

MARJORY STONEMAN DOUGLAS HIGH SCHOOL
PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISSION MEETING
BB&T CENTER CHAIRMAN'S CLUB
PANTHER PARKWAY SUNRISE, FLORIDA 33323

November 15, 2018

COMMISSION MEMBERS/ATTENDEES:

SHERIFF BOB GUALTIERI - CHAIR

JASON JONES - PSC GENERAL COUNSEL

CHRIS NELSON - CHIEF OF POLICE, CITY OF AUBURNDALE

BRUCE BARTLETT - CHIEF ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY,
SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

MIKE CARROLL - FORMER SECRETARY, DCF

RICHARD SWEARINGEN - COMMISSIONER FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

MAX SCHACHTER - VICTIM PARENT

LARRY ASHLEY - SHERIFF, OKALOOSA COUNTY

MELISSA LARKIN SKINNER - CEO, CENTERSTONE OF FLORIDA

PAM STUART - COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION

JUSTIN SENIOR - SECRETARY, AHCA

TIMOTHY NIERMANN, SECRETARY, DEPT OF JUVENILE

JUSTICE REBECCA KAPUSTA - SECRETARY, DCF

JAMES HARPRING - UNDERSHERIFF/GC, INDIAN RIVER
COUNTY

DESMOND BLACKBURN - SUPERINTENDENT, BREVARD COUNTY

GRADY JUDD - SHERIFF, POLK COUNTY

DOUGLAS DODD - SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, CITRUS COUNTY

LAUREN BOOK - SENATOR, DISTRICT 32

RYAN PETTY - VICTIM PARENT

MARSHA POWERS - SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, MARTIN COUNTY

KEVIN LYSTAD - PRESIDENT, FLORIDA POLICE CHIEF ASSOC

CHRISTINA LINTON - COMMISSION STAFF, FDLE

1 (Thereupon, the meeting is called to order:)

2 CHAIR: All right, I think we're ready to
3 go ahead and get started. So we're going to
4 continue this morning with the law enforcement
5 response presentation. Before we do get
6 started I want to just kind of give you what I
7 think will be a roadmap for the day today, and
8 a little bit about how we're going to proceed.
9 Before I do that though I want to answer one
10 question that came up yesterday, and I forgot
11 who asked it. Mr. Schachter, you may have
12 asked it, about the number of people within the
13 Stoneman Douglas school, and the school system,
14 specifically in Stoneman Douglas that we
15 interviewed, and that number is, is at least
16 sixty people, teachers, administrators, et
17 cetera, on campus, that were interviewed at
18 least once. So it's at least sixty people at
19 least once. So the number of interviews that
20 were done were extensive.

21 MR. SCHACHTER: Can you -- can you tell me
22 how many refused to be interviewed?

23 CHAIR: Seventeen.

24 MR. SCHACHTER: Thank you.

25 CHAIR: And along those lines I want to

1 say it again, is, is that I can't stress it
2 enough that the level of cooperation, the level
3 of professionalism, and the level of
4 transparency from the Broward County School
5 District, from the Coral Springs Police
6 Department and the Broward County Sheriff's
7 Office, and everybody that we've dealt with,
8 including the union representing the teachers,
9 the unions representing the administrators,
10 everybody across the board has been
11 professional, transparent, and cooperative, but
12 that doesn't mean that it hasn't been without
13 its challenges, and we've had to make decisions
14 along the way that create the environment that
15 we can get the information we need, and we can
16 get the interviews to be accomplished.

17 There were a number of people that had
18 some concerns that did agree to participate in
19 the interviews after discussions, and quite
20 frankly in some cases after some negotiations,
21 because they had already been interviewed
22 several times, and we needed to make sure that,
23 that they were willing to, you know,
24 participate, and cooperate, because they were
25 concerned about making statements multiple

1 times, and having some perception that they
2 were going to be making inconsistent statements
3 just because they have told that story two,
4 three, four or five times, so we had to make
5 decisions along the way about how these
6 interviews were going to be conducted.

7 Keep in mind is, is that what this body
8 is. This body is an investigative body that is
9 to come up with the facts of what happened, and
10 to make recommendations. We cannot make any
11 decisions. We can't discipline anybody. We
12 can't find anybody at fault and impose any
13 sanctions. Is -- is that we can -- and what I
14 think we all hope, I know what I hope is, is
15 that people will find us to be objective, fact
16 based, and at the end of the day is, is that we
17 were fair, you know, we haven't favored
18 anything or anybody, or any side of this, and
19 just calling balls and strikes as we see it,
20 and that people listen to the recommendations
21 that come out of this commission because they
22 are fair, they are objective, and they are fact
23 based.

24 So we meet once a month. We didn't meet
25 in October, we had a sixty day gap in there,

1 and we need to get things done. We're on a
2 very, very tight time frame. As I said on
3 Tuesday when we opened, and you all know this,
4 is that what you all are doing Yeoman's work,
5 in that most commissions that have investigated
6 these incidents haven't produced reports for
7 between two and a half and three years, and
8 we're in essence putting it together in about
9 seven or eight months, to have something that
10 is meaningful, and that people can understand
11 what happened, and the legislature has an
12 opportunity to tweak 7026 and make any
13 additions that it deems necessary, and so that
14 the districts and the others have the
15 information so that it doesn't take a long
16 time, and you can see the needle move, and you
17 can see things being accomplished.

18 So, you know, with that, we have all done
19 the best we can with what we've had to work
20 with in that short time frame, but it wouldn't
21 be without the cooperation of the people that
22 we have had to get this information from. And
23 they have been transparent, they have been
24 cooperative, but again, it hasn't been without
25 its challenges, and we've been largely able to

1 overcome those challenges by creating an
2 environment that they believe is fair, and that
3 we are doing nothing other than seeking the
4 facts, and seeking the truth, and that they've
5 been treated fairly at the end of it.

6 And -- and I think that, that we've
7 accomplished that, so -- and again, we've
8 probably interviewed well over two hundred
9 people at least once, and some of those people
10 have been interviewed multiple times. Go
11 ahead.

12 MR. SCHACHTER: Of the seventeen, were all
13 MSD administration and staff interviewed?

14 CHAIR: All administrators were
15 interviewed. No administrators refused. The
16 only people that refused were teachers, and
17 some guidance counselors in the past, and some
18 of those went back to people who were not on
19 campus or involved in February 14th but may be
20 involved in the threat assessment process
21 previously. And there are some people that we
22 are going to go back to who refused, and we are
23 going to issue subpoenas to them, because they
24 weren't on campus that day, and they're really
25 not in a situation where it's emotional, or

1 that they have some sensitivity issues, and
2 that, you know, they probably do, it does need
3 to be pursued.

4 But again, we can't do this all at once,
5 is, is that there's an interim report that's
6 due in January, we're going to submit it on
7 time, but this commission's work is not over
8 with, and nobody should be mistaken that just
9 because we are going through what we are doing
10 now, and we're going to submit that report in
11 January, that this is over. And in some
12 respects it's just the beginning, and where we
13 go, we'll have that discussion in December. We
14 got to get through this today, and get the work
15 done this week so that we can get this report
16 together and get a draft to you.

17 It's going to be a challenge to get a
18 draft report to all of you well enough in
19 advance of the December meeting to you have
20 time to read it, and digest it, make your
21 recommendations, and we can have a productive
22 meeting in December about finalizing that
23 report. We can't walk into the December
24 meeting and hand you the report in the day of
25 the December meeting. We have to get it to you

1 ahead of time so that you have an opportunity
2 to do what you need to do with it and then
3 provide your input. So this is why we got to
4 just move this, we got to move this along, and
5 that's the, that's the juncture.

6 But remember -- and I think there might be
7 some -- yes, slight confusion on this, is, is
8 that we are -- we cannot -- we have no
9 authority to impose any discipline, or any
10 sanctions, or to do anything other than to find
11 these facts and turn them over to the school
12 board, to the Sheriff, or to anybody else if we
13 find that it warrants further investigation
14 into what people have done or didn't do, we
15 can't do that, and so that's the role, and then
16 to make this public finding as to specifically
17 what occurred, and to make recommendations to
18 the legislature. So we have to keep in mind as
19 we are going through this, and I think
20 everybody has to keep in mind what this role
21 is.

22 So for today Sergeant Suess is going to
23 finish his presentation. We have a hard stop
24 of 2:00, and the reason why we have a hard stop
25 of 2:00 is, is because Mr. Peterson is under

1 subpoena. He'll be here to testify at 2:00,
2 and we're going to stop before then, so we
3 really need to get through Sergeant Sues's
4 presentation, there's a long, there's a ways to
5 go with that.

6 And just for housekeeping, so that we know
7 what the plan is, anybody's got any questions
8 about it, ask, we can discuss it, is, is that
9 when Deputy Peterson comes in to testify
10 Commissioner Bartlett is going to take the lead
11 on that. He's prepared to ask the questions,
12 and to get everything on the table. And then
13 after Commissioner Bartlett goes through the
14 questions, and leads that in a very thorough
15 comprehensive way, then each of the
16 commissioners will have an opportunity if you
17 want to to ask Mr. Peterson any questions that
18 you want to. But the initial lead on that will
19 be by Commissioner Bartlett, who is prepared to
20 do that.

21 Then after we're done with Mr. Peterson
22 Superintendent Runcie will be here, and then
23 Sheriff Israel. And what I've told both of
24 them is, is that they'll have an opportunity to
25 make any opening comment that they want to

1 make, limited to about ten minutes, and their
2 total time here though, because we have to keep
3 this on schedule, and we're not going to turn
4 this into a four or five hour marathon, is, is
5 they will be here for ninety minutes, so
6 whatever questions you have I suggest that you
7 start thinking about those, and preparing those
8 now, because they'll have about ten minutes to
9 answer, to make an opening statement if they
10 want to, and each of them, and I'm going to
11 hold it to it, ninety minutes, and at the
12 ninety minute mark they're done.

13 So you need to make sure that the
14 questions that you're asking are, again,
15 probative questions relevant to the topics,
16 relative to the things we're investigating, and
17 keep it on track. And then at the end of the
18 ninety minutes, but, and we will rotate it
19 around the commission so that there is a fair
20 opportunity for everybody to ask questions, but
21 I just ask you to start thinking about now any
22 questions you have for the superintendent, or
23 for the sheriff. And the same thing tomorrow
24 morning with Chief Parry. Chief Parry will
25 have the same opportunity for ninety minutes,

1 and about a ten minute opening.

2 So does anybody have any questions or
3 concerns on that as the way forward for today?
4 Sergeant Suess, go ahead.

5 CONTINUATION OF PRESENTATION LAW ENFORCEMENT

6 RESPONSE

7 SGT. SUESS: Thank you, Sheriff. So to do
8 a quick reset on where we left off yesterday, a
9 very brief summary, approximately thirty
10 seconds prior to this point Nikolas Cruz fled
11 the west end of Building 12. There were eight
12 deputies on the MSD campus, or in immediate
13 proximity. Officer Burton and Medina were
14 driving, I'm sorry, Officer Burton and Andrew
15 Medina were driving north on the east side of
16 Building 8 in the direction of Building 12, and
17 Captain Jordan and Lieutenant DeVita were
18 driving south on Pine Island Road preparing to
19 pull into the administration parking lot.

20 Secretary Kapusta, do provide you an
21 answer to the question you asked yesterday, and
22 I want to be sure I had the right information,
23 but the time at which Deputy Peterson
24 transmitted shots were fired over the BSO radio
25 was 2:23.26. Deputy Kratz was the first other

1 deputy on scene. That was at 2:24.35, one
2 minute and nine seconds later. Is that the
3 answer you were looking, or the information you
4 were looking for?

5 SEC. KAPUSTA: Yes.

6 SGT. SUESS: Okay. Yes, ma'am. So again
7 we're at six minutes and fifty-four seconds
8 after the first shots were fired. Mr.
9 Greenleaf and Assistant Principal Morford have
10 run into the north end of Building 1, and they
11 would shortly thereafter proceed into the
12 camera room. Seven minutes and one second
13 after the first shot Lieutenant O'Neill, who is
14 a Lieutenant in the BSO North Lauderdale
15 District directed that crime suppression team
16 deputies set up for an active shooter response
17 upon their arrival. Lieutenant O'Neill had
18 explained that he had been at the District
19 office earlier, and directed those deputies to
20 start going to the MSD campus.

21 Four seconds later Captain Jordan and
22 Lieutenant DeVita were seen on video running
23 from the vehicle towards the east side of
24 Building 1. So again I direct you to the map
25 of campus, of Building 1. This will become

1 very relevant here in the next several slides.
2 So on the top right corner you see two red
3 boxes which identify doors at Building 1.
4 There's a camera inside there. So just the
5 door at the top right, so on the east side of
6 the Building 1 is the door through which
7 Captain Jordan and Lieutenant DeVita would
8 enter.

9 Seconds later Deputy Marchese, who has
10 arrived in the general area of Deputy Kratz
11 north of the football/soccer field, transmits
12 that he has the gunshot victim, and by the
13 entrance to Westglades Middle School. There's
14 every indication that this victim was Kyle
15 Laman. Sergeant Heinrich would have still been
16 with him, and Deputy Kratz is somewhere in this
17 general area, but there's likely a little bit
18 of distance between Deputies Kratz and
19 Marchese.

20 In reviewing this transmission, this is
21 perhaps over analysis, it calls us to wonder if
22 by Deputy Marchese saying the gunshot victim it
23 may have led others to believe that there was
24 only one potentially. It's something worth
25 considering.

1 Deputy Marchese said that he left Heron
2 Heights Elementary where he was the SRO upon
3 hearing radio traffic about the shots being
4 fired. He approached Holmberg, or approached
5 the campus on Holmberg from the west. Deputy
6 Marchese did not hear gunshots. He encountered
7 Kyle Laman and Sergeant Heinrich moving west,
8 and escorted them south toward the baseball
9 field, and softball field. He spoke of
10 encountering radio problems while trying to
11 call for fire rescue. You'll see a clip of
12 that later on a body cam, where Deputy Marchese
13 is expressing his frustration.

14 He provided security for Kyle Laman and
15 Sergeant Heinrich, and fire rescue as they were
16 treating Kyle Laman. He remained present on
17 the west end of campus, and heard radio traffic
18 about Cruz moving toward the west. He
19 expressed a concern for the safety of the fire
20 rescue personnel, Kyle Laman, and Sergeant
21 Heinrich, in anticipation if Cruz continued
22 west then he could encounter Cruz if need be.
23 Deputy Marchese stated he did not attend his
24 most recent session of in-service training due
25 to being sick, and he could not recall the last

1 time he attended active shooter training.

2 Seven minutes and twelve seconds later
3 Officer Fernandez was driving north on Pine
4 Island Road approaching Holmberg Road, based
5 off his GPS. I believe I failed to mention
6 this earlier, so the GPS records provided by
7 Coral Springs and BSO, there's always a slight
8 margin of error in GPS coordinates. The
9 refresh rate also plays into that. So it's not
10 constantly monitoring somebody's location,
11 it's, the refresh rate determines on how
12 frequently you see where that individual is, so
13 it may be twenty seconds, it may be a minute,
14 it may be five minutes. So that's something to
15 consider.

16 We also sort of tempered our evaluation,
17 or our consideration of the GPS records, as we
18 know some of them to be inaccurate. For
19 example, Officer Whittington's GPS showed that
20 he was beneath the Sawgrass Expressway for an
21 extended period of time, however at the same
22 time Officer Whittington is inside Building 12,
23 as seen on video. So we did not rely very
24 heavily on the GPS records.

25 Officer Fernandez said that upon seeing

1 three deputies on the east end of Holmberg Road
2 he asked them are you breaching, meaning just
3 entering the campus, entering the gate, and
4 they said, no. He responded, well, we're
5 breaching. These deputies were likely Sergeant
6 Miller and Deputy Seward and Hanks.

7 At approximately seven minutes fifteen
8 seconds after the first shot Assistant
9 Principal Morford entered the camera room, and
10 Kelvin Greenleaf evacuated students who had
11 previously been sheltering in that room.
12 Eventually they would go on to provide Deputy
13 Peterson, Assistant Principal Porter, with
14 information over the school radio about what
15 they saw on the video. They would remain in
16 that room for approximately thirty minutes,
17 until law enforcement approached the camera
18 room. Simultaneously Nikolas Cruz was fleeing
19 south on the west end of campus by the tennis
20 courts.

21 Officer Burton provided the description of
22 the suspect.

23 CHAIR: Senator Book, go ahead.

24 SEN. BOOK: So technically they're in, in
25 the camera room, they could see an individual

1 running alone along that sidewalk.

2 SGT. SUESS: They had the ability. Now,
3 both myself and Detective Scott from Broward
4 Sheriff's Office have become extremely familiar
5 with their DVR system, which is a good system,
6 it appears to be. We've dealt with a lot of
7 them. This one was fairly easy to use. There
8 are dozens of cameras on campus, and it's very
9 difficult to review all of them at any single
10 moment, so without having an idea of where the
11 suspect is they wouldn't know where to look, so
12 it's basically you've got to go through each
13 camera. It's a needle in a haystack situation.

14 SEN. BOOK: So it's not like, you know, at
15 my house, where you have like twenty screen,
16 like twenty little --

17 SGT. SUESS: It is, but more cameras than
18 that. And again, you're trying -- they don't
19 know where Cruz is at that point necessarily.
20 They know he was at Building 12 at some point.
21 I presume that that's the first camera they
22 would have tried to review not having knowledge
23 he's already fled, and well on the other side
24 of campus. So without having the proper
25 information, you know, my personal assessment,

1 I don't fault them for not being able to find
2 him at that very moment.

3 SEN. BOOK: And you'll cover sort of the
4 question that we talked about yesterday about
5 the delay?

6 SGT. SUESS: Absolutely.

7 SEN. BOOK: Thank you.

8 SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am.

9 CHAIR: And they would have had to bring
10 up different cameras, like you just said, and
11 that's important, is, is you have a wall of
12 screens, but not every camera is on that wall
13 so you have to click and bring up different
14 cameras. And so like Sergeant Suess said he
15 would assume that they might, but that's an
16 assumption, and they're walking into that room
17 so they don't have access, it's just not a wall
18 where you can just look at the whole myriad of
19 every camera that's available and say, okay,
20 I'm going to look at one, two, you got to bring
21 them up, and you got to click on them to bring
22 them up, correct?

23 SGT. SUESS: Right. Yes, sir.

24 CHAIR: Right. Right. So while we're
25 stopped here, and go back, just -- just because

1 this is going to come back again, look at,
2 cause you passed over it, you know, this is --
3 this does come back to that issue about those
4 deputies that are up there on Holmberg, and if
5 you go back to 263, even Officer Fernandez --
6 and those deputies again, were Sergeant Miller,
7 Seward, and Hanks. Those are the ones that,
8 that we saw all those green dots in the
9 animation, they are up there on Holmberg, and
10 Sergeant Miller doesn't move, and that's going
11 to be something that is, we need to refer I
12 believe to Sheriff Israel for further inquiry
13 as to what that situation was, because he
14 didn't transmit. He was the first supervisor
15 on the scene that -- so that is not
16 insignificant, that Fernandez from Coral
17 Springs gets there, bypasses them, are you
18 breaching, they said no, because they're still
19 standing on Holmberg Road, and Sergeant
20 Fernandez then breaches, so that is, that's
21 significant. All right, go ahead.

22 SGT. SUESS: And this is the transmission
23 by Officer Burton.

24 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is
25 played in the open meeting.)

1 SPEAKER: 39 white male, ROTC uniform.

2 DISPATCH: White male, ROTC uniform.

3 SPEAKER: Burgundy shirt.

4 DISPATCH: Burgundy shirt.

5 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and
6 the proceedings continue as follows:)

7 SGT. SUESS: So again Coral Springs has a
8 pretty significant leg up at this point. They
9 have an accurate description of the suspect.
10 This information has not yet been made
11 available to BSO deputies.

12 Shortly thereafter over BSO's main radio
13 channel this transmission takes place between
14 several deputies.

15 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is
16 played in the open meeting.)

17 SPEAKER: We don't know, but we're
18 entering the building, going in the 13
19 building, Building 13, 17 -- myself --

20 SPEAKER: Does anybody have bolt cutters
21 so I can get this kid out of the fence? He's
22 stuck in the fence. I need bolt cutters.

23 SPEAKER: The coach is with him, see if he
24 can help him over the gate.

25 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and

1 the proceedings continue as follows:)

2 SGT. SUESS: So again, deputies, depending
3 on who made this transmission, it's not exactly
4 clear, I'm confident it's Deputy Perry, he
5 would have been, probably made it just through
6 the west gate in the student parking lot at
7 this point. Deputy Marchese and Deputy Kratz,
8 again, are north of the athletic field on
9 Holmberg Road.

10 SEC. KAPUSTA: I have a question.

11 SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am.

12 SEC. KAPUSTA: How did Burton know the
13 description? Where did he get that?

14 SGT. SUESS: Medina. From Andrew Medina.
15 And if you think about Andrew Medina -- there
16 are some students and teachers that saw Cruz
17 inside Building 12, but I mean they're being
18 shot at so their descriptions aren't that
19 accurate, understandably. Andrew Medina is
20 really the only person at that point that knows
21 what the suspect looks like. Deputy Peterson
22 doesn't even know at that point.

23 So seven minutes and thirty-one seconds,
24 you see on the golf cart Andrew Medina drives
25 north on the east side of Building 8 with

1 Officer Burton riding in the passenger seat.
2 Medina would drop Burton off in that general
3 area, and he would later move onto a tree.
4 Again, Cruz is still continuing south on the
5 west side of campus.

6 Now, on the image on the bottom left you
7 see the light pole. You can just barely see,
8 it looks like Deputy Peterson's hand, and arm,
9 and feet sticking beyond that.

10 MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant.

11 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

12 MR. SCHACHTER: Can you tell me what, what
13 time Deputy Burton arrived on campus?

14 SGT. SUESS: Officer Burton, it would have
15 been at that transmission we covered yesterday
16 where he says he's on campus the first time, he
17 acknowledged it was a little early. Off the
18 top of my head I can't tell you, but we can
19 research that.

20 SHER. ASHLEY: I just want to go back to
21 the last comment before that where you said
22 Deputy Peterson did not know at that point who
23 the, what -- Medina drove him to Building 12.
24 Did he not describe who went in the building
25 during that time?

1 SGT. SUESS: I don't know to what extent
2 he did. And again, you've been in the
3 profession much longer than I have, having
4 these people recall exactly what they said
5 during that short period of time, there's going
6 to be conflicting statements. We could
7 re-evaluate their, both of their, well,
8 Medina's interview, and see what he said he
9 told Peterson exactly.

10 SHER. ASHLEY: I'd just be curious. I
11 mean he saw -- he's the one that called the
12 hall monitor and said, hey, you got this kid
13 coming in, a suspicious kid. I'm -- I'm
14 wondering if he gave a description of who that
15 kid was or what he wearing to the hall monitor,
16 and then he goes to get Deputy Peterson, did he
17 give a description of who they were looking for
18 at that point?

19 SGT. SUESS: Off the top of my head I
20 don't recall, Sheriff Ashley, but I'll take a
21 look at Medina's interview and see what he says
22 he told Peterson. Yes, sir.

23 CHAIR: Mr. Schachter, if you look at the
24 timeline that Sergeant Suess provided, and just
25 refer to that, 2:26.54 is when Burton said that

1 he was on the scene, so the answer is in that
2 document that you have.

3 MR. SCHACHTER: I mean that's -- that's
4 pretty -- that's a lot -- that's a long ago.
5 It's five minutes ago. Do we know why he
6 didn't enter the building?

7 SGT. SUESS: I'm sorry, Mr. Schachter.

8 MR. SCHACHTER: Do we -- Officer Burton
9 was there in two minutes. Do we know why he
10 did not enter the building?

11 SGT. SUESS: Officer -- we're going to
12 cover Officer Burton's statement here in just a
13 minute.

14 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay. Okay, thank you.

15 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So this is a lay
16 of the land. 2:29.09 you see Cruz is in
17 between the tennis courts and Building 9. The
18 eight deputies, their approximate location, and
19 then Officer Burton and Andrew Medina just on
20 the northeast corner of Building 8, as Deputy
21 Peterson remains south of the east side of
22 Building 12.

23 So this is Officer Burton's vantage point
24 essentially from the tree, the location in
25 which he took cover. Turning around, so again

1 that tree is, if you're putting yourself in
2 that position, this is turning to the
3 southeast, so turning to Officer Burton's left.
4 So that is the direction from which he arrived
5 on the golf cart with Andrew Medina, turning
6 slightly to the right, just giving you
7 additional views of what he was able to see at
8 that time.

9 So you see the hallway there, that is
10 where Deputy Peterson would have been located,
11 and the position that would have afforded them
12 the opportunity to communicate with one another
13 just by shouting, not, not over the radio.
14 Again, this large chain link fence was not
15 there on February 14th.

16 At seven minutes thirty-eight seconds
17 Officer Burton makes this transmission over the
18 CSPD radio.

19 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is
20 played in the open meeting.)

21 SPEAKER: Juliet39, last seen in the three
22 story building north parking lot.

23 DISPATCH: 10-4, last seen three story
24 building in the north parking lot.

25 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and

1 the proceedings continue as follows:)

2 SGT. SUESS: Again, in review -- in
3 interviewing multiple Coral Springs officers
4 several of them identified this transmission
5 was the only reason they knew where to go.
6 Many of the officers had never been to MSD.
7 They -- they had never been there. They had no
8 idea where any building was.

9 Shortly thereafter, based on GPS records,
10 Officer Harrison arrives in the general area
11 next to deputies Marchese and Kratz, and
12 Officer Fernandez is seen on Pine Island Road
13 near Holmberg Road. You see the note there,
14 the shortest time to refresh on GPS, the GPS
15 records for Coral Springs is thirty seconds.

16 Seven minutes and fifty-two seconds after
17 the first shot Peterson could be seen making
18 hand gestures in the direction of Officer
19 Burton's location. I apologize, that's a type.
20 Officer Burton works for Coral Springs Police
21 Department. Officer Burton said in his
22 interview that Peterson had his firearm drawn,
23 and he was looking east and west. Deputy
24 Peterson told Officer Burton that the shooter
25 may be in the parking lot. Officer Burton

1 stated, quote, I felt it was my job to lock
2 that, referring to the parking lot, down, I was
3 trying to prevent some type of ambush, or if
4 the suspect wanted to try to escape, if he was
5 hiding in the parking lot I'd be right there.

6 So again, we referenced it earlier, the
7 parking lots present a unique tactical
8 challenge in responding to any significant
9 event, certainly an active shooter. It
10 provides ample opportunities for people to hide
11 or be concealed, or of course potentially for
12 vehicles to be used as a weapon.

13 Seven minutes and fifty-five seconds after
14 the first shot Detective Goolsby transmits that
15 a command post needs to be set up on the south
16 side of the Sawgrass Expressway. He identifies
17 that the gate for the student entrance is
18 unlocked, and directs additional units to get
19 onto campus to try and locate the shooter.

20 Seven minutes and fifty-seven, fifty-six
21 seconds after the first shot, you'll see a
22 video here of Deputy Eason. He begins speaking
23 with some civilians on the baseball field. At
24 that time Nikolas Cruz was approaching the
25 group of students, and would shortly thereafter

1 blend into the group.

2 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
3 open meeting.)

4 SPEAKER: You heard all those gunshots?
5 They were probably, sounded like a doz, at
6 least a dozen, at least. That's only when I
7 got here.

8 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
9 continue as follows:)

10 SGT. SUESS: And you'll see in the map on
11 the bottom right corner of the slide Deputy
12 Eason's approximate location. Seven minutes
13 and fifty-seven seconds after the first shot
14 Kelvin Greenleaf let Captain Jordan and
15 Lieutenant DeVita into the east doors of
16 Building 1. Captain Jordan can be seen on
17 video manipulating her radio, and holding her
18 cell phone up to her ear. Lieutenant DeVita
19 exited Building 1 to retrieve his vest and
20 rifle, and you would see Captain Jordan move
21 back and forth between the north and east doors
22 of Building 1.

23 You'll see video here shortly that shows
24 Captain Jordan's movement. Again I'd direct
25 you to the map of Building 1. So you see

1 there's a dotted line going between those two
2 doors. That's essentially the path of travel
3 you'll see Captain Jordan make repeatedly.

4 So we conducted an interview with Captain
5 Jordan. As far as her experience, twenty years
6 with the Fort Lauderdale Police Department, and
7 five years with the Broward County Sheriff's
8 Office. She had a very brief stint with an
9 agency in Colorado as well in between these two
10 agencies. Captain Jordan stated in her
11 interview that radios were spotty on any given
12 day in Parkland, particularly once you got
13 closer to the Everglades. She said the minimum
14 staffing in Parkland is four deputies and one
15 sergeant. During the day you would also have
16 detectives, and possibly other deputies
17 assigned to work, to focus on traffic related
18 issues.

19 MR. SCHACHTER: When you say that radios
20 were spotty on any given day, and we've heard
21 that several times, does that mean they're not
22 able to transmit, does that mean there's
23 throttling? Can you be more specific?

24 SGT. SUESS: The throttling term I'm not
25 exactly sure on. Well, I've heard the phrase

1 used. I'm not a radio expert by any means.
2 But what I can tell you is there are times, and
3 I don't think it's unique to this area, and
4 I've worked for other agencies, but sometimes
5 there's just areas where you don't get good
6 reception. I would have to defer to a radio
7 expert on the why. I really don't know.

8 On February 14th Captain Jordan said that
9 Deputy Kratz had been assigned to work traffic,
10 and that schools typically have radio
11 transmission issues. In my person experience,
12 Detective Bonasoro was an SRO, we've all been
13 to schools, I'm sure many of the commissioners,
14 often times schools do not get good radio
15 reception on your, on the law enforcement
16 radio. They just don't work. It's
17 frustrating, and it presents an officer safety
18 challenge as well. So that's something to
19 consider.

20 Lieutenant DeVita, according to Captain
21 Jordan, notified her of the shooting, and drove
22 her to campus. She said that she attempted to
23 coordinate a response while driving to campus,
24 but she was not able to use her radio. She
25 heard radio traffic about different locations,

1 such as the football field and the north
2 parking lot. Upon arrival to the school she
3 said she began hearing the throttling noise.

4 Once she arrived she believed that the
5 shooting had stopped due to there being no
6 additional radio traffic about shots begin
7 fired. She was concerned if she moved further
8 onto campus it might make the radio problem
9 even worse. She had no recollection of using
10 her cell phone, and when I pointed out to her
11 that we had watched the video, we know she was
12 on her cell phone -- and let me clarify, I
13 don't think she was being deceptive. It's --
14 even for law enforcement officers it's not
15 unusual to not remember certain things in a
16 high stress environment. So we pointed out to
17 her that she had used her cell phone. She
18 speculated that she was likely trying to
19 contact Sergeant Miller.

20 Staff in the front office told her that
21 the shooting was inside Building 12. So this
22 is a video, and you'll see again on that map,
23 of Building 1. In the northeast corner of that
24 building there's a camera, so this is the
25 perspective which we have. I'll play the video

1 for you, there's no audio, and you'll see
2 Captain Jordan's movement. It is at times
3 again sped up, just otherwise this would be a
4 fairly lengthy video.

5 (Thereupon, the video is played in the open meeting,
6 and the proceedings continue as follows:)

7 SGT. SUESS: That's Lieutenant DeVita and
8 Captain Jordan. The gentlemen -- I'm sorry,
9 sir?

10 SHER. ASHLEY: Is the Captain off-duty at
11 that time?

12 SGT. SUESS: No, sir. No, sir, she was at
13 the office. She was on duty that day. I think
14 she's wearing like an agency polo and some BDU
15 type pants. Andrew Medina just came in there
16 in shorts. So at this point Captain Jordan has
17 left Building 1.

18 CHAIR: Okay, John, hold on a second.
19 Just for context, just keep in mind as you're
20 hearing about all these statements that Captain
21 Jordan makes, or anybody else, is that
22 initially after the event there were interviews
23 that were done by BSO in the criminal case.
24 They were your traditional typical tell me what
25 happened type interviews. They weren't probing

1 type interviews from an investigative
2 standpoint as to what people did or didn't do,
3 of this nature that we're doing now.

4 The only other interviews that have been
5 done of all of these people of the nature that
6 we ask questions, and we sat down with Captain
7 Jordan, and we spent some time with her, and we
8 went through all this, the only other interview
9 was by FDLE's Office of Executive
10 Investigations under the governor's executive
11 order, and none of the results of those
12 interviews have been disclosed to anybody.
13 They haven't been disclosed to the Broward
14 County Sheriff's Office, to the School Board,
15 to the Coral Springs Police Department, to
16 anybody.

17 So what you're seeing now, and what you're
18 hearing about now, the Broward County Sheriff's
19 Office, Coral Springs Police Department, and
20 the Broward County School Board has not heard
21 before. So when you think about asking Sheriff
22 Israel, or Superintendent Runcie, or Chief
23 Parry, well, what about these statements,
24 they're unaware of this until after we present
25 it to you, and then we will, as I said, present

1 it to them.

2 So they did not do this type of interview,
3 or this type of inquiry, this type of
4 investigation. They don't have the knowledge
5 that you all have now. I think it's important
6 that you keep that in mind so you understand
7 the context, that these were the first probing
8 interviews, and none of these interviews have
9 been produced, released publicly, anybody
10 provide any knowledge about, other than to what
11 you're seeing right now today at this minute.
12 So it's important to keep that in context I
13 think, is you understand, so if you get some
14 questions this afternoon, and tomorrow morning
15 from Chief Parry, this afternoon from the
16 superintendent and the sheriff, if they say I
17 don't know, I've never heard that before,
18 they're telling you the truth, because they
19 don't know what you know now, and what we have
20 known, okay?

21 So I just want to put, make sure that
22 we're all, we all understand that, because
23 you're probably going to get a lot of -- some
24 -- some of these statements that, that Captain
25 Jordan made to us, and Sheriff Israel is

1 unaware of this.

2 MR. SCHACHTER: Do we -- when you -- when
3 you asked her, you know, why she didn't go
4 towards the building, why she stayed in the
5 office for so long, what, what, how did she
6 respond, and what is the protocol, was she
7 trying to run the scene from there?

8 SGT. SUESS: So, yes, sir, we covered some
9 of those issues with her, and I believe we'll
10 have additional statements from Captain Jordan
11 in the presentation.

12 CHAIR: Let it unfold, John, there's more
13 in there on it. Let's just -- I think the
14 questions -- then if they're not answered then
15 then let them, but there, there's more in here
16 from her.

17 SGT. SUESS: So at eight minutes and nine
18 seconds after the first shot Cruz has reached
19 the group of students fleeing, and blended into
20 the crowd. He continued to travel west with
21 students, and ultimately nearby to the Walmart.
22 Shortly thereafter over the Coral Springs radio
23 channel dispatch advised three people had been
24 shot inside of room 1216 in the freshman
25 building.

1 MR. SCHACHTER: And they knew that how?

2 SGT. SUESS: I'm -- through the 911 calls
3 that Coral Springs had.

4 Shortly thereafter Deputy Chief Backer
5 initiated a SWAT call out for Coral Springs
6 Police Department. At eight minutes and forty-
7 two seconds these are the approximate locations
8 of Officers Harrison, Wilkins, Dougherty,
9 Fernandez, and Whittington. So this is an
10 estimated time at which Sergeant Myers,
11 Sergeant Mazzei, Detective Monzon, and Officer
12 Wilkins arrived on Holmberg Road. This is one
13 of those instances, we have no footage of them
14 arriving on Holmberg Road, but we know where
15 they end up, so it's an estimation of how long,
16 you know, to put your car in park, get out, if
17 you want to retrieve your rifle, run south. So
18 that's where this estimated time comes from.

19 Sergeant Myers stated upon his arrival he
20 saw several people unlocking the west gate.
21 This in all likelihood is Detective Goolsby and
22 Deputy Perry. Sergeant Myers said he ran
23 through the gate, not paying attention to what
24 those deputies did, and he was unable to
25 describe their appearance. So at this time --

1 again these locations are approximation. As
2 you see a lot of the dots have been lined up.
3 That's merely so it's more legible and not as
4 confusing to read. These are the approximate
5 locations of officers and deputies at 2:30.30.

6 Nine minutes and two seconds after the
7 first shot over the Coral Springs radio
8 Detective Monzon stated he was on the north
9 side of the scene by Building 13 with two BSO
10 deputies, and about to move forward. The
11 possible identities of these deputies are
12 Goolsby, Perry, Hanks, or Volpe. Immediately
13 thereafter Deputy Kratz makes this transmission
14 over the BSO radio.

15 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is
16 played in the open meeting.)

17 SPEAKER: If you can hook up with Coral
18 Springs dispatch, I was advised by one of their
19 officers possibly three additional victims in
20 the three story building, possible suspect with
21 an ROTC uniform. If we can hook up with them
22 and verify -- Coral Springs supervisor, advise.

23 SPEAKER: He says also three additional.
24 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and
25 the proceedings continue as follows:)

1 SGT. SUESS: So at nine minutes and fifty-
2 two seconds after the first shot the first
3 transmission by a BSO supervisor or
4 administrator from the Parkland District is
5 made.

6 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is
7 played in the open meeting.)

8 SPEAKER: 17Sierral.

9 DISPATCH: 17Sierral.

10 SPEAKER: I know there's lots going on.
11 Do we have a perimeter set up right now, and
12 everybody is clearing out of the school?

13 DISPATCH: That's negative.

14 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and
15 the proceedings continue as follows:)

16 SGT. SUESS: So at this point Captain
17 Jordan was inside, or in the immediate area of
18 Building 1. So again that, that video played
19 for a few minutes, we're stepping sort of back
20 to the beginning of that video when she would
21 have made this transmission.

22 CHAIR: What time did Sergeant Miller
23 arrive, do you know off --

24 SGT. SUESS: Not off the top of my head,
25 Sheriff, but Detective Lyons is going to get

1 that time for you.

2 CHAIR: And then -- and then -- again, is
3 you're at nine minutes and fifty-two seconds,
4 remember from all this previous video, and you
5 saw from that previous slide, go back to this
6 one, we're going to come back, you're going to
7 see video of Miller and what was going on at
8 Holmberg Road. Go back to that previous slide
9 in 293 and, and Miller, Seward and Hanks
10 sitting up there, and the Coral Springs --
11 they're sitting up there. Miller is the
12 sergeant. He's the Parkland sergeant that's on
13 duty, and there's no transmission, and the
14 first transmission from any supervisor,
15 including Miller, who had been on scene for
16 minutes and minutes, and minutes, the first
17 transmission is not until 2:21.30, which is
18 nine minutes and fifty-two seconds, almost ten
19 minutes into the event.

20 Miller didn't transmit the whole time that
21 all of this is happening, and he was the
22 supervisor on scene, so that's, you know, again
23 - - I keep coming back to it but, and you're
24 going to see in this video, but these are
25 important points of what the investigation has

1 revealed.

2 SHER. ASHLEY: That was Slide 263?

3 CHAIR: Correct. And when you go -- and
4 you go back to -- that's the one that up there
5 on the screen now.

6 MR. SCHACHTER: 290, 63 --

7 CHAIR: What is --

8 SHER. ASHLEY: He said 93, but it's 63.

9 CHAIR: Sixty-three. I'm sorry 260, yeah,
10 it -- it's the one -- it's the one that's up on
11 board now.

12 SHER. ASHLEY: It's 90, 293.

13 CHAIR: Two -- two -- it is 293.

14 SHER. ASHLEY: Go on to 263, and at
15 2:28.50, or seven minutes twelve seconds in,
16 where he says it's like that Sergeant Miller,
17 Deputy Seward, and Hank --

18 SGT. SUESS: Okay. I think Sheriff Ashley
19 is identifying the time in which Miller
20 arrived, and Sheriff Gualtieri, you were
21 referring to --

22 CHAIR: Okay. Okay, go ahead. And what
23 time was that, Sheriff?

24 SHER. ASHLEY: 2:28.50, or seven minutes
25 and twelve seconds.

1 CHAIR: Right, so he's the first
2 supervisor. So he's sitting up there, you
3 know, at that point, and again there's no --
4 and he doesn't transmit yet for a while. So
5 the first supervisor is Jordan, but Miller is
6 already on scene, and you'll see when Miller
7 first transmits, and the first thing Miller
8 does I believe is call for K-9, or helicopters.

9 SGT. SUESS: I believe so.

10 CHAIR: And you can see that. So again --
11 but he's sitting up there, and you'll see on
12 video, you'll see deputies passing him while
13 he's sitting by his car. And you'll see that
14 when the video comes up.

15 MR. PETTY: Question.

16 CHAIR: Go ahead, Mr. Petty.

17 MR. PETTY: I can't remember if we've
18 talked to, if we've talked about an interview
19 with Miller or not yet. Was he having radio
20 trouble?

21 SGT. SUESS: He did reference radio
22 trouble, you know, so the whole throttling
23 issue, there's no, there's no time stamp.
24 There's no way we can identify and say at this
25 second the throttling began. Based off

1 reviewing the radio traffic there's no
2 indication there's radio problems at the time
3 at which he's arrived. I don't -- I don't
4 think there's that many people on the channel
5 at that point to create a problem.

6 MR. SCHACHTER: And -- and for a
7 supervisor or administrator arriving what would
8 be the protocol?

9 SGT. SUESS: In active -- well, so the
10 extremely significant point to remember is that
11 he hears gunshots, contrary to a lot of these
12 other people arriving, so regardless of rank,
13 you know, if, if myself and the Under Sheriff
14 are coming back from lunch and we respond to an
15 active shooter I'm confident he's going to say
16 the fact that I'm Under Sheriff doesn't remove
17 my ability, or my need, my compulsion to go
18 into that building. So rank sort of goes out
19 the window at that point, you need to be going
20 in towards the gunshots.

21 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay.

22 SGT. SUESS: So at nine minutes and fifty-
23 eight seconds after the first shot Sergeant
24 Foti over the Coral Springs radio channel
25 requested that the BSO helicopter respond.

1 MR. PETTY: Sergeant, another --
2 apologies. Another question.

3 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

4 MR. PETTY: Is -- is this protocol for
5 requesting the helicopter at this point?
6 Should this have been done earlier? Do you
7 have any thoughts or comments on that?

8 SGT. SUESS: I think -- this is my
9 opinion, and of course I defer to the persons
10 with much more experience in law enforcement
11 than myself, but it's not an unreasonable
12 request at this point. Again, Coral Springs,
13 while we're ten minutes after the first shot
14 we're maybe six minutes since Coral Springs has
15 been made aware, so in my opinion I don't think
16 that the timing is unreasonable.

17 CHAIR: Go ahead, Sheriff Judd.

18 SHER. JUDD: In my organization the first
19 911 call would have, would have, would have
20 tripped the helicopter. That would have been
21 an initial response unit, just like patrol.

22 MR. PETTY: It would have been helpful in
23 directing traffic, and officers, and --

24 SHER. JUDD: Well, you know, you get in
25 the area, you see a bunch of ants running

1 around, at least if there had been an active
2 shooter moving around you could have seen that.
3 But there's a standard response when -- when we
4 get a call like that it's like flipping the
5 switch on, patrol responds, air responds, our
6 drone units respond, you know, I mean there's a
7 whole team that when that call comes across the
8 radio no one else has to order anything, it's
9 coming.

10 MR. PETTY: It's automatic.

11 SHER. JUDD: Automatic.

12 SGT. SUESS: Ten minutes and one second
13 after the first shot Deputy Peterson says that
14 we are supposed, in supposed lockdown right
15 now, nobody is leaving the school, everybody
16 knows it's a lockdown. So this is in response
17 to Captain Jordan's transmission about
18 evacuating students from the school.

19 Ten minutes and nine seconds after the
20 first shot Officer Burton transmits over the
21 Coral Springs radio that he's on the east part
22 of the three story building in the parking lot
23 with his long gun. An unknown deputy at that
24 point transmits that we might want to consider
25 somebody up on the Sawgrass to the south side

1 of the school. Dispatch says I'll get someone.
2 This is the transmission to which Deputy
3 Stambaugh would later respond, and leave his
4 location on Holmberg Road.

5 Ten minutes and eleven seconds after the
6 first shot Deputy Greetham arrived in the bus
7 loop on the southeast corner of campus. He
8 exited his vehicle and slung his rifle.
9 Approximately four Coral Springs vehicles and
10 law enforcement motorcycle were present. He
11 went into the trunk of his vehicle and put on
12 his vest, and told another deputy to wait with
13 him as he was doing that.

14 Deputy Greetham spent one minute and seven
15 seconds unslinging his rifle, removing his body
16 cam and other equipment, putting on his vest,
17 reattaching the body cam, and again slinging
18 his rifle. And you'll see the video of that.

19 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
20 open meeting.)

21 SPEAKER: Hey -- in here.

22 SPEAKER: All right. You want to hang
23 with me for a second? Let me get dressed.
24 Just watch your hide. They said something
25 about a three story building.

1 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and
2 the proceedings continue as follows:)

3 CHAIR: See, you don't get to not show up
4 for work dressed and say wait and hang with me
5 while I get dressed. Now, there's no gunshots,
6 and Cruz is gone, but they didn't know that at
7 this point. And if you're going to show up for
8 work you need to act. Go ahead.

9 SHER. JUDD: Did -- did he have a vest on
10 under that? Was that a rifle vest, or did he
11 have a regular patrol vest?

12 SGT. SUESS: That's a fair question,
13 Sheriff, and to be honest that's something that
14 hadn't crossed my mind up to this point. I
15 believe, this is based purely off my memory,
16 that Deputy Greetham was working an off-duty
17 detail at that point.

18 SHER. JUDD: I just know a lot of our
19 deputies wear vests all day, and then they have
20 a rifle vest.

21 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

22 CHAIR: Go ahead.

23 SHER. JUDD: And in regards to -- and I
24 guess I can ask Sheriff Israel, do they have
25 ballistic shields, helmets, as a regular piece

1 of equipment, or is it SWAT only?

2 SGT. SUESS: Right. I think Sheriff
3 Israel will be better equipped to answer that.
4 We -- we never see ballistic shields on, on any
5 footage.

6 SHER. JUDD: Thank you.

7 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

8 CHAIR: Go ahead, Senator.

9 SEN. BOOK: Thank you. And I'm not law
10 enforcement, so this is just pure -- would it
11 appear -- it would appear that there's no a
12 tremendous sense of urgency. Yes, you show up,
13 and if you show up not dressed you go, you
14 don't get dressed, you dress while you, you
15 dress while you run, but also it just doesn't
16 appear to be tremendously rapid --

17 CHAIR: You'll see more of that. You'll
18 see more video of that.

19 SEN. BOOK: Is that common? Is that not,
20 in your, the law enforcement officers in the
21 room, I mean --

22 CHAIR: I'd say it depends on the
23 circumstances, you know.

24 SHER. JUDD: It -- it would be my
25 experience that there's a, there's an attempt

1 not to show a lot of emotion in these. It
2 doesn't give excuse for the slowness of the
3 act, but not a lot of emotion is going to be
4 shown in any of them, attempts at calm.

5 SGT. SUESS: Ten minutes and twelve
6 seconds after the first shot -- and as a
7 reminder that video was approximately a minute
8 long so we're stepping back at a little time in
9 the chronology. So from that camera on the
10 northwest corner of Building 13, I pointed out
11 to you earlier this is the one where
12 essentially grown adults look like ants, so you
13 see a group of law enforcement officers. You
14 can't specifically identify who they are, which
15 agency they are from, based solely on the
16 video, however in all likelihood this is
17 Sergeant Mazzei, Sergeant Myers, Detective
18 Monzon, Officer Wilkins and Officer Harrison,
19 all of Coral Springs Police Department, and
20 Deputy Volpe, Deputy Goolsby, or Detective
21 Goolsby, and Deputy Hanks.

22 Ten minutes and nineteen seconds after the
23 first shot Deputy Yurchuck arrived on the south
24 side of the MSD campus. He followed a group of
25 unattended students who was moving west towards

1 Westglades Middle. Deputy Yurchuck explained
2 his concern is if the shooter had attempted to
3 go after this crowd of students they were
4 helpless.

5 Then minutes and twenty-two seconds after
6 the first shot Captain Gallagher tells everyone
7 over the Coral Springs channel that the
8 building they're looking for is the three story
9 building on the northeast corner of campus. At
10 ten minutes and thirty seconds after the first
11 shot, this is when Deputy Eason asks the SRO
12 Deputy India do you have Westglades locked
13 down, and Deputy Stambaugh then says that he
14 will go to the Sawgrass Expressway on the south
15 side of school.

16 So well look at Deputy Stambaugh's
17 response at this point. As those officers are
18 running south towards Building 12 Deputy
19 Stambaugh gets back into his vehicle. He had
20 been on the north side of his vehicle the
21 entire time. He gets into his vehicle and
22 drives west on Holmberg Road. You're going to
23 see in this video, and we've tried to identify
24 some of the law enforcement officers with the
25 red dots moving south towards Building 12, and

1 the yellow circle represent, and you'll see
2 Deputy Stambaugh's vehicle driving west on
3 Holmberg Road.

4 (Thereupon, the video is played in the open meeting,
5 and the proceedings continue as follows:)

6 SGT. SUESS: This is the route that Deputy
7 Stambaugh traveled, west on Holmberg Road,
8 south on Coral Ridge Drive, east on the
9 Sawgrass Expressway to, I believe that's
10 University, off the top of my head, then he had
11 to make a U-turn. Now, he was -- there is no
12 off-ramp, no exit ramp at Pine Island and
13 Sawgrass so he couldn't have exited there. He
14 traveled 3.8 miles, and that took him
15 approximately five minutes and thirty seconds.

16 MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant.

17 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

18 MR. SCHACHTER: Do the cars have any kind
19 of monitoring devices on them to tell us any
20 indication of speed of travel, or anything like
21 that?

22 SGT. SUESS: I do not know. I don't know
23 if their GPS does. I know most in-car camera
24 systems have that ability as far as their GPS,
25 and -- actually I don't think Stambaugh has

1 GPS, so I don't think there would be a
2 mechanism.

3 CHAIR: Sheriff Ashley.

4 SHER. ASHLEY: Just thinking, did any of
5 the deputies or police officers say they had
6 been to this high school prior to this call?

7 SGT. SUESS: Some of them had, yes, sir.

8 SHER. ASHLEY: Do we know how many?

9 SGT. SUESS: No. I couldn't give you a
10 number, no, sir. And there were certain ones
11 that we asked because it was of significant
12 relevance. But, you know, it's worth saying
13 that several of them had from both agencies.
14 The -- I was very surprised the number of law
15 enforcement officers who had kids inside this
16 school, and even inside Building 12 on the day
17 of the shooting was also pretty shocking, so
18 some of them had a great deal of familiarity.

19 SHER. ASHLEY: Thank you.

20 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

21 MR. SCHACHTER: In the training do they
22 ever train at the high schools?

23 SGT. SUESS: I don't know about all their
24 training. I know some agencies do. I know
25 Coral Springs, we recently interviewed Chief

1 Pustizzi, who said that Coral Springs had
2 actually trained at Stoneman Douglas a couple
3 of years ago. It's not uncommon for law
4 enforcement to do that as, as practice though.

5 MS. LARKIN SKINNER: Do you know the -- it
6 looks like a green median, like it might be
7 grass. Is that a ditch that divides the two
8 directions, the lanes? Is it something that
9 could have been crossed by a vehicle, or no?

10 SGT. SUESS: I could not give you a direct
11 answer, ma'am. I'm sorry.

12 MR. SCHACHTER: It's -- it's a median.
13 There is grass there, but yes, they could
14 cross. There are deputies that I do see on, on
15 top of the median at sometimes, I think.

16 CHAIR: Senator Book, go ahead.

17 SEN. BOOK: Thank you through the Chair.
18 At what point do they call a lockdown on
19 Westglades Middle and the elementary schools
20 that are across the street adjacent, not
21 knowing where this active shooter was when does
22 that happen?

23 SGT. SUESS: I couldn't give you a time.
24 I recall, again hundreds of interviews rattling
25 around in my head, but I believe Deputy India,

1 while he was at training, the SRO for
2 Westglades upon learning called the principal
3 at Westglades and told him they needed to go on
4 lockdown.

5 SEN. BOOK: But at no point in time was
6 there a system wide, there is an active shooter
7 here, everyone within X amount of miles are on
8 lockdown. The elementary schools, we don't
9 know if they were contacted, or --

10 SGT. SUESS: I -- I know a lot of schools
11 in that area went on lockdown. Now, whether
12 there's a mechanism through the schools, I am
13 unaware of any. Detective Bonasoro, did you
14 come across that?

15 DET. BONASORO: I'm sorry, what was the
16 question?

17 SGT. SUESS: Did you come across any
18 mechanism by which the schools would notify
19 other schools in the event of a code red?

20 DET. BONASORO: No. No.

21 SGT. SUESS: And within law enforcement
22 it's incumbent upon, you know, if there was an
23 SRO there he would have heard the radio
24 traffic, he would have been on the same channel
25 as Deputy Peterson, so that deputy would have

1 heard it.

2 So ten minutes and forty-four seconds
3 after the first shot Sergeants Mazzei and Myers
4 from Coral Springs Police Department led the
5 response to the west side of Building 12.
6 Sergeant Myers, the gentleman in the back,
7 provided a quote during his interview with us.
8 I made the decision to go in with my handgun.
9 I have an AR-

10 And a rifle in my trunk. The decision to
11 go into my trunk and unsecure the AR-15 in my
12 mind would take too long. I felt like every
13 second mattered, and I made the conscious
14 decision to run in with my handgun instead of
15 arming myself with the rifle, knowing full well
16 that the rifle was one thousand times better
17 than the handgun. I had to make the decision
18 that seconds mattered.

19 So at this point, these are the
20 approximate location --

21 CHAIR: Secretary Carroll, do you have --

22 MR. CARROLL: Where was he from, was
23 that --

24 SGT. SUESS: He's a sergeant with the
25 Coral Springs Police Department. He's in their

1 investigations bureau, or division, and part of
2 their SWAT team.

