

MARJORY STONEMAN DOUGLAS HIGH SCHOOL  
PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISSION MEETING  
BB&T CENTER CHAIRMAN'S CLUB  
PANTHER PARKWAY SUNRISE, FLORIDA 33323

November 14, 2018

COMMISSION MEMBERS/ATTENDEES:

SHERIFF BOB GUALTIERI - CHAIR

JASON JONES - PSC GENERAL COUNSEL

CHRIS NELSON - CHIEF OF POLICE, CITY OF AUBURNDALE

BRUCE BARTLETT - CHIEF ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY,  
SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

MIKE CARROLL - FORMER SECRETARY, DCF

RICHARD SWEARINGEN - COMMISSIONER FLORIDA DEPARTMENT  
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

MAX SCHACHTER - VICTIM PARENT

LARRY ASHLEY - SHERIFF, OKALOOSA COUNTY

MELISSA LARKIN SKINNER - CEO, CENTERSTONE OF FLORIDA

PAM STUART - COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION

JUSTIN SENIOR - SECRETARY, AHCA

TIMOTHY NIERMANN, SECRETARY, DEPT OF JUVENILE

JUSTICE REBECCA KAPUSTA - SECRETARY, DCF

JAMES HARPRING - UNDERSHERIFF/GC, INDIAN RIVER  
COUNTY

DESMOND BLACKBURN - SUPERINTENDENT, BREVARD COUNTY

GRADY JUDD - SHERIFF, POLK COUNTY

DOUGLAS DODD - SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, CITRUS COUNTY

LAUREN BOOK - SENATOR, DISTRICT 32

RYAN PETTY - VICTIM PARENT

MARSHA POWERS - SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, MARTIN COUNTY

KEVIN LYSTAD - PRESIDENT, FLORIDA POLICE CHIEF ASSOC

CHRISTINA LINTON - COMMISSION STAFF, FDLE

1 (Thereupon, the meeting is called to order:)

2 CHAIR: All right, good morning everybody.  
3 We're going to begin this morning with a  
4 presentation on the physical site security at  
5 Stoneman Douglas. And you're going to learn  
6 about the campus itself, how the campus was set  
7 up, the investigative work that was one on  
8 campus, and also the results of many interviews  
9 there were conducted with the school personnel.

10 This presentation this morning is not  
11 about the law enforcement response, so please  
12 that keep that mind. And please keep that in  
13 mind as you have questions because after this  
14 presentation this morning we're going to get  
15 into the law enforcement response, and you're  
16 going to get a very detailed presentation on  
17 that. So with all of this there some segue  
18 way, you know, between the two topics, but  
19 again this is primarily focused on the campus  
20 itself. So we'll ask Detective Bonasoro to  
21 come up and make his presentation on the site  
22 security.

23 And with this, we kind of did it  
24 yesterday, I know in previous meetings we were  
25 holding questions to the end, but with this

1 topic, and with the next one that we're going  
2 to have when Sergeant Suess comes up and talks  
3 about the law enforcement response, because  
4 there's so much here if you have specific  
5 clarifying questions that you want to ask  
6 during the presentation I think it's probably a  
7 good idea that we allow that, and that we do  
8 that, but if you have just general questions  
9 then we'll do what we usually do at the end.  
10 But if you want to ask any clarifying as you go  
11 through it because it's the right time to put  
12 that on the table then speak up and we'll, and  
13 we'll do it that way for today.

14 Wally, all yours.

15 PRESENTATION PHYSICAL SITE SECURITY

16 DET. BONASORO: Thank you, Sheriff. Good  
17 morning Commissioners. Like the Sheriff said  
18 we're going to be covering topics three and  
19 four. We're going to touch on a brief history  
20 of MSD. We're going to talk a little bit about  
21 the campus structure, the buildings, the  
22 fencing, the gates around the campus. We're  
23 going to touch on some school board policies  
24 that were in place at the time, or not in place  
25 at the time. We'll talk a little bit about

1 training that the campus staff received by Al  
2 Butler, and then we're going to conclude with  
3 some of the teacher and administrator  
4 interviews.

5 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School is  
6 located at 5901 Pine Island Road in Parkland,  
7 Florida. It opened in 1990 to meet the growing  
8 population of Parkland and Coral Springs. The  
9 school itself was named after Marjory Stoneman  
10 Douglas. She was an author, journalist,  
11 women's rights advocate, and was most known for  
12 her Everglades conservation efforts. Douglas  
13 passed away in 1998 at the age of one hundred  
14 eight.

15 At the time of the shooting there were  
16 three thousand three hundred eighteen students  
17 enrolled at MSD. Three thousand ninety were  
18 present the day of the offense. There is one  
19 principal assigned to the school, five  
20 assistant principals, six guidance counselors,  
21 one full time social worker. According to the  
22 principals approximately two hundred ten total  
23 staff, and the school hours are 7:40 a.m. to  
24 2:40 p.m. Just a side note, on that day  
25 Principal Ty Thompson was not present, and

1 Assistant Principal Denise Reed was in command.

2 I'm going to get into a little bit about  
3 the campus structure. This is an overview of  
4 the campus. It sits on forty-five acres, and  
5 this picture just depicts the sheer massive  
6 size of the campus itself. The next slide is  
7 the west border of MSD that separates the high  
8 school from the middle school there. It runs  
9 approximately nine hundred fifty-nine feet  
10 north and south, and these are the property  
11 lines, nine hundred fifty- nine feet north and  
12 south, and approximately sixteen hundred  
13 forty-one feet east to west.

14 There are at least fourteen buildings on  
15 the campus. The picture shows the numbers in  
16 white are mostly student housing classrooms.  
17 I've seen there is some depictions of this map  
18 that says there's sixteen buildings on the  
19 campus, but the one that was provided from the  
20 district says there's at least fourteen. The  
21 campus also houses a football field, baseball  
22 and softball fields, tennis and basketball  
23 courts. The box depicts that the athletic  
24 fields are to the west of the main campus.

25 There are about six, or there is six

1 parking lots on campus; three student lots to  
2 the north, two staff lots, and one visitor lot.  
3 The staff lot to the south side there also  
4 incorporates the bus loop and ESE drop-off.  
5 The visitor parking lot is at the very east  
6 end, where visitors and administrative staff  
7 park.

8 Building 12 is the newest building on the  
9 high school campus, and it was designed a lot  
10 different than the other buildings. Building  
11 12 was built in 2008, and open for students in  
12 2009. The older structure is a two story block  
13 constructed building in which the classroom  
14 doors lead out into open air hallways. All the  
15 exterior walls were block, or are block with  
16 metal doors. The window in the door measured  
17 five inches wide, and the door locks were the  
18 same style locks that were inside Building 12.

19 This photo depicts the perimeter fencing  
20 that encompasses the campus. There is a six  
21 foot chain link perimeter fence that surrounds  
22 the entire campus. The fence was not, is not  
23 anchored at the bottom, and there's no added  
24 security features at the top of the fence. A  
25 side note; the campus monitors would say they

1 frequently saw on a daily basis students easily  
2 scaling and jumping that fence. And there's  
3 some other opinions out there, and studies,  
4 that anchoring the fence would make it easier  
5 to, to get over, however this fence was not  
6 anchored, and according to the staff the kids  
7 were jumping the fence on a daily basis, so.

8 This next slide, if you can see it, great,  
9 but it depicts a parking lot gate. There's two  
10 gates there that swing open. They are chain  
11 link. That secures the parking lot entrances.  
12 Those are locked by a chain and a padlock.  
13 There are four pedestrian gates at the front of  
14 the school, two gates long the west property  
15 line that separate MSD from Westglades Middle,  
16 and one pedestrian gate on the southwest  
17 property line. The next slide will show you  
18 where those gates are. The red circles  
19 indicate pedestrian, or walk in gates, and the  
20 blue circles indicate the parking lot swinging  
21 gate access.

22 During interviews I was told that the  
23 gates to the west where the football fields  
24 are, and the baseball fields, are constantly  
25 locked there, they just don't open them

1           anymore. The ones on the east side of the  
2           school, the red circles, they are unlocked and  
3           locked on a daily basis.

4           This next slide depicts the front of the  
5           school. What you see there, what we tried to  
6           capture is the, the gate. That is a ten foot  
7           high metal gate with doors, and above the doors  
8           you see that it extends even higher. This next  
9           slide is the visitor entry. You'll see that  
10          little awning there. If you pull up to the  
11          school this is where it funnels you into, and  
12          that's the visitor entry.

13          So if all the perimeter gates were locked  
14          this becomes your single point of entry. You  
15          stand outside the door and a secretary buzzes  
16          you in. There is no screening process outside  
17          of that door. Even though you get buzzed in --  
18          I've been there multiple times, anybody who  
19          walks to that door, rings the bell, and can  
20          still enter the administration building. Once  
21          you have access to the administration building  
22          there's no additional security features there.

23          The school hours again are 7:40 a.m. start  
24          time, and dismissal is at 2:40 p.m. The  
25          perimeter pedestrian gates and parking lot

1 gates were opened at 5:30 a.m. by the  
2 maintenance staff. All the gates were  
3 re-secured anywhere between 7:50 and 8:00 a.m.  
4 And again, school begins at 7:40, so between  
5 5:30 in the morning and approximately 8:00 a.m.  
6 the gates were open and left unstaffed. In the  
7 afternoon at dismissal the gates were opened at  
8 approximately 2:15 p.m. Again, these gates  
9 were not staffed.

10 COMM. STEWART: Let me ask a question --

11 CHAIR: Go ahead.

12 COMM. STEWART: So between 8:00 and 2:15  
13 were those pedestrian gates egress accessible  
14 so --

15 DET. BONASORO: At approximately 8:00 all  
16 the gates were locked, and if somebody had to  
17 leave the school administration would contact  
18 the campus monitors, the campus monitors would  
19 then meet the student or staff member to allow  
20 them --

21 COMMM. STEWART: But if the student wanted  
22 to, instead of scaling the fence would they  
23 actually egress, or were they locked such that  
24 the students couldn't get out?

25 DET. BONASORO: Unfortunately the premise

1 was to have them ask to be allowed out, however  
2 during the interviews there were multiple times  
3 that were said once the gates were opened they  
4 were left open, so.

5 CHAIR: Well, and explain during that, to,  
6 about the responses, as to why, you know, they  
7 open the gates at 5:30 in the morning. School  
8 doesn't start until 7:40, so you got two hours.  
9 And then in the afternoon Medina opened that  
10 gate at 2:15.

11 DET. BONASORO: Yes.

12 CHAIR: And of course school doesn't get  
13 out until 2:40.

14 DET. BONASORO: Right.

15 CHAIR: Why? I mean what -- what was the  
16 -- why do they open them so early? And of  
17 course they're unstaffed, which just provided  
18 unfettered access for, you know, two hours in  
19 the morning.

20 DET. BONASORO: I asked that question, and  
21 just the response was it was the routine. That  
22 was the start of the day, that maintenance  
23 would get there at 5:30, and the first thing  
24 they would do is unlock the school.

25 CHAIR: All right, so the point is that

1           there's, there's no operational reason, just  
2           the way they did it.

3           DET. BONASORO: No.

4           CHAIR: Okay, go ahead.

5           DET. BONASORO: Again, the interviews with  
6           the school administrators cited insufficient  
7           personnel as the explanation for the unstaffed  
8           gates. This next slide is an overview of the  
9           campus, and again depicting Building 12.

10          Building 12 was first utilized for students in  
11          2009. It's a three story building. There's  
12          ingress/egress to the building on the east and  
13          west side of Building 12. This next slide just  
14          depicts the three stories, and the classrooms  
15          on each level.

16          CHAIR: Hey, Wally --

17          DET. BONASORO: Sir.

18          CHAIR: Senator Book, you're recognized.

19          DET. BONASORO: I'm sorry.

20          SEN. BOOK: One of the things I remember  
21          when we were there walking around the building  
22          together was that Building 12 sort of was like  
23          plunked in the middle because it was an  
24          addition, and that obstructed some of the, the  
25          surveillance cameras. Are you going to cover

1           that, or is, that's not a part of this?

2           DET. BONASORO: I'm going to briefly touch  
3           on the surveillance cameras inside of Building  
4           12, however Sergeant Suess will go into further  
5           detail about that in his explanations.

6           CHAIR: The -- the answer is he'll get  
7           into it, and he's going to show you a map, but  
8           the answer is correct, there were gaps in  
9           coverage because of where that building was  
10          erected, there was, but he'll get into that, so  
11          the answer is yes though.

12          SEN. BOOK: Okay, thank you.

13          DET. BONASORO: What you're looking at  
14          here is the east doors to Building 12. The  
15          double metal doors lead into a hallway where  
16          classrooms are located. The single stairwell  
17          doors off to the right there, if you access  
18          that will lead you right into the stairwell,  
19          and these are, the maroon doors there are the  
20          doors that Cruz entered the building. He then,  
21          once entered the building, he make a right into  
22          that stairwell.

23          This next slide is the ingress/egress on  
24          the west side of Building 12. Same type of set  
25          up, and that single door, stairwell door, is

1       where Coach Feis entered. Building 12 --  
2       within Building 12 is about thirty classrooms,  
3       plus teach and planning breakrooms on the west  
4       end of each floor. The building is occupied by  
5       approximately thirty teachers and nine hundred  
6       students daily. There are boys and girls  
7       bathrooms on each floor. And there are  
8       thirteen interior cameras which cover the  
9       hallways, but no video inside the classroom.  
10      And we heard yesterday that the camera  
11      configuration in Building was there are three  
12      cameras on each hallway on each level, and then  
13      in the stairwells there was two each.

14             This next slide shows where the bullet  
15      holes travelled through the drywall. Building  
16      12, the interior of that building, the walls  
17      were constructed of standard drywall, and of  
18      course this picture is showing where the bullet  
19      holes went easily through the walls. In this  
20      picture here, we'll stay on it for a second,  
21      this is the north wall of Building 12, so when  
22      Cruz was in the hallway he shot through the  
23      window. This wasn't the hallway wall, he shot  
24      through a window, it went through the  
25      classroom, and this is the north wall of one of

1 the classrooms.

2 In Building 12 the classroom doors are  
3 made of metal with a pane, with a pane of glass  
4 that measures eight inches wide. The doors on  
5 the older construction building are also metal  
6 with a five inch wide glass pane. I just point  
7 that out because the wider the pane the more  
8 area of the classroom you can see from the  
9 outside. As we all heard many times at that  
10 time the doors could only be locked from the  
11 outside of the classroom. And I go into the  
12 door locks in a little bit further detail on an  
13 additional slide here later on in the  
14 presentation.

15 CHAIR: Sen. Book, go ahead. No, no  
16 problem.

17 SEN. BOOK: Can -- I know that the doors  
18 are metal. Can metal -- can these type of  
19 doors stop those, stop bullets, or do they, can  
20 they penetrate the metal?

