -- what I've learned, even with

7   school assessments, whatever, we take best

8   practices from everywhere and kind of build it

9   into -- we use a lot of I Love You stuff, some

10   signage and stuff like that. You saw a map

11   I've used. So we use some of their stuff. We

12   -- Vermont's done a lot of good stuff. There's

13   a lot of federal best practices, and let's face

14   it, lessons learned from prior incidents, or

15   averted incidents.

16   COMM. SCHACHTER: What situations have you

17   used your reunification plans in?

18   CAPT. FRANCIS: Just drills and training.

19   We have thankfully, knock on wood, not had to

20   use this.

21   COMM. SCHACHTER: So how often do you have

22   those drills?

23   CAPT. FRANCIS: We try to drill once a

24   quarter.

25   COMM. SCHACHTER: And everybody comes out,

1   and you tell, you tell the students and the

2   parents?

3   CAPT. FRANCIS: Yeah, we -- you start off

4   small. You start off by just doing one

5   classroom. We start off by -- actually we

6   just, initially start off by just having the

7   information pushed out to the, to, you know, a

8   group, or let's say the science hall, we push

9   it out, rosters there, so they can log in, see

10   a count, goes back to the dashboard, and then

11   we build into, all right, we're going to move

12   off to the, to the bus ramp, do the process.

13   And then we move into, okay, now we're going to

14   move from here to an off-site location. And

15   then later on in May we're doing a full scale,

16   where we're taking everything and doing the

17   whole package.

18   COMM. SCHACHTER: You guys have, it's all

19   electronic, all, all the kids, I mean all the

20   teachers have an app, so they know where the

21   kids are, or you have those i-Pads?

22   CAPT. FRANCIS: It's an opt-in. So it's

23   an opt-in. Everything, including our soft

24   panic with emergency notification, it's an

25   opt-in, you know, we highly encourage it. And

1   let's face it, if I'm a teacher, and I'm using

2   this technology, my kids are getting reunified

3   a little bit faster, you know, then, because

4   I'm not taking handwritten notes, and stuff

5   like that, on who's there.

6   COMM. SCHACHTER: What would you

7   recommend, because do we know if Broward County

8   has a reunification policy, Sheriff?

9   CHAIR: I don't know. We'll find out.

10   COMM. SCHACHTER: So I'm going to assume

11   they don't, and I don't think they have an app

12   to know where the kids are if there was an

13   emergency. So for schools that do not have,

14   you know, that type of technology, and as

15   advanced as, as your county is, is it possible

16   to do reunification?

17   CAPT. FRANCIS: Sure it is. It's just now

18   it's going to be -- you know, we used to use --

19   we have crisis response kits in our, in our, in

20   our schools, where we used to make the

21   principal at the beginning of the day print

22   off, or their designee, print off the school

23   roster for that day and shove it in this

24   emergency bag that had other critical

25   information in it, keys, et cetera. Obviously

1   now with the digital world I don't have to do

2   that any longer, but, you know, we, we're still

3   going -- no matter what we're still going to

4   have those naysayers that don't want to put

5   this helpful app on their phone, so we're going

6   to have to do some of that, you know, print out

7   a roster, or use an electronic, you know.

8   Thankfully, you know, everything is

9   updated live, so I can pull up Skyward and I

10   can see a class roster immediately. Now, it

11   gets into the equation, is like who, who and

12   when at different levels takes attendance, and

13   that's from our educational professionals, and

14   we realize that could be a little bit of an

15   issue, or taking it second period, third

16   period, so if someone cracks off at first

17   period they may not have an accurate

18   attendance, but the nice thing about the app is

19   I can live feed anything I want.

20   I can, you know, it's -- that teacher can

21   -- I can push out a roster -- the nice thing,

22   it's incident driven, so not until I need the

23   incident, we hit the button, it creates this

24   process, then I'm pushing it to the, to that

25   particular school base, and the teachers open

1   their app up, they have their roster, I can

2   account for kids there, kids missing, injured,

3   whatever the case may be.

4   COMM. SCHACHTER: You know in Marjory

5   Stoneman Douglas on February 14th all the kids

6   self-evacuated, and obviously there's no

7   reunification then, so is this only for like

8   elementary school and middle schools, would you

9   say?

10   CAPT. FRANCIS: I wouldn't say only. I

11   mean we teach, and we've had it happen with

12   lockdowns in our, in our area, the incident we

13   had in Lake Mary, we had first responders over

14   the radio, kids are self-evacuating, that's

15   what we teach them to do, there's nothing wrong

16   with that. And we've talked to -- I get in

17   front of even patrol supervisors and say this

18   is the expectation, at a high school you're

19   going to have a bunch of kid going that way,

20   unless they're shooting at you your job is to

21   go to the school, not to worry about the kid

22   leaving, we'll spend a day or two getting, make

23   sure we're getting proper reunification on that

24   level.

25   Is it more applicable to maybe an

1   elementary where they're not self-evacuating,

2   absolutely, but I think it still has its, its

3   merit at a high school, because obviously

4   that's, we're going to have the, you know,

5   parents are, or kids are good about checking in

6   their parents, and especially when something

7   like this happens, so a lot of times the

8   parents will have the information, so we start

9   pushing information out on school messenger,

10   because that would be one of our messaging,

11   that we still have some unaccounted for kids,

12   you know, and we start sending out a message to

13   those means.

14   COMM. SCHACHTER: Thank you.

15   CAPT. FRANCIS: Yes, sir.

16   CHAIR: All right, anybody else have any

17   questions? Secretary Mayhew, go ahead.

18   SEC. MAYHEW: This is incredibly

19   impressive. How long has this been in place,

20   and what was the period of time from we've got

21   to create this to when this was stood up?

22   CAPT. FRANCIS: So I've been in this

23   position for three years. It was literally a

24   first month on a to do list. We have -- the

25   nice thing about this, this is a back-in

1   product to a front-end product, so our, we were

2   already in process of acquiring a front-end

3   visitor management system. Thankfully the same

4   company was on the path for a reunification

5   app, and back-end emergency management, so not

6   only can I do rosters, I can push out floor

7   plans, and stuff like that. It's really not

8   needed for us because we have other means for

9   that.

10   So just like anything else it's a

11   procurement process, RFPs, et cetera, it took

12   me about six months to go through that process.

13   And then there was just that change of

14   attitude, and how we were going to handle those

15   sites. And I just, you know, after Parkland a

16   lot of us started looking at our own system,

17   like how can I do things better, and I actually

18   came down here to see what we could do better.

19   And that was one of the things I wanted to make

20   sure that we handled the last school year.

21   CHAIR: Okay. Yeah, Commissioner, go

22   ahead.

23   SEC. POPPELL: Thank you, Captain.

24   CAPT. FRANCIS: Yes, sir.

25   SEC. POPPELL: I was curious, the liaison

1   position that you referred to, is that the

2   formal connection point to the crisis

3   counselors, and follow-up mental health

4   services, or is that a different connection?

5   CAPT. FRANCIS: It could be. The idea is,

6   is to have that person, it's connected to the

7   school. If it's a small incident, you know,

8   obviously we have to pull more resources in,

9   but let's just say if it's a small isolated

10   incident we would team, if that SRD or SRO is

11   interest in doing that, if there's somebody not

12   want to be interested then we'd find a

13   supervisor, or someone else to handle it, but

14   their job is to simply just to be with that

15   family, anything they need, from driving them

16   from A to B, or if a call is coming in to them

17   answering the phone, I mean it could be, just

18   to avoid that.

19   But the biggest thing for us is we have a

20   crisis team that's made of all the city, we

21   have the, we can pull from the school, the

22   school side, we can pull from the Sheriff's

23   Office side, or other health resources, and,

24   you know, we attack that wrap, we call it wrap

25   around service. We want to make sure that

1   person is getting wrapped around, that family,

2   to ensure they're getting all the resource they

3   need.

4   CHAIR: Mr. Petty, go ahead.

5   COMM. PETTY: Probably more of a comment

6   than a question, and I guess I'll, I should

7   temper my comment because I'm sitting in

8   between two school board members here. Thank

9   you.

10   CAPT. FRANCIS: Yes, sir.

11   COMM. PETTY: I think this demonstrates

12   what's possible if we don't just try to do the

13   minimum, or what DOE says, or whatever, and we

14   actually imagine what we hope never happens,

15   but we're prepared for it. I think every

16   district in the state should have a similar

17   plan, and capability, so thank you for, for you

18   doing this.

19   CAPT. FRANCIS: Yes, sir.

20   COMM. PETTY: As a parent this -- thank

21   you for setting the bar.

22   CAPT. FRANCIS: Yes, sir.

23   CHAIR: All right, anybody else? Thank

24   you, Captain, we appreciate it.

25   CAPT. FRANCIS: Thank you, sir.

1   CHAIR: All right, so the next

2   presentation will be on SESIR, the School

3   Environmental Safety Incident Report, and I

4   think first up will be Julie Collins from DOE,

5   and then Sergeant John Suess on the statistical

6   analysis. I just want to kind of lead into

7   this a little bit, and for again to refresh,

8   and for the new members of the commission. So

9   what we're talking about here is, is that the

10   schools through the School Environmental Safety

11   and Incident Report are required to report this

12   information to the Department of Education.

13   We had a presentation on this to some

14   degree in the last year. We didn't delve into

15   it in any great way. It was largely reported

16   on in the media, and we saw a little bit of

17   this as we touched the issue last year, that

18   there are problems with SESIR, and that there

19   is non- reporting, and underreporting going on.

20   One of the questions, and I still say it's a

21   lingering question, is why, and maybe we'll get

22   a little bit of insight in that today perhaps.

23   This is also an area that is a topic, if you

24   recall from yesterday it's a topic that is

25   within the scope of the grand jury, that they

1   will be investigating, and I guess trying to

2   get at really in the scope is, is that is it

3   intentional non-reporting or underreporting.

4   The value, of course, of having this

5   information is that so parents in the community

6   know what is going on in a particular school,

7   and also for the schools themselves, and for

8   the districts, so that they know if they have a

9   problem, or problems in a particular location,

10   and that those can be addressed and remediated.

11   The information, the data is extremely

12   important. So when you have the data in place,

13   and if the data is not accurate, then that

14   poses a totally different set of problems than

15   if you don't have any information at all.

16   Now, some of this, as we're going to get

17   into it, is counterintuitive to common sense

18   definitions, and is counter to legal

19   definitions, so as an example is, is that what

20   is required to be reported as in the category

21   of theft, well, is that the category of theft

22   that's required to be reported is only what in

23   legal circles and law enforcement circles,

24   prosecution, would be grand theft, so it's $300

25   or more.

1   If you get into the category of batteries,

2   well, when you look at the definition it's

3   really what we would call an aggravate battery,

4   significant bodily harm. If somebody is

5   reporting just a simple battery it would be in

6   the category of probably a physical attack. So

7   another aspect of this is that some of this

8   that's required to be reported is not criminal

9   at all. Some of it are behavioral issues, so

10   it's a combination of what occurs on the campus

11   from a behavioral standpoint with some of it,

12   and some of that could be bullying, or

13   harassment, sexual harassment, and some of it

14   is crimes.

15   So some of the data that you're going to

16   hear about, and just again to segue way into

17   this, shows that what we suspected last year is

18   in fact there, and that is that there is a

19   problem. There's no question there's a

20   problem. The question that is still unanswered

21   and lingering is why. So I'll give you a

22   couple of examples, and so you can think about

23   this as you're hearing the initial presentation

24   until we get into the statistics.

25   Is, is that in one elementary school, and

1   this is what Sergeant Suess is going to cover,

2   are the 17/18 statistics, which are the most

3   recent statistics and data that's available, is

4   that in one elementary school, in Alachua

5   County for the 17/18 year that one elementary

6   school reported seventy two incidents of a

7   physical attack, in one elementary school in

8   Alachua County, where the whole entire

9   Miami-Dade School District reported zero. So

10   -- okay.

11   Is that in Pinellas County, they reported

12   four hundred and ten batteries in Pinellas

13   County, and the Palm Beach County School

14   District reported sixty-six. It doesn't make

15   any sense. So the data clearly reviews, it

16   reveals, I'm sorry, the data clearly reveals

17   that there's a problem, but what the data

18   doesn't tell us is the why behind it, so I

19   think it's very important. Julie Collins from

20   DOE is here, and is the person handles this.

21   She's got a lot of experience, a lot of

22   background, and she's going to run through

23   again to familiarize us with SESIR, what it is,

24   some data. And then Sergeant Suess will get

25   into the specific analysis of the 17/18. So,

1   Julie, thank you for being here. We appreciate

2   it.

3   PRESENTATION - SESIR REPORTING STATEWIDE

4   MS. COLLINS: Thank you. First, I want to

5   tell you a little bit about the trends for

6   SESIR data. This is 2010, 2011, until the

7   current, well, the current year that we have

8   final data for is 17/18, and you can see

9   there's a downward trend from 2010/11 school

10   year. We were averaging 29.23 incidents per

11   1,000 students, and that's statewide, all the

12   incident categories.

13   Now, for those of you that are not

14   familiar SESIR stands for School Environmental

15   Safety Incident Reporting. And I'll give you a

16   little bit of background on it so that you can

17   understand sort of the origin, and some of the

18   definitions, and the information that we

19   collect. The downward trend that you see here

20   sort of mirrors the general downward trend that

21   you see in, in crime reporting data. There's a

22   little bit of a blip upward in the 2014/15

23   school year, and that's when both the

24   legislature and the US Department of Education

25   added three new incident categories that we had

1   to collect, so that would be logical that we'd

2   have a little bit of an uptick, and then

3   continuing downward for the most part.

4   Why we have decreases in the, in the

5   reporting, some of it you can attribute to

6   strategic discipline and prevention programs,

7   but it generally mirrors what's going on in the

8   community at large. State requirements for

9   data reporting, the first two items there, the

10   statute and rule are sort of the general data

11   reporting requirements for the Department of

12   Education. The third there, Section 1001.54 is

13   the duty of school principals, and it speaks to

14   accurate and timely reporting of, of safety and

15   discipline data. And that safety data is the

16   SESIR data, so the ultimate requirement is, or

17   the initial requirement is on the principal to

18   provide that data.

19   CHAIR: So I'm going to interrupt you

20   because I'm not clear on this. I think it's

21   important that we all have an understanding as,

22   as you go through this. Is, is that these

23   definitions, again a battery being what we

24   would call an agg battery, theft being $300,

25   the other definitions in here, and what is, and

1   there's a differentiation here, as we'll find

2   out, about what is required to be reported to

3   law enforcement, as opposed to a consultation

4   with law enforcement. So in all of that who

5   sets those definitions, who, and we're

6   ultimately getting at is who can change those

7   definitions. I know you say to some degree

8   it's the feds, it's the state, it's the DOE, so

9   what I'm really trying to get is a crystallized

10   as to, because who sets it can change it, and I

11   don't know the answer to that.

12   MS. COLLINS: I'll get to that if you'd

13   just --

14   CHAIR: Okay.

15   MS. COLLINS: I want to talk a little bit

16   briefly about the federal requirements.

17   EdFacts is sort of the umbrella, large data

18   collection. There's a smaller Civil Rights

19   Data Collection, that speaks to a whole host of

20   issues. It talks about incidents. It talks

21   about bullying and harassment on the basis of

22   sex, race, disability, sexual orientation or

23   religion, a whole host of issues, and then the

24   Every Student Succeeds Act requires a state

25   reporting, a report card that talks to, speaks

1   to elements such as safety.

2   The key features on SESIR, and this will

3   get into some of the background that you were

4   interested in, it was developed in 1995. As

5   far as I can tell, because this predates me, it

6   was developed in the State of Florida, and then

7   some state folks led a national group that came

8   up with guidance that most other states use.

9   So the National Center for Education Statistics

10   I believe hosted a group. They produced a

11   report in 1996, and the definitions and the

12   structure is very similar to what was produced

13   back in 1996, and it was based on input from

14   law enforcement, it as a multi-disciplinary

15   group that came up with, with the guidance that

16   we have now.

17   It has evolved. We do generally do not

18   change things on whim, just because we want to

19   know it, but we do have the authority to change

20   things if they are confusing to districts, if

21   there's a requirement, for example I think

22   there's a bill in the legislature that would

23   change that $300 threshold that you spoke to.

24   If that changes, we would probably change that

25   in SESIR.

1   CHAIR: Okay, so -- so these SESIR

2   definitions, and the SESIR reporting

3   requirements are not in Florida law and

4   statute.

5   MS. COLLINS: No.

6   CHAIR: Okay. Are they in the Florida

7   Administrative Code?

8   MS. COLLINS: No, to the extent that --

9   they are in -- the reporting requirement is in

10   statute for some of them. So bullying and

11   harassment, and the definition that we use,

12   comes almost directly from that statute.

13   CHAIR: So the definition of what is

14   reportable as a battery versus a physical

15   attack, that's solely within DOE's discretion,

16   DOE sets that definition?

17   MS. COLLINS: I don't -- I think that was

18   set by this national, the other group.

19   CHAIR: Yeah, but this national group

20   doesn't -- it's not in law, you all --

21   MS. COLLINS: No, no, it's not in law.

22   CHAIR: So that's what I'm saying. It may

23   be set by, or adopted by DOE, but my point is

24   --

25   MS. COLLINS: Correct.

1   CHAIR: -- is that -- this is important,

2   because if we're trying to figure out what's

3   going on, why, you know, let's say that the

4   conclusion is that there is confusion, what I

5   want to know is, is that who can change it.

6   And what I'm hearing from you is, is that with

7   a good majority of this this is set

8   discretionarily by DOE, and therefore DOE, if

9   there was a will or a need DOE can change this,

10   so we don't have to go through a law change, or

11   an administrative code change --

12   MS. COLLINS: Absolutely. If we wanted to

13   change something, and we had a good rationale

14   for it, because again when you're collecting

15   data, data over years and years and years, and

16   you change the definitions regularly, then

17   you're not going to have reliable data. I mean

18   that's one of the reasons that --

19   CHAIR: Well, and I'd suggest to you you

20   don't have reliable data now because of what

21   we're seeing. But we'll find out.

22   MS. COLLINS: Well, and I -- and I will

23   suggest to you that we do. And I'll get into

24   this when we speak later, but we do a lot of

25   training, but we can't invite ourselves

1   everywhere. We do have training that's

2   available online, and not everybody has availed

3   themselves of it. The definitions, the key to

4   getting this correct is knowledge of the

5   definitions, and so we've produced posters, we

6   provide training on site, we provide training

7   online, and we are ecstatic that you all are

8   interested in this data collection.

9   CHAIR: Right, I'm not saying that, but if

10   you, you know, that adage you can't lead them

11   and make then, you can't lead them to the water

12   but can make them drink, is that, well, is that

13   you may be leading them to the water but

14   they're not drinking, and so if they're not

15   doing it right you're still not getting data.

16   And -- and when you have a situation like we're

17   talking about with this is, is that, in this,

18   and again it was down here in Broward, and it's

19   been widely reported, when we look at this data

20   is, is that when you have that, that situation

21   of one elementary school with sixty seven in

22   the entire Miami District, and you got Pinellas

23   with four ten in, in Broward, it doesn't make

24   any sense.

25   And so it does seem that there, well,

1   there, there's a problem with the data. And

2   not, you know, not getting to the why, that's

3   what we're trying to figure out is the why and

4   is it a training issue or is it intentional

5   underreporting, or what's the cause of it.

6   That -- that -- you know, because if it's a

7   definitional issue, and a training issue, then

8   that's something that could be addressed.

9   MS. COLLINS: Well, and there is the

10   potential for intentional underreporting, but

11   there's also the potential for unintentional

12   over-reporting when people don't understand the

13   rules. And I'll get to this, it's actually on

14   the next couple of slides, but when we talk

15   about -- SESIR is, is per incident, so as an

16   example, if we have a fight with twenty

17   students involved it's going to be one SESIR

18   fight with one incident number, and it will

19   have twenty matching disciplinary records. So

20   if, if somebody is unclear on that at the

21   school level then they could be entering twenty

22   fights and over- reporting. So there's -- it

23   goes both ways. We do have accidental

24   over-reporting. We have erroneous reporting.