3 These are the approximate locations of the
4 officers and deputies on campus. At tend
5 minutes and fifty-three seconds after the first
6 shot Officer Burton broadcasted that the
7 suspect was dressed in an ROTC uniform with
8 black pants and a burgundy shirt. So this is
9 the first radio transmission by Sergeant
10 Miller, eleven minutes and four seconds after
11 the first shot. He asked to get the helicopter
12 in the air, and also get some K-9s to his
13 location. Sheriff Ashley, Detective Lyons
14 found the information about Medina, and the
15 quote was, the only conversation I had with
16 Peterson was the description of the kid. So
17 presumably, yes, Deputy Peterson --

18 SHER. ASHLEY: So he did give him a
19 description.

20 SGT. SUESS: I'm sorry?

21 SHER. ASHLEY: So he did give him a
22 description.

23 SGT. SUESS: Based off Andrew Medina's
24 statement, yes, sir. Yes, sir.

25 At eleven minutes and four seconds, so

1 this is simultaneous to that prior slide, the
2 first law enforcement responders enter through
3 Building 12, Sergeants Myers and Mazzei,
4 Detective Monzon, and Officer Wilkins. They
5 encounter Mr. Hixon, is still moving at that
6 point, but was unable to communicate. As I
7 referenced earlier in the animation we're going
8 to start referring to these groups, so this is
9 the Mazzei group. Sergeant Mazzei, more or
10 less between he and Sergeant Myers, led this
11 group for the first initial response we'll say.

12 It's important to note again due to the
13 limited camera coverage must of the response on
14 the west side of Building 12 was not on video.
15 As an example, Detective Monzon was the second
16 person inside Building 12, but does not appear
17 on any exterior video. Deputes Hanks, Volpe,
18 and Goolsby, as well as Officer Harrison, were
19 immediately behind those first officers that
20 entered the building.

21 ASA BARTLETT: I have a question, Mr.
22 Chairman.

23 CHAIR: Commissioner Bartlett, go ahead.

24 ASA BARTLETT: Just out of curiosity, back
25 at seven minute sixteen seconds, and it's Slide

1 265, Coral Springs says that -- I think it was
2 that one. I'm sorry, make -- check -- scratch
3 that. 289, Coral Springs radio main channel,
4 dispatch advised three people shot in room 1216
5 in freshman building. So that's our building,
6 but they don't breach it until now. How do
7 they get that information back then at eight
8 minutes and twenty-six seconds?

9 SGT. SUESS: That would have been from the
10 911 calls going into the Coral Springs call
11 center.

12 ASA BARTLETT: Okay.

13 SEN. BOOK: Can I ask --

14 CHAIR: Senator Book.

15 SEN. BOOK: So I understand, when you say
16 that they encounter Coach Hixon, did -- and I'm
17 trying to just put all the different parts
18 together in my mind. Would they also have seen
19 Coach Feis, or -- they did. So they -- they
20 can see the things like in that back, like that
21 back area?

22 SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am. That area
23 between Buildings 12 and 13, it's very open.
24 You know, when we went there there's a bunch of
25 fences up, and it obscures your view. Prior to

1 this, or at this moment it's, it's very open,
2 you've got a good range of vision. There was
3 immediately, and I, and we'll get to it I
4 believe, but people immediately go to Coach
5 Feis and assess him. Special Agent Massucci,
6 he's going to get a little more into the
7 medical response, but, yes, ma'am, Coach Feis
8 was visible, and evaluated.

9 SEN. BOOK: Thank you.

10 SEN. BOOK: Yes, ma'am.

11 CHAIR: They passed him because they
12 immediately determined he was deceased, and
13 then they went in, and then they pulled Coach
14 Hixon out, put him on the golf cart, and
15 immediately came out. So they bypassed him and
16 went in and pulled Hixon out. Mr. Petty, you
17 had a question?

18 MR. PETTY: That was the --

19 CHAIR: Sheriff Ashley.

20 SHER. ASHLEY: Just for clarification can
21 you tell me, us, how far Holmberg Road is from
22 Building 12? Is that a hundred yards, less
23 than a hundred yards?

24 SGT. SUESS: I think approximately a
25 hundred yards would be pretty accurate. It's a

1 hundred and twenty from the east end of
2 Building 12 to Pine Island. Holmberg is a
3 little closer, so I think a hundred is probably
4 a fair estimate.

5 SHER. ASHLEY: So all the deputies and
6 officers on Holmberg and closer, other than
7 vehicles they have no visual obstruction to
8 Building 12.

9 SGT. SUESS: Again the only thing I would
10 point to in the map as misleading in this
11 sense, but if we put too much on the map then
12 it becomes jumbled, but there are quite a,
13 quite a good number of large trees, and again,
14 the parking lot is full of cars.

15 SHER. ASHLEY: Okay.

16 SGT. SUESS: There is the six foot fence.
17 And I don't believe at that portion of the
18 fence at that time that they had these banners
19 that Deputy Kratz would have encountered by the
20 football field, but we can re-evaluate some
21 footage and --

22 CHAIR: There's -- there's no structures,
23 if that's your question. There's no
24 structures. The only thing would have been
25 trees and cars, and there was nothing on the

1 fences at that time.

2 SHER. ASHLEY: Thank you.

3 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So again a
4 reminder for the approximate range of coverage
5 on February 14th. So we're going to go through
6 a few of these deputies and officers, and their
7 response. So Deputy Hanks, I referred to him
8 earlier. We're going to go through his
9 response. You can see he responded westbound,
10 westbound on Holmberg, exited his vehicle. He
11 would run past Sergeant Miller and Deputy
12 Seward, and then south on campus and to
13 Building 12.

14 Deputy Hanks did not have a body camera,
15 due to being on the Parkland budget. He
16 arrived on Holmberg Road, did not hear
17 gunshots. He saw Sergeant Miller west of him
18 on Holmberg Road. He heard radio transmissions
19 about shots being fired, or injuries near the
20 football field. He had no knowledge of the
21 building numbers. He exited his vehicle and
22 took cover for a few seconds to get his
23 bearings. Shortly, almost immediately
24 thereafter he was joined by an unknown Coral
25 Springs officer behind his vehicle.

1 Deputy Hanks ran west on Holmberg Road
2 past Sergeant Miller, who was at his car.
3 While arriving at Sergeant Miller's location he
4 saw about five officers and a deputy running
5 towards campus. Presumably these individuals
6 are Sergeants Myers and Mazzei, Detective
7 Monzon, Officer Wilkins, Officer Harrison, all
8 from CSPD, and Deputy Volpe.

9 Deputy Volpe arrived on Holmberg Road. He
10 also would have passed Sergeant Miller and
11 Deputy Stambaugh, and then parked near the west
12 gate. He exited his vehicle and ran south to
13 the west doors of Building 12. Deputy Volpe
14 additionally did not have a body camera. He
15 did not hear gunshots. And he parked near the
16 west entrance, west gate. He briefly took
17 cover, and then followed a group of officers
18 and deputies toward Building 12. He described
19 seeing Deputy Perry in the parking lot north of
20 Buildings 12 and 13 doing an over-watch.

21 Officer Harrison, a motorcycle officer,
22 and he was somewhat easier to identify in that
23 camera on Building 13. Motorcycle officers with
24 Coral Springs wear a white shirt, so obviously
25 that stands out from some of the other

1 individuals on campus. But he arrived from the
2 west on Holmberg Road, parked in the, near the
3 west end of the athletic field, got off his
4 motorcycle and ran east, and then went through
5 the west gate.

6 Officer Harrison stated he saw an
7 unidentified deputy stopping traffic. We
8 believe this to be Deputy Kratz. Ran east
9 along the road, and saw another unidentified
10 deputy getting his rifle from his trunk. He
11 continued through the west gate, and then south
12 with other officers. And again this would have
13 been Myers, Mazzei, Monzon, Wilkins, and
14 Deputies Hanks and Volpe. Upon reaching the
15 west doors he escorted a female who was
16 evacuated from Building 12. Again we're moving
17 ahead in the chronology, but we'll get back to
18 that shortly.

19 Officer Harrison took a position on the
20 east side of Building 13 covering the second
21 and third floors. So a lot of these officers
22 and deputies tell us as they're responding they
23 see the bullet holes on the west end of the
24 third floor of Building 12, which it's a safe
25 conclusion at that point that that would

1 present a risk to responding officers.

2 Approximately eleven minutes and nine
3 seconds after the first shot, and this is five
4 seconds earlier when the Mazzei group entered
5 Building 12, you see four additional law
6 enforcement officers walking north on the east
7 side of Buildings 1 and 8. One of them appears
8 to be Sergeant Kozlowski. He's largely
9 identifiable, his position at the agency, he
10 actually wears shorts with his uniform, so he
11 stands out a little more than other officers
12 and deputies. He stated that as he moved north
13 he was directing officers in pairs to take
14 positions at various points of egress in the
15 event that the shooter tried to flee campus.

16 Eleven minutes and sixteen seconds after
17 the first shot Captain Jordan begins to
18 transmit, and is notified by Detective Gonzalez
19 that multiple SWAT units are responding to the
20 scene. Captain Jordan would have still been
21 inside, or in the immediate area of Building 1
22 at this point. And again, we've been at this
23 presentation for several hours between the two
24 days, we're at slide 326, just to drive home
25 the point eleven minutes have passed since the

1 first shot, so I just again want to make that
2 clear.

3 Captain Jordan follows up with a radio
4 transmission.

5 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is
6 played in the open meeting.)

7 SPEAKER: 17Sierral, I want to make sure
8 that we have perimeters set up, and the school
9 -- all the kids are getting out, so we need, we
10 need to shut down around this school -- have a
11 place where we're setting up for all the units
12 coming to the area.

13 DISPATCH: 10-4. They're advising that
14 the school is on lock --

15 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and
16 the proceedings continue as follows:)

17 SGT. SUESS: So in subsequent
18 transmissions Sergeant Miller states that they
19 do not have a command post set up, we have a
20 perimeter around him, and two units, or two
21 teams going in to check right now. Captain
22 Jordan acknowledges that, and asks which way
23 they're going into the school. Sergeant Miller
24 says they're entering from the north side
25 through the parking lot where the students

1 park. A deputy whom we believe to be Perry
2 says we, we've got a team that entered the 900
3 building on the first floor, west side of the
4 900 building.

5 So at this point, approximately twelve
6 minutes and one second after the first shot,
7 Deputy Greetham and a Coral Springs officer
8 approached the southeast corner of Building 1.
9 They would encounter Andrew Medina, and he
10 would remain there with them for an extended
11 period of time.

12 MS. LARKIN SKINNER: Sergeant Miller's
13 statement that a perimeter is around him, that
14 doesn't seem true to me, but I'm a, a lay
15 person, so --

16 SGT. SUESS: No, ma'am, I'm -- I couldn't
17 give you a good reason as to why he said that
18 at that point.

19 CHAIR: Sheriff Ashley.

20 SHER. ASHLEY: On the previous slide, so
21 Captain Jordan is saying we're, kids are
22 evacuating, and then they're saying, no, we're
23 on lockdown, so is there confusion there, or
24 did you find confusion in there, whether they
25 thought they were evacuating or whether they

1 thought they were on lockdown?

2 SGT. SUESS: I -- potentially there may
3 have, Captain Jordan may have not been clear on
4 what the appropriate response was, whether it
5 was to evacuate students or to lock them down.
6 That -- and that -- honestly that's a
7 conclusion based off of these radio
8 transmissions.

9 CHAIR: Commissioner Schachter, go ahead.

10 MR. SCHACHTER: Is -- is she talking,
11 because I think I remember Peterson saying that
12 they were on lockdown; is that correct?

13 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

14 MR. SCHACHTER: And then when Perry is
15 saying about the 900 building is he just
16 confused?

17 SGT. SUESS: Yeah, I believe so, yes, sir.
18 And he said in his interview he thought that
19 the 1200 building used to be called the 900
20 building. I don't know if that -- we confirmed
21 that with Principal Thompson, it's always been
22 the 1200 building. I don't know if the fact
23 that the 1200 building is also referred to as
24 the freshman building, 9th grade, if there's
25 some confusion there, maybe, I don't know.

1 CHAIR: You talk about lockdown, there
2 were hundreds of kids, literally hundreds,
3 maybe more, that were fleeing to the west, so
4 you had, maybe some people were locking down in
5 some places, and there were, but you had a
6 whole bunch that were fleeing and evacuating at
7 the same time, so to say the whole school is on
8 lockdown is not correct, but to say that people
9 had locked down was correct, so had both of the
10 situations going on.

11 SHER. ASHLEY: I'm just -- yes, sir. And
12 I agree. I just was trying to determine if
13 Captain Jordan knew of the two different
14 procedures, or standard operating procedures
15 for dealing with an evacuation versus a lock
16 down.

17 CHAIR: Yeah, well, and you'll see more of
18 that I think as you get into it, and more who
19 had some observations, and you'll see some
20 comments that others made regarding Captain
21 Jordan later in the presentation.

22 ASA BARTLETT: I mean I think in
23 transmissions Peterson says to, that it's in
24 the 1200 slash 900 building, and that's
25 probably where they're picking up the 900

1 building.

2 CHAIR: You're correct, yeah, that's --
3 good point.

4 ASA BARTLETT: So that's -- right.

5 CHAIR: Senator Book.

6 SEN. BOOK: Yes. And I know we've talked
7 about this at length, but in the FSSAT one of
8 the things that they ask is has everything been
9 uploaded, like with the maps and everything.
10 Again, how important those things are for
11 people to be trained on those things, I mean I
12 think we, we talked about the most important
13 piece of information that, you know, cut
14 through a lot of the noise, was the largest
15 three story building, that's the place.

16 CHAIR: You know, and a lot of agencies,
17 and I don't know, and, John, you can answer
18 this if you know, is, is that -- and I believe
19 Coral Springs does, I'm just not sure about
20 BSO, and maybe to some degree they do, is that
21 in most agency's CADs, the computer aided
22 dispatch system, is most of the CADs are
23 preloaded with what we call pre-plans, or
24 diagrams of major structures within the
25 agency's service area, so as an example is that

1 with a click of a button, is that all the
2 deputies can pull up the maps of all the
3 schools, they can pull up all the arenas, they
4 can pull up all the high vulnerability targets,
5 mobile home parks even, and different, and so,
6 you know, a lot of agencies, I wouldn't maybe
7 go as far as to say most, but a lot have that
8 in their CAD system so that somebody who is
9 responding, or when you're on scene, you can
10 click the pre-plan because it's connected to
11 the address and it's bringing up those maps.

12 So that's another way that that is often
13 accomplished, so that you have ready access to
14 current maps. I don't know, and that's
15 something -- do you know?

16 SGT. SUESS: Sheriff Gualtieri, yes, sir,
17 it's -- through the interviews it looks like
18 both BSO and Coral Springs have access to
19 schools on their in car computers.

20 CHAIR: Go ahead.

21 SHER. ASHLEY: Just for the commission's
22 sake, we do a lot of this, but if God forbid we
23 had an active shooter in here today half of
24 this group could not direct law enforcement to
25 where we're at right now, and whether we don't

1 know whether we're on the north side of the
2 building, or the east, or the west, or whether
3 we come in through the VIP, I mean you just go
4 down the list, and most people cannot tell you
5 how to direct help to themselves.

6 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. And that's
7 something we've evaluated, and Chief Lystad,
8 I'm sorry to throw you under the bus, we had a
9 discussion yesterday about, I'm sure every law
10 enforcement officer has experienced this, when
11 you respond to an apartment complex, or a
12 school, and you have an address or a building
13 number, but it's on a placard, you know, one
14 foot square, you, you have no idea where you're
15 going. And that's happened to all of us dozens
16 of times probably, and it is, it delays your
17 response. So it's something to consider
18 potentially as a recommendation about making
19 school buildings clearly identifiable for the
20 first responders.

21 MR. SCHACHTER: And -- and I think that
22 that is a lessons learned after Columbine,
23 after Sandy Hook, after all these massive
24 school shootings, is that they number all the
25 buildings, number all the rooms, and make sure

1 that law enforcement is on the same page, and
2 that they know, and that they train in the
3 school, and so, you know, so there's not this
4 mass confusion. It does not look like that was
5 done here.

6 CHAIR: It's in the recommendations we'll
7 talk about on Friday.

8 SGT. SUESS: Sheriff Ashley, Special Agent
9 Massucci reviewed Peterson's interview of BSO,
10 and he acknowledges getting a description from
11 Andrew Medina on what Cruz was wearing.

12 SHER. ASHLEY: But we don't know that he
13 ever broadcast that.

14 SGT. SUESS: No, sir, correct.

15 CHAIR: It's not -- it's not that we don't
16 know that he ever broadcast that, he did not
17 broadcast it.

18 SHER. ASHLEY: Did not broadcast it.

19 CHAIR: Commissioner Dodd, did you have --

20 MR. DODD: Yeah, I just had a question as
21 far as the timeline goes with the bell
22 schedule. What time again does school dismiss
23 at Stoneman - -

24 SGT. SUESS: 2:40.

25 MR. DODD: At 2:40, so right now we're

1 still, the dismissal bell hasn't gone. But we
2 look back at the 2:29 mark and Cruz is leaving
3 in the group of students, fleeing students
4 that's heading towards the nearby Walmart, so
5 there was a large number of students that were
6 exiting the campus, and yet there were still
7 some students that were going back into the
8 lockdown, correct?

9 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

10 MR. DODD: Okay. And so -- and then
11 Captain Jordan discusses, or mentions all the
12 kids are getting out. My question is was there
13 an alarm - - when did that alarm get -- when
14 did the alarm stop?

15 SGT. SUESS: The fire alarm?

16 MR. DODD: Yeah, the fire alarm, do we --

17 SGT. SUESS: We -- Detective Lyons, he'll
18 -- Chris, if you would just review the
19 chronology and identify that time please.

20 MR. DODD: Was -- was that -- were we
21 already past the, the alarm had already been
22 cut off at the 2:33 mark, or eleven minutes
23 after?

24 SGT. SUESS: I'm quite certain it has, but
25 we'll get you a definitive answer.

1 MR. DODD: It's -- okay.

2 CHAIR: Go ahead, John.

3 SGT. SUESS: So twelve minutes and five
4 seconds after the first shot Detective Monzon
5 and Officer Wilkins pull Mr. Hixon towards the
6 west doors on the first floor. So it's been
7 twelve minutes and five seconds since the first
8 shots were fired when the first wounded victim
9 is evacuated from Building 12. Officers and
10 deputies worked together to load Mr. Hixon onto
11 the rear of a golf cart.

12 Seconds later officers approached Officer
13 Burton's location on the north side of Building
14 8 from the east. These individuals include
15 Sergeant Kozlowski and Officer Best. Twelve
16 minutes and thirty-three seconds after the
17 first shot Officer Burton, I'm sorry, Officer
18 Best runs southwest towards Deputy Peterson's
19 location. Officer Burton asks Deputy Peterson,
20 hey, brother, what do we got, Deputy Peterson
21 responds shots fired, the shooter is on the
22 second or third floor. Officer Burton yelled
23 this to Sergeant Kozlowski. Sergeant Kozlowski
24 said he did not hear this.

25 I want to point out that does not lead us

1 to believe that Officer Best is lying. I think
2 it's safe to assume just because Sergeant
3 Kozlowski didn't mean it, or didn't hear it, it
4 doesn't mean Officer Best didn't say it.

5 So you see the image of Sergeant Kozlowski
6 walking north in the general direction of
7 Officer Burton, and Officer Best running south
8 towards Deputy Peterson. Twelve minutes and
9 forty seconds after the first shot Lieutenant
10 O'Neill transmits that he's going to set up a
11 staging area beneath the Sawgrass Expressway.
12 Sergeant Miller identifies that there's a park
13 south of that, but he is pinned in where the
14 cars are, and is unable to move from his
15 location. Captain Jordan directs that units
16 stage on the south side of the Sawgrass, and
17 that we will move in from the south. She
18 directs all units to set up there.

19 After pulling Mr. Hixon out of the west
20 doors from, out of the west doors, Detective
21 Monzon from Coral Springs returns inside
22 Building 12, and Deputy Hanks follows him
23 inside. Deputy Hanks is the first Broward
24 Sheriff's Office deputy to enter Building 12.
25 It's a minute and forty-five seconds after

1 Coral Springs entered. I do want to reiterate
2 again that there were several deputies just
3 outside of that door, and they were assisting
4 officers with Mr. Hixon and Coach Feis.

5 Thirteen minutes and nine seconds after
6 the first shot Captain Brad Mock arrived on the
7 north side of Building 8 near Officer Burton
8 and Sergeant Kozlowski. Captain Mock is the
9 SWAT commander for Coral Springs PD. I'll go
10 ahead and point this out now. So Captain Mock
11 was pretty easy to identify. He's wearing a
12 white shirt. He was in plain clothes that day,
13 but had put on a tactical vest.

14 So in the first reviews of this video,
15 obviously I know who none of these people are,
16 which agency they work for, it was very evident,
17 particularly inside Building 12, that Captain
18 Mock essentially was running that, was running
19 the show, he was directing that group, and so
20 you will see as this progresses the Mock group
21 forms, and he's integral in working with BSO to
22 coordinate the response.

23 At approximately 2:35 Officers
24 Whittington, Dittman, Carvalho, and Fernandez,
25 have all arrived on Holmberg Road and

1 approached the east gate. The gate was locked,
2 but Officer Whittington kept bolt cutters in
3 his car, and used those to unlock the gate.
4 These officers moved south toward the east side
5 of Building 12. Deputies Carbocci and Johnson
6 arrived sometimes around this same time. And
7 again this estimate time of 2:35, we don't have
8 video of them arriving, but we know at what
9 time they get to Building 12, so it's just
10 estimating how much time it would take them to
11 get there.

12 So this is the gate. This is what we
13 refer to as the east gate. It's just
14 happenstance, obviously this photo was taken
15 after the shooting, that there's a, a BSO car
16 there. But this is east gate through which
17 Officer Whittington would have cut the lock,
18 and officers moved south. This map illustrates
19 their approximate path of travel.

20 Officer Whittington stated that upon his
21 arrival he saw deputies taking cover on the
22 north side of their cars. One of them was a
23 sergeant, who it is safe to say was Sergeant
24 Miller. He saw two deputies, Officer
25 Whittington stated that one of these deputies

1 may have been Deputy Van Der Eems, who then
2 quickly followed Coral Springs inside. We do
3 know that Deputy Van Der Eems was on the, sort
4 of the initial wave of response on the east
5 side of Building 12.

6 Officer Whittington is one of those
7 officers who commented on Officer Burton, about
8 his radio transmission being the only way he
9 knew where to go. Thirteen minutes and
10 twenty-five seconds after the first shot over
11 the BSO radio the dispatcher states that they
12 received information from Coral Springs that
13 the shooter is on the north side of the parking
14 lot. They don't have a description of the
15 suspect, but said this call was made
16 approximately three to five minutes earlier.

17 Thirteen minutes and thirty seconds after
18 the first shot Deputy Hanks entered the first
19 floor office, and he was followed by Detective
20 Monzon. They located an uninjured adult
21 female, and evacuated her. She was turned over
22 to Officer Harrison, who escorted her to the
23 northwest. Officer Harrison later returned to
24 the east side of Building 13. So Officer
25 Harrison would take up a position -- I think

1 it's too bright. But he would go to the east
2 side of Building 13 and again cover the second
3 and third floors with his rifle.

4 One of the commissioners asked earlier,
5 and Detective Lyons located, so the fire alarms
6 began shutting down at 2:22.57, so only a
7 minute and nineteen seconds after the first
8 shot, Commissioner Petty. I believe that was
9 you, sir. That's on Slide 108.

10 Thirteen minutes and forty seconds after
11 the first shot Officer Schmidt transmits over
12 the Coral Springs radio that BSO had a team
13 enter the first floor. Over approximately the
14 next one and a half minutes there would be
15 additional transmissions from Deputy Chief
16 Parry of Coral Springs, and Captain Mock of
17 Coral Springs, trying to determine whether BSO
18 has entered Building 12. This was, was Captain
19 Mock was on the east side of Building 12, and
20 it likely caused a slight delay in entering
21 Building 12 in an attempt to avoid a friendly
22 fire situation.

23 At thirteen minutes and forty nine seconds
24 after the first shot Officer Wilkins and Deputy
25 Volpe drive Mr. Hixon north on a golf cart

1 toward Holmberg Road, and later turned him over
2 to emergency medical personnel at the triage
3 area. Shortly thereafter Deputy Chief Backer
4 was seen on the body camera of a deputy near
5 the bus loop on the southeast corner of campus.
6 Deputy Chief's Backer and Parry, along with
7 Captain Soberon, would have arrived shortly
8 before this point.

9 So in interviews with Captain Soberon he
10 stated that he arrived on Pine Island Road with
11 Deputy Chiefs Backer and Parry, all of the
12 Coral Springs Police Department. When they
13 advanced towards Building 1, the Deputy Chiefs
14 that is, he remained on Pine Island Road trying
15 to locate, and would eventually go on to
16 establish command operations. Captain Soberon
17 stated he asked a BSO Lieutenant where the
18 command post was located, but he did not know.

19 Approximately fourteen minutes and twenty-
20 two seconds after the first shot about eighteen
21 law enforcement officers from the south and
22 north would converge on the east doors of
23 Building 12, and they would filter inside the
24 building over the next two minutes. It's
25 important to note that even after this takes

1 place Deputy Peterson remains on the northeast
2 corner of Building 7.

3 This group included approximately fourteen
4 Coral Springs officers, included Captains Mock
5 and Gallagher, and approximately four BSO
6 deputies. This is the group we will refer to
7 as the Mock group. So on this slide you see at
8 this time the approximate location of both the
9 Mazzei and Mock group. Both groups are
10 comprised of Coral Springs officers and BSO
11 deputies. At this point it is still very much
12 a predominantly Coral Springs dominant
13 response, which can in my opinion be largely
14 attributed to proximity.

15 Fourteen minutes and twenty-eight seconds
16 after the first shot within Deputy Greetham's
17 group there was discussion about whether they
18 should advance or hold their position. An
19 unidentified person says, on the body camera,
20 is there no active shooting going on, and that
21 SWAT is on their way, so there is no need for
22 them to rush in. Deputy Greetham stated he's
23 bunkered somewhere.

24 Fourteen minutes and twenty-eight seconds
25 after the first shot Lieutenant O'Neill as he's

1 responding to the scene directs responding
2 units to shut down northbound traffic on Coral
3 Springs Drive, and that will be used as a
4 staging area. So again I'd like to remind you
5 sort of these lessons learned from the Fort
6 Lauderdale Airport shooting, was the staging
7 issue, so Lieutenant O'Neill very much focuses
8 on that, and you will see some of his actions
9 shortly.

10 Fourteen minutes and thirty-two seconds
11 after the first shot Sergeant Mazzei waves his
12 hand towards the east after realizing officers
13 and deputies were entering the east doors.
14 This was the first of potentially multiple
15 friendly fire situations. Sergeant Mazzei said
16 that he told the Mock group that they would
17 move to the second floor, and then the Mock
18 group would continue to search the first floor.

19 Fourteen minutes and thirty-nine seconds
20 after the first shot Detective Johnson from the
21 Broward Sheriff's Office, his body cam began
22 recording as he was getting his rifle and thigh
23 holster. I want to point out it appears
24 Detective Johnson was in a plain clothes unit,
25 so the delay on his part to gather his

1 equipment I think is more, more readily, and
2 more easily explained than perhaps some patrol
3 officers and deputies. While leaving his car
4 he sees a subject who by all accounts appears
5 to be Sergeant Miller standing north of his
6 vehicle on Holmberg Road. You'll see that
7 image shortly.

8 Fourteen minutes and fifty-four seconds
9 after the first shot Lieutenant McCoy, so he's
10 the SWAT executive officer, the number two in
11 command of the SWAT team at that point, tells
12 Captain Jordan that the entire team is coming
13 towards the campus. Captain Jordan at this
14 point was inside, or in the immediate area of
15 Building 1.

16 Fifteen minutes and eight seconds after
17 the first shot, this is the image from
18 Detective Johnson's body cam with Sergeant
19 Miller standing behind his vehicle. Again, the
20 still image, it's difficult to see, but in
21 watching the video it is very clearly a
22 sergeant, and all evidence indicates it's
23 Sergeant Miller. Four seconds later Detective
24 Johnson continued south on, I'm sorry, from
25 Holmberg Road through the east gate.

1 He was followed by Detective Valdes. They
2 met up with Deputies Carbocci and Seward on the
3 east side of Building 12, and all went on to
4 join the Mock group. Four seconds after that
5 Lieutenant DeVita ran toward the main gates in
6 between Buildings 1 and 8, and let multiple law
7 enforcement officers, and including Sergeants
8 DeRosa and Detective Schroy. This group
9 advanced west onto campus, and went on to check
10 on students inside the auditorium, Building 8.

11 Fifteen minutes and thirty-seven seconds
12 after the first shot the Mazzei group began to
13 advance up the west stairwell toward the second
14 floor. This included eight Coral Springs
15 officers and Deputy Hanks. This is the point
16 in which Captain Jordan exited Building 1. She
17 went out the east doors, and went to the
18 administration parking lot. She spent seven
19 minutes and thirty-six seconds inside Building
20 1.

21 So approximately fifteen minutes and
22 fifty- five seconds after the first shot
23 Captain Gallagher was directing Deputy Seward
24 on the east side of Building 12 to start using
25 his radio on the BSO channels to start securing

1 other buildings on campus. Two subjects,
2 presumably Deputy Peterson and Officer Best,
3 could be seen standing in between Buildings 7
4 and 8. You could hear a BSO radio throttling
5 several times at this point.

6 Sixteen minutes and four seconds after the
7 first shot Captain Jordan meets up with
8 Sergeant Sklar in the administration parking
9 lot just east of Buildings 1 and 8. So Captain
10 Jordan stated that she left Building 1 due to
11 hearing information about the shooting taking
12 place at Building 12 and the football field,
13 and additional traffic about the north parking
14 lot. She attempted to use Sergeant Sklar's
15 portable and in-car radios, but they would not
16 work. Captain Jordan directed Sergeant Sklar
17 to take her to the north side of campus, and he
18 did so. Sergeant Sklar corroborated Captain
19 Jordan's statements about the attempts to use
20 his radio, and the fact that they were not
21 operating.

22 Captain Jordan stated that she saw
23 vehicles on Holmberg Road, but could not recall
24 seeing any officers or deputies. So this is an
25 image of the Mock group as they have made it in

1 the east doors of Building 12 and have begun to
2 approach the alcove for Classrooms 1216 and
3 1217. Officer Carvalho from SC is standing at
4 the doorway to 1218.

5 At sixteen minutes and thirty-three
6 seconds after the first shot Lieutenant O'Neill
7 arrived beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. So if
8 you remember from very early on that image that
9 identified the staging area beneath the
10 Sawgrass Expressway at Pine Island Road, or
11 Coral Springs Drive. Lieutenant O'Neill was
12 the shift commander for the North Lauderdale
13 District at that time. He was the first BSO
14 supervisor to transmit on 8Alpha when he
15 directed the crime suppression team and motor
16 units to respond. You'll see some of his
17 transmissions that he made as he was responding
18 to the scene.

19 Lieutenant O'Neill would go on to work
20 feverishly to clear Pine Island Road of
21 vehicles, and keep parents south of the
22 Sawgrass Expressway. In an interview with
23 Lieutenant O'Neill he said from his perspective
24 that the focus of operations appeared to be on
25 victim rescue, and not the active killer

1 response. He heard radio traffic about a
2 command post being north of the MSD campus. He
3 recalled hearing Captain Jordan over the radio,
4 and he assumed that she would be the incident
5 commander due to this occurring within her
6 district.

7 He described the initial command structure
8 as being ineffective and, quote, not engaged
9 with the problem, end quote. He said Captain
10 Jordan appeared to have a, quote, dreamlike,
11 end quote, nature to her speech. He heard
12 multiple deputies on the radio immediately, but
13 they were focused on the problem immediately in
14 front of them and not the cause of the problem.

15 CHAIR: Senator Book.

16 SEN. BOOK: Thank you, Mr. Chair. When
17 you -- when he says dream like nature to her
18 speech, like what, what does that mean? What
19 did you interpret that to mean, like --

20 SGT. SUESS: So the -- I believe another
21 phrase he used was trance like perhaps, and
22 it's just again, he was referencing the idea,
23 he did not think that she was responding to the
24 actual problem at hand. She -- I think the not
25 engaged with the problem is a pretty accurate

1 description of what I perceived Lieutenant
2 O'Neill to mean.

3 SEN. BOOK: Thank you.

4 SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am. Lieutenant
5 O'Neill went on to say that they had learned
6 from the airport shooting staging, staging,
7 staging, and identified that the critical
8 incident will end very soon. Lieutenant
9 O'Neill said that he was trying to prevent
10 self-dispatching and over congestion of the
11 scene. It was not clear to him exactly where
12 the command post was located. He said that he
13 went on to work with other agencies to
14 coordinate the reunification of students and
15 parents.

16 He described a Coconut Creek captain as
17 being heavily involved. This likely was just a
18 misnomer, and a reference to Deputy Chief Lees
19 from a Coconut Creek Police Department, and you
20 will hear more about him shortly.

21 MR. SCHACHTER: Can -- can you elaborate
22 on Lieutenant O'Neill's comment that the at the
23 airport shooting they learned staging, staging,
24 staging? Does that mean that you, you wait and
25 you stage before you go in?

1 SGT. SUESS: So again it's very, as we
2 were talking about with Senator Book's question
3 yesterday the response is usually very fluid.
4 The -- the main driving force in an active
5 shooter response -- and let me say I'm not an
6 active shooter response expert, I could tell
7 you anything about this case really, but as far
8 as tactics, as far as what I know my
9 responsibility to be, if you hear gunshots you
10 go to the gunshots. When they stop if you
11 don't know where the shooter is you're going to
12 slow down. So you absolutely have to get to
13 the scene as soon as possible, but at some
14 point there reaches a, there does reach a point
15 where there are too many cooks in the kitchen,
16 so to speak, and if there are too many officers
17 or deputies there that presents challenges on
18 its own as well.

19 We're going to go through some more
20 statements by Lieutenant O'Neill, and show some
21 images, and I'm sure the commission will come
22 to their conclusions.

23 MR. SCHACHTER: Can you just give me a
24 definition of staging; what does that mean?

25 SGT. SUESS: So essentially, getting back

1 to that point, you don't want too many people
2 there at any one point, so once as the incident
3 commander you have enough resources addressing
4 the immediate threat, then you're going to have
5 some other areas park, or stage, or just wait.
6 It's sort of like a lobby, basically wait in
7 the lobby until we need you, and then we'll
8 call you in.

9 MR. SCHACHTER: Thank you.

10 MS. LARKIN SKINNER: Can you tell me what
11 a crime suppression team is?

12 SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am. So as best I can
13 tell it appears to, and I got different
14 descriptions from different people, but it
15 appears to be auxiliary training that some
16 detectives receive, and they have a pretty
17 fluid role within the agency, for example I
18 think in Parkland one of the sergeants
19 explained that if there's a narcotics issue
20 they'll go address that. If there's, you know,
21 there's a burglary spree happening overnight,
22 they may go work overnight and address that.

23 They wear more tactical type clothes, so
24 they may to other people look like a SWAT team
25 member, and they drive unmarked vehicles, is my

1 understanding. I'm sure Sheriff Israel could
2 probably give you a very detailed --

3 CHAIR: It sounds like a street crimes
4 unit, some people would call it that.

5 SGT. SUESS: More or less, yes, sir.

6 CHAIR: So everybody, it's a utility --
7 everybody's got them, and everybody calls them
8 something different, but it's just people you
9 use to deal with problems in essence.

10 MS. LARKIN SKINNER: So it's like a
11 multipurpose team.

12 CHAIR: Yes. Right.

13 SHER. JUDD: You relieve them from
14 answering calls for service, and you track your
15 data, and the data says this is a hot spot, and
16 this is the kind of crimes that are permeating
17 the area, and these folks come in with that
18 data based upon intelligence, based upon your,
19 your analysts, and then the attack those issues
20 in those areas, and are not burdened with the
21 regular demand for service.

22 SGT. SUESS: So continuing with Lieutenant
23 O'Neill, he stated that the most recent version
24 of active shooter training was focused more on
25 the rescue task force concept, and not active

1 shooter response. But he did say there were
2 some active shooter instruction and drills.
3 And so again just a quick reminder, the rescue
4 task force is paramedics, not SWAT medics but
5 paramedics, joining up with law enforcement
6 officers going into a warm zone, not a hot zone
7 where there are active threats. He believed
8 the recent rescue task force training was the
9 first time that it was mandatory.

10 Prior active shooter training was
11 voluntary, and it was typically the same
12 deputies who would choose to go to the
13 training. He described SRO supervisor's
14 contact with their SROs as, quote, slim to
15 none. He expressed a concern about deputies
16 being in specialized units for too long, which
17 may cause law enforcement skills to atrophy.

18 Sixteen minutes and thirty-seven seconds
19 after the first shot Sergeant Rossman and
20 Deputy Chief Backer joined the Greetham group
21 on the southeast corner of Building 1. So from
22 this point forward you will see Sergeant
23 Rossman quite a bit. You'll see him on Deputy
24 Greetham's camera, and you will see Sergeant
25 Rossman's actions from his own camera, and some

1 of the audio from his camera proved to be
2 pivotal in the evaluation.

3 Sixteen minutes and forty-eight seconds
4 the Mazzei group has begun to reach the second
5 floor landing on the west end of Building 12.
6 So again, at this point the first, the Mock
7 group is on the first floor moving west, and
8 the Mazzei group is moving up the west stairs.

9 MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant, can you -- in
10 reference to Lieutenant O'Neill's comments that
11 prior active shooter training was voluntary,
12 and typically the same deputies would choose to
13 go to the same training, how is that consistent
14 with the training that we heard, how do you
15 reconcile that?

16 SGT. SUESS: So part of the -- it was --
17 it was confusing for us. Some of the deputies,
18 we would ask them about active shooter
19 training, and they said, well, we haven't been
20 to it, but we've been to rescue task force
21 training. And then some people would explain
22 how, well, there also were some active shooter
23 drills. Others would say, well, it was really
24 just focused on the rescue task force, or
25 providing emergency medical care.

1 You know, I mean BSO has provided us with
2 the numbers of the people they've put through
3 training. I think then the question for the
4 commission to consider potentially is how
5 effective is the training. I'm not saying it's
6 effective or ineffective, I think that's just
7 something potentially the commission can
8 consider.

9 CHAIR: And we heard, heard some of it
10 previously too, is they were signed up by their
11 district commanders, so that was some of it,
12 where the district commanders are signing them
13 up, and so you had -- remember you had some
14 pretty significant numbers that went, and again
15 this is just one person's view of it, and there
16 are different views that different people have.
17 So this is just one lieutenant's view.

18 We're just reporting what he said, but,
19 you know, you know, you get -- you go back to
20 -- there's no question that this your, and when
21 he's talking about recent here, and when he
22 says in here, you know, what, what's happening
23 now, he's talking about 2018, in, you know,
24 2018, is I told you that they have put, they
25 combined their rescue task force and their

1 active assailant drill into an eight hour
2 block, and they put twelve hundred people
3 through in 2018, so it's different.

4 And previously it was two separate blocks,
5 it was RTF, rescue task force, it was active
6 assailant, and people would sign up to go, or
7 they were assigned by their district
8 commanders. So there was definitely a
9 heightened emphasis on it this year than what
10 it was previously, but they still got a whole
11 bunch of people through.

12 ASA BARLETT: Question. So when the
13 Mazzei group and the other group come in, and
14 they're coming from opposing sides, anybody
15 that's BSO still cannot talk to Coral Springs
16 at all.

17 CHAIR: Right. So when the -- the west
18 group came in, and the west group went in
19 first, and then the east group went in second,
20 and then that's where, you know, they, they
21 started having the hand contact with each
22 other, because that's right, at that point
23 there was no communication at all between, the
24 Coral Springs people and the Broward Sheriff's
25 Office people could not communicate. And then

1 you'll see here as we get into some more
2 slides, we're going to take a break here in a
3 minute and then come back, but you'll see that,
4 you'll see a lot of evidence of the radio
5 throttling, so then on top of all of that the
6 Broward people couldn't communicate among
7 themselves either, which led to the use of the
8 runners, and more use of the hand signals to
9 communicate.

10 ASA BARTLETT: That's a very bad
11 situation, because everybody's got their finger
12 on the trigger.

13 CHAIR: That was a very bad situation,
14 yeah. Let's get through a few more, John, then
15 we'll take a break.

16 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. Almost seventeen
17 minutes after the first shot Detective Johnson
18 pulled Martin Duque from the east doors of, I'm
19 sorry, from the doors of Classrooms 1214 and
20 15, and out of the east doors of Building 12.
21 Simultaneously officers pulled Luke Hoyer and
22 Gina Montalto from the doorway into the hall.

23 Seventeen minutes and sixteen seconds
24 after the first shot Chief Pustizzi from Coral
25 Springs Police Department ran north from the

1 Sawgrass Expressway toward the southeast corner
2 of Marjory Stoneman Douglas. So in an
3 interview with Chief Pustizzi he said after his
4 arrival he saw some of his officers stopping
5 traffic, and others running towards campus. He
6 had a level of familiarity due to the SWAT team
7 having trained at MSD previously. He made
8 contact with Captain Soberon, and attempted to
9 locate the command post. He learned from
10 Captain Soberon that multiple officers were
11 handling the tactical response. Chief Pustizzi
12 directed that a command post be established,
13 and was unaware that BSO had an incident
14 commander at that time.

15 Shortly thereafter Lieutenant Feeley would
16 be seen at the southeast corner of Building 1
17 with the Greetham group. Within approximately
18 the next ten minutes he returned beneath the
19 Sawgrass Expressway with Deputy Chief Parry.
20 Lieutenant Feeley stated that he was briefly on
21 the Southeast corner of Building 1. He saw
22 Deputy Chief Parry there, and ended up
23 returning to the Sawgrass Expressway to try and
24 locate a command post.

25 He heard Captain Jordan on the radio, and

1 assumed that she would be the incident
2 commander. Lieutenant Feeley did not
3 experience any problems with his radio. He was
4 directed by Sergeant Kallman to go south of the
5 Sawgrass Expressway to oversee the staging
6 area. He described seeing Sergeant Miller
7 beneath the Sawgrass, but did not recall
8 Sergeant Miller giving him any information
9 about operations on campus.

10 Again we're jumping ahead with Lieutenant
11 Feeley's statement. Sergeant Miller at this
12 point in the chronology is still on Holmberg
13 Road. As it pertains to training Lieutenant
14 Feeley stated he recalled attending two recent
15 active shooter training classes, but believed
16 they were both elective courses for select
17 individuals.

18 Seventeen minutes and twenty-two seconds
19 after the first shots as deputies are carrying
20 Martin Duque north from the east side of
21 Building Deputy Valdes provided cover by
22 pointing his rifle towards the second and third
23 floors. Deputy Valdes made approximately six
24 to eight attempts to transmit on his radio
25 prior to being successful. You'll see a video

1 of this shortly. Eventually multiple officers
2 and deputies were able to load Martin Duque
3 onto the rear of a golf cart and he was taken
4 to the triage site.

5 This is from deputy, or I believe he may
6 be a detective, Valdes's body cam.

7 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
8 open meeting.)

9 SPEAKER: All right, I got cover. You
10 going to take him all the way out?

11 SPEAKER: Grab his arm, grab his arms.
12 Ready? Go. Go. Go.

13 SPEAKER: 541, I'm going in -- where do
14 you want --

15 SPEAKER: Bring me some cover. Cover me.

16 SPEAKER: Ready? Go ahead. Go ahead. Go
17 ahead.

18 SPEAKER: Yankee4, we're coming out with
19 one to fire rescue, one injured person, he's
20 shot.

21 DISPATCH: Yankee451 with one victim.

22 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
23 continue as follows:)

24 SGT. SUESS: So you can barely see it, but
25 on the sidewalk a little further down, that's

1 the golf cart where at this point I believe
2 it's an officer and a deputy are both on there,
3 and they are more or less serving as a, as a
4 transport, as an ambulance getting victims to
5 the triage site.

6 At seventeen minutes and thirty-six
7 seconds after the first shot Deputy Chief
8 Backer says if I can get on the radio I'm going
9 to ask for the patch. Both Deputy Chief Backer
10 and Sergeant Rossman appear to have difficulty
11 transmitting on their radios. I would like to
12 point out consistently Coral Springs did not
13 experience problems with their radios. What
14 almost certainly happened, and is not unusual
15 in any, even if you're responding to a bank
16 robbery or a shooting less significant than
17 this, a lot of people are trying to transmit at
18 the same time, so if two officers or deputies
19 try to key up at the same time your radio won't
20 work. That could possibly explain the issue
21 Deputy Chief Backer experienced at that point.

22 Approximately eighteen minutes and twenty
23 seconds after the first shot the Mazzei group
24 entered the west end of the second floor hall.
25 Some officers remained in the stairwell to

1 cover the stairs. So essentially they're,
2 you've got to have somebody watching those
3 stairs. Again, they have every reason to
4 believe the shooter is still inside the
5 building, so in possible anticipation that he
6 may come down from the third floor, they don't
7 want to be approached from behind.

8 This is the estimated time at which
9 Captain Jordan and Sergeant Sklar would have
10 arrived north of Building 13. Sergeant Sklar
11 transmits that we are on scene, and asks where
12 the shooter was last seen.

13 MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant, why didn't
14 Captain Jordan just run over? Why did she get
15 in, take the car?

16 SGT. SUESS: I didn't ask her that
17 question specifically. What I can tell you
18 though is at the point she asked Sergeant Sklar
19 she was right next to his car. I think it's
20 safe to assume that's probably the quickest
21 way.

22 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay. Okay.

23 SGT. SUESS: Sergeant Miller she knew was
24 on Holmberg Road. And again, this is an
25 extraordinarily chaotic situation. I'm not --

1 I'm not trying to say the response was proper
2 or improper, but these decisions are being made
3 instantaneously.

4 So Captain Jordan said that after moving
5 south from the west gate on Holmberg she met
6 with Deputy Perry and Goolsby behind the car on
7 the north side of Building 13. Based off what
8 we know it's unlikely that Detective Goolsby
9 was still by that car. Deputy Perry pointed
10 out Coach Feis to her, and said that teams were
11 inside Building 12. Captain Jordan said she
12 also saw the bullet holes on the west end of
13 Building 12.

14 She said that she continued to have radio
15 problems, and used Deputy Perry's radio, which
16 was also ineffective. She had no recollection
17 of other deputies joining her. You will see
18 later in the presentation that several deputies
19 would join her behind that vehicle. Captain
20 Robinson arrived as she was pulling out her
21 cell phone to call the communications center to
22 try and address the radio problems. It's
23 important to note that Captain Robinson would
24 arrive approximately twenty minutes after
25 Captain Jordan would get behind the car.

1 Captain Robinson, I don't think he's been
2 introduced, he's the SWAT commander for BSO.
3 You will hear more about him shortly after.

4 Eighteen minutes and thirty-two seconds
5 after the first shot Deputy Chief Parry tells
6 the Greetham group, so he has joined that
7 group, that the scene is on the northeast
8 corner of campus, and it's a three story
9 building. He cautioned everyone that they
10 still do not know where the shooter is, and
11 they need to watch behind them.

12 SEC. KAPUSTA: Because I believe in a
13 prior slide BSO transmitted that the, the
14 suspect was on the north side parking lot, and
15 that they had received this information from
16 Coral Springs three to five minutes ago, and
17 here we are much later in the process and they
18 are still saying they don't know where the
19 shooter is --

20 SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am, so --

21 SEC. KAPUSTA: -- and I haven't seen any
22 evidence that they're going after the shooter.

23 SGT. SUESS: Right. So at this point,
24 and, you know, we have not yet interviewed
25 Chief Parry. He will be here tomorrow morning.

1 So the information that you're referring to was
2 received by Coral Springs 911. A dispatcher,
3 or call taker, apparently relayed that
4 information to BSO, and it was broadcasted over
5 BSO's radio. I do not recall off the top of my
6 head, we do have the data, about whether that
7 information about the shooter being in the
8 north parking lot was also broadcasted over
9 Coral Springs's radio. I think it's safe to
10 say that Chief Parry's statement at that point
11 is despite, yes, maybe we got information the
12 shooter is in the north parking lot, we still
13 don't know where the shooter is, and just
14 because they were there doesn't mean they are
15 still there.

16 And again going back to that rule of plus
17 one, just because you have information that the
18 shooter may be there we don't know if there's
19 one, two, fourteen shooters. Basically he's
20 just telling these people watch your back, I
21 don't want anybody to be shot in the back.

22 SEC. KAPUSTA: So would -- it would not be
23 routine to send some responders to that north
24 side parking lot to, in addition to going to
25 Building 12?

1 SGT. SUESS: No, that would be routine.
2 Again we haven't interviewed Chief Parry. It's
3 my understanding that at this point it would
4 have been conveyed over the Coral Springs radio
5 that there were a good number of officers at
6 the Building 12 area. Captains Gallagher and
7 Captain Mock, Deputy Chief Parry would have
8 almost certainly known at that point were
9 inside Building 12, and Captain Mock being a
10 SWAT commander is likely the best person to be
11 in that situation.

12 CHAIR: You still -- you had deputies up
13 on Holmberg Road. Miller is still parked up
14 there, I mean he still hadn't moved, and you
15 had other ones, so that north parking lot,
16 there were people that had eyes on that north
17 parking lot. There's a couple things that you
18 can take for granted in any situation, and
19 especially in a situation like this, there's
20 going to be a lot of misinformation, and that
21 the time frames that you get from people are
22 going to be off, and if somebody says two
23 minutes make it five minutes.

24 So they said they saw him two minutes ago,
25 it's going to be longer than that. And that's

1 just from experience, that you're going to get,
2 it's going to be a ton of misinformation, and
3 the times are going to be off, and they're
4 usually going to be shorter than what it
5 actually was. And -- and that's just the way
6 it is. But in the north parking lot, remember
7 the north parking lot is, and there was
8 activity in the north parking lot, and there's
9 a lot of entry teams that had already come in
10 that came from the north, so that north parking
11 lot had law enforcement activity in it.

12 And, and there was a few times in there
13 where you heard those transmissions yesterday
14 when we went through the 911 calls, and what
15 you're hearing in this, you know, presentation,
16 there was a lot of speculation as to where he
17 was. And you heard one deputy say in there
18 that he was probably bunkered down inside, and
19 he wasn't, so, you know, to some degree you
20 just don't know, and you have to take it with a
21 grain of salt.

22 So let's take a break, John.

23 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

24 CHAIR: Let's take fifteen minutes. I got
25 10:25. We'll come back at 10:40.

1 (Thereupon, the meeting is in recess, and the
2 proceedings continue as follows:)

3 CHAIR: All right, we'll go ahead and get
4 started again. Senator Book, we were able to
5 find the EAS, what time Westglades Middle was
6 in lockdown, and the best we can tell, that
7 they were in lockdown at 2:36 p.m.

8 MR. SCHACHTER: Sheriff, can I ask did
9 they lock the, all the other schools down?

10 CHAIR: I don't know the answer to that,
11 Mr. Schachter. I really don't. You're
12 talking about like the elementary schools
13 across the street, et cetera, and all --

14 MR. SCHACHTER: Yeah, you know.

15 CHAIR: I don't know the answer to that.
16 I can tell you at the time though that, as far
17 as I know, there were no SROs at any of the
18 elementary schools, or any law enforcement
19 officers.

20 MR. SCHACHTER: But -- but I mean you know
21 when there's an active shooter at the high
22 school the first thing you would do, and you
23 don't know where he is, is lock down the other
24 high schools, middle schools --

25 CHAIR: It make sense, but I don't know

1 the answer, I just don't know the answer to
2 your question. I really don't know, you know.
3 And remember that they had, as Sergeant Suess
4 said, Deputy India, who was at Westglades,
5 wasn't there, so there was nobody there to hear
6 the radio at that time. But anyway, but the
7 point is that the time is 2:36. Go ahead,
8 John, let's go ahead and get started again.

9 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So eighteen
10 minutes and thirty-eight seconds after the
11 first shot the first mass evacuation of
12 civilians began. Excuse me, I'm sorry. Began
13 from Classroom 1216. The students exited the
14 east doors, and continued toward Pine Island
15 Road. So in this map you'll start to see these
16 green circles in each room, and that represents
17 that that room has either been approached, the
18 door has been approached, or access has been
19 gained by law enforcement. Some of the rooms
20 it's difficult to tell when they actually
21 enter, just because of the camera angles, so
22 that's a point of reference for you as we
23 continue.

24 So eighteen minutes and forty seconds
25 after the first shot Deputy Chief Backer and

1 Sergeant Rossman had a brief conversation about
2 patching radios, incident command, and getting
3 a map of the school.

4 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
5 open meeting.)

6 SPEAKER: Who is your incident commander,
7 and we need --

8 SPEAKER: -- K9 to the north parking lot
9 --

10 SPEAKER: We need a map of the school. We
11 need a map of the school. We need a map of the
12 school, and we need to get the radios patched.

13 SPEAKER: I'm working on our end to get
14 them patched.

15 SPEAKER: 2, we need to get these radios
16 patched with BSO.

17 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
18 continue as follows:)

19 MR. SCHACHTER: What -- what is standard
20 operating procedure if you do not know where an
21 active shooter is, do you evacuate people until
22 you find the active shooter, or, you know, how
23 do you normally play it? Do you keep everybody
24 locked down before you evacuate until you find
25 the suspect, or --

1 CHAIR: Yeah, because you want -- yes. I
2 mean, you know, again, and there's some many --
3 what's a standard operating procedure, you
4 really have to, it depends upon the
5 circumstances, the situation, the building
6 you're dealing with, the environment that
7 you're in, et cetera, you know, and so, you
8 know, it's been, as has been explained is, is
9 that while there is active shooting going on
10 is, is that there's only one thing that's on
11 your mind, one thing that's in your vision, one
12 thing you're focused on, and that is going to
13 the shots and stopping the person who is doing
14 that shooting.