21 DET. BONASORO: They'll penetrate the  
22 metal. And I do have a slide depicting that  
23 here in just a second.

24 CHAIR: And remember what Detective Scot  
25 said yesterday, is, is that the majority, from

1 the best anybody can tell is, is that when he  
2 was shooting in the classrooms the way he was  
3 shooting in order to shoot people was through  
4 the window, but some of the rounds looked like  
5 more that he missed. It wasn't intentional, he  
6 was trying to go through the door, and these  
7 are actual rounds in the door, and what you saw  
8 on the wall is, Detective Bonasoro pointed out,  
9 once the rounds went through the window then  
10 they hit walls in the classroom. Those walls  
11 are drywall, so then they're going through that  
12 drywall.

13 So, and you do see some in there where  
14 from the outside hallway, a few where there  
15 were rounds from the hallway into the  
16 classroom, but those are few, so he wasn't  
17 tactically, strategically, intentionally trying  
18 to shoot through the door or the wall, from the  
19 best anybody can tell, it's through the  
20 windows, and then of course the victims in the  
21 hallways themselves. So that's the -- so but  
22 what you see, I would describe it here as, what  
23 you see in these doors, or in the walls, is  
24 more collateral, as opposed to his intentional  
25 effort to fire.

1           MR. SCHACHTER: Chair, can I ask you a  
2 question?

3           CHAIR: Mr. Schachter, go ahead.

4           MR. SCHACHTER: When -- when the murderer  
5 shot through the window did he purposefully  
6 aim, or was it just indiscriminate shooting in  
7 the classroom, or was he specifically aiming at  
8 children? Did he spend time trying to do that?

9           CHAIR: Well, you can see from the video  
10 he moved very fast, and by all accounts, and by  
11 looking at it is, is that it was unfortunately  
12 whoever was line of sight. So it wasn't that  
13 he was picking out any specific individuals, it  
14 was, and you can see by the window there is, is  
15 that it is long and it's narrow, so as he shot  
16 it's unfortunately whoever was in that line of  
17 sight, and that's what it appeared to be. It  
18 wasn't that he was trying to get angles, and  
19 we'll get ahead of ourselves here, but I'll  
20 keep saying it because I think it's so  
21 important, is that he wasn't even trying to  
22 defeat hard corners, so if you're shooting  
23 through that window with what he did, if you  
24 went into that classroom and you took a hard  
25 left into the hard corner you were going to be

1 safe.

2 Where you were unsafe is if you were in  
3 that line of sight, and unfortunately there  
4 were a lot of people that were in that line of  
5 sight, including people that could not get into  
6 the hard corners, and according, and a couple  
7 of those kids we talked about that were hiding  
8 behind a TV because they couldn't get in. So  
9 he was shooting line of sight. Commissioner  
10 Carroll.

11 MR. CARROLL: On one of the 911 calls  
12 yesterday, and it was a young lady on the call,  
13 she was afraid because she said the window's  
14 been shot out so he can simply reach in and  
15 open the door. Is that true, because that's a  
16 pretty high door handle there, and it's  
17 adjacent with the window, once the window is  
18 gone can you open the door from the inside  
19 still?

20 DET. BONASORO: Yes.

21 MR. CARROLL: Okay.

22 DET. BONASORO: And, Senator --

23 CHAIR: Mr. Schachter, go ahead.

24 DET. BONASORO: I'm sorry.

25 MR. SCHACHTER: So one of the

1 recommendations that I think that we should put  
2 in the recommendations is that any new  
3 construction schools, and new doors, the vision  
4 windows should be on the opposite side as the  
5 door handle so that what Commissioner Carroll  
6 mentioned is not possible, because he could  
7 have easily put his hand in, opened up that  
8 door, and then executed everybody in that room.

9 CHAIR: Yeah. Go ahead.

10 DET. BONASORO: All right. So the  
11 ingress/egress doors to Building 12 on the east  
12 and west sides were left unlocked due to the  
13 amount of foot traffic that was in and out of  
14 that building all day. One of the campus  
15 monitors, David Taylor recognized that, and  
16 suggested to his supervision that one side of  
17 the doors be locked so that the other side  
18 could be staffed. He followed up by saying  
19 once he made that suggestion he never heard  
20 anything about it again.

21 MR. SCHACHTER: Detective, did he mention  
22 who he, which administrator he informed?

23 DET. BONASORO: I believe it went through  
24 Greenleaf, and then Greenleaf ran it through  
25 the administration. If it went any further

1       than Greenleaf I'm not sure. The classroom  
2       setup, Broward County Public Schools does not  
3       have a policy relating to classroom setup other  
4       than the minimum standards established by the  
5       fire code. The district policy regarding the  
6       establishment of hard corners or safe areas in  
7       each room, or has no policy regarding the  
8       establishment of hard corners or safe areas in  
9       each room.

10           According to the response that we received  
11       from the district, it stated that the teachers  
12       are permitted to set up their classrooms as  
13       they see fit to provide educational instruction  
14       and inspire learning. The only requirements  
15       that would be that they do so in a safe manner,  
16       and provide clear paths of egress for an  
17       emergency.

18           CHAIR: And that's the current policy  
19       today.

20           DET. BONASORO: That is today, yes.

21           CHAIR: There is no requirement of  
22       teachers having hard corners in the Broward  
23       County schools today.

24           DET. BONASORO: When looking at the fire  
25       code there is nothing in the fire code that

1 would have prohibited the district from  
2 establishing and/or requiring hard corners in  
3 each classroom.

4 During a walk-through of Building 12 the  
5 safe or hard corners of some rooms were  
6 obstructed by furniture. Actually most of the  
7 rooms were. Later on in this presentation we  
8 have many slides to, to show you that. There  
9 was furniture, desks, and in some instances  
10 large cabinets were mounted to the walls in the  
11 safe area.

12 During a training session on January 11,  
13 2018 Detective Al Butler with the Broward  
14 County Public Schools Police Special  
15 Investigations unit did instruct the staff  
16 about utilizing a hard corner of the room to  
17 hide in the event of emergencies. Only two of  
18 the thirty classrooms in Building 12 had a line  
19 of tape on the floor to denote the hard corner.  
20 The classrooms are equipped with a landline  
21 telephone and a PA system. The PA system is  
22 activated by flipping a switch that is on a  
23 wall. The PA provides two way communication.  
24 There are no speakers in the common areas or  
25 the hallways of Building 12.

1 CHAIR: Mr. Schachter, go ahead.

2 MR. SCHACHTER: Did Al Butler, going back  
3 a slide, he instructed the staff. Do we know  
4 -- or you said there were only two classrooms  
5 that, or two teachers that took his  
6 recommendations, and - -

7 DET. BONASORO: We're going to get into  
8 that in further detail later on in the  
9 presentation.

10 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay. Do we know if, if  
11 anybody in MSD administration did anything with  
12 his recommendation?

13 DET. BONASORO: No, they did not.

14 MR. SCHACHTER: Did -- did we know -- did  
15 he recommend that to MSD admin, that they put  
16 hard corners in all the classrooms?

17 DET. BONASORO: He recommended that during  
18 the presentation on the 11th.

19 MR. SCHACHTER: Who was present at that?

20 DET. BONASORO: The entire staff.

21 MR. SCHACHTER: So all the APs and, and Ty  
22 Thompson?

23 DET. BONASORO: Yeah, I think it was  
24 December 15th he came again, of 2017, he did a  
25 similar presentation to the principal, the

1 administrators, and the campus monitors. On  
2 January 11th he came back and did a very  
3 similar presentation for the teachers and the  
4 rest of the staff.

5 MR. SCHACHTER: Let me just get this  
6 straight. So on two separate occasions he told  
7 the staff and the administration of Marjory  
8 Stoneman Douglas that this was a vulnerability,  
9 and they ignored his recommendations, and they  
10 did not institute this as a policy.

11 DET. BONASORO: Well, he suggested  
12 utilizing the hard corner. That's what he  
13 stated.

14 MR. SCHACHTER: Did they give a reason why  
15 they didn't do this?

16 DET. BONASORO: No, sir.

17 CHAIR: Commissioner Stewart.

18 COMM. STEWART: I know that the other  
19 older buildings have direct access to the  
20 outside.

21 DET. BONASORO: Yes.

22 COMM. STEWART: Not an indoor corridor.

23 DET. BONASORO: Right.

24 COMM. STEWART: But is there a PA system  
25 in that center courtyard, or outside of any of

1 the buildings so that --

2 DET. BONASORO: At the time there was not.

3 COMM. STEWART: And was there any reason  
4 provided for why there would not be a PA system  
5 in the hallway in Building 12, or on the  
6 outside of the buildings?

7 DET. BONASORO: No. It was just stated  
8 that the PA system were in each of the  
9 classrooms.

10 CHAIR: Some of these questions, and I  
11 encourage you, remember Superintendent Runcie  
12 will be on Thursday, and I encourage you to  
13 take notes of any questions you want to ask  
14 him. I can tell you that the questions that  
15 you are asking are probative questions that we  
16 have asked, and the investigators have asked  
17 during the course of the last several months of  
18 interviewing many people, and so we've asked  
19 that the same question. Where -- and the only  
20 thing that we've determined is the only place  
21 there were speakers were inside the -- no  
22 common areas had speakers at all. So again,  
23 when the code red, and that's what I said  
24 yesterday, if the code red had been called, I  
25 mean it wasn't, the problem was, there's a

1       problem that it wasn't called until after three  
2       minutes into the event, I mean that's a problem  
3       in and of itself.

4               But the point of it is even if it had been  
5       called it would have been useless because  
6       nobody could have heard it anyway, you know.  
7       But I -- again I would encourage those of you  
8       so inclined with some of these questions that  
9       we don't have the answers to that you still  
10      have questions about, that they would be  
11      appropriate questions to ask the superintendent  
12      on Thursday, so.

13             MR. SCHACHTER: And, Chair, I wasn't here  
14      for the video, so I'm sorry if some questions I  
15      ask was, was already gone over. How many  
16      children apparently were killed because they  
17      could not get into the hard corners, or as a  
18      result of the not, you know, doing that  
19      correctly in the classrooms, to your --

20             CHAIR: Well, there is some. And you're  
21      going to see some of it during the law  
22      enforcement response presentation later today  
23      and into, into tomorrow. I mean I, you know,  
24      there, there were some definitely that, and  
25      you'll see some as Detective Bonasoro gets into

1           this presentation. We're going to show you  
2           actual photos from the actual classrooms as  
3           they existed on that.

4           You're going to see what we'll call crime  
5           scene photos, and you'll see how it was set up,  
6           and you'll see what it is, and there are kids,  
7           it's a fact, who, you know, one in particular  
8           who died on the line because she was nudged out  
9           of the hard corner because she couldn't get in.  
10          There are two that were hiding behind a TV set  
11          because they couldn't get into the hard corner.  
12          So there was a problem with the kids not being  
13          able to get into the hard corner and be in that  
14          safe spot within this classrooms. It's just a,  
15          yeah, those are just the facts.

16          MR. SCHACHTER: When you interviewed the  
17          assistant principal and Ty Thompson did you ask  
18          him about Al Butler's recommendations on two  
19          separate occasions in two different years to  
20          institute the hard corners?

21          DET. BONASORO: We asked him about the  
22          training, and he said he was in attendance for  
23          the training. So no, specifically no, we  
24          didn't ask him why he didn't implement the hard  
25          corners.

1           MR. SCHACHTER: What was the -- what was  
2           the date in, in 2017?

3           DET. BONASORO: I believe it was December  
4           15th. Again, yesterday Jeff Moquin, Moquin,  
5           with the School Board was here, and he did say  
6           during his presentation that there were several  
7           enhancements made to the PA's infrastructure.  
8           I don't know if that meant that speakers were  
9           added to the, the hallways or not, we would  
10          have to clarify that tomorrow, but he did say  
11          that there were several enhancements made. I  
12          don't know if it was to the existing  
13          infrastructure or it was added to.

14          MR. SCHACHTER: I had a whole intercom  
15          system donated, but the District decided to go  
16          ahead and buy a brand new intercom system, so  
17          it's completely new, \$150,000.

18          CHAIR: Go ahead, Wally.

19          MR. SCHACHTER: The -- the fire alarm on  
20          MSD and the suppression system, Building 12's  
21          fire alarm system was installed by Bass United  
22          Fire and Security Systems. Although Building  
23          12 was constructed at a later time the newer  
24          system was fully integrated with the older  
25          system in the building. The detectors inside

1 of Building 12 are placed thirty feet apart in  
2 the hallways on all floors. Refracted or  
3 reflected beams of light link the detectors  
4 together, and that's how they communicate.

5 A representative from Bass United advised  
6 that the alarm went off either because the beam  
7 of light was disrupted by muzzle flash from the  
8 gun, smoke from the gun, or dust which was  
9 created by the ceiling tiles' movement from the  
10 percussion of the rifle. The main control  
11 panel to the fire alarm is located inside of  
12 the SRO's office, which is located inside of  
13 the administration building. It did confirm  
14 that the second detector from the east door on  
15 the first floor was triggered. It also  
16 confirmed that no pull stations were triggered,  
17 or pulled anywhere on campus.

18 Further, the fire alarm systems may have  
19 positive fire alarm features. If they do the  
20 operation also must comply with the following.  
21 The signal from any device must be acknowledged  
22 at the fire alarm control unit by trained  
23 personnel within fifteen seconds of  
24 enunciation. If the signal is not acknowledged  
25 within fifteen seconds the notification signals

1 are automatically and immediately activated.

2 CHAIR: Senator Book, go ahead.

3 SEN. BOOK: Thank you very much. I'm --  
4 so I'm skipping, and going back and forth. But  
5 so just because one spot, one building has,  
6 triggers an alarm, that means that everywhere  
7 on the campus, all of the buildings, a fire  
8 alarm goes off.

9 DET. BONASORO: Right now, yes.

10 SEN. BOOK: It seems kind of --

11 CHAIR: It's the way it's set up now.

12 SEN. BOOK: And I guess my question is  
13 does that necessarily seem like the safest and  
14 smartest choice?

15 DET. BONASORO: That's the way it's always  
16 been, however if we just get through these  
17 couple of slides here it will show you this is  
18 an additional option to have.

19 CHAIR: And -- and this is important,  
20 because a lot of you in your recommendations,  
21 and I know we covered, you know, a tremendous  
22 amount of material, and some of it gets to be a  
23 little blurred sometimes, remember though, and  
24 a lot of you in your recommendations said that  
25 we should include a recommendation that the

1 fire code be changed, and Florida law be  
2 changed to allow a delayed response. It is  
3 already in the law, and this is what Detective  
4 Bonasoro is covering now, so I encourage you,  
5 those of you who have questions about it, pay  
6 close attention to this, because Florida law  
7 sets forth the procedure for allowing a delayed  
8 alarm, so it's not a law change that's  
9 required, it's a system change that's required,  
10 and that's what he's explaining now.

11 But a lot of you had this in your  
12 recommendations that you submitted to us, so  
13 this explains it. So it's not a question of a  
14 law change, it's a question of implementing the  
15 system. The systems exist, it's a question, is  
16 do they have the desire to do it, and then the  
17 capacity to revise our alarm systems.