25   And we ask the district level person to check

1   on that data and make sure, the person who's

2   the best trained in this information, to make

3   sure that it's correct.

4   CHAIR: Again, but this -- and this is an

5   example, and it could be, and I don't know, but

6   it could well be, is that's absolutely counter

7   to uniform crime reporting, where uniform crime

8   reporting, so as an example, at Stoneman

9   Douglas this is reported under SESIR as one

10   homicide even though there were seventeen

11   victims.

12   MS. COLLINS: That's correct.

13   CHAIR: Where UCR reported it as seventeen

14   homicides. So when you've got those kind of

15   differences, but, but again I go back to -- and

16   I'm not suggesting whether it should at this

17   point, I just wanted to know, you know, is that

18   the decision about, in SESIR, that it is

19   incident and not occurrence, if you will, so

20   that when there's seventeen homicides it's

21   reported as one. That is a decision made by

22   the Florida Department of Education, that's not

23   in the law some place, or in code, or in

24   statute.

25   MS. COLLINS: I think that's the way we

1   collect the data, because ultimately the

2   schools report to the districts, the districts

3   report to us, and we report to the feds, and I

4   think that's the way they want the data

5   reported.

6   CHAIR: Do you think -- and so is that in

7   federal law, or the code of federal

8   regulations, or you don't know?

9   MS. COLLINS: I'd have to track that down.

10   It's -- it's --

11   CHAIR: You don't know, okay.

12   MS. COLLINS: It's probably part of that

13   EdFacts system that we report to, and I can, I

14   can definitely look that up and get that

15   information to you. But if we reported what

16   was in uniform crime reporting then why would

17   be collecting the data separately? It's a

18   different data system. It's not -- I mean

19   there are parallels, but they're not designed

20   to the same thing.

21   CHAIR: I understand. I get that.

22   MS. COLLINS: Okay, I'm going to back up

23   and just give you the quick history. It was

24   developed in '95. The State of Florida had a

25   big lead in the national development of data

1   collection on crime and violence. It's based

2   on criminal code, but as you mentioned it's not

3   always identical. We do provide a crosswalk to

4   the schools in the district so they understand

5   if somebody gets arrested under this statute it

6   would be reported this way in SESIR.

7   Currently we have twenty-six incident

8   categories, and each of those incident

9   categories can have related elements. And the

10   rationale behind that is if you have a school

11   information system you're going to put in a

12   narrative to explain what happened, and we

13   don't have the capability or the capacity to

14   handle all the narratives for every incident

15   that happens in every school, so all we get is

16   codes in particular fields, data elements, so

17   you can use, or a school can use any or all of

18   these, or none of these related elements to

19   give some depth to the incident they're

20   reporting.

21   SESIR incidents basically happen on school

22   grounds, school transportation, or at school

23   sponsored events. If it's not under those

24   three categories it's not reportable in SESIR.

25   Generally if there are several elements to an

1   incident then you would code with the most

2   serious. So for example, if it was a battery

3   that was hazing related, battery outranks

4   hazing, so you wouldn't code it has a hazing

5   incident, you would code it as a battery and

6   use the, the related elements.

7   The other thing that's important to note

8   is with SESIR we're talking about 365 days a

9   year 24 hours a day. If it happens over the

10   summer break, and nobody is on campus, if it

11   meets the definition of a SESIR incident it's

12   reportable to SESIR. And also the other thing

13   that's key, and I think not always understood,

14   is that SESIR is primarily students, but it

15   also encompasses non- student and unknown

16   offenders, so if you have a vandalism that

17   takes place on a campus over a weekend, and

18   that person is never identified, it's still a

19   reportable SESIR vandalism, there just wouldn't

20   be a matching disciplinary record.

21   Okay, we've talked about per incident and

22   per student. I skipped ahead. One of the

23   questions that was asked was how frequently we

24   get this data, and this is something that's a

25   real challenge to us, because we don't -- the

1   perception would be that we get real time data,

2   but we don't. There are three surveys that

3   were both the SESIR data, the incident data,

4   and the discipline data are updated to us, and

5   that's a Fall survey, Survey II, a Spring

6   survey, Survey III, and then at the end of the

7   year Survey V provides us the full years' worth

8   of data, so at this time we are not getting any

9   data more frequently than that.

10   Okay, these are the incident categories

11   that we capture, Level I being the most

12   serious, arson, battery, homicide, kidnapping,

13   and sexual battery. The Level II, breaking and

14   entering, burglary, drug sale/distribution,

15   physical attack, which is relatively new as of

16   2014, robbery, trespassing, weapons possession,

17   and also sexual assault is relatively new as of

18   2014.

19   A Level III, disruption on campus, drug

20   use/possession, hazing, fighting, larceny,

21   theft, sexual harassment, sex offenses other,

22   which is not, it doesn't, it's, you know, some

23   of these definitions are a little bit, like you

24   said some are counterintuitive. Sex offenses

25   other is really kids, inappropriate behavior

1   with students, or something, it's lude and

2   lascivious basically, it's not a sex offender

3   in the traditional sense.

4   CHAIR: So do these definitions drive, as

5   an example, is there are certain things, and

6   you'll get to it or, or John will get to it,

7   there are certain things that are, have a

8   mandatory report to law enforcement.

9   MS. COLLINS: I'm getting to that right

10   next.

11   CHAIR: Okay. All right.

12   MS. COLLINS: So threat assessment,

13   threat, intimidation, vandalism, other major

14   offenses. And then last are alcohol, the

15   lowest, alcohol, tobacco, bullying, and

16   harassment. And those with a blue star are not

17   required, do not require consultation with law

18   enforcement. Now, there's a distinction to be

19   made between consultation with law enforcement

20   and reported to law enforcement. Reported to

21   law enforcement is an official action, so it's

22   an affidavit, a report, a case number, a civil

23   citation, you know, that whole list of official

24   actions, whereas consultation with law

25   enforcement is the school resource officer and

1   the dean, or whoever is involved in this

2   incident have a conversation and make a

3   decision that is it best to pursue this through

4   the juvenile justice system, or is it best to

5   pursue this through the consequences that the

6   school can dole out.

7   CHAIR: So are Level I's report?

8   MS. COLLINS: The mandatory reporting ones

9   that they will be rejected, the records will be

10   rejected, are battery, homicide, kidnapping,

11   and sexual battery. We provide some leeway for

12   the others because just as soon as we determine

13   that there's a situation that absolutely has to

14   be reported to law enforcement a school comes

15   up with a scenario that says, yeah, you know,

16   this kid is in third grade, I don't think that

17   this is something that we really need to --

18   CHAIR: So robbery, sticking a gun in

19   somebody's face is not a mandatory report to

20   law enforcement.

21   MS. COLLINS: It's -- it will be flagged.

22   It will not be rejected. So it will -- it will

23   go back to them, and say are you sure this

24   needs, this didn't get reported. Now, some of

25   the local systems are set up that they have to

1   have a case number, or they can't proceed, but

2   those are just, those are determined locally.

3   And it's really from a data management

4   standpoint, because if we kicked out all these

5   records, I think that we would have a

6   challenge.

7   Not everything -- I'm trying to think.

8   I'm trying to think of some examples of the

9   lower level things, but, you know, it really

10   just determines on the circumstances, because

11   --

12   CHAIR: Go ahead.

13   COMM. STEWART: -- and we didn't report

14   that to law enforcement.

15   CHAIR: But, okay, so that would be not

16   even a theft under -- a robbery though.

17   COMM. STEWART: Well, it was a fairly

18   significant toy.

19   CHAIR: Okay, but still -- well, anyway, a

20   robbery is by force, by placing in fear, a

21   robbery, so, you know, if a kid walks up to

22   another kid and threatens with a bat, and says

23   give me your cell phone, that's a robbery. To

24   me that's pretty serious, but that's just me.

25   MS. COLLINS: Well, and when you spoke to

1   the $300 threshold the, the only incidents that

2   get reported to us are these twenty-six SESIR

3   incidents. There are local codes that are

4   defined at the school district level, and by

5   the School Board. So for example, anything

6   less than $300 would be a local theft, and that

7   would be reported to the, at the school

8   district level, and they would probably, you

9   know, consult with law enforcement on that.

10   But just because it's under $300 doesn't mean

11   it doesn't get reported, it just doesn't get

12   reported to us.

13   CHAIR: Well, and ultimately, you know, is

14   that when the community, when parents, when

15   people are looking to this information to give

16   them a read on particular schools, or a

17   particular district, is, is that this is so

18   nuanced, and there is so much detail in these

19   definitions, is, is that personally I don't

20   think it's easily understood. This is not

21   something where a consumer can go -- because

22   all this data is out there, it's available,

23   correct?

24   MS. COLLINS: Yes.

25   CHAIR: So if I'm moving into an area, or

1   I want to know something about a particular

2   area of a district, and whether there is a

3   crime problem, and I'm a parent, and I go look

4   at this stuff, and, and I look at battery,

5   well, how am I supposed to know without, you

6   know, that battery only means like aggravated

7   battery, and that robberies don't have to be

8   reported to the cops, I mean this is, it is

9   very detailed and --

10   MS. COLLINS: Well, we do provide links to

11   the definitions. We provide them information,

12   and what I'm hoping is, we do have a data

13   portal, and that someday soon some of this

14   information might be available in the data

15   portal where it would be in it, because I know

16   Mr. Schachter and I had a conversation

17   yesterday, and he said spreadsheets are not

18   super useful for just about, you know, for the

19   average person, so there's hope that the data

20   portal will be up soon with this kind of data,

21   and it will provide it in a different format.

22   Generally what we provide to the districts

23   is a SESIR poster, and the blue column is what

24   requires consultation with law enforcement.

25   And again that doesn't mean reported to law

1   enforcement, it just means consultation. That

2   change came about in 2009 with the legislature.

3   The zero tolerance statute, I think at the time

4   there was a group, a large group of people who

5   decided that we were criminalizing what we

6   refer to as adolescent stupidity, with

7   referring folks to juvenile justice for things

8   that none of us would have gotten in trouble

9   for a generation ago, and so they changed the

10   statute to relax some of the requirements under

11   zero tolerance. And frankly, many states

12   doesn't even use the term zero tolerance

13   anymore.

14   So that change came about, where we went

15   from reported to law enforcement in that blue

16   column to consultation with law enforcement in

17   2009. The green area is the, are the ones that

18   do not require consultation with law

19   enforcement.

20   How do districts compare. These are the

21   folks at the high end of incidents per 1,000,

22   and you know, it's important for us to not

23   create, if there are disincentives to report,

24   not create further disincentives to report, but

25   I'll tell you we've got at the highest there, I

1   can't see from here, but it's 108.0 per 1,000,

2   and that's consistently high for that

3   particular district. The state average is

4   usually around 24 or 25, you saw in that

5   opening graph that I showed you.

6   An important thing to note is you can't

7   draw definitive conclusions just by looking at

8   these numbers, you have to know what's behind

9   them. And so high numbers could mean that the

10   place is, they're totally law and order, and

11   they write everything up, and that's the way it

12   is, or high numbers could mean that the place

13   is, you know, having some control issues. Low

14   numbers could mean it's the safest school in

15   town, or it could mean that they're sweeping

16   things under the rug, so you can't just by

17   looking at these numbers draw a conclusion

18   about the safety and security of a particular

19   school.

20   That being said, these are districts that

21   are on the high end.

22   CHAIR: Over what period of time?

23   MS. COLLINS: Over what period of time is

24   this?

25   CHAIR: Yeah.

1   MS. COLLINS: This is the 17/18 school

2   year.

3   CHAIR: Okay, so -- so for all -- you

4   have -- you have three reporting periods, and

5   this is what, an average over that reporting,

6   or --

7   MS. COLLINS: This is for the full data,

8   for 17/18, it's closed, so the data is closed,

9   and this is the full data for 17/18 school

10   year. So in that first survey we get in the

11   Spring, the second survey we get the Fall, and

12   then later in the Summer we get the whole

13   series.

14   CHAIR: Right. And you just said highest

15   quartile, I didn't know what that -- but it's

16   the whole 17/18 school year.

17   MS. COLLINS: Correct. So these are the

18   folks in the top quarter, and these are the

19   folks in the bottom quarter.

20   CHAIR: I got you. Now I got you.

21   SHER. ASHLEY: -- the school districts?

22   MS. COLLINS: No, I said it's not a good

23   measurement of, of the safety and security of

24   the school district.

25   SHER. ASHLEY: And, I'm sorry, but what is

1   the purpose of SESIR?

2   MS. COLLINS: Well, we're required to

3   report it federally. We're required to report

4   it in state statute. I think it's one of many

5   measures. I think climate is a measure. Just

6   looking at this number, and what I was trying

7   to explain before is high numbers could mean

8   that it's total law and order, that they're

9   writing up everything, that there's no, that

10   they are using the zero-tolerance approach.

11   SHER. ASHLEY: I guess one of the reasons,

12   other than grants, one of the reasons that,

13   that I understand that SESIR is actually even

14   gathered is to determine the effectiveness of

15   intervention.

16   MS. COLLINS: That is one reason. It's

17   also to identify problems, to get either the

18   board, the board to take action, or to get

19   grant funding for a particular problem, because

20   we tell the districts and the administrators

21   what gets measured gets done, if you don't

22   identify the problem with the data you're not

23   going to get the resources to fix it.

24   SHER. ASHLEY: But if, if the measurement

25   is not accurate then the effectiveness can't be

1   measured.

2   MS. COLLINS: I don't know if I'm

3   contradicting myself by saying that the

4   measurement -- I don't know that I said the

5   measurement is not accurate. It's -- there's

6   -- there is some variance, obviously, in the

7   reporting that we see.

8   UNDER SHER. HARPRING: Because of the

9   variance in the reporting would it be fair to

10   say that just by looking at, at these tables,

11   they really don't tell anyone anything?

12   MS. COLLINS: I don't think that's the

13   case. I mean they're -- they're consistently

14   not telling us anything if that's the case,

15   because they're usually fairly consistent in

16   their reporting. I mean I usually see the, see

17   the same districts on the high end, and I

18   really and truly believe the folks at the

19   district are doing, are very devoted to getting

20   good data. They understand the purpose of it.

21   It may not be a priority at the school level --

22   and I will tell you also if you're an

23   elementary administrator you're not going to

24   see a lot of this stuff.

25   UNDER SHER. HARPRING: And I'm not -- and

1   don't get me wrong, I'm not directing this at

2   you as a presenter --

3   MS. COLLINS: No, no -- no, no, I know.

4   UNDER SHER. HARPRING: I would -- I would

5   guess I would agree with your rhetorical

6   statement, that I think it consistently doesn't

7   tell us anything of value, primarily because of

8   the variance.

9   MS. COLLINS: I -- but I don't think they

10   -- I think the variance is -- you may see

11   variance from district to district, but I think

12   the districts are generally consistent among

13   themselves. And -- and the point I was going

14   to make about an elementary school is you're

15   not going to see a whole lot of these offenses

16   in elementary, so if they do have to report an

17   elementary offense you're asking somebody to do

18   something they do once a year, and I know if

19   it's me if it's not something I do regularly

20   I'm probably not going to do it right, or I'm

21   going to have to reach out to people.

22   But I get, regularly get calls from

23   districts saying we have this incident, we want

24   to report it correctly, how do we do this, this

25   is what happened, it's a little weird, it

1   doesn't fit the usual parameters. So I will

2   tell you that there's a lot of good faith

3   effort to get good data. I think for the most

4   part people understand that this is important

5   data, and while it varies widely -- and, you

6   know, there's a training issue. And I can tell

7   you there are a lot of places I have not been

8   to training, and I can tell you that there are

9   a lot of places, a lot of districts that have

10   not availed themselves of the training that's

11   available.

12   But I think that when, when folks are

13   aware of this, and the importance of it, they

14   are invested in it, and they will make an

15   effort.

16   CHAIR: But how can you explain that

17   answer against the backdrop of in Alachua

18   County and elementary school in the category of

19   physical attack, seventy-two. In the entire

20   Miami-Dade School District, zero. That data is

21   not explainable against that answer.

22   MS. COLLINS: There are a couple of things

23   when you know the particulars of different

24   districts, one is, first of all physical attack

25   is relatively new, it was 2014. I can tell you

1   that Miami-Dade has some reporting issues, in

2   that anything more serious than the lowest

3   level offenses has to go through their law

4   enforcement agency, and they're using law

5   enforcement, to my knowledge they're using law

6   enforcement definitions and not the SESIR

7   definitions.

8   CHAIR: Then -- then the whole thing is

9   screwed up, because, you know, they why is, and

10   you can get to the why, but there's a problem

11   here. And -- and if you've got an entire

12   district that is reporting zero and one

13   elementary school in the same category at

14   seventy-eight, there is no consistency.

15   MS. COLLINS: Well, and you can look at

16   the definition. I mean we talked about how the

17   definitions vary. Physical attack is simple

18   battery, it's me coming up and, you know,

19   laying my hands on you.

20   CHAIR: Right, I get it.

21   MS. COLLINS: You know the definition of

22   simple battery.

23   CHAIR: I get it.

24   MS. COLLINS: And in an elementary school

25   you would think that people laying their hands

1   on each other is one of those things, I mean

2   that kids would, would maybe -- it happens all

3   the time, so it may be in an abundance of

4   caution they're over-reporting. I mean -- I

5   know you perceive this as underreporting, but I

6   think there is also unintentional

7   over-reporting in some of these cases, and

8   that's what skews that.

9   CHAIR: Commissioner Carroll, go ahead.

10   COMM. CARROLL: Just to comment. Any time

11   you have an incident, a self-reported incident

12   reporting system, there's going to be

13   variances, I get that.

14   MS. COLLINS: Sure.

15   COMM. CARROLL: But I don't know how you

16   can say that the data is in any way useful. If

17   it were, we'd have a state of emergency in

18   Gadsden, because they're ten times more likely

19   to be on this report for something than, than,

20   who's, Bradford, Bradford is 2.8. And you can

21   say, well some underreport and some

22   over-report, well, that speaks to how

23   inconsistent and wildly not valid this data is,

24   so I don't understand what you're using it for.

25   How can you even justify using this data with,

1 with this level of variance?

2   MS. COLLINS: We -- we do have incidents

3 -- I mean Gadsden is, is usually very, I mean

4 they're consistent, that's all I can say.

5   COMM. CARROLL: So -- so -- so the --

6   MS. COLLINS: And I don't have the

7 authority --

8   COMM. CARROLL: -- Department of Education

9 is not alarmed at the rate of incidences in

10 Gadsden County?

11   MS. COLLINS: Yes.

12   COMM. CARROLL: What have you done about

13 it?

14   MS. COLLINS: I don't have the authority

15 to change the, the -- I can tell you I've never

16 been there for training. I will tell you that.

17   COMM. CARROLL: But not even about

18 training. If this data is valid, then what

19 have we as a state done with that alarming

20 level of incidences in Gadsden?

21   MS. COLLINS: I couldn't tell you.

22   CHAIR: And again, I know Commissioner

23 Dodd wants to get in here, but Commissioner

24 Stewart, do you want to --

25   COMM. STEWART: I think that it was said,

1   Julie has said this, we don't have authority to

2   step in. Have done things with Gadsden County,

3   absolutely. Have we done things with several

4   counties, absolutely. But you've heard this

5   refrain several times, there isn't authority.

6   We only have the authority that we are given

7   the authority. Can we use the pulpit,

8   certainly, but that's, that's really the

9   authority that we have. This is a requirement

10   that we do. That's the reason it's done.