15 Now, beyond that once the shots have
16 ceased, and they have subsided, then you're
17 going to approach it a little bit differently.
18 It's going to be more of what is called a slow
19 and methodical. You're going to not be just
20 rushing to it, you're going to do it in a more
21 tactical way, in a more strategic way, because
22 you don't know where the person is. So at that
23 point is, is that if you are actively still
24 trying to seek the person you're not going to
25 be engaging in an evacuation simultaneously.

1 And again, we're talking about a school
2 setting. There's a whole bunch of different
3 settings, so a lot of, a lot of it's going to
4 depend upon, again, the physical environment,
5 and all the of the other factors, how many
6 people you have, where are they the safest at
7 the time. So it's a very difficult question to
8 respond to in a, in a categorical way. The
9 only thing that is for sure is, is that when
10 shots are being fired that means somebody is
11 being hurt, somebody is being killed, and we
12 need to stop that shooting to stop the
13 bleeding, if you will figuratively and
14 literally, and but then once the, the shooting
15 subsides, then you're still going to focus on
16 the shooter, but your response to dealing with
17 the shooter is going to be different, it's
18 going to be more slow and methodical, it's
19 going to be more tactical, and isn't just going
20 to be we need to get to that and stop the
21 shooting.

22 MR. SCHACHTER: And you evacuate victims
23 at the same time, or evacuate people at the
24 same time.

25 CHAIR: Well, you're going to treat the

1 victim situation differently, is, is that the
2 law enforcement officers' response is going to
3 be to bypass victims, as hard as that is to
4 say, and as hard as it is for people to hear,
5 law enforcement officers are going to step
6 around victims, over victims, is that they are
7 not going to stop and assess, and treat,
8 they're going to the shooting. And -- and
9 that's just what you need to do, because if you
10 stop to assess that victim then more people are
11 being shot.

12 So law enforcement officers -- now, if the
13 shooting has stopped then you're going to deal
14 with it differently. You may stop to assess
15 some victims because -- it depends on the
16 circumstances. But when the shooting is
17 happening the law enforcement officers are
18 going to the source of the shooting to stop the
19 shooting, and there is nothing else that
20 officer is going to be concerned about than to
21 stop the shooting, and it means going around
22 victims. You're not going to be concerned with
23 anything other than stopping the shooter.

24 MR. SCHACHTER: And I assume later we're
25 going to get into, you know, Gina Montalto

1 specifically, and that she was stepped over and
2 not evacuated at the time that they found her,
3 but later she was and taken to the hospital,
4 right?

5 CHAIR: We're going to get into that. And
6 there's a lot of misinformation about that.

7 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay.

8 CHAIR: Okay, there's a lot of very, very
9 misinformation about, that information about
10 that misinformation about that. She -- she
11 wasn't stepped over. She was assessed. I've
12 had discussion with her dad about it, and he's
13 aware of the circumstances. But we will get
14 into that especially in the medical response
15 presentation that Special Agent Massucci is
16 going to do later today, or maybe tomorrow at
17 this point, but there will be more about that.

18 But you want to be careful, because
19 there's, there's just misinformation about what
20 happened on that. Go ahead, John.

21 SGT. SUESS: So nineteen minutes and one
22 seconds after the first shot Captain Robinson
23 transmits over the radio asking where the
24 command post is. Dispatch tells them it's at
25 the south side of the Sawgrass on the Coral

1 Springs side. If you haven't seen it already
2 you will at this point at least begin to see
3 that there becomes a great deal of confusion
4 about where the command post is. As I
5 referenced earlier, there is the misnomer about
6 wherever the command bus is is where the
7 command post is. That's not always the case.
8 And then where the incident commander is. So
9 you'll start to see that theme develop.

10 Captain Robinson responds, confirm with
11 the incident commander that is where they want
12 SWAT to respond. Dispatch then says that's the
13 staging area for now, and asks Sergeant Miller
14 for additional details. Detective Goolsby
15 would later provide direction that the north
16 parking lot was available.

17 Seconds later Deputy Chief Parry tells the
18 Greetham group that they need to start getting
19 this whole building, an apparent reference to
20 Building 1 which they are standing next to,
21 locked down. Multiple deputies and officers
22 begin moving south after that guidance, or
23 direction.

24 Nineteen minutes and thirteen seconds
25 after the first shot Captain Soberon inquired

1 about the patching of channels with BSO, and
2 asked where the BSO's command post was located.
3 So this was a transmission over Coral Springs
4 radio. Dispatch tells him that they are
5 working with BSO to complete the patch.
6 Seconds later Sergeant Rossman directs with
7 Deputy Chief Backer, and tells him that the
8 command post is on the south side of the
9 Sawgrass Expressway, and points southeast of
10 the school. We tried to not get too hung up on
11 names or titles, it's important to note if that
12 is the command post the incident commander is
13 on the north side of campus.

14 Nineteen minutes and twenty-eight seconds
15 after the first shot Captain Soberon transmits
16 over the Coral Springs radio that without
17 radios being patched they are running two
18 separate operations. Captain Soberon, it was
19 apparent in his tone, seemed pretty annoyed by
20 the current state of radio traffic.

21 In an interview with Captain Soberon he
22 said that he responded with Deputy Chiefs Parry
23 and Backer. He heard Captains Mock and McKeone
24 addressing the tactical response, and he was
25 unable to find the command post. While trying

1 to locate the command post he directed parents
2 away from Pine Island Road. Once he met with
3 Deputy Chiefs Backer and Parry they began
4 command post operations, and he remained at the
5 command post facilitating support operations.

6 Shortly thereafter, Officer Popock
7 escorted Samantha Grady from Classroom 1214,
8 who suffered non-fatal injuries, and directed
9 her out of the east doors with other students.
10 Among those students was an ROTC student in
11 uniform, who was detained by Deputy Valdes.
12 Deputy Valdes made several unsuccessful
13 attempts to transmit over his radio, and you'll
14 see that video shortly.

15 On this image the, they're just outside of
16 the east side of Building 12, you'll see that
17 green and yellow dot, Deputy Valdes and the
18 students. A couple of the commissioners, that
19 just so you're aware, the green dots on this
20 map is now going to represent when law
21 enforcement has either gained access to or
22 approached the doors to these buildings, to
23 these classrooms. You see that law enforcement
24 on the first floor, so the Mock group is
25 continuing to move west on the floor as the

1 Mazzei group on the second floor is
2 simultaneously moving east. This is that video
3 of Deputy Valdes.

4 (Thereupon, the following video
5 is played in the open meeting.)

6 SPEAKER: Hey, ROTC uniform -- hold him.
7 They said ROTC uniform. You got no guns on
8 you?

9 SPEAKER: No, sir.

10 SPEAKER: Come over here to the side, man.

11 SPEAKER: Drop the bag. Drop the bag.

12 SPEAKER: No, no, no, no, no.

13 SPEAKER: How come --

14 SPEAKER: I'll take him.

15 SPEAKER: How come I don't get to go --

16 SPEAKER: The shooter has your uniform.

17 SPEAKER: The north side of the school is
18 where --

19 SPEAKER: You got no, no guns on you, you
20 got nothing, right?

21 SPEAKER: -- we're going to check right
22 now --

23 SPEAKER: Touch me wherever, I just don't
24 want to be --

25 SPEAKER: 1584 --

1 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
2 continue as follows:)

3 SGT. SUESS: So to point out there, again
4 you hear the throttling. He has problems
5 getting on the radio. And Deputy Valdes'
6 action in retrospect obviously is confusing,
7 but at the time that's the information that he
8 had, he is looking for somebody in an ROTC
9 uniform, so it goes back to the disparity of
10 information between the two agencies.

11 CHAIR: Because it had been put out over
12 Coral Springs he was wearing khakis and the
13 maroon shirt, right.

14 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. Nineteen minutes
15 and forty nine seconds after the first shot
16 Lieutenant O'Neill directs a K-9 deputy to the
17 command post somewhere on the north side of
18 campus, and that deputy continued that way.
19 Almost twenty minutes after the first shot
20 Andrew Medina and Assistant Principal Porter
21 were seen on the south side of Building 1 with
22 the Greetham group. At about that same time
23 Lieutenant DeVita, who in this image is the
24 gentleman further back, Sergeants DeRosa,
25 Detective Schroy, and Officer Dejnak, I believe

1 it's pronounced, approached Peterson and Best's
2 location from the south.

3 Detective Schroy recognized Deputy
4 Peterson as the SRO from seeing him at prior
5 school sporting events. He asked Deputy
6 Peterson where the shooter was located.
7 Peterson pointed to the 1200 building and said
8 I believe he's on the third floor.

9 We conducted an interview with Lieutenant
10 DeVita, and said that as he approached Peterson
11 was on the school radio talking with someone
12 watching the cameras. That largely appears to
13 be substantiated. He Deputy Seward was holding
14 the east doors of Building 12 open as students
15 and staff were fleeing. Deputy Seward yelled
16 to Peterson asking for his keys. Lieutenant
17 DeVita took Peterson's keys and ran them up to
18 Deputy Seward. If you recall Deputy Peterson's
19 statement, he said that he ran the keys up to
20 Building 12.

21 Lieutenant DeVita saw approximately twelve
22 officers or deputies inside of Building 12.
23 DeVita himself went on with multiple Coral
24 Springs officers to search the fields to the
25 west. They discussed staying together so that

1 they could hear each other's radio traffic.

2 Twenty minutes and twelve seconds after
3 the first shot Deputy Valdes made that
4 transmission that he's with a student in an
5 ROTC uniform, and asked what to do with him.
6 Sergeant Miller broadcasted he's having
7 problems with his radio. On the east side of
8 Building 1 Sergeant Rossman approached Mr.
9 Medina and asked him if he's a witness. This
10 began BSO's process of getting information from
11 Medina and Porter.

12 Shortly thereafter a deputy on the south
13 side of Building 2, his body cam begins
14 recording. There is at least one deputy with
15 him, and they are quickly joined by additional
16 officers and deputies. This captured, Sergeant
17 Sklar asked who is with a school administrator
18 that has access to the camera system inside the
19 school. Peterson -- Sergeant Miller responds
20 that Peterson would be that person, and
21 dispatch asked does anyone know where Peterson
22 is. Peterson did not respond.

23 MR. PETTY: Sergeant.

24 CHAIR: Go ahead, Mr. Petty.

25 MR. PETTY: A question on Slide 397.

1 Peterson was asked a question by the detective
2 and, and says I believe he's on the third
3 floor. Since he's never been into the building
4 how would he know the shooter is on the third
5 floor?

6 SGT. SUESS: That's a fair question.

7 MR. PETTY: So he's -- he's not only
8 making things up, he's perhaps creating more
9 confusion and, and delaying the response.

10 SGT. SUESS: It's quite possible.

11 MR. PETTY: Thanks.

12 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So twenty-one
13 minute nearly, Mr. Medina begins to give
14 Sergeant Rossman a narrative about what he saw
15 and what he did. This is the point in which
16 Medina will reference a rifle bag, and we'll
17 play the video here for you in a minute. So
18 it's important to note that Mr. Medina has been
19 interviewed several times by several entities.
20 It's our opinion as detectives that this, given
21 the proximity in time to when he saw Medina,
22 and the spontaneous nature of his statements,
23 that this is the most credible statement by
24 Medina about what he witnessed.

25 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the

1 open meeting.)

2 SPEAKER: The front gate, because I hold
3 the caution coming in --

4 SPEAKER: So the subject, he got dropped
5 off by an Uber?

6 SPEAKER: He got dropped off by an Uber.
7 He walked -- he started -- he walked on campus.
8 I saw him walking on campus, and I saw him with
9 the, with the bag with the, with like a rifle
10 bag or something, so I --

11 SPEAKER: No, everybody's on the other
12 side of --

13 SPEAKER: I called my other security guy
14 that was at, that's in the building, and I told
15 him, heads up, I think somebody, somebody crazy
16 with like a bag coming, cause the boy crazy,
17 you already know the kid kind of crazy, so I
18 saw him coming with the bag, I wanted my guy to
19 be careful. As soon as -- as soon as he walked
20 in the building all I heard was bop, bop, bop,
21 bop, bop, bop, bop --

22 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
23 continue as follows:)

24 SGT. SUESS: At twenty-one minutes and
25 seventeen seconds after the first shot Sergeant

1 Sklar transmits that they need somebody with
2 the camera system as soon as possible, asking
3 where the principal is located, and points out
4 that they need to start making a plan.
5 Twenty-one minutes and twenty-two seconds after
6 the first shot this is the approximate
7 location, you can see the two different groups,
8 the Mock group and the Mazzei group, are moving
9 simultaneously working to clear the building.

10 So this video is from Classroom 1213.
11 This -- I do not recall if this had been
12 circulated or not. This is difficult video to
13 watch. A great deal of the images inside of
14 this have been blurred.

15 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
16 open meeting.)

17 SPEAKER: All right, guys, three down,
18 three injured.

19 SPEAKER: Is anybody injured?

20 SPEAKER: Yes, yes --

21 SPEAKER: Where?

22 SPEAKER: Right here. Right here. He's
23 right here.

24 SPEAKER: He can walk. Can you walk?
25 Where were you shot?

1 SPEAKER: Oh, my God, I'm sorry, I'm --
2 the police are here. Can we -- can we go.

3 SPEAKER: I need help. I need help. I
4 need help. Look out. Look out. Look out.
5 Look out.

6 SPEAKER: Oh, my God.
7 (inaudible)

8 SPEAKER: It's okay, we're going to get
9 you out of here. We're going to get you out of
10 here. Do you need my help up?

11 SPEAKER: My -- my water bottle. Can you
12 get my phone? With the bag with the water
13 bottle -- (inaudible)

14 SPEAKER: Yes.

15 SPEAKER: Let's go. Come on, let's go.
16 Let's go. Come on, follow me. Follow me.
17 Follow me.

18 SPEAKER: Okay, police -- police --

19 SPEAKER: Hug the wall, hug the wall.

20 SPEAKER: Okay, go -- go -- go -- go --

21 SPEAKER: Oh, my God.

22 SPEAKER: Hug the wall.

23 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
24 continue as follows:)

25 MR. SCHACHTER: Who was he saying follow

1 me, follow me, what is that?

2 SGT. SUESS: Just one of the officers or
3 deputies just helping to give the kids
4 direction. Twenty-one minutes and twenty-seven
5 seconds after the first shot, after Sergeant
6 Sklar asked about getting access to the camera
7 system Greetham asked Medina about where the
8 cameras were located, and Greetham broadcast
9 over the radio that he is with Medina. Medina
10 points out that they are inside Building 1.
11 Deputy Greetham begins to move that way to go
12 inside to the camera room. Sergeant Rossman
13 stops Greetham and Medina, and says that he
14 wants to slow down and get more information
15 from Medina and Porter.

16 So on this map you see these two red boxes
17 which represent the two doors. They start to
18 move south towards the door on the south side
19 of Building 1, and at a while, for a period of
20 this video you'll see Deputy Greetham, his hand
21 covers his body cam.

22 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
23 open meeting.)

24 SPEAKER: -- access to the camera systems.

25 SPEAKER: They found the camouflage

1 jacket?

2 SPEAKER: 17 --

3 SPEAKER: Can we get someone -- access to
4 where the computer, where the cameras are.

5 SPEAKER: Camouflage jacket, somebody --
6 somebody --

7 SPEAKER: Does anyone know where Peterson
8 is?

9 SPEAKER: 1216, first floor --

10 SPEAKER: 500, we need somebody with the
11 camera system ASAP, where is the principal,
12 who's with the principal --

13 SPEAKER: Hey, can he -- can you use the
14 cameras?

15 SPEAKER: They're inside.

16 SPEAKER: Can you use them?

17 (inaudible)

18 SPEAKER: Motor49, I got a guy here
19 outside the building with us that can get the
20 cameras. We're going to go inside and go get
21 to the cameras.

22 SPEAKER: Don't walk in front of me.

23 SPEAKER: Sorry.

24 SPEAKER: They want to see cameras.

25 SPEAKER: -- let's slow down --

1 SPEAKER: Come on.

2 SPEAKER: Do you want to see the cameras?

3 SPEAKER: 500 --

4 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and
5 the proceedings continue as follows:)

6 SGT. SUESS: Twenty-one minutes and forty-
7 four seconds after the first shot Sergeant
8 Kozlowski, Officer Schmidt, and Deputy Volpe
9 carried Ben Wikander from Classroom 1213 to the
10 east doors of Building 12. He was the
11 individual, one of the individuals they carried
12 from Classroom 1213.

13 Shortly after twenty-two minutes Captain
14 McKeone and Sergeant Heinrich advanced east
15 towards the east side of Building 13. So you
16 see their path of travel. This is that moment
17 in which Detective Goolsby referenced he nearly
18 shot Sergeant Heinrich.

19 Twenty-two minutes and eleven seconds
20 after the first shot Officer Maclean carried
21 Samantha Mayor, who suffered non-fatal
22 injuries, from the first floor to the east
23 doors of Building 12. Cell phone video moments
24 earlier captured Sergeant Vullo picking him,
25 her up, and handing her off to Office Maclean.

1 As you see officers and deputies are continuing
2 to work both on the second and first floors.

3 At twenty-two minutes and fifty-four
4 seconds after the first shot Sergeant Rossman
5 broadcasted a description of Cruz which he gets
6 from Medina.

7 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
8 open meeting.)

9 SPEAKER: No hoodie. No hoodie, burgundy
10 JROTC shirt.

11 DISPATCH: The suspect was wearing an ROTC
12 uniform, I don't have any further.

13 SPEAKER: No, T-shirt, burgundy --

14 SPEAKER: 7Kilol, stand by for updated
15 BOLO.

16 SPEAKER: Black hat, burgundy ROTC
17 T-shirt, black jeans.

18 SPEAKER: 7Kilol, subject was dropped off,
19 subject was dropped off by an Uber on the east
20 side of the, the east side of the school,
21 entered the school with a backpack, believed to
22 be also a long rifle, handguns. Subject
23 wearing a black hat, maroon in color JROTC
24 colored shirt. Pants?

25 SPEAKER: Where's the front entrance --

1 SPEAKER: And black pants.

2 SPEAKER: And back pants.

3 SPEAKER: Hey, where's the front entrance
4 to the school --

5 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
6 continue as follows:)

7 SGT. SUESS: Twenty-three minutes and
8 sixteen seconds after the first shot dispatch
9 broadcast that CSPD's main channel was being
10 patched with 140ps2.

11 CHAIR: Hey, John, hold on one second.
12 Senator Book, go ahead.

13 SEN. BOOK: Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
14 And perhaps I'm getting a little in the weeds
15 with it, but clearly Medina knew exactly, and,
16 and knew from the beginning. I think the
17 interesting thing was, is when they detained
18 that student who is wearing the ROTC uniform,
19 that day a lot of the kids who were in JROTC
20 were wearing their JROTC uniform, they all
21 were.

22 CHAIR: Right.

23 SEN. BOOK: That is a different JROTC --

24 CHAIR: Right.

25 SEN. BOOK: -- attire -- I'm --

1 CHAIR: Right. It's not a formal uniform,
2 it's more informal, right.

3 SEN. BOOK: Correct. I mean I think that
4 that is actually, you know, a piece of
5 information that's really important.

6 CHAIR: Right.

7 SEN. BOOK: If he was not in the typical
8 JROTC uniform, which every single student would
9 have been in, was that, you know, I think later
10 on when we kind of like look back it's just an
11 important piece of the puzzle that again if
12 people were a little bit within the school
13 dynamic, would have said, hey, these kids who
14 are in, who are our students, who are JROTC,
15 would be wearing the appropriate uniform.
16 Again, I just -- it --

17 CHAIR: Yeah. Commission Stewart?

18 COMM. STEWART: Casual ROTC shirt he had
19 on is the school color, and so even if they had
20 known that they would have been stopping
21 multiple students, because that is a school
22 color.

23 CHAIR: Well, I don't know, you know, I go
24 back to, I mean that's -- if the gate was
25 opened at 2:15 for a 2:40 dismissal, and if

1 there had been somebody standing at the gate
2 the whole time it was open, you know, you know,
3 and even if he showed up with the maroon shirt
4 on that said Stoneman Douglas on it, and
5 someone said who are you, and where are you
6 going, and by the way, you know, that rifle bag
7 probably doesn't belong here, you know, I mean
8 that's --

9 So there -- there's -- there's a lot,
10 there's no doubt about it, and but there were
11 others I believe who were wearing -- I mean
12 that maroon shirt, as Commission Stewart points
13 out, is a school shirt, and you did have, and
14 of course as we know, a lot of people who were
15 wearing their formal uniform that day.

16 SGT. SUESS: At twenty-three minutes
17 thirty- eight seconds after the first shot
18 Chief Pustizzi directs responding units who are
19 not in the school to take a perimeter point,
20 due to not knowing where the shooter was
21 located. Twenty- three minutes and forty-four
22 seconds after the first shot Medina tells
23 Assistant Principal Porter that BSO needs
24 access to the system, the camera system.
25 Greetham tells Porter that they need to wait

1 for SWAT.

2 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
3 open meeting.)

4 SPEAKER: Do any of them speak English?

5 Do I need to take him now? Okay, hold on.

6 We're going to wait on SWAT, because SWAT's --

7 SPEAKER: No hoodie --

8 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
9 continue as follows:)

10 MR. SCHACHTER: Why does he say that? Why
11 do they need to wait for SWAT?

12 SGT. SUESS: In my personal opinion
13 there's not a good answer to that.

14 CHAIR: And wasn't that -- there was some
15 direction from Sergeant Rossman on that.

16 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. I mean there is
17 that issue, that -- and I don't know if it had
18 been prior to that point, but at some point
19 Rossman does say he wants to wait for SWAT,
20 so --

21 CHAIR: And Sergeant Rossman was running
22 that, with Porter and Medina there, and
23 Sergeant Rossman was running that, you know,
24 and, and there is a judgment call to be made
25 with that. They were at the, at Building 1,

1 the cameras were at Building 1. We know that
2 there are a couple people in the camera room,
3 Porter was in there, they were trying to go
4 through the cameras, and they're having
5 problems, you're going to hear a lot more about
6 that. You know, the question is, you know, and
7 I don't think any of us can or should really
8 put ourselves in Sergeant Rossman's position.

9 He was trying to make, I think trying to
10 make the best decision that he could make based
11 on the information that he had, and when you're
12 going to put a civilian, put a non-law
13 enforcement person into a situation where you
14 don't know where the shooter is, you got to
15 really think heard about that, and I think what
16 he was trying to not do was to inject Medina,
17 or anybody else, potentially into a warm zone,
18 or even a hot zone situation, so --

19 MR. SCHACHTER: To go to the camera room?

20 CHAIR: Yeah, even to go to the camera
21 room. I, you know, in that, and hearing this,
22 and watching all of this, and watching a lot
23 more that was here, I think Rossman was, you
24 know, I think he was trying to make the right
25 decision. You know anybody can sit back in

1 hindsight, and Monday morning quarterback it,
2 but I do think that a criticism of Sergeant
3 Rossman's decision would be improperly Monday
4 morning quarterbacking it. I think he was
5 trying to protect everybody, and do what he
6 felt was the right thing at the time. That's
7 my take on it.

8 MR. SCHACHTER: Several slides back it
9 says that Peterson is watching the cameras; is
10 that, is that correct?

11 CHAIR: No.

12 SGT. SUESS: No, sir. Peterson was
13 communicating with somebody over the school
14 radio about the cameras. Morford and Greenleaf
15 were in the camera room.

16 MR. SCHACHTER: Talking with somebody
17 watching the cameras, got it.

18 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. Twenty-four
19 minutes and twenty seconds after the first shot
20 Sergeant Kozlowski and Officer Maclean carried
21 Ashley Baez, who suffered non-fatal injuries,
22 from Classroom 1210. Ashley had a severe
23 gunshot wound to her left thigh. In the
24 following twenty seconds she is loaded onto the
25 rear of a golf cart by officers and deputies.

1 And this is video footage that we have but
2 chose to not show it due to its graphic nature
3 on Detective Valdes' body cam, but he, while
4 they move, are moving on the cart, takes a
5 tourniquet from his gun belt and applies it to
6 her upper leg. And that's one of those things
7 you, you can't really train for. He was very
8 much thinking on the spot.

9 This is at Pine Island Road and Holmberg
10 Road. This is an image from Deputy Valdes'
11 body cam, and there's just three still images
12 here to give the commission an idea of what it
13 looked like at this intersection.

14 At twenty-four minutes and twenty-two
15 seconds you see progress is continuing on the
16 first and second floors. Detective Goolsby
17 transmits do not let anyone enter the school
18 unless they come from the north. So this is
19 that same transmission we covered earlier about
20 trying to avoid a friendly fire situation, or a
21 blue on blue as it's sometimes called.

22 At Sergeant Rossman's request Assistant
23 Principal Porter called Assistant Principal
24 Morford on the radio. Porter begins asking, or
25 been speaking with Morford and Greenleaf as

1 they are watching the surveillance video.
2 Twenty-five minutes after the first shot Chief
3 Pustizzi requested to set up a command post in
4 front of the school at the sign at Coral
5 Springs Drive, Pine Island Road, and Holmberg.
6 So that would be at the northeast corner of
7 campus.

8 You'll see some video in a minute from
9 Detective Johnson's body cam. The, so due to
10 the bathrooms being locked, that obviously
11 presented challenges and hazards for the
12 students, but then law enforcement, you know,
13 one of the rooms, one of the premise of
14 clearing buildings for suspects is to not walk
15 past a door. You need to clear every door
16 because you don't want somebody to attack you
17 from behind, so they encounter this problem as
18 they are moving through Building 12.

19 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
20 open meeting.)

21 SPEAKER: You guys cleared out already?

22 SPEAKER: Bathroom -- bathroom is locked.
23 We can't get in. We got to get in the
24 bathroom. We got to get in.

25 SPEAKER: The bathrooms are locked.

1 SPEAKER: Slow down --

2 SPEAKER: I need a fucking pry bar or

3 something --

4 SPEAKER: Hey Captain, we got to get into

5 --

6 SPEAKER: It's locked --

7 SPEAKER: Anybody got a tool?

8 SPEAKER: In my car, I don't --

9 SPEAKER: No, he's on the -- it's --

10 (inaudible)

11 SPEAKER: -- don't have a key --

12 SPEAKER: Do you want me to knock the nob

13 off? You think we'd fucking stop him --

14 SPEAKER: No, not -- not on --

15 SPEAKER: No, it's -- it's an outward

16 door.

17 SPEAKER: Yes.

18 SPEAKER: -- how are we on the first

19 floor --

20 SPEAKER: -- we got a locked -- north --

21 SPEAKER: We're almost done, ninety

22 percent done.

23 SPEAKER: Hey, ask for a pry bar, can we

24 have -- anybody has a pry bar that we can pry

25 this door, because it's locked --

1 SPEAKER: Anybody have a pry bar?

2 SPEAKER: That one's locked too?

3 SPEAKER: This is locked right here.

4 SPEAKER: You got that bathroom?

5 SPEAKER: It's -- it's locked.

6 SPEAKER: No, I know. I got it.

7 SPEAKER: Yeah, he's --

8 SPEAKER: Heads up -- heads up --

9 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
10 continue as follows:)

11 MR. SCHACHTER: And so they're concerned
12 somebody is in there, right?

13 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. Correct, whether
14 it's a victim or a suspect.

15 Twenty-five minutes twenty-two seconds you
16 see they're continuing to make progress.
17 Shortly thereafter Sergeant Rossman directed
18 Porter to direct Morford to follow Cruz on the
19 video.

20 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
21 open meeting.)

22 SPEAKER: Do they have him on camera
23 somewhere?

24 SPEAKER: Do they have him on camera yet?

25 SPEAKER: Do not have him --

1 SPEAKER: -- in the school, and rescue
2 is --

3 SPEAKER: Third floor of the 1200 --

4 SPEAKER: Start there, but continue to
5 follow him.

6 SPEAKER: 10-4. I'm with the deputies.
7 That's why I asking you all those questions,
8 they said start there and follow him.

9 SPEAKER: 10-4. We're working on that
10 now.

11 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
12 continue as follows:)

13 SGT. SUESS: Shortly thereafter you'll see
14 Detectives Alfin and Gariepy, both from Coral
15 Springs SWAT team, leave the Greetham group and
16 advance north on the east side of Building 1
17 towards Building 12. I'll play some radio
18 traffic here. Sierral references to Captain
19 Jordan, and you will hear it appears as though
20 dispatch can hear Captain Jordan but nobody
21 else can.

22 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is
23 played in the open meeting.)

24 SPEAKER: -- in front of the school at
25 south Holmberg Road, I don't think anybody is

1 stopping them.

2 DISPATCH: Sierral, we're working on, I'm
3 working on the -- right now.

4 SPEAKER: -- Sierral.

5 DISPATCH: 10-4, Sierral. We will tell
6 them that we need them for the perimeter.
7 Originally they were not going to lodge unless
8 they had victims ready to go.

9 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and
10 the proceedings continue as follows:)

11 SGT. SUESS: Twenty-six minutes and twenty
12 seconds after the first shot Detectives Polo
13 and Schaub, they arrive on Holmberg Road. They
14 approach Sergeant Garcia, who appears to be the
15 first BSO SWAT deputy on scene. There are at
16 least ten marked and unmarked vehicles on
17 Holmberg Road. I'm confident there were many
18 more, but that's what we can see. And a single
19 deputy and unidentifiable officer are behind
20 vehicles on Holmberg Road.

21 CHAIR: Now hold on. Commissioner Petty.

22 MR. PETTY: Just going back. So Ashley
23 Baez was recovered from Room 1210?

24 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So she -- she was,
25 had gone into the Building 1 to use the women's

1 room. She attempted to flee into the women's
2 room when the shots fired. When she couldn't
3 get in, ran across the hall to 1210.

4 MR. PETTY: She made it into a classroom.
5 So why -- because she walked in one minute
6 fourteen seconds before the shooting started.
7 Why was, was, was she in --

8 SGT. SUESS: She was in the hall. She
9 was, pretty much had made it to the women's
10 room by the time Cruz began firing.

11 MR. PETTY: Was that her classroom, 1210?

12 SGT. SUESS: No, sir, I don't believe --
13 as best I recall, this is based purely off my
14 recollection, she is not a student in that
15 class, she just went to go use that restroom.
16 I recall some students saying they like going
17 to the restroom in Building 12 because it had
18 air conditioning.

19 CHAIR: She walked in with Luke Hoyer and
20 -- and there's three of them that just walked
21 in --

22 MR. PETTY: And Martin. And Martin.

23 CHAIR: And Martin. And they walked in
24 really like simultaneously just before Cruz.
25 And we've blurred it out in there, they're

1 captured in this, in we've seen, but they
2 literally are walking northbound between the
3 7/8 Building, and as he's walking west, you
4 know, into the east door they're coming from
5 the south, and they walk literally -- and you
6 can see them, in some of these, you see the
7 images that pass the stairwell door, that's
8 them walking past the stairwell, so I mean
9 they're, they're literally just in the wrong
10 place at the wrong time, and walked in just
11 before him.

12 MR. PETTY: Were -- were all three going
13 to that building to use the restroom?

14 CHAIR: I don't know why -- I don't why
15 Martin and Luke were going into there. I don't
16 know --

17 SGT. SUESS: I believe they were returning
18 to their classroom. They're 12 --

19 MR. PETTY: They were returning, and
20 Ashley Baez was going to the restroom.

21 SGT. SUESS: As best I recall, yes, sir.
22 And I believe Martin and Luke were going to
23 Classroom 1215.

24 MR. PETTY: Because we had heard -- I know
25 in the building, in Building 12 some of the

1 restrooms were locked. Was she there because
2 of air conditioning, or because restrooms in
3 her building were locked?

4 SGT. SUESS: I do not know if restrooms in
5 her building were locked. Do we have any
6 information on that? All right.

7 MR. PETTY: It'd be interesting to know
8 what the policy was at the school. I'm
9 assuming if there are bathrooms locked in
10 building, in the 1200 building, there were
11 bathrooms locked in other buildings and, and
12 it's unfortunate, wrong place, wrong time, but
13 if students are having to travel to other
14 buildings to find a restroom to use --

15 CHAIR: Right. Mr. Schachter, go ahead.

16 MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant, you know, we've
17 heard, gone through a lot of slides, and
18 Captain Jordan's name has not come up. Was she
19 pacing, still pacing in the front office? Or
20 actually she had moved to the north of the
21 school. She was the incident commander at this
22 time, right? What has she been doing to run
23 the incident?

24 SGT. SUESS: So the radio traffic, any
25 significant transmissions by her have, you've

1 seen up to this point. We don't know exactly
2 where she was, it's not on camera. You will
3 see her very shortly here, and it appears as
4 though she's behind the car with Deputy Perry
5 during that time.

6 So this is -- so Detectives Schaub and
7 Polo both had body cams on that provided a
8 great deal of information. And you'll see
9 video from their cameras. That's Sergeant
10 Garcia from BSO SWAT. He, you'll see the
11 Garcia group essentially forms here in a
12 minute. To the left it appears that's a BSO
13 deputy behind a Coral Springs car, and in the
14 distance there is a law enforcement officer
15 behind a vehicle, but his or her uniform is not
16 distinguishable.

17 MR. SCHACHTER: Is the officer -- is this
18 a SWAT officer right here?

19 SGT. SUESS: The gentleman with the rifle,
20 yes, sir.

21 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay.

22 SGT. SUESS: Sergeant Garcia, yes, sir.
23 He's a team leader on the SWAT team.

24 MR. SCHACHTER: Thank you.

25 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. Twenty-six minutes

and twenty-nine seconds after the first shot Lieutenant O'Neill is approached by a deputy heading north on Pine Island Road. So that's the Sawgrass Expressway. I believe that's the first time you've seen it in this presentation, so that is really the staging area, and south of that location.

(Thereupon, the following video is played in the
open meeting.)

SPEAKER: We don't need any more long guns right now, they got enough people, and SWAT's here. What we need to do is make sure only law enforcement stages on this road. All civilian cars out of here. EMS is going to -- this will be their road.

SPEAKER: Use this -- okay. All right.
(Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
continue as follows:)

SGT. SUESS: The twenty-six minutes and fifty-five seconds after the first shot the Mock group entered the first floor office. So at this point, all first floor classrooms and the office have been searched by this point. The bathrooms and interior office doors, which were locked, have not been searched. About

1 that same time Sergeant Sklar makes reference
2 to his radio not working properly. You see the
3 progression through Building 12.

4 Almost at twenty-seven minutes after the
5 first shot Officer Ryen from Margate PD SWAT
6 team approached Lieutenant O'Neill. He is
7 turned around by Lieutenant O'Neill, saying
8 that there were enough long guns and SWAT on
9 scene. It is important to note that BSO SWAT
10 is not inside Building 12 yet, and there are at
11 this point three SWAT deputies on Holmberg
12 Road.

13 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
14 open meeting.)

15 SPEAKER: They got enough long guns, and
16 they got the SWAT team there, so just stand by,
17 and we'll stage out.

18 DISPATCH: 10-4 --

19 SPEAKER: I know, I -- take a breath.

20 DISPATCH: -- west side of building, three
21 stories --

22 SPEAKER: -- SWAT, so --

23 SPEAKER: They got three down.

24 SPEAKER: They got three shot?

25 SPEAKER: Where's your guys? We don't

1 need you integrating with only your team, okay?
2 Find out where your team is. I know your kid
3 is in there, but take a breath, man.

4 SPEAKER: 15Echo2 to Sierra --

5 DISPATCH: Sierra is on the west end ready
6 to receive.

7 SPEAKER: 15Echo2 to dispatch and any
8 responding units, on Coral Springs Drive the
9 southbound lane is for EMS only. We've got it
10 set up for EMS only. The northbound lane is
11 for responding units.

12 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
13 continue as follows:)

14 SGT. SUESS: So a couple things to point
15 out there. You heard a little bit of the
16 throttling on Lieutenant O'Neill's radio.
17 Officer Ryen is off-duty at that time
18 obviously. He had just come from the gym. He
19 learned of the shooter, put on his outer plate
20 carrier, and grabbed his rifle, and responded
21 to the scene. He did not have his radio, which
22 you will hear shortly. As you heard in the
23 video his daughter attends the school, so he
24 had an obvious personal interest in the
25 response.

1 In my assessment Lieutenant O'Neill's
2 direction was not unreasonable at that point.
3 If very SWAT officer, or every officer for that
4 matter self-deployed into the scene having
5 limited information, and not having a radio,
6 that creates more of a problem than it does
7 help the situation.

8 At twenty-seven minutes after the first
9 shot Deputy Pianelli's body cam began recording
10 as he was on Pine Island Road. He was just
11 north of the Sawgrass Expressway by the bus
12 loop. He was directed to keep Pine Island Road
13 clear for emergency traffic. He would later go
14 on to direct multiple people to the command
15 post south of the Sawgrass Expressway. This is
16 an image from Deputy Pianelli's body cam. So
17 that's looking northwest, and then Pine Island
18 Road is running north there on the right side
19 of the screen.

20 Just after twenty-seven minutes after the
21 first shot Sergeant Garcia yelled east on
22 Holmberg Road to Detectives Gonzales and Deputy
23 Sherlock, also both SWAT deputies, to come to
24 his location. Detective Polo and Schaub waited
25 by Sergeant Garcia for direction. Shortly

1 thereafter Cruz was captured on surveillance
2 video walking to the Walmart west of Westglades
3 Middle School.

4 Officer Wilkins and Deputy Carbocci drove
5 south on campus after dropping off Ashley Baez.
6 And you'll see them briefly on the golf cart.
7 Sergeant Garcia led Detectives Gonzales, Polo,
8 Schaub, as well as Deputy Sherlock, south on
9 the campus through the western gate. This is
10 the Garcia group. So you'll see Gonzales and
11 Sherlock, they would run southwest, join with
12 Garcia, Schaub, and Polo, and continue south.

13 This is the body cam from Detective Polo.
14 And I'll point out to you, you see the silver
15 car in the distance, and then the golf cart
16 just on this side of that silver car.

17 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
18 open meeting.)

19 SPEAKER: -- to dispatch, responding
20 units -- Coral Springs Drive, the southbound
21 lane is for EMS only.

22 (inaudible)

23 DISPATCH: 10-4. Southbound -- go ahead.

24 (inaudible)

25 SPEAKER: I have SWAT off scene.

1 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
2 continue as follows:)

3 SGT. SUESS: So as they arrive, this is
4 the view from Detective Polo's body cam. You
5 see Building 12 on the left, Building 13
6 directly in front of you, Deputy Perry and
7 Captain Jordan behind that vehicle, as their
8 approximate location as it relates to Buildings
9 12 and 13.

10 Just after twenty-eight minutes after the
11 first shot Sergeant Garcia and Deputy Sherlock,
12 they would continue on past Deputy Perry and
13 Captain Jordan to the east side of Building 13.
14 Sergeant Garcia would meet up with Captain
15 McKeone, who was with CSPD SWAT at the time,
16 Sergeant Heinrich, Officer Harrison, and
17 Detective Goolsby. Gonzalez, Polo and Schaub,
18 would join Deputy Perry and Captain Jordan
19 behind that vehicle and get some information
20 from them, which you will see shortly on video.

21 So you see the location of the vehicle
22 were some of the, one of the SWAT detectives
23 and some CST deputies, crime suppression team,
24 join Perry and Captain Jordan. The other
25 deputies on the east side of Building 13, again

1 they are lined up in that only to make this
2 easier to read. They're -- that's not exactly
3 where they're standing. So you'll see on the
4 left, that's Coach Feis' golf cart. Sergeant
5 Garcia is speaking with Captain McKeone. At
6 this point again the green being used to
7 identify Sheriff's Office employees, and blue
8 for the officers. Goolsby and Heinrich are a
9 little beyond Sergeant Garcia, and you see
10 Officer Harrison with his rifle covering the
11 second and third floors.

12 So we're going to go back to the body cam,
13 so as Polo, Schaub, and other deputies continue
14 south.

15 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
16 open meeting.)

17 (inaudible)

18 SPEAKER: Okay, you got a -- guy right
19 here. There's rounds out the window. They
20 said 1200 or 1300 --

21 SPEAKER: All right, this buildings the
22 last -- (inaudible)

23 SPEAKER: -- last fired -- last shots
24 fired -- do you guys know the layout of the
25 school?

1 SPEAKER: No.

2 SPEAKER: That's two stories -- when you
3 come through here this is one story --

4 SPEAKER: We got that side covered, or no?

5 SPEAKER: That's your gymnasium. There
6 should be people -- that's your football field,
7 then the rest of the building is a bid square
8 top and bottom with an open, open courtyard,
9 okay?

10 SPEAKER: Do we got this side of the
11 school covered?

12 SPEAKER: That hasn't been searched,
13 right?

14 SPEAKER: That has not been searched to my
15 knowledge.

16 SPEAKER: So we need to cover down on that
17 area.

18 SPEAKER: Okay. Can you patch through
19 with Coral Springs and see what they've done,
20 because they've been in the building --

21 SPEAKER: 7201, I'm -- with an
22 administrator how has the -- working the
23 cameras. Stand by.

24 SPEAKER: Person on the camera says the
25 subject -- second floor now, not seen on the

1 second floor.

2 SPEAKER: Second floor. Second floor.

3 SPEAKER: Of which building, the 12 or
4 1300 Building?

5 SPEAKER: You see, you go through the
6 courtyard, you see that building right there --

7 SPEAKER: Yeah, dead ahead.

8 SPEAKER: -- that's, that's your second
9 floor, it goes all the way around --

10 SPEAKER: Straight through, okay.

11 SPEAKER: -- and it shoots off to the
12 right, the classrooms down to the right --

13 SPEAKER: 7Alpha1.

14 DISPATCH: 7Alpha1.

15 SPEAKER: I have --

16 DISPATCH: They're staging at the
17 southbound of the Sawgrass on the Coral Springs
18 side.

19 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
20 continue as follows:)

21 SGT. SUESS: So twenty-six minutes and
22 thirteen seconds after the first shot over the
23 BSO radio dispatch broadcasted that they have a
24 dispatcher on SWAT1. So what that is, it's
25 another channel that can really be accessed

1 only by SWAT team members that they use for
2 their operations. Captain Robinson says that
3 they will remain on the main channel to get
4 their response organized.

5 Twenty-eight minutes and thirteen seconds
6 after the first shot the Mazzei group continued
7 to move east on the second floor. So you'll
8 see Deputy Chief Parry approaches Lieutenants
9 O'Neill and Feeley attempting to locate Captain
10 Jordan and the command post.

11 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
12 open meeting.)

13 SPEAKER: Where is -- where is --

14 (inaudible)

15 SPEAKER: I don't know -- North
16 Lauderdale --

17 SPEAKER: She is at the command post,
18 which is on the northwest corner I believe of
19 the school.

20 SPEAKER: Okay. All right, what I'd love
21 to do, I'm the, I'm the Deputy Chief of Coral
22 Springs.

23 SPEAKER: Okay.

24 SPEAKER: I'd love to set up a command
25 post and start systematically scratching out

1 where we've got, what we've searched, what
2 we --

3 SPEAKER: Okay, then you'll have to go to
4 the command. This is just staging.

5 SPEAKER: They said it was on the south
6 side of the Sawgrass.

7 SPEAKER: Then it's going to be on that
8 side --

9 SPEAKER: -- with an administrator --
10 working the cameras -- stand by --

11 SPEAKER: Our GOLF Unit, SWAT team has
12 just arrived, they're going to do the same
13 thing. Let me find out where they are. I
14 don't have her phone number, because I don't
15 work for her, so --

16 SPEAKER: At which building, the 12 or
17 1300?

18 SPEAKER: Do you have Jan's number?

19 SPEAKER: I don't. I left my phone in my
20 desk I ran out so fast.

21 SPEAKER: Shit.

22 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
23 continue as follows:)

24 SGT. SUESS: Twenty-eight minutes and
25 thirty-eight seconds after the first shot

1 Deputy Perry asked Captain Jordan to patch with
2 Coral Springs so they can see where they are
3 since they have been in the building. There is
4 no an audible response to this request.

5 Twenty-eight minutes and fifty-three
6 seconds after the first shot Detectives Gariepy
7 and Alfin meet with Captain Mock on the east
8 side of Building 12. They get some -- there's
9 no audio, but it's apparent he's giving them
10 some direction, and they would shortly move
11 west down the first floor hall.

12 Twenty-nine minutes after the first shot
13 you'll see Sergeant Rossman transmits about the
14 suspect last being seen on the second floor.
15 Simultaneously Officer Best transmits this on
16 the radio. So it's safe to say at this point
17 that Officer Best would have received that
18 information, because he's standing next to
19 Deputy Peterson who has a school radio, and has
20 communication with Morford and Greenleaf inside
21 the camera room.

22 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
23 open meeting.)

24 SPEAKER: Got a good look at him, any --

25 SPEAKER: 7Kilol.

1 SPEAKER: He went on the second floor.

2 SPEAKER: He went on the second floor.

3 SPEAKER: He's on the second floor?

4 SPEAKER: He went on the second floor,
5 from what they saw.

6 SPEAKER: 10-4.

7 SPEAKER: Do you have him on the second
8 floor?

9 SPEAKER: Just keep me updated, Jeff, I --

10 SPEAKER: Do you have the video up there?

11 SPEAKER: Yeah, he had -- he found, he saw
12 him on the second floor.

13 SPEAKER: On the second floor?

14 SPEAKER: Yeah.

15 SPEAKER: 7Kilol, I'm landline with an
16 administrator who has a person in the office
17 working the cameras --

18 SPEAKER: Pustizzi just said he wants no
19 more talking but --

20 SPEAKER: -- stand by. One person on the
21 camera says the subject was last seen on the
22 second floor now, last seen on the second
23 floor.

24 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
25 continue as follows:)

1 SGT. SUESS: So a couple things to point
2 out. Again Sergeant Rossman has the throttling
3 problem with his radio. The polo which Mr.
4 Porter is wearing is the same one that Cruz was
5 wearing, to give you an idea of what he had.
6 This really begins the confusion about the
7 delay on the video, and it really comes down to
8 as a great deal of problems, communication.
9 Really there's a tense issue about is he on
10 there now or was he, and you'll see this
11 continues.

12 SEN. BOOK: -- bathrooms, right?

13 SGT. SUESS: I'm sorry, I couldn't hear
14 you.

15 CHAIR: Right.

16 SEN. BOOK: I'm sorry. I apologize. And
17 the -- and the bathroom doors still have not
18 yet been opened on the first floor or third
19 floor --

20 CHAIR: No. No.

21 SEN. BOOK: So they're kind of operating
22 in a, he's on the second floor, we see him on
23 the second floor --

24 CHAIR: Right. Right.

25 SEN. BOOK: -- they couldn't open these

1 doors, so there's like a lot of --

2 CHAIR: Right. Remember what they're
3 seeing is, is that, and they don't know it at
4 the time, it's like, right, you know, they're
5 watching video as opposed to live camera feeds,
6 right. Yeah.

7 SEN. BOOK: I'm talking about like in the
8 current space where they are right now, like
9 what they could be --

10 CHAIR: So, yeah, I mean the question --
11 the first and the third floor bathrooms were
12 never unlocked.

13 SEN. BOOK: At all?

14 MR. CARROLL: Can I ask you a question
15 related to that? The -- the guy who slid into
16 the, Taylor slides into that --

17 CHAIR: Yeah. Closet, yeah.

18 MR. CARROLL: -- utility room there. And
19 it looks like that's one of the first rooms
20 that you would come across if you were entering
21 from that side of the building, which was, that
22 was the side of the building I thought that
23 they were starting with on the second floor.
24 Did they come across him early in that search,
25 and did he offer anything? He was the guy who

1 had the keys, wouldn't he?

2 SGT. SUESS: Right. No, they came in
3 contact, contact with him fairly early on. I
4 don't believe that there was exchange of keys
5 at that point.

6 MR. CARROLL: Okay.

7 SGT. SUESS: You know, again to point out
8 any, any event even approaching this magnitude,
9 or even events far less significant, there's
10 always going to be a great deal of confusion.
11 I mean these are -- this -- again, we're
12 looking at this under microscope. This
13 happened so quickly, and people have to make
14 decisions extremely quickly, and not just law
15 enforcement, I mean administrators and
16 everybody, so it's, it's important to keep that
17 in mind, in my assessment.

18 Just approaching thirty minutes after the
19 first shot Cruz entered the Subway inside of
20 Walmart, where he ordered a drink. Captain
21 Mock broadcasted that the suspect was last seen
22 on the second floor. So twenty-nine minutes
23 and twenty-nine seconds after the first shot
24 Deputy Eason has moved further west to the
25 buildings on the Westglades Middle campus, has

1 a phone call with an unknown person, and again
2 references the gunshots which he heard.

3 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
4 open meeting.)

5 SPEAKER: -- Sawgrass on the south side.

6 SPEAKER: Okay, go ahead. Yeah. Yeah,
7 I'm on the scene. I heard the gunshots. They
8 were a few feet away from me.

9 SPEAKER: 17Delta2 --

10 SPEAKER: Yeah, yeah, I'm okay, but I was
11 at the school when the shots were coming out.
12 I'll call you back. Bye.

13 SPEAKER: 1701 --

14 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
15 continue as follows:)

16 SGT. SUESS: At approximately that same
17 time just after Deputy Chief Parry asked
18 Lieutenants O'Neill and Feeley for the location
19 of the command post Feeley transmits over the
20 radio that he's with Deputy Chief Parry, and
21 asks for the location of the command post.
22 Dispatch tells him that BSO was staging at the
23 south side of the Sawgrass Expressway. So this
24 is seconds after that video where Deputy Chief
25 Parry is asking to set up a command post with

1 BSO.

2 So we're going to return on terms of the
3 chronology back to the vehicle where Deputy
4 Perry and Captain Jordan had been joined by the
5 other deputies. You'll see this -- so the
6 Garcia group had split momentarily. They
7 rejoin here and approach Building 12.

8 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
9 open meeting.)

10 SPEAKER: 17Delta -- 1701 --

11 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
12 continue as follows:)

13 SGT. SUESS: So that just, again from the
14 map illustrating their approximate travel.
15 Twenty-nine minutes and fifty seconds after the
16 first shot Captain Jordan requested additional
17 units from other districts, and asked
18 Lieutenant Feeley to call her cell phone.

19 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
20 open meeting.)

21 SPEAKER: 17Sierra1.

22 SPEAKER: Who is the incident commander?

23 SPEAKER: 17Sierra1.

24 SPEAKER: 10-4. Do you need additional
25 units from District 11?

1 SPEAKER: That's a 10-4 until -- shut
2 down, and we know what we've got inside, we
3 need everybody coming into the area to stage
4 south of the Sawgrass, we'll stage there. And
5 can you have Lieutenant Feeley give me a call
6 on my cell phone please.

7 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
8 continue as follows:)

9 CHAIR: And she's still in the, behind the
10 car in the north parking lot at that point, the
11 best we know.

12 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So we're
13 approaching thirty minutes after the first
14 shot. The Garcia group entered the west end of
15 the first floor. This group now includes SWAT
16 deputies, Crime Suppression Team deputies, K-9
17 Sergeant from BSO. Also important to notice,
18 or note, I don't think I mentioned this
19 earlier, so those CST deputies, they receive
20 additional tactical training with SWAT on a
21 frequent, more frequent basis. I believe it's
22 quarterly.

23 Simultaneously the Mazzei group reached
24 the alcove for Classes 1231 and 1232, and an
25 apparent response to Captain Mock's traffic

1 about the shooter being on the second floor,
2 they stop advancing until 3:01.06. So this is
3 the approximate location at that time.

4 As the Garcia group is entering the west
5 stairs of Building 12 Porter tells Rossman that
6 Cruz is on the east side second floor trying to
7 track him to the third. This information is
8 not broadcasted on BSO's radio.

9 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
10 open meeting.)

11 SPEAKER: -- on the east side -- track him
12 to the third.

13 SPEAKER: East side second floor, they're
14 trying to track him to the third. (inaudible)

15 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
16 continue as follows:)

17 SGT. SUESS: Thirty minutes and fourteen
18 seconds, Officer Schmidt, Detectives Alfin,
19 Hodgson and Gariepy, all from CSPD SWAT, join
20 the Garcia group on the first floor of the west
21 stairwell. So this, the Garcia group has grown
22 significantly. You have SWAT members from both
23 agencies. Yes, sir.

24 MR. PETTY: The Mock group stopped, just
25 to make sure I understand the timing here,

1 they, was that ten minutes they stopped?

2 SGT. SUESS: Approximately, yes, sir. And
3 it's the Mazzei group on the second floor. Is
4 that the one you're referring to?

5 MR. PETTY: Sorry, the Mazzei group, yeah.
6 Yeah, that's right, the Mazzei group. So for
7 ten minutes they, they stopped on the second
8 floor.

9 SGT. SUESS: Right. And that is based on
10 their getting this information the shooter is
11 on the second floor.

12 CHAIR: And they're waiting for him to
13 come down, is what it was.

14 SGT. SUESS: Approximately thirty minutes
15 and thirty seconds after the first shot Officer
16 Ryen, who had been cited in the media of being
17 critical of the response, and seeing officers
18 and deputies taking cover positions, he
19 approached Deputy Pianelli, who was on Pine
20 Island Road. He told Deputy Pianelli, like he
21 told Lieutenant O'Neill, that his daughter was
22 in the school. Officer Ryen went on to
23 approach the campus from the south, and was
24 told by an unknown officer or deputy that the
25 shooter is in the administrative officer, which

1 would be Building 1. Officer Ryen went on to
2 enter Building 1 with Officer Clarke of Coral
3 Springs and other unidentified SWAT team
4 members. As I pointed out earlier Officer Ryen
5 did not have his radio. He would not have been
6 able to hear Goolsby's transmission at 2:47
7 telling all officers to enter from the north
8 side of campus. After entering Building 1, and
9 you'll see the video, he is suspected to nearly
10 be the victim in a friendly fire situation.

11 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
12 open meeting.)

13 SGT. SUESS: That's Officer Ryen as he
14 approached Deputy Pianelli.

15 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
16 continue as follows:)

17 SGT. SUESS: Moving back to the Garcia
18 group, as they are moving up the stairs
19 Detective Polo expresses some frustration about
20 the radio traffic. This is not a problem
21 unique to BSO. This happens on a lot of high
22 stress calls where if there's a tactical team
23 or deputies inside a building you don't want a
24 lot of radio traffic about other issues that
25 are not as significant.