18 SEN. BOOK: And, I'm sorry, this is being  
19 done just because this is the way it's been  
20 done, right, because --

21 CHAIR: Well, a lot of things are that  
22 way.

23 SEN. BOOK: Okay. I'm -- but I'm really  
24 just asking, not being not like flip about it.

25 CHAIR: Yes, right. Right, no, and they,

1       you know, they legally have the capacity to  
2       have a delay in the alarm system, and this is  
3       what he's explaining now, is, is that, and, you  
4       know, getting into here is, is that so it has  
5       to be acknowledged within fifteen seconds. If  
6       it's acknowledged with in fifteen seconds then  
7       somebody has a hundred eighty seconds to access  
8       whether it's a true fire emergency, and whether  
9       they should then allow the alarm to continue  
10      with the activation.

11             Once it's acknowledged in fifteen if there  
12      isn't a decision to override it then it sets it  
13      off within a hundred eighty seconds. That's  
14      what the law says. And there are systems that  
15      do that, so the question is do the individual  
16      schools want that type of system, or do they  
17      want a system, as soon as something happens it  
18      just, everybody everywhere, and everybody  
19      reacts to it. And that's the system that was  
20      at MSD, or is at MSD.

21             SEN. BOOK: And even still, like let's say  
22      there was a fire in Building 12 --

23             CHAIR: Right. Right.

24             SEN. BOOK: That doesn't mean that  
25      Building or Building 2 should have to evacuate

1 out into --

2 CHAIR: Those are valid points.

3 MR. SCHACHTER: And, Chair, I just had a  
4 meeting with Chief May of Broward County Public  
5 Schools, and also the fire marshals, along with  
6 the new School Board member Lori Alhadeff, and  
7 we were addressing those issues, because  
8 currently the fire alarm at Marjory Stoneman  
9 Douglas continues to go off incessantly,  
10 traumatizing the kids currently there. And one  
11 of the challenges is that the panel that they  
12 have, they're not able to distinguish which,  
13 which building, which, which floor, which  
14 classrooms, so that needs to, that needs to  
15 change as well.

16 CHAIR: Go ahead, Wally.

17 DET. BONASORO: As the Sheriff just  
18 explained, that's a perfect explanation of what  
19 these slides are, so we'll go back and just  
20 reiterate this just one more time real quick.  
21 The signal from any, any device, must be  
22 acknowledged at the fire alarm control unit by  
23 trained personnel within fifteen seconds of  
24 enunciation. At that point you then have a  
25 hundred eighty seconds to determine what's

1           happening. After a hundred eighty seconds if  
2           no additional action is taken the fire alarm  
3           will go off if it's not reset. So -- and this  
4           is the current law, as the Sheriff said. MSD  
5           did not have this system in place at the time.

6           MR. SCHACHTER: Well, I mean is it -- is  
7           it conceivable that once they hit the, once the  
8           fire alarm goes off they hear a notification,  
9           that they have their staff, or designated  
10          people go check to see if there's actually a  
11          fire there before they evacuate every building,  
12          because, because to Senator Book's point, it's  
13          absolutely ridiculous to evaluate thirteen  
14          masonry buildings if there's a fire in the  
15          kitchen, in the cafeteria.

16          DET. BONASORO: Right now we're going to  
17          get into some of the SRO and the security  
18          staff. Scot Peterson was the SRO at MSD. He  
19          had about thirty-two years total of law  
20          enforcement, twenty-eight as an SRO,  
21          approximately nine years as the SRO at MSD.  
22          There was thirty-three hundred students, a  
23          little over thirty-three hundred students  
24          enrolled at the time, and there was only one  
25          SRO assigned to the school.

1           The security staff on campus one 2/14, you  
2           had one security specialist and campus  
3           monitors. All were present at the time.

4           SEN. BOOK: Is there --is there a specific  
5           location where the SRO is supposed to be  
6           located on, because it's a big campus,  
7           forty-two acres, so is there a specific  
8           location where he's supposed to be?

9           CHAIR: I'm sorry, we can't hear you. Can  
10          you speak into the microphone?

11          SEN. BOOK: I'm sorry. If there's only  
12          one SRO assigned to the campus, and it's  
13          forty-two acres, is there a specific location  
14          that that SRO is supposed to be located, and if  
15          so where is that in location, or respect, to  
16          Building 12?

17          DET. BONASORO: Nothing specific, but on a  
18          daily basis he should be visible. That's what  
19          SROs do, they're out, out and about on campus,  
20          and should be visible at all times.

21          SEN. BOOK: Do you know where he was  
22          located when the shooter arrived at the school?

23          DET. BONASORO: We do. And again,  
24          Sergeant Suess will go over that in detail, but  
25          he was in the SRO office at the time. He was

1 handling another situation.

2 SEN. BOOK: Okay.

3 DET. BONASORO: The SRO office is located  
4 in the administration building.

5 CHAIR: So he was in Building 1. His  
6 office is in the admin building, and Building 1  
7 on the map, and so Peterson was in his office  
8 in Building 1 when the incident began.

9 MR. SCHACHTER: Do you know if he was  
10 wearing a vest?

11 CHAIR: He was not.

12 MR. SCHACHTER: Did he have a vest?

13 CHAIR: I don't know.

14 MR. SCHACHTER: Did he have a rifle?

15 CHAIR: He didn't have it with him, and as  
16 far as we know he did not.

17 SEN. BOOK: Can I just ask one quick  
18 question on the staffing? When we talk about  
19 security specialists and campus monitors, what  
20 qualifies somebody to be a security specialist,  
21 is that like a higher level of certification,  
22 is that more time, like what is a special, do  
23 they have special responsibilities?

24 DET. BONASORO: It's a supervisory  
25 position, so they do have to qualify for that

1 position. And in a few slides here we have the  
2 actual job description of the campus security  
3 specialists. Good question.

4 COMM. STEWART: Sheriff, if I may?

5 CHAIR: Commissioner Stewart.

6 COMM. STEWART: But one of, may be behind  
7 part of your question, most of these here at  
8 this school did not hold an educator's  
9 certificate.

10 CHAIR: You'll see, the qualifications for  
11 the monitor are very minimal, and they're just  
12 there to open gates and report. He'll get into  
13 it more. Go ahead. He'll explain more. Go  
14 ahead, Wally.

15 DET. BONASORO: So we asked the district  
16 whether or not there was a written policy  
17 regarding campus monitor responsibilities and  
18 we received the following response: There is  
19 no specific policy regarding responsibilities  
20 of campus monitors. The only written  
21 information provided was the job description of  
22 the campus monitor outlining their job  
23 responsibilities.

24 Like the Sheriff said it's that they're  
25 opening gates, dealing with students on a daily

1 basis. So I just want you to, of all these  
2 responsibilities here I want to refer you to  
3 number seven, determine the reason of outsiders  
4 on campus. That was in the job description,  
5 and --

6 CHAIR: But -- but also know that, again,  
7 we asked for a policy that tells everyone as to  
8 an operating policy about the campus monitors,  
9 the security specialists, et cetera. It  
10 doesn't exist. So this is the job description,  
11 so this is when somebody applies for the job  
12 this is what they would see when they apply for  
13 the job. So how many people remember what's in  
14 the job description they applied for five years  
15 ago, you know, this isn't something that guides  
16 daily activity, I want to be clear about that.  
17 There is no policy. There is no procedure.  
18 There's no written document that tells the  
19 administrators, that tells other staff, that  
20 tells teachers, that tells anybody what these  
21 monitors do. This isn't the job description.  
22 So there's a big difference.

23 MR. SCHACHTER: Chair, you know, we can --  
24 we can -- we're dealing with the school  
25 hardening, and that's extremely important, but

1 the, you know, you can put as much technology  
2 in these schools as possible, cameras,  
3 everything, but it's the monitors, it's the  
4 personnel that make the decisions that, that  
5 really obviously let this murdered on the  
6 campus to murder these seventeen innocent  
7 people, so we need in my opinion to put  
8 something to educate these monitors, and to  
9 prepare them, and to train them along the lines  
10 of what you're saying, Chairman. That is  
11 extremely important. There's nothing more  
12 important than the personnel.

13 DET. BONASORO: So during the interviews  
14 of the campus monitors one of the main  
15 questions we asked was what is your job  
16 responsibilities, what do you do as a campus  
17 monitor, and every single one of them, their  
18 answer was we observed and we report. And I  
19 asked what that meant, and their explanation  
20 did not meet what they actually do on a daily  
21 basis. Observing and reporting, you observe  
22 something go down, they're saying that they  
23 report to their boss, or the administration, to  
24 come handle the problem, when in fact that's,  
25 that's not reality on the campus.

1           So they do encounter students on a daily  
2 basis, and they do much more hands on work  
3 than, than what they, what observe and report  
4 technically means. And again I want to point  
5 out that one of their responsibilities was to  
6 determine the reason for the presence of  
7 outsiders on campus.

8           MR. SCHACHTER: And so -- so I ask the  
9 question, that if their job is only to observe  
10 and report, that's exactly what Medina did,  
11 that's exactly, you know, none of these guys,  
12 who's there to protect the school, who's there  
13 to do something if there's somebody on campus  
14 that's not supposed to be there?

15          CHAIR: Go ahead, Wally.

16          DET. BONASORO: So we asked Greenleaf, the  
17 security specialist, what does a campus monitor  
18 do on a daily basis, and this is, the following  
19 is some of the information that he told us.  
20 Each monitor is assigned a general area of the  
21 school to monitor throughout the day. The  
22 assignments do adjust according to activity or  
23 need. The perimeter of the school is often  
24 patrolled by the monitors, according to  
25 Greenleaf. He did suggest that they unlock the

1 gates for early dismissal.

2 They were not trained in the use of the  
3 video camera system, however he did say that  
4 some did have limited and generic knowledge on  
5 how to use it. The monitors will initiate  
6 contact with multiple students throughout the  
7 day to ensure that the students are out of  
8 class for a legitimate reason. Monitors will  
9 often participate in debriefings after fire and  
10 other code drills. And monitors will perform  
11 other duties assigned by the principal and/or  
12 APs.

13 These next few slides are going to explain  
14 Andrew Medina's movements and actions when he  
15 first observed Cruz. I do want to state that  
16 Medina is going to be talked about in greater  
17 detail in Sergeant Suess's presentation. So at  
18 2:19 p.m. Medina was on the east side of the  
19 school unlocking the gates, preparing for  
20 dismissal. He observed an Uber stop on Pine  
21 Island Road in front of the school, and  
22 observed Cruz exit. Cruz walks toward, walked  
23 toward the school wearing a backpack, and  
24 carried what was readily identifiable as a  
25 rifle bag.

1 Cruz entered through one of the gates that  
2 Medina had just opened. Now, that gate there  
3 -- if this will work here -- I don't know if  
4 you can see that there. It's right in that  
5 area where that dot is there.

6 COMM. STEWART: Chair?

7 CHAIR: Commissioner Stewart, go ahead.

8 COMM. STEWART: And where exactly was  
9 Medina in relation?

10 DET. BONASORO: Medina -- okay, so the  
11 front -- the whole front of the school there,  
12 there was several gates that he had to open.  
13 He was working his way south opening the gates,  
14 so he was on the southern portion of the  
15 property when he observed this.

16 CHAIR: Well, can you, based on your, you  
17 know, discussion with Medina just, you know,  
18 use the pointer and, and just point generally  
19 where you know that Medina was.

20 DET. BONASORO: Let's see, he was probably  
21 down in this area here.

22 CHAIR: And -- and Cruz came in -- point  
23 to where Cruz was.

24 DET. BONASORO: And Cruz comes in right  
25 about through here.

1           MR. SCHACHTER: So about a hundred yards  
2 or so?

3           DET. BONASORO: A little bit over. Yeah,  
4 it was over a hundred yards away. This is the  
5 bag Cruz was carrying.

6           MR. SCHACHTER: And can you talk for a  
7 second about -- so he it was -- it was -- they  
8 open the gates every day at 2:15?

9           DET. BONASORO: Approximately, yes.

10          MR. SCHACHTER: Okay. And that was --  
11 that was determined by administration, it's not  
12 like - -

13          DET. BONASORO: That was a --

14          MR. SCHACHTER: I'm sorry?

15          DET. BONASORO: Determined?

16          MR. SCHACHTER: Yeah, like that was --  
17 pushed down as a procedure through the  
18 administration.

19          DET. BONASORO: Yes, sir, at some point  
20 the monitors had to take direction from  
21 somebody, so. And that was just a common  
22 practice, every day at 2:15 the gates would  
23 start being opened.

24                 So Medina sees Cruz walking, and at that  
25 point he radios campus monitor David Taylor,

1       who was stationed inside of Building 12. We  
2       know from yesterday's presentation that David  
3       Taylor was on the second floor of Building 12.  
4       Medina tells him that there is a suspicious kid  
5       that just came onto the campus. At this point  
6       Medina is in his golf car, and he starts  
7       driving from where he was on the south end, he  
8       starts driving up towards where Cruz was  
9       walking.

10               When we talk about this, the bag, and  
11              you'll hear it in Sergeant Suess' presentation,  
12              he makes a specific comment to law enforcement  
13              that he knew the bag Cruz was carrying was a  
14              rifle bag, he refers to it as a rifle bag just  
15              minutes after the incident. And with that in  
16              mind, he did not call a code red at this time.

17              MR. SCHACHTER: Did -- wow, that's --  
18              that's shocking, because I had thought that in  
19              his testimony he said he didn't realize that.  
20              Did we look at testimony -- did he give the  
21              School Board a written statement?

22              DET. BONASORO: Yeah, we looked into that.  
23              He did not.

24              MR. SCHACHTER: Because it was -- it was  
25              told to me by the superintendent and school

1 board members that Medina's statement to them  
2 was contrary to what he gave to BSO.

3 DET. BONASORO: He was interviewed several  
4 times by law enforcement. I don't know about  
5 the school board personnel.

6 CHAIR: But you'll hear it tomorrow, and  
7 you'll hear it in his own words. It's captured  
8 on a body cam video, and he tells a sergeant  
9 from Broward County Sheriff's Office that he  
10 saw Cruz carrying a rifle bag. So you'll hear  
11 it later today or tomorrow, it depends when  
12 Sergeant Seuss gets to it in his presentation.  
13 So there's no doubt that Medina knew what he  
14 was seeing was a rifle bag, and those are his  
15 own words, and what you just saw in that  
16 previous slide is the actual bag that he was  
17 carrying, and that's a rifle bag. It's not a  
18 pool cue bag. It's not a guitar case. It's a  
19 rifle bag, and he says that. So I mean that's  
20 what know, those are the facts, what he has  
21 said otherwise to others, you know, this is  
22 what came to, the words that came out of his  
23 own mouth.

24 MR. SCHACHTER: When we asked the district  
25 why they didn't fire him initially they said

1           they didn't have evidence to support that.

2           CHAIR:   They -- they didn't.   This  
3           district still doesn't have -- this is being  
4           told for the first time, because the district  
5           doesn't have that body cam footage.   They don't  
6           -- the district doesn't know yet what we know,  
7           and they're hearing it now.   Senator Book.