11   COMM. CARROLL: And don't get me wrong,

12   I'm not saying there's a problem in Gadsden,

13   I'm telling you there's a problem with the

14   data, and, and if nothing's been done to look

15   at the data, and to understand what's causing

16   these inconsistencies, then there could be a

17   problem in data, and there could be a problem

18   in Gadsden that no one's addressing, or there

19   could be a problem in Bradford, but no one is

20   addressing it because we're I guess pretending

21   that this data is relevant and valid. It just

22   can't be with the --

23   COMM. STEWART: I just -- I have to say

24   I'm not sure that that's a fair statement. You

25   said it when you started out, it's

1 self-reporting. Self-reporting is

2 self-reporting, and unless and until there is

3 some other mechanism put in place to do

4 something other than self-reporting that,

5 that's going to continue to exist because of

6 issues that have already been identified in

7 self reporting. That -- that's going to

8 continue to exist because of issues that have

9 already been identified in self reporting.

10   CHAIR: Commissioner Dodd, go ahead.

11   COMM. DODD: And then when you talk about

12 a variance you've got to look at how is

13 consideration given to students with a IEP or a

14 504 plan? I mean isn't that -- isn't that

15 consideration allowed to be given in reporting

16 SESIR data?

17   MS. COLLINS: It's -- it's -- the

18 consideration is on the discipline side. Now,

19 with any -- I should say there is a -- there is

20 another point to be made, is that with any of

21 these incidents you would look at the age, and

22 the understanding, and the ability of the

23 student. So for example, some of these

24 behaviors that are a little far in, you know,

25 anything of a sexual nature, if it's a very

1   young child they're probably, you know, without

2   getting into -- I'm trying to think of some

3   appropriate examples. There are a lot of

4   things that little kids would not be written up

5   for if they didn't understand the impact of

6   their actions. The exact same with students

7   with disabilities, if it's a, you know, if it's

8   a manifestation, you know, there's a whole host

9   of issues that come into play with that.

10   So, yes, you're right, we do -- there is

11   some consideration taken at the school level

12   for the ability and the understand of the

13   student for what their impact, you know, what

14   the impact is that the caused.

15   CHAIR: Go ahead, Mr. Schachter.

16   COMM. SCHACHTER: I have a couple of

17   questions. Number one, are there any negative

18   consequences to reporting high numbers, in your

19   opinion, aside from, you know, let's say the

20   public went online, which they're not going to

21   do, or very very few?

22   MS. COLLINS: I think there are some

23   perceived disincentives. There's -- for

24   example, there's a federal report called the

25   Unsafe School Choice Option, and if you're, if

1   your school meets the State's definition then

2   you can, there's some serious consequences

3   about kids being able to opt out of that

4   school.

5   COMM. SCHACHTER: Do any of our schools or

6   districts --

7   MS. COLLINS: No.

8   COMM. SCHACHTER: No?

9   MS. COLLINS: No, it has to do -- there

10   has to be a gun incident, a certain percentage

11   of the student body expelled. The bar is

12   pretty high for an unsafe school, for, it's

13   called a persistently dangerous school, and

14   we've never had one.

15   COMM. SCHACHTER: A gun incident, so would

16   that be murder on campus?

17   MS. COLLINS: A gun incident, any

18   possession of a firearm, plus a certain extent,

19   a certain percentage of the student body

20   expelled, so it's not just one factor, it's a

21   whole host of factors that come into play, and

22   no, no school in Florida has met that.

23   COMM. SCHACHTER: What is -- what is the

24   advantage to, to having it the way it is

25   currently, where you don't have accurate

1   numbers based on crime? What is the advantage

2   to only showing one incident versus the real

3   number, which is seventeen dead people?

4   MS. COLLINS: As I told the Chair if we,

5   if we were, if we wanted to collect uniform

6   crime reporting data then we wouldn't need to

7   because it's already being collected.

8   COMM. SCHACHTER: We don't -- they don't

9   collect it in schools though, don't, do they?

10   MS. COLLINS: Say again?

11   COMM. SCHACHTER: Do they collect uniform

12   crime data in schools?

13   MS. COLLINS: They do collect arrest data,

14   they do.

15   COMM. SCHACHTER: In -- in -- okay.

16   MS. COLLINS: Yes, they do. The best

17   numbers come from DJJ, but they're also

18   required at the school level to report school

19   related arrests.

20   COMM. SCHACHTER: But all of these twenty-

21   six categories is --

22   MS. COLLINS: That's all the --

23   COMM. SCHACHTER: -- I think uniform crime

24   data is, is only what, like rape, murder, or is

25   it a lot more? I'm not familiar.

1   MS. COLLINS: You'd have to ask the law

2   enforcement folks the specific categories for

3   uniform crime reporting, but there is some

4   overlap.

5   COMM. SCHACHTER: Okay. Just to give you

6   an example, Addison, you were talking about

7   elementary schools, we won't find, you know, I

8   can't remember your exact quote on elementary

9   schools, but I did found this alarming, Addison

10   Mizner Elementary in Boca Raton sent no reports

11   to the state for 2015 and 2015 school years,

12   even, not even after a seven year old boy with

13   autism reported that two classmates forced him

14   into sex acts on the playground in November of

15   2015.

16   MS. COLLINS: Is that the incident from

17   the Sun-Sentinel article?

18   COMM. SCHACHTER: Correct.

19   MS. COLLINS: Yeah. And it's possible

20   that things are not reported. I cannot explain

21   to you why it wasn't reported in that

22   particular case. I'm not familiar with the,

23   what the school was, what their thought process

24   was when they chose not to --

25   COMM. SCHACHTER: Did you say earlier that

1   stuff on the -- we're not -- we're not really

2   going to expect to see a lot of reporting on

3   elementary schools?

4   MS. COLLINS: We do see reporting, but not

5   a lot, because when you look at these

6   incidents, they're generally not things that

7   happen in elementary schools. And -- and what

8   I alluded to was for folks that do report one

9   of these per year, if they do have these types

10   of incidents, you know, it's, it's not a

11   process that they're familiar with, so if they

12   don't do it correctly it's a concern, but it's,

13   they're, they're not frequently reported at

14   elementary schools.

15   COMM. SCHACHTER: Taylor Ranch Elementary

16   School in Sarasota hasn't completed a safety, a

17   safe, a State safety report for more than five

18   years despite two fugitives with weapons

19   trespassing on campus in 2014. And I'll just

20   read a couple of more instances. The West

21   Virginia couple arrived at the campus

22   playground in a stolen mini-van after alluding

23   police in a high-speed chase. One of the

24   subjects was carrying a plastic knuckles with

25   spikes, and the other was carrying a folding

1   knife. School District spokesman Kelsey

2   Wheeley falsely claimed that only bullying and

3   harassment must be reported to the state, not

4   trespassing. She referred additional questions

5   to the State DOE.

6   At Parker Elementary School in Panama City

7   a twelve-year-old boy stole a school bus in

8   2014, went on a two-hour joy ride, just hours

9   after he had appeared in court on another bus

10   theft. The theft was never reported to the

11   State. The school district did not respond.

12   And my last example is Hillsborough County

13   ignored repeated audits that advised, quote,

14   please be certain that incidents involving

15   teachers and staff who were arrested for

16   on-campus offenses are included.

17   So what enforcement power do you have if

18   the school is not --

19   CHAIR: Mr. Schachter, she already said

20   they don't. They don't have enforcement power.

21   COMM. SCHACHTER: They don't have any.

22   Got it.

23   CHAIR: They -- they've got none. She

24   already said we know we got a problem.

25   Commissioner Swearingen, go ahead.

1   COMM. SWEARINGEN: That's kind of my

2   point. I'm trying to understand -- so in law

3   enforcement if we identify an emerging crime,

4   or some trend that, that we don't have the

5   authority, we go the legislature and we seek

6   authority to be able to deal with that, so

7   Secretary, or, I'm sorry, Commissioner Carroll,

8   I agree with him. When you see Gadsden County,

9   and you're saying this is consistently at 108.0

10   per 1,000 students --

11   MS. COLLINS: It's consistently high,

12   yeah. I don't know exactly from year to year,

13   but it's consistently high.

14   COMM. SWEARINGEN: And then you hear the

15   examples that were just given by Commissioner

16   Schachter, as the body that has oversight over

17   these districts if they're not going to do the

18   right thing at what point do you go to the

19   legislature and ask for the authority to deal

20   with these things? If they're not going to do

21   it themselves, and I think we've seen this over

22   and over, where they don't comply with many of

23   the things that are placed on them, whether

24   it's FSSAT reporting, whatever that is, we

25   can't just keep saying we don't have --

1   somebody has got to get the authority to deal

2   with these people. Somebody has got to bring

3   them into compliance, and if that has to be

4   DOE, at what point do we go to the legislature

5   and say we need this authority?

6   MS. COLLINS: With -- with Gadsden as your

7   example I'm not quite sure what authority we

8   would get. I mean I -- I would imagine if the

9   reports are consistently high, they're

10   reporting what's going on on their campuses.

11   We don't have the authority to intervene. We

12   do with academic programs and other issues.

13   CHAIR: Or -- or maybe not, I mean, you

14   know, consistent -- so like an example -- and

15   I'll get -- Sheriff Judd is next up here, but

16   as an example you got Pinellas reporting 410

17   batteries, which really is 410 aggravated

18   batteries, so is, is that, is that consistently

19   high, is Pinellas -- I don't know the answer to

20   that, but is that high because they don't

21   understand the definitions, they're improperly

22   using it --

23   MS. COLLINS: It's possible.

24   CHAIR: -- are they really calling

25   batteries, which are, and by your, collective

1   you, entity DOE, an aggravated battery, but

2   they're thinking they're reporting a simple

3   battery, is it all mixed up, because you don't

4   know what's underlying what's being reported?

5   MS. COLLINS: Yeah, and that's a

6   challenge, I mean --

7   CHAIR: You know -- you know -- and this

8   -- right.

9   MS. COLLINS: -- with 4,000 schools we

10   won't know every single incident, and we got

11   almost 100,000 incidents reported every year.

12   CHAIR: So you could have a, a huge

13   problem in Gadsden County. You could have a

14   huge problem, and a consistently huge problem

15   that nobody is doing anything about, or you

16   could just have a misreporting problem where

17   they got a whole bunch of minor incidents that

18   are just being lumped in the wrong category,

19   and we don't know. Sheriff Judd, go ahead.

20   And then -- go ahead.

21   SHER. JUDD: And -- and let me clearly say

22   we're not, you know, we're not attacking the

23   messenger.

24   MS. COLLINS: I understand.

25   SHER. JUDD: I have seen examples where

1   there is significant pressure to underreport

2   events, and we see that throughout society

3   today, don't tangle the kids up in the criminal

4   justice system, well, how do you do that, you

5   don't tell the cops. How did Nikolas Cruz

6   avoid the criminal justice system, though,

7   throughout his career, did he never, ever, ever

8   do anything that was violent, was that

9   reported? I suggest that this report in its

10   current form statewide, and probably

11   nationwide, should start out; once upon a time

12   in a land far, far away, because I have

13   absolutely no faith -- Gadsden may be reporting

14   this exactly correct, and they may be the only

15   one in the state, or there may be a

16   misunderstanding.

17   There's pressure from school to school,

18   principal to principal, in some areas that you

19   got to keep your school under control, and if

20   it's not under control any place else keep it

21   under control on paper, so my suggestion is,

22   and it's do we really want to know what it is

23   or do want to be able to survive to fight

24   another day, whether it be grants, funding,

25   allocation -- once again there's this federal

1   authority to say, oh, this is a dangerous

2   school, you don't have to send your kid there,

3   well, do you think under that threat for a

4   minute you're going to get accurate reporting

5   if there's the threat of they can pull

6   everybody out of the school?

7   You know it's -- it's obvious that there's

8   too many different moving parts, and too much

9   at stake for school administrators personally

10   and professionally, for the district, for the

11   community, and I'm not, I'm not comfortable at

12   all that, that, that we have a uniform standard

13   that unequivocally this gets reported, this

14   doesn't, and that your ability to be a

15   principal next year is not what your numbers

16   are but your ability to accurately report. But

17   --

18   CHAIR: So let's do this -- let's --

19   Secretary Marstiller, and then let's let Julie

20   finish, and then let Sergeant Suess get up

21   there and get all this data out in front of us,

22   and then we can continue this. So, Secretary

23   Marstiller, do ahead.

24   SEC. MARSTILLER: Thank you. Just a

25   question for you, because obviously what we're

1   hearing, what I'm hearing anyway, is that we

2   have numbers that for which we can't do, we

3   can't do anything, they're -- they don't really

4   -- they're not meaningful in the form that they

5   are. So my question to you, and you may be

6   reluctant to answer it, but my question to you

7   is what would it take, what tools would you and

8   DOE need to get behind these numbers, right, to

9   audit, I guess is my, is the best way to put

10   it, to audit the numbers that are coming in,

11   and to do some analysis on the underlying

12   facts, because as you're hearing what we have

13   in raw data, whether it's properly purported,

14   reported, or underreported, or what really

15   happened, what would it take for you to be able

16   to get behind these numbers and audit what

17   we're really getting?

18   MS. COLLINS: I think there are some

19   provisions in maybe one, or both of the

20   proposed bills that the Chair presented

21   yesterday that provides staff. Maybe it's the

22   original version of 7030, and hopefully the new

23   version of 7030, that talks about audit

24   responsibilities for this particular data. The

25   challenge is, you know, with almost 4,000

1   schools how do you know what's going on in

2   every single school, but there, there is a

3   provision for that, and that's a start.

4   I'm a staff of one, and I will say that

5   this is fraction of a fraction of what I do,

6   because a lot of the work that we do now is

7   implementation of 7026. So as much as I like

8   crunching numbers, and doing the data side,

9   there's just, you know, a part of my time

10   that's used for this. So I don't know if that

11   exactly answers your question, but I think the

12   fact that you guys are paying attention to this

13   -- and certainly we welcome your

14   recommendations for improving this data. We're

15   certainly not the only agency that collects

16   data. Your agency does a phenomenal job with

17   data, but, but you all get your data because

18   those kids come through your system and you lay

19   hands on them, it's not relying on another

20   party to self-report, so but you guys have

21   fantastic data, and he way that you present it,

22   and I hope that we would be at that point

23   sometime soon.

24   So we welcome any opportunity to, your

25   suggestions, your support has been appreciated,

1   because I'll tell you if the numbers have gone

2   up in 17/18 it's because the interest that you

3   all and others have expressed in the SESIR

4   data.

5   CHAIR: So one quick question from Sheriff

6   Ashley, then, Julie, we'll ask you to finish

7   and then get Sergeant Suess up there. Then we

8   can continue this with questions. I want to

9   get all the data out there. Go ahead.

10   SHER. ASHLEY: Thank you for this insight.

11   My only question is does the Department of

12   Education direct, or allocate any resources

13   based off SESIR data?

14   MS. COLLINS: No. No. Not directly, no.

15   SHER. ASHLEY: Indirectly?

16   MS. COLLINS: No, not that I know of.

17   SHER. ASHLEY: Okay, thank you.

18   CHAIR: Okay, go ahead, Julie. Do you

19   have -- are you finished, or are you --

20   MS. COLLINS: Technically no, but I don't

21   want to take up all his time.

22   CHAIR: No, no, no, I want you to finish

23   first, and then he can --

24   MS. COLLINS: Okay, well, we'll go quickly

25   here. I wanted to mention we do have online

1   training. We've had it since 2007. We did a

2   major revamp in 2012. It's a --

3   CHAIR: Do you -- do you know -- speaking

4   of that I don't -- do you know -- because

5   you're right there, do you have any way of

6   determining is people actually use that online

7   training?

8   MS. COLLINS: Yes. Yes, I can tell who's

9   completed, but don't ask me, I don't know the

10   number off the top of my head. I can go in and

11   look.

12   CHAIR: Have you looked at it in the past?

13   MS. COLLINS: Yes, I have, but we also --

14   CHAIR: Okay, how -- how prevalent is it,

15   is it used or is it not?

16   MS. COLLINS: Some -- in some districts

17   it's mandatory, and they make everybody go

18   through it, and in some districts hardly

19   anybody has been in there at all.

20   CHAIR: Okay. All right, go ahead.

21   MS. COLLINS: So basically, it's fifty-two

22   scenarios where they walk through, it's either

23   a video or a narrative, and then they have to

24   code it, and if it's not coded correctly it'll

25   correct them. So it'd designed to teach the

1   definitions and the proper coding of these

2   incidents. We do have an online SESIR poster

3   to accompany the color one that we do sent out,

4   and the way that that one works is if you have

5   a particular incident, and I know you've

6   mentioned battery, you can click on battery,

7   it'll give examples, non-examples, frequently

8   asked questions, and the statutes, the relevant

9   statutes that would fall under that particular

10   definition of battery.

11   So if somebody got arrested under these

12   statutes then it would be a reportable SESIR

13   batter. And that's all I have, and I will turn

14   it over to Sergeant Suess, thank you.

15   PRESENTATION - 17/18 SCHOOL YEAR SESIR DATA

16   SGT. SUESS: All right, good afternoon,

17   Commissioners. So I'm going to recap a couple

18   of things that Ms. Collins pointed out. So the

19   twenty-one incidents, on that chart that she

20   showed, the color chart, within those

21   twenty-one incidents it says that these

22   incidents must be reported to SESIR, and are

23   expected to include consultation with law

24   enforcement. So prior to this point last year

25   I had never heard of SESIR. I had no idea what

1   it was, so I'm an outside coming into this, and

2   when I read that to me that's confusing, when

3   it says you're expected to do something, I

4   don't think there's much compulsion, or urgency

5   in that definition. And then it uses the

6   phrase consultation.

7   Later you'll see where it talks about

8   reported to law enforcement, and it provides a

9   very specific definition of what that is. So

10   these incidents, and I'm going to harp on this

11   several times to, to try and make it as clear

12   as possible, and please interject if I

13   mischaracterize something, but these incidents,

14   it's expected that law enforcement is

15   consulted. That data is not tracked on a

16   statewide level, it's only on a local level,

17   whether law enforcement was consulted or not.

18   So we'll get back to this, to that point

19   shortly.

20   These five incidents that must be reported

21   to SESIR may not need to include, again,

22   consultation with law enforcement. Again that

23   phrase may not need I think is pretty

24   subjective and open to interpretation. Going

25   back to the prior slide real quick, you'll see

1   the asterisk by battery on the left, physical

2   attack at the top of the right, and the

3   fighting. And we'll get into those three

4   specific ones, but essentially with SESIR

5   there's three categories if you lay hand on

6   somebody else, a manner in which that could be

7   classified. And we'll go through those

8   definitions, and from my perspective, and I'll

9   certainly leave it to everyone to come to their

10   own conclusion. I think they are confusing and

11   create difficulty for school administrators.

12   So going back to those two phrases that I

13   was speaking about earlier, and those two

14   definitions about incidents that are expected

15   to include, or may not need consultation with

16   law enforcement, on this same chart it says

17   reporting guidelines, and reported to law

18   enforcement, so throughout the presentation

19   I'll make references to incidents that were

20   reported to law enforcement. And SESIR does

21   keep track, the State DOE does keep track of

22   incidents that are reported to law enforcement.

23   That does not mean that they pick up the phone

24   and call the deputy down the hall, or go into

25   his office and they report it to him, what it

1   means, interpret this as official law

2   enforcement action was taken, not necessarily

3   an arrest, but a law enforcement agency pulled

4   a case number and just wrote an incident

5   report, a kid was given a juvenile citation,

6   something to that affect. So when you hear

7   reported to law enforcement please understand

8   that to mean that an official law enforcement

9   action of some sort was taken, not that law

10   enforcement was notified or consulted.

11   CHAIR: And if your head is spinning with

12   this it should be spinning, because that means,

13   that means when somebody goes down and reports

14   it to the SRO that that's not reporting unless

15   the SRO actually takes a case number, as an

16   example, and so this is where this is just --

17   it's a mess. So, you know, you get down to,

18   you know, at the school level, because of this

19   self-reporting, and for some of this I know

20   that, that people in the schools don't

21   understand this.