1 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
2 open meeting.)

3 SPEAKER: 17Sierral --

4 SPEAKER: K-9 -- K-9 coming through.

5 SPEAKER: K-9 coming through.

6 SPEAKER: That's a 10-4, and -- south of
7 the Sawgrass, we'll stage there. And can you
8 have Lieutenant Feeley give me a call on my
9 cell phone, please?

10 DISPATCH: Lieutenant Feeley, 1045
11 17Sierral.

12 SPEAKER: I do not have my cell phone with
13 me. Stand by.

14 SPEAKER: -- Sierral20, go ahead and take
15 two from each district -- staging area.

16 SPEAKER: -- units coming too.

17 SPEAKER: They need to clear the fucking
18 air man.

19 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
20 continue as follows:)

21 SGT. SUESS: As they continue up the
22 second floor, they reach the second floor
23 landing on the west stairwell. This group now
24 contains approximately eleven law enforcement
25 officers, which are mostly SWAT team members

1 from both BSO and Coral Springs. These
2 officers and deputies will go on to have
3 communication about which radio channel each
4 agency was using.

5 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
6 open meeting.)

7 (inaudible)

8 SPEAKER: -- staging is going to be south
9 of the Sawgrass on the Coral Springs side.

10 (inaudible)

11 SPEAKER: Hey, guys, 17Bravo1, I have
12 Westglades on lockdown --

13 (Unintelligible)

14 SPEAKER: You got -- right?

15 SPEAKER: Yeah, we're on -- we're on Main.
16 You guys are on a different channel, right?

17 SPEAKER: Us -- us too --

18 SPEAKER: We're on Bravo.

19 (inaudible)

20 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
21 continue as follows:)

22 SGT. SUESS: So back beneath the Sawgrass
23 Expressway Lieutenant O'Neill approaches Deputy
24 Chief Parry, and advised him no more officers
25 are needed at the scene.

1 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
2 open meeting.)

3 SPEAKER: Can you -- can you get over your
4 radios and tell your people we don't need any
5 more police at the scene, come to the staging
6 area.

7 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
8 continue as follows:)

9 SGT. SUESS: As the Garcia group reached
10 the second floor hall Detective Gonzales looks
11 in and sees the Mazzei group, as they are
12 further east in that hallway. So at this point
13 you'll see that both groups pretty much stop
14 advancing, and we'll continue to evaluate why,
15 and looking at the radio traffic, the
16 information they're being given.

17 Dispatch and Captain Robinson coordinate
18 on where to have parents gather as they're
19 obviously responding en masse to the school.
20 This is done as the Garcia group is advancing
21 up those stairs, so probably about the same
22 time that Detective Gonzales is frustrated with
23 the amount of radio traffic. As the Garcia
24 group is on that landing Morford broadcasted
25 over the school radio that Cruz is leaving the

1 third floor and, quote, going back down toward
2 the second floor.

3 Cruz left the third floor at 2:27.35,
4 which means that there was actually a
5 twenty-six minutes delay in the surveillance
6 video review. Sergeant Rossman asked Mr.
7 Porter if the information about Cruz going to
8 second floor is live, and Mr. Porter says it
9 is. Yes, ma'am.

10 SEC. KAPUSTA: I have a question about the
11 video system. So I have a video system in my
12 hospital, and it tracks the time constantly so
13 I would know the time of the video. Is that
14 not the case with this system?

15 SGT. SUESS: No, ma'am, they would have
16 known the time. So this really boils down to
17 the telephone game, where you have people
18 inside the camera room watching it who are
19 relaying it over a school radio to both
20 Peterson and Porter, who are relaying it to
21 deputies, who are relaying it to other people
22 over their phone, over their radio.

23 CHAIR: You -- you -- you're going to see
24 this now, This next video is really the crux of
25 the problem, because it's all a communication

1 thing, because the question is are you watching
2 it now, and you're watching it now, well,
3 they're saying, yeah, they're watching it now,
4 versus are what you watching being live. So
5 you say they're watching it, they're watching
6 it, yeah, but they're watching it on delay.
7 That was the disconnect. Go ahead and play it,
8 it will make sense. Play -- play this. Now
9 you'll -- you'll see what happened here.

10 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
11 open meeting.)

12 SPEAKER: -- is leaving, going back down
13 towards the second floor.

14 SPEAKER: No, not that I know of.

15 SPEAKER: I'm not certain because I'm not
16 on that side of --

17 SPEAKER: Okay, keep me posted. Tell me
18 if he exited the building.

19 SPEAKER: Is this live intel?

20 SPEAKER: Yes, sir.

21 SPEAKER: This is live?

22 SPEAKER: This is live.

23 SPEAKER: Nobody else get on this radio
24 but the camera guy.

25 SPEAKER: So what do you --

1 SPEAKER: -- staging area on the south
2 side of --

3 SPEAKER: No, sir. Stay off the phone. I
4 don't know the school like you do. I need this
5 information to relay it on the radio.

6 SPEAKER: -- he's asking me --

7 SPEAKER: No, I -- I don't know the
8 school. When I tell you, ask you a question,
9 give me an answer.

10 SPEAKER: That's our direct --

11 SPEAKER: -- keep them south of our
12 staging area.

13 SPEAKER: Okay, where -- where was he last
14 seen? This is live right now.

15 SPEAKER: They -- they just said he walked
16 out, back to the second floor.

17 SPEAKER: He's walked to the second floor
18 or the first floor?

19 SPEAKER: No, back to the second floor.
20 He went to the third. They said he went back
21 to the second floor.

22 SPEAKER: This is right now?

23 SPEAKER: -- it'll override everybody.

24 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
25 continue as follows:)

1 CHAIR: Is it live. He's saying, yeah,
2 it's live, they're watching it, as opposed to
3 watching a video. That -- that -- that's --
4 that's -- this is -- this video tells the
5 entire story of the crux of the problem, is, is
6 that they knew what they were watching, it was
7 on video delay, but it was being conveyed that
8 it was live. They're in the room watching it,
9 that's live, but what they're watching is a
10 delay.

11 SEC. KAPUSTA: So because it was relayed
12 on the school radio, and we don't have
13 recordings of that --

14 CHAIR: Right.

15 SEC. KAPUSTA: -- we don't actually know
16 if they said --

17 CHAIR: Right.

18 SEC. KAPUSTA: That they're -- that they
19 mention the time stamp when he was making that
20 transmission from the third floor to the second
21 floor. We don't know if they --

22 SGT. SUESS: What I'll do -- what I'll do
23 if it's all right, I'll play the video again,
24 and I should have pointed this out, the very
25 first radio transmissions you'll hear are the

1 school radio, so you're hearing exactly what's
2 being told to Mr. Porter, Medina, and Sergeant
3 Rossman.

4 SEC. KAPUSTA: And I didn't hear anything
5 about time.

6 SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am. No, I don't -- I
7 don't think they -- I don't -- but again, we
8 don't have the advantage of a full transcript
9 of what was said, it's just small fragments.
10 So I'll play this again real quick.

11 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
12 open meeting.)

13 SPEAKER: -- is leaving, going back down
14 towards the second floor.

15 SPEAKER: No, not that I know of.

16 SPEAKER: I'm not certain because I'm not
17 on that side of --

18 SPEAKER: Okay, keep me posted. Tell me
19 if he exited the building.

20 SPEAKER: Is this live intel?

21 SPEAKER: Yes, sir.

22 SPEAKER: This is live?

23 SPEAKER: This is live.

24 SPEAKER: Nobody else get on this radio
25 but the camera guy.

1 SPEAKER: So what do you --

2 SPEAKER: -- staging area on the south
3 side of --

4 SPEAKER: No, sir. Stay off the phone. I
5 don't know the school like you do. I need this
6 information to relay it on the radio.

7 SPEAKER: -- he's asking me --

8 SPEAKER: No, I -- I don't know the
9 school. When I tell you, ask you a question,
10 give me an answer.

11 SPEAKER: That's our direct --

12 SPEAKER: -- keep them south of our
13 staging area.

14 SPEAKER: Okay, where -- where was he last
15 seen? This is live right now.

16 SPEAKER: They -- they just said he --
17 this is live.

18 SPEAKER: -- walked down, back to the
19 second floor.

20 SPEAKER: -- parking lot --

21 SPEAKER: He's walked to the second floor
22 or the first floor?

23 SPEAKER: No, back to the second floor.
24 He went to the third. They said he went back
25 to the second floor.

1 SPEAKER: This is right now?

2 SPEAKER: -- it'll override everybody.

3 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
4 continue as follows:)

5 SGT. SUESS: So almost thirty-two minutes
6 after the first shot Coral Springs mobile
7 command bus arrived beneath the Sawgrass
8 Expressway. Continuing on Captain Soberon, he
9 said once the command bus arrived he was able
10 to print up maps of the MSD school, which they
11 already had possession of. According to
12 Captain Soberon, Chief Pustizzi, the deputy
13 chiefs and he were running command operations
14 beneath the Sawgrass.

15 Approximately that same time Cruz left
16 Walmart, which is west of Westglades Middle
17 School. You'll see at thirty-two minutes and
18 fourteen seconds after the first shot Sergeant
19 Garcia and Detective Gonzales, both from BSO
20 SWAT, entered the west end of the second floor
21 watching the Mazzei group.

22 SEN. BOOK: Excuse, Mr. Chair. So -- and
23 I don't -- and I guess I, I'm just like focused
24 on the campus itself. So he walked by, like
25 walked behind Westglades Middle?

1 SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am. So I don't know
2 the exact path that he took. I know there's a
3 canal. I don't know if there's a bridge over
4 the canal. I don't know if he went up to
5 Holmberg and around that way.

6 SEN. BOOK: Okay. And just in terms of
7 like larger scale conversations, why that
8 lockdown piece is important for when, I mean
9 let's say he didn't want to go to Walmart and
10 he wanted to go into a middle school, I mean --

11 SGT. SUESS: There - there is -- it's my
12 understanding -- and I'll get you a definitive
13 answer, but there is a, that same six foot
14 chain link fence also surrounds Westglades
15 Middle. Now again we're back to the issue of
16 how much of a challenge is that for a nineteen
17 year old, for a nineteen year old man, but --

18 SEN. BOOK: And was it unlocked?

19 CHAIR: You know, and Deputy Eason was
20 there on the, on the west side. He was
21 probably to the north, and may not have seen
22 him, but on that same plane, if you will, that
23 Cruz passed, Cruz would have passed by Eason.
24 So Eason is here, Cruz is coming down here some
25 place, and there's a canal. Eason is here, I

1 mean, so there is somebody there, but --

2 MR. PETTY: And maybe we're going to get
3 into this when we talk about the EMS response,
4 and medical response, but do you have a view on
5 the video delay issue, the impact that had? I
6 see ten minute, ten minutes, we've got the
7 teams in the building that are stopped from
8 breaching rooms and assessing any victims in
9 those, in those rooms. I know there aren't any
10 on the second floor, but they were, they were
11 still breaching rooms, and they didn't know
12 that at the time.

13 Do you have -- do you have an opinion, or
14 an assessment of the, the impact?

15 SGT. SUESS: So I don't think there's any
16 definitive answer. Ten minutes in this
17 obviously is a long time. It would go by
18 quick. Now the issue you run into, I mean I'm
19 not a doctor, I know, we work with forensic
20 pathologists, Special Agent Massucci much
21 longer than I, and I think we're both in
22 agreement you're not going to find a reputable
23 forensic pathologist that can tell you if they
24 had been there ten minutes earlier then this
25 victim may have been in a better condition. I

1 don't -- it cannot be specified to that extent
2 based off my experience.

3 MR. PETTY: Did -- did this also -- it
4 stopped the progress on the second floor, but
5 did it, I mean it also impacted the response on
6 the first floor, and the response on the third
7 floor obviously because we haven't gotten up
8 there yet.

9 SGT. SUESS: Right. No, I mean it --
10 there was definitely an impact. Whether it --
11 what it amounts to, I'm not sure how I can
12 offer a fair assessment of that.

13 MR. PETTY: Was anyone from law
14 enforcement in the camera, in the camera room?

15 SGT. SUESS: No, sir.

16 MR. PETTY: Should someone have been?

17 SEC. KAPUSTA: Oh, yes.

18 SGT. SUESS: To Sheriff Gualtieri's point,
19 in hindsight, yes, that would be great. I mean
20 we know that the shooter was not there, there
21 was no threat in that building. At the time
22 Sergeant Rossman did not know that, and you'll
23 see, we asked him that specifically from his
24 perspective, and you'll see a direct quote from
25 him on why he made that decision. Again, in

1 the heat of the moment, him making that
2 decision, that's a difficult one to, to be too
3 critical of.

4 MR. PETTY: Fair enough. But Captain
5 Jordan had been in there for seven plus
6 minutes, right?

7 SGT. SUESS: Right.

8 CHAIR: So -- so it's going to come out,
9 and just so -- to get to your point is, is that
10 -- and a direct answer to your question is, is
11 that they didn't get to the third floor until
12 at the forty minutes mark, so, and there were
13 victims that were treated on the third floor.
14 Of course there were also deceased on the third
15 floor. You know, the, the ultimate question I
16 think you're asking is, is that would it have
17 made a difference. Nobody knows the answer to
18 that. Nobody will ever know the answer to
19 that. But was there a delay in getting to the
20 third floor, and the answer is yes, you know,
21 there's, there's no question there was a delay
22 in getting to the third floor, but it was
23 because of the tactical decisions that were
24 being made based on the information they had.

25 So based on the information they had, if

1 they're being told that they're in the landing
2 and he's coming down, well, they're going to do
3 what they did, which was to point their rifles
4 and wait for him, and engage him. And did that
5 slow them down, there's no question it slowed
6 them down. And -- and did they -- was the --
7 at the forty minute mark, so it wasn't until
8 3:02 that they hit the third floor landing.
9 That's going to come up here in a minute, and
10 it will come up in Agent Massucci's
11 presentation, so it's -- those are the facts.

12 MR. PETTY: Since Captain Jordan had been
13 in that building, and in that room for seven
14 plus minutes, would that have been an
15 appropriate site for a command post, or was
16 that too close to a -- was that the warm zone,
17 or hot zone?

18 CHAIR: No, you would never put a command
19 post within that building, no.

20 COMM. STEWART: Sheriff, can I --

21 CHAIR: Commissioner Stewart.

22 COMM. STEWART: -- ask one follow up
23 question? I may have misunderstood, but on
24 Slides 428, 429, and I'm not sure which one was
25 the live video, they were directing Morford to

1 follow Cruz on the video from the third floor,
2 and then I don't understand how four minutes
3 later they still have him elsewhere.

4 SGT. SUESS: So there in all likelihood
5 was a great deal of confusion. So Kelvin
6 Greenleaf was operating the camera system. Mr.
7 Morford was there watching him, and controlling
8 the radio basically. What I can tell you in
9 our experience with these, these DVRs, it's
10 difficult, again, as we were speaking with
11 Senator Book about the number of cameras that
12 you have to review, there's different angles,
13 depending on how familiar you are with the DVR
14 system you may miss him at one point, and then
15 you try and backtrack, and then you lose him,
16 so then you got to go back to another camera
17 and pick him up.

18 That's tricky in a static environment, in
19 this dynamic environment, where I'm sure Mr.
20 Greenleaf and Morford were stressed out, it
21 probably complicated the matter.

22 So thirty-two minutes and twenty-two
23 seconds, you'll see Detective Gonzalez attempt
24 to use his radio but unable to do so.

25 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the

1 open meeting.)

2 (inaudible)

3 SPEAKER: I can't queue.

4 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
5 continue as follows:)

6 SGT. SUESS: So obviously Detective
7 Gonzales is frustrated, and in the interview
8 with him he said something that was pretty
9 astounding. And I don't know if it's at this
10 very moment, but he says at some point he's
11 inside Building 12 and he goes and he looks out
12 the window, and sees a great deal of officers
13 and deputies with their rifles pointed at him
14 at the window, so he tries to get on the radio
15 and explain to them if you see, even if you see
16 the shooter and he's shooting at you take
17 cover, do not shoot in here unless absolutely
18 necessary. The concern of course being that
19 there's plenty of civilians and these officers,
20 in there, so they don't want to get shot by
21 their own officers.

22 But information as vital as that he's
23 unable to transmit to those other officers and
24 deputies. Now, is it because he's in school,
25 and we know the signal is restricted, or the

1 throttling, or a combination thereof, I'm not
2 qualified to make that assessment, but it
3 definitely had a negative impact on their
4 response.

5 CHAIR: And even if he had -- getting back
6 to that point -- this is what we talked about,
7 is that the Coral Springs people wouldn't have
8 heard that transmission anyway, so.

9 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. Thirty-two minutes
10 and thirty-one seconds after the first shot
11 Sergeant Mazzei stated he's going to have the
12 students shelter in the classrooms until the
13 find the shooter. So that's Sergeant Mazzei.
14 You see he turns, walks -- so this camera is in
15 the middle. So he turns and walks west back
16 towards Sergeant Garcia, who is on the west end
17 of the second floor, and the two of them
18 engaged in discussion with each other.

19 Shortly thereafter you will see that
20 Medina and Porter get information that Sergeant
21 Rossman would broadcast the suspect had moved
22 from the third to the second floor. This
23 transmission is made as if it is taking place
24 in real time.

25 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the

1 open meeting.)

2 SPEAKER: It's a white male, correct?

3 SPEAKER: Yes.

4 SPEAKER: Correct.

5 SPEAKER: 17t01 1033 for --

6 SPEAKER: Man, I'm trying to think of that

7 kid's name.

8 SPEAKER: -- traffic 1033 only --

9 SPEAKER: They are monitoring the subject

10 right now. He went from the third floor to the

11 second floor. Third to the second floor. He

12 may have a gas mask on now. Stand by for

13 further. They're monitoring him on camera.

14 Sir, what else?

15 SPEAKER: That's all they said -- gas

16 mask --

17 SPEAKER: Where -- what exact room?

18 SPEAKER: They didn't -- they didn't say

19 what room yet.

20 SPEAKER: What building?

21 SPEAKER: 1200 still, third floor.

22 SPEAKER: Kilo1, the subject is now back

23 down on the second floor. He was on the third,

24 back on the second floor now of the 1200

25 building --

1 SPEAKER: Well, so -- I'm so sorry --
2 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
3 continue as follows:)

4 SGT. SUESS: So we'll get to that slide in
5 a minute. Again, we're trying to do this
6 chronologically. This is the point at which
7 Mr. Porter corrects Sergeant Rossman, and
8 advises him that it's not live. But we -- we
9 will get to that shortly.

10 So in response to that radio transmission
11 by Sergeant Rossman you will see that the
12 Garcia group points their rifles up the
13 stairwell.

14 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
15 open meeting.)

16 SPEAKER: They are monitoring the subject
17 right now. He went from the third floor to the
18 second floor.

19 SPEAKER: Third to the second floor. He
20 may have a gas mask on now.

21 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
22 continue as follows:)

23 SGT. SUESS: To clarify one point, several
24 witnesses thought Cruz had a gas mask on.
25 You've -- the majority of you have seen the

1 video. He did not, so just, that happens
2 though, subject descriptions are fairly
3 frequently inaccurate.

4 Thirty-three minutes after the first shot
5 multiple law enforcement officers from various
6 agencies are gathered on Pine Island Road near
7 the bus loop. Chief Pustizzi was among this
8 group. Thirty-three minutes and four seconds
9 after the first shot Deputy Valdes was on the
10 north side of Holmberg Road with a group of
11 deputies. He referenced Building 12 as where
12 the victims were being taken from. Sergeant
13 Miller is standing next to him, points, and
14 says that was the area where he last heard the
15 shots. Seconds later over the Coral Springs
16 channel Captain Mock broadcasted that the
17 suspect is on video moving from the third floor
18 to the second floor.

19 Thirty-three minutes and twenty-one
20 seconds after the first shot approximately
21 three to four BSO SWAT team members enter the
22 east end of Building 12. CSPD had been holding
23 that stairwell. So the way this played out
24 really, law enforcement pretty early on
25 identified they were going to use the west

1 stairwell, and just keep the first floor
2 stairwell secured, or basically keep there from
3 being any movement in there. Again this gets
4 back to the friendly fire situation. If you
5 have two teams moving on both stairwells and
6 then they face each other, and the suspect
7 happens to run out, then it obviously is going
8 to result in additional casualties. So this is
9 the approximate location of everybody at that
10 time.

11 So this is on Deputy Dolcine's body
12 camera, and you will see the fence directly in
13 front of him. That's the same fence that
14 Nikolas Cruz would have gone through. He --
15 once he learns, this deputy learns that the
16 shooter is in Building 12, he identifies that
17 to some nearby paramedics treating a victim,
18 and tells them that basically where they are is
19 not safe, they need to move away.

20 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
21 open meeting.)

22 SPEAKER: Hey, what building is it?

23 SPEAKER: This building, it's this
24 building.

25 SPEAKER: This building, all right. All

1 right, second floor --

2 SPEAKER: He's coming to the second floor
3 now --

4 SPEAKER: Oh, yeah, windows. Yeah. Hey,
5 let's hurry up and move them.

6 SPEAKER: -- rescue team --

7 SPEAKER: Careful --

8 SPEAKER: Yeah, guys --

9 SPEAKER: -- get them out of here --

10 SPEAKER: Let's get them out of here.

11 Let's get them out of here. This is the
12 building right here. This is the building.

13 The suspect is --

14 SPEAKER: In that building right there --

15 SPEAKER: Yeah, let's get them out of
16 here. Let's go. Let's go.

17 SPEAKER: He can't move -- he can't move
18 him -- he's --

19 SPEAKER: Yeah.

20 SPEAKER: One, two, three --

21 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
22 continue as follows:)

23 SGT. SUESS: After broadcasting seconds
24 earlier that the suspect had moved from the
25 third to the second floor Mr. Porter tells

1 Rossman the video is on a delay, and asks to be
2 taken to the camera room.

3 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
4 open meeting.)

5 SPEAKER: 1200 building.

6 SPEAKER: I'm so sorry. I'm sorry.
7 You're asking me if this is live intel, is that
8 where he is right now.

9 SPEAKER: Yeah.

10 SPEAKER: That's where they last saw him
11 on the camera. So that -- that's -- what
12 they're telling me is what they saw on the
13 camera.

14 SPEAKER: All right, what did -- what are
15 they getting from that --

16 SPEAKER: -- in the three story tan and
17 white building, we can do a live feed.

18 SPEAKER: You can do a live feed on your
19 phone --

20 SPEAKER: Yeah, Yeah. Yes. Yes.

21 SPEAKER: No, I don't have it on my phone
22 --

23 SPEAKER: -- there's only three stories --

24 SPEAKER: But if you all will take me
25 inside I can -- but I can't go inside --

1 SPEAKER: -- here on the east side
2 entrance with the dog --

3 SPEAKER: The only people that can take
4 you inside would be SWAT.

5 SPEAKER: Is that SWAT?

6 SPEAKER: That's a bunch of people on --

7 SPEAKER: Can they take me inside?

8 SPEAKER: I don't know.

9 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
10 continue as follows:)

11 MR. SCHACHTER: Did you ask about their
12 training, you know, the administration, these
13 individuals, what kind of training did they get
14 on the video system, and how often is that?
15 Did you feel their training was adequate?

16 DET. BONASORO: They did not -- they
17 didn't train any of the staff on it. There was
18 very limited staff that knew how to
19 proficiently use the camera system. Others
20 could use it, but didn't have the proficiency
21 as others.

22 MR. SCHACHTER: What about --

23 DET. BONASORO: There was no training.

24 MR. SCHACHTER: There was no training.
25 What about Porter -- who's -- who's in the, in

1 the camera room right now?

2 SGT. SUESS: Mr. Morford and Mr.
3 Greenleaf.

4 MR. SCHACHTER: And how was their
5 training, the same thing, none? They were
6 walking in cold.

7 SGT. SUESS: I think -- I think Mr.
8 Greenleaf was proficient with the system, is my
9 understanding.

10 DET. BONASORO: One of the APs, Max
11 Rosario, helped set up the camera system, so he
12 got with Greenleaf, so Greenleaf knew how to
13 use it real well. Then it kind of trickled
14 down from there on how to generically use it,
15 but there was no formal training for it.

16 CHAIR: Senator Book.

17 SEN. BOOK: So this gentleman right here
18 who is laughing and joking, he still works at
19 the school today?

20 CHAIR: At -- yes.

21 SEN. BOOK: And I just also want to make
22 sure I'm clear based on your kind of summation.
23 The district doesn't know this yet?

24 CHAIR: No.

25 SEN. BOOK: Okay.

1 CHAIR: Correct. The District has never
2 seen this.

3 ASA BARTLETT: Question. Have they found
4 his gun by now?

5 SEN. BOOK: No.

6 CHAIR: No. No, the gun isn't found until
7 they hit the third floor landing, which we've
8 yet to come to yet. And we don't hit that
9 until about the forty minute mark, so until --
10 because when he exits the west stair door to
11 the staircase on the third floor, he drops the
12 vest, the tactical vest with the rounds in it,
13 and the magazines, and the, and the weapon, the
14 AR, right inside the door, so it's literally on
15 the landing, so until you get up the stairs
16 you're not going to see it. So the answer is,
17 no, at this point they have no indication that
18 he had abandoned his weapon.

19 SGT. SUESS: So thirty-three minutes and
20 forty-four seconds after the first shot you'll
21 see deputies have an exchange about whether
22 somebody is or is not watching the camera live.

23 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
24 open meeting.)

25 SPEAKER: They're watching the --

1 SPEAKER: It's live, okay.

2 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
3 continue as follows:)

4 SGT. SUESS: Sergeant Garcia steps away
5 from Sergeant Mazzei, and to speak with
6 Detective Gonzales, and you will see Detective
7 Gonzales make reference to his radio problems.
8 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
9 open meeting.)

10 SPEAKER: Tell him. Tell him.

11 SPEAKER: I can't, because you can't queue
12 up here, there's no tone, I got to go back
13 outside.

14 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
15 continue as follows:)

16 SGT. SUESS: So early on in speaking with
17 the BSO homicide detectives they made reference
18 to SWAT having to revert to this runner system
19 because their radios weren't working. Again
20 going back to when we were reviewing this,
21 before we knew who any of these people were and
22 watching the video, we referred to Detective
23 Gonzales as Runner 1, and Detective Hayes, who
24 you'll see later, as Runner 2. It was that
25 apparent as to who these people were because

1 they were just going up and down the stairs, up
2 and down the stairs, and back outside, to relay
3 messages to other law enforcement personnel.

4 CHAIR: Something we should be clear
5 about, we can't differentiate -- when they
6 can't transmit, and you get the bonking, or you
7 get what is that noise, we can't differentiate
8 whether it's an inability to transfer or
9 whether it's throttling because of radio
10 capacity, so there's no way to differentiate
11 that. That tone you get, the sound you get is
12 either because you can't get out or because of
13 throttling, but get, not getting out is not
14 throttling, so they're two different issues,
15 but what, you're going to have the same effect,
16 is you just can't transmit.

17 So we should be clear about that, that you
18 can't tell, and some of it might be throttling,
19 and some of it might be an inability to
20 transmit, so --

21 SGT. SUESS: Thirty-three minutes and
22 fifty- eight seconds, Coral Springs' Bearcat,
23 their armored vehicle arrived in between
24 Buildings 12 and 13. Shortly thereafter Mr.
25 Porter again asked to be taken to the camera

1 room, and turned over his keys to an officer.

2 Sergeant Rossman made a request to have a SWAT
3 team respond to his location.

4 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
5 open meeting.)

6 SPEAKER: He can take you --

7 SPEAKER: I can take you to the camera --

8 SPEAKER: I have access to the office, I
9 have access in the camera room --

10 SPEAKER: Where's the office?

11 SPEAKER: It's right inside this door. We
12 can actually open this side door -- (inaudible)

13 SPEAKER: Guys, can -- (inaudible)

14 SPEAKER: Sierra3 --

15 SPEAKER: Sergeant, can I go in --

16 SPEAKER: -- I'll take him to the --

17 SPEAKER: It's in my office, and it's in
18 the camera room where, where they are, so I can
19 get on a live feed while they're looking at a
20 recorded feed.

21 SPEAKER: They're -- they're going --
22 they're going to the second floor to start
23 clearing classrooms -- (inaudible)

24 SPEAKER: Yes, I have keys. I have keys
25 right there. (inaudible)

1 SPEAKER: We have not been able to --
2 building yet -

3 SPEAKER: -- out of the staging area, do
4 not leave your vehicles.

5 SPEAKER: Guys, we have to assume there
6 could be second person --

7 SPEAKER: We're talking -- we're talking
8 -- are you talking fifteen minutes ago?

9 SPEAKER: He said the last -- 1:26 or
10 something like that. It was -- well, it was
11 like 2:26.

12 SPEAKER: Yeah, 2:26.

13 SPEAKER: Because we were close to the end
14 of the day. (inaudible)

15 SPEAKER: They're going to be coming out
16 of the other side of the building.

17 SPEAKER: You guys don't have live feed
18 from your phones?

19 SPEAKER: No, not on these, no.

20 SPEAKER: I think they're trying to follow
21 him, pick him up, and then I think they're
22 going to go live.

23 SPEAKER: He didn't leave the building,
24 because whenever --

25 SPEAKER: He couldn't --

1 SPEAKER: He was still shooting when
2 everybody was running out --

3 SPEAKER: And this building was tight, we
4 locked that down. I locked all of the doors,
5 the kids are secure --

6 SPEAKER: He's in that building somewhere.

7 SPEAKER: But you've never seen, you don't
8 know who he is?

9 SPEAKER: No, I heard gunshots on the
10 other side of campus --

11 SPEAKER: -- I can't think of his name
12 right now, but I know who, I know who the kid
13 is.

14 SPEAKER: There are a bunch of kids in the
15 auditorium.

16 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
17 continue as follows:)

18 SGT. SUESS: Fourteen seconds later Deputy
19 Sherlock from BSO SWAT directed Detective
20 Hodgson to take additional people with him
21 towards the landing between the second and
22 third floors. He moved halfway beyond, or he
23 moved beyond that halfway landing after seeing
24 victim Jamie Guttenberg lying on the ground on
25 the third floor landing.

1 Thirty-four minutes and fifty-one seconds
2 after the first shot Chief Pustizzi advised
3 officers to assume there is a second shooter,
4 and hold perimeter positions. So again getting
5 back to that plus one rule that is constantly
6 being reinforced.

7 MS. LARKIN SKINNER: Sergeant, was the
8 helicopter ever deployed that was called for?

9 SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am, it was. And it's
10 my understanding, I believe BSO's helicopter
11 serves both the law enforcement and the medevac
12 role, and there were, it was eventually
13 deployed, yes, ma'am.

14 MS. LARKIN SKINNER: Do we know was it
15 deployed at this point?

16 SGT. SUESS: I do not know that. I'm
17 sorry. So at this point Chief Pustizzi
18 approaches Deputy Pianelli and asks are you
19 guys on our channel, or no. Deputy Pianelli
20 replies, no, they didn't patch. So Detective
21 Gonzales, again one of the runners, entered the
22 west end of Building 12. So he's on the first
23 floor. You'll see he has additional radio
24 problems, and he tells Captain Mock, again the
25 Coral Springs SWAT commander, to not have units

1 fire into Building 12. So it's that same issue
2 we referred to earlier.

3 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
4 open meeting.)

5 SPEAKER: Hold on a second. Tell the
6 guys -- do not fire inside -- (inaudible)

7 SPEAKER: Third floor?

8 SPEAKER: Yes.

9 SPEAKER: Shots fired --

10 SPEAKER: Why can't I queue up?

11 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
12 continue as follows:)

13 SGT. SUESS: It's thirty-five minutes
14 twenty-five seconds after the first shot.
15 Peterson and Morford were engaged in
16 conversation on the school radio track, about
17 tracking Cruz through 12. So again this, a
18 body cam is picking up nearby school radio
19 transmissions.

20 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
21 open meeting.)

22 SPEAKER: 01 --

23 SPEAKER: Do we have any visual on him?
24 (inaudible)

25 SPEAKER: No, Scot, we do not. We're

1 still trying. The last thing we see is he's
2 still on the third floor, but again that's
3 still 2:27. (inaudible)

4 SPEAKER: See if he left the third floor.

5 SPEAKER: Mr. Greenleaf is trying. We're
6 trying to get it.

7 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
8 continue as follows:)

9 SEC. KAPUSTA: Do they at this point know
10 that it's Nikolas Cruz they're looking for, or
11 are they still looking for a suspect, and you
12 just referenced Cruz in your document?

13 SGT. SUESS: Still looking for a suspect.
14 And I think we'll get there to where you'll see
15 Medina is basically thinking out loud and says
16 it's Nick something, Nick something. So it's a
17 later I think when they come up with his name.

18 MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant, can't they --
19 isn't there -- on the screen doesn't it say
20 live or not live, or green, or red to indicate
21 that?

22 SGT. SUESS: So we've been given a
23 download that has the proprietary DVR player
24 which allows us to play it. I haven't seen the
25 system at the school, how it works. It may be

1 slightly different, so I don't know, you know,
2 if it's flashing live. It's unlikely in my
3 experience, of what I've seen on DVRs it's
4 unlikely that that would be the case.

5 MR. DODD: Where -- I've got a question.
6 Where was Peterson at this time, was he still
7 in the same location thirty-five minutes
8 afterward when they're talking on the radio
9 here?

10 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir, it's -- and you'll
11 get the timestamp. I think it's around forty
12 nine, forty-five minutes that he leaves that
13 area.

14 CHAIR: So he's still there. It's not
15 until 3:11.20, forty nine minutes and forty-two
16 seconds, that he leaves his hiding place.

17 SGT. SUESS: So thirty-five minutes
18 thirty- three seconds after the first shot
19 Colonel Polan attempted to locate the incident
20 commander. He, Colonel Polan that is, was not
21 yet on scene.

22 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is
23 played in the open meeting.)

24 SPEAKER: -- Sierra3.

25 SPEAKER: Sierra3.

1 SPEAKER: Where is the incident commander
2 right now?

3 DISPATCH: 17Sierra1.

4 SPEAKER: 17Sierra1.

5 DISPATCH: Advise your location.

6 SPEAKER: 17Sierra1.

7 DISPATCH: Your 20? (inaudible)

8 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and
9 the proceedings continue as follows:)

10 SGT. SUESS: So again, definitely appears
11 to be some radio problems through these
12 transmissions.

13 MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant, do we know where
14 Assistant Principal Rosario was, and what his,
15 what he did?

16 SGT. SUESS: At that very moment, no, sir.
17 But we do -- we have seen his involvement and
18 what he did, yes, sir.

19 MR. SCHACHTER: Are we going to talk about
20 that?

21 SGT. SUESS: No, sir. His -- his role --
22 he was not actively involved. We -- I believe
23 he was one of them that saw Peterson, and then
24 he started directing students away from
25 Building 12. Rosario I believe was another one

1 that identified gunshots coming from 12.

2 If -- if we were to stay here and tell you
3 everything we've learned from everybody we'd be
4 here for probably the next month.

5 MR. SCHACHTER: He's just an assistant
6 principal, so that's why I was curious.

7 SGT. SUESS: No, I understand. At thirty-
8 five minutes and thirty-eight seconds after the
9 first shot Captain Mock tells SWAT officers in
10 the Bearcat that there are people inside the
11 building, and not to fire unless absolutely
12 necessary, presumably in response to his
13 discussion with Detective Gonzales.

14 Over the school radio Deputy Peterson is
15 telling Assistant Principal Morford what to
16 watch for on the video, and Mr. Porter again
17 points out the time delay. Sergeant Rossman
18 would not broadcast the fact there was a delay
19 for about another four minutes.

20 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
21 open meeting.)

22 SPEAKER: Jeff, keep all -- keep all the
23 monitors at all one time so you can see if he's
24 existing.

25 SPEAKER: We got them -- we got them all

1 open.

2 SPEAKER: See, they're looking at recorded
3 feeds, not like feeds.

4 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
5 continue as follows:)

6 MR. SCHACHTER: I'm sorry, can I just ask
7 a question. How many people were injured on
8 the third floor that survived?

9 CHAIR: Ten -- ten -- there were ten total
10 shot on the third floor.

11 MR. SCHACHTER: So four survived.

12 CHAIR: Right.

13 SGT. SUESS: Thirty-six minutes and
14 eighteen seconds after the first shot, after
15 Mr. Porter had turned over his keys civilians
16 begin getting evacuated from Building 1.
17 Sergeant Rossman sort of gets dragged into
18 this, and points out his concerns. The
19 downfall is this sort of pulls him away from
20 the video review.

21 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
22 open meeting.)

23 SPEAKER: Hey, guys -- guys --

24 SPEAKER: You all okay? You guys okay?

25 (inaudible)

1 SPEAKER: Come on. This way -- this --
 2 debrief them.
 3 SPEAKER: Pat them down.
 4 SPEAKER: Along the wall. Along the wall.
 5 Along the wall.
 6 SPEAKER: Run along the wall. Don't go
 7 too far out.
 8 SPEAKER: Can I help with this --
 9 SPEAKER: No, sir, we got it.
 10 SPEAKER: Run up against the wall.
 11 SPEAKER: No (inaudible)
 12 DISPATCH: All units are entering from the
 13 north side of the school --
 14 SPEAKER: More coming. More coming. Hold
 15 on.
 16 SPEAKER: I'm ready.
 17 SPEAKER: There are a lot of kids in
 18 there.
 19 SPEAKER: All right, send them out to us
 20 one by one, one by one. Special needs coming
 21 out -- coming out.
 22 SPEAKER: Got to get reunited with their
 23 parents --
 24 SPEAKER: Don't worry about that, we'll
 25 get that.

1 SPEAKER: Can I bring them out --

2 SPEAKER: Not yet, let's -- let's do it
3 one -- I don't want to do individual runs --
4 (inaudible)

5 SPEAKER: Come over here guys. Come over
6 here. It's okay. It's okay.

7 SPEAKER: It's all right, it's all
8 right --

9 SPEAKER: Why are we taking them out --

10 SPEAKER: We have a special needs
11 students --

12 SPEAKER: If they're sheltered in place
13 why are we taking them out, Lieutenant?

14 SPEAKER: Is anyone else inside that --

15 SPEAKER: I don't know who's directing --

16 SPEAKER: I mean shelter in place. This
17 is going to cause more of a logistic problem.
18 We're going to get too many people here.

19 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
20 continue as follows:)

21 SGT. SUESS: Thirty-six minutes twenty
22 seconds after the first shot Detective Hayes,
23 so he's that other runner. Basically he
24 handles the east side of Building 12 while
25 Detective Gonzalez is on the west. You'll see

1 Detective Hayes and Captain Mock engage in
2 conversation on the first floor. Detective
3 Hayes then ran to the east stairs and appeared
4 to be giving direction to SWAT deputies in the
5 east stairwell.

6 So at this point not in the formal
7 command, incident command system, but you have
8 by de-facto a command post within Building 12,
9 and that Captain Mock, Detective Hayes, and
10 Detective Gonzales, are sharing information and
11 coordinating the movements within side Building
12 12.

13 Thirty-six minutes and twenty-one seconds
14 after the first shot Detectives Hayes, I'm
15 sorry, Alfin Hodgson, and Officer Schmidt from
16 Coral Springs SWAT, reach the third floor
17 landing, where the located Jamie Guttenberg,
18 and located Cruz's gun and vest.

19 CHAIR: So that's the point where they
20 first -- Commissioner Bartlett, this is the
21 first place now that they realize that the gun
22 is recovered, and we got it. So let's do this.
23 Let's stop there. It's 12:20. Hopefully you
24 all will be able to live with this -- we still
25 got a ways to go before we get through this,

1 and we need to stop a few minutes before 2:00
2 with Peterson coming in. Hopefully everybody
3 can live with about thirty minutes for lunch.
4 So it's 12:20 now. Let's start again at 12:50,
5 and then we'll take a short break before 2:00.
6 So we'll reconvene at 12:50.

7 (Thereupon, the meeting is in recess, and the
8 proceedings continue as follows:)

9 CHAIR: All right, we're going to resume.
10 Sergeant Suess, go ahead.

11 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. Mr. Sample, if
12 you'd just switch the screens please, I'd
13 appreciate it. Thank you, sir. So just to, as
14 a reminder, at this point the first three
15 officers have reached the third floor via the
16 west stairwell. They locate Cruz's gun.
17 Again, to reemphasize that plus one rule, you
18 can't assume because they find this gun that
19 another shooter, or the shooter doesn't have
20 another gun on him.

21 So again, at this point this is where
22 everyone approximately is located within the
23 building, still operating based off the
24 information, the delayed information about
25 where the shooter is seen on video. Detective

1 Gonzales and Sergeant Garcia discuss bringing
2 additional SWAT deputies to their location, and
3 you'll see Gonzales attempts to use Detective
4 Polo's radio, but it does not work either.

5 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
6 open meeting.)

7 (inaudible)

8 SPEAKER: You want to queue up on this
9 radio, this --

10 SPEAKER: -- were entering from the north
11 side of the school -- (inaudible)

12 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
13 continue as follows:)

14 SGT. SUESS: Thirty-six minutes and forty-
15 four seconds after the first shot Sergeants
16 Mazzei and Captain Mock coordinate about the
17 movement of the law enforcement officers within
18 Building 12. Captain Mock is working to
19 coordinate the response between the two SWAT
20 teams, and this is just a sample, but this type
21 of communication would continue over Coral
22 Springs radio system.

23 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
24 open meeting.)

25 SPEAKER: Use the radio -- use the radio

1 --

2 SPEAKER: 10, go ahead.

3 SPEAKER: Right now we got BSO SWAT
4 (inaudible) staging on the west, or I'm sorry,
5 the east stairwell, the east stairwell on the
6 second floor. They are not going to
7 (inaudible) until you guys clear. Once you're
8 done marry up with them, and we're going to
9 pound up to the north on both stairwells, on
10 the third floor to hold.

11 SPEAKER: All right, copy that. We've
12 already cleared most of the second floor. We
13 still go about halfway to go. I am (inaudible)
14 BSO right here. You want us to finish the
15 second floor clearing? We do have students
16 that are sheltered in place right now, but you
17 want us to proceed to the third floor, correct?

18 SPEAKER: Okay, yes. BSO is holding the
19 stairwell. Yeah, let's let -- finish the clear
20 for victims, and if we can, if you can clear it
21 up where we can push teams up to hold the third
22 floor let's do that.

23 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
24 continue as follows:)

25 SGT. SUESS: Thirty-six minutes and fifty

1 seconds after the first shots fired by Cruz a
2 deputy asked aloud why didn't they patch these
3 channels. Another law enforcement officer
4 nearby says that's the first thing they should
5 have done. I include this just to illustrate
6 some of the frustrations on the front line,
7 officers and deputies.

8 Thirty-seven minutes and thirty-one
9 seconds after the first shots Mr. Morford
10 transmitted over the school radio that Cruz has
11 fled the building without his gun. Mr. Porter
12 relayed this information to Sergeant Rossman.
13 Sergeant Rossman at this point was engaged with
14 the fleeing students, and trying to address
15 that issue. Nearby Coral Springs officers
16 heard it over the, over their radio as a result
17 of Peterson sharing the information with
18 Captain Gallagher and Officer Best.

19 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
20 open meeting.)

21 SPEAKER: The west stairs, and --

22 SPEAKER: -- down the west stairs, and
23 came down --

24 SPEAKER: -- running outside of the
25 building?

1 SPEAKER: This way --

2 SPEAKER: 10-4.

3 SPEAKER: He came outside of the building

4 and, and dropped his bag.

5 SPEAKER: Did he go out the east side or

6 the west side?

7 SPEAKER: Whoa, this way. Whoa -- whoa --

8 this way.

9 SPEAKER: -- still had his --

10 SPEAKER: Hold them. Why were you --

11 (inaudible)

12 SPEAKER: -- can we -- in place.

13 SPEAKER: His name is Nick, Nick

14 something.

15 SPEAKER: About twenty minutes ago is what

16 we're showing --

17 SPEAKER: Okay, about twenty minutes ago

18 --

19 SPEAKER: He got -- (inaudible)

20 SPEAKER: -- you can see him fleeing

21 towards the stadium.

22 SPEAKER: Up -- up against the wall.

23 SPEAKER: They're trying to look to see if

24 he fled towards the stadium.

25 SPEAKER: -- nothing yet.

1 SPEAKER: All right, that's it for kids
2 coming out.

3 SPEAKER: Up against the wall. Ma'am --

4 SPEAKER: Come on, let's get them back
5 against the wall.

6 SPEAKER: Excuse us -- (inaudible)

7 SPEAKER: His name was Nick, Nick
8 something, not, he wore a camo mask last year,
9 he was wearing -- he was scaring kids with the
10 camo mask.

11 SPEAKER: Step up here, sir. (inaudible)

12 SPEAKER: Heads up. Did you hear that?

13 SPEAKER: What?

14 SPEAKER: Suspect ran out of the west
15 side --

16 SPEAKER: Suspect just ran out of the west
17 side building --

18 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
19 continue as follows:)

20 SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am?

21 MS. LARKIN SKINNER: Do we know who
22 decided to evacuate Building 1 of civilians?

23 SGT. SUESS: No, ma'am, not exactly. No,
24 we -- we do not know. I'm sorry. That's the
25 clear answer.

1 Thirty-seven minutes and thirty-nine
2 seconds, the BSO Bearcat pulls in behind the
3 CSPD Bearcat, and again these are just the
4 armored vehicles, north of Building 13, and
5 multiple SWAT deputies exited the rear of the
6 BSO Bearcat. On the other end of the building,
7 so the east end of Building 12, Detective Hayes
8 and Captain Mock engaged in communication on
9 the first floor. Detective Hayes later ran to
10 the east stairwell and directed those SWAT
11 deputies to move up to the second floor
12 landing. Image illustrating everyone's
13 approximate location at that point.

14 Thirty-eight minutes and eleven seconds
15 after the first shots Captain Robson BSO SWAT
16 commander arrived on scene. He parked behind
17 the BSO's Bearcat north of Building 13.
18 Thirty-eight minutes and forty-four seconds
19 after the first shot Captain Gallagher
20 broadcasted over Coral Springs radio that the
21 suspect was on video running out of the west
22 side of the building. So Deputy Pianelli,
23 again, he's on Pine Island Road near the bus
24 loop north of the Sawgrass Expressway, and
25 engaged in conversation with multiple people,

1 including Major Grant from BSO and Chief
2 Pustizzi of Coral Springs about the location of
3 the command post.

4 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
5 open meeting.)

6 SPEAKER: -- down here --

7 SPEAKER: Was that command post down here?

8 SPEAKER: Yeah, it's going to be up
9 outside the Sawgrass there.

10 SPEAKER: Somebody with him --

11 SPEAKER: They got it south, south of the
12 Sawgrass, they were setting it up over there.

13 SPEAKER: Yeah, they said it was going
14 here, like where Jan Jordan is.

15 SPEAKER: They had like two, two areas. I
16 don't know if Jan is on the north side and we
17 have something -- all the guys that are showing
18 up are on the south side.

19 SPEAKER: Where's SRT going?

20 SPEAKER: 17Juliet4 she was exiting, and
21 she's backing out, she's making her way back to
22 the command post --

23 SPEAKER: Everybody is meeting up back
24 down there, Sarge.

25 SPEAKER: -- command post. All I see is

1 Coral Springs. Right now we have -- we need to
2 get -- with Coral Springs.

3 SPEAKER: -- Pine Island.

4 SPEAKER: The command post -- (inaudible)

5 SPEAKER: Okay, I'm just trying to -- with
6 somebody --

7 SPEAKER: I wish they had radios patched.

8 SPEAKER: Huh?

9 SPEAKER: I wish they had the radios
10 patched. (inaudible)

11 SPEAKER: We're over there.

12 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
13 continue as follows:)

14 SGT. SUESS: It's difficult to hear, but
15 at the end Deputy Pianelli tells Chief Pustizzi
16 I wish they had the radios patched.

17 Thirty-eight minutes and fifty-five
18 seconds after the first shot Mr. Morford
19 broadcast over the radio that Cruz is out by
20 the basketball courts, and ran towards the
21 shed. Thirty-nine minutes and a second after
22 the first shots an unidentified person
23 attempted to locate Captain Jordan. Deputy
24 Perry makes a transmission about her leaving
25 his location, and that she was experiencing

1 radio problems. Shortly after this the
2 Captains Robson and Jordan would meet up.
3 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is
4 played in the open meeting.)

5 SPEAKER: Still looking for the location
6 of the incident commander.

7 DISPATCH: 10-4, we're still -- her radio
8 is not working.

9 SPEAKER: Is somebody with her?

10 DISPATCH: 17Sierra1.

11 SPEAKER: 17Juliet4, she was next to me,
12 and she's backing out, and she's making her way
13 back to the command post. Her radio was 10-7.

14 SPEAKER: I don't see a command post. All
15 I see is Coral Springs, and right now we have a
16 unified response, and we need to get her with
17 Coral Springs.

18 DISPATCH: The command post staging --

19 SPEAKER: -- I am with 17Sierra1, we're at
20 the SWAT -- with the Bearcat. Where is Coral
21 Springs, I need them here if they have SWAT
22 operators.

23 SPEAKER: All right, I will be with their
24 Deputy Chief in thirty seconds. What do you
25 need of them?

1 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and
2 the proceedings continue as follows:)

3 SGT. SUESS: So we conducted an interview
4 with Captain Robson. He has extensive
5 experience with the SWAT team at BSO. Captain
6 Robson stated while he was at the hospital with
7 his mother he received a call from Lieutenant
8 McCoy, so the second in charge on the SWAT
9 team. While responding he was under the
10 impression that the shooter was still present.
11 He was waiting to hear somebody on the radio
12 establish command and control, but he did not
13 hear that happen. While responding he
14 identified a staging area for the SWAT team,
15 and you've heard that radio traffic.

16 He described sustained and prolonged radio
17 problems, which prevented him from coordinating
18 with his team, and others. Upon arrival he met
19 with Sergeant Chris Hickox, who is a team
20 leader on BSO SWAT team. He told Captain
21 Robson that they were also having radio
22 problems. Captain Robson directed the rest of
23 the SWAT team inside Building 12. Captain
24 Robson also spoke about having to make use of a
25 runner system due to the radios not working.

1 He said that he established a TOC, and as a
2 reminder that's the tactical operations
3 command, and a command post at the rear of his
4 SUV. Captain Jordan approached him while he
5 was setting up a command post at the rear of
6 his SUV.

7 In his interview we asked Captain Robson
8 if he recalled any conversation with Captain
9 Jordan in which she provided any information or
10 intelligence, and he said not that I recall.
11 We asked him if she gave any specifics about
12 which building, how many people were inside,
13 whether somebody was in the video room, or
14 anything to that affect, and he said not that I
15 recall.

16 At this point Captain Robson assumed he
17 was the incident commander. He did not recall
18 any specific discussion between himself and
19 Captain Jordan about who was the incident
20 commander. He stated that later as Colonel
21 Polan arrived Colonel Polan identified himself
22 as the incident commander, which allowed
23 Captain Robson to focus solely on tactical
24 issues.

25 Once Building 13 was cleared the TOC moved

1 inside of Building 13. The TOC was used to
2 coordinate all SWAT teams in clearing the rest
3 of campus. He recalled Deputy Peterson coming
4 into the TOC to draw a map of the campus. And
5 again this is moving along later in the
6 chronology. Going back to that plus one rule,
7 Captain Robson's quote, and then obviously
8 switching concerns I had also were, is there a
9 second offender, is there a second shooter, are
10 there IEDs, other things that just because he's
11 gone doesn't mean the threat is over, so that
12 was still our concern with the campus.

13 Captain Robson stated he was unaware of
14 any fire rescue or command stuff being at the
15 command post, or TOC, as it was on the north
16 end of campus. He was aware that SWAT medics
17 were inside the building, and had checked every
18 victim. He directed that the Bearcat be used
19 as an ambulance if necessary to evacuate the
20 injured students. He remained in communication
21 with SWAT team leaders, and the SWAT Medic
22 Lasseter regarding medical issues, medical
23 issues. So Mr. Lasseter is the medic team
24 leader for BSO SWAT. So he's a firefighter
25 paramedic employed by BSO, and a collateral

1 responsibility is he's in charge of all BSO
2 SWAT medics. Special Agent Massucci will go
3 into additional detail about that later today.

4 Captain Robson described that a rescue
5 task force was not an appropriate response to
6 this incident due to SWAT medics being inside,
7 and concerns about there being misinformation
8 on Cruz's location. Captain Pumariega was a
9 captain with the Margate Fire Department. He
10 said that he was at the TOC, and recalled
11 speaking with somebody, and described him. The
12 description of the individual with whom he
13 spoke matched that of Captain Robson.

14 According to Captain Pumariega he
15 requested to use the rescue task force, but
16 that was declined. Captain Pumariega said that
17 once he learned that multiple SWAT medics were
18 inside he was satisfied that the victims were
19 receiving the necessary medical treatment.

20 UNDER SHER. HARPRING: Can I ask a
21 question?

22 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

23 CHAIR: Go ahead.

24 UNDER SHER. HARPRING: Prior to Captain
25 Robson being there was it recognized that

1 Captain Jordan was the ICS commander, the
2 incident commander?

3 SGT. SUESS: So that was never declared.
4 It wasn't transmitted over the radio. I'm, you
5 know, again, we had multiple, multiple say
6 assuming, or presuming, we're in District 17 in
7 Parkland, that she would be the incident
8 commander, but it was never declared or
9 established.

10 UNDER SHER. HARPRING: And that -- since
11 it wasn't that would have been unknown to Coral
12 Springs.

13 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. Yeah, that's --
14 that's abundantly clear, yes, sir.

15 UNDER SHER. HARPRING: Similarly, when
16 Captain Robson arrived it's indicated that he
17 assumed that he was taking over commander, that
18 he was the incident commander; is that correct?

19 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

20 UNDER SHER. HARPRING: Was that ever
21 broadcast, either over BSO or through relay to
22 Coral Springs?

23 SGT. SUESS: Not that I'm aware of.
24 Eventually Captain Mock, once he was finished
25 in Building 12, but that's much later, would go

1 to the CP/TOC. I believe it's not, and we can
2 review the radio transcripts to confirm this,
3 but I believe it's not until Colonel Polan
4 arrives and he broadcasts over the radio and
5 says I'm the incident commander.