8           SEN. BOOK:   Thank you.   And this is a  
9           question for Commissioner Stewart, and we kind  
10          of were looking at each other and talking about  
11          this issue.   They may not have known that then,  
12          or now, but they did know that Medina was  
13          sexually harassing students, and I mean a  
14          complaint was filed, and I think this goes to  
15          something that's a policy piece that's really  
16          important to address that I've been working on  
17          with the commissioner, and has been very  
18          difficult to move forward.

19          And can you just talk, Commissioner, if  
20          you don't mind, Mr. Chair, through you, a  
21          little bit about kind of how we can like fix  
22          some of what this is.

23          COMM. STEWART:   So currently the  
24          Department only has jurisdiction over  
25          individuals that hold and educator certificate.

1 Those individuals that are non-instructional  
2 for the most part do not hold an educator's  
3 certificate. We do have some paraprofessionals  
4 who by nature of their career path do hold a  
5 certificate. We also have some, and this is  
6 public information, Medina happened to have an  
7 athletic coaching certificate. He doesn't have  
8 an educator's certificate, but it, because he  
9 has a coaching certificate it does put him in  
10 the realm of jurisdiction under the Department  
11 of Education.

12 For me to say anything more specifically  
13 about Medina I would have to say I can neither  
14 confirm nor deny.

15 SEN. BOOK: But --

16 COMM. STEWART: But I think surrounding  
17 your question, if there were something to be  
18 put into statute surrounding employees I think  
19 that could in fact be extremely helpful, not  
20 just with this kind of a situation but for many  
21 others. They do have to undergo background  
22 screening, and their hiring policies would have  
23 to take into consideration any background  
24 screening, but that's the level of  
25 jurisdiction.

1           MR. SCHACHTER: Chair, I think the  
2           commission needs to also understand that Medina  
3           sexually harassed, sexually harassed Meadow  
4           Pollack, and that case was brought in front of  
5           the School Board. There was a, you know, maybe  
6           one of the other commissioners know, there was  
7           a person at the district that overrode the  
8           recommendation to get rid of Medina. He  
9           overrode that, and then Medina ended up back on  
10          campus.

11          CHAIR: Go ahead.

12          DET. BONASORO: All right. So Medina  
13          radios Taylor again that the suspicious kid was  
14          heading towards the east entrance of Building  
15          12. While walking to Building 12, you can see  
16          this dot here, there's a bicycle rack somewhere  
17          right in there where that dot is, Medina says  
18          at that point, Cruz is by the bike rack, looks  
19          at Medina and according to Medina, he goes I  
20          recognized him as a former student. Sheriff.

21          SHER. JUDD: Before we get too far away  
22          from it, did the Uber driver know that Cruz had  
23          a rifle with him?

24          DET. BONASORO: No.

25          SHER. JUDD: He didn't recognize the case

1 as a rifle case, or -- where did he pick it up  
2 at?

3 DET. BONASORO: He thought it was some,  
4 some sort of musical instrument.

5 CHAIR: Yeah, she -- she -- it was a  
6 female Uber driver, didn't speak English very  
7 well, hard to communicate, and Cruz told her  
8 that he was en route to the school for some  
9 type of a band practice or something, and  
10 indicated it was guitar case. So she really  
11 didn't know much, and he told her things that  
12 indicated it was other than what it was.

13 DET. BONASORO: So it was at this time  
14 Medina sees Cruz and recognizes him, but at  
15 that point he didn't recall his name. He said  
16 I recognized him but I didn't recall his name.  
17 He says once the two made eye contact Cruz  
18 began to pick up his pace, moving towards  
19 Building 12 with a purpose. Medina then stops  
20 his cart, his golf cart at the northeast corner  
21 of the administration building, and watches  
22 Cruz enter Building 12. The northeast corner  
23 of the admin building is going to be -- he was  
24 right in about that area here, right on the tip  
25 of that corner. It's at that --

1 MR. SCHACHTER: Are we -- I'm sorry.

2 DET. BONASORO: Go ahead.

3 MR. SCHACHTER: Are we going to get into  
4 why Cruz did not, why Medina did not call a  
5 code red later?

6 DET. BONASORO: Yeah, we'll get into it in  
7 - -

8 MR. SCHACHTER: Yes, okay.

9 DET. BONASORO: So Medina is sitting there  
10 in his golf cart. He sits there for  
11 approximately seventeen seconds, and then he  
12 decides to again move towards Building 12 in  
13 his golf cart. At this point, that's when he  
14 hears the first rounds being shot within  
15 Building 12.

16 CHAIR: Commissioner Dodd.

17 MR. DODD: Just so that I'm clear, when  
18 Medina radioed that there was a suspicious kid  
19 that radio was on, on the school radio.

20 DET. BONASORO: Yes.

21 MR. DODD: That's not recorded.

22 DET. BONASORO: Correct.

23 MR. DODD: Do we know if he used any  
24 description? Did he say that he was carrying a  
25 rifle case? Did he radio anything that gave

1 more than a suspicious kid?

2 SGT. SUESS: No, sir. He referenced there  
3 was a suspicious kid, I believe with a  
4 backpack, but no reference to a rifle bag.

5 MR. DODD: Okay.

6 CHAIR: Sheriff Judd.

7 SHER. JUDD: Would Peterson have heard  
8 that communication?

9 DET. BONASORO: Excuse me?

10 SHER. JUDD: Would Peterson have heard  
11 that communication?

12 DET. BONASORO: He could have, yes.

13 CHAIR: He had the school radio, right?

14 DET. BONASORO: He had the school radio.

15 SHER. JUDD: He should have had the school  
16 radio, and should have heard that  
17 communication.

18 DET. BONASORO: Yes.

19 CHAIR: But another thing we heard common,  
20 and you can touch, you want to touch on that,  
21 Wally, just briefly is, is that, and from the  
22 interviews, and of course we haven't  
23 interviewed Peterson, but it was not uncommon  
24 for people to turn the radios off.

25 SHER. JUDD: That's a weakness.

1           DET. BONASORO: So after hearing the first  
2 rounds being fired inside of Building 12  
3 Medina, Medina gets on the school radio again  
4 and advises suspicious noises were coming from  
5 inside Building 12. Again he does not call a  
6 code red at this time.

7           CHAIR: Remember what I said yesterday too  
8 is, so Medina says, is that he is understanding  
9 that in order to call a code red he either had  
10 to see a gun or he had to hear gunshots. So he  
11 sees the gun bag and he doesn't call it, but he  
12 says that he hears gunshots, and so even  
13 hearing gunshots he still didn't call it. And  
14 that's an important point. So even by his own  
15 statements when he heard the shots then even  
16 what he says was his understanding about the  
17 authority to call a code red he nonetheless  
18 didn't do it, so just - - Commissioner.

19          COMM. STEWART: I'm not sure if this is a  
20 question or a statement, but it seems to me  
21 that if in fact they are just observers and  
22 reporters what was the point in letting Taylor  
23 know that this suspicious kid was coming in if  
24 all Taylor would then be able to do is to  
25 observe and report. And in addition to that I

1 really still cannot understand if he recognized  
2 Cruz why he would not have radioed to Taylor to  
3 say, oh, it's Cruz, because all of the security  
4 monitors would have known Cruz.

5 DET. BONASORO: I agree. And observe and  
6 report is not what they do. The reality is  
7 they, they encounter kids, and contact kids on  
8 a daily basis. So after hearing the shots  
9 Medina turns his golf cart back south, and  
10 states that he's going to find other help. He  
11 meets up with Deputy Peterson and Security  
12 Specialist Greenleaf outside of the  
13 administration building, and then transports  
14 Peterson and Greenleaf on the golf cart back to  
15 Building 12.

16 Medina stated that when he was within just  
17 feet of the east doors of Building 12, he drops  
18 off Peterson there, and that's when he hears  
19 additional noises and realizes that the noises  
20 he's hearing is gun, gunfire coming from within  
21 the building. He stated that he believed he  
22 could not call a code red unless he physically  
23 saw the gun or heard gunshots. Despite hearing  
24 the gunshots he still didn't call the code red.  
25 Medina admitted that he did not approach Cruz

1           because he thought Cruz may have had a handgun  
2           that was readily accessible to him.

3           Yes, sir.

4           MR. SCHACHTER: But on the BSO video when  
5           they interviewed him he said I didn't want to  
6           be the guy to call the code red, right?

7           DET. BONASORO: Okay, yes. He then states  
8           that after hearing the gunshots he did not call  
9           a code red because he was focused on getting  
10          more help. Medina advised that the first  
11          person he heard call a code red was campus  
12          monitor Elliot Bonner, and that wasn't, it was  
13          over three minutes after Cruz had begun  
14          shooting, and after Cruz had already shot  
15          and/or killed twenty-four people on the first  
16          floor.

17          MR. SCHACHTER: Detective, could it have  
18          been, and did you ask if Medina had called  
19          Taylor on his cell phone?

20          DET. BONASORO: He did not.

21          MR. SCHACHTER: He did not. He used the  
22          campus radio.

23          DET. BONASORO: Yes.

24          SEN. BOOK: Is there -- is there any type  
25          of protocol around when Medina makes that first

1 call saying I see a suspicious kind on campus  
2 to when he then goes and gets additional help,  
3 is there any kind of protocol around the time  
4 lapse in between there, if, if I make a call,  
5 and I'm Medina, and I say I see a suspicious  
6 kid on campus, how much time should elapse  
7 before I get a response, before I get people  
8 coming to me to assist?

9 DET. BONASORO: No, there's not. And  
10 again there was no policy written regarding the  
11 campus monitor, so what they had to go by was  
12 instruction from their boss, the APs, or the  
13 job responsibilities. And again, one of those  
14 job responsibilities was to encounter and  
15 identify people on campus that weren't supposed  
16 to be there. They did that on a daily basis,  
17 so no, there was no protocol.

18 CHAIR: Secretary Senior.

19 SEC. SENIOR: Medina went and got  
20 Peterson. Did Peterson have access to a school  
21 radio?

22 DET. BONASORO: He did.

23 SEC. SENIOR: He didn't call a code red.

24 DET. BONASORO: He did not.

25 CHAIR: Sheriff Judd.

1           SHER. JUDD: Obviously there should have  
2           been policies, and practices, and procedures,  
3           but the reality of it is anyone with an IQ of  
4           40 who recognizes a troubled kid who shows up  
5           on the campus with a gun bag cdl have called a  
6           code red. He didn't have to have any training  
7           to figure that out. And -- and there is the  
8           issue. I mean certainly there should have been  
9           protocols, and training, and procedures, but  
10          what does it take to figure out there's a kid  
11          that I know that's been a problem that's here  
12          with a gun bag, and nobody calls a code red, no  
13          one. I mean I don't know how you fix that.

14          CHAIR: Well, it's a culture problem.

15          SHER. JUDD: Absolutely.

16          CHAIR: You know, I mean even remember,  
17          again, we need to get through this, but  
18          remember even, even after Chris McKenna was in  
19          the stairwell and saw Cruz loading the gun,  
20          Cruz says get out of here because things are  
21          going to go bad, where does he go, he goes and  
22          gets Aaron Feis, who is unlocking a gate up  
23          there by Holmberg Road, Feis drops him off at  
24          the 13 Building, and then Feis goes in to  
25          confront the shooter and, you know, but even

1 Aaron Feis never called a code red knowing what  
2 McKenna had just told him.

3 What -- remember it's not until three  
4 minutes and sixteen seconds that Elliot Bonner  
5 called the code red. So you had Medina that  
6 didn't call it, you had Taylor that didn't call  
7 it, you had Feis that didn't call it, and you  
8 had anybody who happened to have the radio on  
9 that heard any of the communications between  
10 Medina and Taylor, nobody called it until  
11 Bonner called it at three minutes and sixteen  
12 seconds into it, which is, you know, well into  
13 the shooting. Yeah.

14 MR. SCHACHTER: Since we're talking about  
15 code red, did you interview former Secret  
16 Service Officer Steve Wexler?

17 CHAIR: Yeah, I think you'll hear --  
18 you'll hear the results of his interview in  
19 this, in this presentation, or in Sergeant  
20 Suess' presentation. It's in Sergeant Suess',  
21 so the answer is yes, and you'll hear the  
22 results of that. Go ahead, Wally.

23 DET. BONASORO: And lastly, Medina stated  
24 that he did not observe any, any of Deputy  
25 Peterson's actions, or inactions. I just put

1           this in here. This is the job description.  
2           Again, there's no policy or procedure for the  
3           security specialists in place at the district  
4           at the time. This is the job description of  
5           the security specialist. Calvin Greenleaf is a  
6           security specialist at MSD, and prior to that  
7           he was there for ten, ten years.

8           MR. SCHACHTER: Who was head of security  
9           at the school? Detective, who was head of  
10          security?

11          DET. BONASORO: It would be Calvin  
12          Greenleaf.

13          MR. SCHACHTER: It would be Greenleaf.

14          DET. BONASORO: Yes.

15          MR. SCHACHTER: Is he still the same, in  
16          the same position currently?

17          DET. BONASORO: Yes. So the district does  
18          have an emergency code, color coded flip chart,  
19          and we'll just go through the different color  
20          codes. This -- these charts are in every  
21          single classroom, and this is what the chart  
22          looks like. This is the chart. It's now  
23          hanging on the, on the lanyards of the staff  
24          members, and also in the classrooms, so --

25          The first code is, is red. No movement,

1       imminent danger. There's a threat or incident  
2       to the facility, when the best course of action  
3       is to keep everyone in place, and included the  
4       safe team. An example would be a drive by  
5       shooting, outside disruption, or terrorist  
6       threat.

7               Now, what's written on these slides is  
8       verbatim from their, their chart from the  
9       district.

10              The yellow is limited movement. It's a  
11       threat or an incident to the facility when the  
12       best course of action is to keep everybody in  
13       place, but requires the safe team or other, or  
14       others depending on the nature of the situation  
15       to react. IE would be, an example would be a  
16       neighborhood incident, or at the police  
17       direction.

18              Code brown is to shelter in place,  
19       evacuate, or lockdown. It's a threat or  
20       incident to the facility when the best course  
21       of action is to implement a shelter in place,  
22       lock down, or evacuation. Procedures depend on  
23       nature of the school emergency, chemical, toxin  
24       release, or an explosion.

25              The blue is a medical emergency. That

1 states when the best course of action is to  
2 notify the safe team of a medical emergency.

3 Black would be a bomb threat, which would  
4 require the evacuation of the facility.

5 Orange would be another evacuation when  
6 the situation warrants beyond previous codes.  
7 And no examples were provided for that.

8 And the color code of green would be the  
9 all clear. And that is the chart.

10 I'll touch a little bit about the safe  
11 team. Each school is required to have a safe  
12 team. The team is comprised of the  
13 principal, assistant principal, assistant  
14 principals, security specialists, campus  
15 monitors, the facility maintenance staff, the  
16 SRO, and teacher representative. The team  
17 usually met after a code drill to debrief and  
18 discuss school safety concerns. In previous  
19 years the safe team met limitedly. The safe  
20 team now meets at least once a month.

21 So we're talking about drills. This slide  
22 indicates the '17/'18 school year. Keep in  
23 mind that the first day of school was August  
24 21, 2017, and all these dates and times are  
25 fire drills, so a fire drill was conducted

1 three days after the first day of school, and  
2 then again every month, and on that day, 2/14.