22   As we have delved into this in the last

23   couple months is that in looking at it, the

24   first time that John and I sat down and talked

25   about this, seriously, I walked away and just

1   like, my head was spinning, I was done with it,

2   because it doesn't make any sense.

3   And it -- it is so nuanced, and you got so

4   many people in the schools with so many

5   different responsibilities, and so many

6   different things that none of us should be

7   shocked that this in the situation that it is,

8   because it doesn't -- again, as I said in the

9   opening remarks, some of it, it just defies

10   common sense, it defies logic, so, you know --

11   and you are expected, okay, so that tells me

12   you don't have to do, and then you've got a

13   consult versus report, but you don't, you may

14   not need to. I mean and -- and I would venture

15   to say that there are very few, if any,

16   districts that have official guidelines and

17   policies about, to tell them when they're

18   expected to, or when they may not need to, and

19   it's being done on a ad-hoc basis across the

20   schools, so.

21   SGT. SUESS: And so it's important, I

22   believe, that this changed on, using the phrase

23   and the terminology consult versus reported

24   came about during the '07 timeframe, 2009

25   timeframe, in trying to reduce the zero

1   tolerance policies; just to give you a little

2   background.

3   So it's important to consider when law

4   enforcement is notified or made aware of this,

5   if you take the entire population of student

6   behavior, so all student behavior, good

7   behavior, bad behavior, everything in between,

8   within that there's a smaller group of

9   misconduct, and then within that yet there's a

10   smaller group of detected misconducted. So

11   there's, you know, similar to law enforcement,

12   there's a lot of crime that goes unreported

13   that we aren't made aware of, so within that

14   detected misconduct then there's yet a smaller

15   population, or smaller group that is reported

16   within SESIR, and then of course within that is

17   yet a smaller portion that is reported to law

18   enforcement.

19   If you go back to this definition it talks

20   about classifying something as being reported

21   to law enforcement, it means official law

22   enforcement action was taken. Well, then

23   there's another variable, was law enforcement

24   notified, and that agency, that law enforcement

25   officer for whatever reason chose to not make a

1   report, or that's that agency's policies, so

2   there's another level of variables there.

3   COMM. SCHACHTER: Sergeant.

4   SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

5   COMM. SCHACHTER: So can you also explain

6   when you factor in the Broward County matrix, I

7   know these are two different systems, but just,

8   just help me understand it, because in the

9   current matrix that was just changed it still

10   does not mandate consultation with law

11   enforcement until the fourth offense.

12   SGT. SUESS: I don't think these two

13   systems have anything to do with each other.

14   COMM. SCHACHTER: Yeah. Yeah.

15   SGT. SUESS: So when you look at the

16   2017/2018 school year -- so all these

17   statistics that I'm going to show you are

18   specific to the 2017/2018 school year. So

19   there was approximately 71,000 incidents

20   statewide that were reported to through the

21   SESIR system. Approximately 33% of those were

22   reported to law enforcement. Again, though,

23   that means official law enforcement action was

24   taken. It doesn't mean law enforcement was

25   notified. 67% of those incidents the law

1   enforcement involvement is really unknown. I

2   previously had that on there as not reported to

3   law enforcement, but we can't say that because

4   it may have been an incident where law

5   enforcement was consulted and they didn't take

6   any official action, or it may have been law

7   enforcement was never even consulted.

8   The area, the sample size of law

9   enforcement being just consulted is only

10   maintained at the district level. DOE does not

11   have access to those records. I imagine if you

12   contacted each county in theory you should be

13   able to get them, but we know how that goes.

14   CHAIR: And so just to further, John, we

15   had this discussion, so just for everybody is,

16   is that of the 33% category that reported to

17   law enforcement you could have, of those 23,444

18   that were reported to law enforcement,

19   certainly in that category you could have

20   incidents that were not required to be reported

21   to law enforcement, so the vice-versa is true,

22   where you could have, where it's unknown down

23   below, what is in the unknown category would be

24   those incidents where a law enforcement officer

25   was told about it, or may not have been told

1   about it, but they could have been informed of

2   it but didn't necessarily in that mandatory

3   category draw a number or take a report, right?

4   SGT. SUESS: That's my understanding, yes,

5   sir. Absolutely.

6   CHAIR: All right. Okay. All right. So

7   go ahead.

8   SGT. SUESS: So to break down that total

9   group of the 71,000 statewide incidents, on the

10   left you'll see those are the twenty-one

11   incidents that are again expected to include

12   consultation with law enforcement. There was a

13   total of approximately 3,600, 3,900 total SESIR

14   incidents within those twenty-one, the most

15   serious incidents. 52% of those, or

16   approximately 1,900 involved some sort of

17   official law enforcement action. 48%, or about

18   1,700 of them, we don't know what law

19   enforcement's involvement was. We don't know

20   if they were notified, consulted, or not. On

21   the other side we have those five incidents

22   that may not need consultation with law

23   enforcement, so there's, about 12% of them

24   involve some sort of official law enforcement

25   action, and 88%, again we just don't know.

1   So there's going to be several charts like

2   this, and I sort of just want to explain the

3   layout, and then we'll, we're going to go

4   through several examples. And I tried to take

5   some from different categories, different

6   counties around the state, different populated

7   counties, to give you an idea that really any

8   metric you take, I think, and you look at these

9   numbers, I think if you've lived in Florida any

10   longer than a year, just knowing the population

11   sizes and the crime in different parts of the

12   state it causes you to question the legitimacy

13   of the data.

14   So the blue column is the total number of

15   incidents by county, by school district, so

16   this just looks at the 67 school districts.

17   The red numbers, or the red column indicates

18   incidents in which official law enforcement

19   action was taken. So if we just look at the

20   blue column for a minute, total incidents that

21   occurred in each county, you'll see Miami-Dade

22   County about halfway down. Despite having the

23   most, the highest population -- and you'll see

24   directly beneath each county's, beneath each

25   county is the student population.

1   So Miami-Dade, approximately 354,000

2   students, reported an extremely low number of

3   SESIR incidents about 3,700. Then you compare

4   it to Duval County, who has under half the same

5   student body population, reports almost 10,000

6   incidents. So within that we look at the red

7   column of reported to law enforcement, Duval

8   County the highest reporting number of SESIR

9   incidents, within that only 838, or 8% of those

10   incidents involve some sort of official law

11   enforcement action.

12   So with each, beneath each county's name

13   you have the student population and then a

14   percentage, and you will see that the

15   percentage represents the rate at which each

16   county reports, or I should say within each

17   county the rate at which an official law

18   enforcement action was taken.

19   CHAIR: So -- so if you look at that, if

20   you take Duval and Polk, so Duval has 129,000

21   students, Polk has 104,000, so basically a

22   25,000-student differentiation, and Duval has

23   almost 10,000 incidents and Polk has 3,000

24   incidents, and Polk reports 94% to law

25   enforcement, and Duval reports 8%.

1   SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

2   CHAIR: I -- you can just stop right

3   there. I mean I -- I mean you can't make any

4   sense of this stuff.

5   SHER. JUDD: And -- and I can tell you we

6   get a lot of pressure about why are you

7   reporting this stuff, well, because it

8   happened. So what's happening in Duval,

9   they're, they're bending to the pressure,

10   they're just pushing back and not -- and, you

11   know, I can -- I can -- and I'm saying that for

12   them as a fact, but the reality is we are

13   being, we are getting involved whenever they

14   ask us to get involved, and we accurately

15   report it. Then -- then community groups come

16   to us and go, oh, my gosh, look at this. Well,

17   it is an action, we defer the ones we can, and

18   we don't know how many of them are being dealt

19   with between the principals and the teachers

20   that don't come to our attention, that they

21   don't record. But when you look at the ones

22   that they do report the majority of them are,

23   are to the event that it, it has to be a law

24   enforcement action. But I'm telling you

25   there's pressure not to report, or to

1   underreport.

2   SGT. SUESS: I'll go through this one

3   briefly, and this, this point has really been

4   illustrated. So for statewide the number of

5   SESIR incidents is, this is just to give you an

6   idea of the most common incidents, fighting

7   obviously by far and away, almost 20,000

8   incidents. And that is the, of the three

9   contact, violent contact, that's the one that

10   does not require to be reported or does not

11   expect to be reported to law enforcement.

12   And then you'll see the Marjory Stoneman

13   Douglas shooting. Again, there's one homicide

14   statewide last year, but obviously we know

15   there were seventeen lives lost on that day, so

16   again it's incident based, not based on the

17   number of people involved.

18   So then looking at statewide, the ten most

19   reported SESIR incidents for the same school

20   year -- this is just to give you an idea of the

21   ones that are most commonly reported.

22   Fighting, physical attack, tobacco/drug use,

23   and then you'll see again the group, the grey

24   area identifying the percentage, or the number

25   that involves official law enforcement action,

1   for the most part pretty low. You'll see

2   battery is at 100%. Battery is one of those

3   classifications that the system simply rejects

4   it if the, the person inputting that data does

5   not indicate that they reported it to law

6   enforcement.

7   So looking a little closer at the South

8   Florida Metro area, the statewide average for

9   law enforcement taking official action is about

10   33%. So Broward County at 33% is pretty much

11   on par with statewide average. What's

12   concerning about this is you look at

13   Miami-Dade, with a tremendous number of more

14   students but reporting approximately half the

15   number of incidents to SESIR total, total SESIR

16   incidents.

17   And then you look at Palm Beach County,

18   the rate at which law enforcement is involved,

19   takes some sort of official action, 11%, quite

20   a bit lower than the statewide average.

21   CHAIR: So -- so I noticed that. And I

22   don't know if this is meaningful or not, but

23   those are two districts that have their own

24   police departments, so Jacksonville and Palm

25   Beach seem to be low. If you go back to the

1   other slide, and Jacksonville --

2   COMM. SCHACHTER: Miami.

3   CHAIR: Yeah, but I'm just talking about

4   those. If you go back to the other one, John,

5   you go back to Duval, only 8% reported, right?

6   SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

7   CHAIR: And they have their own police

8   department, and Palm Beach has its own. I

9   don't know what that means, and it may just be

10   a coincidence, but that may be whether because

11   of this whole reporting and consultation thing,

12   because they have their own cops, their own

13   police department, and it may be because the

14   police department is doing the data entry, I

15   don't know, but that's just a fact to point

16   out.

17   SGT. SUESS: Understood.

18   COMM. SCHACHTER: You can get pressure

19   from the school board on the, on this, on the,

20   if you have your own police force --

21   CHAIR: You can or you can't?

22   COMM. SCHACHTER: You can.

23   CHAIR: Yeah, sure.

24   SGT. SUESS: So looking even closer at

25   Broward County -- this is just to give you an

1   idea of the ten most reported SESIR incidents

2   within Broward County. Again fighting,

3   consistent with the rest of the state, is most

4   frequently reported, with about 2,700

5   incidents. And then only 6% of all fights

6   involve some sort of official law enforcement

7   action.

8   So looking at Stoneman Douglas for the

9   2017/2018 school year, in that box on the top

10   left you'll see those categories had zero

11   reports for the entire school year. I find

12   that pretty shocking when you look at bullying,

13   physical attack, trespassing, or vandalisms.

14   Those are all pretty common incidents in high

15   schools. Stoneman Douglas, their total

16   reporting rate is at 38%, the rate at which law

17   enforcement took some sort of official action,

18   so it's pretty much on part with the state

19   average.

20   A single theft was reported in the entire

21   school year, and four fights in an entire

22   school year. Those all seem pretty low.

23   COMM. SCHACHTER: I have - I have the

24   video, you know, you can just look on YouTube,

25   or on any social media, the kids are, you know,

1   recording fights all the time. It's just un -

2   unbelievable.

3   SGT. SUESS: So we look at the definition,

4   so these are those three different definitions

5   for some sort of violent contact against

6   another person. So battery is really on part

7   with an aggravated battery for the state

8   statute definition. Physical attack, pretty

9   much on par with a battery in looking at the

10   criminal definition, and then fighting is

11   pretty much a mutual combatant situation.

12   I think it's safe to say -- for me it's,

13   it's easy how you could see if there's an

14   administrator who doesn't do this frequently,

15   certainly they're at an elementary school,

16   these offer a lot of subjectivity. Now, that

17   being said, on the SESIR website, which Ms.

18   Collins showed a screenshot of, each

19   definition, if you click on it, it has a list

20   of examples and non- examples, so there's some

21   pretty clear, or there's some pretty helpful

22   information. Whether people are taking the

23   time, the administrators, the staff are taking

24   the time to look at that, study it, and know

25   it, is another matter.

1   So when we look at the 17/18 statewide

2   data, on the left you've got the two

3   categories, battery and physical attack. The

4   numbers are not showing up there on the screen.

5   They should be on your page; I apologize for

6   that. But battery, 100% of them were reported

7   to law enforcement. Again, that's a mandatory

8   -- the system will not accept that SESIR report

9   if you don't indicate that it was reported to

10   law enforcement. Physical attack, only 9%

11   involve some sort of law enforcement action,

12   and it's a pretty similar number, 9% in the

13   fighting category that involve some sort of

14   official law enforcement action.

15   So when we look at these, we're going to

16   look at those three groups, fighting, battery,

17   and physical attack. Look at Miami-Dade near

18   the end reporting 540 fight, incidents of

19   fighting in their district, 0%, none of them

20   involved official law enforcement action.

21   Duval County, conversely, again having less

22   than half the same student population is

23   reporting almost 3,900 incidents of fighting.

24   And nearly all ten of these counties are

25   reporting, or there's very small involvement by

1   law enforcement taking some sort of official

2   action.

3   We go onto physical attack, again Duval is

4   very high as compared to the rest of the state.

5   This is physical attack, so this is a category

6   which expects consultation with law

7   enforcement, but only.3% of them involved some

8   sort of official law enforcement action.

9   Alachua County, you see they are pretty much in

10   the middle. They report 100 more physical

11   attacks than Broward County, who is on the far

12   right, despite Alachua County having about, or

13   Broward County having about nine times as many

14   students in their student population.

15   This is that same category which the Chair

16   referenced. Miami-Dade reported zero physical

17   attacks for the entire school year. And then

18   if you look at, Hernando had 53% of these

19   incidents involved some sort of official law

20   enforcement action, while Duval, again

21   reporting.3, in Lee County 4%. So these are

22   some of the numbers which the Chair referenced

23   earlier. You've got that elementary school in

24   Alachua County reports 72 incidents of physical

25   attack. Another elementary school in Duval

1   reporting 119. 101 at a school in

2   Hillsborough, but then other elementary schools

3   reporting zero. The entire Miami-Dade school

4   district reporting none, Pinellas County

5   reporting 3.

6   And you'll see there at the bottom, so I

7   took a pool of 1,100 schools, 861 of those

8   elementary schools, or 73% reported zero

9   physical attacks, so it's safe to say physical

10   attacks are pretty rare in elementary schools.

11   And then 96% of that same group reported 20 or

12   fewer physical attacks.

13   So then the last of those three categories

14   is battery, and again this is that one that

15   requires the, the person submitting the data to

16   indicate that it was, law enforcement was

17   notified. Again, Pinellas 410. The entire

18   Miami-Dade school district reported 67. Orange

19   County is not on the chart, but they have the

20   fourth largest student population in the state

21   with 204,000 students, but they reported 38

22   batteries despite having nearly twice as many

23   students as Pinellas County.

24   When we look at weapons possession Collier

25   County has a pretty low, pretty small student

1   population, under 50,000, but they are right

2   next to Broward and Pinellas in terms of the

3   frequency of weapons possession incidents.

4   Duval County, you'll see there on the right in

5   the chart, they don't make the top ten, but

6   they're only reporting 23. I would contend

7   that if they were reporting such high numbers

8   of physical attacks and fights that there's a

9   pretty bad violence issue at Duval County

10   schools, so if there's only 23 weapons I find

11   that to be pretty incongruent with the other

12   data. And then you look at Polk County and

13   weapons possessions, they're reporting 18 for

14   the 17/18 school year despite having a pretty

15   large student population, over, they're,

16   they're very much on par with Pinellas County

17   there with fifty-seven.

18   When you look at larceny and theft Miami-

19   Dade by far and away is reporting the highest

20   number, 291. Every single one of them involved

21   or referenced that it was reported to law

22   enforcement. This is odd to me, in that Miami-

23   Dade seems to be very much underreporting in

24   other incidents, other types of SESIR

25   incidents, but not on the property crime.

1   Seminole and Broward County both have 112

2   thefts despite Broward County having four times

3   as many students.

4   So I didn't want to focus just on the top

5   ten SESIR reporting for the each, so these are

6   really just the ten counties that are in the

7   middle, middle of the whole sample size. You

8   look at Hernando at the far left, and then

9   Highlands County just right of middle. They

10   both reported very high numbers as compared to

11   their comparable populations. So Martin County

12   has 19,000 students, Hernando about 22,000, but

13   Hernando is reporting many more SESIR incidents

14   than Martin County. All ten of these counties

15   reported law enforcement involvement, official

16   law enforcement action at or well over the

17   statewide average of 33%.

18   And then we look at the ten least popular

19   school districts in the county. So Liberty and

20   Franklin County you see just right of the

21   middle, very comparable student populations,

22   but the rate at which they're reporting

23   incidents to SESIR are very different, 27 in

24   Liberty, 117 in Franklin. Calhoun and Dixie,

25   on the far-left side of this graph, again very

1   student, very similar student populations at

2   around 2,200, but their total number of SESIR

3   incidents are immensely different, 13 in

4   Calhoun and 140 in Dixie. And then Glades

5   County for the entire school year is reporting

6   six incidents, despite having nearly the same

7   student population as Hamilton, which reported

8   105.

9   CHAIR: Well, I don't even know where to

10   begin.

11   SHER. JUDD: Once upon a time in a land

12   far far away --

13   CHAIR: You know, I don't -- Chancellor

14   Olivia, you're going to have to weigh in on

15   this somewhere, because, you know, where do we

16   go, where do we go with this?

17   CHANC. OLIVIA: I was trying to -- I was

18   trying to weigh in earlier, but I wanted to be

19   respectful of the presentation. So when we

20   talk about the data, and say is this consistent

21   from year to year, so if we have certain

22   districts that are spiking one year and

23   dropping another you can look at trend lines,

24   and then even within a district if I have, like

25   these small rurals, they might, you have an a

1   district with ten schools and only two of them

2   are reporting and the eight are, are not

3   reporting, you know, and it's self-reported so

4   data governance is an issue.

5   And I can tell you as a former principal,

6   and a former superintendent, we struggled with

7   these definitions as well, and I was a

8   principal of a high school where if Assistant

9   Principal A dealt with a situation, they would

10   code one thing different than Assistant

11   Principal B. And like even within our school

12   we had our own data governance issues, so where

13   -- where I would say next steps are is, is we

14   need to look at training and clarifying

15   definitions, and how to understand what they

16   mean.

17   But I think we also have an opportunity

18   now with using the school safety specialists

19   that are in districts that are going to help

20   oversee the implementation of these policies

21   that we didn't have two years ago. So even

22   when we're talking about how FSSAT data is

23   reported at the school level, how discipline is

24   coded and implemented, there, there's ways to

25   do checks and balances in looking at what is

1   getting referred to law enforcement, what is

2   getting coded as discipline and how that's

3   being implemented. Adopting policies and

4   procedures, and then really working I think

5   with the school safety specialists to help

6   enforce what's happening in conjunction with

7   the Office of Safe Schools, because we can't

8   make informed decisions unless we have clear

9   and consistent data.

10   CHAIR: So I mean do you -- are you

11   willing to look at the definitions, and I mean

12   -- I don't even know where to begin with it

13   other than to say looking at the entire

14   process, and, you know, what can we do as a

15   commission other than the bring the problem

16   forward, which we have. We can -- in the next

17   report that we have we can spell all of this

18   out, and we can make some recommendations, but

19   ultimately, it's going to require DOE, and a

20   commitment really from the superintendents and

21   the school boards. And the superintendents,

22   and I think they need some help.