6 UNDER SHER. HARPRING: And so prior to
7 that no one really would have a defined idea,
8 at least under NIMS and ICS who the actual
9 incident commander would be.

10 SGT. SUESS: Correct.

11 UNDER SHER. HARPRING: Okay.

12 CHAIR: There was still a lot of confusion
13 about that, and because the command buses were
14 at the Sawgrass and Captain Robson and Captain
15 Jordan were in the north parking lot, and then
16 the TOC ended up moving into the 1300 Building
17 at one point, so throughout, as you'll see,
18 there was confusion as to where the actual
19 command post was, and then after Colonel Polan
20 gets there Captain Jordan went over to the
21 Sawgrass, and it was kind of a split command
22 between the command post being at the command
23 bus and the TOC being in a separate place.
24 You'll see this evolve more, but that confusion
25 probably continued through the whole incident.

1 MR. PETTY: Quick -- quick question,
2 Chair.

3 CHAIR: Go ahead.

4 MR. PETTY: Sergeant, I know this is
5 jumping ahead, the interview jumps ahead a
6 little bit in the timeline, but this, this
7 appears to be the first time anyone is sort of
8 making any type of command decision, at least
9 on the BSO side; is that --

10 SGT. SUESS: As far as it being
11 transmitted over the radio, I mean, you know,
12 early on there's a request for a helicopter and
13 a K-9. That's thinking a little more big
14 picture. I mean it's, it's not establishing a
15 command post, thinking on the grand scale of
16 things.

17 MR. PETTY: And whose responsibility is it
18 to declare the incident commander; how does
19 that work?

20 SGT. SUESS: What I would like to say at
21 that point is I have precisely zero years of
22 experience as an incident commander, so I'll
23 defer to the more senior ranking law
24 enforcement officers.

25 CHAIR: Go ahead, Sheriff Judd.

1 SHER. JUDD: What occurs, the senior
2 person on the initial scene takes command. It
3 goes from the first responding deputy to the
4 first sergeant, to the lieutenant, and then we
5 set a command structure. And then they -- then
6 they designate among themselves, and ultimately
7 you'll end up with a department chief or a
8 division major that, that ultimately runs the
9 command, depending on the type of emergency.

10 CHAIR: But -- but everybody was logical
11 in their assumption. That was the Parkland
12 district, Captain Jordan was on scene. She was
13 the highest ranking person there until a couple
14 majors got there, but certainly when Colonel
15 Polan got there, and everybody's assumption,
16 and talking to everybody that we did the
17 assumption was that she was in command, and
18 that was the logical assumption. And you heard
19 some discussion, some radio traffic about that,
20 you know, so until that point they, that
21 everybody was operating under that premise.
22 And it was clear that everybody was operating
23 under that premise that she was in command,
24 that she was the incident commander.

25 MR. PETTY: Yeah. So the procedure would

1 be for Captain Jordan, or whomever, to declare
2 themselves the incident commander?

3 CHAIR: It's better if they do that
4 because then it takes away any ambiguity. And
5 certainly Colonel Polan did that as soon as he
6 got there. But remember Sergeant Miller was
7 there first, and, you know, you still, you'll
8 see another slide coming up here where he still
9 didn't move off of Holmberg Road until he
10 moseyed on down to the Sawgrass, and so, you
11 know, he was there first, but he was mute for
12 like the first ten minutes that he was there,
13 so, you know, at first he would have been the
14 incident commander because he was the sergeant
15 on duty and he was there, and then when Captain
16 Jordan got there logically, but it's always
17 better to be direct in the communication and
18 take away ambiguity, so in the ideal world,
19 yes, somebody should say I got this.

20 SHER. JUDD: And -- and that's what should
21 happen, there should be a pass off, because for
22 example, I may arrive on the scene but I don't
23 take incident command, but there is someone
24 designated, and, and that, the one that's in
25 command maintains command until relieved of the

1 command.

2 MR. PETTY: Okay.

3 SGT. SUESS: So we spoke with Captain
4 Jordan about the specific issue as well. She
5 said that she briefed Captain Robson by his
6 vehicle about what she knew and where teams
7 were located. Upon Colonel Polan's arrival she
8 was directed to go set up a command post on
9 Pine Island Road. It should be noted it was
10 approximately sixteen minutes after Captain
11 Robson's arrival, is when Colonel Polan
12 arrived.

13 Thirty-nine minutes and twenty-five
14 seconds after the first shots Nikolas Cruz
15 arrived at the McDonalds located south of the
16 Walmart, which you previously have seen. Just
17 shy of forty minutes after the first shots CSPD
18 SWAT officers were on the third floor landing
19 in the west stairwell. They open the door and
20 see an additional victim on the floor who
21 suffered fatal injuries.

22 At this point the Mazzei group left their
23 positions where they had been holding since
24 2:51.31, so just shy of ten minutes. They
25 continued advancing east on the second floor.

1 This would in all likelihood have been in
2 response to it being broadcasted over their
3 radio that the suspect has been seen leaving
4 the building.

5 In response to Captain Robson saying that
6 CSPD SWAT is needed to the command post, and
7 you'll see this video and hear the audio in
8 just a minute, Lieutenant O'Neill tells Captain
9 Soberon that the command post is on the north
10 side of campus. So again, sort of what gets
11 this video set in motion is Captain Robson
12 saying if CSPD SWAT is needed they need to be
13 on the north end of campus.

14 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
15 open meeting.)

16 SPEAKER: Where is Coral Springs, I need
17 them here if they have SWAT --

18 SPEAKER: Coral Springs SWAT, we can use
19 Coral Springs SWAT at the command post.

20 SPEAKER: Where's the command post --
21 (inaudible)

22 SPEAKER: We've been asking where the
23 command post is. We're about to set up our
24 own.

25 SPEAKER: They just -- they -- we can't

1 get on the fucking radio, is the problem.

2 SPEAKER: We're not patched.

3 (inaudible)

4 SPEAKER: -- your SWAT, and they're
5 actually working --

6 SPEAKER: That's what they're asking right
7 now --

8 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
9 continue as follows:)

10 SGT. SUESS: Thirty-nine minutes and
11 thirty- nine seconds after the first shot
12 Nikolas Cruz sat at a table with student John
13 Wilford. John's sister Maddie suffered severe
14 non-fatal injuries inside of Building 12.
15 Approximately thirty-nine minutes and forty
16 seconds after the first shot Mr. Morford
17 broadcasted over the school radio that Cruz was
18 running by the tennis courts, and provided a
19 clothing description. Mr. Porter relayed that
20 information to Sergeant Rossman.

21 Thirty-nine minutes and forty-seven
22 seconds after the first shot Detective
23 Gonzales, again one of the runners, left the
24 second floor landing and ran down the west
25 stairs. He continued out of the west end of

1 Building 12, and would return upstairs
2 approximately one minute later. Just over
3 forty minutes after the first shots Captain
4 Robson said that due to radio problems he
5 needed everyone who was not on the scene to get
6 off the channel. He stated that he's with
7 Captain Jordan next to the SWAT Bearcat in
8 front of Building 13 on the north side.

9 MS. LARKIN SKINNER: One quick question.
10 It's been a while since we had our presentation
11 about radios, but what I was -- what I'm
12 wondering is if the throttling problem affects
13 dispatch, the, the control location. Does that
14 keep them from being able to broadcast, or from
15 people being able to hear it?

16 SGT. SUESS: I actually was not here for
17 that presentation, I was doing investigative
18 work, so I'll defer.

19 CHAIR: No. No, is the answer.

20 MS. LARKIN SKINNER: So in theory someone
21 could have called them to relay some of the
22 information they couldn't relay via the radio.
23 They could have been contacted by telephone
24 perhaps, someone in that area.

25 CHAIR: What you're -- is your ask --

1 somebody could have called them on their cell
2 phones?

3 MS. LARKIN SKINNER: Or a land line, I
4 mean I don't -- whatever.

5 CHAIR: That -- that's really not -- in
6 that situation, you know, with that, you've got
7 so many things going on, and you're doing so
8 much at once, and tactically, to try, you know,
9 and with what they're doing in that building to
10 try and -- and the other part is, is in that
11 building you got cell phone communication
12 issues anyway. The cell phones likely weren't
13 working, and --

14 MS. LARKIN SKINNER: I didn't mean in the
15 building. I mean all those folks that were
16 around the outside, or the --

17 CHAIR: Yeah, but in, you know, having
18 been there done that is, is that, you know,
19 everybody's not going to have each other's
20 numbers, there's all kinds -- that -- that is
21 not an effective way to communicate.

22 MS. LARKIN SKINNER: Okay. I just
23 wondered, in Captain Jordan's situation
24 specifically, if she had called in somehow with
25 her cell phone --

1 CHAIR: But -- well you heard some in
2 there. Remember at one point she says that she
3 wanted Lieutenant Feeley to call her, and
4 Lieutenant Feeley didn't have his cell phone.
5 So they were making some effort at some
6 communication, but to en masse effectively
7 communicate via cell phone where information
8 can be disseminated so that everybody knows,
9 and they can act on it appropriately, it's not
10 going to work.

11 SGT. SUESS: Forty minutes and thirteen
12 seconds after the first shot over Coral Springs
13 radio one of their SWAT medics contacted
14 Captain Mock to try and locate any more victims
15 in order to communicate that with fire rescue
16 staging. Captain Mock explained to him they
17 have victims inside and are working to evacuate
18 them.

19 At forty minutes and twenty-nine seconds
20 CSPD SWAT members yelled down to the second
21 floor landing in the west stairwell while
22 pointing down the hall. This prompts other
23 officers and deputies to run up to the third
24 floor landing. This is in response to victim
25 Anthony Borges, who is lying in the middle of

1 the hallway and asking for assistance.

2 At forty minutes and thirty-one seconds
3 Cruz left McDonalds behind John Wilford.

4 SEC. SENIOR: Do we know what those two
5 were -- do we know of, what the details were of
6 any conversations between those two?

7 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. Very little. And
8 it was -- I mean it's -- it's my belief this is
9 pure happenstance, that he sits at a table with
10 the brother of one of his victims. But Cruz
11 apparently was pretty pushy asking John for a
12 ride, because he knew John's mother was coming
13 to pick them up, and so Cruz was trying to get
14 a ride with John.

15 MR. DODD: And John was there because he
16 had evacuated from the school.

17 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. Yes, several other
18 kids went to the McDonalds, the Walmart, just,
19 you know, waiting, waiting for rides,
20 contacting parents.

21 Forty minutes and forty seconds after the
22 first shots Detective Hayes and Gonzales ran
23 toward each other on the first floor and met up
24 in the center of the hall. Captain Mock walked
25 toward them while gesturing and talking, so

1 again the communication continues between the
2 BSO SWAT deputies and Captain Mock from Coral
3 Springs.

4 At forty minutes and forty-two seconds
5 Sergeant Rossman broadcasted the video is
6 delayed. This is twenty minutes after they
7 first met with Mr. Porter, and seven minutes
8 after Mr. Porter first told Sergeant Rossman
9 that there was a video delay.

10 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
11 open meeting.)

12 SPEAKER: 7Kilol, they have the subject
13 exiting the school about twenty minutes ago,
14 stand by for further. He dropped the bag near
15 the stairwell, stand by for further.

16 SPEAKER: They said he ran out to the side
17 towards the canal. So he didn't come back
18 here, he -- (inaudible)

19 SPEAKER: -- Peterson.

20 SPEAKER: Yes, sir, they're following --
21 it's about a twenty minute delay. They're
22 following him on video, on the camera, they had
23 him exiting the building running south.

24 SPEAKER: We got a victim down in the
25 hallway -- gunshots wounds on the third floor.

1 SPEAKER: -- exiting the west --

2 SPEAKER: You hear that, he got in with
3 all the kids that exited towards Westglades
4 with all of our kids --

5 SPEAKER: -- what building, the three
6 story building on the far east side, that's
7 Building 12, 10-4.

8 SPEAKER: What's Building 12, far east
9 side?

10 SPEAKER: Building 12 is over there.
11 Westglades they went down here -- he went -- he
12 mixed in with the kids and went to Westglades.

13 SPEAKER: Kilo1, according to the school
14 officials and the video he possibly may have
15 mixed in with the kids in a westbound direction
16 towards Westglades.

17 DISPATCH: 10-4, possibly mixed in with
18 children --

19 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
20 continue as follows:)

21 SGT. SUESS: So as I referenced earlier we
22 asked Sergeant Rossman about not going into
23 Building 1, and he stated I'm not going to
24 allow a civilian back into that situation. I
25 still wasn't a hundred percent sure where the

1 shooter was so I'm not going to allow him back
2 into an unknown, and having to go through
3 tactically clearing. There was already
4 somebody in the camera room that we could relay
5 information out, so I chose that as my option
6 rather than going back into a situation with
7 civilians that aren't trained, and having to
8 protect them.

9 Forty-one minutes and eight seconds after
10 the first shot officers and deputies enter the
11 west end of the third floor hall. They advance
12 towards Anthony Borges, who is lying in the
13 middle of the hall. So you see the approximate
14 location on this map of Anthony Borges, and the
15 officers and deputy working their way towards
16 him.

17 Forty-one minutes and thirteen seconds
18 after the first shot Mr. Greenleaf exited the
19 camera room, and was confronted by law
20 enforcement. So this would have been the first
21 time that a law enforcement officer approached
22 the area of the camera room. These law
23 enforcement officers were in there clearing the
24 building. Officer Ryen was among this group,
25 who we referred to earlier. So no one goes, no

1 law enforcement officer goes into the camera
2 room at this point, so just, I do want to clear
3 up that possible misconception.

4 Forty-one minutes and forty-one seconds
5 after the first shots Sergeant Rossman directed
6 Mr. Porter and Medina to come with him to the
7 staging area. They ran southeast toward the
8 staging area at the Sawgrass Expressway.

9 Forty- one minutes and forty-four seconds after
10 the final shot, first shots, law enforcement
11 converged at the last door on the second floor.

12 A BSO SWAT deputy exited the east
13 stairwell, and a CSPD sergeant approached that
14 same door at the same time. So at this point
15 all classroom doors on the second floor and
16 first floor had been approached. So both
17 stairwells at this point up to the second
18 floor, the stairwell up to the third floor, and
19 the first and second floors, have at least, the
20 preliminary search has been conducted. It's
21 important to know again, I'm sorry if I'm
22 beating a dead horse, the plus one rule. Even
23 after you clear these rooms the first time
24 you're going to go back a second and third time
25 looking for additional victims, suspects, or

1 possible IEDs. And that is what happened in
2 this case.

3 Forty-one minutes and forty-five seconds
4 after the first shot Detective Gonzalez exited
5 the west end of the first floor and waived a
6 group of SWAT deputies toward Building 12.
7 Detective Gonzalez was talking on his cell
8 phone prior to and after waiving in these SWAT
9 deputies. So, Commissioner Larkin Skinner, to
10 your point, the cell phones were made use of to
11 an extent, but we also had people say the cell
12 phone service was suffering because of the
13 increased work load.

14 Three minutes -- I'm sorry. Forty-one
15 minutes and fifty-two seconds after the first
16 shot seven members of the BSO SWAT team
17 sprinted toward the west end of Building 12.
18 This group had breaching tools, which they
19 would ultimately use to force entry into some
20 locked doors. SWAT medics Franklin and Noland
21 were present in this group. They met with
22 Detective Gonzales, and followed him up to the
23 third floor.

24 At forty-two minutes and thirteen seconds
25 as those additional SWAT deputies are coming up

1 from the second floor on the third floor
2 landing Officer Schmidt is pulling Anthony
3 Borges onto the third floor landing. So there
4 was some very compelling body cam from this
5 third floor landing from one of, from Detective
6 Polo and Detective Schmidt of BSO. Anthony
7 Borges was alive, and somewhat responsive at
8 this point. We obviously could not show this
9 video, it is very graphic, but they very
10 quickly and thoroughly render medical aid to
11 him, applied multiple tourniquets onto him.
12 They quickly put him onto a soft litter and
13 carry him out of Building 12.

14 Forty-two minutes and fourteen seconds
15 after the first shot the seven additional BSO
16 deputies are advancing up to the third floor
17 landing of the west stairs. As I referenced
18 Detective Polo applies the tourniquet, and
19 within fifteen seconds Medics Franklin and
20 Noland join him, and they take over as leading
21 the treatment of Borges. So you see on this
22 map, this illustrates the approximate location
23 of everybody in Building 12, or the more key
24 players I should say.

25 Forty-two minutes and sixteen seconds,

1 Sergeant Miller has made his way to the
2 Sawgrass Expressway. Forty-two minutes and
3 thirty-two seconds Captain Mock has reached the
4 second floor landing, and he communicated with
5 personnel on that floor. Detective Monzon, you
6 see his arm in that image on the right. It
7 more or less appeared as though he and Captain
8 Mock were hand gesturing, perhaps a thumbs up,
9 and Captain Mock would continue onto the third
10 floor.

11 Forty-three minutes and fifteen seconds
12 after the first shot, after listening to Coral
13 Springs dispatcher broadcast a description of
14 Cruz Deputy Pianelli tells Chief Pustizzi that
15 BSO has not yet broadcasted that information,
16 so Deputy Pianelli shortly thereafter would go
17 on to Broadcast that same description.

18 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
19 open meeting.)

20 DISPATCH: Last seen running westbound
21 towards the middle school. Burgundy shirt,
22 black pants, black backpack -- west through,
23 towards the middle school.

24 SPEAKER: Great. I'm sure he dumped
25 everything up there and then -- (inaudible)

1 SPEAKER: Because that hasn't even come
2 over our air yet.

3 SPEAKER: Really?

4 SPEAKER: Nope.

5 SPEAKER: Can you put it out, because you
6 got --

7 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
8 continue as follows:)

9 SGT. SUESS: So this is Sergeant Rossman's
10 body cam, an image from that, as he, Medina,
11 and Porter, are approaching the Sawgrass
12 Expressway. Again, you see Coral Springs
13 mobile command bus is there. Over
14 approximately the next forty seconds thirteen
15 additional BSO SWAT team members run to the
16 west side of Building 12. SWAT Medic Mormelo
17 as also present in this group, and this group
18 also had some breaching tools.

19 So we've referenced several times these
20 friendly fire, or blue on blue situations.
21 This is inside Building 1. Deputy Greetham has
22 gone in, and begins to clear the building. And
23 as a result of some miscommunication Deputy
24 Greetham, you'll see he very quickly raises his
25 rifle and then yells out blue, essentially

1 identifying who he is.

2 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
3 open meeting.)

4 SPEAKER: -- down the hall.

5 SPEAKER: Blue -- blue -- blue --

6 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
7 continue as follows:)

8 SGT. SUESS: At approximately forty-three
9 minutes and fifty-three seconds after the first
10 shot Colonel Polan learned from dispatch that
11 Captain Robson is at the front of the school
12 near the Bearcat. Colonel Polan has not yet
13 arrived on scene.

14 So I point your attention to this image.
15 So the floors, if you can see, yeah, it's
16 pretty clear, the amount of dust that is on
17 that floor. This is what, you know, you've
18 heard from Detective Scott and others about the
19 dust coming down from the ceiling tiles after
20 Cruz shot, and so you see that there was a
21 significant amount of dust which came down and
22 did ultimately obstruct some of the
23 surveillance cameras. So this group is on the
24 third floor at the west end. It is almost
25 exclusively SWAT team members from both BSO,

1 Coral Springs. So you see this image
2 illustrates their approximate location.

3 Forty-four minutes and fifty-five seconds
4 after the first shot Captain Robson stated that
5 he needs fire rescue in here so he can get five
6 victims into ambulances. So Captain Robson at
7 this point is working to get additional victims
8 from inside the hot zone, which he does
9 identify as a hot zone out to fire rescue.

10 At forty-four minutes and fifty-six
11 seconds, you know, we spoke earlier about
12 people's statements sometimes being much more
13 accurate, or more accurate in the heat of the
14 moment. This deputy is speaking with a Fort
15 Lauderdale PD captain about how Coral Springs
16 seems to have better information than they do.

17 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
18 open meeting.)

19 SPEAKER: I'm on 8Alpha, which is --
20 8Alpha, one I was on -- trying to -- you -- you
21 guys should get -- but for some reason Coral
22 Springs getting closer intel than we are.

23 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
24 continue as follows:)

25 SGT. SUESS: So at forty-five minutes and

1 fourteen seconds, the group of SWAT team
2 members on the third floor continued moving
3 east approaching the different classrooms.
4 Forty-five minutes and fifty-two seconds after
5 the first shot Deputy Pianelli, that's when he
6 obtained that more accurate description of the
7 suspect and would broadcast is over BSO's
8 radio.

9 Forty-six minutes and twenty-two seconds
10 Captain Gallagher, Deputy Peterson, and Officer
11 Best, are all visible near the base of the
12 stairs. So in that bottom right corner is a
13 subject who by all accounts appears to be
14 Deputy Peterson. In surrounding seconds you
15 see Captain Gallagher and Officer Best.

16 UNDER SHER. HARPRING: John, to the best
17 your knowledge during that entire period of
18 time, that forty-six plus, Peterson remained
19 there.

20 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So the location he
21 was at is unique, in that you can't always see
22 where he is when he's there, but there's no way
23 to leave that location without showing up on
24 some camera no matter which way you go, if you
25 go up the stairs, north, south, east, west,

1 you're going to be on camera.

2 CHAIR: It's coming up. You'll see him
3 leave in a minute, but -- and we're confident
4 that it's him leaving, because up the stairs
5 there's a camera, and to the south there's a
6 camera, and so you'll see it here in a minute.
7 So he's there for the entire time.

8 SGT. SUESS: Forty-six minutes and twenty-
9 two seconds after the first shot SWAT team
10 members are continuing to advance east on the
11 third floor. By forty-six minutes and
12 forty-six seconds law enforcement has
13 approached the last classroom on the third
14 floor. So at this point law enforcement has
15 approached every classroom door within Building
16 12. It would take some additional time, some
17 of them they had to break some windows to force
18 entry to get into each classroom, but that
19 process continued on for a little bit.

20 Forty-six minutes and fifty-three seconds
21 BSO SWAT Medic Bradley and Coral Springs SWAT
22 Medic Ceciliano enter the east end of Building
23 12. Detective Polo entered Classroom 1213
24 where Medic Bradley was assessing victim Carmen
25 Schentrup. Medic Bradley stated she's going to

1 be deceased, but I want to double check.
2 Lieutenant McCoy, the executive officer for BSO
3 SWAT entered the classroom as well. After
4 checking on Schentrup Medic Bradley exited Room
5 1213.

6 At forty-eight minutes and two seconds
7 Sergeant Myers from Coral Springs PD and a BSO
8 SWAT deputy, I'm sorry, several of them
9 converged at the top of the east stairwell on
10 the third floor. So law enforcement has now
11 secured both stairwells and all hallways within
12 Building 12.

13 At forty-eight minutes and three seconds
14 Deputy Kratz broadcasted that he learned from
15 the baseball coach that the suspect is Nikolas
16 Cruz. Forty-eight minutes and thirty-seven
17 seconds, Deputy Chief Lees from Coconut Creek
18 PD approached Sergeant Rossman and Lieutenant
19 Feeley beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. He
20 asked is the command post here, and he's told
21 it is. Keep in mind Captain Jordan and Captain
22 Robson are both on the north end of campus.

23 So we spoke with Deputy Chief Lees.
24 They've done some restructuring at their agency
25 of their chain of command structure so he's

1 currently a Captain. It's important to note,
2 and he was very forthcoming about this fact, he
3 retired from BSO after nearly thirty years. He
4 was formerly their SWAT commander. And he
5 pointed out Coconut Creek officers did respond.
6 Their response was not as significant as Coral
7 Springs or BSO. As you all have likely heard
8 Officer Leonard from Coconut Creek is the one
9 who ultimately arrested Cruz.

10 But Deputy Chief Lees explained that had
11 he not had that experience at BSO with knowing
12 everyone he would not have inserted himself as
13 much into the command structure, but given his
14 experience knowing everybody, all of these
15 individuals, his extensive SWAT experience, he
16 became more integral, really involved than he
17 likely would have otherwise. So it's important
18 to know that going in.

19 He stated that upon his arrival he saw
20 SWAT medics removing victims from Building 12.
21 He directed his SWAT commander to the TOC, and
22 he went to go try and locate the command post.
23 He saw Lieutenant DeVita on Pine Island, who
24 directed him to the command post, which he said
25 was beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. Deputy

1 Chief Lees stated that he met with Deputy
2 Chiefs Parry and Backer near the Coral Springs
3 command bus. He cannot recall who from BSO was
4 present at that time.

5 Deputy Chief Lees in my assessment was
6 very fair in his evaluation of the response.
7 He did have some critiques to make, but he did
8 say that these operations are always chaotic,
9 things go wrong, and they can be, quote,
10 confusing, overwhelming, a lot of personnel,
11 and a lot of staffing. Initially he said that
12 no one could identifying to whom to him who the
13 incident commander was. He said it seemed like
14 Coral Springs was running the show from what I
15 could see for the most part.

16 At approximately 3:10.20 Chief Pustizzi
17 and Deputy Chief Backer met in the middle of
18 Pine Island Road, approximately a hundred
19 twenty yard north of the command post. Deputy
20 Chief Backer said that after leaving the east
21 side of Building he went to the south side of
22 campus to assist in setting up a perimeter.
23 Deputy Chief Backer left Building 1 at 2:41
24 according to Sergeant Rossman's body cam, so it
25 was approximately twenty-nine minutes he was on

1 the south side of the MSD campus.

2 Forty nine minutes and twenty-six seconds
3 after the first shot, after approaching
4 numerous rooms on the first floor he was
5 expressing some frustration about not knowing
6 which rooms had been cleared. Detective Polo
7 stated aloud they needed spray paint, or a
8 marker, or something. So you see as the
9 response really transitions from predominantly
10 a Coral Springs led operation to a BSO they're
11 still, BSO, Detective Polo in particular wasn't
12 there when they cleared the first floor, so he
13 doesn't know which rooms have and have not been
14 cleared, which results in this comment.

15 There were a couple instances where Coral
16 Springs had stationed officers at particular
17 classroom doors, which appeared to be very
18 effective, and they could tell everyone either
19 this room has been cleared or there are
20 deceased victims in this room, comments to that
21 affect.

22 Forty nine minutes and forty-two seconds
23 after the first shots were fired Deputy
24 Peterson ran north from Building 7 to the east
25 side of Building 12. This is the first

1 indication that he would have left that
2 location despite the overwhelming law
3 enforcement presence.

4 And interview was conducted with
5 Lieutenant Cardinale from Sunrise PD. He said
6 that he arrived on the east side of Building
7 12, and at some point saw Deputy Peterson. He
8 described Deputy Peterson, or described a
9 deputy as pacing back and forth breathing
10 heavily. He asked the deputy who he was, and
11 he said I'm the SRO. Peterson went on after
12 being asked what's the deal, what's going on,
13 Peterson went on to say I don't know, I don't
14 know, oh my God, I can't believe this.

15 So at forty nine minutes and fifty seconds
16 these are the approximate location of law
17 enforcement on the second and third floors, and
18 the progress they've made through the building.
19 Forty nine minutes and fifty-six seconds after
20 the first shots CSPD SWAT Medic Ceciliano asked
21 Detective Polo on the first floor where do you
22 guys need a medic. Medic Ceciliano stated I
23 don't have comms, or radio communication with
24 anybody. Detective Polo told him to stay with
25 him as they ran east down the hall.

1 Approximately fifty minutes and seven
2 seconds after the first shots Captain Soberon
3 approached Sergeant Rossman beneath the
4 Sawgrass Expressway and asked him which channel
5 they were using. Shortly thereafter Deputy
6 Chief Backer was seen walking south approaching
7 the staging area beneath the Sawgrass
8 Expressway.

9 Fifty minutes fifty-two seconds, SWAT
10 Medic Mormelo, Bradley, and Ceciliano made it
11 to the west end of the third floor through the
12 west stairwell. This was taking place as
13 students are being evacuated. So Deputy
14 Marchese, you'll see here on Deputy Eason's
15 camera, expressing how the cameras were, or,
16 I'm sorry, the videos, the radios, I apologize,
17 were repeatedly busy.

18 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
19 open meeting.)

20 SPEAKER: I tried to get on the radio,
21 it's busy, busy, busy, busy.

22 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
23 continue as follows:)

24 SGT. SUESS: Fifty-two minutes and five
25 seconds, Chief Pustizzi arrived beneath the

1 staging area at the Sawgrass Expressway. Chief
2 Pustizzi and Deputy Chief Lees engaged in a
3 conversation about organizing the law
4 enforcement response.

5 At fifty-four minutes and twenty-one
6 seconds after the first shot Medic Ceciliano
7 walked on the third floor asking aloud what
8 channel are we on. At fifty-four minutes and
9 forty-six seconds after the first shot deputies
10 at Walmart approached a crowd of students and
11 asked them if anyone knew Nikolas Cruz. A
12 student enthusiastically came forward, provided
13 a physical description of Cruz, and searched
14 some social media accounts trying to locate
15 information. They told these deputies, or he
16 told these deputies that Cruz worked at Dollar
17 Tree.

18 So at fifty-five minutes and twenty-six
19 seconds Colonel Polan transmits over BSO's
20 radio channel that he's the incident commander,
21 and that he's at the tactical operations center
22 north of Building 13. We conducted an
23 interview with Colonel Polan. He said he was,
24 he had taken that day off, again it's
25 Valentine's Day, and was walking to the movie

1 theater when he got a call from Major Osgood
2 notifying him of the shooting.

3 He listened to the radio, and attempted to
4 locate the incident command post. He described
5 radio and throttling problems during his
6 response. He parked north of Westglades Middle
7 and walked to the TOC, where he met with
8 Captains Robson and Jordan. They both provided
9 him with a brief summary. Colonel Polan stated
10 upon his arrival he was under the impression
11 that Cruz was still inside of Building 12.

12 Colonel Polan was only able to identify
13 Captain Lasseter, again, the SWAT medic team
14 leader for BSO, as the fire rescue personnel,
15 or command staff I should say, at the TOC. He
16 had no recollection or discussion about a
17 rescue task force with Captain Jordan, or
18 anyone else. He was aware that SWAT medics
19 were inside of Building 12, and when asked if
20 he specifically knew of a void in medical care
21 to the victims he said no.

22 We asked Colonel Polan if he recalled
23 while he was in the TOC any conversations about
24 the use of Building 12. He said he did not,
25 and if there would have been he would not have

1 agreed to it anyway. When asked he explain why
2 he said the building is still hot, referring to
3 it being a hot zone. He said without doubt
4 it's still hot, and we still believe we have a
5 shooter inside. It's a multi floored structure
6 with a minimum of two different entrances, and
7 there is no possible way that I would agree to
8 put a rescue task force into that atmosphere,
9 you know, God forbid you got an east and a west
10 door, and you bring a team in the east, and I
11 bring a team in the west, the bad guy is in the
12 middle, the kids are running everywhere, bad
13 things can happen, so I'm not going to put a
14 rescue task force in that atmosphere.

15 Colonel Polan stated he directed Captain
16 Jordan to set up a command post on Pine Island
17 Road. Her primary role was to ensure that the
18 perimeter was secure. The command post
19 location also gave her access to the staging
20 area beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. They
21 spoke over the radio, in phones, both devices
22 failed at various times. Colonel Polan
23 remained at the TOC as the incident commander
24 until approximately 9:00 p.m. He described
25 that clearing the entire campus was his

1 priority at the TOC. So the TOC would serve in
2 the role of SWAT commanders, and there were
3 well over ten different SWAT teams that came to
4 this location. The SWAT commanders would go to
5 the TOC and be tasked; you take your team,
6 search Building 6, you take your team, search
7 Building 7, so on and so forth. And so they
8 would serve to ensure that the entire campus
9 had been cleared of any other threats, and all
10 students were evacuated.

11 Colonel Polan explained to us that some
12 changes have been made at BSO since February
13 14th. The SRO chain of command has been
14 brought under the operational branch of BSO,
15 and away from community services. An agreement
16 was reached with Broward County Public Schools
17 to put safes for rifles in each school, and
18 each SRO has been issued a carbine to carry on
19 campus in a bag.

20 Fifty-five minutes and forty-six seconds
21 after the first shot Deputy Pianelli spoke with
22 Captain Morse about the frustration of Coral
23 Springs having more current information than
24 BSO.

25 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the

1 open meeting.)

2 SPEAKER: Because at last on video came
3 over Springs channel that he was with a bunch
4 of students towards Westglades Middle, because
5 we're about ten minutes behind Springs radio,
6 and nothing is patched right now so we have no
7 idea what Springs is saying, and what info
8 they're getting on their end.

9 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
10 continue as follows:)

11 SGT. SUESS: Fifty-five minutes and forty-
12 six seconds after the first shot Chief
13 Pustizzi, Lieutenant O'Neill from BSO, Deputy
14 Chief Backer, and Sergeant Rossman, had a brief
15 exchange about the need to patch radios, or to
16 share radios.

17 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
18 open meeting.)

19 SPEAKER: Yeah, I need -- I need --

20 SPEAKER: Sierra3 right now.

21 SPEAKER: Okay, I need him, and I need
22 somebody with a BSO radio, because you guys are
23 patched (inaudible)

24 SPEAKER: We're supposed to be patched on
25 the one channel.

1 SPEAKER: We -- I tried to patch it when
2 we first got here, Cap.
3 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
4 continue as follows:)

5 SGT. SUESS: So at fifty-six minutes and
6 seven seconds Classroom 1249 was the last
7 classroom to which law enforcement gained
8 access. So by this point all classrooms have
9 been accessed by law enforcement. Fifty-six
10 minutes and fifteen seconds after the first
11 shots the BSO mobile command bus arrived on
12 Pine Island Road. Shortly thereafter, within
13 seconds Captain Jordan approached Deputy
14 Pianelli's location immediately north of the
15 recently arrived command bus. This is the
16 first indication that Captain Jordan has left
17 the TOC where Captain Robson and Colonel Polan
18 were located.

19 Fifty-eight minutes and fifty seconds
20 after the first shot dispatch told all deputies
21 who have not been assigned to position to
22 switch to 7Bravo. So this goes back to the
23 point we discussed earlier about if you're
24 inside the building in a tactical situation you
25 don't want less significant conversations

1 taking place, so it's common practice in these
2 situations to have other deputies, or law
3 enforcement officers switch to another channel
4 to address perimeters, reunification with
5 parents, and those types of matters.

6 While hear the mobile command buses
7 Lieutenant O'Neill asked Captain Jordan about
8 who was managing the response.

9 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
10 open meeting.)

11 SPEAKER: Who's managing right now?

12 SPEAKER: Polan just took over as incident
13 commander.

14 SPEAKER: Is he CI3?

15 SPEAKER: Yes.

16 SPEAKER: Yeah.

17 SPEAKER: -- switch to channel 7Bravo,
18 7Bravo --

19 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
20 continue as follows:)

21 SGT. SUESS: Continuing with our interview
22 with Captain Jordan, she said that she viewed
23 herself as the person responsible for setting
24 up and coordination of supporting roles at the
25 mobile command bus. Her primary roles included

1 finding a safe place for fleeing students,
2 identifying witnesses, family reunification,
3 and PIO media relations. Captain Jordan
4 identified Colonel Polan as the overall
5 incident commander. She described multiple
6 commanders from various agencies being present.

7 Captain Soberon in his interview said that
8 once the command buses were set up Coral
9 Springs turned over operations to BSO, which
10 was the first time he saw Captain Jordan. His
11 assessment was that BSO supervisor and command
12 stuff, command staff got too entrenched in the
13 operation itself, and did not establish command
14 and control, it did not appear that BSO had a
15 single person running operations at the command
16 buses. He expressed frustration with
17 politicians being present at the command post.
18 That is a theme you will see several times.

19 Chief Pustizzi had thirty years in law
20 enforcement, seventeen years on SWAT, and five
21 years as a SWAT commander. To further
22 emphasize a point that we've tried to make, he
23 stated I don't think any of us are prepared for
24 the magnitude of that kind of call. He spoke
25 about becoming frustrated at one point with not

1 having a single incident commander. He said
2 that eventually two BSO majors identified
3 Captain Jordan as the incident commander.
4 Captain Jordan sought assistance from Chief
5 Pustizzi and Deputy Chief Lees, and she seemed
6 receptive to their guidance.

7 Going back to the interview with Deputy
8 Chief Lees, he said that Major Holmes
9 introduced Captain Jordan to everyone as the
10 incident commander. After Captain Jordan's
11 arrival he witnessed BSO radio problems, and
12 Captain Jordan told him that she had not been
13 able to communicate on her radio. Deputy Chief
14 Lees described BSO's radio failure as
15 incomprehensible, and something that would
16 hinder any law enforcement response.

17 Deputy Chief Lees did express some concern
18 that within the command, the mobile command
19 bus, there was no documentation in the command
20 post of assignments or responsibilities. He
21 said that the command post did not have strong
22 leadership or cohesion, but Captain Jordan did
23 make attempts to bring command staff together.
24 After being asked a question, a more open ended
25 question, he said, listen, Jan Jordan was

1 overwhelmed, she was overwhelmed, I could see
2 it, I tried to help her.

3 Deputy Chief Lees told Captain Jordan,
4 Sergeant Kallman from BSO, and CSPD command
5 staff, that they needed to split the tactical
6 channel and the command, or logistics channel.
7 County commissioners, school board members, and
8 city officials were unnecessarily present at
9 the command post, according to Deputy Chief
10 Lees.

11 Deputy Chief Lees expressed -- I
12 apologize. Coral Springs Fire Department Chief
13 McNally expressed to the group at the mobile
14 command buses that he wanted to use a rescue
15 task force, and expressed a concern that the
16 victims were not getting necessary treatment.
17 Deputy Chief Lees never became aware of a void
18 in medical care for the victims. He said that
19 Chief McNally -- or I apologize. He told Chief
20 McNally that SWAT medics were treating and
21 evacuating the injured victims. He could not
22 recall if Captain Jordan was present or not
23 during that exchange.

24 Captain Jordan's statements on operations
25 at the mobile command bus, she said that Chief

1 McNally asked on one occasion about using a
2 rescue task force. Chief McNally in his
3 interview said that he asked approximately six
4 times, and brought a great deal of attention to
5 this issue. Captain Jordan said that as far as
6 I remember she asked Colonel Polan about using
7 a rescue task force. Colonel Polan stated
8 confidently this never happened.

9 Captain Jordan was not overseeing tactical
10 operations, and could not have authorized the
11 use of a rescue task force at this point.
12 Colonel Polan as the incident commander was the
13 only person that could have done this. At some
14 point Captain Pumariega was at the TOC.
15 Captain Jordan was never aware of any students
16 needing medical care in Building 12 who did not
17 receive that care.

18 Chief Pustizzi from Coral Springs recalled
19 several -- I apologize. He recalled
20 conversations between Deputy Chief McNally from
21 Coral Springs Fire Department and Captain
22 Jordan on the use of rescue task forces.
23 Captain Jordan told Chief McNally she would
24 have to check and get back with him. Chief
25 Pustizzi pointed out issues with BSO providing

1 law enforcement and Coral Springs providing
2 fire services for the City of Parkland, and
3 said that BSO does not train for rescue task
4 force with Coral Springs Fire.

5 Chief Pustizzi was also aware that SWAT
6 medics were inside of Building 12. Chief
7 Pustizzi was asked about any voids in medical
8 care, and said he was not aware of that. He
9 said confidently that if there was he would
10 have circumvented BSO if necessary to ensure
11 that medics made it inside of the building.

12 Captain Soberon's comments regarding
13 operations at the mobile command bus, he did
14 not witness any discussions about the use of
15 rescue task forces. He was also aware that
16 SWAT medics were inside of Building 12. He was
17 aware of Coral Springs FDE's concerns, and he
18 stated that's people who didn't get a chance to
19 go in who felt they should have gone in, but we
20 had that well in hand. Captain Soberon made
21 reference to the medical packs which are issues
22 to each of their officers.

23 CHAIR: So, John, just here for context,
24 now Agent Massucci is going to talk more about
25 the medical response. We're covering it here

1 because there was so much made of the lack of
2 rescue task forces, and the use of rescue task
3 forces, so we're covering it here. You're
4 going to get a lot more on it. But I want to
5 tell you this, that in every single interview
6 without exception of everyone we asked the
7 question do you know of anybody that was in the
8 1200 building that was in need of medical care
9 that they weren't getting when this discussion
10 was being had about rescue task forces, and the
11 answer one hundred percent of the time
12 unequivocally was no.

13 So as this discussion was being had the
14 people who were asking about the rescue task
15 forces didn't know that there were medics
16 inside who were treating. Some of them were
17 under the impression for some reason that the
18 TAC medics, or the SWAT medics were only there
19 to treat the officers, or law enforcement
20 personnel if they had been injured, and that
21 was absolutely not the case. So when they were
22 calling for these rescue task forces it was
23 under the misimpression that there wasn't
24 treatment.

25 And again, one of the reasons why we

1 included the prior slides in this section of
2 the presentation about the treatment, which
3 you're going to get a lot more of when Agent
4 Massucci presents later on, is, is to exemplify
5 the point that there was medical care. So it's
6 really important that everybody understand
7 that, that even though this was raised, and
8 Deputy Chief McNally from Coral Springs Fire --
9 and we asked him, and I asked him personally,
10 are you aware, when you were calling for these
11 rescue task forces are you aware of anybody
12 that was not getting the adequate medical care
13 that they needed, and his answer was no.

14 So it's become a red herring issue, it was
15 published in the media quite a bit, but we're
16 covering, covering it here, and we'll talk more
17 about it. But I just want to put that in
18 context at this point.

19 SGT. SUESS: Fifty-nine minutes and
20 twenty- five seconds after the first shot
21 deputies at Walmart located another student who
22 was friends with JT Snead. Cruz was friends
23 with JT, and living with the Sneads. The
24 student provided information to deputies about
25 Cruz, and also a phone number for JT's father

1 James. Deputy Valdes, Valdes later used that
2 information to contact James and try and get
3 information on Cruz's location.

4 Fifty-nine minutes and twenty-three
5 seconds after the first shot Captain Mock
6 transmitted be advised 1200 building is almost
7 done, out with BSO and their command, we are
8 going to get all building numbers, and CSPD
9 SWAT will be clearing Building 13. This is the
10 first indication we have that Coral Springs
11 command staff and the BSO incident commanders
12 were in direct communication with each other.

13 At one hour one minute and fifty-five
14 seconds after the first shot Coral Springs
15 mobile command bus moved from beneath the
16 Sawgrass Expressway next to the BSO mobile
17 command truck. While at Walmart Deputy Valdes
18 continued to encounter severe radio problems
19 while broadcasting information about Cruz and
20 the Snead family.

21 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the
22 open meeting.)

23 SPEAKER: Attention all units, be advised,
24 just a repeat of the last instruction,
25 juveniles being loaded onto the buses, are

1 going to (inaudible) the ID's need to be
2 checked of the juveniles before they board the
3 buses to make sure that Nikolas Cruz is not
4 part of this group.

5 SPEAKER: Jesus Christ, man --

6 SPEAKER: He didn't get out of --

7 SPEAKER: Sector 11168 --

8 SPEAKER: He's probably at home.

9 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings
10 continue as follows:)

11 SGT. SUESS: One hour six minutes and
12 eight seconds after the first shot Deputy
13 Valdes called James Snead from Walmart. James
14 told Valdes that his son JT said that Cruz was
15 nearby at a McDonalds. Deputy Valdes and other
16 law enforcement officers left Walmart and
17 traveled to the McDonalds.

18 And hour and six minutes nine seconds
19 after the first shot Lieutenant O'Neill
20 approached the mobile command bus for Coral
21 Springs and BSO. This is just a still image,
22 just to give you an idea of how things looked
23 at that time. At that time the persons that
24 were visible at the command bus included majors
25 from BSO, Captain Jordan, Lieutenant DeVita,

1 and then some other sergeants. Chief Pustizzi,
2 Deputy Chief Backer, and Captain Soberon from
3 Coral Springs were there, Deputy Chief Lees,
4 individuals from the FBI. There was nobody
5 from the fire department visible at that time.

6 At one hour nine minutes and two seconds
7 Deputy Morales' body cam began recording as he
8 was on the northeast corner of Building 7.
9 Deputy Peterson was no longer at this location.
10 Something just occurred to me, Sheriff, in
11 regards to your comment that I want to point
12 out. I don't think it's in here. So Chief
13 McNally regarding that issue said that he
14 arrived at the BSO mobile command bus, and we
15 know based on the time that that wasn't there
16 until approximately 3:16, so we know at the
17 absolute earlier Chief McNally's concerns were
18 made known to BSO at 3:16. So I just want to
19 put that time frame out there.

20 One hour ten minutes and fifty-four
21 seconds after the first shot Deputy Valdes and
22 several other law enforcement officers from
23 several agencies arrived at the McDonalds.
24 They searched the McDonalds trying to locate
25 Cruz, however he had already left. One hour

1 twelve minutes and fourteen seconds after the
2 first shot Deputy Valdes received a call from
3 James Snead. Snead asked Valdes to have
4 deputies to go by his house because he could
5 not get in touch with his wife, and was
6 concerned for her safety.

7 Deputy Valdes obtained Cruz's number, and
8 passed it on to the BSO communications center.
9 Yes, ma'am.

10 SEC. KAPUSTA: Did James Snead have an
11 idea of what had happened, and Nikolas Cruz's
12 involvement; is that why he called?

13 SGT. SUESS: I think at that point it
14 became clear to him, yes, ma'am. I don't know
15 for certain, but I would assume if he's asking
16 deputies to go check on his wife then by
17 deduction I would think so.

18 At one hour fourteen minutes and
19 forty-four seconds after the first shot Captain
20 Mock says in reference to which buildings are
21 clear, right now at SO command, and we are
22 pulling that up, and gridding this up.

23 CHAIR: And he was at the TOC at that
24 point.

25 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

1 CHAIR: See, this is -- this is getting
2 back to the problem that, that was going on
3 there, is, is that Captain Mock and Colonel
4 Polan, and the other SWAT commanders, were in
5 the TOC, and the TOC had moved from the back of
6 Captain Robson's SUV into the 1300 building
7 where, where they had moved it inside, but you
8 had the command buses underneath the Sawgrass,
9 and Captain Jordan had been sent over by
10 Colonel Polan to coordinate, but she wasn't the
11 incident commander, and so that's what was
12 causing confusion, is, is that you had the TOC,
13 which is where the incident command was,
14 because that's where the incident commander
15 was, who was Colonel Polan, and you had the
16 tactical operation being directed from there,
17 and everybody else was over underneath the
18 Sawgrass, which was a good distance away.

19 So that's what caused a lot of confusion
20 and misunderstanding, and, and at one point
21 when we talked to Deputy Chief McNally from
22 Coral Springs Fire about it, and his
23 frustration was, is that he was asking Captain
24 Jordan about the rescue task forces, and other
25 questions, and she wasn't responding. And in

1 fact he said that she as acting like she wasn't
2 the incident commander. It's because she
3 wasn't the incident commander, and she was
4 taking the information and making inquiries.

5 So that separation of the TOC and where
6 the command buses were, and that split, caused
7 a lot of confusion for a lot of people, so.
8 And -- and as we said earlier don't get
9 confused by the command buses versus the
10 command post, and there's reason to separate
11 that tactical command, but the fact that
12 Colonel Polan and others were over there, and
13 Captain Jordan, who was a part of the commander
14 was by the buses, led people to believe certain
15 things without knowing, and, and again, and you
16 have the situation -- remember when Colonel
17 Polan gets on the radio and takes over command,
18 and says I am the incident commander, again,
19 that is only heard by BSO, everybody on the
20 Coral Springs channel didn't hear that, so they
21 didn't know that he had taken incident command
22 affirmatively prior to this. So it was --
23 that's what led to the confusion.

24 SGT. SUESS: One hour sixteen minutes and
25 seven seconds after the first shot was fired

1 Officer Leonard from Coconut Creek transmits
2 over Coral Springs radio I have the suspect,
3 Nikolas Cruz, do not move. This is a video
4 taken by a passerby of the apprehension of
5 Cruz.

6 (Thereupon, the video is played in the open meeting,
7 and the proceedings continue as follows:)

8 SGT. SUESS: One hour twenty minutes and
9 twenty-eight seconds after the first shots were
10 fired, Lieutenant Phillips body cam began
11 recording as he was at the TOC, which is still
12 outside north of Building 13. Individuals
13 present included Sheriff Israel, Colonel Polan,
14 Colonel Dale, and Lieutenant Colonel DiMaggio.
15 From BSO Swat Captain Robson, Sergeant Garcia,
16 and Sergeant Hickox. From Coral Springs SWAT
17 Captain Mock. Detective Goolsby. There are
18 multiple other law enforcement officers,
19 including state and federal law enforcement
20 officers. Captain Pumariega was not visible on
21 this sole body cam, but again that does not
22 necessarily mean he was not there.

23 One hour twenty-one minutes and fifty-five
24 seconds after the first shot Colonel Polan
25 stated to Lieutenant Phillips that they are

1 going to move the command post inside. We were
2 just able to use this really as a, sort of a
3 marker in time to identify when the TOC had
4 been moved inside and when it was still
5 outside. One hour twenty- three minutes and
6 two seconds Sergeant Hickox tells Lieutenant
7 Phillips that Building 12 is secure, which
8 Lieutenant Phillips wrote down on a white
9 board.

10 One hour twenty-four minutes and nineteen
11 seconds, Detective Hayes gave Lieutenant
12 Phillips a sheet of paper on which SWAT had
13 been keeping track of where casualties were
14 located by room number and by floor.

15 So we're going to go through some
16 consistent themes, and these are really themes
17 that were seen throughout the multiple
18 interviews that we did.

19 MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant.

20 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

21 MR. SCHACHTER: Before you start can you
22 tell us what time Sheriff Israel arrived on
23 scene?

24 SGT. SUESS: No, sir. All we can do is
25 tell you what time he was seen on that body

1 cam. That's the only, only way we have track
2 that really.

3 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay. And can you tell us
4 what he did on scene? I don't think we've
5 heard that yet.

6 SGT. SUESS: Sheriff Israel will be here
7 shortly, and I think it's best to ask him that,
8 sir.

9 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay. Okay. You know,
10 it's just -- it's just extremely upsetting. We
11 had these same command and control problems at
12 the airport disaster in 2017, and now all over
13 again. I don't understand why it wasn't
14 corrected.

15 CHAIR: Go ahead, John.

16 SGT. SUESS: So while several deputies
17 were identified as not responding to hearing
18 any gunshots it's important to know that many
19 other deputies responded in the proper manner
20 by running to the scene, seeking out the
21 shooter, and providing first aid.

22 The non-functioning radios absolutely
23 hindered BSO's ability to manage the response.

24 BSO patrol deputies taking time to put on
25 their vests and reapply body cams also slowed

1 the response.

2 Confusion over which rooms have been
3 cleared and which had not, I covered that just
4 moments earlier.

5 School board members and other politicians
6 or government officials crowding the command
7 post was a problem identified by several
8 persons at the mobile command buses.

9 Confusion over the location of the command
10 posts between the staging area, the TOC, the
11 command bus for law enforcement on Pine Island
12 Road, and the command post for fire rescue at
13 Holmberg and Pine Island Road.

14 Coral Springs officers consistently
15 praised their training in their interviews.
16 Without hesitation they all knew they had
17 received active shooter training each year over
18 the past several years. They had no difficulty
19 in explaining the proper response to an active
20 shooter.

21 Broward deputies, most of them remembered
22 attending training in the past few years. Some
23 could not remember the last time they attended
24 active shooter training. Some could not recall
25 what type of training they received. Several

1 referenced the policy saying the deputies may
2 go toward the shooter.

3 Deputies and officers both suggested
4 additional training would be beneficial, and
5 deputies and officers said that no training is
6 adequate to prepare you for an event like this.

7 I do want to point out as well that, as I
8 said, we've drawn attention to a lot of the
9 failures in the response, or facts for the
10 commission to consider that are failures I
11 should say. There are a great deal of number
12 of officers and deputies that responded in the
13 appropriate manner, and it was difficult for
14 us, the number of times that officers and
15 deputies broke down crying during these
16 interviews. It was obviously a very
17 challenging and traumatic experience for these
18 officers and deputies as well.

19 CHAIR: All right, thanks, John. You did
20 a great job with that. Let's -- like we said
21 we were going to do from the beginning of this
22 yesterday morning when we went through the
23 animation, we're going to do the animation for
24 you again here at the end. So, we did it at
25 the beginning so you could see from the start

1 to the end. We'll do the animation again now,
2 and after that we will take any final questions
3 you may have for Sergeant Suess, and then we'll
4 take a quick break and we'll come back with
5 Deputy Peterson's testimony.

6 We're not going to narrate this. As we
7 said you should have enough information now to
8 have an understanding.

9 (Thereupon, the animation is replayed in the open
10 meeting.)

11 CHAIR: All right, does anybody have any
12 final questions for Sergeant Suess? Okay,
13 we'll take -- go ahead, Mr. Schachter.

14 MR. SCHACHTER: I just -- I just want to
15 say that, you know, ever since this happened
16 the only thing that seventeen families have
17 wanted was to find you the truth, and some
18 accountability, and I want to thank you,
19 Sheriff Gualtieri and the FDLE, for I can't
20 even image all the countless hundreds and
21 thousands of hours that it took to put this
22 together, so because of you I think we're going
23 to get that, so thank you very much.

24 CHAIR: You're welcome. All right, we'll
25 take ten minutes. It is now 2:30, so we'll

1 reconvene at 2:40.

2 (Thereupon, the meeting is in recess, and the
3 proceedings continue as follows:)

4 CHAIR: All right, we're going to go ahead
5 and get started. Everyone in the audience
6 please take your seats. As we begin this
7 afternoon's session we're going to hear from
8 Mr. Peterson, Superintendent Runcie, and
9 Sheriff Israel. I just remind everybody in the
10 audience that there's an opportunity for public
11 comment, if you want to fill out a card at the
12 end of the session today, but there's not a
13 time for public participation until that time,
14 and we need to ask you to refrain from any
15 comments our outbursts, and if anybody engages
16 in that type of conduct we're just going to ask
17 you to leave. So with that we'll call Mr.
18 Peterson, who is under subpoena to appear.