3 MR. SCHACHTER: Detective, we've heard  
4 that there was an announcement there was going  
5 to be a drill that morning, or there was one.  
6 Have you heard anything to that affect?

7 DET. BONASORO: There was a fire drill?

8 MR. SCHACHTER: Yeah.

9 DET. BONASORO: Yeah, right here, 2/14, it  
10 was early in the a.m. Now, this is the  
11 printout from the district on the next slide.  
12 It doesn't indicate on here, I guess at the  
13 time we requested the information they hadn't  
14 captured it yet, however there was a drill on  
15 2/14 in the morning, a fire drill.

16 MR. SCHACHTER: Because they're -- because  
17 staff, at least what we have heard, and you  
18 tell me if this is correct, that they were  
19 anticipating to have another fire drill later  
20 on in the afternoon, so a lot of teaches, when  
21 they heard this they thought it was just a  
22 drill and did not react. Have you heard that  
23 in interviews?

24 DET. BONASORO: No, that's incorrect.  
25 They were not anticipating another fire drill.

1       Where the -- where I think that statement came  
2       from was on the January 11th training with Al  
3       Butler they talked about lock down procedures,  
4       code red, so at some point some of the teachers  
5       indicated that they were anticipating a code  
6       red drill to follow that training, but not on  
7       that day.

8               CHAIR:   There was a rumor floating around  
9       about a code red drill, and you'll hear that in  
10      some of the interviews with Mr. Rospierski and  
11      some others later, because there was a rumor  
12      about that.   That's where you're getting that  
13      from.

14             DET. BONASORO:   All right, moving forward  
15      with the drills, there was a tornado drill  
16      conducted on August 19, 2017, eight days after  
17      school started.   Code red drills for the  
18      2017/2018 school year, zero, none.   Interviews  
19      were conducted with multiple staff, to include  
20      teachers, administrative staff, campus  
21      monitors, and maintenance.   It was the general  
22      consensus that the staff did not have a clear  
23      understanding as to who could call a code red  
24      prior to the January 11th training with Al  
25      Butler.

1 MR. SCHACHTER: Did you ask the  
2 administration why they didn't have any code  
3 red drills?

4 DET. BONASORO: We asked them if they had  
5 any code red drills, and they said no. And  
6 their response was they were planning to have  
7 one.

8 UNDER SHER. HARPRING: This may come up  
9 later, but in the slide at least it references  
10 that the, that the code red drill, they didn't  
11 have an understanding prior to the January 11th  
12 meeting. Was there some different  
13 understanding --

14 CHAIR: He's -- he's getting there, Jim.

15 DET. BONASORO: It'll come up, yeah.

16 CHAIR: He's going to get there.

17 DET. BONASORO: Then any kind of other  
18 drill they did not have. I just want to add  
19 that during the interviews with the teachers we  
20 did inquire as to when, when was the last time  
21 you had a code red drill, and a lot of the  
22 teachers stated that they couldn't remember the  
23 last time that they ahead a code red drill.

24 CHAIR: Secretary Kapusta, go ahead.

25 SEC. KAPUSTA: I understand they didn't

1 have a code red drill, but I thought I  
2 understood you to say that they had meetings on  
3 a regular basis with the safety team?

4 DET. BONASORO: Yeah, the safe team. They  
5 did not up until this year. Each team -- each  
6 school is required to have a safe team, which  
7 was comprised of the members that I talked  
8 about, however prior to this year they didn't  
9 meet a lot.

10 SEC. KAPUSTA: Did they -- do you know  
11 what they discussed during the course of those  
12 meetings?

13 DET. BONASORO: Generically school safety.  
14 They would get together briefly and just  
15 discuss different topics about school safety.  
16 They said they would debrief on, for example,  
17 the fire drill, you know, what went good, what  
18 went bad, what could they do better, stuff like  
19 that.

20 SEC. KAPUSTA: Did they have an emergency  
21 preparedness plan that covered each of these  
22 different codes?

23 DET. BONASORO: We'll get into that in  
24 just a couple of slides, yes.

25 SEC. KAPUSTA: Okay, thank you.

1           DET. BONASORO: After the training with Al  
2 Butler on January 11th teaches were still  
3 unsure as to the correct procedure required to  
4 call a code red. Some of the teachers said  
5 that they could use the PA to contact the front  
6 office, but they also said they didn't want to  
7 risk roaming about the classroom trying to get  
8 to the, to the button on the PA. Some of the  
9 teachers said that they would, they could use  
10 their cell phone to call the front office or  
11 911 if they, if they needed to call a code red,  
12 and they could also use the landline phone to  
13 make call. Again they said they're, they're  
14 roaming around the classroom to try to get to  
15 the landline phone.

16           Although it was verbally communicated to  
17 the teachers that anyone could call a code red  
18 the procedure was still unclear.

19           MR. SCHACHTER: And was there any  
20 corroboration, you know, talk about culture,  
21 Medina talked about it, that he didn't want to  
22 be the guy to call the code red. That's what  
23 he said in the BSO interview. Was there any  
24 confirmation amongst the teachers and other  
25 administration that that was the same culture?

1 DET. BONASORO: No, they were just  
2 confused as to how they could, or if they  
3 could.

4 MR. SCHACHTER: It's just -- it's just,  
5 you know -- obviously nobody called a code red,  
6 you know, Medina, Taylor, nobody, so it just  
7 leads me to believe that there's more -- it's  
8 not just confusion that MSD staff and admin  
9 told them you better not call a code red unless  
10 you see it or, you know, something.

11 DET. BONASORO: Yeah, possibly. So  
12 according to the district it did not, and still  
13 does not, have any written code red or similar  
14 lockdown policies. Specifically there is no  
15 written policy regarding who may direct an  
16 immediate campus lockdown. And this is the  
17 emergency preparedness manual --

18 CHAIR: So, Wally, just for context again  
19 because, is that in some of the recent  
20 interviews, and some of the interviews have  
21 been done in the last few weeks, correct?

22 DET. BONASORO: Yes.

23 CHAIR: And even in the last few weeks  
24 there's still confusion among the staff about  
25 the code red, who can call it, what to do, and

1           that still exists today, correct?

2           DET. BONASORO: It does. And that's the  
3           climate. We asked -- they all agreed that they  
4           were told they can call a code red, but when we  
5           follow it up and say, well, how do you do that,  
6           they shrug their shoulders and say we have no  
7           idea.

8           CHAIR: Sheriff Ashley.

9           SHER. ASHLEY: Since there's no written  
10          policy regarding who may direct an immediate  
11          campus lockdown who, who -- I'm sure they've  
12          had campus lockdowns. Who calls them?

13          DET. BONASORO: It usually came from the  
14          administration, the assistant principals, or  
15          the principal.

16          CHAIR: See somebody would have to because  
17          of the limited radios, how it worked there is,  
18          is that say a teacher picked up the phone, and  
19          saw something, a teacher picked up the phone  
20          because that teacher didn't have a radio, the  
21          teacher picked up the phone in the classroom,  
22          called the office, said code red, then they'd  
23          have to get an AP or the principal, then they'd  
24          have to go to the PA system and announce the  
25          code red, or maybe get it over the radio to

1 some people that had radios. And if they had  
2 the radios on, because again in a number of  
3 interviews it was not uncommon if the radios  
4 were turned down, or turned off.

5 But even if they -- then you get to the  
6 point where even if they announced it over the  
7 PA system, is that unless you're in a classroom  
8 you're not going to hear it, so, because  
9 there's no PA systems in the common areas or in  
10 the hallway, so you know, again there's a, a  
11 large problem with the lack of a system, and a  
12 notification system all the way around.

13 SHER. ASHLEY: Lack of communication  
14 system, or just lack of guidance in --

15 CHAIR: Lack of guidance, lack of a  
16 system, there's a lack of everything in it,  
17 because nobody, nobody knows what they can do,  
18 when they can do it, how to do it. And then  
19 even if somebody does trigger the process the  
20 process is not going to get the word out to  
21 everybody.

22 MR. SCHACHTER: You know, there's a lack  
23 of leadership, that's what there is.

24 SEC. KAPUSTA: Can I -- do we know --

25 CHAIR: Secretary Kapusta, go ahead.

1           SEC. KAPUSTA: Thank you. Do we know if  
2           this relevant just to MSD, or whether or not  
3           it's across the state?

4           CHAIR: No. No, they're -- these same  
5           problems exist in other places, and, you know,  
6           in my discussions with superintendents and  
7           school officials in other places, you know, the  
8           lack of these type of code red policies, and  
9           effective means of communicating them, this is  
10          not unique just to MSD, and it's not unique  
11          just to Broward County.

12          MR. SCHACHTER: How can they not have  
13          instituted this stuff nine months after this,  
14          this disaster; I just don't understand.

15          CHAIR: And they -- and they have, you  
16          know, and they have, and I've had this  
17          discussions, you know, the district is well  
18          aware we, you know, my position on this, the  
19          two big things are the hard corners and an  
20          effective code red policy, so.

21          MR. SCHACHTER: But they haven't done  
22          either.

23          CHAIR: Well, ask Superintendent Runcie,  
24          he'll be there Thursday. That's your  
25          opportunity to ask him the question.

1 MR. SCHACHTER: It's unbelievable.

2 SHER. JUDD: One last question, and you  
3 can probably answer it better. Is the coding,  
4 code red, code yellow, brown, blue, all these  
5 codes, is that statewide or just district wide?

6 CHAIR: Different people call it different  
7 things in different places, so code red is not  
8 a, code red is just what Broward uses. Other  
9 places may do it. Some people call it lock  
10 down. Some people call it -- everybody's got a  
11 name for it. There's no standardization. And  
12 there's -- if you read all the literature, and  
13 you read articles, and you read -- people have  
14 different views of it, about whether it should  
15 be plain language, and whether it should even  
16 be called a code red, and so there's no, the  
17 answer to your question is there's no  
18 consistency on it, and there's no mandate as to  
19 what it's called.

20 MR. SCHACHTER: I would -- I would  
21 disagree with that. Most of the school  
22 security experts that I talk to say that they  
23 should not use codes, they should use plain  
24 language, because if you have someone that is  
25 new to the school, a substitute, you want them

1 to understand what's happening, and I think  
2 it's critical, and that should be one of our  
3 recommendations, Sheriff.

4 CHAIR: Everybody -- there are a lot of  
5 opinions out there on it, so you -- go ahead,  
6 Wally.

7 DET. BONASORO: I see, you did mention the  
8 emergency preparedness manual, and I indicated  
9 that here. The district does have an emergency  
10 preparedness manual. It's a hundred fifty-one  
11 page document that outlines various protocols  
12 for a wide range of emergencies, however in  
13 this hundred fifty-one page document nowhere is  
14 there active shooter protocol, active killer  
15 protocol, or code red protocol.

16 SEC. KAPUSTA: Is the manual reviewed by  
17 the district, or is it --

18 DET. BONASORO: It's a district manual put  
19 out by the district.

20 SEC. KAPUSTA: It's a district manual,  
21 thank you.

22 MR. SCHACHTER: In 7028 was there a  
23 mandatory requiring of that, no?

24 CHAIR: No.

25 MR. SCHACHTER: I think that should be one

1 of the recommendations, to force these  
2 districts, they have to do this. This is --  
3 it's got to be mandatory by the state. How  
4 could it not?

5 CHAIR: Go ahead.

6 DET. BONASORO: These next couple of  
7 slides -- I'm sorry?

8 CHAIR: No, go ahead.

9 DET. BONASORO: These next couple of  
10 slides are the table of contents just showing  
11 what actually is in the manual, and what's not  
12 in the manual. So if we skip over to the MSDHS  
13 Safety Plan, each school is required to have  
14 their own safety plan, and basically what this  
15 is is information about this specific school.  
16 It's a nineteen page document. We're not -- we  
17 won't go through all nineteen pages however.  
18 It covers generic information, chain of  
19 command, school hours, who, if they need, in  
20 need of CPR who is certified on campus, basic  
21 information like that.

22 However, if we go to this slide here, I  
23 don't know if you can see it real well, it  
24 indicate the list of dates that's required of  
25 staff development, and they indicate that they

1 had a lock down drill, a required lock down  
2 drill on January 11, 2018, which is incorrect.  
3 That's -- they did not have a drill on the  
4 11th. That was the training that Al Butler  
5 came and provided to the staff, so.

6 CHAIR: So what -- what did staff say in  
7 your interviews? And so, and Secretary Kapusta  
8 has asked you a couple times about the safety  
9 plan, and about the emergency preparedness  
10 manual, and what did staff say about their  
11 knowledge of the manual, and the safety plan,  
12 and whether they ever even knew it existed;  
13 what did staff tell you?

14 DET. BONASORO: The administrators knew  
15 that the emergency plan, the emergency  
16 preparedness manual was out there, and the  
17 safety plan was out there, however most if not  
18 all of the staff members had no idea what the  
19 emergency plan was or how to access it.

20 CHAIR: And it was online, correct?

21 DET. BONASORO: It is online, yes.

22 CHAIR: But most of them didn't even know  
23 it was there.

24 DET. BONASORO: No.

25 SEN. BOOK: Mr. Chair.

1 CHAIR: Senator Book.

2 SEN. BOOK: If it's okay to ask  
3 Commissioner Petty and Commissioner Schachter,  
4 here it says that parents are notified of  
5 lockdown procedures.

6 MR. SCHACHTER: Are what, notified what?

7 SEN. BOOK: Of lockdown procedures. Were  
8 you ever notified of lockdown procedures?

9 MR. SCHACHTER: I mean I might have gotten  
10 a text or an e-mail that there was a lockdown,  
11 but --

12 SEN. BOOK: No, this says in the safety  
13 plan that parents are informed of lockdown  
14 procedures.

15 MR. SCHACHTER: Maybe when, you know, Alex  
16 signed up for school it was in the student  
17 manual or something like that. I don't  
18 remember how --

19 MR. PETTY: I'm not sure.

20 CHAIR: Senator Book, go ahead.

21 SEN. BOOK: It's hard to read, sorry, but  
22 it does say that you were told, you were told,  
23 that you were apparently notified via  
24 newsletter and parent meetings. No.

25 CHAIR: That -- that's similar to what's

1       -- remember, and that's similar to, you know,  
2       getting into some of the stuff that's in the,  
3       in the confidential session, but remember some  
4       of, some of that same problem exists in what's  
5       in the FSSAT, so it's a similar problem.

6             DET. BONASORO: I went ahead and skipped  
7       forward a couple of slides. I'm going to start  
8       talking about Al Butler's training  
9       specifically. Emergency code training was  
10      conducted by Al Butler of the Special  
11      Investigations Unit. There was, again, the  
12      administrative staff was trained on the 15th of  
13      December 2017, and then he came back again on  
14      January 11, 2018 and conducted a similar  
15      training for teachers, maintenance staff, and  
16      support staff.

17            A PowerPoint of the codes that we just  
18      talked about, he went over that, and then a  
19      portion of the training was spent discussing  
20      the various color codes, and what to do in each  
21      instance.