23   And I can see where -- and another

24   explanation could be, in some of these

25   districts, like Pinellas as an example, that

1   has its own police department, it wouldn't

2   shock me at all that why they have the high

3   number of batteries is because the people who

4   are doing this are within that school's police

5   department, and they're applying the legal

6   definition of simple battery, that's why

7   they've got so many high batteries.

8   I don't know that, but I'm trying to make

9   some semblance, apply some logic to why this is

10   all over the board. But, you know, we need

11   your help, and the Department's help in

12   figuring this out, because unless I'm missing

13   something this is completely useless at this

14   point.

15   CHANC. POPPELL: So the school boards

16   adopt student code of conducts, and so they

17   have a start with policy and definition, and

18   then how we implement those code of conducts to

19   be consistent across the board is something

20   that we need to work with superintendents, work

21   with principals, work with the Office of Safe

22   Schools and school safety specialists, to be

23   clear and consistent. And even just looking at

24   the SESIR definitions of battery, there's a lot

25   of, or the three that we looked at, battery,

1   physical attack and fighting, there's a lot of

2   subjectivity on how do you measure whether or

3   not a fight was high enough for force that

4   needed to include law enforcement, or was

5   pushing and shoving, and lowered, coded lower,

6   and could have been coded as horse play or

7   another code.

8   CHAIR: Well, maybe the definitions need

9   to be reworked then.

10   CHANC. POPPELL: Right. I think that

11   would be a first step.

12   CHAIR: You know, any other commissioners

13   want to weigh in? I want to ask you though,

14   please make sure, please have a discussion with

15   Commissioner Corcoran about this, and make sure

16   he's aware of this, and this presentation. I

17   think that this rises to that level, that he

18   needs to be aware of this.

19   CHANC. POPPELL: Of course.

20   CHAIR: Commissioner Petty.

21   COMM. PETTY: I guess I would just echo

22   that, and put it back in, you know, since we're

23   living in a land a long time ago, far far away,

24   whatever, if you could wave your magic wand

25   what would you want? I mean I think -- I think

1   we're at the point where we need the Department

2   of Education to say here's, here's what we'd

3   like to have the authority, or ability, or

4   capability to do I'd like to put it back on

5   you, Commissioner, to come back to us with

6   those recommendations, and say these are the

7   things, in an ideal world this is what we'd

8   like to do, because I'm not sure we even

9   understand why we started collecting the data

10   in the first place.

11   It's -- it's interesting because we can

12   make pretty charts and graphs, and put them on

13   the Web, but I'm not even sure if the

14   Department of Education did what this detective

15   did, actually analyze the data to this level

16   to, to realize that it's nonsense. And this

17   doesn't do anyone any good, especially the

18   parents and students of, of the public schools

19   in the state of Florida.

20   So I'd love for the Department of

21   Education to have the same level, and I'm sure

22   there are people that do this, and I -- please

23   don't be offended by what I'm about to say.

24   The presentation we got on the reunification

25   from Seminole County, I'd like the Department

1   of Education to have the same level of care and

2   concern for what you do, and what your mandate

3   is, as I saw there. So please come back to us

4   with, here's what we'd like to have, and, and

5   then I would argue let's make some

6   recommendations and get those things changed.

7   If we need to change laws, we'll go to the

8   legislature. If there are things that you can

9   do as a Department then, then we'll use the

10   bully pulpit to help you, but this, this is not

11   acceptable. This is -- this helps no one, and

12   the kids in our state pay the price.

13   CHAIR: Secretary Marstiller.

14   SEC. MARSTILLER: We've mentioned earlier

15   about the Governor's executive order that

16   directs DOE and DJJ to work together to audit

17   school- based discipline and diversion

18   programs, and DJJ to issue a report. That

19   report, whatever, whatever those findings turn

20   out to be that report may help inform or answer

21   some of the questions, or fill in some of the

22   gaps that we have relative to this reporting

23   thing, so my suggestion is let's, once we get

24   that report out let's revisit this issue and

25   put all of the information we have together.

1   Then I think we're in a much better place to

2   make more, you know, substantial and inclusive

3   recommendations on what to --

4   CHAIR: And the grand jury is going to be

5   looking at this as well, so. Sheriff Judd, go

6   ahead.

7   SHER. JUDD: There is pressure upon the

8   school districts, upon the community to

9   underreport. Nikolas Cruz was underreported.

10   Broward did what, what was occurring, so there

11   was not the opportunity for there to be a red

12   flag in our formal systems. So that's got a

13   lot of pressure on how these reports occur

14   here. I might suggest, and this is just a

15   snapshot, but if you look at the police

16   departments that are run by the school systems,

17   where the school systems have more direct

18   control over the chief and the reporting

19   system, the reports seem to be lower, so we've

20   got to have a truth in reporting so that we, or

21   not penalize, or attack the principal, or the

22   superintendent, or the school district, for not

23   appropriately reporting, because I can tell you

24   that right now socially across the country,

25   Nikolas Cruz was underreported or maybe there

1   could have been some help, and it's gone on,

2   and here's our imperial evidence right here

3   that it's, there's not a standard, and it's how

4   much pressure from what part of the, the State,

5   or the nation.

6   CHAIR: Sheriff Ashley, and then

7   Commissioner Powers.

8   SHER. ASHLEY: I think we already have the

9   ability to amend current statutes, and I can go

10   back, and I'm not sure which one it is, if it's

11   Florida Statute 1006.09 or -- but it's the

12   duties of principals, and each principal must

13   ensure that the standardized forms prescribed

14   by Rule of State Board of Education used to

15   report data concerning school safety and

16   discipline to the Department of Education, the

17   principal must develop a plan to verify the

18   accuracy of reported incidences.

19   So it's getting back down on the ground

20   level and holding that principal responsible

21   for the accuracy of that data being reported,

22   but there is no consequence to not doing that

23   in statute, so it may just be that include, or

24   ask for an amendment to the statute to include

25   a consequence for not doing that.

1   CHAIR: Commissioner Powers, and then Mr.

2   Schachter.

3   COMM. POWERS: So I agree. I think that

4   right now the education level at each district

5   is different. Some are reporting more, some

6   are reporting less. I -- while I appreciate

7   the report that's going to come out of DJJ and

8   DOE I think immediately there needs to be

9   consistent education to all superintendents,

10   whether whatever staff is tasked with entering

11   that data that it be immediately, trying to get

12   the consistency across the state of Florida

13   now, not waiting. I don't think there's really

14   a need to wait to get, try to get at least more

15   consistent data right now.

16   And I think the move should be to -- I'm

17   -- I'm loud in my County about underreporting.

18   I don't think it does any good to anybody if we

19   underreport. And I think we need to move to a

20   mandatory reporting system, the same way that

21   we are mandatorily required to report child

22   abuse; these things need to be reported. And

23   the consequence when you look at in removing

24   some of those, if it's going to impact the

25   perception in your community, if that's going

1   to drive you to take action to correct those

2   behaviors then that's what it should take. The

3   community should be outraged when things like

4   this are happening in schools, what are we

5   doing to prevent it.

6   So I don't want to wait until another

7   report comes out. I think we can take -- or

8   DOE can really take action now in trying to get

9   as much as you can consistent reporting.

10   CHAIR: Mr. Schachter, go ahead.

11   COMM. SCHACHTER: Is -- is the State doing

12   anything to help the districts that have

13   reported high numbers, in other words, funneled

14   more money into, you know, counties that are

15   reporting high violence?

16   MS. COLLINS: We had -- somebody had asked

17   that question before, there's no funds attached

18   to the data.

19   COMM. SCHACHTER: Well, I think -- I

20   think -- I think that, you know, when you

21   analyze this, I think that's something that we

22   have to counteract, the, the negative

23   influences of reporting a lot, we need to

24   counteract that. Obviously, if there is a lot

25   of violence, maybe we need to be pushing more

1   services, or pushing more funds in there, you

2   know how do we counteract that as well.

3   CHAIR: All right, anybody have anything

4   else on this? I think, you know, it --

5   SHER. ASHLEY: I can't -- I can't let it

6   go, Sheriff. Again, why are we collecting

7   SESIR data if it is not tied to any allocation

8   of funds, it's not allocating any services?

9   Why are we collecting it?

10   UNDER SHER. HARPRING: It's a federal

11   requirement.

12   SHER. ASHLEY: But what serve -- I man

13   who's looking at it?

14   UNDER SHER. HARPRING: That's all --

15   that's all I got.

16   CHAIR: Well, Julie, expand on, expand on

17   that. Why -- why -- because a lot of this is

18   reported to the federal government, a lot of

19   this data?

20   MS. COLLINS: Yes, almost, almost all of

21   it. We -- we get a fraction of what the

22   districts collect, and then the feds get a

23   fraction of what we collect.

24   SGT. SUESS: And correct me if I'm wrong,

25   if I may interject, is it bullying, is attached

1   to some sort of federal funding, reporting of

2   that; is that correct?

3   MS. COLLINS: It's actually the State Safe

4   School allocation. It's -- I believe it's

5   still in 1006.147, a failure to comply with a

6   statute puts your district's Safe School

7   allocation funds in jeopardy.

8   CHAIR: So Chancellor Olivia, will you

9   come back at the June meeting? I think we need

10   to follow up on this, and I don't, you know,

11   and, and perhaps, I don't know, maybe we should

12   hear from a couple superintendents about this

13   issue and see what their take is. Is this a --

14   and how many districts have you, in the last

15   year how many districts have you visited and

16   trained on SESIR, can you --

17   MS. COLLINS: I average about one a month.

18   CHAIR: One a month, so, so about, out of

19   sixty-seven districts twelve in the last year?

20   MS. COLLINS: But I also usually present

21   at the State MIS Conference, and those are the

22   MIS people who program their systems to collect

23   the data.

24   CHAIR: But are those the people that are

25   actually collecting this data, and inputting

1   this data? Is the training getting the right

2   people? And I understand you're one person,

3   and you can't reach everybody, but I raise that

4   as a, as a question, but probably more of a

5   statement. I don't think it's getting down to

6   the right people, or not enough people are

7   being trained is what it seems.

8   MS. COLLINS: No, you know, we could use

9   some help getting the training out, because

10   you're right, I am just one person. I think

11   that when we train we usually train the Deans,

12   usually the Deans and Assistant Principals, so

13   the people that are primarily focused on

14   discipline, and they don't seem to have a hard

15   time with the definitions or -- and again I

16   think maybe our frequent flyers, the ones that

17   do the best job are the ones that we've

18   trained, I don't see the people that we haven't

19   been to train, but they don't seem to have a

20   problem understanding the definitions and the,

21   the reporting requirements.

22   CHAIR: So but -- but how -- how can you,

23   I really, I'm so struggling with this. How can

24   the entire Miami-Dade school district, the

25   entire school district have zero for any

1   physical attacks in the Miami-Dade district?

2   MS. COLLINS: What -- what I had explained

3   during my presentation is Miami-Dade is in a

4   unique situation in a lot of respects, but in

5   this particular case they have a system set up,

6   they're looking at, at changing the way they

7   report, because they recognize that there's a

8   problem, but if it's, unless it's the lowest

9   level of offense it has to go through law

10   enforcement, well, I don't think there's a

11   definition in statute for physical attack so

12   the law enforcement agents who I have not

13   trained are not recognizing that as simple

14   battery, so like you suggested they're probably

15   reporting simple battery as our aggravated, as

16   SESIR battery, which is aggravated battery.

17   CHAIR: Which means -- which means people

18   are not effectively trained, is what it's

19   coming down to, because if they don't, if they

20   don't know the definitions, and they can't use

21   the correct definition in the right reporting

22   requirement, then they're, the message isn't

23   getting to the right people so they can do this

24   correctly.

25   MS. COLLINS: And I don't think I've ever

1   been down there to train. But I think I will

2   be down there soon. They have contacted me,

3   and we are, we'll be working together, so.

4   CHAIR: But again, it's just not limited

5   to Miami-Dade, so I need you to come back, and,

6   you know, once you all have some discussion

7   about it, and probably ask you to come back and

8   report to us on, you know, where we're going

9   with this. And then we'll of course have to

10   include this in the next report that we do and

11   see what the options are and see what the

12   legislature does as well.

13   MS. COLLINS: If I could make a

14   suggestion, one thing that hampers us is not

15   having real time data, because I can read

16   something in the clips and know that there was

17   an incident at a school, but I have to wait

18   several months for the data to come out to see

19   if it was reported, and if we had that stuff in

20   some semblance of real time data it would make

21   it a whole lot easier to crosswalk what we know

22   actually happened that gets reported in the

23   media with what's getting reported.

24   CHAIR: And I would suggest to you, and I

25   know you said this, but what I would suggest to

1   you, that mirroring, having these two separate

2   definitions, and having physical attack be what

3   a whole bunch of people consider a battery, and

4   having a battery what a whole bunch of people

5   consider an aggravated battery, doesn't serve

6   any purpose.

7   MS. COLLINS: Well, but the exception is

8   that the people that are reporting this are

9   generally not law enforcement.

10   CHAIR: I know, but -- but -- but --

11   MS. COLLINS: So they don't know the

12   difference.

13   CHAIR: But in Miami-Dade you're saying

14   that that's probably a cause of why they're

15   doing zero. So anyway, consistency is not a

16   bad thing, and clear definitions are not a bad

17   thing, and making it easily understood is a

18   good thing. So looking at these definitions,

19   and maybe trying to mirror some of this up so

20   that, you know, what's the purpose -- and you

21   said yourself that some of these definitions

22   change, getting to Sheriff Judd's point, they

23   changed in 2009. Why did they change in 2009?

24   Because they were concerned about zero

25   tolerance policies, and watering down so that

1   there wasn't so much being reported. So it

2   seems to be that some of these definitions, and

3   some of this came about in an effort to appear

4   or be a little softer and not report as much.

5   MS. COLLINS: It wasn't the definitions

6   that changed in 2009, it was the -- reported to

7   law enforcement was changed to --

8   CHAIR: Okay, well, that's what I was

9   talking about. I call that a definition.

10   MS. COLLINS: Okay. Okay.

11   CHAIR: I understand, not the definition

12   of, of a battery, that didn't change, but it's

13   the definitions of what may be, shall be --

14   MS. COLLINS: Yes, correct.

15   CHAIR: I can't even get it -- I can't

16   even remember it in my head because it's

17   reported, and should be reported, and may not

18   be reported, and, you know, it's, you know -- I

19   don't -- I don't see how people understand it,

20   so.

21   MS. COLLINS: A lot of them do.

22   CHAIR: Yeah, well -- well, anyway. All

23   right, thanks, John.

24   SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

25   CHAIR: So here's what we're going to do,

1   is, is that we're at 3:45. We've got -- we

2   need to get to the one presentation we didn't

3   get to yesterday, which is the follow-up on the

4   BSO active assailant training, and then what we

5   have left, which we're not going to get to is,

6   it's about a two hour presentation on mental

7   health, so why don't -- John, why don't you

8   just do that presentation on the active

9   assailant training. That should take us

10   probably close, close to about 4:30. We still

11   want to have some brief discussion about Path

12   Forward. We need to do public comment, and

13   then we'll stay on track and get out of here by

14   5:00.

15   So we're just not going to get to the

16   mental health presentation, we'll have to just

17   postpone that until June.

18   PRESENTATION - FOLLOW-UP BSO ACTIVE ASSAILANT

19   TRAINING

20   SGT. SUESS: Thank you. So if you recall

21   near the end of last year Special Agent

22   Massucci reported on some training at the

23   Broward Sheriff's Office, so I'm going to do a

24   quick review of the information which he and

25   Special Agent Camp worked on just to bring

1   everyone up to speed, and as a brief refresher.

2   And it's very much related to the some of the

3   follow-up investigation that we did, and also

4   highlight some of the changes that have

5   happened since Sheriff Tony took office.

6   So as you may recall there have been four

7   versions of active shooter training at the

8   Broward Sheriff's Office since 2007. The

9   2015/2017 version is what we're really going to

10   focus on. Again, BSO is a very large agency,

11   approximately 1,500 law enforcement officers.

12   It takes a while to get that many people

13   through the active shooter training. That was

14   the most recent version prior to the shooting

15   at Stoneman Douglas. And then you'll see in

16   2018, so at the end of last year, nearly

17   everyone at the Sheriff's Office again went

18   through active shooter training.

19   So in 2007 it was an eight-hour training

20   session, emphasized the need for rapid

21   response, tactics included a minimum of four

22   deputy team, and no one else entered once that

23   first team was deployed, and there was no

24   immediate entry if there was a barricaded

25   gunman or hostage. You'll see there's an

1   evolution here, and it's pretty much consistent

2   with the evolution throughout law enforcement

3   over the years.

4   2012/2013 it was an eight-hour training

5   session. Approximately 163 deputies attended.

6   The objectives included the phrase that the

7   student will be able to identify the time of

8   need for a solo response to an active shooter.

9   The curriculum indicated that within that eight

10   hours thirty minutes was spent in the

11   classroom, six hours was spent on the range,

12   shooting positions, reloading, shooting on the

13   move, and an hour and a half spent on solo

14   response to active shooter and live fire

15   scenarios.

16   So this 2015/2017 version is again the one

17   we're going to focus on. It was four hours of

18   active shooter training, four hours of rescue

19   task force, or RTF. And for those of you that

20   aren't aware, so a rescue task force,

21   essentially what that does is it takes your

22   patrol law enforcement officers working with

23   your immediate fire rescue responders, and in

24   some situations it is appropriate, and it's a

25   very specific situation, it would be

1   appropriate for fire rescue to go with law

2   enforcement into what would be considered a

3   warm zone.

4   So the suspect isn't necessarily there, he

5   may be in another building, but that building

6   is safe enough for those

7   firefighters/paramedics to put on a ballistic

8   vest and a ballistic helmet, be escorted by a

9   team of law enforcement officers, work their

10   way to wounded, and either, you know, provide

11   some initial treatment there, and then evacuate

12   them so they can ultimately make it to advanced

13   medical care. So if you hear that phrase RTF,

14   or rescue task force, that's what that means.

15   Nearly all deputies attended this

16   training. The curriculum indicated ninety

17   minutes were dedicated to practical exercises

18   or scenarios, approximately 20 to 30 deputies

19   per class, and this course included three

20   practical scenarios, including a single, two,

21   and four deputy response. So 2018 the active

22   shooter training, this occurred mid to late

23   2018. This was eight- hour training session at

24   Port Everglades. Four hours were dedicated to

25   active shooter drills, as opposed to ninety

1   minutes in the 2015/2017 school year. 1,572

2   deputies attended this training. There were 92

3   deputies that did not attend this mandatory

4   training.

5   I've spoken with the new training major,

6   Major Robson, and he said that since then all

7   92 of those deputies who could attend the

8   training attended. So even if they were on

9   light duty they sat through the classroom and

10   observed the practical exercises. If there

11   were some that, you know, were just suspended,

12   or out of work, unable to attend, then that's

13   something that they are still working to follow

14   up on.

15   This training was comprised of classroom

16   training on active shooter response, and

17   tactical combat casualty care, or first aid,

18   TCCC, several different names ascribed to that

19   practice. These drills included sim rounds and

20   blanks. So sim rounds, you'll hear that

21   phrase. Sim rounds are simunitions, and all it

22   is really is a way we can modify our firearms

23   to a fancy paintball gun more or less. It's

24   what I would consider the gold standard in

25   training. It's as realistic as we can get

1   without actually shooting each other. SWAT

2   assisted with this tactical training, and SWAT

3   medics were also there from BSO Fire to assist

4   on the TCCC, that first aid.

5   So in 2018 when all the investigators, we

6   did a lot of interviews with a lot of deputies

7   and police officers, and as you may recall some

8   of the responses we got from some of the

9   deputies about the last time they went to

10   active shooter training in some instances

11   raised more questions than it answered. There

12   was some inconsistency about equipment that was

13   issued to deputies, could not remember the last

14   time they went, and unsure if the training was

15   mandatory or optional. In short, it appeared

16   as though this training was ineffective or

17   impactful. That -- and when I'm referring to

18   that phase of training that is prior to the

19   shooting at Stoneman Douglas.