19 MR. DIRUZZO: Good afternoon. My name is
20 Joseph DiRuzzo. I represent Mr. Peterson. I
21 represent Mr. Peterson. As you can tell Mr.
22 Peterson is not here. Mr. Peterson will not be
23 testifying today. Earlier this morning I filed
24 a three count complaint with the court seeking
25 to quash this court, this commission's

1 subpoena, declare the actions illegal, and to
2 hold certain members of the commission liable
3 for abuse of process.

4 I have copies of the complaint here. I
5 will leave them. Please have your attorneys,
6 or attorney reach out to me for service. And I
7 thank you for your time.

8 MR. SCHACHTER: He didn't do his job. My
9 daughter should be alive.

10 CHAIR: Okay, if you all would have
11 Superintendent Runcie come on down, and we'll
12 move onto his testimony. And just so that
13 everybody knows, the attorney who just appeared
14 was contacted on November 8th, and he accepted
15 service on behalf of Mr. Peterson, and that he
16 told us that Mr. Peterson would appear. So we
17 were operating under the premise based on the
18 representation of the lawyer who just showed up
19 and left that Mr. Peterson would be here. He
20 had not communicated with us at all in the
21 interim, and we had been attempting to make
22 sure that we dialogued with him, so this is the
23 first we heard, and when he showed up here this
24 afternoon he wouldn't communicate with us,
25 wouldn't tell us whether Peterson was here, not

1 here, and you heard what we heard for the first
2 time, but he had represented to us that
3 Peterson would be here and testify, so.

4 SHER. JUDD: I might highlight for the
5 record, he not only showed up here and said Mr.
6 Peterson wouldn't attend, but he also informed
7 us all we were being sued. So that's, that's
8 always warm, and makes you feel real good.

9 CHAIR: Yeah, well, get in line, so --

10 SHER. JUDD: Like I care.

11 CHAIR: Yeah, like I care. Go ahead.

12 MR. SCHACHTER: Chair, due to the fact
13 that now we have ninety extra minutes can we
14 extend the time of the other two gentlemen
15 testifying?

16 CHAIR: No, we're -- we're actually
17 behind, and we still haven't gotten to Special
18 Agent Massucci's presentation, so we're
19 actually behind schedule. This will keep us
20 from not being here until 7:30 tonight. So
21 even at this rate with Superintendent Runcie,
22 so the format will be, as I explained this
23 morning, is is that Superintendent Runcie is
24 going to come in, he'll be given an opportunity
25 if he so desires to make a statement, and then

1 his testimony will be limited to ninety
2 minutes.

3 Commissioners can ask questions, as I
4 asked you earlier, to be succinct in your
5 questions, make them relevant and factual as to
6 the issues. We need to make sure that every
7 commissioner that has an opportunity, that
8 wants an opportunity has the opportunity to ask
9 questions. We need to make sure that we pass
10 that opportunity around, as we have. Please go
11 through me, and we will make sure that we give
12 everybody the chance that they want. Secretary
13 Kapusta.

14 SEC. KAPUSTA: Yes. In the packet that
15 the attorney dropped off is there any record,
16 or indication that the subpoena was in fact
17 quashed?

18 CHAIR: I haven't seen the packet so I
19 don't know what's in it, or why. All I know
20 is, is that we attempted, you know, we had
21 served in person Mr. Peterson for the October
22 meeting. He was served by the Florida
23 Department of Law Enforcement Agency in person,
24 they handed him the subpoena. Of course we had
25 to cancel the subpoena because of the

1 cancellation of the meeting due to the
2 Hurricane, and then we attempted to re-serve
3 him, and a copy of it was sent to his lawyer.
4 The lawyer said that he was accepting service,
5 and we have it of course all in writing, on
6 behalf of Peterson, and that Peterson would
7 appear. And from there you know where we are
8 right now. So he was effectively served, and
9 there's no issue with him being served. He
10 said he was going to come, and then he didn't
11 come.

12 UND. SHER. HARPRING: Sheriff, just
13 interested, could you identify the attorney
14 that was present here.

15 CHAIR: Joseph DiRuzzo.

16 UND. SHER. HARPRING: Joseph.

17 CHAIR: DiRuzzo. Mr. Schachter.

18 MR. SCHACHTER: Can we hold him in
19 contempt?

20 CHAIR: So what we need to do is we need
21 to review the pleadings that he has given us,
22 and we will do that, and then we'll make a
23 decision how to proceed from there. Ordinarily
24 if somebody is issued a subpoena and they don't
25 comply with a subpoena there is a motion to the

1 circuit court for an order to show cause as to
2 why the person shouldn't be held in contempt.
3 As you know the statute provides us to petition
4 the court, and for the court to consider it,
5 and to hold somebody in contempt if they don't
6 comply with a subpoena issued by this
7 commission.

8 So we will look at the pleadings, we'll
9 consult with our general counsel Mr. Jones
10 about it, and decide what the appropriate
11 course of action is. So with that, like I said
12 for this afternoon that will be the format, and
13 then once we get finished with Superintendent
14 Runcie we'll take a quick, quick break, and
15 then move into Sheriff Israel for ninety
16 minutes. And even with that we're still not
17 going to finish probably until after 5:30 or
18 so. But we'll probably get to Special Agent
19 Massucci's presentation on the medical response
20 tomorrow morning. So at this point I'd ask
21 Superintendent Runcie to come up.

22 Welcome, Superintendent Runcie. Thank you
23 for being here. I want to just, before I give
24 you an opportunity to make opening remarks I
25 want to reiterate what I said this morning, and

1 thank you and the staff of the Broward County
2 School District for your professionalism, and
3 your transparency, and your cooperation with
4 this investigation. Everybody from you
5 throughout the district over the last seven
6 months has been nothing other than what I just
7 described, as professional, as transparent and
8 cooperative, and been very responsive to all of
9 our requests, and all of the interviews, and
10 all of the asks by investigators, so we thank
11 you for that, welcome you here today, and give
12 you an opportunity to make any opening remarks
13 that you would like to make.

14 PRESENTATION SUPERINTENDENT RUNCIE

15 SUP. RUNCIE: Thank you, sir. And thank
16 you to the commission for giving me this
17 opportunity to be here today with you. I
18 understand and appreciate the critical
19 importance of the work of this commission, and
20 how it will inform district practices and
21 policies, and not just here in Broward County
22 but throughout the state of Florida, and at a
23 greater level on a national, on a national
24 basis. I want to, you know, acknowledge the
25 parents, the families who work tirelessly to

1 get the legislation passed, the Marjory
2 Stoneman Douglas Public High School Safety Act,
3 and the creation of this commission.

4 On February 14th shortly after a number of
5 school visits that day in the morning, and
6 after leaving an event at Monarch High School
7 where we were presenting our teacher of the
8 year with the keys to a Toyota Camry, shortly
9 after leaving that I began to receive calls of
10 a possible incident at Marjory Stoneman Douglas
11 High School. On the way to my office, and
12 having a conversation with the Sheriff which
13 described a horrific scene, the worst that he'd
14 ever seen, it really became overwhelming.

15 The only thing I knew I had to do at that
16 point is to get out to the school, and that
17 tragedy that took the lives of fourteen
18 precious children and three of our loved
19 members of our Broward public schools family
20 and community, physically wounding many others,
21 and the trauma that continues to inflict our
22 community, has been extensive, but nowhere has
23 the impact been as great as it has been for the
24 seventeen families who lost a precious child or
25 a loved one. And to the families, and I

1 apologize for my back to some of you, I want to
2 offer my condolences, and just say that I am so
3 so sorry that you sent your kids to school on
4 that day like any other parent would expecting
5 them to return and somehow, you know, we failed
6 to live up to that promise to you.

7 I know there's nothing that we can do to
8 bring back your loved ones, but I will tell you
9 that I will continue to do all that I can to
10 the best of my ability, and to the extent that
11 God gives me the wisdom and the strength to do
12 to support all of you the best way that we can.
13 I want to assure the entire community that we
14 have been, and will continue, to support
15 everyone that's directly impacted, or
16 indirectly, physically and mentally,
17 emotionally. We will never be the same. We
18 will never be able to return to the world prior
19 to the tragedy. And we acknowledge, and I know
20 there's nothing that we can do that's ever
21 going to be enough to remove the loss, the
22 pain, the hurt, and the anger, but I'm
23 committed to being present, listening, and
24 providing whatever help, resources, and
25 assistance that we possibly can.

1 At the moment that I saw the massacre in
2 the 1200 Building that evening I pledged to do
3 everything I could in my power to honor the
4 lives of the victims by trying to find some
5 purpose and meaning out of the tragedy, and so
6 there immediately went to three areas that we
7 began to immediately focus on. First was the
8 recovery and wellness of our students, our
9 faculty, families in the community. Secondly
10 was to improve school safety and security
11 measures, including physical security and
12 protocols, as well as school climate and mental
13 health. And a third is to work as we can with
14 the commission, other entities, to figure out
15 what, what went wrong, to inform the changes
16 that we need to make in terms of our policies,
17 our practices, and to hold people accountable
18 for any mistakes that have been made.

19 First on a recovery and wellness efforts
20 that we put in place, we immediately opened
21 five locations for the Marjory Stoneman Douglas
22 community to receive mental health support,
23 including a resiliency center that was open
24 seven days a week. We did that in partnership
25 with the City of Parkland. We engaged national

1 experts, including the National Center for
2 School Crisis and Bereavement, the Center for
3 Mind, Body, Medicine, the National Center for
4 Victims of Crime, University of South Carolina
5 Medical School, their trauma therapy
6 specialists, and many others.

7 We consulted with individuals from
8 Columbine, Sandy Hook, and Pulse. We had
9 numerous meetings with students, teachers, and
10 families. We worked to provide supports to the
11 school that have been ongoing. We've staffed
12 twenty one social workers, trauma focused
13 behavioral specialists within the MSD zone,
14 including therapy dogs. We added two
15 additional guidance counselors to the school as
16 well. Our facilities department worked to
17 expedite the installation of thirty six new
18 modular classrooms that were put in place
19 before the start of this school year. That
20 included two wellness centers where students
21 can go in a safe way to receive therapeutic
22 services.

23 On the school safety and security
24 measures, we enhanced the single point of entry
25 at the school with a door buzzer video intercom

1 system that was installed. We put in RFID
2 controlled access card readers to staff entry
3 points at the school. We completed the upgrade
4 to our video surveillance cameras at the
5 school, and we did that actually throughout the
6 whole entire district. And we added over a
7 hundred additional cameras to the campus.

8 We put in additional fencing and gates,
9 that install to create a second perimeter on
10 the campus. All classroom doors received new
11 locking hardware throughout the school to
12 ensure that doors remained locked at all times,
13 and they would lock automatically. We upgraded
14 the intercom system at the school as well. We
15 doubled the security staff to eighteen members,
16 which now comprise a security team at Stoneman
17 Douglas. And we -- we completed our two phase
18 security risk assessment, which has been
19 conducted by Safe Haven, an independent
20 security firm, which started in June. They
21 completed the second phase recently, and
22 they're compiling a report to the district,
23 which we'll make available shortly.

24 We also worked with the municipalities to
25 expand school resource officers, and we

1 collaborated with BSO to train armed guardians
2 to provide at least a school resource officer
3 or an armed guardian to each and every one of
4 our schools at the start of the school year.
5 We've been very clear in terms of resetting
6 expectations at our schools around safety
7 protocols for routine school operations, that
8 they need to be continuously enforced. This
9 includes requiring all students and staff to
10 wear identification badges while on campus,
11 visitors need to wear identification while on
12 campus as well, locking all classroom doors,
13 exterior doors at all time, gates locked
14 throughout the day, just being vigilant in
15 monitoring the campus.

16 The district has also expedited our single
17 point of entry work, which uses a system of
18 doors and locks to create a single entry point
19 for visitors. Our goal is to have all schools
20 completed during this school year. And then
21 the board, our school board authorized over \$30
22 million this summer for additional
23 enhancements, including intercom systems at all
24 of our schools, radios and repeaters, adding
25 another three thousand surveillance cameras to

1 the district.

2 We worked with the support of Mr.
3 Schachter to secure funding from the Department
4 of Justice for another \$1.3 million for
5 security measures in our schools. We recognize
6 that we needed to have additional funding above
7 and beyond what we received from the state, so
8 we were successful in going out to our
9 community through a referendum to secure
10 additional dollars for school safety to cover
11 the hiring of additional school resource
12 officers so that we can get to our desirable
13 ration of 1:1000 in terms of armed guardians or
14 officers to students. It will also enable us
15 to hire approximately three hundred additional
16 security specialists and campus monitors.

17 And finally, we added another \$3 million
18 to create what we call an enterprise risk
19 management framework, which includes our new
20 Office of School Safety, Security, and
21 Emergency Preparedness that will oversee all
22 our efforts in the district, and report
23 directly to the Superintendent.

24 We encourage our students in particular,
25 and our families, to continue to share

1 information to us through tips, and do that
2 anonymously. I strongly believe that our
3 students play a major role in the safety of our
4 schools, and we've done that through a number
5 of methods that we have today. We've worked
6 with BSO to get information out about the Safer
7 Watch App, FortifyFL has come on board. We
8 have a direct number for people to call into,
9 754-321-0911. There's an e-mail for the
10 district. There's a tip line.

11 And then finally, the third area which we
12 have put a significant amount of focus on is on
13 school climate and mental health. We're
14 leveraging the dollars that we received from
15 the state to hire over fifty additional
16 counselors, social works, and behavioral
17 specialists, so that we can get our ratios down
18 and provide the services that we know our
19 students need. We also included in that
20 referendum that was passed this past August by
21 our voters, included additional dollars,
22 approximately \$8 million to hire more
23 counselors, more social workers, and more
24 behavior specialists.

25 We also moved forward to conduct some

1 investigations, of which we've shared reports
2 with you, the Collaborative Education Network,
3 which we engaged to do a review of the
4 shooter's history in Broward County schools.
5 We began a review of threat assessments, and we
6 noticed an anomaly that we saw at Stoneman
7 Douglas, so I had reached out to the Florida
8 Department of Law Enforcement to conduct an
9 investigation there. They folded that into the
10 investigation of this commission, and my
11 understanding, we'll get those results as well
12 from their report.

13 We engaged RSM, an external auditing firm,
14 to audit all threat assessments in the district
15 to ensure that they were being done properly in
16 identifying the opportunities that we needed to
17 make changes. We reviewed our discipline
18 management systems, and we're cooperating with
19 this commission, the State's Attorney's Office,
20 as we move through this, this period.

21 We've also been working with the State
22 Fire Marshall to see if we can get some type of
23 relief, in particular at Stoneman Douglas, from
24 the number of drills that need to be done,
25 because it continues to re-traumatize students

1 and staff, and earlier this week we were
2 successful in receiving approval for a waiver
3 to not conduct fire drills at MSD for the next
4 four months. We'll substitute fire drills with
5 an actual curriculum.

6 I'll also say that given the testimony and
7 the information that I've seen and heard that
8 has come out this week that we will absolutely
9 begin to move to take some preliminary
10 disciplinary action with employees in the
11 district as early as next week.

12 You know, I try to look for the
13 opportunity and purpose in, in every
14 difficulty, and, you know, one of the things I
15 was reading the other day was a quote from Hank
16 Aaron, a baseball player who said his motto was
17 always to keep swinging, whether he was in a
18 slump or feeling bad, or having trouble on the
19 field, the only thing to do was to keep
20 swinging, and my commitment to our families,
21 our entire community, is that I'll continue to
22 get up every day, and to continue swinging in
23 good times and bad times for our children and
24 this community which I love. I'll continue to
25 get up each and every day and pray for our

1 families, pray that God gives them the strength
2 to deal with the pain and suffering, and the
3 loss that they have.

4 I'm looking forward to receiving the
5 commission's report, and any other external
6 reports that we're able to get our hands on,
7 and to be able to use those to improve school
8 safety, to inform policies in the district, and
9 to ensure that we enact accountability as well.
10 With that said, again thank you, Sheriff, for
11 the opportunity to be here, thank you to the
12 commission, and I'll take your questions.

13 CHAIR: Thank you, Superintendent Runcie,
14 for your remarks. And just so you know, as we
15 begin with the questions I have told the
16 commission members earlier, and so they'll keep
17 it in mind with their questions, that the
18 information that has come out this week is
19 information that is not previously known to the
20 district, that you have not heard a lot of the
21 things that the commissioners have heard, your
22 staff has not heard these, and that these were
23 presentations that were received for the first
24 time publicly, and so that they know that you
25 don't have a lot of answers to some of these

1 things that came out because we have not shared
2 that with you, and we're the ones that have
3 been conducting the investigation.

4 So it's against that backdrop that they're
5 going to ask their questions today, so know
6 that they know that. So we'll begin,
7 Commissioners, do you have questions?
8 Commissioner Harpring, go ahead.

9 UND. SHER. HARPRING: First, thank you,
10 Mr. Runcie. I just want to be clear, has the
11 district done any evaluation, disciplinary
12 evaluation, or were you awaiting results from
13 the commission?

14 SUP. RUNCIE: We're awaiting results from
15 the commission, and to be able to use the
16 information that we have here, to inform the
17 actions that we need to take.

18 UND. SHER. HARPRING: And you indicated in
19 your statement that based on some information
20 that you've learned you will begin some
21 administrative investigations relative to
22 behaviors of individuals at Marjory Stoneman
23 Douglas; is that correct?

24 SUP. RUNCIE: That -- that's correct.

25 UND. SHER. HARPRING: I would respectfully

1 ask that you keep the commission abreast of
2 those things, and --

3 SUP. RUNCIE: I will absolutely do that.

4 UND. SHER. HARPRING: -- follow up with us
5 with, you know, both documents and information
6 relative to those investigations.

7 SUP. RUNCIE: Yes. Yes, I will. And it's
8 my intent to, if it's fine with the commission,
9 to first apprise our families of what we intend
10 to do before that's public.

11 CHAIR: That's fine. Sheriff Judd.

12 SHER. JUDD: Mr. Runcie, thank you for
13 being with us, and I appreciate the things that
14 you outlined that you, that you're working on.
15 Can you first define sense of urgency for me?

16 SUP. RUNCIE: Define sense of urgency?

17 SHER. JUDD: Yes, sir.

18 SUP. RUNCIE: Sense of urgency is dealing
19 with the situation with the utmost priority,
20 focus. That's how I would define urgency.

21 SHER. JUDD: Do you believe that that has
22 occurred with this incident as it relates to
23 the Office of the Superintendent and the school
24 system in Broward County?

25 SUP. RUNCIE: I absolutely will say that's

1 the case. I will tell you we get up every
2 single day, there's not a day that goes by
3 without this situation, this tragedy, and how
4 to improve where we are, how to help our
5 community recover, how to put in the safety
6 measures and improvements, which is a
7 continuous process that we have to do. It's
8 every day for us. It is the urgent priority,
9 so much so that, you know, we start asking
10 ourselves are we an education institution.

11 I believe that we are in our kind of 9/11
12 moment for public education, and we need to
13 redefine what the education system looks like,
14 what the priorities are. And I will tell you
15 that as far as safety, mental health, no
16 question that those areas are as important, and
17 maybe more critical than the academic piece,
18 because we'll never get to any of that unless
19 we get those two pieces right.

20 SHER. JUDD: That's encouraging to hear.
21 Was the school system prepared to have either
22 armed guardians or full time armed police
23 officers trained and assigned to the campus the
24 first day of school this year?

25 SUP. RUNCIE: Yes, we were.

1 SHER. JUDD: Was that with law enforcement
2 officers on extra duty detail because there
3 weren't sufficient hired as the full time job?

4 SUP. RUNCIE: That -- that is -- that is
5 correct. Throughout Broward County one of the
6 things that we realized is there is a
7 significant amount of vacancies, I think I was,
8 been informed by law enforcement leaders in
9 Broward County that there was probably
10 somewhere in excess of three hundred vacancies,
11 so there was no way that we were going to be
12 able to meet that goal without pursuing the
13 armed guardian program, and at the start of the
14 school year engaging officers in some cases in
15 overtime detail in order to do that. So we've
16 worked to make sure that we have full coverage
17 at our schools, and we continue to go through
18 the armed guardian process. I believe we're
19 completing our fourth cohort now, so we're
20 actually getting to the number that we would
21 want, and as we are able to bring those
22 guardians on we then release some of the SROs
23 that are on extended duty.

24 SHER. JUDD: How many armed guardians are
25 currently trained and on campus today, and how

1 many do you still need to hire?

2 SUP. RUNCIE: The exact number I'd have to
3 get back to you, but I believe it's somewhere
4 close to forty. Our goal is to have I think
5 about fifty five of them. We wanted to have a
6 little bit of a cushion for situations where,
7 you know, individuals are off sick, or on
8 leave, whatever it may be. So we're actually
9 very close to the actual number of guardians
10 that we want. I think after we complete this
11 cohort, which is I believe it would be in the
12 next week or two, we will be there, but we'll
13 continue to probably do another coupled of
14 cohorts just so we can have a cushion as well.

15 SHER. JUDD: So as of August 13th you did
16 not have either a full time guardian trained,
17 selected, screened, trained and on campus, or
18 full time police officers, SROs, SRDs,
19 whatever, whatever the vernacular you use, on
20 the campus. In fact you had to fill in with
21 overtime until you got that accomplished,
22 correct?

23 SUP. RUNCIE: That -- that is -- that is
24 correct.

25 SHER. JUDD: That will be all. I'll have

1 more questions later.

2 CHAIR: Okay, Secretary Kapusta, and then
3 Mr. Schachter.

4 SEC. KAPUSTA: We saw in the videos that a
5 lot of the hard corners were cluttered and
6 inaccessible to the students. What has the
7 district done to make sure that those heard
8 corners are cleared and available to students,
9 not just as Marjory Stoneman Douglas but all
10 the schools in Broward County?

11 SUP. RUNCIE: Yeah, so one of the things
12 that has come up, and we've realized from this,
13 in terms of creating a safer area within the
14 classroom. We're currently working with our
15 security risk consultant to develop some
16 protocols and processes around that, and we
17 intend to implement guidance to schools this
18 year of how to create those safer zones or
19 areas within classrooms, and have those
20 delineated.

21 And one of the things would be obviously
22 to address clutter, but every room is a little
23 different so we're going to have to make sure
24 that we provide sufficient guidance to deal
25 with various scenarios.

1 SEC. KAPUSTA: So as of today there are no
2 additional rooms at Marjory Stoneman Douglas
3 that have been taped off for that hard corner,
4 and desks removed from those hard corners?

5 SUP. RUNCIE: I am not aware that that's,
6 that's actually done throughout, through the
7 school.

8 CHAIR: I'm just going to follow up on
9 that, then turn it over to Mr. Schachter. You
10 know, the unfortunate reality, Superintendent
11 Runcie is, is that, and the evidence shows, and
12 as the commission has heard, is, is that the
13 hard corners were not affected in the
14 classrooms in Building 12, and the facts are
15 the facts, is, is that there's at least one
16 student who died on the line. There are others
17 who couldn't get into those, and I'm going to
18 ask you to create a policy, not a guidance but
19 a policy, that mandates, because the school is
20 under your direction, have a hard corner so
21 that these kids can be safe.

22 It's one of the core safety elements that
23 doesn't cost anything, and it can be done by
24 the stroke of a pen. And I know from what I've
25 seen with this incident that it's an essential

1 element of school safety that the doors be
2 locked and those kids can get to the safest
3 place they can in the classroom that don't have
4 bookshelves, that don't have desks, that don't
5 have things that can't be moved.

6 And we also understand the constraints of
7 the classrooms, and that the teachers need
8 space, but we're not saying that the space
9 can't be occupied. It can't be occupied by
10 permanent things that can't be easily tossed,
11 so please consider a policy that will effect
12 those hard corners in every school in the
13 Broward School District.

14 SUP. RUNCIE: I will have that policy to
15 our school board at the first school board
16 meeting in December.

17 CHAIR: Thank you, I appreciate that. Mr.
18 Schachter.

19 MR. SCHACHTER: Thank you, Sheriff, for
20 saying that. That was one of the things I was
21 going to talk about. You mentioned in your
22 remarks that you were going to be taking
23 disciplinary actions. Based on what findings
24 that are commission reported are you going to
25 be taking disciplinary actions?

1 SUP. RUNCIE: Based on I think testimony
2 that has been provided this week I will take
3 some preliminary actions. I think the final
4 actions I will need to actually have a report
5 that we can use, because all employees are
6 certainly required to have due process, so we
7 will make sure that we do that correctly. But
8 I think there has been sufficient details that
9 I have heard and seen this week that would
10 enable us to certainly draw some preliminary
11 conclusions that we can work through.

12 MR. SCHACHTER: And, Superintendent, I
13 think this is, this is what Sheriff Judd was
14 talking about, its urgency. So yesterday
15 Sheriff Gualtieri mentioned that he spoke to
16 you and recommended that you create safe spaces
17 in all the classrooms, apparently it was not
18 done, I don't understand why. And again today
19 you said you're going to give guidance. I mean
20 it just doesn't make any sense to me. If kids
21 died in that room because the teachers did not
22 make a safe space why not do it, you know, I
23 don't understand that.

24 As far, you know, you've known since
25 February 14th that Joaquin Oliver and Meadow

1 Pollack could not escape the, the murderer, due
2 to the bathrooms being locked on the third
3 floor. Is it district policy to lock the
4 bathrooms to combat a drug problem?

5 SUP. RUNCIE: No, it is not.

6 MR. SCHACHTER: What disciplinary measures
7 did you impose on assistant principal Porter
8 and Ty Thompson for making those decisions to
9 lock the bathrooms?

10 SUP. RUNCIE: The decisions that are made
11 to take those type of actions are school based
12 management decisions. There isn't some policy
13 in the district, or guidelines, or practices
14 against it, you know, school leaders and school
15 communities have flexibility in terms of what
16 they believe they need to do to manage their
17 campuses.

18 MR. SCHACHTER: I understand. I'm just
19 saying you've known since February 14th of this
20 specific fact --

21 CHAIR: Okay, Mr. Schachter --

22 SUP. RUNCIE: But it's not a viable --

23 CHAIR: -- please ask your questions, let
24 the Superintendent finish, and then you can ask
25 a follow up question. It's only fair that he

1 be given the opportunity to finish his answer,
2 okay?

3 Superintendent Runcie, you can finish your
4 answer.

5 SUP. RUNCIE: Yes, so you are correct,
6 we've known that is the case, but again,
7 there's no district protocols against doing
8 that. Obviously we've seen the ramifications
9 of that here, but it's, there wasn't some
10 violation of district policy and protocols that
11 the administration made by doing that.

12 MR. SCHACHTER: But did you -- do you
13 support that?

14 SUP. RUNCIE: No, I don't. So again, we
15 will get that changed.

16 MR. SCHACHTER: As you've -- you knew that
17 six kids died on the third floor since February
18 14th you've been aware that the mass confusion
19 with the camera system on campus that created
20 that delay in law enforcement arriving to the
21 third floor. One of the way that you could fix
22 that is by giving law enforcement access to the
23 cameras inside the school to give them real
24 time intelligence. This would -- they would
25 have known that the murderer had left the

1 building long ago, they could have immediately
2 rendered life saving medical assistance to the
3 injured, and could have saved six people's
4 lives in my opinion. Why do you continue to
5 refuse to give law enforcement access to the
6 school cameras?

7 SUP. RUNCIE: Well, I'll tell you here
8 right now I absolutely want to give law
9 enforcement a hundred percent access to our
10 cameras real time. I am working out the
11 details of an agreement with the Sheriff.
12 There are -- there's some challenges in terms
13 of where, you know, our legal department may
14 have an opinion on that. I know what my
15 opinion is, and I'm, you know, going to
16 basically say that legal can give us legal
17 advice but it's up to management to make a
18 business decision, and our business decision is
19 to make sure that law enforcement has full
20 access to our cameras.

21 MR. SCHACHTER: Again it's urgency, and
22 that's what concerns me. You've known about
23 this since February 14th and you haven't done
24 anything to fix it. I know that you can, you
25 can get this done. This is the right thing to

1 do. This will safely --

2 SUP. RUNCIE: We -- we expect to get it
3 done within the -- we expect to get this done
4 within the week.

5 MR. SCHACHTER: Thank you very -- thank
6 you very much.

7 CHAIR: Mr. Schachter, just because I
8 think it's so important that we be factually
9 accurate with everything, and I want to just
10 clarify something because you, part of your
11 question was about the six kids and the third
12 floor, and the cameras, and the access. What
13 we just heard this afternoon, and that Morford
14 and Porter, I'm sorry, Morford and Greenleaf
15 were in the camera room, but there is no
16 evidence that on the day of the incident on
17 February 14th, even though law enforcement was
18 not in the camera room and watching those
19 cameras there is no evidence that the district
20 wouldn't have allowed law enforcement in there,
21 or the district precluded law enforcement from
22 going in there.

23 It was Sergeant Rossman from the Broward
24 County Sheriff's Office that made the decision
25 to not have Porter or Medina go in there, or

1 anybody else at that point, so it's very clear
2 to everybody that it's two separate issues.
3 And it is true that the Broward County
4 Sheriff's Office would like live real time
5 access for future incidents to the camera
6 system of the school board. I can tell you
7 that we have that in Pinellas County, and other
8 districts do.

9 The issue with it is, is that it's a legal
10 interpretation under FERPA, and under state
11 law, as to whether it's a student record, and
12 that there's differing views by differing
13 lawyers on that, and it is no clear, there is
14 some ambiguity, and in some districts it's
15 allowed or it's not. But I think it's
16 important that everybody know that on February
17 14th there was no decision by anybody, there's
18 no evidence of any decision by anybody in the
19 Broward County School District to preclude any
20 law enforcement officer from watching any
21 video.

22 SUP. RUNCIE: And we have a -- and just to
23 close the, the point, we have an MOU that's in
24 place right now with the Sheriff's Office.
25 We're actually trying to work through some of

1 those legal points that the Chair just
2 mentioned.

3 MR. SCHACHTER: I -- Chair, I was
4 certainly not making that inference. I was
5 talking about moving forward from February
6 14th, that needs to happen in my opinion.

7 CHAIR: Okay. Do you have any questions?
8 We have other commissioners, but do you have
9 anything else for right now, Mr. Schachter?

10 MR. SCHACHTER: No. No.

11 CHAIR: Okay, so we're going to move onto
12 Chief Lystad, and then Sheriff Ashley.

13 CHIEF LYSTAD: Superintendent Runcie,
14 thank you for being here today. I just want to
15 follow up on a to do list from Sheriff
16 Gualtieri about policies and procedures,
17 notwithstanding the information that you
18 learned from this commission regarding any
19 disciplinary actions you may take. One of the
20 issues that clearly was identified as far as it
21 relates to Marjory Stoneman Douglas is the code
22 red system, and who could, who could authorize
23 that, who could call one of those, and there
24 seemed to be great confusion of that.

25 There doesn't seem to be any policy or

1 procedure in place, in addition to any policy
2 and procedure for the security monitors, what
3 their roles are, what they're supposed to do
4 and not do, there was a lot of conflicting
5 testimony, and so I'd like to ask you to add
6 that to your list of, of priority of things to
7 get done, and so that everyone knows how to do
8 a code red, teachers, students, everyone else.
9 There should be a very clear policy and
10 training for them to do that.

11 My question that I do have, though, is in
12 light of the fact, I know you haven't done any
13 disciplinary actions as it relates to Cruz's
14 schools, and his movements to Cross Creek, and
15 to MSD, has you or your staff conducted any
16 type of review of that, and whether that was an
17 appropriate decision to make, notwithstanding
18 FERPA?

19 SUP. RUNCIE: And you're -- to make sure I
20 understand, the movement from Cross Creek to
21 MSD?

22 CHIEF LYSTAD: Correct.

23 SUP. RUNCIE: Yeah, so -- so there's --
24 there isn't anything that we see in terms of
25 what was actually done in terms of a student

1 moving from a behavior center back to their
2 zoned school, that that's, that's not something
3 that's unusual, like the process they went
4 through was, was appropriate. You know, we
5 certainly look back on that, and we can make a
6 judgment of whether it was appropriate or not,
7 but the process was fine. I saw nothing out of
8 what would be normal professional guidance and
9 protocols in terms of making that decision.

10 CHIEF LYSTAD: So nothing -- nothing came
11 to light that that was inappropriate, or you
12 would have liked to have left him at Cross
13 Creek, or your staff, because of FERPA that was
14 a correct decision on staff?

15 SUP. RUNCIE: What, from a FERPA
16 perspective are you --

17 CHIEF LYSTAD: What I asked -- the
18 question was, is whether or not you reviewed
19 the decisions as it relates to placing him
20 back, or mainstreaming him from everything that
21 was historical in his file, from disciplinary
22 problems at schools, and evaluations from staff
23 members about that, and what I'm trying to
24 drive at is whether or not you felt there was
25 something that maybe could have been done

1 better and it was restricted by FERPA or
2 policies and procedures I place, and whether or
3 not you would be able to recommend something
4 different so that this, we can prevent this
5 from happening again.

6 SUP. RUNCIE: Yeah, so what we've put in
7 place this year is to actually have an external
8 review by control office ESE professionals on
9 any recommended transfers that would occur from
10 behavior centers to a school, so there's now
11 additional oversight on it to ensure that it
12 would be an appropriate decision.

13 CHAIR: Sheriff Ashley.

14 SHER. ASHLEY: Thank you, Chair. Thank
15 you, Superintendent, for being here today.
16 I've got a few questions, and some are broad
17 based, and some are more specific. How would
18 you -- how would you judge your school security
19 assessments for this past year; do you think
20 those were accurate school safety assessments
21 that were conducted?

22 SUP. RUNCIE: You're referring to the
23 FFSAT pieces?

24 SHER. ASHLEY: Yes.

25 SUP. RUNCIE: What I'll -- what I'll say

1 about the assessments, I think they can, it be
2 improved. I think the instrument can be
3 improved. I think the process can be improved.
4 That is a work in progress, and I think, I hope
5 one of the recommendations coming out from the
6 commission are ways that we can actually get
7 that changed, not only at the state level but
8 what we actually do in the district.

9 I will say to you that we, unlike many
10 districts, went out to hire independent
11 security risk assessment firm to give us a
12 comprehensive view of what was going on each
13 school, and they did two phases. They went out
14 throughout the whole summer, went to over two
15 hundred campuses in Broward County, looked all
16 the physical security measures. They did a
17 second round to all the schools again while
18 they were occupied with students and faculty to
19 look at protocols and practices in action.

20 Those recommendations are ones that I
21 think give us the most comprehensive and best
22 information, because we actually have experts
23 doing that work.

24 SHER. ASHLEY: Okay, so how do you as a
25 superintendent, or school board, or principal,

1 or any other administrative setting, how do you
2 know your personnel know what your policy and
3 procedures are; do you give them a handbook, do
4 you make them go online, do they have to sign
5 that they've read the policy that they've had
6 training, or how do you hold somebody
7 accountable for your policies and procedures?

8 SUP. RUNCIE: It is the responsibility of
9 school leaders and administrators to review
10 district policies and procedures, and make sure
11 that they're current on them. Over the summer
12 period usually there are training sessions that
13 are done by staff, as well as the legal
14 department, on policies and procedures, and
15 guidelines in the district, so there's really
16 no excuse for anyone to say I don't know what
17 the policies and procedures are.

18 SHER. ASHLEY: And you know that because
19 there's been some signature signed, or some
20 proof that they've been presented that policy,
21 or that training, that you can hold them
22 accountable to?

23 SUP. RUNCIE: In some cases there are
24 signature sign offs. In others I think they
25 may just do attendance. We've talked about

1 making the actual sign offs on a form a
2 mandatory piece of future training, but in the
3 past there hasn't been a consistent method to
4 determine that they've actually gone through
5 that.

6 SHER. ASHLEY: I just want to move in --
7 if the Chairman will bear with me just, just a
8 couple more questions. As a parent I'm moving
9 to Broward County, and I want to send my child
10 to school at whatever school, and I want to
11 learn as a parent how safe your school is, or
12 that particular school is in my area. Do you
13 feel like there's a degree of underreporting on
14 incidents that occur on campus? Is that a
15 cultural thing, or do you feel like we're
16 pretty accurate in reporting incidents that
17 occur, and making that information available to
18 parents so they can check out the security of
19 the school before they send their children
20 there?

21 SUP. RUNCIE: I believe that the schools
22 report incidents there, and the degree of
23 consistency across the system, I review that as
24 well. We haven't seen any anomalies. Now,
25 what I'll tell you is that if someone doesn't

1 report something and it, it doesn't get in our
2 system, so we don't know that they aren't doing
3 it. I've made it repeatedly clear, I've sent
4 communication out to our school leaders, anyone
5 that's caught in a situation where any
6 behavioral incidents aren't reported, it will
7 result in serious disciplinary action, and
8 possibly even termination.

9 I am also not leaving it up to school
10 leaders anymore. I am actually having our
11 internal audit department do an annual audit of
12 school disciplinary records and practices at
13 the school to ensure that there's compliance
14 with what our expectations are.

15 SHER. ASHLEY: And along that same line,
16 have you any examples of personnel that have
17 been disciplined for not reporting?

18 SUP. RUNCIE: Not at -- not at this time.

19 SHER. ASHLEY: Okay, so how do you tell
20 the parents then; do you put that information
21 online, do you -- how do you tell parents how
22 many thefts were at school, how many fights,
23 how many bullying incidents; how do they know
24 these things?

25 SUP. RUNCIE: I believe that the

1 discipline data, it's available. I mean I know
2 it's on the state site. I don't know if it's
3 on individual school websites. I think that's
4 what you're probably referring to?

5 SHER. ASHLEY: Yeah, I'm just wondering --
6 I'm a parent, and I want to send my kids to
7 school, and I want to know if it's safe.

8 SUP. RUNCIE: I mean I think the best
9 thing for the parent to do at that point, I
10 mean go, they can go to the school, they can
11 secure that information from the
12 administration. Again, it's also something we
13 report to the state. And I believe we have,
14 you know, what we call accessor and behavior
15 data that's, that's available in the district.
16 I think out --

17 SHER. ASHLEY: But that's just applied in
18 that school, individual schools, or district
19 wide?

20 SUP. RUNCIE: Yeah, I think there's --
21 there's individual school information, and I'd
22 have to go back and see how we would make that
23 available, but certainly any parent requesting
24 that information we would, we would make it
25 available to them.

1 SHER. ASHLEY: And the last question, how
2 difficult, if at all, is it to expel a student,
3 we'll use an example of Cruz, from a school? I
4 mean we have this FERPA that, you know, free
5 and public education in the least restrictive
6 environment, and that seems to be the guidance
7 you all have to work under. How do you take a
8 violent student out of school?

9 SUP. RUNCIE: We expel students every day.
10 I mean this week I expelled twelve kids from
11 Broward County schools. I think on an annual
12 basis it's probably somewhere in excess of
13 three hundred expulsions. There are also, you
14 know, I think somewhere north of fifty thousand
15 suspensions that we have in the County, so I
16 mean we take student misbehavior very
17 seriously.

18 SHER. ASHLEY: Does it cost the school
19 district financially to educate a child -- does
20 it cost them more to educate a child that's
21 been expelled than it does mainstream?

22 SUP. RUNCIE: No, I don't -- to educate a
23 child that's been -- no, I don't -- I don't
24 think so. We have -- no, it doesn't, it
25 wouldn't cost us any -- it would be a different

1 -- they would be in a different environment,
2 but I'm not aware that it would cost, there's
3 some cost differential.

4 SHER. ASHLEY: Thank you.

5 CHAIR: I'm just -- Superintendent, I'm
6 just going to ask you to clarify one of Sheriff
7 Ashley's questions, because I'm not clear on
8 it. Is that is there a written policy or
9 directive system for the employees of the
10 Broward County public schools, either a written
11 document, or book of documents, or online, and
12 as an example is we've heard that there was no
13 written policy governing the conduct of campus
14 monitors, that would be an example, about
15 policy about what they do, don't do, so that's
16 the type of written policy or directive system.
17 More specifically, but generally, is there a
18 written system of a hundred policies, or two
19 hundred policies --

20 SUP. RUNCIE: Yes, there is. There's over
21 three hundred plus policies, and those policies
22 are online.

23 CHAIR: Okay, thank you. Commission
24 Larkin- Skinner, and then Commissioner Carroll.

25 MS. LARKIN-SKINNER: Thank you,

1 Superintendent Runcie. I want to say that I'm
2 glad to hear your quote from Hank Aaron,
3 because I know that in these situations it's
4 easy to want to walk away, and so the fact that
5 you're going to stand here and fight means a
6 lot. I have a couple of questions. The
7 repeaters that you're talking about, one of the
8 common themes we heard is about radios, and the
9 difficulty with them on the MSD campus.
10 Apparently it's throughout Parkland as well,
11 but specifically the school campus. Can you
12 tell me what those, what your intention is with
13 those repeaters; is that to enhance the
14 broadcasting of the school radios, but also of
15 the first responder radios if they're on
16 campus, if that's a possibility?

17 SUP. RUNCIE: So the -- we're putting
18 repeaters to ensure and enhance the radios that
19 we're deploying within the district. I will
20 tell you that there's a significant problem in
21 this district, and I will tell you throughout
22 the state, with campuses. Based on the way
23 they're configured there are dead zones on each
24 campuses, and in order to address that you will
25 need to put what are called BDAs, bidirectional

1 antennas. Those can be enormously expensive,
2 anywhere from \$100,000 to \$200,000 per campus.
3 That's what I - - and so if you were to
4 extrapolate that to Broward County you're
5 looking at somewhere around \$40 million or so
6 to be able to do that, and you have to go and
7 assess each and every campus.

8 We're in the process of doing some
9 assessments on that now. The challenge is
10 going to be, you know, where does the funding
11 come from to be able to do that in Broward,
12 Dade, Palm Beach, Pinellas, throughout the
13 state.

14 MS. LARKIN-SKINNER: My hope would be that
15 all, well the communities would get behind it,
16 but also the different agencies that are
17 affected, the school board, the superintendent,
18 law enforcement, EMS, would get together to try
19 to figure that out, because I don't think that
20 is your problem alone, it's the community's
21 problem.

22 SUP. RUNCIE: No, it's -- right. And so
23 we've been working with a couple of
24 municipalities on this issue, which has emerged
25 over the past year or so, and so we're, you

1 know, we've got to figure out a global solution
2 to it versus the one offs that we've been
3 doing.

4 MS. LARKIN-SKINNER: Okay. And can you
5 elaborate, Mr. Mokelan (phonetic), and then you
6 also mentioned it, about the special department
7 that's being developed that the school board
8 approved.

9 SUP. RUNCIE: Yes.

10 MS. LARKIN-SKINNER: Can you elaborate on
11 what exactly the goal is with that department,
12 and what they will oversee?

13 SUP. RUNCIE: The goal is to hire a chief
14 of school safety security and emergency
15 management and response to consolidate all of
16 our school safety related functions that are in
17 disparate departments, consolidate that under
18 one individual who will be responsible for
19 providing the direction and oversight to the
20 district.

21 MS. LARKIN-SKINNER: And just to add to
22 Chief Lystad's comments about the code red,
23 it's a serious problem that people have no clue
24 what to do, what it means, who calls it, and I
25 think that any efforts towards improving that

1 need to included actual drills, because the
2 more people drill the more muscle memory they
3 develop, and they know exactly what to do when
4 the time comes.

5 CHAIR: Commissioner Carroll, and then
6 Senator Book.

7 MR. CARROLL: Thank you. I just want to
8 ask a quick question, actually two questions.
9 The first question relates to all of the
10 questions that have been asked. The culture
11 within the school system, it's decentralized,
12 so you have the school of education, that while
13 they have some must do things they provide a
14 lot of guidance to individual districts. And
15 what I've seen at individual districts is you
16 have some must things that some schools have to
17 do, but you rely on, and provide a lot of
18 discretion to school principals. And in your
19 district I think that, I think there was
20 something that said two hundred twenty eight
21 different schools.

22 And just as an example, you talked about
23 that, Commissioner Kapusta brought up the hard
24 corners, and you said, well, well, we provide
25 guidance, and we may provide a policy. You

1 provide guidance on, on lots of things. I know
2 on the, on the Florida School Safety Assessment
3 Tool, you sent that out, and you provided
4 guidance and feedback to questions, but you had
5 two hundred and twenty eight different schools
6 fill these forms out, and you got two hundred
7 and twenty eight different responses, that the
8 variability within that was great, and I think
9 that showed up on February 14th with the level
10 of confusion that took place in the school.

11 And I would say that level of confusion almost
12 led to a tragedy that was far more significant
13 than the one that happened, because if anything
14 happened differently there could have been many
15 more kids caught out in the hallways.

16 So my question is at what point do you
17 start looking at the culture of the
18 organization, particularly as it relates to
19 school security, because like you said the core
20 competency of any school administrator is
21 really to educate kids, it might not be around
22 school safety, or the latest techniques, or the
23 best practices around that, so at what point do
24 you start addressing the culture
25 decentralization, and then when does it become

1 in the best interest of the school system to
2 say this type stuff has to be centralized?

3 So there's a new group that you're setting
4 up, are they going to provide guidance, are
5 they going to truly provide oversight and
6 mandates?

7 SUP. RUNCIE: The intent is to provide
8 oversight, ensure compliance. I will tell you
9 you hit on a piece that is part of the public
10 education arena, and that's the, you know, the
11 tension between autonomy and centralization,
12 and how does that work relative to local
13 schools. You know, we have a mix, to what we
14 call managed autonomy, which means, yes, there
15 are some things that we are going to give
16 schools discretion on, and there's some things
17 that they're absolutely non-negotiables. I
18 will say that the directives, and the
19 requirements around all aspects safety related
20 are non-negotiable items, and there's no
21 autonomy I believe that schools should have any
22 longer in any aspect to how they do it, it's
23 just too critical.

24 We cannot afford to have variability when
25 it comes to safety. As was mentioned earlier

1 if a parent comes to Broward County they should
2 have the same kind of expectation around
3 security as they would if they go to McDonalds,
4 they are expecting a certain product, it to be
5 implemented a certain way, and we've got to
6 make sure that is consistent across the board.
7 That's our challenge. That's what we need to
8 work on, to make sure that all aspects of
9 security are consistent across the board.

10 MR. CARROLL: And I would agree with that,
11 and I think it is going to be a huge challenge.
12 I'm glad to hear you say it. Whether that's
13 actually going to happen is yet to be seen, but
14 I do think it needs to happen. A question with
15 respect to your interface with the community
16 providers on mental health. In this case, and
17 in many cases, the school deals with kids who
18 have pretty significant behavior health issues,
19 either mental disorders or behavior issues, or
20 substance abuse issues, or some type of
21 combination of all of them. How would you
22 describe the effectiveness in your relationship
23 between the school system and the community
24 mental health providers; do you think the
25 communication between the two is effective, do

1 you think you're aligned in terms of driving
2 what should be in treatment plans for the kids
3 that you're mutually serving, and if not what
4 would you say needs to be improved?

5 SUP. RUNCIE: I believe that communication
6 in structures there, that's an actual formal
7 committee among the mental health and
8 behavioral health partners that we have in
9 Broward County. They meet regularly. I think
10 the focus and scope of the work, and what needs
11 to be done, that can be improved, but in terms
12 of the structure, the communications, the
13 working relationships, that I believe has been
14 positive.

15 MR. CARROLL: And I'm sure at some level
16 that's true. I think on the treatment level,
17 and probably this is an example where not all
18 parties had the same information as, working
19 off the same sheet of music, so while I agree
20 at some level there's good communication, at
21 the treatment level, at individual student
22 level there is a need for improvement.

23 SUP. RUNCIE: Yes.

24 MR. CARROLL: How much money did this
25 district get as a result of the funds that were

1 available last year through the legislation to
2 improve along the terms of mental health
3 services in your budget?

4 SUP. RUNCIE: I believe it was
5 approximately somewhere between \$5 million and
6 \$6 million.

7 MR. CARROLL: And what is the plans in
8 this school district for using this, and how
9 did you go about determining whether that was
10 the most appropriate, and would provide the
11 biggest bang for your buck with those funds?

12 SUP. RUNCIE: The plan was to, is to, as I
13 had mentioned in my earlier comments, to hire
14 additional behavioral specialists,
15 psychologists, nurses, school counselors,
16 social workers. The ratios that we have now,
17 they're significant. I've had numerous
18 conversations with the governor and legislators
19 about this topic, and, you know, I think that's
20 one of the reasons we were able to get some of
21 the, the funds in here, because these rations
22 are high, and make it very difficult to, to
23 meet the needs of the, the students that we
24 have. So that, that's the focus of the, what
25 we're doing with those dollars.

1 MR. CARROLL: And my encouragement, and my
2 ask for you to add to the to do list is, I
3 think it's critically important that there be a
4 much higher level of coordination with
5 community mental health providers. And the
6 reason I say that is in this case if a kid has
7 that type issue they have that issue when they
8 go home, they have it on breaks from school,
9 and they have it during the summer, and if
10 treatment changes during that time period it
11 creates, you know, an up and down, a hamster
12 wheel if you will for the kid, but it also
13 creates issues where you're not making
14 sustained progress over time with the kids.

15 And so I do think that -- and this is just
16 not specific necessarily to this school
17 district, but I would encourage you to work
18 very closely, because how we handle these kids
19 in school, and how we handle them when they go
20 home, is going to be critically important to
21 preventing something like this in the future,
22 and I do think there are many opportunities to
23 improve how that happened, not only in this
24 specific case but in general.

25 SUP. RUNCIE: Yes, I would agree.

1 CHAIR: All right, Senator Book, and then
2 Commissioner Swearingen.

3 SEN. BOOK: Thank you so much. And thank
4 you for being here, Mr. Superintendent. And
5 you said you've been listening for, you know,
6 for the past couple of days, and, and seen some
7 of the timeline, so I'm going to go back to a
8 few things that have been touched on a little
9 bit by some of our, my fellow commissioners
10 and, and the chair.

11 Have you ever heard of a cross killing
12 field?

13 SUP. RUNCIE: A cross killing field? No,
14 I don't believe so.

15 SEN. BOOK: It actually was covered
16 several weeks ago, something that Eric Harris
17 and Dylan Klebold tried to do actually during
18 the Columbine attack, and that was when they
19 preplaced pipe bombs and propane bombs, and
20 they would be prepositioned in the woods so
21 when kids were evacuating once the fire alarms
22 were pulled they can just shoot at them. And
23 so I'm wondering how did you feel as the
24 superintendent watching the video yesterday
25 when you had kids just running, backpacks,

1 balloons, once a code red drill, code red was
2 called eventually, you saw a teacher pull the
3 hand, put a hand up, kids were running back
4 into the building. We're two hundred seventy
5 three days fifteen hours and fifty three
6 minutes, to be exact, from the minute that,
7 that the shooter started his attack, and again,
8 to my understanding, there is no code red
9 policy in place that is district wide; is that
10 correct or incorrect?

11 SUP. RUNCIE: I'm not aware of an actual
12 code red policy, but there is code red
13 training, there is code red manuals, and there
14 are expectations around what should occur
15 during code red drills.

16 SEN. BOOK: But there is no policy.

17 SUP. RUNCIE: I don't believe so. I
18 couldn't -- I couldn't confirm that there's a
19 policy. I just know what we actually provide
20 in terms of training to schools, and what the
21 expectations are.

22 SEN. BOOK: Now, when -- when I came down
23 with our senate president, and we sat down
24 together, one of the things that was very
25 important to my president, and to, to me, was

1 did a code red, was a code red called, and you
2 told you us that, yes, absolutely it was, and,
3 you know, now we know that that's true. Today
4 we ask, I asked when was a code red lock down
5 drill, when was a code red called for
6 Westglades Middle, was a code red called at
7 Westglades Middle, is there an automatic
8 trigger for surrounding schools to be on
9 lockdown when there is an active assailant and
10 you have a school, two schools that are
11 basically connected. And it took us some time
12 to go and look, and eventually there was a
13 lockdown, but the shooter ran right past that
14 school before it was on lockdown.

15 As the superintendent knowing the facts,
16 and knowing the things that have occurred, do
17 you believe that you need to have in place a
18 policy district wide relating to code red
19 drills, code red, calling code reds, and code
20 red drills?

21 SUP. RUNCIE: Yes, I do.

22 SEN. BOOK: Do you -- could you -- and I'm
23 asking in my capacity as a commissioner here on
24 this commission, as a state senator that
25 represents this district, that that be done

1 when you address the hard corner issue, because
2 it shouldn't have been one day, but it's been
3 two hundred seventy three days fifteen hours
4 and fifty four minutes.

5 Beyond that, another issue that has come
6 up that is really troubling to me is a theme
7 that teachers are afraid to come forward about
8 things that are actually happening in their
9 schools, and in the district. I would ask, and
10 I'm going to ask now, for you to speak to those
11 teachers who may listening, who may be
12 watching, who may catch this on the news, talk
13 to them, and, and do we want to encourage them
14 to come forward, and in, what is the best way
15 to do that?

16 SUP. RUNCIE: I encourage every teacher,
17 every employee, to come forward with issues
18 that they see, concerns that they have. I have
19 teachers that contact me on a regular basis,
20 and I would say that if you're not getting the
21 response that you need from your school
22 administration to contact the superintendent's
23 office.

24 SEN. BOOK: And what about their concerns
25 and fears of retribution?

1 SUP. RUNCIE: Retribution is not something
2 that we tolerate in the district. I have --
3 I've heard that there's concern and fear among
4 people. All I can say is that when someone
5 comes forward with an issue it makes us all
6 better, it makes us safer. We can't get better
7 as a district if we don't have folks that are
8 on the front line giving us some sense of what
9 the real issues are.

10 That why I go out to schools, I talk to
11 students, I talk to teachers. We welcome that
12 feedback, and that should be done in a climate
13 where there absolutely shouldn't be any
14 retribution. There shouldn't be -- if people
15 are doing their job they shouldn't have any
16 concerns about that, so I would, I would
17 encourage every teacher, every employee, every
18 student, to speak up on any concerns that they
19 have. If you don't feel that your voice is
20 being heard, or a serious issue is being taken
21 seriously at the local school level, work your
22 way up to the superintendent's office. That
23 happens on a regular basis.