22            MR. SCHACHTER: So, Detective, when the  
23      staff says that they had no idea what the  
24      emergency plan was but they did have training  
25      December 5th of 2017, and then January 11th,

1           how do you reconcile those two?

2           DET. BONASORO: I think we're talking  
3           about two different documents. The emergency  
4           preparedness manual they did not -- they were  
5           well aware of the color coded chart that we  
6           talked about.

7           MR. SCHACHTER: Okay. Okay.

8           DET. BONASORO: According to Butler he had  
9           an open discussion about code red protocols.  
10          Butler discussed keeping doors locked at all  
11          times, shutting off the lights, covering the  
12          door windows, moving the students to a hard  
13          corner of the classroom, and to stay quiet.  
14          Butler states that the, or stated that the  
15          discussion was very interactive, and many  
16          teachers did ask a lot of good questions during  
17          the training. Butler also indicated to me that  
18          he suggested marking the hard corner of the  
19          room, and after the training, and on February  
20          14th, only two of the thirty classrooms in  
21          Building 12 were marked denoting the hard  
22          corner.

23          MR. SCHACHTER: How many teachers were  
24          present at these trainings; do we have numbers?

25          DET. BONASORO: I believe it was a hundred

1           percent participation.

2           MR. SCHACHTER: Oh, really? Okay. And  
3           but there was no, nobody going around to make  
4           sure that this was completed, obviously, on a  
5           school wide level, and there was no policy on  
6           Butler, you know, instituting this as policy,  
7           right?

8           DET. BONASORO: No, sir, it was just a  
9           generic training. In the -- in the following  
10          slides here there is some follow up with the  
11          administration on trying to make sure that the  
12          teachers were following direction and locking  
13          their door, so we'll get into that in a minute.  
14          And again, the district has no policy on this,  
15          and it leaves it up to the teacher's  
16          discretion.

17          We attempted to interview a teacher,  
18          Marsha Cunningham. She declined the interview,  
19          but did voluntarily make the following  
20          statements. Two years prior to Butler's  
21          training she had been told to remove a piece of  
22          paper that covered her door window. After the  
23          Al Butler training she immediately replaced the  
24          paper on the door window, and also placed the  
25          tape on the ground denoting the chard corner.

1 UNDER SHER. HARPRING: Well, question.

2 DET. BONASORO: Yes.

3 UNDER SHER. HARPRING: Regarding your  
4 interview with her, you're an experienced  
5 detective, do you get that sense that she  
6 either just didn't want to be interviewed, or  
7 she felt that she could be subject to some  
8 retribution, or that she was concerned about  
9 ramifications of giving a false statement?

10 DET. BONASORO: Maybe -- maybe both. She  
11 was extremely emotional, but did want to, did  
12 make these statements, and she felt like she  
13 had to get that off her chest, and she wouldn't  
14 sit down for the interview. She came in, she  
15 made those statements, and then walked out  
16 extremely emotional.

17 CHAIR: So just for the Commissioner's  
18 benefit, is we had attempted to interview  
19 virtually every teacher, or every teacher in,  
20 that was in the 1200 Building that day, as well  
21 as some other teachers that were on campus, and  
22 a good number of them agreed to be interviewed,  
23 and you see the results of that here. Some of  
24 the teachers that were in the 1200 Building  
25 that day that were involved in this declined

1 the interview, but a good majority of them did  
2 agree to be interviewed.

3 The question came up about subpoenaing  
4 those teachers who didn't want to provide  
5 statements who were in the building that day,  
6 and I'm just telling you I made the decision  
7 I'm not going to subject that, subject them to  
8 that, and if the teachers didn't want to  
9 testify I made the decision not to subpoena  
10 them. If they were not involved, and had no  
11 emotional involvement, et cetera, that's a  
12 different story, but to me I wasn't going to do  
13 it.

14 So if anybody's got any concerns, that's  
15 my decision, I made that decision, because I  
16 wasn't going to drag those teachers in and  
17 force them to testify when they didn't want to  
18 because of the emotional situation they were  
19 in. So a good number of them did, but we did  
20 have some that wouldn't, and in the case of Ms.  
21 Cunningham she provided the statement and left,  
22 and the issue came up, and we did not subpoena  
23 her. But that's the reason why.

24 UNDER SHER. HARPRING: And, Sheriff, for  
25 my part I just, I support that. I believe that

1 was the appropriate call. I'm sure everyone is  
2 aware of the reasons that question is --

3 CHAIR: No, I know, I'm just telling you,  
4 just so you know.

5 UNDER SHER. HARPRING: Yeah, some  
6 articulable concern that some of the teachers  
7 might be concerned about, you know, retribution  
8 from the administration or the district based  
9 on, on what they have to say.

10 CHAIR: And -- and we have some that --  
11 you know, this is ongoing, and this is not the  
12 end of this by any stretch, and again the  
13 report in January is an interim report. We  
14 still have some people that have refused that  
15 we probably will issue some subpoenas to who  
16 weren't there that day, or weren't involved  
17 directly, and don't fall into that category  
18 where I think we should give them the  
19 deference. But the people who were in the  
20 building that day who were affected by this who  
21 emotionally are not ready to do this, then  
22 those are the ones I think that we should give  
23 them that deference, and not force them to come  
24 forward.

25 MR. SCHACHTER: In -- in -- I'm sorry.

1 CHAIR: Secretary Carroll, go ahead.

2 MR. CARROLL: Question. 12 -- Room 1212  
3 looks to be one of the rooms that have the tape  
4 on the floor. Were the kids in that -- were  
5 there kids in that room on the first floor when  
6 this was going on?

7 DET. BONASORO: Yes.

8 MR. CARROLL: And how did they fare in  
9 that room; were there any casualties in that  
10 room?

11 DET. BONASORO: Let me find out for you  
12 exactly.

13 MR. CARROLL: Because there's a line  
14 there, but you're right, because you've made  
15 continuous references that there's a lot of  
16 furniture there. It looks like the teacher's  
17 desk is behind the line.

18 DET. BONASORO: 1212, there was no  
19 injuries or casualties.

20 MR. SCHACHTER: Sheriff -- Chair --

21 CHAIR: Mr. Schachter, go ahead.

22 MR. SCHACHTER: How many teachers refused  
23 to be interviewed?

24 CHAIR: Off the top of my head I don't  
25 know. I've got that list some place in all of

1           this. I can get it to you, but --

2           MR. SCHACHTER: But I don't want them not  
3           to come forward with their testimony for fear  
4           of retribution. Isn't there some way that we  
5           could protect them, and make sure that -- it's  
6           vital that we get their testimony. There is a  
7           massive culture problem in this school we need  
8           to get the bottom of why --

9           CHAIR: Some of it -- some of it's not  
10          that. The information is, from a lot of them,  
11          from the discussions, and the discussions I had  
12          with the investigative team, it was more of an  
13          emotional thing for them, and, you know, I  
14          don't think that it is appropriate under these  
15          circumstances to force these teachers who don't  
16          want come forward -- they are -- they're all  
17          adults, they're all professionals, they can  
18          make their own decision, and if they are not  
19          prepared because of what they went through it's  
20          not right for us to drag them through the  
21          coals, and to force them to do it.

22          I'm not going to issue them a subpoena,  
23          and force legal process on them, and force them  
24          to do something they're not comfortable with  
25          unless there is some compelling reason, and I

1 don't see a compelling reason.

2 MR. SCHACHTER: No, of course I agree with  
3 you. I'm talking about if they're afraid of  
4 retribution, if that's the reason is there some  
5 way that we can protect them, because --

6 CHAIR: Nothing we can do. And again, I  
7 want to be clear that we don't have, you know,  
8 any specific statements that were made in this.  
9 Detective Bonasoro responded, he was asked a  
10 question as to his opinion and he gave his  
11 opinion, and I'm sure it's an accurate one, but  
12 we don't have anybody that I know of that came  
13 forward and said the only reason why I'm not  
14 going to provide information is, is I'm  
15 concerned of some retribution by somebody, or  
16 the district.

17 MR. SCHACHTER: No, of course.

18 CHAIR: There is no expressed statement  
19 made by somebody. Are you aware of anybody  
20 that said specifically for that reason only I'm  
21 not going to testify?

22 DET. BONASORO: No, sir.

23 MR. SCHACHTER: Of course, I mean they're  
24 probably not going to say that to you, but, you  
25 know, that is, that is a fear.

1 CHAIR: Right. So, Mr. Petty?

2 MR. PETTY: Just a question of  
3 clarification, Mr. Chair. When -- when  
4 somebody presents, or testifies, are they under  
5 oath when they talk to us as a commission,  
6 under what conditions are they under oath, or  
7 do they -- how does that work?

8 CHAIR: We haven't been -- we haven't been  
9 putting anybody under oath, but all the  
10 interviews are recorded, and a good number of  
11 them are transcribed, not all are transcribed.  
12 The investigators are there, and as far as the  
13 district personnel are concerned I don't know  
14 of any ones that were done where they weren't  
15 represented by counsel. They all have  
16 representation there, either through the union  
17 or otherwise, so it's a, I would say at least a  
18 quasi-formal setting where, again, they're  
19 represented, the investigators are there,  
20 there's more than one, usually two, and it's  
21 recorded and memorialized.

22 MR. PETTY: If you've issued a subpoena  
23 are those witnesses under oath then at that  
24 point?

25 CHAIR: No. We have made -- we made a

1 decision for a number of reasons not to put  
2 people under oath, and but, but again as a  
3 formal setting, but they are not, it's not  
4 sworn testimony.

5 DET. BONASORO: All right. These next few  
6 slides are going to depict some classroom  
7 images that we, we took, or that were taken.  
8 This first slide is of Classroom 1212 with the  
9 hard corner taped. You can see on the left  
10 side of the slide a little sliver, or wedge of  
11 the door, so the tape is in the appropriate  
12 location, however if you look beyond the tape  
13 what, what do we see there, it's cluttered with  
14 desks and, and other, other shelving. This is  
15 another angle of that classroom just depicting,  
16 yes, the hard corner is down, but are we going  
17 to fit thirty kids in that corner.

18 MR. SCHACHTER: Detective, were -- were  
19 the kids in this classroom able to get into  
20 that safe space? I think the answer -- I think  
21 Secretary Carroll asked were there --

22 DET. BONASORO: They -- they were.

23 MR. SCHACHTER: There were no casualties  
24 in this room.

25 DET. BONASORO: No casualties, no injuries

1 in that classroom.

2 MR. SCHACHTER: And all the students in  
3 this classroom were able to get behind that  
4 line?

5 DET. BONASORO: We don't know if they were  
6 all behind that line. We know there was no  
7 casualties or injuries in that room.

8 MR. CARROLL: Were shots fired into that  
9 room?

10 DET. BONASORO: Yes, if we go back, yes,  
11 there were. So this is 1229, the other room --

12 CHAIR: Hang on second. Senator Book, go  
13 ahead.

14 SEN. BOOK: I apologize. Just as a point  
15 to, to put it out there so we can readdress it  
16 at some point, if these are regular ed  
17 classrooms when we start thinking about, just  
18 for the recommendations, classrooms with, you  
19 know, ESE kid, or a special needs, medically  
20 vulnerable kids that may be in a school  
21 setting, I just think that we need to be like  
22 thoughtful about how, hard corners, yes, that  
23 there's lots of space, that there's a way to  
24 access what that is, because, you know, in a  
25 general ed classroom a little bit easier, but

1       like when you have some of those kids who have  
2       to be quiet, and have exceptionalities, it's  
3       more complicated.

4               CHAIR: It is. Well, and then go -- and  
5       you look at the next one, and the next one, you  
6       know, there's a line, and you can see the stuff  
7       in the hard corner is easily movable, where,  
8       you know, in 107, but in 106 you can't easily  
9       move, and some of that is anchored to the wall  
10      in there, with the bookshelves, and you've got  
11      the desks, and you've got other things. So,  
12      you know, it's one thing to have hard corners  
13      where they're not totally free all the time  
14      because you have to use space, but that you can  
15      easily move the stuff, and quickly move it,  
16      where, you know, even there you've got some  
17      bookshelves, but you've got a few desks, and  
18      all that stuff could be tossed, but, you know,  
19      in 106 you can't be moving that desk and all  
20      that other stuff.

21              And there are some that are even worse  
22      than this, I mean we're just showing you some.  
23      And you'll see some later today or tomorrow in  
24      some video of where they were full, the hard  
25      corners were full.

1 MR. SCHACHTER: Detective, when you go  
2 through this can you tell us, okay, there, you  
3 know, there are casualties, there weren't  
4 casualties, there were shots fired, I think  
5 that would help us on each one of these slides  
6 so we can get an idea.

7 DET. BONASORO: Yeah, no problem.

8 MR. SCHACHTER: Thank you.

9 DET. BONASORO: 1229, no injuries, no  
10 shots were fired into the classroom.

11 CHAIR: That is Slide 107, Classroom 1229.  
12 What's that?

13 MR. SCHACHTER: The window is out.

14 CHAIR: Oh, the window, so, okay, so --

15 DET. BONASORO: Law enforcement --

16 CHAIR: Okay, so -- yeah, law enforcement.  
17 So these photos are obviously taken afterward,  
18 and when law enforcement went in and cleared  
19 even windows that were, didn't have shots fired  
20 is, is that to gain entry to the classrooms law  
21 enforcement broke every window as they were  
22 going in. So that's why you see some of that,  
23 because again these are actual photos of the  
24 classrooms on that day, everything is as it  
25 was, but it's after the law enforcement

1 response.

2 MR. SCHACHTER: Can you just answer me,  
3 the -- when the murderer shot through the  
4 window all the windows were shot out, or how  
5 would --

6 CHAIR: Shot through a window.

7 MR. SCHACHTER: The glass is completely  
8 gone basically, he could have reached in and  
9 opened the door.

10 CHAIR: Yeah, and you've asked -- we've  
11 talked about that. He -- he could -- yes, and  
12 let's be clear, put this, is, yes, he could  
13 have reached in and opened any door that he  
14 wanted to. He did not. He did not go into one  
15 classroom, and we know that, so.

16 MR. SCHACHTER: Did he put the gun through  
17 the window?

18 CHAIR: No. Nope, he did not. He shot  
19 from outside, and there was no contact with,  
20 the barrel of the gun with any, the window, or  
21 he didn't get close to sticking it through the  
22 window, or anything like that. It was line of  
23 site.

24 COMM. SWEARINGEN: Now I'm confused.  
25 Could -- Chair, could the -- did the door lock

1 from the outside or the inside?

2 CHAIR: No -- all these doors at that time  
3 could only be locked from the outside, so you  
4 couldn't lock the doors from the inside. You  
5 could open it from the inside, so you could get  
6 out, but you couldn't lock -- so if the door --  
7 you know, the idea -- you know, the theory was  
8 -- I guess is, or was, that the door should be  
9 locked from the outside and the door should  
10 always be locked.

11 And if -- and if that theory held true  
12 then you would have a secure classroom because  
13 the door would never be propped open, it would  
14 never be left open, it would never be unlocked.  
15 But that theory only holds true that you don't  
16 need a locking mechanism on the inside if that  
17 policy is enforced and the door is always  
18 locked, and it's never left unattended, and  
19 it's never propped open.