20   COMM. SCHACHTER: Can -- can you

21   elaborate, or are you going to elaborate on the

22   equipment --

23   SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

24   COMM. SCHACHTER: Okay, thank you.

25   SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So -- and we will

1   get back to that, Mr. Schachter. There had

2   been some significant changes to active shooter

3   training under Sheriff Tony. I want to

4   highlight some of those. So as I mentioned

5   Major Robson, as you may recall was formerly

6   Captain Robson, he was the SWAT commander on

7   February 14, 2018, took over as the incident

8   commander, and relieved Captain Jordan.

9   In speaking with him he was able to

10   highlight a lot of improvements that have

11   happened. You will see shortly there was prior

12   to the shooting at Stoneman Douglas a

13   significant absence of long guns, so whether

14   rifles or shotguns, issued to patrol deputies

15   at the Broward Sheriff's Office. Since that

16   time they have, are in the process of

17   purchasing 1,500 rifles, that are going to be

18   issued to all patrol deputies, and it's going

19   to be mandatory that they all get trained.

20   All deputies are receiving training on

21   breaching doors, so forcing entry into, through

22   doors. Additionally all supervisors are going

23   to receive breaching tools, so a Halligan tool

24   and a sledgehammer that they can use in forcing

25   entry, and as I'm sure a lot of you recall not

1   being able to get into the classrooms, and not

2   being able to get into the bathrooms to clear

3   them, it slowed down the response inside of

4   Building 12.

5   Additionally eight hours of active shooter

6   training had been scheduled for this summer, so

7   in the upcoming months. The training section

8   has doubled in terms of their staff. So

9   previously the Department of Law Enforcement

10   had 13 training deputies, they now have 25.

11   The Department of Detention increased their

12   training deputies from 4 to 8. They have

13   created a tactical training team. So this is

14   comprised of SWAT deputies that work within the

15   training unit, and their primary focus is

16   training patrol deputies on how to operate in a

17   tactical environment.

18   Currently training deputies have been

19   given the authority to fail students. So if

20   some of these deputies come through training

21   and the training deputies, often referred to as

22   red shirts, if those training deputies feel

23   that the deputy is not performing properly,

24   they're not taking it seriously, or they don't

25   meet the standard, then they can fail them, and

 1   bring them back in for remedial training.

 2   Additionally, training deputies are

 3   completing evaluations on each of the, each of

 4   the students, each of the deputies that come

 5   through the training, so that's a manner in

 6   which they can go back, evaluate the

 7   effectiveness of the training, and see how

 8   deputies may or may not be progressing. Ad you

 9   may recall in evaluating Deputy Peterson's

10   training record all we could see is that he

11   attended the class. There was no sort of

12   documentation on how well he performed, whether

13   certain standards were or were not met.

14   And so within the field of law enforcement

15   there's a lot of soft skill classes that we're

16   required to take, such as human diversity,

17   blood borne pathogens, that don't necessarily

18   require practical exercises, so all of those

19   types of training classes are being moved to

20   online training, so when deputies have to be in

21   a training environment, and they have a

22   dedicated training day, that can focus just on

23   practical exercises, so these types of things

24   like building clearing, or active shooter

25   training, TCCC, traffic stops, those types of

1   things.

2   Major Robson, in speaking with him said

3   that the major focus currently is on mortality

4   mitigation in their active shooter training.

5   They've partnered with the FBI's ALERRT Program

6   at Texas State University. That stands for

7   Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response

8   Training. They've partnered with the Federal

9   Law Enforcement Training Centers, FLETC, to

10   make BSO a training site for FLETC courses, so

11   they're going to host some classes here at BSO.

12   Additionally all active shooter

13   instructors are going to be certified by FLETC

14   by May of 2019 to be instructors for active

15   shooter. All deputies and communications

16   personnel are attending incident command system

17   training, which they're calling Critical

18   Incident Management. Major Robson explained to

19   us, so what they do in their active shooter

20   training currently is they, as the deputies are

21   responding, they've got deputies there,

22   supervisors, as well as communications

23   personnel, and they're actually making use of

24   the radios.

25   All three of those groups are separated so

1   they can't see each other, so they're making it

2   as realistic as possible. So they're having to

3   communicate with a supervisor who can't see

4   what that deputy is doing, they're

5   communicating with dispatchers. He explained

6   that they're training the dispatchers to try

7   and identify the incident commander, be

8   proactive in that, and so when they identify

9   that incident commander they refer to that

10   person not by name or their call sign, but

11   actually refer to them as command, so it sort

12   of drills that theme into every listening to

13   the radio, all right, well, we know who the

14   incident commander is.

15   You're going to hear several references to

16   individual first aid kits, or IFAKs, and you'll

17   see some images there. And these are becoming

18   more and more common within law enforcement,

19   and these are very helpful in treating severe

20   injuries, particularly gunshot wounds, or knife

21   wounds. It's comprised of a tourniquet, latex

22   glove, a chest seal, which is beneficial if you

23   have what's called a sucking chest wound, which

24   can be fatal, but it's fairly easy for even law

25   enforcement officers to treat in the field to

1   at least buy time to get that person to a

2   hospital or more advanced care. Blood clotting

3   gauze you'll hear about. So most of us are

4   issued some type of gauze that has a blood

5   clotting agent in it, so in addition to direct

6   pressure with that gauze there's additional

7   chemicals inside of it that expedites the

8   clotting process, again just focusing on

9   stopping bleeding. And then scissors, which

10   you can use with those bandages and, and other

11   applications.

12   In December of this year the Sheriff's

13   Office is breaking ground directly behind their

14   headquarters on a new training facility. It's

15   going to be a $30 million facility. These are

16   funds which the Sheriff's Office already had,

17   required no new funding from the County. It

18   includes three indoor gun ranges, an indoor

19   shoot house, several stories of parking

20   garages. It's a 78,000 square foot facility.

21   It includes defensive tactics rooms,

22   classrooms, so it's going to offer a venue for

23   training for all sorts of classes within the

24   Sheriff's office, both civilian, law

25   enforcement, detention, and fire rescue.

1   So in response to those interviews with

2   deputies in 2018 raising some questions we went

3   back and conducted some interviews with

4   deputies that were not at the Stoneman Douglas

5   or had very involvement with Stoneman Douglas

6   response. These are new interviews. These are

7   deputies that had not been interviewed before.

8   We selected them. They were randomly selected.

9   We took at least three from each of the sixteen

10   districts, which includes the airport, Port

11   Everglades, and the courthouse. We took five

12   district level detectives that work property

13   crimes at the different districts, four crime

14   suppression team members, those are more or

15   less a street crimes unit.

16   And some of the questions we covered, we

17   spoke about some of them yesterday when it came

18   to communications, but the main focus really

19   was on this active shooter response. When you

20   look at the population of the deputies we

21   interviewed, their average tenure in law

22   enforcement was approximately fifteen years,

23   average tenure at the Sheriff's Office

24   approximately twelve years. They ranged from

25   one year at BSO to thirty years. Thirty-four,

1   so the bulk of the deputies had five to twenty

2   years of experience at BSO. So those are

3   seasoned deputies, they've been around long

4   enough to, to have a good idea of what they're

5   talking about, they're not brand new right out

6   of the academy. There were seven detectives,

7   eleven sergeants, and thirty-seven deputies,

8   and you'll see they have experience in various

9   units at the Sheriff's Office.

10   So all deputies had been issued a

11   ballistic vest prior to Stoneman Douglas, and

12   we asked them to describe the frequency with

13   which they wear their vests. Fifty-two of them

14   said they wore it daily, and three of them

15   indicated they wore it frequently. Some

16   deputies had purchased their own rifle plate,

17   and rifle plate carriers, and those are just

18   vests that offer an additional level of

19   protection beyond your standard ballistic vest.

20   We asked the deputies prior to February

21   14th were you issued a rifle or a shotgun, and

22   this is something I referenced earlier. Only

23   five of them had been issued a rifle,

24   forty-eight of them had been issued neither a

25   rifle nor a shotgun. And as I mentioned

1   earlier this has since been replaced, and they

2   have rifles now for every deputy at the

3   Sheriff's Office. Yes, sir.

4   COMM. SCHACHTER: Sergeant, during the

5   incident we saw Deputy Stambaugh get dressed,

6   and they, correct me if I'm wrong, they did

7   have an act, a bulletproof active vest wear

8   policy, right?

9   SGT. SUESS: At the time you could excuse

10   yourself via a waiver, but that has since been

11   changed. It's a mandatory wear policy now.

12   COMM. SCHACHTER: It is mandatory now.

13   SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

14   COMM. SCHACHTER: Thank you very much.

15   SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. Since February 14,

16   2018 have you been issued a rifle or shotgun;

17   so of those forty-eight that did not have

18   either only two of them had since that time

19   been issued a rifle. Thirty-one of the

20   deputies had purchased their own out of their

21   own pockets.

22   So we asked the deputies about what types

23   of emergency medical equipment which they had

24   been issued prior to the shooting at Stoneman

25   Douglas. So two of them were unable to recall.

1   Thirteen of them had been issued some sort of

2   first aid kit, but more or less, you know,

3   Band-Aids, small gauze, nothing that's going to

4   be beneficial in an active shooter response.

5   Three of them referenced that they had been

6   issued some sort of clotting material, or

7   clotting agent. Eight of them indicated they

8   had been issued a tourniquet. Fifteen

9   indicated they had been issued both a

10   tourniquet and some sort of clotting material,

11   and fourteen of them indicated they had been

12   issued an IFAK. Again, that's really the gold

13   standard for law enforcement. You don't really

14   want us doing much more when it comes to, to

15   medical treatment than what we can do with that

16   IFAK.

17   So then we asked the deputies about types

18   of emergency medical equipment they were issued

19   after February 14, 2018. Two of them were

20   unknown. Sixteen said nothing additional.

21   Four of them indicated they had been issued a

22   tourniquet or other bleeding control, and

23   thirty- three of them were issued an IFAK or

24   equivalent. And so when I say or equivalent,

25   some of them had, as you recall, you know,

1   chest gauze, or chest, I'm sorry, gauze with a

2   clotting agent, a tourniquet, and then they

3   were also issued a chest, a chest seal after

4   the shooting. So all of that, let's say is

5   they were, maybe not at one point given an

6   IFAK, but they had been given all of the

7   equipment that would be in an IFAK. So when I

8   say or equivalent that's what I'm referring to.

9   Some of the specific responses we got

10   regarding the medical equipment is that some of

11   them had been issued it due to special

12   assignment, so they're quick response force,

13   which is similar to a mobile field force, or a

14   riot unit, they have taken on auxiliary

15   responsibilities here, they're crime

16   suppression team or money laundering unit.

17   Some equipment we were told is issued

18   specific to the district, so we had somebody

19   tell us that everyone at Port Everglades gets

20   an IFAK. All sergeants in Central Broward

21   receive IFAKs. We had somebody tell us that

22   all deputies in Deerfield Beach received a

23   tourniquet and quick clot, and a blood clotting

24   agent was received by one deputy once he

25   transferred to Oakland Park from another

1   district. I had one deputy tell me, and this

2   is something that was after the recorder was

3   off, but he commented on the different

4   districts. He said think of it this way, we

5   have sixteen districts, it's really sixteen

6   different police departments, so that really

7   summed up a lot, that, that one statement.

8   Several deputies referenced tourniquets

9   being issued agency wide years ago. And we had

10   a lot of deputies that said they had

11   tourniquets so that is, that does appear to be

12   the case. All deputies indicated they had been

13   trained on using this equipment, and a very

14   small minority of them requested additional

15   training. We asked deputies if they had been

16   issued breaching tools. Again this is

17   something that has been remedied since that

18   time. Fifty-two of them said no, and three of

19   them said they had.

20   Now, I do want to point out the very large

21   number, I'd say well over 90% of them probably,

22   said they had been issued a pry-bar, or a

23   crowbar. I would have reworded this question

24   and made it a little more specific. We don't

25   consider that a breaching tool. That isn't

1   going to get you through many doors. Maybe a

2   mobile home door, but it's not going to help

3   you at a school. It's certainly not going to

4   help you breach that door. So that's the

5   reason for the manner in which we classified

6   that question.

7   Some of the responses we got specific to

8   breaching tools and other equipment, most, I

9   spoke about the pry-bar and the crowbar. Some

10   deputies referenced having access to the tools

11   at their district office. Most deputies said

12   they had recently been issued a ballistic

13   helmet. Previously they just had a riot helmet

14   of some sort. Some referenced being issued

15   different types of equipment, such as gas

16   masks, ballistic helmets, I'm sorry, ballistic

17   shield, rifle plates or carriers. Incident

18   command kits, a sergeant in Oakland Park said

19   that he had been issued one.

20   We had one sergeant tell us that his

21   district was probably the best equipped second

22   to the SWAT team. That's difficult -- that's

23   difficult to sort of wrap your head around,

24   that one district neighboring another district

25   is going to be so much more better equipped for

1   seemingly budgetary reasons. We asked the

2   deputies the last time they attended active

3   shooter training. We had, three of them said

4   never. Seven of them said they could not

5   recall when they last attended. Three of them

6   said it was prior to 2015. Forty 2015 to 2018,

7   and two of them said that they get it annually

8   as part of their assignment to the QRF team.

9   Now, I do want to point out that the ones

10   that said they had never attended, all, or two

11   of those three were new hires, so they had

12   received it at prior law enforcement agencies,

13   but since their time as BSO had not received

14   any active shooter training.

15   So going back to this 2015/2017 issue; we

16   obtained data both from Major Robson, in the

17   past few months, and his staff, we asked for

18   that data after receiving some data from his

19   predecessor, the prior training major. You'll

20   see regardless of who we got that from, the

21   numbers to vary a little, but from 2015 to 2017

22   we see that the numbers are largely consistent.

23   You see there's a large spike, and that

24   correlates with the data that we got from these

25   deputies about the last time they attended. We

1   had forty of them tell us in that same time

2   frame they attended.

3   Some of the responses we received

4   regarding active shooter training prior to

5   February 14, 2018, most deputies indicated this

6   training was mandatory, most indicated they

7   received both classroom and practical

8   scenarios. That training, as best as we can

9   tell in speaking with these deputies, did not

10   include sim rounds. It was just a blue gun,

11   which is, essentially, it's just a plastic mold

12   of a real gun. It doesn't fire blank rounds,

13   or sim rounds, anything along those lines.

14   We asked the deputies about the number of

15   repetitions in active shooter training

16   scenarios prior to February 14, 2018. Eighteen

17   of them either were unknown, they couldn't

18   remember, or they just did not attend training.

19   Two of them said it was less than two

20   repetitions. Thirty- two said they received

21   two to five repetitions, and three of them said

22   they received three repetitions.

23   We asked the deputies if they understood,

24   and that BSO expected them on and before

25   February 14, 2018 to enter an active shooter

1   situation by yourself if necessary and kill the

2   shooter. Forty of them said yes. Fifteen said

3   no. Despite there being a significant number

4   that said yes fifteen is still a pretty high

5   number, in my assessment, that said they were

6   not aware that BSO expected that of them.

7   We asked deputies if the word may in the

8   active shooter policy resulted in any confusion

9   or discussion about the proper response. The

10   majority of them obviously said no. We had

11   five that said it did. Two of them were

12   unsure. And in some of the specific responses

13   we received some of them did say it caused

14   confusion, some said it meant you could wait

15   for backup to go in. They could see how it

16   would cause hesitation. Some said may left it

17   as a judgment call.

18   One sergeant who it didn't cause confusion

19   for her, but said she has heard people say that

20   it meant they did not have to go in. We had

21   several of them that said they were not aware

22   of may being in the policy until after the

23   shooting. And the majority of deputies that I

24   spoke with, and this was split up through the

25   investigative team, but most of them that I

1   spoke with said they weren't so much concerned

2   with what the policy said, they really knew

3   what they signed up for when they, when they

4   took the oath when they took this job, and

5   that's really what they were basing their

6   response on.

7   We asked the deputies if that 2015/2017

8   active shooter rescue task force training

9   seemed more focused on active shooter response

10 or rescue task force. Twenty-seven of those

11 deputies said both. Thirteen said rescue task

12 force. And then two of them, only two of the

13 deputies said active shooter. So we frequently

14 in speaking with, with the prior training Major

15 and other personnel last year, this 2015/2017

16 training was cited as the most current

17 training, but there's only two deputies really

18 that identified that as being actual active

19 shooter training.

20   But even if you take those twenty-seven

21 deputies who say it was focused on both, well,

22 at most four hours were dedicated to active

23 shooter training, and within that four hours

24 only ninety minutes was allocated to drills, to

25 training. This is one of those practices that

1   you absolutely need repetition, and it needs to

2   be realistic training. And we'll talk about

3   that shortly, about some changes that were

4   made.

5   Some of the responses we received about

6   that 2015/2017 training, they said it seemed

7   like they were training us to work with the

8   fire department. Another said, one of the

9   instructors for that class said that the class

10   was mostly focused on the rescue task force

11   training. We had one individual tell us that

12   it was focused on two to four person movements,

13   and then a sergeant who did not attend the

14   class said he was scheduled to attend in late

15   2015, he received an e-mail telling him that it

16   would be rescheduled, and said he never heard

17   back from the training division.

18   So let's talk about the training 2018,

19   after the Stoneman Douglas shooting.

20   Fifty-three of the fifty-five deputies we

21   interviewed said they attended this training.

22   They were asked if there was a noticeable

23   difference in the training prior to and after

24   the Stoneman Douglas shooting. Nearly every

25   deputy described the post MSD shooting training

1   as better training. And you'll see some of the

2   responses here. More scenarios, more stress on

3   deputies, which that's a good thing in this

4   training, you want to create stress for the

5   deputies, more realistic, lots of role players,

6   more intense, urgency to go in and stop the

7   shooter, focused on single deputy response.

8   I would say this was by far one of, if not

9   the most, consistently answered question, about

10   whether this training was better, whether it

11   has improved. We got a lot of very consistent,

12   positive responses about that training.

13   COMM. SCHACHTER: Sergeant?

14   SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

15   COMM. SCHACHTER: There was a training

16   after February 14th at the airport, I mean at

17   the Port Everglades.

18   SGT. SUESS: Correct.

19   COMM. SCHACHTER: Okay, but that was under

20   Sheriff Scott Israel, right?

21   SGT. SUESS: Correct. That's the -- and

22   that's the training that that last --

23   COMM. SCHACHTER: That's what you're --

24   SGT. SUESS: I'm sorry.

25   COMM. SCHACHTER: That's what you're

1   referring to.

2   SGT. SUESS: That is. Yes, sir.

3   COMM. SCHACHTER: Okay. Okay, thank you.

4   SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So in conclusion,

5   prior to February 14th 87% of deputies were not

6   issued a rifle or shotgun. Equipment was

7   obviously issued inconsistently throughout the

8   agency. Most deputies attended the 2015/2017

9   cycle of active shooter training. That lesson

10   plan, it was four hours of active shooter

11   training and ninety minutes of drills. Thirty-

12   four deputies indicated that they went through

13   five or fewer drills. Two of those forty-six

14   deputies who attended that 2015/2017 training

15   identified active shooter response as the focus

16   of that training. And deputies consistently

17   and emphatically praised the 2018 training as

18   more effective and more realistic, with a focus

19   on active shooter response.

20   Does anyone have any questions?

21   CHAIR: Mr. Schachter, go ahead.

22   COMM. SCHACHTER: So let's see, were the

23   results of these interviews revealed to Sheriff

24   Tony?

25   SGT. SUESS: I have not communicated

1   directly with Sheriff Tony. I don't know if

2   they've made it to him yet. It's -- Major

3   Robson has seen them, and I'm confident that

4   they've had discussions.