24 SEN. BOOK: Thank you, Mr. Superintendent.

25 CHAIR: Okay, next is Commissioner

1 Swearingen, and then Commissioner Petty.

2 COMM. SWEARINGEN: Thank you,
3 Superintendent Runcie. I want to say thank you
4 first for being here today. One of the
5 toughest things after any tragedy is to take a
6 tough look in the mirror and answer the hard
7 questions, and by showing up today you show
8 more courage than the coward that was supposed
9 to speak before you, so I appreciate your
10 willingness to be here.

11 Understanding that you don't know what we
12 know I'm going to ask this in a very general
13 way. When students are involved in criminal
14 activity at school, particularly if that's an
15 act of violence against another student,
16 against a teacher, can you assure this
17 commission and the parents that those crimes
18 will absolutely be reported to either the SRO
19 or other law enforcement, and that law
20 enforcement will decide whether that warrants
21 an arrest or not?

22 SUP. RUNCIE: I can assure this commission
23 and this community that that should be reported
24 to law enforcement, they should be engaged,
25 that information should be logged in our

1 discipline management systems, and if it is not
2 it needs to be reported to the superintendent's
3 office. We have an office of school oversight
4 called our Office of School Performance
5 Accountability, and if there's any deviance
6 from that occurring we're going to take serious
7 disciplinary action on school administrators
8 that don't adhere to that.

9 That -- we just can't tolerate that. And
10 we've set the expectations very clearly this
11 year, I think our administrators know that,
12 and, you know, we're going to move down that
13 path, and, you know, given how large the
14 district is we may find someone that's not
15 doing that, and the first person, we're going
16 to make an example out of them.

17 COMM. SWEARINGEN: Thank you. Thank you
18 again for appearing.

19 CHAIR: Commissioner Petty, and then
20 Commissioner Dodd.

21 MR. PETTY: Mr. Runcie, thank you for
22 appearing today. I've waited nine months to
23 hear you finally admit that there were mistakes
24 made on February 14th, and in the events
25 leading up to the tragedy that day. You've

1 described February 14th as our 9/11 for
2 education, and you've also said we will never
3 be the same. I can only hope that's true
4 because our students, teachers, and their
5 families, deserve better than what the district
6 offered on February 14th. Nothing you do as
7 superintendent, nothing that is done as a
8 district, Mr. Runcie, matters if the students
9 and teachers don't make it home at night.

10 Sheriff Ashley asked about discipline, and
11 FSSAT submissions. Have you ever, or do you
12 review those submissions prior to them being
13 submitted to the state?

14 SUP. RUNCIE: No, I don't review them
15 directly. I have a general conversation with
16 my chief of staff and head of school district
17 police in investigations who oversee that.
18 Whether there are any issues in it, we, you
19 know, look at some of the particulars, but I
20 don't go through every one of the two hundred
21 plus items there.

22 MR. PETTY: Could I encourage you, Mr.
23 Runcie, in the spirit of this being our 9/11,
24 that you take your own personal time to review
25 at least a sampling of that submission by your

1 district, which ultimately you are the chief
2 administrator of the district, and I think it
3 would behoove you to know what's being
4 submitted to the state, and be able to
5 represent that it's in fact complete and
6 accurate, and that you look at the submissions
7 that are being made by, by the schools, at
8 least a sampling of those so you have a sense
9 for whether or not there's consistency in the
10 way those are, are being handled at the school
11 level, and also whether or not there's
12 additional training required, because the
13 answers given in those reports will indicate
14 where there might be opportunities for
15 improvement.

16 You mentioned single point of entry, and a
17 secured entry area. And you mentioned those
18 improvements, I think they were specific to
19 MSD; is that correct?

20 SUP. RUNCIE: I'm sorry, the improvements
21 for what, for MSD?

22 MR. PETTY: Single point of entry, and the
23 secured entry area, was that, were you
24 referring to MSD specifically?

25 SUP. RUNCIE: MSD and the entire district,

1 yes.

2 MR. PETTY: What percentage of the schools
3 in the Broward County have implemented and
4 functioning single point of entry in a secured
5 entry area?

6 SUP. RUNCIE: I'd have to get back to you
7 with that number. I would say the majority of
8 schools in Broward County do.

9 MR. PETTY: I would encourage you to have
10 a sense of urgency about getting that done.
11 We've talked a little bit about the lack of
12 training that contributed to chaos, and I just
13 wanted to read a couple of statements from,
14 from the teachers that we heard testimony, or
15 we heard earlier this week.

16 The teachers in building, in the 1200
17 Building indicated that they sheltered in place
18 because the first thing they heard was gunfire.
19 The teachers in the 1200 Building that
20 evacuated their classrooms did so because the
21 first thing they heard was a fire alarm. There
22 was no clear indication of what was happening.
23 There was no clear communication about what was
24 happening, and those teachers were left to make
25 split second, life altering in many cases,

1 decisions for the students in their care, and,
2 Mr. Runcie, that's unacceptable.

3 Are you aware that in the Broward County
4 School District Emergency Preparedness Manual,
5 it's a hundred fifty one pages by the way, that
6 there is no section for active shooter, active
7 killer, or code red?

8 SUP. RUNCIE: Yeah, I don't believe that's
9 in, that's part of that particular policy.

10 MR. PETTY: I would encourage you to add a
11 section there.

12 SUP. RUNCIE: Right.

13 MR. PETTY: We've talked about hard
14 corners. Just a reminder, and to add to the
15 sense of urgency around getting a policy on
16 lockdown and code reds, as I mentioned before
17 the teachers that locked their classrooms did
18 so not because a code red was called, they only
19 did because they heard shots fired. It wasn't
20 until three minutes and sixteen seconds, and
21 twenty four had been shot and killed, before a
22 code red was called. And the image, Mr.
23 Runcie, I watched the video on Tuesday, the
24 unedited video of the killer walking through
25 the school and killing seventeen, and injuring

1 seventeen others, and the image I can't get out
2 of my mind is the third floor hallway filled
3 with over a hundred students, and heaven forbid
4 he had been on the third floor when those
5 students were in that hallway. As was already
6 said, this would have been significantly worse.

7 What is your understanding of the
8 responsibility of the campus security monitors;
9 what are they there to do?

10 SUP. RUNCIE: They are there to provide
11 some, you know, monitoring of students, to, you
12 know reports issues that, that they're seeing
13 on the campus. I mean we have a job
14 description that covers that.

15 MR. PETTY: Yeah, you do have a job
16 description. What you don't have is training.
17 What you don't have is any sort of written
18 performance specifications, or anything that
19 would indicate or help them do, do their job,
20 and I can't help but think that one of the
21 catastrophic failures that day was that the
22 security monitor Mr. Medina opened the gates
23 early because there was no policy or procedure
24 as far as I can tell, although I think the
25 district requires those gates to be opened only

1 at specific times, but he opened them early, he
2 opened the gate that allowed Cruz to come in,
3 he saw and identified Cruz, he saw, we believe
4 he saw and reported a rifle bag, but he made no
5 attempt to stop Cruz at a point where the rifle
6 bag was closed.

7 Now, he said he thought Cruz may have had
8 a handgun, and so in his defense perhaps he was
9 trying to be careful in not, in not approaching
10 Cruz directly, but he then, but he then drove
11 back to the administration building to find the
12 deputy rather than using his radio, so I
13 question that. This to me just says there's a
14 lack of training and understanding what they're
15 there to do, and what they're supposed to do,
16 and in a situation like that.

17 In your -- in your opinion -- in your
18 opinion, Mr. Runcie, and in light of the horror
19 that you personally saw in 2/14 as you toured
20 the campus, do you, how do you believe district
21 policy should change towards students that pose
22 a protractive threat to a school, or to other
23 students and teachers?

24 SUP. RUNCIE: Students that fit the
25 description that you're referring to, they

1 should absolutely be in some alternative
2 education setting receiving appropriate
3 services, but a student, given what we know
4 now, yes, they shouldn't be in a traditional
5 school environment.

6 MR. PETTY: I would agree with that. I
7 think there might be another environment he
8 would, he would belong in, and I think there
9 were opportunities and information available to
10 the district that, that indicated that he was
11 in fact a threat, and had, and had in fact
12 committed acts on school property that, that
13 might have reached a threshold where he should
14 have been engaged with the law enforcement
15 community, and that decision should have been
16 made by law enforcement, and not by the school
17 district.

18 The data was there. It was sitting in
19 school administration, it was sitting with the
20 school administration, Mr. Runcie, and, and
21 whether it was by district policy or by their
22 own fiat they chose not to take further action,
23 and I would ask you to review, now in light of
24 what you know today I would ask you to take
25 action and review very critically in the events

1 leading up to 2/14 what was done or not done by
2 school administration with the information that
3 they had.

4 I will say, and I know Commissioner
5 Swearingen and I think alike on this, this is
6 an opportunity to fully implement proactive
7 threat assessment in the schools, but that will
8 require a change in culture and policy at the
9 district so that law enforcement is not viewed
10 as the enemy but actually viewed as, viewed as
11 part of the, part of the, part of the solution,
12 but it's going to require sharing of
13 information with the mental health
14 professionals.

15 When you -- when you see what we've seen,
16 when you understand what was known by mental
17 health, law enforcement, and the school
18 district, it paints a picture that is
19 unmistakable. This Cruz posed a threat to this
20 school, and the, then the actions that he took
21 on 2/14, it's pretty clear what he intended to
22 do. But the only way we stop the next one is
23 by sharing information. Thank you.

24 CHAIR: Commissioner Dodd.

25 MR. DODD: All right.

1 CHAIR: And so I have a couple
2 commissioners that haven't had an opportunity,
3 and then we'll come back around to the ones
4 that have if we have time. So Commissioner
5 Dodd, and then Commissioner Stewart.

6 MR. DODD: All right, thank you,
7 Commissioner Petty, that was very well
8 articulated, and I appreciate your comments,
9 and Commissioner Schachter, your views on this,
10 your opinions are so valuable to this
11 commission, so we thank you. And I too had
12 some concerns, some large concerns over the
13 campus monitor program, so I kind of wanted to
14 know how the district got to that, and if there
15 was a formula for the number of campus
16 monitors. At Stoneman Douglas there were seven
17 that reported to us that were assigned to that
18 school as monitors, so can you expand on that a
19 little bit more?

20 SUP. RUNCIE: Yeah, there's an allocation
21 formula for schools based on the enrollment at
22 the school. So that would, you know, that
23 would dictate everything from either the number
24 of instructional staff, campus monitors,
25 administrators that you have at the school,

1 clerks.

2 MR. DODD: It's not based on discipline or
3 crime, or any of those areas?

4 SUP. RUNCIE: No, it's not based on any
5 community data or statistics.

6 MR. DODD: And there's not a district
7 policy that deals with the monitor program
8 though; is that correct?

9 SUP. RUNCIE: That's correct, in terms of
10 the training and oversight that is correct.

11 MR. DODD: And have those, have you
12 considered training those monitors to be
13 guardians?

14 SUP. RUNCIE: Not at this time. Our
15 requirements for guardians are, you know, much
16 higher bar than a campus monitor. The
17 guardians in Broward County are required to
18 have prior law enforcement or military
19 experience. Not all of our campus monitors
20 would fit that. We do have I believe one, and
21 maybe two situations where we've had campus
22 monitors that have met that particular profile
23 have applied to be in the guardian program.

24 MR. DODD: So I think too that there
25 should be a policy, and a clear description, as

1 far as the responsibilities, as far as their
2 training, as far as the ability to call a code
3 red. I mean that's very important. And I had
4 another question, I'll reinforce, it's kind of
5 been covered but the Florida, the FSSAT safe
6 school assessment tool, very important, the
7 seriousness of that.

8 Other districts, all the districts in the
9 state are required to complete those, and I
10 know you've already mentioned that you hope
11 that that gets retooled, or redefined, an
12 certainly I believe there will be movement in
13 that direction, but those safe school
14 assessment, that tool is very valuable to the
15 district, and to the safety of those schools.

16 And then the last question I had deals
17 with the school resource officer program, and
18 where you see the future of that for Broward
19 County, and the number of contracts you have
20 with municipalities, and with the Sheriff's
21 Office, and then with your own school board
22 police. Can you kind of give us a little
23 vision of what, how do you see that changing,
24 or will it change?

25 SUP. RUNCIE: So to the first part of your

1 question, so currently I believe we have
2 fourteen agreements, thirteen with
3 municipalities, and one with the Broward
4 Sheriff's Office that covers I believe another
5 ten municipalities that don't have their own
6 police force. That arrangement has I think
7 worked in Broward County, in terms of being
8 able to maximize as much coverage as we can.
9 So for example, when I would look at the ratio
10 of school resource officers that we had per
11 student it was significantly better than some
12 of our surrounding neighbors. Now, still I
13 don't believe that's sufficient, and we're
14 actually obviously adding more resources there
15 at this time.

16 There's a -- there's been a discussion
17 about the district potentially having its own
18 police force. That would require a, again a
19 significant investment, dollars that can go
20 into hiring and developing school resource
21 officers and/or guardians. Our school board
22 has asked us to put together, excuse me, a
23 model for what that may look like, so that may
24 be a conversation that we'll have some time
25 later this school year, but there's no -- my

1 sense is that we continue to move forward,
2 enhance the relationships we have with our
3 municipalities.

4 I think they're very beneficial for us to
5 engage with our local municipalities and
6 Sheriff's Office. It creates a connection to
7 law enforcement individuals, they have
8 relationships within the communities where we
9 have schools, and I think that's worked well
10 for us, and I think we'd want to continue to
11 maintain that.

12 I think the biggest issue that we try to
13 work through is, is the funding. We
14 historically were providing about \$46,000 per
15 SRO. This year we were able to increase that
16 by another \$6,000, so we contributed \$52,000
17 for each SRO. The municipality covers the
18 balance.

19 MR. DODD: Thank you. And thank you,
20 Superintendent Runcie, for being here today.

21 CHAIR: Okay, so before we move on to the
22 commissioners who have already asked questions
23 are there any commissioners who have not asked
24 the question they want to? I'm sorry,
25 Commissioner Stewart, go ahead.

1 COMM. STEWART: Good afternoon,
2 Superintendent Runcie.

3 SUP. RUNCIE: Good afternoon.

4 COMM. STEWART: Several people have
5 thanked you for being here today, and it's been
6 said that you came where the previous speaker
7 did not. I think I doubted whether or not the
8 last speaker would be here, but there was never
9 any doubt in my mind whether or not you would
10 be here today. I would ask you what advice
11 would you give to your fellow sixty six
12 superintendents.

13 SUP. RUNCIE: Safety and security of your
14 schools is something that you need to take a
15 complete pass and overhaul through. I think
16 the other pieces look at the qualify of the
17 relationships, an the sharing of information
18 with law enforcement agencies, with community
19 mental health providers, a lot of the
20 organizations that help provide services to
21 students that are in need, those kids that we
22 have enormous challenges with. There's got to
23 be better coordination there as well. But the
24 safety security is the highest priority that we
25 have, and as we're doing here I think they

1 should look at the report, the results of the
2 work of this commission, and use that to inform
3 their policies, procedures in their district.

4 I would also encourage districts to do
5 what we've done in Broward, go hire independent
6 security risk assessment organization because,
7 you know, that's not our expertise. There's a
8 lot of benefit to bringing someone in that can
9 identify those issues. I mean for the FSSAT,
10 for example, we had our security risk
11 consultants look at that and try to align that
12 with the observations and issues that they saw
13 in schools, and what was it that the FSSAT
14 results were showing in looking at that in
15 order for that where to prioritize investments.
16 And so as a result of that we were able to then
17 allocate, and make recommendations to the board
18 about allocating funds, again, in areas like
19 intercom systems, radios, and surveillance
20 cameras.

21 COMM. STEWART: Thank you.

22 CHAIR: Sheriff Judd. We've got a few
23 minutes left, so we can just, a couple more we
24 can get to, Sheriff Judd, and then Commissioner
25 Harpring, and then Commission Schachter.

1 SHER. JUDD: Once again thank you,
2 Superintendent Runcie for being here. I think
3 you've acknowledged today this a new normal and
4 a new day. It's an environment where we're sad
5 that it's here, but it's here. And you've --
6 you've spoken of culture change. I want to
7 offer a coaching point that I practice, and
8 it's efficient. Maybe you already do.

9 When I have a meeting, and that's every
10 week, I have assignments to my chiefs, due
11 dates, and statuses, and I expect them to meet
12 that. If they don't accomplish the task as
13 I've requested then I get me new staff members,
14 and as a result of that then we have meetings
15 for short durations the other four days of the
16 week, and I remind them, I call it checks and
17 balances, and follow up, and oversight, and
18 what I'm setting them up for is success. But
19 if you create that you'll have a sense of
20 urgency, because I found when you attach
21 people's paycheck and their position their
22 desire to accomplish what needs to be
23 accomplished remarkably improves immediately.

24 I want to tell you that there was one
25 issue early on that this commission did not

1 take up, but we did hear significant testimony
2 in the beginning about the PROMISE program. On
3 paper it looks remarkable. The testimony
4 before us was anything but remarkable. There
5 is a multibillion dollar system in place across
6 this country today to hold people accountable,
7 to set checks and balances, and responsibility,
8 and to be able to force people into mental
9 health counseling, into probation checks, into
10 curfews, and that's the criminal justice
11 system.

12 When we looked at Nikolas Cruz the
13 criminal justice system never had the
14 opportunity for a variety of reasons to hold
15 him accountable because he never came to our
16 attention. That was not all a school system
17 issue. Quite frankly that was also a law
18 enforcement issue, a home issue. But I
19 encourage you, and request that you go back and
20 personally set a check and a balance, and an
21 oversight, and report on what's really
22 happening in the PROMISE program, and what is
23 really being documented, and what systems and
24 processes there is for people to get data out.
25 Can you comment on that now?

1 SUP. RUNCIE: Yes. The PROMISE program is
2 an alternative to external suspension. The
3 genesis of that came from a collaborative
4 effort with law enforcement agencies in Broward
5 County, state's attorney, public defender,
6 Department of Juvenile Justice, children's
7 services counsels, all of the entities that
8 impacted students who were having issues, what
9 we consider minor misdemeanor offenses. So
10 these weren't felony related offenses.

11 The alternative was we were actually
12 sending them home, or, you know, where they
13 would be out on the street, and then they,
14 after five days, or whatever the suspension
15 period is, they would be back in school, so we
16 put this program in place as a way to actually
17 have a way to provide interventions, and some
18 type of consequences for them versus just
19 letting them out to go home.

20 That program is -- we -- we've given a lot
21 of the conversations and focus on that program
22 for a variety of reasons. We've certainly gone
23 through that with a significant degree of
24 scrutiny. We're making changes to that
25 program. There isn't a program that we have in

1 Broward County that we can't improve and fix,
2 certainly the PROMISE program is one of them.
3 Regardless of what you call it we need to have
4 something in districts that deal with students
5 that have these minor misdemeanor offenses that
6 require suspensions, but that they have some
7 alternative to it, so we're working to make
8 adjustments and changes to that program.

9 And we've made some already based on the
10 legislation that has been put out, so we've
11 made some refinements, what -- that -- that's
12 an ongoing work of progress, and that's an
13 ongoing, continuous --

14 CHAIR: We have less than five minutes. I
15 need to get to Commissioner Harpring, and then
16 to Mr. Schachter, so Commissioner Harpring, go
17 ahead.

18 SHER. JUDD: Let me -- let me close my
19 statement, thank you very much. And, Mr.
20 Runcie, this commission has a five year, a five
21 year life, and we plan to check and balance,
22 and follow up. Thank you.

23 SUP. RUNCIE: Thank you.

24 CHAIR: Thank you, Sheriff.

25 UND. SHER. HARPRING: Thank you, Sheriff,

1 I'll be direct. Mr. Runcie, we've discussed
2 the FSSAT issue, shortcomings, things like that
3 with the document, the tool itself. Were you
4 aware that after February 14th the assessment
5 that was done for Marjory Stoneman Douglas High
6 School itself, did you have an opportunity to
7 review that?

8 SUP. RUNCIE: I've -- I've heard about the
9 issues related to it, and I sat down, and we
10 did review it. We had staff, Mr. Mokelan go
11 back and actually have a conversation with the
12 school to determine what, how some of the
13 responses came to be there.

14 UND. SHER. HARPRING: That was -- that was
15 after the question raised --

16 SUP. RUNCIE: That's correct, yes.

17 UND. SHER. HARPRING: So you -- as a
18 result of the commission work you're aware that
19 the post February 14th assessment for Marjory
20 Stoneman Douglas contained internal
21 inconsistencies, and essentially was
22 inaccurate?

23 SUP. RUNCIE: That's correct.

24 UND. SHER. HARPRING: Okay. Directly the
25 last thing I want to ask, or say specifically,

1 is that when we talk about hard corners we're
2 talking about identifying the location in a
3 classroom without permanent obstructions which
4 is essentially a, a safe place regarding the
5 door and entrance, and an active assailant. A
6 hard corner is immediate, it doesn't cost
7 anything, and it is an immediate life saving
8 action that can take place. Is there any
9 reason why tomorrow there's not a hard corner
10 in every classroom in every school in the
11 district? Is there any reason why you can't
12 make that happen tomorrow, because we know as
13 we sit here today that that does not exist?

14 SUP. RUNCIE: As I indicated our -- we --
15 we could -- we can make that happen. I -- it's
16 -- implementing and executing that, we can't
17 just say just -- I mean we can say, look, just
18 go put a, find a corner in your classroom, but
19 I think we need to help folks figure out what
20 the best way to do that in the, in the
21 classroom is. So again, we'll get that done
22 within the next couple weeks, we'll put a
23 policy in place and bring that to the, to our
24 school board at the first board meeting in
25 December.

1 CHAIR: All right, Mr. Schachter, we only
2 got a couple minutes, so go ahead.

3 MR. SCHACHTER: Yes. Yes, no problem.
4 Thank you very much. Superintendent, as
5 Marjory Stoneman Douglas law enforcement went
6 into all the classrooms and worked with the
7 teachers to show them where the safe spaces
8 were, where the hard corners were, and all the
9 teachers know at Marjory Stoneman Douglas. If
10 we can do it at Marjory Stoneman Douglas we can
11 do it at every school in the district.

12 SUP. RUNCIE: Yes, all right.

13 MR. SCHACHTER: All the witness statements
14 to this commission were extremely upsetting. I
15 hope you get a chance to read them. There were
16 students that described going to see Principal
17 Thompson, Assistant Principal Morford, and
18 stated, for instance, that they told Thompson
19 that the murder was a threat to shoot up the
20 school. The students stated that Thompson
21 seemed disinterested, and referred him to
22 autism, as was the same statement by another
23 student to Morford. It shows that students
24 knew that he was going to do this but students
25 don't feel comfortable enough telling your

1 staff. This is a major, major problem, because
2 we know that with these murderers there is
3 leakage. They tell people in over eighty
4 percent of the time, so I think that one way we
5 can prevent this from happening is by changing
6 the culture in that school to enable,
7 understanding that everybody that's on that
8 campus is part of making that school safe,
9 getting everybody to trust the administration,
10 and I think that that happens by
11 accountability.

12 And you said that that was going to happen
13 so I really thank you for that, but FortifyFL
14 is something that should be pushed out heavily.
15 It's not in my daughter's middle school right
16 now, and that is a program that needs to
17 happen, not only in this state but around the
18 country to save lives.

19 CHAIR: Thank you, Mr. Schachter. And I'm
20 going to -- one question from Commissioner
21 Petty, go ahead.

22 MR. PETTY: Thank you, Mr. -- thank you,
23 Mr. Chair. I just want to clarify one thing
24 Mr. Schachter said cause, and I'm glad you
25 raised this, this final issue. I think the

1 students were comfortable bringing issue, the
2 administrators didn't do anything once they
3 were made aware of the issues. So again, Mr.
4 Runcie, my ask is to, to speak with the
5 administrators and make sure, and now I think
6 we do have a problem at Marjory Stoneman
7 Douglas where students are not feeling
8 comfortable. And as you heard, Commissioner
9 Book, they're not comfortable bringing
10 information forward now because it was so
11 readily dismissed by administrators before. So
12 thank you.

13 CHAIR: Thank you, Superintendent Runcie,
14 for being here. We will be following up with
15 you, and appreciate the time and the effort in
16 your presentation today. It's 4:35. What
17 we're going to do is take a ten minute recess.
18 We'll be back at 4:45 with Sheriff Israel.

19 (Thereupon, the meeting is in
20 recess, and continues as
21 follows:)

22 CHAIR: All right, so we're going to
23 continue with the testimony this afternoon, and
24 the next that we'll hear from is from Sheriff
25 Scott Israel. I know Sheriff Israel is on his

1 way down. He'll be here in a second.

2 Welcome, Sheriff Israel. We appreciate
3 you being here this afternoon. Before we get
4 started a couple things, and I want to thank
5 you and the members of the Broward County
6 Sheriff's Office over the last several months
7 for being transparent, for being cooperative,
8 and for extensive professionalism on the part
9 of you and your agency as we have gone about
10 our business. And you and Coral Springs, the
11 School Board, everybody, but the Broward County
12 Sheriff's Office has been exceptionally
13 cooperative in this process, and we thank you
14 for that.

15 Just to lay a little bit of groundwork, I
16 want you to know that, I've said this to the
17 commissioners before, but they know that they
18 have information based on the presentations
19 this week that you don't have, and a lot of
20 this is going to be new to you, as we will
21 provide it to you in the next period of time
22 with some recommendations that you take a look
23 at certain things, but a lot of the video, a
24 lot of the statements, audio, et cetera, are
25 things that we gleaned during this

1 investigation over the last several months that
2 you haven't been provided, and the
3 commissioners now know that, so in context they
4 know as far as their questions are concerned
5 that not to ask you about things that you just
6 don't have any knowledge of. So we've already
7 established that as we go forward, so I want to
8 make sure that we are all on the same page with
9 that.

10 You have an opportunity, Sheriff, to make
11 any comments you want to make for a few
12 minutes, and then we will begin with questions
13 from the commissioners. So again, thank you
14 for bring here.

15 PRESENTATION SHERIFF ISRAEL

16 SHER. ISREAL: Thank you, Sheriff. First
17 I want to say good afternoon, and I welcome
18 this opportunity to come before this commission
19 and help out in any way I can. For those of
20 you for the last seven or eight months on this
21 commission have been crisscrossing this state
22 to come to these very, very important hearings,
23 thank you. To the families that lost loved
24 ones, I'm beyond sorrow. I can't put into
25 words how I feel. Susan and I chose to raise

1 our children in Parkland. Our triplets grew up
2 in Parkland, attended Stoneman Douglas High
3 School, graduated from Stoneman Douglas High
4 School, and it's an indelible image in my mind
5 the first time I walked through the crime
6 scene, thinking that my triplets had attended
7 school in the 1200 Building. As devastating as
8 it is for us it pales in comparison to the
9 families that lost loved ones. I am truly,
10 truly sorry.

11 Since this catastrophic event we've been
12 working at the Broward Sheriff's Office
13 feverishly to do everything we can to not only
14 keep children safe in school but to make
15 children feel safe in school. Our security
16 efforts have been the number one focus. This
17 summer, Chief, we implemented a new program for
18 all school resource officers. All our SROs
19 were trained on short barrel carbine. This
20 will improve accuracy, and better prepare them
21 to win the battle. Our SROs went through a
22 five day course where they trained on carrying
23 the carbines, and the backpacks that they carry
24 the carbines within.

25 We are making heavy use of the risk

1 protection orders. For anyone involved in our
2 legislature that got these risk protection
3 orders to fruition, you have given law
4 enforcement a tool that we've desperately
5 needed for a long time, where we can now try
6 and keep guns out of the hands of people who
7 should not have them. I hired a terrorism
8 expert, a retired deputy colonel from the New
9 York City Police Department who is here today.
10 He will be in charge of our threat assessment
11 unit. He is working as we speak on a real time
12 crime center.

13 I've had talks with Mr. Runcie about the
14 Broward Sheriffs being able to commandeer, if
15 you will, the cameras in schools when we
16 recognize an emergency is about to happen, or
17 is happening, a fluid situation that in our
18 mind we feel police need to be in charge of
19 these cameras, we need to be seeing what's
20 happening.

21 Since this commission convened I have
22 welcomes the review of this incident. I know
23 this is a fair and impartial body that just
24 wants to make Florida, all sixty seven
25 counties, a safer place for children. I'm here

1 today to receive information, and impart
2 information, and help in any way I can. Thank
3 you, Sheriff.

4 CHAIR: Okay. All right, thanks, Sheriff
5 Israel. Commissioners, who has questions?
6 Commissioner Harpring, go ahead.

7 UND. SHER. HARPRING: Thank you, Sheriff.
8 I appreciate your being here, and your
9 cooperation. One of the things directly that I
10 wanted to touch on has to do with a policy, and
11 I don't want to get into minutia on the SOP
12 number, but basically we saw earlier that
13 relative to entering essentially a hot zone, an
14 area where an active shooter may be, that
15 there's specific language -- and just for your
16 personnel it's SOP 4.37.

17 There's specific language that references
18 that essentially that the deputy may go in,
19 that there is some discretion, and we've some
20 other policies by comparison that dictate
21 shall. Now, that policy itself as I recall was
22 in effect, I think it went into effect some
23 time in June of 2016. Now, that seemed to
24 conflict in a negative way with the training,
25 and the training specifically referenced that

1 basically immediately go to the danger, there's
2 no discretion. Can you just address that, that
3 conflict, and if that will be resolved, because
4 it seems that the training was appropriate and
5 suggestive of what we know as our law
6 enforcement model now, is to immediately go to
7 the instant area without hesitation, no
8 discretion.

9 SHER. ISRAEL: Yes, sir. I personally had
10 the word may inserted in the policy, but I had
11 it inserted in conjunction with our training
12 program, so our training is appropriate. The
13 reason I inserted may, and believe
14 wholeheartedly in that word, Sheriff, is
15 because I want an effective tactical response,
16 not a suicide response. The goal of any
17 agency's response is to save lives. May allows
18 a deputy discretion. It allows a deputy to
19 think on his or her feet. May allows a deputy,
20 Under Sheriff, to be armed with real time
21 intelligence carrying out a mission, preparing
22 if you will to enter, Sheriff, the east side
23 door, and then deciding based on information
24 they develop to be able to change their
25 approach.

1 For example, you believe an active shooter
2 is on the east side of a building. All your
3 tactics and training tell you go in the east
4 side of the building and engage, and as you're
5 approaching the east side, Sheriff, a witness
6 tells you the killer booby trapped that door,
7 that door is ready to explode. I don't want a
8 deputy opening that door and dying, I want them
9 to find another way in, a safer way in so they
10 can do what they're trained to do.

11 I had staff review many policies, Florida
12 Sheriff's Association policies, major police
13 departments throughout this agency, in excess
14 of twenty, ladies and gentlemen of this
15 commission, there is clearly no consensus, not
16 in Florida, not nationally, every policy that
17 we reviewed in some place within the policy
18 appropriately allowed for officer discretion.
19 Even policies that use the word shall, some
20 place in the policy they had the words
21 reasonable consideration before entry.

22 Our policy promotes an effective tactical
23 response. Make no mistake about it, our
24 deputies will go in, and they will insert
25 themselves into harm's way, no doubt, just not

1 in a suicidal manner. A dead deputy is not
2 going to be able to help anyone. I hope that
3 explains it, sir.

4 UND. SHER. HARPRING: It does. And just
5 one very brief and direct follow up. Based on
6 what you know about Peterson's actions do you
7 think they were consistent with the oath that
8 he took?

9 SHER. ISRAEL: As I stand here today I
10 could tell you Peterson could have had ten
11 policies, he could have trained for ten years,
12 and he would not have gone in. Peterson not
13 going in was a performance issue. It had
14 nothing to do with training, and nothing to do
15 with policy.

16 UND. SHER. HARPRING: Thank you, Sheriff.

17 SHER. ISRAEL: Yes, sir.

18 CHAIR: Chief Lystad is next.

19 CHIEF LYSTAD: Sheriff Israel, thank you
20 for being here today, and --

21 SHER. ISRAEL: Yes, sir.

22 CHIEF LYSTAD: And being here to answer
23 our questions. And so I want to preface my, my
24 questions and my remarks with I hope that you
25 will appreciate the comments from the law

1 enforcement members on this, on this
2 commission. I believe that no agency is going
3 to get it a hundred percent right every time,
4 there's just human error in everything that we
5 do, but my comments and my remarks are offered
6 as constructive criticism to review. And I
7 make that statement with the fact that I know,
8 as this Chair has said, you have not seen and
9 know everything that we know today, so I'll
10 start with my, my questions as first, is am I
11 correct to assume that officers that are
12 assigned to the Parkland district, it's based
13 on seniority, and that's based on a labor
14 agreement?

15 SHER. ISRAEL: Yes.

16 CHIEF LYSTAD: Is that the same for ROs,
17 are they, are they chosen based on seniority
18 for their, for their assignments?

19 SHER. ISRAEL: No.

20 CHIEF LYSTAD: The -- in your SRO program
21 do you rotate your SROs, or can they end up, at
22 least in this particular case it looked like
23 Deputy Peterson was there for an extended
24 period of time.

25 SHER. ISRAEL: They're not rotated very

1 often unless we have reason to rotate it. And
2 bear in mind, and this is very important, prior
3 to February 14th former Deputy Peterson I
4 believe was a school resource officer of the
5 year, so there would have been no reason to, no
6 information ever came to me to rotate him.

7 CHIEF LYSTAD: It would seem there would
8 be a potential, and I'm sure you've considered
9 that, that there's a possibility of complacency
10 with an officer assigned to one location for an
11 extended period of time, and kind of dismissing
12 routine behavior after a certain number of
13 years, and making the comment that's just
14 whoever, and so I would ask you to consider
15 that as you look at your SRO program.

16 SHER. ISRAEL: Yes, sir.

17 CHIEF LYSTAD: One of the other questions
18 I already asked. So my other, my other
19 statement is that I'm extremely concerned of,
20 at least in my opinion of what appeared to be
21 a, a lack of sense of urgency or preparedness
22 on arrival on the scene, and so I hope that you
23 all --

24 SHER. ISRAEL: Can you -- can you repeat
25 that, sir, please?

1 CHIEF LYSTAD: Sure. I'm concerned about
2 a lack of sense of urgency upon arrival. There
3 were multiple units in the video we saw hearing
4 gunfire that appeared to be, at least in one
5 person's opinion, one, one law enforcement
6 official's opinion, weren't really prepared
7 when they showed up on the scene. And so I
8 think that we would agree that the, the
9 important thing that we do is getting the right
10 people to the right location with the right
11 information and the right equipment, and so I
12 think on all those points there are issues that
13 we can improve on. But all of us can do that,
14 not solely your agency but my agency, and every
15 agency.

16 SHER. ISRAEL: Can I respond to that,
17 Chief?

18 CHIEF LYSTAD: Certainly.

19 SHER. ISRAEL: Pursuant to discussions I
20 had with Sheriff Gualtieri when he was made
21 Chair of this commission I committed total
22 transparency, total cooperation, and I thank
23 the Sheriff for his opening remarks and
24 recognizing that, how our, how our staff
25 responded. We -- I guess -- I guess you could

1 say we were, we are anxiously awaiting the
2 first report, the initial report. As Sheriff
3 Gualtieri said there are things that I probably
4 will be reading and hearing about for the first
5 time. I know that I'm going to see videos, and
6 hear about things where deputies on the Broward
7 Sheriff's Office, Coral Springs Police
8 Department, and others, acted in heroic
9 fashion. I hope we don't give up on heroes in
10 this country, they're still out there, they
11 still exist.

12 But also know that if we get feedback,
13 Chief, that one of our deputies acted
14 inappropriately, or failed to act, I could
15 assure you that we will continue the
16 investigation, we will do a robust internal
17 affairs review, and if we find out that one or
18 more deputies chose a path of inaction they
19 will be disciplined, and they will be
20 disciplined swiftly, as I did with Peterson and
21 others. So I absolutely look forward to
22 reading the report and doing what a Sheriff
23 would be expected to do, and take care of
24 business within our agency.

25 CHIEF LYSTAD: And again I have no doubt

1 that you will, and I appreciate that. I think
2 you'll, you'll glean a lot of information from
3 what we were presented here this week. I do
4 have one other follow up question, and I would
5 like to ask about the throttling. That seemed
6 to play a significant deficit in the officers'
7 ability to communicate and respond, and the
8 patching issue. And if you could tell me
9 where, where are you with the throttling issue,
10 there didn't seem to be any clear solution,
11 that officers knew how to solve that.

12 SHER. ISRAEL: I know I'm here today to
13 answer questions, appropriately so, from you,
14 but I'm here to make a request of this
15 commission, Sheriff, a request I make based on
16 forty years in law enforcement. Sheriff
17 Gualtieri, we have sixty six sheriffs in this
18 state, and one director. Sixty seven total.
19 We need sixty seven regional communication
20 systems. When a individual frantically, I ask
21 you to put a family member, picture a family
22 member frantically calling the phone, calling
23 911 and asking for help, should they ever be
24 told to repeat that story a second time?

25 They should be able to tell the dispatcher

1 what happened, and then either decide to run,
2 run, hide, or fight. We need to have a
3 regional system where a phone, a 911 call is
4 not coming in to a dispatcher who's giving it
5 to a fire department in another city. When a
6 firefighter or a police officer, or a deputy,
7 pushes a radio button, the only thing that
8 should happen is they should be heard.
9 Throttling, trunking, these things need to be
10 handled with state of the art systems.
11 Counties need to spend money to make it as safe
12 as possible for first responders.

13 We can absolutely work together, but most
14 importantly for those of you who have been
15 first responders, for those of you who grew up
16 and played with your friends, and played that
17 game telephone where you whisper something to
18 the next person and it never came back around
19 the right way, every first responder in a
20 county that's handling an incident should be
21 hearing the same exact thing at the same exact
22 time.

23 One of the most problematic things, and
24 you know this, Coral Springs was receiving X
25 information and we were receiving Y

1 information. I urged this commission
2 wholeheartedly to make recommendations,
3 legislation if necessary, so that we, we can
4 have one communications system. I heard a few
5 weeks ago, I heard Sheriff Gualtieri speaking,
6 and he talked about a city, correct me if I'm
7 wrong, sir, but I think it was Largo, and this
8 city came into his comm center, and they were
9 there for maybe half a year, and everything
10 went well, and then they decided to, I guess
11 they were refurbished and they went back to
12 whence they came.

13 Why -- why can't first responders be
14 treated in the manner they deserve to, make
15 them as safe as possible. We need to hear the
16 same information at the same time. Thank you,
17 Chief.

18 CHIEF LYSTAD: Sheriff, my, my last, my
19 last question is as -- I just want to ask the
20 question, I'm just going to reiterate, I
21 believe that you and your staff have not seen
22 yet what we were showed this week; is that
23 correct? And I'm not taking any investigative
24 steps, or review of any officer or deputy's
25 actions, correct?

1 SHER. ISRAEL: Well, we reviewed, we
2 started to review of the actions of Peterson,
3 and I made some decisions, and he retired. And
4 we are -- we investigated two deputies who
5 should have probably done more in handling a
6 call. But other than that, these were started
7 before this commission. Since that time we've
8 done nothing, sir, as directed.

9 CHIEF LYSTAD: Okay. Then I -- then I
10 would appreciate once you complete those
11 investigates, and your findings, and report
12 back to us, I would appreciate that.

13 SHER. ISRAEL: Roger that.

14 CHAIR: So on that -- on that topic,
15 before we move on, just is that what do you
16 think is the barrier here in Broward County to
17 consolidating 911 with Coral Springs? I'm
18 going to ask Chief Parry the same question
19 tomorrow morning, because there is no doubt,
20 the facts are the facts, the evidence is the
21 evidence, is the Coral Springs Police
22 Department had more information than the
23 Broward County Sheriff's Office did, and we saw
24 evidence of that this afternoon in some body
25 camera footage, where you have deputies saying

1 to Coral Springs officers, and to others, we're
2 ten minutes behind, and Coral Springs has more
3 information.

4 So it's a fact that that was a impediment
5 in this situation, but it happens every day,
6 and it isn't just related to major events, and
7 significant events, it's when somebody calls
8 because they have a prowler in their backyard,
9 somebody's calling because it's an in progress
10 theft, somebody is calling because there's a
11 fight, it's hold on and let me transfer you.
12 So how can that be rectified in Broward County?

13 SHER. ISRAEL: I believe it, it's going to
14 be necessary for legislation. I believe
15 senators and state reps are going to have to
16 mandate that that be done. If you want I can
17 certainly elaborate into some of the
18 conversations I've had.

19 CHAIR: Well, I don't want to take up too
20 much time, because other commissioners have
21 questions on this, but I think it's a very
22 important question. Have -- have you -- have
23 you and Chief Parry ever had a sit down face to
24 face and said, look, let's try and work this
25 out?

1 SHER. ISRAEL: You know, Chief Parry is a,
2 is a great man, a great friend, and I know
3 you're going to have the chance to ask him this
4 tomorrow, but as my experience, Sheriff Judd,
5 in the six years that I've been Sheriff these
6 are decisions that would be made by the dais,
7 not Chief Parry and the, you know, I don't want
8 to say the whole dais, but at least one of the
9 folks that I've talked to has been absolutely
10 against that, steadfastly against that.

11 CHAIR: Who is that?

12 SHER. ISRAEL: The Mayor Skip Campbell who
13 passed away.

14 CHAIR: So are there any other
15 commissioners on Coral Springs that you've had
16 discussions with about this who have said no?

17 SHER. ISRAEL: No.

18 CHAIR: All right. So -- so your
19 understanding is, is this is a decision, not
20 Chief Parry's decision, but it's a decision
21 from city government in Coral Springs?

22 SHER. ISRAEL: That's -- based on my
23 conversations over the years with Mayor
24 Campbell that's what I know.

25 CHAIR: Okay. Sheriff Judd.

1 SHER. JUDD: Thank you, Sheriff. One of
2 the things that, that sheriffs do, is we speak
3 frankly to each other, and, and certainly as
4 one of my colleagues that it's important for me
5 to tell you I've been involved in writing
6 policy probably thirty five years, and we agree
7 that Scott Peterson's response was egregious,
8 outrageous, unacceptable, and unable to
9 adequately explain why he did what he did.

10 But words matter, and according to your
11 policy he didn't have to go in, his training
12 might have dictated that, certainly I'm sure
13 dictated that. I couldn't agree more with you
14 that you certainly don't want to send a law
15 enforcement officer into a suicide situation,
16 but your policy clearly gives him the option.
17 My recommendation to you as a, as a colleague,
18 is you take may out and you replace it with
19 shall, and then you let them tactically figure
20 out how to get in there.

21 Our policy says you shall go in and
22 eliminate the threat. And that is -- there is
23 no margin for error with that. We don't -- we
24 don't suggest, nor do we train, and I'm certain
25 that you don't either because you have

1 professional trainers, you're a professional
2 agency, that they enter a suicide mission, but
3 the fact is if Scott Peterson would have come
4 here today, and quite frankly he reiterated to
5 me what I already knew, he was a coward, he
6 didn't show up again. He didn't show up at
7 Marjory Stoneman Douglas, and he didn't show up
8 here, but if had stood up and said I followed
9 the policy, it said I may go in, words matter,
10 nothing in that paragraph makes him go in, and
11 so I'll, I offer that to you.

12 The other question, and let me go back to
13 the radio system, because obviously you all,
14 you all had the throttling issue when you had
15 the horrible shooting at the airport. How long
16 have you all been asking for updates or a new
17 radio system?

18 SHER. ISRAEL: I don't want to give out
19 misinformation obviously, but I believe it
20 started in the mid '90's.

21 SHER. JUDD: A significant period of time.

22 SHER. ISRAEL: Yes, sir.

23 SHER. JUDD: So -- so you -- you or
24 representatives from Broward Sheriff's Office,
25 and/or the County, recognized for many years

1 that the system was, was not significant, or
2 not, was not efficient and effective.

3 SHER. ISRAEL: Yes.

4 SHER. JUDD: I think that's all the
5 questions I have for now.

6 CHAIR: Senator Book.

7 SEN. BOOK: Thank you so much, Mr. Chair,
8 and thank you so much Sheriff Israel for being
9 here today. I want to go back if we could to
10 the vest issue. And I guess there was some,
11 something came up about there's a, there's some
12 sort of a reason that you can opt out of
13 wearing your, your vest, and so I just wanted
14 to kind of understand why is that, what does
15 that mean?

16 SHER. ISRAEL: If I could take you through
17 the origin, I was with command staff, myself,
18 Colonel Pollan, Colonel Kinsey, Major Schultz,
19 and we were talking about, two years ago about
20 instituting a mandatory vest policy. I want
21 deputies to be able to survive an encounter.
22 We were ready, and did begin to invest,
23 implement the vest policy. About this time
24 last year, in November of 2017, our union that
25 represents the deputies filed an impact

1 bargaining grievance, if you will, they wanted
2 an impact bargain so I wasn't able to institute
3 it when I wanted to. The impact bargaining
4 took a few months, and in May of this year,
5 this past year, I implemented a mandatory vest
6 policy.

7 I also, at that time Sheriff wanted to
8 implement rifle plates, but wasn't going to
9 logically buy rifle plates if I wasn't sure the
10 vests were going to be mandatory. So we -- the
11 union grieved the institution of the policy in
12 May, and just this past week we were notified
13 by union counsel that they withdraw their
14 grievance, so we do have a mandatory vest
15 policy.

16 But let me say this, and I'm sure the
17 Chief, and sheriffs, and law enforcement,
18 captain, will agree with me, whether you have a
19 mandatory vest policy or not, Senator, if you
20 show up at the scene of an active shooter and
21 you made a conscious decision not to utilize
22 your vest that day you're going in, that was
23 your choice.

24 SEN. BOOK: Thank you so much, Sheriff.
25 And we had the same sentiments. Sheriff Ashley

1 has made a couple of comments about the way
2 that his deputies roll, and I just want to
3 understand, not only do they have their
4 bulletproof vests but they have shotgun vests;
5 is that what it is?

6 SHER. ASHLEY: The standard -- the
7 standard vests that they were in the -- versus
8 a rifle plate vest, that's extra --

9 SEN. BOOK: Okay. And then we -- and then
10 a little bit about where they store their
11 rifles, because I noticed as well when some of
12 the deputies were arriving not only did it take
13 time to, quite a bit of time for them to put
14 their vests on, you know, getting the, the
15 rifle out of, out of, out of the, out of the
16 trunk, you know, some didn't bring their long
17 guns in. I just am wondering is there a
18 particular policy, or where, are all of them in
19 the trunk?

20 SHER. ISRAEL: Before I answer that,
21 Senator, with permission, when a deputy has a
22 rifle, and chooses to take the rifle out, he's
23 allowed to do that, or she's allowed to do
24 that. If they don't have a vest on, and it's
25 not a mandatory policy, they're allowed to

1 outfit themselves with their vests if they know
2 there was an active shooter.

3 Now, Sheriff Gualtieri and Chief Lystad
4 were crystal clear with me, they told me there
5 were things you know that I don't. I accept
6 that, and I anxiously wait to the report, and
7 to make, to do the accountability, and make the
8 corrections if I need to, but at this point
9 based on what I know I don't have any reason to
10 believe that any member of our agency knew
11 there was an active shooter. Peterson, not
12 only did he not go in but he never got on the
13 radio and advised this agency there was an
14 active shooter.

15 SEN. BOOK: I -- I believe that there is
16 one instance that you'll see in some of the
17 video where a deputy, and I can go through it
18 and find his name, but --

19 CHAIR: So just -- so just to help out on
20 this, because you're going to get information,
21 and we can't get bogged down in this, but, but
22 Peterson is standing at the east door of the
23 1200 Building, he says there's shots fired, and
24 he puts it out over channel 8A that there are
25 shots fired. Responding deputies on 8A would

1 have heard that, or where in a position to hear
2 that, and I can tell you that when they arrived
3 on Holmberg Road there are several deputies,
4 and it's verified by their body cameras, or it
5 is revealed to us through their body cameras
6 that they heard shots being fired, and that is
7 before Peterson said anything about staying
8 away, or gave any instructions to the deputies
9 that would have indicated to them not to do
10 anything other than go in.

11 So we'll share that information with you,
12 and it's only fair, again, because there's so
13 much -- but that's what Senator Book is
14 referring to. So that information is there,
15 and hopefully in the near future we'll sit down
16 and, and we'll convey that to you.

17 SHER. ISRAEL: Okay.

18 CHAIR: Okay, Commissioner Petty.

19 MR. PETTY: Sheriff, thank you for being
20 here today.

21 SHER. ISRAEL: Yes, sir.

22 MR. PETTY: I want to continue the thought
23 that Sheriff Judd had about language, and why
24 it matters. We learned some things this week
25 about policies in place, or lack of policy in

1 place at the Broward County School District
2 that had a significant impact in their
3 response, teachers that heard gunfire sheltered
4 in place. Teachers that heard a fire alarm let
5 students out into the hallway, which created a
6 chaotic environment, and so I think well
7 defined policies and language really matter.

8 SHER. ISRAEL: Agreed.

9 MR. PETTY: And in my view, Sheriff, may
10 allows a deputy to stand behind a cement
11 barrier for forty five minutes. May allows
12 deputies to stand behind their cars while shots
13 are being fired. May allows a deputy to get
14 dressed, and wait for others to get dressed
15 while innocents are being gunned down. May
16 forces medics to remove bodies of victims from
17 classrooms, and may forces your detectives to
18 investigate a massacre. So as you review what
19 we've learned, you watch the footage and you,
20 and you, and you look at the response, I would,
21 I would ask you to keep that word may present
22 in your mind.

23 SHER. ISRAEL: I certainly will.

24 Commissioner, could I respond please?

25 MR. PETTY: Yes.

1 SHER. ISRAEL: Commissioner, may was in
2 place when on January 6, 2016, 2017, Sheriff
3 Judd, Sheriff Ashley, Sheriff Gualtieri and
4 myself, we belong to an organization called the
5 Florida Sheriff's Association. In 2017 the
6 Florida Sheriff's Association gave the Deputy
7 of the Year award, a very prestigious award, to
8 Deputy Jesse Madragal from our agency. Deputy
9 Madragal was working the detail at the airport,
10 I mean he was at the airport. He was governed,
11 Commissioner Petty, by the same policies and
12 procedures as those that were in Parkland that
13 fateful day. He had the same command staff,
14 the same equipment, and the same training. He
15 heard gunshots, he ran towards those gunshots,
16 and he took the killer into custody seventy two
17 seconds after he heard the first gunshot.

18 I will take a strenuous look at the
19 policy, but the way we train is to insert
20 ourselves into harm's way, just not go on a
21 suicide mission if a door is booby trapped or
22 entering a fatal funnel. It just gives a
23 deputy discretion to think on his or her feet
24 and find another immediate way in so they could
25 make the subject barricade himself, number one,

1 or surrender, number two, or be eliminated,
2 number three, in whatever order the subject
3 applies. But we will take a look at that, sir,
4 I promise you.

5 MR. PETTY: Thank you. And anything that
6 I say today I don't mean to impugn the, the
7 good work that were done by several of your
8 deputies that day, and I want to make that very
9 clear, but there is a significant response
10 difference between what I saw from Coral
11 Springs officers and what I saw from BSO, so
12 keep that in mind as you think about that.

13 SHER. ISRAEL: Okay.

14 MR. PETTY: Can you -- you haven't had the
15 benefit of looking at some of the evidence that
16 we've looked at, but can you help me understand
17 why you recommended Captain Jordan for a
18 command position?

19 SHER. ISRAEL: The captain before that
20 preceded Captain Jordan, Jonathan Greenberg
21 retired out of Parkland. Per the contract that
22 we have with Parkland the City Manager at the
23 time within the contract asked for me to
24 provide her with three promotable, or people
25 that were already the rank of captain or

1 higher. She had asked for some diversity,
2 appropriately so. I gave her three names. One
3 of the names I gave her was Captain Jordan.
4 Parkland, the City of Parkland set up an
5 in-house review, a board if you will, a
6 selection board. No member of the Broward
7 Sheriff's Office, including myself, was on the
8 board. That's the way Parkland wanted it. And
9 Parkland selected Captain Jordan. And that was
10 the etymology of how that came about,
11 Commissioner.

12 MR. PETTY: Okay. You asked us to imagine
13 being a family member of a loved one trying to
14 reach for help, and this week we heard calls
15 from several students and family members trying
16 to, to reach out for help. It's -- it's
17 already been asked of you, but I would ask you,
18 Sheriff, to listen to those calls yourself
19 personally.

20 SHER. ISRAEL: I will.

21 MR. PETTY: Because regardless of what the
22 state legislature does I think as the law
23 enforcement official for Broward County you
24 have a responsibility to make sure that we have
25 the regional communications infrastructure that

1 you believe is necessary. And I think you
2 don't need to wait for the legislature to give
3 you anything to do that, you should be
4 advocating for that, and I would ask you to
5 continue to do that, because the responses, the
6 messages we heard, and the transfers, and
7 having to repeat a story, are absolutely
8 heartbreaking. And so I would ask you to
9 listen to those and redouble your efforts to
10 make sure that regional communications system
11 is put in place.

12 And if there are other priorities that are
13 blocking that, or getting in the way, that,
14 that you take a leadership role in making sure
15 the County, that the citizens of Broward County
16 understand how important that is.

17 SHER. ISRAEL: Understood.

18 MR. PETTY: The issue of training has come
19 up, and in an agency -- it's been -- it's clear
20 to me now in an agency the size of the Broward
21 Sheriff's Office that you can't train for every
22 type of incident every year, but there were
23 several deputies that hadn't had active shooter
24 training in some time, or couldn't even
25 remember when they had last had it. Is the --

1 is the issue of, of cycling through these
2 deputies through training, is it a budgetary
3 limitation, or, or what --

4 SHER. ISRAEL: Commissioner, before I
5 answer your question I want to comment on your
6 question. One thing that I will be keenly
7 looking at is if a deputy came before this
8 commission and he or she said they didn't have
9 active killer training, or didn't remember
10 something, my first thought is going to be to
11 say what did you do, did you choose a path of
12 inaction, and you conveniently thought to
13 forget about your training because you didn't
14 want to exhibit courage and go to where you
15 needed to go. I don't want to overlook that
16 right now, sir, but we -- we --

17 MR. PETTY: Fair enough. Is -- is there
18 an opportunity to improve the frequency of
19 training? Is it a budgetary issue?