20 And but in this situation once he shot  
21 through the window is that whether there's  
22 locking mechanism on the inside or the outside  
23 -- and the point of having a locking mechanism  
24 on the inside is in that situation, if it's not  
25 enforced, or through carelessness, or just

1 forgetfulness, or whatever that they didn't  
2 lock it from the outside, you could quickly  
3 lock it without having to reach out in the  
4 hallway with your key as rounds are buzzing by  
5 back and forth.

6 So that was the idea, that's the premise  
7 of, of having the ability to lock it from both  
8 sides. Go ahead.

9 DET. BONASORO: All right. This next  
10 slide is 1229 again, just showing different  
11 angles of it, and how the room was completely  
12 filled with desks. But the good point, a good  
13 point was, you know, putting something in the  
14 hard corner that would be able to be moved  
15 fairly easily.

16 CHAIR: And one other thing, and you look  
17 -- when you -- you know, these, these things --  
18 so the hard corner is, is that, with this  
19 teacher stuff, is it where it should be,  
20 because it should be on the opposite wall. I  
21 mean it's real easy. Go ahead.

22 DET. BONASORO: This next classroom, 1215,  
23 again there were students that were in the  
24 hallway that were shot, however it shows here,  
25 again the hard corner would be to the right of

1 the door, and it's, it's filled with the desks.  
2 And just to the left of the desks, I mentioned  
3 earlier in the presentation that some, some  
4 shelving was affixed to the wall. That is a  
5 huge cabinet that is actually mounted to that  
6 wall.

7 MR. SCHACHTER: Detective, were there any  
8 injuries, or shots fired into this room?

9 DET. BONASORO: I don't -- I don't  
10 believe --

11 CHAIR: Yeah, there were. And this is the  
12 one you heard yesterday in the 911 call where  
13 the teacher is on there, she's calling from  
14 this classroom, and she says there's rounds  
15 coming through the door.

16 MR. SCHACHTER: Any casualties or injuries  
17 in this room?

18 CHAIR: That I don't know.

19 DET. BONASORO: Out -- outside of the  
20 room.

21 MR. SCHACHTER: Were -- were they trying  
22 to get in?

23 DET. BONASORO: No, they were ambushed  
24 immediately.

25 Again another classroom, 1217 showing the

1       hard corner with the large cabinet mounted to  
2       the wall, and several furniture items in the  
3       hard corner. Nobody injured in this classroom.  
4       1234, came thing.

5               CHAIR: And look at 1234. Look at that  
6       one. That one is -- there's no -- there's no  
7       room for anybody in that hard corner. I mean  
8       some of the other ones you might be able to fit  
9       a few people, but there's literally no room in  
10      there. Go ahead, Sheriff.

11             SHER. JUDD: Is there any other exit out  
12      of these rooms?

13             DET. BONASORO: Excuse me?

14             SHER. JUDD: Is there any other exits out  
15      of these --

16             DET. BONASORO: No.

17             CHAIR: No.

18             COMM. SWEARINGEN: Mr. Chair, was 1234 the  
19      one that was by Peterson with the window?

20             DET. BONASORO: Yes.

21             CHAIR: Yes.

22             MR. SCHACHTER: What was the question, I  
23      didn't hear? The question was --

24             CHAIR: Go ahead and ask your question  
25      again, Commissioner.

1           COMM. SWEARINGEN: I asked if 1234 was the  
2           classroom that we saw the boards on that was  
3           directly above where Peterson was standing, and  
4           he said yes.

5           DET. BONASORO: Yes, it is.

6           CHAIR: Now, how the -- how the numbering  
7           system works there, so it's twelve, and you got  
8           to go to the third digit. Anything with a zero  
9           or a one is the first floor, anything with a  
10          two or a three is the second floor, anything  
11          with a four or a five is the third floor. Now,  
12          if you can follow that you're good. So but if  
13          you're looking at it, so you want to know which  
14          floor they're on, et cetera, is that's how the  
15          numbering system works.

16          SEN. BOOK: I was just wondering on the  
17          first floor could you, were there windows that  
18          they could like jump out of?

19          CHAIR: There were windows, and -- and I  
20          don't know. I don't know whether they, whether  
21          they could have, you know, pushed the windows  
22          out, and fled out through there or not, I don't  
23          know the answer to that. Wally, do you know?

24          DET. BONASORO: No, I think they're just  
25          fixed windows.

1 SEN. BOOK: Got it.

2 DET. BONASORO: Is there any more  
3 questions about the classroom setups before we  
4 move on?

5 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay, I'm -- I have a --  
6 let's see here. I'm sorry. I did have a  
7 question, as far as going back a little bit.  
8 How many campus monitors and security  
9 specialists were on campus?

10 DET. BONASORO: All of them, seven campus  
11 monitors and one security specialist.

12 MR. SCHACHTER: And how many gates were  
13 there?

14 DET. BONASORO: Gates?

15 MR. SCHACHTER: I mean just -- I'm just  
16 trying to get at -- the school said, or, you  
17 know, one of the people you interviewed said  
18 they didn't have enough people to monitor the  
19 gates. If they've got seven security monitors  
20 and one security specialist it seems like they  
21 have plenty of staff to monitor the gates.

22 DET. BONASORO: Well, there's three, three  
23 parking lot entrances.

24 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay.

25 DET. BONASORO: There was the entrance to

1 the front of the school, the administration  
2 building. And then you have one, two, three,  
3 four pedestrian gates at the front of the  
4 school, which would be the east side of the  
5 school. So three, three pedestrian, or three  
6 parking lot gates, four pedestrian gates.

7 MR. SCHACHTER: That's seven. They have  
8 seven security monitors. They have five APs.  
9 They have plenty of staff. Security was not a  
10 priority obviously.

11 DET. BONASORO: Multiple teachers advised  
12 that Butler's training in January of 2018 was  
13 useful because prior to that they did not have  
14 any code red training at all. Post training  
15 administrators and campus monitors found most  
16 of the teachers lock their classroom doors,  
17 however administrators and campus monitors did  
18 continue to find some doors around the campus  
19 that were left unlocked, and even propped open.  
20 In the event those doors were found the campus  
21 monitors and/or administrators would just poke  
22 their head in and tell the teacher to, remind  
23 them to keep their doors locked.

24 These next few slides is Al Butler's  
25 PowerPoint. Al Butler stated during his

1 interview that he did want to keep it simple,  
2 and this is what he provided to the teachers.  
3 You guys can scroll through it on your own.

4 CHAIR: Commissioner Dodd.

5 MR. DODD: And the reason that Al Butler  
6 was there in January, was that part of the  
7 district plan to have this course at all the  
8 high schools, or all the schools, or what,  
9 where were we at with that?

10 DET. BONASORO: The way Al Butler  
11 explained it was he had several high schools  
12 that he oversaw, and MSD was just on his list  
13 to conduct, he, he was going through the  
14 different schools conducting this training.

15 MR. DODD: The schools that he had under  
16 his --

17 DET. BONASORO: Yeah.

18 MR. DODD: Okay. So out of all the other  
19 schools in Broward County do we know if this  
20 training was similar, or was this offered to  
21 the other schools?

22 DET. BONASORO: This PowerPoint was  
23 offered to the schools that Al Butler oversaw.

24 MR. DODD: Were there other individuals  
25 like Al Butler doing this in other schools?

1 DET. BONASORO: Oh, yes, sir, there was  
2 several others. Yes.

3 MR. SCHACHTER: And Al Butler is part of  
4 the SIU, the Special Investigative Unit, and so  
5 there are I don't know how many SIU officers.  
6 The Broward County does not have a schools  
7 police department, this is their guys that  
8 investigate wrongdoing on the teachers.  
9 Miami-Dade County, Palm Beach County, has an  
10 individual school police department that, that  
11 does all that.

12 MR. DODD: So it was part of a district  
13 plan then to have this type course taught at  
14 all the schools.

15 DET. BONASORO: Yes.

16 MR. DODD: And was there a deadline on  
17 when that was supposed to have been met by?

18 DET. BONASORO: I don't know. As you can  
19 see the PowerPoint is, is very simple, it's  
20 very generic, however the teachers did say that  
21 they did learn a lot from it because they did  
22 not have any prior training.

23 SEC. KAPUSTA: Can you tell me who the  
24 school incident commander was at Marjory  
25 Stoneman Douglas?

1           DET. BONASORO: It was Denise Reed that  
2           day. The school incident commander is the  
3           principal of the school, and the principal was  
4           absent that day so Denise Reed, who is one of  
5           the assistant principals, was in command.

6           SEC. KAPUSTA: Had a walkie-talkie, a  
7           radio?

8           DET. BONASORO: Yes.

9           SEC. KAPUSTA: And so when Medina radioed  
10          the first time saying that there was a  
11          suspicious child on campus she would have  
12          theoretically been on that same channel, and  
13          gotten that same --

14          DET. BONASORO: Theoretically she may have  
15          heard it, she may have not have heard it. And  
16          again, we'll talk about, I do go into a little  
17          bit more detail about Denise Reed here in just  
18          a minute. Your welcome.

19          CHAIR: Commissioner Petty.

20          MR. PETTY: I just want to reconcile two  
21          things. So Al Butler was going around training  
22          on code reds, but there was no district policy,  
23          or there was nothing in the manual, the  
24          emergency manual, if I understood you  
25          correctly, about a code red or an active

1 shooter situation.

2 DET. BONASORO: That's correct. I asked  
3 him about it, and he said he came up with this,  
4 this is what they came up with to present to  
5 the schools.

6 MR. PETTY: Okay. So, okay, so lack of  
7 guidance or leadership at, at the upper levels,  
8 he took the initiative, solved the problem.  
9 And the outlines in his training here the  
10 incidents of, of attacks on school, on school  
11 property, November 2002, September -- in  
12 Broward County. September 2005, December 2005,  
13 2007, 2012, 2016, 2017, several incidents of  
14 guns on campus.

15 DET. BONASORO: Yes.

16 MR. PETTY: So he took an initiative and  
17 created this program?

18 DET. BONASORO: Whether he was directed to  
19 come up with the PowerPoint or took the  
20 initiative himself I don't know, but he did  
21 come up with that.

22 CHAIR: And if others were doing it, we  
23 don't know whether anybody else within SIU who  
24 may have been doing it, we don't know whether  
25 theirs was consistent with his. This is

1 something he put together himself, correct?

2 DET. BONASORO: Yes.

3 CHAIR: So this is something that Butler  
4 did himself. And again, you know, just you're  
5 correct, there is, there is no policy, there's  
6 nothing in any manual, so anything that he put  
7 together is what he put together, it's not  
8 driven from any written protocols, or anything  
9 that the district has espoused as to how things  
10 are going to be done. So he -- if you look at  
11 it, and you read it, it's more of a best  
12 practices training than, than anything else.

13 MR. SCHACHTER: Have you interviewed the  
14 Chief of SIU to, to verify that this is the  
15 case?

16 DET. BONASORO: No, we have not.

17 SEC. KAPUSTA: Can I ask another question?  
18 I'm sorry. Were the school incident  
19 commanders, were they trained on the incident  
20 command system, do you know, because that's a  
21 whole different protocol, and most are not  
22 familiar with it.

23 DET. BONASORO: Yeah, I don't know.

24 SEC. KAPUSTA: Is my guess.

25 DET. BONASORO: Yeah, I don't know if they

1           were.

2           CHAIR:   You're talking about NIMS?   No, I  
3           can tell you they weren't.

4           DET. BONASORO:   This next slide again is,  
5           is the door locks, and we just spoke a little  
6           bit about that.   The door locks at the time  
7           could only be locked from the outside using a  
8           key, so if the door was left unlocked  
9           essentially you would have to go outside, or  
10          open the door, reach around and insert the key  
11          to lock the door.   So from the in, from the  
12          inside you could just open the door.   There was  
13          no lock on the inside so you can -- the door  
14          could be locked and you could open it from the  
15          inside and go out, but once the door closes  
16          again it is, it is locked.

17          There was a couple of different ways to  
18          unlock that at the time.   If you -- if you  
19          inserted the key in there and just turned it a  
20          quarter of the way you could feel that the door  
21          would open, but then you could take out the key  
22          and the door would remain locked.   In order for  
23          the door to be unlocked completely there needed  
24          to be one complete revolution of that key to  
25          unlock the door, and essentially another

1 revolution to lock it.

2 CHAIR: So, Wally, let's do this. So  
3 we're going to get into some interviews now,  
4 and several interviews with Wexler, and Denise  
5 Reed, and others, so let's take a fifteen  
6 minute break, and then we'll come back, and  
7 then we'll wrap up your presentation.

8 (Thereupon, the meeting is in recess, and the  
9 proceedings continued as follows:)

10 CHAIR: I just ask everybody for the  
11 benefit of our court reporter, is that everyone  
12 please make sure that you're talking into the  
13 microphones, because it's difficult for her to  
14 capture everything unless we are doing that.  
15 So just a friendly reminder, and I know she'll  
16 appreciate it. Wally.

17 MR. SCHACHTER: Chair, can I ask a  
18 question before we get started?

19 CHAIR: Go ahead.

20 MR. SCHACHTER: It's been brought to my  
21 attention that other SIU detectives have gone  
22 and done these presentations at other schools  
23 in Broward County, so my question, it's obvious  
24 that this presentation on code red had never  
25 taken place at Marjory Stoneman Douglas, right?

1 CHAIR: Right.

2 MR. SCHACHTER: Do we have any idea why if  
3 it's happened at other schools in prior years,  
4 why?

5 DET. BONASORO: Do not know why.

6 MR. SCHACHTER: And there was no policy  
7 that it had to be done every year, you said.

8 DET. BONASORO: Correct.

9 SHER. ASHLEY: Probably sheer number of  
10 schools.

11 CHAIR: Well, yeah, they got two hundred  
12 thirty schools, but, you know, but again, you  
13 know, yes, so, you know, we beat that to death.  
14 There -- there is no policy so, you know, when  
15 you have no policy, you know --

16 MR. SCHACHTER: This happened in other  
17 schools. They do have code red trainings in  
18 other schools in other years.

19 CHAIR: Right, but there's no district  
20 wide policy.

21 MR. SCHACHTER: Right.

22 CHAIR: So when you don't have a district  
23 wide policy, you know, this is what you're  
24 going to end up. You're going to end up with  
25 differences, it's going to be ad hoc, and, and

1       it's going to be, and it gets back to what I  
2       said yesterday, which is what we all know the  
3       way the schools work, is it's largely  
4       decentralized, and so it's up to the individual  
5       principals, and it's not driven, you know, a  
6       lot of it is not driven at a district level.  
7       We see this repeatedly in themes in all these  
8       different topics that we cover, you know --

9               MR. SCHACHTER: But the -- the school  
10       district says safety and security is one of  
11       their top priorities, so how can you not have a  
12       code red policy?