5   COMM. SCHACHTER: The results of these

6   trainings, yeah, so Robson is going to --

7   SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. I was speaking to

8   Major Robson earlier today about these.

9   COMM. SCHACHTER: Okay. So Robson is

10   going to communicate to him, okay. One of the

11   previous slides, you said the deputies that

12   said they had not attended since 2015, attended

13   active shooter training, so that's -- but I

14   thought we said that in one of the earlier

15   slides that everybody have, has gone through

16   active shooter training.

17   SGT. SUESS: So there are deputies that

18   attended -- most deputies attended the

19   2015/2017 active shooter training. There were

20   other iterations before that. Our main focus

21   was evaluating that 2015/2017 training. That's

22   when most deputies went through, I think in

23   2012/2013, if I recall. It was a pretty low

24   number, below two hundred I think that

25   attended.

1   COMM. SCHACHTER: How many blue guns did

2   they have prior to February -- you don't know?

3   SGT. SUESS: I have no idea.

4   COMM. SCHACHTER: Okay. In one of the

5   slides you said that most -- originally when

6   we -- when we -- you know, last year we talked

7   about may versus shall. In the interviews my,

8   my recollection was that many deputies said

9   they used may as a reason why they did not

10   enter the building, but in, in your

11   presentation here, in one of the slides it said

12   that that was not a, you know, not a reason why

13   that went in. How do you recollect -- how do

14   you reconcile those two statements?

15   SGT. SUESS: I don't -- as best I recall,

16   the interviews we did with the deputies in 2018

17   I don't recall any of them citing the word may

18   as their reason for not going in.

19   COMM. SCHACHTER: I have that in one of

20   the slides, so I was just, I was just curious.

21   CHAIR: Yeah, I don't remember that

22   either, Mr. Schachter. I mean there was --

23   COMM. SCHACHTER: In the law -- in the law

24   enforcement response, you know, presentation

25   back last year, we had said that deputies cited

1   that as one of the reasons that they did not --

2   CHAIR: We can always talk about -- I

3   don't know, because I remember us bringing that

4   up, because that didn't become aware -- we were

5   not aware of that until we started doing a side

6   by side of the Coral Springs and the BSO

7   policy.

8   COMM. SCHACHTER: Yeah, yeah.

9   CHAIR: So in those interviews I don't --

10   I don't know about that, but, you know, anyway,

11   to the extent there is we can, we can look at

12   it, but, you know, this speaks for itself. And

13   but the difference is, is that, was there

14   anybody in these interviews, John, that was

15   interviewed out of the Parkland district?

16   SGT. SUESS: No, sir.

17   CHAIR: So and -- and so nobody here was

18   interviewed out of Parkland. This is -- and we

19   wanted to -- we purposely did this outside of

20   the Parkland district because we wanted to do a

21   cross section of the entire agency outside of

22   Parkland. All of those other people, whatever

23   came before was predominantly, if not totally

24   people within Parkland.

25   COMM. SCHACHTER: Yeah, so what I want to

1   -- what I want to find out is, because I am

2   100% sure that in the law enforcement response

3   PowerPoint that you did, you know, it was 600

4   slides, one of them said that may versus shall

5   was one of the reasons that they cited as a

6   reason they did not go in, so I'm just curious

7   --

8   CHAIR: I don't remember that.

9   COMM. SCHACHTER: -- are they just saying

10   that because they didn't respond, or are, we're

11   saying that that's not, that wasn't, that's not

12   an issue now, right?

13   CHAIR: Okay, yeah. Sheriff Judd is next.

14   SHER. JUDD: Let me refer to the forty

15   eight of the fifty-five, 87% of those you

16   surveyed were not issued a rifle or a shotgun.

17   Can you extrapolate that across the entire

18   patrol, or law enforcement function, that 87%

19   of the deputies don't have a, weren't issued a

20   rifle or a shotgun?

21   SGT. SUESS: What I can tell us is that

22   prior to this BSO had 300 patrol rifles. They

23   now have 1,500. So I don't know how many of

24   them had been issued, there were some deputies

25   that they had the ability, or the option to

1   check out a rifle if they so choose, but I, as

2   best I can tell a good number of them did not.

3   SHER. JUDD: I want to draw the

4   illustration for those of you not in law

5   enforcement. Not to have a long gun in the

6   patrol car is unconscionable, and that is

7   something that has occurred for decades, police

8   agencies have issued their officers at least

9   one long gun per, it started out with a

10   shotgun, and after the bank robbery in Los

11   Angeles where the Los Angeles police officers

12   actually went into gun stores to get rifles to

13   fight with the bad guys, law, or professional

14   law enforcement agencies started issuing

15   rifles.

16   So if -- if you take that snapshot, and

17   that data is accurate across the board, that is

18   rank incompetence and dereliction of duty, not

19   to issue every law enforcement officer that

20   puts his or her life on the line every day a

21   long gun.

22   CHAIR: Well, I can -- I can tell you that

23   the majority of those, because we knew of this

24   from the interviews and what was done before,

25   the majority of them, unless they were in a

1   special assignment, they were available for

2   check-out, and they kept them in the district

3   offices. And we don't know whether, you know,

4   could have had a situation where some of them

5   just weren't checked out.

6   And if you remember we had one of the

7   presenters here last time, last year, and we

8   had to kind of separate it because -- anyway,

9   is, is that they kept talking about that they

10   were all rifle qualified, and I probed that

11   further because we were asking, trying to find

12   out who had long guns, who had rifles and

13   shotguns, and we kept getting they were rifle

14   qualified, well, rifle qualified. Well, rifle

15   qualified doesn't mean rifle issued, it doesn't

16   mean they have one, so we had to separate that,

17   and that's where we found out last year that,

18   well, just because they're rifle qualified

19   doesn't mean they had one, they weren't issued,

20   and that they were at the district office

21   available for check-out.

22   So that was predominantly my understanding

23   the way it was, you know, prior to I guess

24   Sheriff Tony, and what's happened here as far

25   as issuing them, or what's happened in the last

1   year in issuing them, but that's the way it

2   was.

3   SHER. JUDD: And quite frankly even

4   available at the office, that's a subliminal

5   message about we don't want you to have it,

6   because you got to go through the check-out

7   procedure, the check-in procedure, the safety

8   procedures, so there's your sign.

9   CHAIR: Commissioner Carroll, go had.

10   COMM. CARROLL: You may not know the

11   answer to this, Sergeant, but with respect to

12   the differences depending on where you're at,

13   and I suspect it has to do with the contracts

14   that they have with the different cities, or

15   the municipalities, is there a standard

16   equipment package? Are those negotiated

17   individually with the cities, and if it's

18   negotiated individually with the cities, which

19   would explain the differences in the equipment

20   packages as you move from one area to the

21   other, is that normal for sheriff's offices

22   that have multiple jurisdictions that they

23   serve?

24   SGT. SUESS: Sheriff, I'll defer to you.

25   CHAIR: No. No.

1   SGT. SUESS: I mean I know it's not for

2   us, but --

3   CHAIR: No. No. I mean, you know --

4   SHER. ASHLEY: We have a standard

5   equipment package, but it does not include the

6   smaller items such as handguns, rifles --

7   cameras, tires, I mean you get a list, some

8   things are included but not, not to that

9   degree.

10   CHAIR: But if you have contract cities,

11   so we have, actually we have the same number

12   that Broward does, we have thirteen contract

13   cities, Broward has thirteen contract cities,

14   but every single deputy's equipment is

15   standard. It doesn't matter whether you're in

16   the unincorporated part of the county, the

17   biggest city, the smallest city, everybody gets

18   issued the same. It's not driven by what the

19   city will pay for, and that seems to be here,

20   that comment that you had, all these, you know,

21   they have different districts, including the

22   airport and the seaport, et cetera, that's why,

23   but that it's, it's all different. Sheriff

24   Judd, did you want to --

25   SHER. JUDD: No, sir, I just concur.

1   SHER. ASHLEY: Most -- most standard

2   equipment -- is covered under an allocation,

3   support allocation, it is not covered as

4   individual cost.

5   CHAIR: Everybody should have the exact

6   same stuff.

7   COMM. SCHACHTER: Remember Parkland was

8   not issued body cam.

9   CHAIR: Right, same, because, because

10   Parkland wouldn't pay for it.

11   COMM. SCHACHTER: Right.

12   CHAIR: So it was -- it was finance

13   driven, and the same reason that you had

14   inconsistent staffing with SROs, it depended

15   upon what the city would pay for. So it seems

16   that here in Broward, that there were a lot of

17   differences based upon those city contracts.

18   It seems that way. Secretary Poppell, did you

19   have something? I thought you did. Okay, I'm

20   sorry. Anybody else have anything for Sergeant

21   Suess? All right, thanks, John.

22   SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

23   CHAIR: All right, so it's been a long

24   couple days. As I said we're not going to get

25   to the mental health presentation. We're not

1   going to even try and start that because

2   there's no way we would finish it. I just want

3   to make a couple comments about that though,

4   and we'll pick that up next time, and it kind

5   of will segue way into what I want to, just

6   license to do for the next few minutes before

7   we break, is to talk a little bit about the

8   path forward, what we need to cover next time.

9   And on that issue of mental health -- and

10   I need your help, and your input on this,

11   because I'm a little bit torn on it, and

12   somewhat perplexed by it in this sense, is the

13   mental health topic itself is a complex topic.

14   It is a very important topic. The mental

15   health system is large, and some of us at least

16   share an opinion about the mental health system

17   in Florida, that while it works in some

18   respects there's a lot of room to do more, and

19   do it differently, and that's all fine and

20   well.

21   How much, and to what extent does this

22   commission as we move forward this year, how

23   much do we get into that, how much do we want

24   to get into that?

25   How much should we get into that against

1   this backdrop? Is, is that here's, as I've

2   talked to recently in the last couple of

3   months, talked to people within different

4   districts, and talked to superintendents, and

5   talked to mental health providers, and trying

6   to, you know, sort this out, is it's become

7   even more clear to me that the role that the

8   mental health providers have in the schools is

9   very narrow, and very limited, and it is

10   limited to helping those children succeed in

11   the educational environment. It is not being a

12   holistic mental health provider that is to fix

13   every mental health issue, and fix all the woes

14   that the kids have, which in some cases are

15   very significant.

16   So the analogy, and this may not be a good

17   one, but a few people that I've talked to, and

18   I've framed it at least in my mind this way, if

19   you have somebody that gets arrested and they

20   have mental health issues, and they're deemed

21   incompetent to stand trial, they are sent to

22   the state hospital, and the purpose of the

23   state hospital is to restore competency. It's

24   not to fix their mental health issues. The

25   purpose of the state hospital is so they can

1   come back and understand the proceedings, and

2   the case can be disposed of, and they can be

3   released from the criminal justice system, in

4   essence. It's a restoration of competency.

5   Here in the school system is the purpose

6   of the mental health providers is to ensure

7   that that child succeeds in the educational

8   environment. It is not to, again, address all

9   these mental health needs. In the mental

10   health community when you have somebody that

11   has serious mental health conditions, and in

12   therapy they call it unwrapping the child, so

13   that you're unwrapping the person, is, is that

14   it's been told to me by just about everybody

15   that it is unwise, and not appropriate for the

16   school, and the mental health providers in the

17   school, to try and unwrap the kids, and try and

18   break that down, and try and fix them, that

19   their role is to refer it out, and refer it out

20   into the community based mental health system,

21   or the private mental health system, and that

22   they largely are a referral source out.

23   Then you couple that with the situation in

24   the schools, there is a significant lack of

25   care coordination between the school mental

1   health providers, the community mental health

2   providers, and the private mental health

3   providers, and one of the reasons, as I've

4   heard many times, which I also see from

5   personal experiences with the community and

6   private providers because of funding that's out

7   there, and that one of the reasons, and there's

8   others, but one of the reasons is, and perhaps

9   Commissioner Carroll, you can comment on it, or

10   Secretary Poppell can comment on it, is that

11   for a lot of these providers there's not pay

12   points for them to be able to come to the

13   school and sit at staffings, and be involved in

14   that care coordination.

15   And you have a whole bunch of kids, and we

16   saw this with Cruz, is that you have a whole

17   bunch of kids that have uncoordinated care, and

18   they will have multiple care plans by the

19   different providers that are not coordinated.

20   So with all that said is, is that what do we

21   want to do on the mental health topic? We

22   touched on it last year. We talked about it.

23   It's extremely important. Do we want to just

24   focus on just the school aspect of it? Cruz

25   got outside the school aspect of it because

1   he's out into the community and private, and

2   community based, and private, with Henderson,

3   et cetera. So what are -- what are the rails

4   going to be on this, what's the scope of this,

5   and how far do we go, and to what extent do we

6   go?

7   COMM. CARROLL: Just a quick comment on

8   that. First of all I can't agree with you more

9   in terms of what you said. I think my issue

10   here is care coordination, because I do think

11   the school's focus is during the day, it's

12   educationally focused, it's to get that child

13   to be able to function in that environment over

14   a set period of time, and that the folks who

15   work with that child on an ongoing basis are

16   really out in the community. But there has to

17   be stronger care coordination and communication

18   between the two, because there is crossover.

19   And I think this case, you know -- a lot

20   of the kids that we see in our system -- this

21   case was unusual because there was a plethora

22   of services provided over a period of time to

23   this individual, both inside the school and

24   out. I would argue that the communication

25   between those providers was not where it needed

1   to be, and because of that missing information

2   there were possible missteps, in terms of what

3   might have been done.

4   So the care coordination I think between

5   schools and those outside mental health

6   agencies has to be stronger. And I -- I think

7   it's like everything we've seen to date, is

8   some school systems, and some schools do that

9   really well, and some school systems don't do

10   it very well, and so my thing would just be

11   there's some minimum standards around what the

12   level of that care coordination needs to be,

13   because this kid is going to go on breaks,

14   they're going to go in summer vacation.

15   And this case was the perfect example,

16   where every time they went outside the school

17   environment you had a kid decompensate and then

18   come back to school in an escalated fashion,

19   and they had to start all over again, so --

20   CHAIR: So do we need to do -- in your

21   view do we need to do anything more? We

22   touched on that, or actually hit it, you know,

23   fairly hard in our report, and about case

24   management and care coordination. You know

25   case management is different than care

1   coordination, okay, but this -- in this sense

2   do you think, do we want to bring people in, do

3   we want to explore this more, or have we

4   explored it and made our feelings known about

5   it, made enough recommendations, and we don't

6   need to do anything else on it?

7   COMM. CARROLL: Well, I don't think -- and

8   I'll defer it to Secretary Poppell, but I like

9   you don't think that this group is the right

10   group to fix issues related around the bigger

11   system of mental health. But I know that care

12   coordination is a big piece and should be a

13   requirement of school systems in terms of the

14   partnership with community mental health

15   systems going forward. And I also think the

16   community mental health systems need to look

17   more at -- in Florida our community mental

18   health system is focused on the deep end, okay,

19   so if you have a serious and persistent mental

20   illness, you're more likely to get service than

21   if you have behavioral health issues. A

22   behavioral analyst, which would help a lot of

23   these kids before they get to that point --

24   CHAIR: Sure, but -- but should we be

25   doing it, because I can chock full the agenda

1   for the rest of this year on a tremendous

2   amount in this whole area, but I need direction

3   from you all in what is the consensus, do we

4   want to go down that path, should we go down

5   that path? Secretary Poppell, go ahead.

6   SEC. POPPELL: I just wanted to mention

7   that, I don't know if you saw that a round

8   table was convened about a week and a half ago

9   by the First Lady and the Governor regarding

10   gaps in our mental health coverage around the

11   state, and so all of the HHS agencies, and law

12   enforcement, and the law makers, are actually

13   actively looking at the gaps. So I would

14   encourage this group, if there are known gaps

15   to bring those forward. It is a -- it's a

16   focus of the Governor, and so I think it would

17   be the right time to actually do that, and

18   allow the state agencies to come back and, and

19   work on some plans and report back to you.

20   CHAIR: And we -- you know, and we did

21   touch on this in our initial report. We could

22   maybe develop more, but do we, you know, we had

23   slated here a presentation from the Broward

24   County Schools just on more school based mental

25   health to get some perspective there, but do

1   you all want me to reach out more, bring more

2   people in? Again, do we want to start -- do we

3   want to continue down this path?

4   Do we want to expand what we've already

5   done, or in this area of mental health have we

6   done enough, and that there are other groups,

7   the Governor is focused on this, there are

8   other efforts out there, and others looking at

9   it, and it is just such a big, broad topic that

10   we have done all that we should do within the

11   scope of what this commission's mandate is, or

12   is there more to do, and do you want, do we

13   want to keep going down this path? Mr. Petty,

14   go ahead.

15   COMM. PETTY: I would say in line with the

16   care coordination piece, an area where I think

17   we may have some more work to do is around the

18   mental health input into this behavioral threat

19   assessment process, and how that, and how that

20   works, and sort of the reporting requirements,

21   or again, behavioral threat assessment, right,

22   you have to build a picture over time, and

23   there's information that's sitting outside of

24   those behavioral threat assessment teams, and I

25   don't, I don't think it's clear for the mental

1   health professionals, I don't think it's clear

2   for law enforcement, and I don't think it's

3   clear for those teams yet what's appropriate

4   information to share, when to bring that in,

5   and how that should be done.

6   So I think in that regard -- and that's

7   not the only thing, but I think in that regard

8   I think there's more we could do.

9   CHAIR: So who do -- who do you want to

10   hear from?

11   COMM. PETTY: Well, we heard a

12   presentation from the State of Virginia, that

13   has done a threat assessment model that I think

14   is, I think is quite good. Perhaps there's

15   something there we could learn from, or pattern

16   what we do here in Florida.

17   CHAIR: All right, and we already heard

18   from them. And so the information -- the issue

19   of information sharing I have, and already have

20   that as the, talk to you about here in a second

21   on some other topics. Information sharing is,

22   is different than delving into the mental

23   health system all the way from DCF through the

24   managing entities, to the community based

25   providers, getting into what works, what

1   doesn't work, case management, and all of those

2   things, and, you know, jumping into that whole

3   big ocean, and, and keep going down this path,

4   and as it relates to the schools getting more

5   into the schools, the different, the

6   psychologists, the social workers, the

7   counselors, the level of treatment, and all

8   their doing, you know, again, do we just stay

9   with what we have or do we get into that?

10   And I got to tell you -- and I -- and I'm

11   a little leery about going any further. I'm

12   not -- but I need you all to tell me what you

13   want to do. Sheriff Judd, go ahead, and we'll

14   get to you in a second, Mr. Schachter.

15   SHER. JUDD: You know we -- we can, as one

16   of my priorities here, follow the Broward

17   County Commission, or the Hollywood Commission,

18   to make sure a radio tower is put in place. We

19   can't tackle the mental health system at all.

20   We just -- you know, it's -- but if we didn't

21   dive deep enough, I think we did in that

22   original report, to say, look, here's the

23   problem, there's silos that have got to be

24   broken down, the mental health counselors have

25   got to report to us when there's a threat, or

1   an imminent threat of great bodily harm, and

2   we've got to, there has to be wrap around

3   services when we engage children that have

4   significant mental health issues, or

5   significantly declining mental health issues

6   that can end up as, as a direct threat to

7   themselves or others, and stop it there,

8   because otherwise it can go on forever.

9   CHAIR: But -- and I -- and I think -- and

10   so you all correct me if I'm wrong, but we, you

11   know, we spent a tremendous amount of time last

12   year on mental health. Between, and in closed

13   sessions and open sessions, so everything I

14   just heard from you Sheriff, is I'm sitting

15   here thinking to myself we already done that.

16   SHER. JUDD: We've done that. And -- and

17   do -- we've got a five-year window. We can

18   look to see how what we've already recommended

19   is playing out.

20   CHAIR: Right. Go ahead, Mr. Schachter.

21   COMM. SCHACHTER: We spent time looking at

22   that, and we saw that there were all the red

23   flags, but we didn't have the expertise. We

24   didn't bring in anybody to help us figure to

25   what the problem was and how we can solve this.