20 SHER. ISRAEL: It's not a budgetary issue.
21 We have -- we train fifteen hundred deputies.
22 We put them through active killer training
23 every three years. That's totally sufficient.
24 It's within industry standards, and it's best
25 practices. The other sheriffs and chiefs, and

1 law enforcement officers up here, will tell you
2 there is so much mandatory training that goes
3 on throughout the year, human behavior, report
4 writing, and on and on and on. We train in
5 active killer training. We train well. We
6 train collaterally. Our SWAT teams, our CST
7 teams, our QRF teams, quick response force.

8 You can't train courage, and you can't
9 train performance. If there is a training
10 issue, and as I sit there today, Commissioner,
11 and look at you, I don't believe there is. If
12 there is we'll fix it, we'll train better, but
13 believe that my focus is going to be on are
14 there performance issues, and holding people
15 accountable.

16 MR. PETTY: Okay. The night of February
17 14th, it was chaotic, and the environment for
18 the families of the victims, there's no way to
19 say this other than to say, you know, it left a
20 lot to be desired. That's about -- it's almost
21 euphemistically stating that. My family was
22 asked no fewer than four times to provide
23 details about my daughter, including, including
24 her description and pictures. And each time we
25 could, we couldn't get any additional

1 information from the Broward Sheriff's Office
2 to understand what was happening, or why
3 additional information was needed.

4 Her description was she was wearing her
5 JROTC uniform that day with a name badge on it,
6 and why we had to be asked four times, I don't
7 understand that. And it wasn't until well
8 after midnight that were actually finally
9 informed of her fate. Sheriff, I would ask you
10 to take a look at how you handle these
11 incidents, and family reunification, and how
12 you communicate to the families of victims of
13 these mass, mass casualty incidents, because
14 the way it was handled made that day all that
15 more difficult for all of the families.

16 SHER. ISRAEL: Commissioner Petty, it
17 breaks my heart to even look at you, and I'm so
18 sorry we're here for the same reason, you know,
19 for the reason we're here. I'm deeply, deeply
20 sorrow. Sheriff Gualtieri, I had asked that I
21 not be forced to answer this question in
22 detail, just to say this, I walked through the
23 crime scene, and it was necessary, very
24 necessary for it to take as long as it did.
25 And I hope this commission could take me at my

1 word, I don't think it's something that you
2 would want me discussing here, Sheriff.

3 MR. PETTY: Just -- just a last statement,
4 Sheriff Israel. The Broward Sheriff's Office
5 is known for its community outreach, and I use
6 the term euphemistically, but I will tell you
7 there is no more important community outreach
8 function than the one that you were, you were
9 elected to handle, the one that you were
10 elected to handle competently, and it's the
11 incidents like what happened at Marjory
12 Stoneman Douglas that is the kind of community
13 outreach that we need you to focus on, and I
14 would ask you to, to do that, sir. Thank you.

15 CHAIR: Sheriff Ashley.

16 SHER. ASHLEY: Sheriff, I'd just like to
17 state we are in the unenviable position of
18 playing Monday morning quarterback, but it's
19 necessary if we're to improve our profession
20 during this exercise, and some of the questions
21 that I have -- let's me just start with have
22 you ever heard the, have you ever been taught
23 the principle of tombstone courage?

24 SHER. ISRAEL: No.

25 SHER. ASHLEY: In the academy back when I

1 went through they taught this, you know, you
2 don't want to be the hero at the expense of
3 being dead, and I understand that, and I
4 noticed during our review of this how many of
5 your deputies that responded to the scene were
6 veterans, twenty, twenty five, thirty year
7 veterans that, that responded to the scene. Is
8 -- is that for any particular reason? Was this
9 area Parkland under contract? Was this a
10 choice area to work, choice unit, choice
11 section?

12 SHER. ISRAEL: Parkland is a, is a
13 well-off City. There's not a lot of crime in
14 Parkland. But the marines have a saying, every
15 marine is a rifleman, and every marine is
16 expected to act like a rifleman. Whether you
17 work in any one of our contract cities, fifteen
18 or sixteen, the airport, the seaport, the
19 courthouse, you're expected to expect the
20 unexpected, you're expected to engage. We
21 receive the same training in Weston as we do in
22 Parkland, as we do in West Park.

23 What I -- as I said to Sheriff Gualtieri I
24 anxiously look forward to looking at the
25 performance, or lack thereof, of any member of

1 this agency, and handling it appropriately.
2 But as far as if, if what you're alluding to,
3 Sheriff, and I apologize if I'm, if I'm
4 incorrectly, if it's a cultural difference
5 amongst officers in Parkland as opposed to
6 other places, it's not. And I believe, and you
7 probably have the information, but I've been
8 told that two of the first officers that
9 actually went into the 1200 Building were
10 Parkland officers, or Parkland deputies, so I
11 don't know that there's any stigma attached to
12 Parkland.

13 SHER. ASHLEY: And I -- the reason I say
14 that, this is a contract, Parkland is a
15 contract service provide, you provide services
16 to, to Parkland under the contract.

17 SHER. ISRAEL: Yes.

18 SHER. ASHLEY: Do any of your -- are any
19 of your deputies trained or equipped
20 differently via contract?

21 SHER. ISRAEL: No.

22 SHER. ASHLEY: They're all trained alike,
23 they're all equipped alike based off --

24 SHER. ISRAEL: Well, I will say this,
25 Parkland, when I ran for office six years ago

1 one of the things I ran on was transparency. I
2 believe in transparency. The only reason this
3 body has the ability to view body camera
4 footage is I brought body cameras to the
5 Broward Sheriff's Office. I wanted out
6 communities, I wanted things like this to be
7 able to be seen, directives, so that we could
8 have, you know, so that we can learn. Parkland
9 is the only city that I provide police services
10 to that had elected not to go to body cameras.
11 I was told directly that they wanted to be the
12 last city in, and as we speak now I believe
13 it's in the current contract, and I don't know
14 for sure, so when you ask about equipment, the
15 deputies in Parkland would not have had body
16 cameras on that others would have had.

17 SHER. ASHLEY: Was that a policy, or a
18 political decision, versus a financial
19 decision, or --

20 SHER. ISRAEL: That was a decision made by
21 Parkland.

22 SHER. ASHLEY: But we don't know whether
23 it was a financial decision or a policy
24 decision, a political decision?

25 SHER. ISRAEL: I would -- I would -- my

1 hypothesis would be that it would be a
2 financial decision. I'm -- but I'm -- I'd be
3 speaking, you know, that's my hypothesis.

4 SHER. ASHLEY: And I appreciate you
5 sharing that with us. In your review, since
6 you've not had the opportunity I would ask that
7 you, the people that could have made, or at
8 least from my opinion the people that could
9 have made the biggest difference in saving
10 lives this day were of course Deputy Peterson,
11 who did not act, Sergeant Miller, and, and
12 Captain Jordan. Nobody seemed to take control
13 of the scene, or direct, or at least
14 effectively direct so the tactical, you know,
15 we talked about effective tactical responses,
16 once you, when you review that I hope you will
17 come back to this commission and give us your
18 professional opinion on how your agency
19 responded to this incident.

20 And there were a lot of obstacles placed
21 in your way, your communications were horrible,
22 certainly Coral Springs Police had better intel
23 coming -- I can't understand, at least from my
24 perspective, why your communications center
25 wouldn't stay on the phone line with Coral

1 Springs, and Coral Springs wouldn't stay on the
2 phone line so that at least they would be going
3 over two channels rather than no channels. And
4 that ineffective communication I believe, and I
5 have no doubt from, from my opinion, that it
6 cost lives that day, the inability to
7 communicate.

8 And the reason I, I speak on the
9 equipment, there was some question in my mind
10 on whether your deputies wear ballistic body
11 armor underneath their uniforms and also have
12 an alternative to put on a, a rifle plate or
13 entry vest. But it didn't look like in a
14 number of occasions where they were in a very
15 big hurry to do that, and, and so I would ask
16 you to review that as well, and come back and
17 give us your professional opinion on that.

18 And lastly, Chairman, the difference
19 between exclusive services and shared services
20 as a countywide jurisdiction, every citizen,
21 even municipal citizens within Okaloosa County,
22 Broward County, Polk County, whatever county it
23 may be, we share that service the same as we do
24 the family TV. We've got to share who's got
25 the remote, what, who gets service and when,

1 who gets to watch what when, but in our own
2 bedroom in our own city we have exclusive
3 services. A police department, that's services
4 above and beyond that shared served, and so in
5 this case Parkland has you as their police
6 department, and they also have the Sheriff's
7 Office, so providing services is twofold in
8 your case.

9 The -- the Sheriff's Office provides a
10 shared service to Parkland residents, and they
11 also provide exclusive service via contract to
12 Parkland, so they should be getting the double
13 the service than county residents, cause
14 they're paying double, and my question is why
15 weren't they equipped the same as all the rest
16 of your deputies. And that may not be a
17 question you can answer, that may be a question
18 that you're city answers, but I think you'll
19 find the same thing that we found, that the
20 response was inadequate for a whole number of
21 reasons.

22 SHER. ISRAEL: Sheriff, I wanted to
23 respond to one of your remarks.

24 SHER. ASHLEY: Yes, sir.

25 SHER. ISRAEL: Sheriff, you can be in

1 Okaloosa County, Pinellas County, Polk County,
2 or Broward County, you can be in command but
3 that doesn't mean you're in control. I spoke
4 to Captain Jordan that night. She was
5 extremely frustrated. She referred to her
6 radio as a brick. You can be in command, but
7 you can't control the men and women you work
8 with if you can't communicate with them, if you
9 can't bark out directives, if you can't impart
10 information, if you can't receive information
11 you can't control the situation. Thank you,
12 thank you for that, Sheriff.

13 SHER. ASHLEY: Thank you.

14 CHAIR: Well, one of the first ones -- one
15 of the first ones I'm going to bring to you --

16 SHER. ISRAEL: I can't hear you, sir.

17 CHAIR: One of the first ones I'm going to
18 bring to you who was in command, and should
19 have been in control, was Sergeant Miller. He
20 sat up on Holmberg Road for over ten minutes.
21 He heard gunshots, and he didn't move, he never
22 got on the radio. He was the first supervisor
23 on the scene, and he never moved, even after
24 deputies and officers were going into that
25 building that man never moved until he moseyed

1 on down to the Sawgrass, to the command post,
2 and the man was the first sergeant on the
3 scene, there was no radio throttling issues,
4 there were no communication issues, he didn't
5 act, and he sat up there. That's one of the
6 first ones that I'm going to bring to you.

7 SHER. ISRAEL: I look forward. I look
8 forward to reading it.

9 CHAIR: So about rifles, we're on the
10 topic of equipment, explain to us, because
11 we've heard different things. You're deputies
12 have I believe, so correct this, that they have
13 the ability to self purchase and carry if they
14 qualify with ARs. You have some that are
15 available, and they're available for check out,
16 but not every deputy is issued an AR. Is that
17 the correct landscape within the Broward
18 Sheriff's Office?

19 SHER. ISRAEL: That is the correct
20 landscape.

21 CHAIR: Okay. The next one is
22 Commissioner Dodd.

23 MR. DODD: Thank you, Sheriff. Thank you,
24 Sheriff, for being here.

25 SHER. ISRAEL: Yes, sir.

1 MR. DODD: So the Broward Sheriff's Office
2 runs the County fire service, correct?

3 SHER. ISRAEL: Well, we run fires services
4 - -

5 MR. DODD: Fire service, so you don't --

6 SHER. ISRAEL: -- for the port, the
7 seaport, and two or three cities.

8 MR. DODD: So -- so fire historically had
9 done incident command very well, I mean ICS and
10 Ms, it's in their culture.

11 SHER. ISRAEL: Yes. Yes.

12 MR. DODD: My question to you is the
13 incident, incident command training on the law
14 enforcement side, is it, is it not ingrained in
15 the culture of Broward County Sheriff's Office,
16 is there a need for more training? And one of
17 the things that we found here is that the
18 command, the command post, the incident
19 command, it was very, very overwhelming, very
20 confusing, and so there wasn't a real good
21 incident command structure set up. So can you
22 talk a little bit about that?

23 SHER. ISRAEL: Sure. You -- you know,
24 Sheriff Gualtieri said that you have an
25 advantage, that there's a lot of information

1 you have that I haven't had yet, and I
2 appreciate, you know, you saying that, but I
3 have an advantage over you, Captain, in this
4 response, I was at the command center. I went
5 to the tactical operations center. It could
6 not have been run in a smoother, in a smoother
7 way. Captain Steve Robinson of SWAT, Colonel
8 Jim Pollan, Lieutenant Colonel Ed Grant, they
9 were there doing the things that they needed to
10 do. They were taking care of the three
11 elements of any type of situation of this
12 magnitude, the tactical response, the planning,
13 and the strategic response that was going to
14 come within weeks. It was operating
15 proficiently, people knew what they were doing.

16 There was mass confusion, it was chaotic,
17 as you might imagine, you know, this isn't a
18 bakery, you know, where you go in an orderly
19 line. There were thousands of students
20 separated from their parents, it was a very,
21 very, very chaotic horrific scene. But the
22 operations center, the tactical operations
23 center was, was as seamless as a command post
24 could be based on what was going on, sir.

25 MR. DODD: And maybe what I saw more was

1 in the initial response with setting up
2 command, and those things, and obviously maybe
3 you don't have, you wouldn't have seen that, so
4 --

5 SHER. ISRAEL: No, I would -- no, sir, I
6 would have to take a look at that.

7 MR. DODD: Right, that would be just
8 something that I would like you to look at.
9 Also I asked Superintendent Runcie about the
10 school resource officer program, and his
11 commitment, or his vision to that, and he
12 shared some comments about the school board
13 looking at going to their own school board
14 police. One of your command officers, I
15 believe she was a major, spoke to the
16 commission early on and mentioned the, the
17 potential for, you know, not having school
18 resource officers with the Broward Sheriff's
19 Office anymore, so my question to you is what
20 is your idea and vision for your school
21 resource officer program?

22 SHER. ISRAEL: Well, right -- right now we
23 have, you know, a lot of times people think,
24 well, we have the, the school board, and then,
25 you know, we have almost fifty five hundred

1 employees, I think fifty six when fully
2 staffed, so they say, well, the Broward
3 Sheriff, you know, it goes school board,
4 Broward Sheriff. I -- I share the
5 responsibility to the schools, where many
6 police chiefs around the, you know, county, I
7 think there's fifteen or sixteen police chiefs,
8 so I do think when you have one team, one
9 mission, one fight, I think that's a better way
10 to go.

11 I envision a time where whether it's under
12 the Broward Sheriffs or under the school board,
13 I think if you have the same terminology, the
14 same training, the same policies and
15 procedures, not Fort Lauderdale doing it this
16 way, BSO doing it this way, Coral Springs doing
17 it this way, I'd like to take a look at a
18 module for that, look at the methodology for
19 going in that direction, I'd love to be part of
20 a committee, and let's do what's best for the,
21 the safety of the students in Broward County.
22 I think we, we can't take a parochial view, we
23 have to take, you know, a global view. If we
24 have to give up something then we have to give
25 up something, but we have to do what's best for

1 the kids.

2 MR. DODD: Okay, thank you.

3 CHAIR: Commissioner Schachter.

4 MR. SCHACHTER: Thank you, Chair.

5 Concerning the regional command I just want the
6 other commissioners to, to know that the
7 Sheriff and Coral Springs PD has worked with me
8 to fix these issues that our commission has,
9 has addressed. We've worked on a couple of
10 them, but after the testimony that have heard I
11 will redouble my efforts to fix these issues
12 concerning the ones -- we were trying to fix
13 the Parkland and Coral Springs BSO issues
14 first.

15 I think that the remaining problem, we had
16 a letter submitted to the commission from
17 County Commissioner Bertha Henry, and the main
18 impediment right now was Coral Springs has a
19 GPS on their, their phones currently and, on
20 the radios, and the current County radio
21 system, Motorola was not able to do that. So
22 when Chief Parry gets here we can certainly ask
23 him about that, but that was the, the main
24 objection currently to them switching to the
25 County CAD.

1 Number two, can we -- today we learned
2 details, and the testimony that we heard today
3 was the first time that we had ever seen this
4 as well. Were you able to watch the, the whole
5 testimony today?

6 SHER. ISRAEL: No, sir.

7 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay, so when you get a
8 chance it, you know, it will show you a lot of
9 things that you, you haven't seen yet, but I
10 had never seen this before today either, and
11 today, you know, as the other commissioners
12 have talked about, we've learned about
13 tremendous command and control problems at
14 Marjory Stoneman Douglas. Can you tell us what
15 you did to correct the command and control
16 problems that you experienced at the airport in
17 2017?

18 SHER. ISRAEL: There were no huge command
19 and control problems. The radio was a horrific
20 problem, but at the airport due to the
21 incredible work of Deputy Madragal, as I
22 alluded to before, we, we took a killer into
23 custody in seventy two seconds. If you think
24 that at Marjory Stoneman Douglas there was mass
25 confusion, we had twenty two thousand people in

1 proximity of the airport. We had to clear I
2 believe seven or eight parking garages. I was
3 there that day. I watched the men and women of
4 the Broward Sheriffs work. I watched them meld
5 with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.
6 Director Sacco, Troy Wacco was here, who's here
7 today was here then. He can substantiate this.
8 We worked with the FBI, and it was a seamless
9 brotherhood of law enforcement coming together,
10 so I think the command and control was
11 exceptional, sir.

12 MR. SCHACHTER: You know, the other
13 commissioners have also touched on the
14 testimony that we, we heard, some of which
15 either you haven't seen yet, but Commissioner
16 Petty talked about this, that some of your
17 deputies had, did not recall having active
18 shooter training in ten years, or twenty years.
19 It took them eleven minutes to enter the
20 building. Officers hid behind trees.

21 In light of the fact that these active
22 shooter incidents seem to be growing extremely
23 around our country, in light of the fact that
24 we just had five people die at the airport in
25 2017, I feel that eight hours of training for

1 an active shooter is, is not enough over a
2 three year period of time. Now, maybe it was
3 best practices. I certainly think that needs
4 to be reevaluated in the current environment
5 that we're in right now.

6 SHER. ISRAEL: I wouldn't -- I wouldn't
7 disagree with you. There are some logistical
8 issues, but it is in the current climate. You
9 know, we have people being assassinated at
10 Temples, people being assassinated in
11 nightclubs, at churches, Dallas police officers
12 sniped from behind, your, your incredible loss
13 in Parkland. I can't disagree with that,
14 Commissioner.

15 MR. SCHACHTER: Yeah, I mean for, for a
16 community member to hear that just eight hours
17 over a three year period, you know, that's,
18 that does not seem enough to me.

19 SHER. ISRAEL: But -- but again with,
20 especially with Peterson, and I can't
21 reemphasize this enough, Commissioner, it
22 wasn't a training issue, it was a performance
23 issue. Information - - information --
24 information dictates action with other deputies
25 around there, and I absolutely, you know, I saw

1 Sheriff Gualtieri's look, and he looks forward
2 to sitting down with me and talking about the
3 sergeant, and I just as, you know, I'm just as
4 eager to have that conversation.

5 MR. SCHACHTER: Yeah, this --

6 SHER. ISRAEL: But sometimes it's not
7 about policies, and it's not about training,
8 it's about performance, and you just can't
9 measure heart.

10 MR. SCHACHTER: The testimony that we
11 heard today is live stream on the internet so
12 you can watch it at your convenience.

13 SHER. ISRAEL: I will. Yes, sir.

14 CHAIR: Commissioner Swearingen.

15 COMM. SWEARINGEN: Thank you, Chair.
16 Thank you, Sheriff, we appreciate your being
17 here, and we appreciate your transparency. I
18 want to make a comment, and then I have a
19 question. There's been a lot of talk about the
20 words may in policy, procedure, training, but
21 there's something that trumps all of that, and
22 that's the oath that those of use who get into
23 this business take to protect the citizens that
24 we serve.

25 And I would hope as you watch the, the

1 video, and see the things that we have seen
2 that you have not had the opportunity to see,
3 if you see a member of your agency, and I have
4 no doubt you'll do this, who violates that
5 oath, failed to protect the citizens that they
6 swore an oath to protect and serve, that you
7 will deal with those, those folks the same way
8 you dealt with Deputy Peterson. So that's,
9 that's my comment.

10 SHER. ISRAEL: I guarantee that, sir.

11 COMM. SWEARINGEN: Thank you, Sheriff. My
12 question is, and Commissioner Petty and I have
13 had many talks about the, the threat assessment
14 model, so I'm interested to hear, you said
15 you're starting a threat assessment unit, I'd
16 be interested to hear how that's going to be
17 set up, and what the, you know, how that, the
18 make up of that team that, that's going to, how
19 that's going to work.

20 SHER. ISRAEL: I have your phone number,
21 as you know. You'll be getting a call tomorrow
22 from who will be our captain, Mike Ruggio, he's
23 here today. He's the transplanted New Yorker.
24 He was the director of threat assessment as a
25 deputy chief inspector up there, and he will

1 calling you to have those conversations.

2 COMM. SWEARINGEN: Right. Thank you,
3 Sheriff.

4 CHAIR: Commissioner Carroll.

5 MR. CARROLL: Sheriff -- and I want to go
6 back to Peterson, and, and based on what you
7 said, because with Peterson, and, and you
8 probably don't have all of this information,
9 but, you know, he made a statement to the Today
10 Show, and the statement was do you think I
11 would stand idly by while my kids, because he
12 described the kids in that school as my kids,
13 were being slaughtered. That's exactly what he
14 did. He was at the front door when he heard
15 the first shots, and, and instead of going in
16 he retreated.

17 And I agree with you totally, by the way,
18 you should be doing it smartly, but in these
19 school shootings we've got lots of information
20 at the beginning of our work that showed in all
21 of these school shootings most of the active
22 killing is done within the first three minutes,
23 and there's only person with a gun that could
24 have interrupted that killing, and it was him.
25 And so he doesn't have all day to assess that.

1 He took all day, because he never went into the
2 building.

3 But my question to you is, because I think
4 we all agree with your assessment of Peterson,
5 my, if we're going to put school resources,
6 resource officers at school, and we know that
7 if you don't interrupt this event in the first
8 three minutes it's going to lead to additional
9 casualties, and you have said we can't really
10 judge character or heart, how do you know that
11 you have the right people in these school
12 resource officer positions, you know, a guy
13 serving that role for twenty eight years, how
14 do you know he's going to call when the call is
15 made?

16 SHER. ISRAEL: Commissioner Carroll, if I
17 knew the answer to that everybody here would be
18 lining up out the door to ask me how to do
19 that. You train soldiers, you tell them to
20 take the hill. Some of the soldiers that will
21 take the hill surprise you, I never thought he
22 or she would have been out there, and then the
23 ones you see training in the weight room, they
24 go in the opposite direction. That's trying to
25 make sense of the senseless.

1 Peterson in his own words on the Today
2 Show said I was trained, I knew what I needed
3 to do, and I don't know why I didn't do it. We
4 -- we read the article, Sheriff, in Las Vegas,
5 that came out in Las Vegas, we had a deputy
6 write a police report in Vegas, he doesn't
7 understand why he went in.

8 I can tell you this, there are heroes in
9 law enforcement all over this country. We all
10 know them. The vast majority of deputies,
11 cops, police officers, would have gone in.
12 People behind me, people at this dais, do you
13 know how many people right now, my wife who is
14 not a cop, I wish I could have been there, I
15 wish I could have been there for those kids
16 that day. Commissioner, there's no way that I
17 know to look inside the soul of a man or woman
18 and know what they're going to do when they get
19 tapped on the shoulder and they're told put
20 your life on the line, this is what you took an
21 oath to do.

22 COMM. SWEARINGEN: Yeah. Let me ask you
23 this, because this came as kind of a surprise
24 to me.

25 SHER. ISRAEL: I can't hear you, sir, I'm

1 sorry.

2 COMM. SWEARINGEN: The -- I want to go to
3 different question because it was surprising to
4 me. You talked about the hiring of Captain
5 Jordan. In that practice where you gave three
6 names to civilian elected officials who then
7 made a selection on who they thought --

8 SHER. ISRAEL: Not a civilian elected
9 official, the City Manager of the, of the City
10 of Parkland.

11 COMM. SWEARINGEN: And is the City Manager
12 a law enforcement expert?

13 SHER. ISRAEL: No. She might have had a
14 law enforcement person on her selection
15 committee, but it wasn't anybody from our
16 agency.

17 COMM. SWEARINGEN: Is that -- is that true
18 in other jurisdictions, is that how you do it?
19 It just seems strange to me that you would
20 defer the selection of your leadership team,
21 which I think is unbelievably important, to a
22 group outside your agency. Is that normal?

23 SHER. ISRAEL: You don't know how much it,
24 it, how many times we've been over this with
25 staff. It's in a binding contract, and many of

1 these contracts were set up prior to me
2 becoming Sheriff of Broward County. So it's in
3 the contract, three names, and the City gets to
4 select the three names. The cities have, I'm
5 certainly not going to mention any cities, or
6 any names, but cities have accessed me in
7 succession planning, Sheriff, give us this
8 lieutenant, give us this person. No, they're
9 not prepared. So I won't give a name of
10 somebody who is not prepared, but I selected
11 the new captain to Parkland. I promoted him.
12 Chris Mulligan, he serves there now, former
13 military, SWAT, strong leader, strong
14 communication skills, and I've had
15 conversations regularly with the City, the
16 current City Manager of Parkland, and I spoke
17 to the Mayor of Parkland just this past week,
18 and they've never felt more secure with the
19 people that are there now, so.

20 COMM. SWEARINGEN: And my last is just a
21 comment, because you alluded to, that you
22 thought incident command went exceedingly well.
23 You mentioned Captain Robinson and Colonel
24 Pollan. When Captain Robinson --

25 SHER. ISRAEL: Not incident command, but

1 the command, what happened at the command
2 center, the talk --

3 COMM. SWEARINGEN: Right. I -- I will
4 tell you when those two folks showed up it got
5 infinitely better, and despite the
6 communication issues I think it got infinitely
7 better because they exerted active leadership,
8 and I think what was missing, and you'll have
9 to look at this, because you don't have the
10 information that we have, but on the initial
11 response, and, and by that I'm talking the
12 first three, five minutes, before those folks
13 even got on the scene, folks who you would have
14 thought would be the folks to take leadership
15 roles, I think was inadequate, and I'll leave
16 that up to you, but based on what we've seen,
17 and the evidence we've seen, I understand the
18 barriers around it, and the communication
19 issues around it, but it didn't appear to me to
20 be real active leadership from a couple of your
21 folks, and that's disappointing.

22 And -- and by the way I am not, you had
23 deputies that ran toward the building, and I
24 will never take that away, because those are
25 the folks that we need doing this work every

1 day, you had that, but you also had a couple of
2 folks that did not exert active leadership, and
3 in my opinion it delayed the response into the
4 building.

5 SHER. ISRAEL: Yes, sir.

6 CHAIR: So I want to make a comment on
7 your question about contract cities. We have
8 twenty four cities in Pinellas County, thirteen
9 are contract cities. And to answer your
10 question I have never heard, other than here in
11 Broward, and it's been here for a long time,
12 where the contract cities dictate to the
13 sheriff, in essence, because they say give us
14 three names here in Broward, and then the
15 sheriff has to give three names, and then the
16 City Manager selects.

17 SHER. ISRAEL: I'm -- I'm being
18 straightforward with you, sir, that it does
19 exist just like that.

20 CHAIR: And -- and, you know, I can tell
21 you that that's a difficult process I think for
22 any sheriff to, to work within. I would never
23 work within that process. And I do say to you
24 on that issue, and whether Captain Jordan was
25 the right selection or not, and ultimately

1 somebody decided she was there, and with
2 others, but you do have, Sheriff, you do have
3 the authority to cancel the contract, and, you
4 know, there terms in these contracts that, and
5 that's one that I think is a very troubling
6 thing for somebody outside of law enforcement
7 to decide, who's going to be the commander of a
8 district, a commander of a city, in essence the
9 chief of police, in the prior administration
10 they called them chiefs, correct, and you
11 changed it to captains, but whatever it is it's
12 a law enforcement leader of that jurisdiction,
13 and you know, I just -- you have power, just
14 tell them you're not going to do it, and cancel
15 the contract, and that can be done.

16 But anyway that's -- it is -- it isn't
17 something that's common that I know about.
18 Maybe it's done in some other places, but I
19 think that that's something that is, is worthy
20 of thinking about anyway, and, and maybe I'm
21 overstepping on that, but I, it struck me
22 throughout this when we heard that, that you're
23 bound, your hands are tied, and that a civilian
24 board in essence, a non-law enforcement board
25 is selecting who these people are, so.

1 Yeah, go ahead.

2 MR. SCHACHTER: And it still begs the
3 question -- so that was -- that was you,
4 Sheriff, that made the recommendation of three
5 to the City, so while --

6 SHER. ISRAEL: Absolutely.

7 MR. SCHACHTER: -- while they may have
8 made a poor choice, you fed them the poor
9 choice.

10 SHER. ISRAEL: Well --

11 CHAIR: All right, I don't have anybody
12 else. Any other commissioners -- Commissioner
13 Bartlett.

14 ASA BARTLETT: I kind of -- I just can't
15 let this go without saying it again. I know
16 we've heard this, but over the last few days I
17 watched a terrified teacher in a classroom call
18 911 expecting help, and to be told she's put on
19 hold, and then was going to be transferred, all
20 the while shots are being fired at the door.
21 She's scared to death. I watched officers from
22 BSO show up, have the inability to communicate
23 with each other about who was where and what
24 was going to happen.

25 Likewise I watched the inability of the

1 BSO to communicate with Coral Springs, and even
2 to the point that they entered into the
3 building in question, they were thwarted in
4 their ability to do their job and enter because
5 one agency is down here, and then in comes
6 another agency from another one that can't tell
7 the folks down there that they're coming in, so
8 they're having to use hand signs.

9 It is unbelievable how the community could
10 let their communication systems devolve to this
11 situation that existed, and you had the perfect
12 storm, and it happened. And somebody needs to
13 do something about it now, I mean not, you
14 know, not down the road. It's dangerous to the
15 officers, life threatening to them, to the
16 students, and may have cost lives as it is
17 because of the inability to get life saving
18 things to those who need it.

19 SHER. ISRAEL: I couldn't agree with you
20 more, Commissioner. I've never shied away from
21 a, a battle that needs to be fought in my life,
22 but if a county commission wants to spend money
23 in a certain way, or doesn't want to spend
24 money in a certain way, they're not in my chain
25 of command, they're nine elected officials, and

1 I simply can't tell them what to do.

2 ASA BARTLETT: I'm not yelling at you,
3 Sheriff. I'm just saying you need to come
4 together as a community, and they need to
5 resolve these issues, because it's, it's a
6 three way situation, and --

7 SHER. ISRAEL: Well, Commissioner
8 Schachter's -- we've talked numerous times over
9 the past six or seven months, and I, he's been
10 trying. He's -- he's been a brother in arms
11 that way, and he's been trying, so perhaps
12 we'll get it done.

13 SHER. ASHLEY: You can certainly bring
14 political pressure on their commission to do
15 the right thing.

16 SHER. ISRAEL: Yes, sir.

17 CHAIR: And it's a big deal, you know, and
18 it's, it's politics, it's turf, it's
19 chieftdom's, it's not being willing to play in
20 the sandbox. And that isn't even a good, I
21 guess metaphor, analogy, because it's so
22 serious, and this can be fixed. And I said in
23 my opening remarks on Tuesday is, is that this
24 can be fixed, but it requires the will of the
25 stakeholders to come together and fix it, and

1 if the stakeholders -- it isn't just here in
2 Broward County, it's in other places in
3 Florida, and if the stakeholders aren't willing
4 to fix this void that's created by them in the
5 911 system, so when somebody calls 911 every
6 place in the state the person answering the
7 phone can communicate with the person that can
8 respond and give them help, then I'm going to
9 do it, and whether this commission recommends
10 it or not I can tell you I'm going to do
11 everything I can independently or as part of
12 this commission to get the Florida legislature
13 to force them to do, because sometimes people
14 don't have the will to do it, the desire to do
15 it, and they're going to continue down this
16 path with the reasons they can.

17 They need to get to yes on this. They
18 need to get to the finish line on this, and
19 figure out not what they want but what they can
20 live with, and compromise on it, and if not the
21 Florida legislature must mandate that every 911
22 center in the state that takes an EMS call, a
23 fire call, a police call, can immediately
24 communicate with the units that are responsible
25 for responding. And there's no excuse for that

1 not to happen in the state of Florida in 2018,
2 and I can tell you that I'm going to do
3 everything I can, and jump up and down, and
4 raise enough Cain about that to get them to do
5 it, because there are a lot of people in this
6 county and other counties in Florida that won't
7 move off that mark because of politics, because
8 of chieftdom's, be of an unwillingness to get to
9 the place to provide effective public safety in
10 their communities. So I'm going to do
11 everything I can to change that.

12 That just is a -- it's frustrating because
13 there's no reason for it. People say there's
14 reasons, but they're not good reasons, and, and
15 the safety of the community, and when you call
16 911, to get put on hold, to get transferred, to
17 have to tell your story twice, there is no
18 excuse for it. Sheriff.

19 SHER. JUDD: My parting comment is,
20 Sheriff Gualtieri, I'm there with you, and,
21 heck, we can start lobbying this legislator
22 that's right here. I think she's already
23 taking notes. Sheriff, we want to support your
24 efforts. I talked earlier to Superintendent
25 Runcie about checks and balances, and

1 oversight, and follow up, and I have found in
2 my shop when I create a to do list, and every
3 Monday morning I say what is due this week, and
4 your responsible for it, that when I tie their
5 position and their salary to it I get
6 immediately, immediate response. I realize
7 that you also have union issues, and obviously
8 when your union is fighting you over a
9 mandatory wear policy when what you're trying
10 to do is create a policy to protect their
11 lives, that's problematic and takes a little
12 longer, but it's a good thing to do.

13 We are in a new normal, and a new day.
14 None of us likes the fact that we're having to
15 have this conversation at all. I can remember
16 back in the day when a school official told me
17 over my dead body will we put an armed police
18 officer on my school campus, and now we're
19 seeing a horrible set of circumstances where
20 there are a lot of children across this county
21 that are dying, and they're dying because there
22 wasn't a law enforcement officer there, or they
23 didn't go in and do their job.

24 We've got to have a culture change. We've
25 got to look at the radio system and say the way

1 it's always been is not acceptable, and none of
2 us are accepting this anymore. We've got to
3 look at cities, and Tamarac I think has
4 responded that they didn't want a tower for a
5 radio system in their town. But at the end of
6 the day I want to end with this, if you don't
7 have an active set of checks and balances, and
8 due dates, and oversights in your management
9 system and processes, as you look not only to
10 your day to day function, but look at these
11 emergencies, I encourage you to do that, and as
12 a commission we have a five year shelf life,
13 and we will be checking and balancing, and
14 providing oversight and support for you, for
15 the superintendent, so you can get to where you
16 need to be so we can do the best we can for the
17 students, not only in Broward County but across
18 the state and nation.

19 SHER. ISRAEL: Roger that, Sheriff.

20 CHAIR: All right, Sheriff Israel, we
21 appreciate you being here today. Now, I'm
22 going to ask is that everybody in the audience
23 -- we still are not finished, we have public
24 comment. So, Sheriff Israel and your staff,
25 you are free to go. Thank you for being here.

1 CHAIR: But for the audience, please don't
2 stand up and start talking. If you want to
3 leave please do so quietly, because we have
4 three public comment cards, so I'm going to
5 call and ask these people to come up, and
6 they'll have their three minutes. So Sheriff
7 and staff, thank you for being here. The first
8 public comment I stony Montalto.

9 PUBLIC COMMENT

10 MR. MONTALTO: It looks like we're going
11 things a little bit different tonight. I'd
12 like to start by thanking the Chairman for
13 addressing some of the concerns I spoke about
14 yesterday. As has been mentioned before while
15 the focus of this commission is to address the
16 failures leading up to and on 2/14/18 we want
17 to acknowledge those school and law enforcement
18 officials who have done, and continue to do the
19 right thing.

20 You heard a lot of, a lot of talking by
21 Superintendent Runcie today. Unfortunately
22 this county has not seen nearly enough action
23 by the Board County School Board which he
24 leads. The fact that he was unable to report
25 to this commission, and to the public, that a

1 single point of entry, a basic measure for
2 school safety for nearly a decade, has not been
3 completed in every Broward County School
4 despite the tax payers approving funds for that
5 nearly four years ago demonstrates that
6 security was not a top priority here in
7 Broward.

8 This lack of urgency is unacceptable. Mr.
9 Runcie spoke of being the next stop if
10 information passed to administrators is not
11 acted upon, yet his office has clearly failed
12 to act when it came time, when it came to a
13 timely response to this massacre.

14 There was talk today of the need for
15 culture change specifically at Marjory Stoneman
16 Douglas High School. The culture will not
17 change without changing the people who created
18 the failed culture. This is one of the reasons
19 our families have repeatedly mentioned that
20 some if not all of the administrators at
21 Marjory Stoneman Douglas should be suspended
22 pending the outcome of the investigation into
23 this incident. We will see if the office of
24 the superintendent carries out any of the
25 promises made before you today.

1 As far as testimony from Sheriff Israel
2 regarding his choice of words in the policy
3 being may or shall we agree that no one want to
4 see a dead deputy due to policy. However,
5 deputies know their job is to protect the
6 citizens of their jurisdiction. If we can't
7 get that point across, especially when children
8 are involved, when can we make that happen?

9 The audience in general was aghast at the
10 Sheriff's comment regarding Coral Springs
11 recently deceased Mayor Skip Campbell. As with
12 most disputes it takes two to tango. I'm sure
13 the leaders of Coral Springs would give a
14 contrasting opinion to that of Sheriff Israel.
15 We expect our leaders to be professional, and
16 not take cheap shots. We so expect them to be
17 able to find the compromise positions that make
18 people safer.

19 There were clearly issues with the
20 response to this incident of the Broward
21 Sheriff's Office personnel and equipment.
22 Effective training, or lack thereof, may also
23 need study. Certain aspects of the response
24 were reminiscent of the Columbine shooting
25 nearly twenty years ago, clearly an outdated

1 approach to school shootings. We are hopeful
2 that the BSO will study all available after
3 action reports and make the necessary changes.
4 Thank you.

5 CHAIR: Thank you, Mr. Montalto. The next
6 is Jeff Ostroff.

7 MR. OSTROFF: Hi. Good evening,
8 Commissioners. I knew three of the victims.
9 Two are deceased, and one of them survived.
10 One of the victims, her name was Carmen
11 Schentrup, beautiful girl, smart girl,
12 wonderful piano player, and the way we all knew
13 each other was my daughter and myself, and
14 Carmen, and the other boy that survived, we all
15 had the same piano teacher, and we, we would do
16 two piano recitals every year, June and
17 December.

18 Well, you know, in a few weeks coming up
19 I'm going to be playing at a recital and Carmen
20 is not going to be there. She used to play
21 right before I did, immediately before me, and
22 it's just a shame that you always get the
23 people that have the most to offer society that
24 get taken out by the person with the least
25 amount to offer society.

1 So not wanting to see this ever repeated
2 again a couple of ideas I had. I know we
3 talked about this in June, but I've always had
4 this idea that if anybody who has ever been
5 picked up by the Baker Act, I think their name
6 ought to go on a list of people who are
7 ineligible to ever own a gun. You know, if
8 you're that person it sucks to be you, but I
9 think there's too much risk for the rest of us.
10 And if you've also gone online and put any kind
11 of threats online I think you ought to be
12 ineligible to own a gun as well.

13 And another point I wanted to bring up was
14 a couple of days after the shooting I went and
15 pulled from the BSO database their call log,
16 that now famous forty calls, and on there was
17 one of a call to a friend of mine's house up in
18 Parkland, they used to be a neighbor of the
19 shooter and he had killed their chicken with a
20 gun, and they called BSO deputies, they wanted
21 to press charges, deputies showed up, they
22 said, no, we're not going to arrest him, he's
23 got autism, they gave him all sorts of, you
24 know, song and dance. I guess at the end of
25 the day it ended up they, they weren't going to

1 arrest him.

2 But when I looked on here on the
3 resolution it says on there that the owners
4 refused to press charges, and when I told my
5 friends that they were furious. So what I
6 wanted to point out to you guys is a lot of the
7 data you've received is bum data. Somebody is
8 trying to sell you guys a used car that has
9 been previously wrecked, and they're trying to
10 give you a clean CARFAX report. So I'm telling
11 you guys, hopefully you already know this, most
12 of you, that, you know, don't drink that
13 Kool-Aid that they're trying to feed you.

14 And lastly I just wanted to point out that
15 there seemed to be a lot of arrogance, and a
16 lot of cracks that this guy fell through that
17 enabled this thing to go on, and arrogance
18 always causes problems. And I see a lot of
19 frightening parallels between what happened
20 here today, or that day, and the Titanic,
21 because, hey, this can't happen in Parkland,
22 the Titanic can't sink. Both cases were very
23 complex chains of events that led to this
24 happening, so there's many, many cracks that
25 this guy fell through.

1 So as you guys are coming up with all of
2 your suggestions please fill all of those
3 cracks. If you have an idea in your mind that
4 you think, no, no, no, you know, they're not
5 going to want that, put it on the list. Please
6 fill every one of those cracks. Thanks for
7 listening.

8 CHAIR: Okay, so next is Stephen Brown.

9 MR. BROWN: Thank you for let -- thank you
10 for letting me speak tonight. I have a couple
11 of things, once with Sheriff Israel, which we
12 just heard. When he was talking about the, the
13 three people he brought forth to Parkland to be
14 the, the three people he brought to Parkland,
15 and that the City Manager makes the choice of
16 who gets hired in Parkland, and from my
17 understanding from talking to people at the
18 city commission, the city manager is not there
19 at the time, one left, and they didn't have
20 anybody there at the time, and Sheriff Israel
21 pushed Jan Jordan through to Parkland, and it
22 wasn't the city commission or the city
23 commission manager, because there was none,
24 that actually chose Jan Jordan there. Just,
25 just something that I've heard over the past

1 few months.

2 Also with, with Runcie, as you guys said
3 the PROMISE program seems like a great idea.
4 The implementation and the oversight has been
5 miserable. And when I went to the PROMISE
6 program meeting months ago they were, they said
7 that Cruz was part of the program but never
8 showed up. The judge said that everybody, one
9 hundred percent of the people show up to it
10 because I make them an offer they can't refuse,
11 but then the admitted that he never attended
12 the PROMISE program even though he was supposed
13 to. Nothing happened. They never followed up
14 on it.

15 The discipline matrix that -- so you --
16 everybody's been focused on the PROMISE
17 program, but the behavioral intervention plan
18 and the discipline matrix states that the
19 principal is responsible for making the
20 decision whether to put law, bring law
21 enforcement, to get law enforcement involved in
22 situations at the schools. So on the bottom of
23 every single page of the discipline matrix it
24 has said that the principal can override the
25 discipline matrix if they feel that law

1 enforcement should not be involved, when it
2 comes to minor offenses all the way up to major
3 violent offenses.

4 They have since taken that out in the last
5 couple of months. Also the behavioral
6 intervention plan says that murderers and
7 rapists that are convicted and spend time in
8 juvenile justice are allowed back in mainstream
9 schools. That so me is -- and that has also
10 since been removed, and now they say that it
11 has never been there. It's the --it's the lies
12 that we get from these people, and the ability,
13 their thought process of putting violent kids
14 into schools, and allowing a principal who has
15 no law enforcement experience to make the
16 decisions whether law enforcement should be
17 involved.

18 And those are the things that frustrate me
19 as father, from somebody who was there that
20 day, and, and going forward. So thank you.

21 CHAIR: Thank you. Next is Kenneth
22 Preston.

23 MR. PRESTON: Superintendent Runcie's
24 testimony to the commission today was shameful.
25 To have stood there and to suggest that he

1 stood by the families at every turn while
2 ignoring the repeated requests for answers by
3 families of victims, and failing to take
4 responsibility for the district's shortcomings,
5 is not only demonstratively false, but a stain
6 on the district.

7 While he paraded his achievements of
8 superintendent he failed to acknowledge his
9 role in helping foster the culture of leniency
10 that led to underreporting, his removal of law
11 enforcement from discipline, and his failure to
12 spend school safety funds in an appropriate and
13 timely manner. He also failed to acknowledge
14 those who are actually responsible for such
15 achievements.

16 It was not the superintendent, but Mr.
17 Pollack and Mr. Guttenberg that successfully
18 petitioned to have a predator and failed
19 security monitor removed from the school. It
20 was not the superintendent but Jessica Bakeman
21 who brought the shooter's referral to the
22 PROMISE program to the light after the
23 superintendent's categorical denial. It was
24 not the superintendent, but Mr. Schachter, who
25 worked tirelessly to ensure that schools are

1 properly secure. And it was not the
2 superintendent, Ms. Alhadeff, Mr. Petty, and
3 Mr. Mendelson, who campaigned for months
4 championing for safer schools and
5 accountability.

6 So despite the superintendent's speech
7 claiming the contrary the strides made and
8 success achieved by this community are not to
9 his credit, but to the credit of the tireless
10 work of students, teachers, and families, that
11 have uplifted this community. The
12 superintendent's contribution to this county is
13 a culture of leniency in place of actual
14 discipline, and a massively mismanaged bond
15 program that failed to provide increased safety
16 measures in a timely manner.

17 It is my sincere hope that this commission
18 will reconsider if dismissal of these,
19 dismissal of the, these discipline programs may
20 have played, and take a deeper look at the
21 superintendent's role in the failures leading
22 up to the shooting, and the appalling lack of
23 leadership that followed. Thank you.

24 CHAIR: Next, this is hard to read, but I
25 believe it's Laura Loomer.

1 MS. LOOMER: Hello, my name is Lara
2 Loomer. I'm an independent journalist, and I'm
3 here today to speak to you to urge you to
4 further look into Sheriff Scott Israel.
5 Sheriff Scott Israel of course has been at the
6 forefront of this tragedy, and this controversy
7 surrounding the handling of the Parkland
8 shooting, also because of his direct
9 involvement and his own personal ties to
10 Marjory Stoneman Douglas. One thing that was
11 extremely troubling to me during his own
12 comments today while he was addressing
13 questions about the school resource office,
14 officer Scot Peterson, is the topic of whether
15 or not these officers need to be rotated, and I
16 would argue that Sheriff, Sheriff Israel's
17 statement in which he said he had no reason
18 previously to rotate Scot Peterson is entirely
19 false.

20 If you recall directly after the Parkland
21 shooting a report came to light that showed
22 that Scot, Scot Peterson was involved in
23 covering up an assault that was carried out by
24 Brett Israel, who is Sheriff Scott Israel's
25 son, during the time that he attended Marjorie

1 Stoneman. And I just want to ask everybody
2 here today if you think that it is, it is
3 right, that it is moral, it is ethical to have
4 a Sheriff who claims to care about student
5 safety, who claims to care about having people
6 in positions of power who can do their job,
7 when he himself has been directly involved in
8 covering up incidents of, of abuse and, and
9 bullying, and assaults carried out by his own
10 son while he was a student there.

11 And, you know, if you look at this entire
12 situation, regardless of whether it be Brett
13 Israel and Sheriff Israel, there's a lot of
14 things that, that Sheriff Scott Israel has done
15 that have been extremely unethical. I would
16 like you all to ask does anybody here think
17 that it is right for Sheriff Israel to have
18 signed off on Nikolas Cruz to have been able to
19 register to vote on July 25, 2018 from the
20 Broward County Jail, where he was able to
21 register to vote despite the fact that he
22 murdered seventeen people, because that --
23 obviously, I mean a lot of people here, upon
24 hearing that it opened up a lot of heartache,
25 and a lot of pain for the community, and I

1 think that Sheriff Scott Israel has a lot to
2 answer to.

3 Sheriff Scott Israel received a vote of no
4 confidence from majority of the officers here
5 in Broward County, and he is completely unfit
6 to continue serving as, and the Broward County
7 Sheriff, and I think that everybody in this
8 room would agree. His -- his handling of this
9 situation has been entirely atrocious, along
10 with Robert Runcie as well.

11 And I hope that Robert Runcie, now that he
12 has won his election to continue being
13 superintendent, I hope that they seriously
14 consider the PROMISE program because it's
15 getting people killed, and under no
16 circumstance whatsoever should students be
17 allowed to commit crimes, and assault people,
18 and be able to not go to jail simply for the
19 sake of the county receiving more funds for the
20 government to keeps these kids out of jail. If
21 you commit a crime, regardless of how old you
22 are, and you're attending the public school
23 system, you should go to jail. And if Nikolas
24 Cruz would have been sent to jail instead of
25 being protected by Sheriff Scott Israel and

1 Robert Runcie this probably could have been
2 avoided.

3 You know, the fact that this was reported
4 the FBI numerous times, and the fact that
5 Sheriff Scott Israel and deputies received
6 multiple reports to, to respond to Nikolas
7 Cruz's home, this is on law enforcement. And
8 regardless of what Sheriff Scott Israel says,
9 however much he wants to protest against guns,
10 he has a lot to answer to.

11 And I would also like to point out the
12 hypocrisy of Sheriff Scott Israel claiming to
13 be anti-gun, and to get AR-15s off the street,
14 when he is being represented by Stuart Kaplan,
15 who is a former FBI agent, and is also
16 representing the gun store that sold Nikolas
17 Cruz the AR-15 which he used to kill the
18 seventeen victims. So thank you so much for
19 listening to me today, and I sincerely hope,
20 like I've stated, that, you know, all of you
21 take into consideration whether or not Sheriff
22 Israel should even be continuing his position
23 as, as Broward County Sheriff, because trust me
24 when I say that he has a national reputation
25 for being a disgraceful individual. Thank you.

1 CHAIR: The last comment -- the last
2 comment card that we have is Michael Cirbola.

3 MR. CIRBOLA: Yes, hello, thank you.
4 Three to ten percent of children throughout
5 history have been challenged by their personal
6 neurobiology in the environment they've been
7 born into, a percentage that has held steady
8 thousands of years. These are like canaries in
9 a mine. Has there been a sudden increase in
10 severe acts of violence and shootings by our
11 canary children? Sure access to guns enables,
12 and this access is inexcusable and obscene, but
13 let's be clear what drove our children to seek
14 to do violence.

15 Children are the weakest and most
16 voiceless of us. They are the canaries in the
17 mines that fall victim to toxic gasses first.
18 All of our kids fit this description, shooters
19 and their victims alike, both most sadly.
20 There has been a very recent frightening dying
21 off of our weakest and most vulnerable canary
22 children. This sudden frightening increase in
23 Marjory Stoneman Douglas level of violence is
24 concurrent with our nation being attacked by a
25 foreign power, Russia, and domestic political

1 terrorist organizations also that poured money
2 into weaponizing artificial intelligence to
3 pulverize us and increase our cognitive
4 dissonance.

5 It may not be a question of if, but how
6 much did this cause our canaries to begin
7 falling. Have incidents like MSD gone past the
8 tipping point? Congress is looking into legal
9 actions against Russia now. Let us here ask
10 that they, or us here in Florida, sue for funds
11 to fix this damage, and put the funds into both
12 the health and the safety of our kids, fund
13 schools, yes?

14 This county, this state, our nation, does
15 anyone doubt that we've all been affected? We
16 suffer increased polarization and cognitive
17 dissonance. Our psychology has been affected.
18 Many believe we have just inadvertently
19 directed tested ourselves to see how much we've
20 been affected by trauma and stress, all of us
21 here in Broward, when we were found to be three
22 times, that's three hundred percent, more
23 likely to make the cognitive visual intentional
24 error of missing the senate and governor's
25 marks on our ballots, truly amazing.

1 Culture is biology. We must rise above
2 our biology. The minute we raise one's hand,
3 or one's voice, or threatens a punishment or
4 consequence, then the original error or bad
5 done is largely forgotten, and the opportunity
6 to learn is lost. This is how to raise a
7 psychopath. Error is an opportunity to learn
8 and teach, not punish, judge, or apply a
9 consequence. Kids are mimes. We have to model
10 this in how treat children, and how we treat
11 ourselves as well. Kids are mimes, and this is
12 why teaching works, and teachers can be so
13 effective. One in three children abused by
14 eighteen is a behaviorally transmitted
15 epidemic.

16 Our ignorance, and our willing to look
17 past this in our discussions is a sign of how
18 pathological we are. Underfunding is child
19 abuse. It is time we step up. Thank you.

20 CHAIR: All right, we don't have any other
21 cards. Commissioner Carroll?

22 MR. CARROLL: It's the end of the day, but
23 I did want to publicly acknowledge your team.
24 I think I thanked some of them individually,
25 but I have to tell you that the professionalism

1 of the way they have gone about collecting the
2 information, you kept promising us to wait for
3 the information, and they packaged a very
4 complex set of information in ways that even
5 someone like me could understand and follow,
6 and I thought it was an exceptional job, so
7 thank you.

8 CHAIR: Thank you. Thank you. They did a
9 great job. And I can tell you all, all of them
10 worked very hard, and I know that they
11 appreciate your recognition, because everybody
12 along that wall has been working extremely,
13 extremely hard, and long hours for a long time,
14 so thank you for recognizing them. We'll see
15 everybody tomorrow morning at 8:30.

16 (Thereupon, the meeting concluded.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E

(STATE OF FLORIDA)

(COUNTY OF MIAMI-DADE)

I, NATHANIEL TORO, Reporter, certify that I was
authorized to and did report the foregoing
proceedings and that the transcript is a true and
correct transcription of my notes of the
proceedings.

Nathaniel Toro

NATHANIEL TORO, Reporter

Commission: GG 111434

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