1   We know this is not the only murderer in our

2   schools. How are we going to identify -- how

3   are we going to prevent this from happening --

4   CHAIR: When you say what the problem is

5   what do you mean, because I'm not following

6   you?

7   COMM. SCHACHTER: We looked at his entire

8   mental health background, and we did not -- I

9   felt very unsatisfying, that I don't, I don't

10   think that we came up with, okay, this is what

11   we need to do to prevent this, to identify

12   these kids. This kid had so many red flags.

13   They did not help this child. So what can we

14   do to fix this, identify them in the future,

15   and make sure this doesn't happen?

16   CHAIR: I don't -- I don't know you can do

17   that.

18   COMM. SCHACHTER: Why -- I mean why don't

19   we have other people from, you know, experts

20   from outside of Florida look at this to figure

21   out, okay, this wasn't done, and this wasn't

22   done?

23   CHAIR: And I -- and I question, again, is

24   we got to be careful that we don't get outside

25   the scope of what this commission's

1   responsibility is. I --

2   COMM. SCHACHTER: What have we done to

3   prevent this from happening again on that

4   aspect?

5   CHAIR: And -- and again mental health is

6   a big topic, this -- and I think we have to be

7   careful about transforming this into a mental

8   health commission.

9   COMM. SCHACHTER: This wasn't --

10   UNDER SHER. HARPRING: Sheriff, I think

11   from my perspective, in regards to our initial

12   report I think we did a substantive job in

13   taking a look at it as it directly related to

14   Cruz, plus a little larger global view. In

15   light of Secretary Poppell's comments I think

16   it would probably be appropriate, and would

17   best serve the time of the commission to see

18   what happens on the statewide level with the

19   Governor's initiative, and then come back and

20   determine what are those things that are going

21   to be done, or are recommended by the

22   Governor's initiative, and then determine, at

23   least in the scope of what our particular

24   statutory charge is, is there anything else

25   that we can do, are there any concerns that we

1   have based on our collective experience, and

2   then move forward if we need to.

3   And of course, I mean as you indicated,

4   you know, Cruz had services for an awful long

5   period of time, and you get to be eighteen, and

6   you say you can't make me do anything anymore,

7   and that's what it is.

8   CHAIR: Yeah. And again, getting into the

9   mental health system means, you know, and this

10   is where I don't think we should go, because,

11   is, is the managing entity system a good system

12   that's working, are, are they holding, because

13   what you hear is, is that, and we know that

14   some of the private, or the community based

15   providers, there is a sense of a lack of

16   metrics and accountability, and driven

17   outcomes. I think those are very fair

18   questions, and maybe constructive criticisms,

19   and there's room for all that, but I don't

20   think that's this commission's role.

21   I think that we're taking to -- now, what

22   it is -- and, Secretary Poppell, I'll get with

23   you in, over the next few weeks, is, is that

24   what is within our role, and I'm going to ask

25   for it for the next meeting, as an example, in

1   7026 there were created, or additional funding

2   for community action teams, mobile response

3   teams, the youth mental health awareness

4   training, the mental health assistance

5   allocation. Those are all things that are

6   within the scope. Those are the things that

7   are going to, you know, potentially make a

8   difference within the schools, and ask you to

9   update on some, where those things are. That's

10   within our wheelhouse.

11   But trying to get into the system itself,

12   and whether there is adequate case management,

13   whether the community-based providers are

14   performing adequately towards end goals, and

15   they have funding and metrics that are tied,

16   and all that, that's, you know, because that

17   might be for somebody else. Go ahead.

18   SHER. JUDD: And I'm certainly not

19   suggesting we do that, but I do -- every time

20   there's a mass shooting the first thing that's

21   said publicly is that was a person with a

22   mental health issue, it isn't a gun issue, it's

23   a person with a mental health issue, and so I

24   don't think that we can look at all of the

25   issues we looked at and then punt down the road

1   on the mental health issue. What I do think,

2   though, I think you're absolutely right, we're

3   broad barning to delve into it, but I think

4   there are issues unresolved in how school

5   systems and community mental health programs

6   marry up and provide the best services possible

7   to kids.

8   And -- and I -- at a minimum I would think

9   that we make the recommendation that there be

10   follow-up by some group who is more qualified

11   than this group, because quite frankly you're

12   going to need a lot of the folks from the

13   school system, and folks from the mental health

14   world, in the room to do that. But -- but I

15   think we need to make that recommendation if

16   we're really interested in preventing this, and

17   mental health is a significant contributor to

18   these type incidents, then I think that we need

19   to make a recommendation that we have more work

20   to do around the coordination of care for

21   folks, and particularly focused on younger kids

22   in school settings, because they don't, these

23   issues don't always end in, in mass shootings,

24   but it disrupts schools every day.

25   It leads to kids being hurt and injured

1   more often than being killed, but, but it's a

2   significant issue, and, and so I just don't

3   want to move forward as a commission and

4   pretend that that's not an issue anymore,

5   because it's one we spent a lot of time on at

6   the beginning of this, and I think when we

7   looked at those records were surprised, one,

8   that he received as much services as he did,

9   but we were, maybe some of us weren't as

10   surprised at how disconnected sometimes those

11   services were to each other.

12   And so I just think that if -- if we move

13   that issue to another body, I'm fine with it,

14   but to totally disregard it, then I think we're

15   missing the --

16   CHAIR: Yeah, no, I'm not suggesting that.

17   And I do think that we ask Broward to come in

18   and do the presentation they were slated to do

19   this afternoon that will tell us about what is

20   going on within the schools, the mental health,

21   and how it's set up, and do a little deeper

22   dive in that. I think that's appropriate. But

23   to get into, you know, again, more of the, the

24   topic of care coordination is vital because as

25   I said, and I know it's happening, is that

1   you've got kids that are in school that are

2   under multiple treatment plans that are

3   unconnected because the school and the

4   community based provider and/or private

5   providers, are not coordinating enough, and

6   those multiple treatment plans could be, could

7   be competing in some, they're at least not

8   complimenting.

9   So those are the things we can get into,

10   but as far as -- so I guess I'll leave it here,

11   if I hear consensus on this, is stick with the

12   school stuff, stay with the coordination stuff,

13   but we're not going to get into the community

14   based aspect of it, and we're going to leave

15   that for somebody else. Do I have it? Is that

16   --

17   SHER. ASHLEY: Can I -- can I say one

18   thing?

19   CHAIR: Go ahead, Sheriff.

20   SHER. ASHLEY: And I'll start with an

21   example. I had a child commit a battery,

22   multiple, it was third or fourth battery,

23   charge him with agg battery. The mental health

24   professional caring for this child was very

25   upset that we charged him with agg battery,

1   because it was his fourth offense, and he

2   choked a child, another child. She said,

3   quote, I'm tapering this child off medications,

4   I have informed the school district that he was

5   violent and should not participate in any

6   competitive sports, and I can't believe you

7   charged him with a crime. And my response is,

8   is why the hell do you have this kid at school

9   if he's violent and you're tapering him off

10   medication, which you have no idea what that's

11   going to do.

12   So agreeing with Commissioner Carroll,

13   this is not the group to try to delve into, but

14   the, the red line, the clear demarcation,

15   establishing a standard of when can school

16   officials remove somebody who is so mentally

17   unstable from that environment, nobody has

18   identified that, nobody has said what that is,

19   and I think this commission can certainly help

20   push in that direction, is we've mainstreamed

21   kids that should not be mainstreamed, for, for

22   political correct reasons, I don't know why

23   we've done it, but our schools, or at least the

24   evidence we've seen, are incapable of providing

25   the level of care that these kids need, and so

1   it's a disservice to them, and it's a

2   disservice to all those other kids that are

3   trying to learn, so I don't think we should

4   drop it there.

5   CHAIR: Commissioner Dodd, go ahead.

6   COMM. DODD: I did like Commissioner

7   Petty's talk about the behavioral threat

8   assessments, and that process, so I too would

9   like to get more into that, and to look about

10   what services we can do, provide for the mental

11   wellbeing of children. You know, and I'm not

12   sure if the analyzation of social media posts

13   and, and troubled children, and how we follow

14   them on social media, are indications that they

15   may be apt to make a threat. I mean all

16   threats are, are serious, have to be taken

17   seriously, and so I'm not sure if that falls

18   into this, this area with the behavioral threat

19   assessment process or not, but I would like to

20   see the commission look at this social media

21   side and come up with some ideas, or some

22   recommendations on, on, you know, how we can

23   better monitor that, if we can identify

24   troubled students that should be monitored and

25   how that would be done, just to see if there's

1   any indications that they may, you know, commit

2   an act of violence.

3   CHAIR: Just to throw this out, and kind

4   of being this in to come conclusion here, the,

5   the topics that I have that we're going to

6   cover next time, and moving forward, is that I

7   said we're going to bring in Broward County

8   Schools and ask them to present on their new

9   threat assessment policy, and that software.

10   Of course we're going to continue with 911 and

11   the radio systems. We need to have a follow-up

12   on SESIR. And we'll get some updates on the,

13   at the next meeting on what came out of the

14   legislature.

15   So those will be some things for next

16   time. Off the top of your heads does anybody

17   have anything else that you want to -- Sheriff?

18   SHER. JUDD: I would like Damien to be

19   able to continue to report on the school

20   districts that are complying with 7026, and

21   because I'm not through pushing a public

22   accountability for those districts that are not

23   complying. So I think that, I think if we

24   measure what he reported this time to next time

25   we'll be able to see if those districts that

1   have been non-compliant, or less than robust,

2   if they're moving, just maybe at a slower pace,

3   or if they're resisting us.

4   CHAIR: We'll do that update. We'll do an

5   updated survey, ask him to do an updated

6   survey, and that will tell us where it is. Mr.

7   Schachter, go ahead.

8   COMM. SCHACHTER: I mean the two things

9   that I, I had e-mailed, the staff was -- we

10   know that this murderer had 124 instances of,

11   of violence, what are we, what have we done as

12   a commission to prevent this from happening

13   again, and, you know, we know that this culture

14   of leniency persists inside the district, has

15   that changed?

16   CHAIR: What are you looking for, because

17   I think we've done a lot, you know, I think

18   that we did a tremendous amount last year, and

19   I think there is significant amount of findings

20   and recommendations that are in that initial

21   report, so I think we've accomplished a

22   tremendous amount.

23   SHER. JUDD: Let -- let me see if I can

24   support him with this. Is there any way that

25   we can have a report, and start measuring the

1   outcomes from our meetings, from the people

2   that have agreed to help, from the results, you

3   know, kind of, kind of have, start having a

4   report back to the commission on the outcomes

5   of our actions?

6   CHAIR: Yeah, well, that's -- I mean we

7   are. I think we've, we've done some of that.

8   Give me some specifics that you're looking for.

9   SHER. JUDD: Well, for example we passed,

10   when, when 7026 passed we, one of the mandates

11   was that there was someone in every school with

12   a firearm.

13   CHAIR: Well, we got that.

14   SHER. JUDD: Okay, well, that's just an

15   example. So boom, that's one. The -- the

16   Broward Sheriff's Office has changed sheriffs,

17   and as a result here's what's occurred, and

18   that's subsequent to the commission meeting.

19   So just a list of --

20   CHAIR: Okay, and we're doing that. I

21   mean and just like we brought back for you

22   updates on a number of things -- one of the

23   things I just mentioned that we're going to ask

24   DCF to update on are all of those mental health

25   components that all right in 7026, and we got

1   one update, so we're going to ask for a

2   supplemental update, so I think we're doing

3   that. If there's some topic that we, you know

4   -- you can e-mail these if you think about

5   them. If there's some topic that you want to

6   see updated that we are not updating and, and,

7   and have slated for an update, by all means let

8   me know.

9   SHER. JUDD: Well, maybe I'm not making

10   myself clear. If -- if we had a graph that

11   said, look, here's, here's the outcomes that,

12   that we have brought in for a landing --

13   CHAIR: Okay.

14   SHER. JUDD: So we can -- so we can

15   measure our outcomes, and that will give, that

16   will give us some sense of visual understanding

17   of how much is actually occurring, even though

18   in some areas we're still falling short, IE.

19   Tamarac. You know that -- you know that --

20   CHAIR: All right, I get you. We'll take

21   shot at that. Anybody else have anything?

22   SHER. ASHLEY: The one follow-up from

23   today, I thought Captain Francis' presentation

24   was actually excellent, and I thought a lot of

25   it was based on best practice. I would be

1   interested to know how many law enforcement

2   agencies around the state have a similar

3   approach to the back end of that. Because I

4   know we, when we were looking at the front-end,

5   and we were looking at Broward's policy, I know

6   there was some type of comparison done to other

7   law enforcement agencies around the state to

8   see how many of them had may as opposed to

9   shall, and that type of stuff.

10   CHAIR: Right.

11   SHER. ASHLEY: I'd be interested to know

12   how many have that type of response when it

13   comes to reunification and notification after

14   an incident like this.

15   CHAIR: Okay, we'll see what we can do in

16   that. You know -- you know, there's roughly --

17   I can tell the small ones aren't -- you know,

18   there's roughly 400 law enforcement agencies in

19   the state of Florida, you know, you got 67

20   Sheriff's Offices, but you got quite a few

21   police departments, and roughly it's 400, so

22   we'll see what we can do. And maybe we'll

23   apply some criteria, and some size cut-off,

24   because I would venture to say, you know, the

25   small, ten, twelve person police departments,

1   they're not going to have it, so I'll see what

2   we can do with that, and see what we can come

3   up with.

4   SHER. ASHLEY: That would give us a

5   snapshot of how many are doing active shooter

6   training, and how many are properly equipping,

7   how many --

8   CHAIR: Right. Right. All right, we'll

9   take a look at it. All right, I think we have

10   some public comment as we wrap up. First is

11   Tony Montalto.

12   PUBLIC COMMENT

13   MR. MONTALTO: Just a few things on some

14   stuff we heard today, and various parts of the

15   testimony. Once again, Sheriff Judd and

16   Sheriff Gualtieri, you guys were talking about

17   the issuance of the long guns, and just another

18   example of the failure of the suspended Sheriff

19   of Broward County's leadership, in that his

20   officers weren't property equipped. Again,

21   that's not to say that the rank and file is all

22   at fault, but again we have to look at the

23   leadership when the people don't have the

24   equipment they need to do the job.

25   Another thing we, or I want to say, is

1   that as a longtime resident of Florida there's

2   been a few times during these hearings when

3   I've just been very disappointed in some of our

4   state departments. One of them was when the

5   Department of Children and Families got up here

6   and said they had a problem when people aged

7   out from seventeen to eighteen and no offering

8   for solutions. Another part was today during

9   the Department of Education talking about the

10   SESIR data, and having no idea of its validity

11   or use, yet it's been collected all these

12   years.

13   And that was only compounded when I heard

14   the presenter, who was getting very defensive,

15   say that, well, you know, she spends a lot of

16   time covering her 7026 data. And to any

17   agency, or anybody in the state who feels that

18   7026 and the changes that it imposed on you is

19   an effort I would just remind them that 7026

20   came about because of the loss of seventeen

21   people, including my daughter, so basically

22   straighten up, fly right, and do your job.

23   That's been a problem that we've seen.

24   We've heard about people here in Broward County

25   that can't coordinate a, basically a merger of

1   all the systems that created the ORCAT, and

2   that's unacceptable, so I implore you guys to

3   continue your mission. I implore the elected

4   officials and the civil servants to quite

5   frankly do what you've been elected to do or do

6   what you've been hired to do. Let's just

7   everybody make a renewed effort to do your job.

8   That's what we need.

9   The fact that people didn't do their jobs

10   is quite frankly something that led to

11   seventeen deaths, and seventeen people being

12   wounded at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High

13   School. Thanks again. I look forward to your

14   continued work.

15   CHAIR: Thank you, Mr. Montalto. The

16   next, and the last one we have is Kathryn

17   Reeve.

18   MS. REEVE: Good afternoon. My name is

19   Kathryn Reeve. I'm here today as a

20   representative of the Florida Chapter of Moms

21   Demand Action for Gun Sense in America. We,

22   along with most students, parents, teachers,

23   and school administrators, oppose the proposal

24   to allow teachers to serve as guardians. The

25   majority of districts have declined to even arm

1   non-instructional school staff. Of sixty-seven

2   school districts twenty-five have utilized the

3   Guardian Program, but very few of those opt to

4   arm existing school staff, and instead hire

5   full time security guards.

6   This indicates a broad consensus that

7   educational school staff should not be

8   transformed into armed guards. So if the

9   majority of Florida schools do not believe

10   staff should be armed why are we considering

11   going beyond that and arming teachers? There

12   is no evidence that arming teachers would make

13   our school safer. In fact the data indicates

14   just the opposite. Research shows that

15   students may be aware of where and how teachers

16   keep their firearms, and how to obtain access.

17   Access to a firearm, fire, sorry, access

18   to a firearm, irrespective of age, triples the

19   risk of death by suicide, and doubles the risk

20   of death by homicide. Research also casts

21   significant doubt on the ability of teachers to

22   stop active shooters. The fact is that the

23   shooting accuracy of even the most highly

24   trained law enforcement officers significantly

25   decreases in stressful situations such as

1   gunfights. What level of stress do you think a

2   school teacher is under in an active shooter

3   situation in a classroom full of children in

4   fear for their lives?

5   We also know that armed civilians

6   complicate law enforcement response to active

7   shooter incidents. As former Dallas Police

8   Chief David Brown said in the wake of an ambush

9   on law enforcement in 2016, you may remember,

10   we don't know how, sorry, we don't know who the

11   good guy is versus the bad guy when everyone

12   starts shooting. Then if you still not believe

13   the facts, and here are severe, sorry, and here

14   are several potentially, potentially fatal

15   mistakes made by armed guards in school.

16   On a single day in February 2018, this is

17   one single day, a St. Paul, Minnesota third

18   grader managed to pull the trigger of a gun in

19   an officer's holster, firing a bullet into the

20   school's floor. And in Fort Walton Beach a

21   parent discovered a school resource officer's

22   gun in a faculty bathroom. During a two-day

23   period in March 2018 a school police officer in

24   Virginia accidentally fired his gun through a

25   middle school classroom wall. A teacher in

1   California demonstrating firearm safety

2   mistakenly fired a round through the ceiling,

3   injuring three students who were hit by falling

4   debris. And a deputy in a Michigan school left

5   a loaded service weapon in a middle school

6   locker room, where a six-grader found it.

7   CHAIR: Ma'am, you need to wrap it up,

8   you're over by a minute, so please.

9   MS. REEVE: Of course. Yes, thank you.

10   Thank you. Just last month a New York armed

11   security guard left a gun on a bathroom counter

12   of a junior high school, and on, and on, and

13   on. And I don't want to take up any more of

14   your, of your time.

15   CHAIR: All right, thank you. Appreciate

16   it.

17   MS. REEVE: But -- but, thank you. Thank

18   you very much for listening.

19   CHAIR: Okay, does anybody have anything

20   else? Mr. Schachter?

21   COMM. SCHACHTER: You know, we talked

22   about a school safety rating system, you were

23   asking for suggestions, right? I think that's

24   extremely important, if we could develop that.

25   CHAIR: You can have that discussion -- we

1   can put that discussion on for, for next time,

2   we'll talk about it. We'll put that on. I'll

3   make sure I make a note of that, and we'll make

4   sure -- you're right, we said we would talk

5   about it, so I'll put it on, we'll make sure

6   that's on there for next time. So I think

7   that's it. We're adjourned, and I'll see you

8   all in June.

9   (Thereupon, the meeting concluded.)

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1   C E R T I F I C A T E

2

3   (STATE OF FLORIDA)

4   (COUNTY OF MIAMI-DADE)

5

6   I, NATHANIEL TORO, Reporter, certify that I was

7   authorized to and did report the foregoing

8   proceedings and that the transcript is a true and

9   correct transcription of my notes of the

10   proceedings.

11

12

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14

15   *Nathaniel Toro*

16   _____

17   NATHANIEL TORO, Reporter

18   Commission: GG 111434

19   Expires: 06/04/2021

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