13              CHAIR: Well, --

14              SHER. JUDD: The bottom line is day to day  
15       their primary mission is to teach students,  
16       and, and so -- and in their world what occurred  
17       at Marjory Stoneman Douglas, you know, is not  
18       present, you know, it's kind of like a fire  
19       drill. They do a fire drill because it says  
20       you got to do a fire drill. They don't wake up  
21       and think, gosh, there could be a fire today at  
22       the school and burn up a bunch of kids. And  
23       therein is the problem when you don't have  
24       systems, and processes, and procedures in place  
25       that take that into account, because every day

1       those teachers, and those administrators, are  
2       going in there trying to bring kids together to  
3       educate them, and that's their business. And  
4       all of this is an additional requirement, and  
5       to some of them they just see it as a, as a  
6       burden that's never going to occur.

7               Well, Bingo, it did occur, and, and  
8       horrible things happened, so that's why you've  
9       got to change as, as the Chairman has talked  
10      about you've got to have a systemic culture  
11      change, and recognize that safety and security  
12      matches exactly. Until they're safe and secure  
13      you can't teach them.

14             MR. SCHACHTER: If they don't come home  
15      every say nothing else matters.

16             SHER. JUDD: Nothing else matters.  
17      Nothing else matters.

18             CHAIR: And -- and I can tell you from  
19      discussions, you know, around the state with  
20      some superintendents, and with others, is that  
21      the needle is moving. The question is, is it  
22      moving, is it moving far enough, fast enough,  
23      and will it be sustained. And, you know,  
24      that's part of the challenge I think that we  
25      all have, is to ensure that it moves, and that

1       it moves far enough, and this isn't a one and  
2       done, and this is a sustained, and what that  
3       means is a culture change, and that there has  
4       to be an emphasis on this, and not seen as a  
5       perfunctory function, not seen as a check the  
6       box, not seen as a, ugh, do I really have to do  
7       this, and that they find that it is necessary  
8       and meaningful, and that's where we need to  
9       help them get to that point.

10       MR. SCHACHTER: Sheriff, how can you  
11       explain to me that after 911 we made the  
12       airports and the cockpits safe, after Oklahoma  
13       City we, we made the federal building safe --  
14       It's been twenty years since Columbine. This  
15       is not like this just started. Why are schools  
16       still not taking school safety and security as  
17       their number one priority?

18       CHAIR: Well, some have, and you see I,  
19       you know, you can, you know that, you can look  
20       at Colorado, you can look at Connecticut, you  
21       can look at the places where these tragedies  
22       have happened and, and they have moved the  
23       needle exponentially. And it gets back to what  
24       Sheriff Judd said, you know, in some places, it  
25       hasn't affected us, so if it hasn't affected

1       us, well, that happens in other places, that  
2       doesn't happen here, and, you know, we got our  
3       challenges, we need to teach the kids, we've  
4       got only so many hours in the day, we need to  
5       teach, we got tests, we got standardized tests  
6       we need to worry about, you know, all those  
7       other things, and so, you know, this did not  
8       rise to the level of being the number one.

9               MR. SCHACHTER: Even after seventeen  
10       people were killed.

11              CHAIR: Well, no, and I don't think that's  
12       true. I think it has. I think it has  
13       resonated, and I think that there's an effort  
14       being made, and like I said the question is, is  
15       that is it widespread enough, is it fast  
16       enough, and is it moving the needle far enough,  
17       and will it be sustained. There are definite  
18       -- it's definitely got the attention of the  
19       district, of the superintendents, of the  
20       administrators, but again is it everybody, and  
21       is it fair enough, you know, and -- and you  
22       also have to give them some opportunity to make  
23       that culture change, and to implement this some  
24       of this in a, in a way.

25              I don't think it's something that you

1       should just knee jerk it, and heave ho, let's  
2       just do a lot of things for doing a lot of  
3       things. It needs to be in -- and I go back to  
4       it, and I said this a thousand times, so I'll  
5       say it for the thousand and first time, is  
6       focus on the basics. There's a lot, a lot of  
7       room here to do things that are the basics  
8       before we get into the more advanced things, so  
9       the basics, what are the basics.

10           And you raised one of them, is one of the  
11       basics is, and this isn't hard, is that when  
12       you have locked gates, and you open those  
13       gates, those gates shouldn't be open unless  
14       there's somebody standing by the gate, have  
15       staffed gates. Do you have the personnel to do  
16       it? If there's a will there's a way, there's  
17       enough bodies there, then you can have a policy  
18       that says that when we open up pedestrian gates  
19       they'll only be open during the narrowest of  
20       periods that are necessary for operational  
21       reasons, and that that gate will never be  
22       unattended.

23           And when we have doors in buildings  
24       they're going to be locked, if they're open for  
25       ingress/egress they're going to be staffed. Do

1       you have enough people there that can do that;  
2       I venture that if you wanted to do it you could  
3       do it. Having a policy that says classroom  
4       doors shall be locked, period, end of story,  
5       and if somebody doesn't lock their classroom  
6       door that means accountability, that means  
7       consequences, that means we're serious about  
8       it, and it means you keep your classroom doors  
9       locked, because one of the safest places for  
10      the kids would be hunkered down in those  
11      classrooms when it is announced.

12             Another thing, it doesn't cost you  
13      anything, are the hard corners that I've beaten  
14      to death, but I feel strongly about them, so  
15      there's a lot of things along those lines that  
16      can be implemented that don't cost a dime that  
17      the districts across the state are not there  
18      on, and that's what the focus needs to be, and  
19      the emphasis needs to be on, and the immediacy  
20      needs to be there for.

21             MR. SCHACHTER: When did you have that  
22      conversation with Superintendent Runcie  
23      recommending that he do that, as also with  
24      instituting the code red policy?

25             CHAIR: You know, I can't tell you. And

1 I've had a lot of conversations with him, with  
2 staff down there, you know, they, and we've had  
3 these discussions. You know, I think that they  
4 are, they're trying, and they're doing certain  
5 things, and trying to implement certain things,  
6 but there's been a number of conversations over  
7 a period of time about this.

8 MR. SCHACHTER: It takes zero dollars to,  
9 to do that. Now, I know because of my  
10 insistence Marjory Stoneman Douglas I think has  
11 met with all the teachers. They had law  
12 enforcement come in and mark out in each  
13 classroom where the safe zones are, but it  
14 needs to be done district wide.

15 CHAIR: There you go. Wally, go ahead.

16 DET. BONASORO: Sheriff, thank you. On  
17 the on -- at the onset of this there was a lot  
18 of questions brought up about Steven Wexler,  
19 and who he was, what he did, so these next  
20 couple of slides will hopefully clear that up  
21 for everybody. Steve Wexler is a retired  
22 Secret Service Agent. Over the past five years  
23 Wexler has served as a guest speaker to several  
24 of the social studies classes at the high  
25 school. According to Assistant Principal

1 Winifred Porter Wexler developed a positive  
2 rapport with students and staff over the years.

3 On 12/15/2017 Assistant Principal Porter  
4 arranged a meeting with Wexler to discuss  
5 campus security, and solicit feedback from  
6 Wexler. On 12/15/2017 Porter met with Wexler  
7 in the east parking lot of the school. Porter  
8 entered Wexler's vehicle, who subsequently  
9 drove into the south parking lot of the high  
10 school. The south lot is secured by a  
11 perimeter fence with two swinging gates  
12 allowing vehicle access into the lot. At the  
13 time the car drove through the, the gates, the  
14 gates were left unlocked and unattended.  
15 Wexler did point out that the gates should be  
16 locked at all times. Wexler also pointed out  
17 that someone could position themselves on the  
18 Sawgrass Expressway and open fire during an  
19 evacuation.

20 Wexler proceeded to make his way through  
21 the campus on foot. Wexler placed sticky paper  
22 on doors, denoting that each sticky represented  
23 a potential vulnerability. Porter stated to me  
24 that Wexler made the following recommendations.  
25 They talked about training. Train early, train

1 often to ensure personnel and students are  
2 familiar with the processes. Train substitutes  
3 when appropriate. He wanted the custodians to  
4 attend the safe team meetings, which they do.  
5 Teacher training to identify safe zones in  
6 their classrooms, and the students are trained  
7 by teachers of proper protocol.

8 He also recommended, make recommendations  
9 about the fire alarm, determine if the alarm is  
10 real or if it is was a decoy, check out the  
11 alarm prior to evacuating all buildings at  
12 once. And again, MSD did not have that system  
13 in place at the time. Porter stated though, it  
14 was determined there would be no changes to the  
15 evacuation procedures due to the expectations  
16 of existing district practices. In short that  
17 means the district says when the fire alarm  
18 goes off everybody is going to exit, so he was  
19 sticking to that.

20 Wexler made a recommendation to place a  
21 monitor in the front of the school. This is  
22 the east lot depicting the front of the campus.

23 CHAIR: And just to be clear, when you're  
24 talking about a monitor we're not talking about  
25 like a video monitor, we're talking about one

1 of the campus monitors.

2 DET. BONASORO: Campus monitors, yes.  
3 Yeah. Medina has been moved from his previous  
4 post to the front of the school to monitor  
5 students coming and going, as well as to  
6 monitor visitor traffic. He also suggested  
7 that the exterior gates remain locked. Some of  
8 the recommendations that were implemented,  
9 training on existing emergency codes, who could  
10 call a code red, reiterating it during the  
11 January 11th training with Al Butler. Walking  
12 exterior gates that were not being staffed when  
13 open. Provide substitutes with identification  
14 badges while on campus.

15 Medina was in fact assigned to the front  
16 of the school. He wanted the hard corners  
17 identified in the classrooms, and again, only  
18 two of the thirty classrooms in Building 12 are  
19 marked and identified with the hard corner.  
20 According to Porter Wexler did not complete a  
21 written report. These suggestions were  
22 articulated verbally during a conversation  
23 between Wexler and Porter. Wexler is not an  
24 active Secret Service Agent, and he was acting  
25 as a civilian.

1           MR. SCHACHTER: I have a couple of  
2 questions.

3           CHAIR: Go ahead.

4           MR. SCHACHTER: Wexler also talked about  
5 command and control that day; is that true?  
6 Are you aware of that?

7           DET. BONASORO: No, I'm not. Actually  
8 Special Agent Mosquera was the one who  
9 interviewed, and interviewed, he was the one  
10 who interviewed Wexler. I interviewed Porter.

11          MR. SCHACHTER: Did -- did you -- did you  
12 request Thank you Thompson's calendar?

13          DET. BONASORO: No.

14          MR. SCHACHTER: Did he notify people that  
15 he was not going to be there that day?

16          DET. BONASORO: Yes, Denise Reed was in  
17 charge that day.

18          MR. SCHACHTER: Is there -- is there  
19 policy that, as far as command and control, if  
20 the principal is not there Denise Reed needs to  
21 understand that she is to move up in that  
22 position, and everybody is also to move up one  
23 level, because, you know, that's extremely  
24 important in these, in these mass casualty  
25 events? Are there policies and procedures, and

1 is administration understanding of those, what  
2 to do?

3 DET. BONASORO: They are. I don't know  
4 about policy and procedure, however that is in  
5 the safety plan, that if Ty Thompson is out who  
6 the next in charge is, and if that person is  
7 out who the next in charge is. So they were  
8 all aware of that.

9 MR. SCHACHTER: And where to go in each,  
10 in each circumstance?

11 DET. BONASORO: Yes.

12 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay. Okay.

13 DET. BONASORO: So now we're going to get  
14 into some of the highlights of the teacher  
15 interviews. There were multiple teachers from  
16 Building 12 that were interviewed, along with a  
17 sampling of several teachers whose classrooms  
18 were not in Building 12. Below is just a  
19 summary of, and highlights of their statements.  
20 Most of the teachers, not all of the teachers,  
21 knew that Assistant Principal Porter was the  
22 assistant principal in charge of school safety.  
23 All of the teachers stated that the color coded  
24 emergency flip charts were placed in their  
25 room. All of the teachers advised that they

1 had not drilled for any of the color codes  
2 prior to 2/14 except for the monthly fire  
3 drills. That includes no code red drills.

4 All teachers advised they did not know of  
5 a specific policy regarding code red or lock  
6 down procedures. All the teachers stated that  
7 they attended the training conducted by Al  
8 Butler on January 11, 2018, and found the  
9 information was helpful during the time of the  
10 incident. None of the teachers said that the  
11 security staff or SRO Peterson conducted any  
12 additional follow up training, or any training  
13 whatsoever to the staff during a normal school  
14 year. Other than Al Butler's training no other  
15 training was conducted.

16 Teachers were not advised on how to set up  
17 their classrooms. The administrative staff did  
18 not inspect the rooms. All of the teachers  
19 interviewed stated that they knew to keep their  
20 doors locked. All of the teachers said that  
21 their doors locked were, or that their doors  
22 were locked on the day of the incident.

23 MR. SCHACHTER: Not -- I'm sorry, but can  
24 I -- can I just go back? I just want to  
25 understand this. So when Wexler was there he

1           had a conversation on code red, and he  
2           reiterated that everyone on campus has to have  
3           the ability, and the culture needs to  
4           understand that everybody needs to be able to  
5           call a code red, and have that, that  
6           confidence. And then they had the meeting by  
7           Al Butler, and did he, did he reiterate that as  
8           well?

9           DET. BONASORO: He did.

10          MR. SCHACHTER: He did.

11          DET. BONASORO: Yeah.

12          MR. SCHACHTER: But still we had all of  
13          these security monitors that did not do this.

14          DET. BONASORO: Correct.

15          MR. SCHACHTER: And I'm just trying to  
16          understand, because Medina said, and I'm sorry  
17          to be repetitive, but I don't want to be the  
18          guy to call the code red, so do we have any  
19          opinions as to why these people did not call a  
20          code red? And this could have saved a lot of  
21          people's lives.

22          CHAIR: Mr. Schachter, if you're looking  
23          for somebody here to say, and one of these  
24          investigators to say that we have information  
25          that we know that they were directed not to

1 call a code red, we don't have that  
2 information. Everything that we have indicates  
3 that they were misinformed, not informed,  
4 confused, et cetera. It was a lack of a  
5 policy, the lack of training, the lack of  
6 effective implementation. But I'll say it  
7 again, and we're going to leave it here because  
8 we're beating this thing up, is, is that we  
9 don't have any information that anybody  
10 directed any staff in the Broward County School  
11 District, and specifically at Marjory Stoneman  
12 Douglas High School, we don't have any  
13 information that somebody told anybody that  
14 they could not call a code red. Let's just put  
15 that to rest. We don't have that.

16 DET. BONASORO: During the January 11th  
17 training --

18 CHAIR: Secretary Senior.

19 SEC. SENIOR: Just quickly, and just to  
20 get an idea of whether we think this is a  
21 coincidence, we have, we have two incidents at  
22 this school in the sixty days prior to the  
23 attack where they appear to be taking some  
24 steps associated with dealing with an attacker.  
25 Is that just coincidence? Is that normal, and

1 did other schools in the state have two, or was  
2 there something making them nervous that had  
3 them training on this?

4 CHAIR: No, it was coincidence. Remember  
5 the one in December was for the administrators,  
6 in December 15th, and the one on January 11th,  
7 and January 11th I believe, I think it's an in-  
8 service day, a pro ed day, or something.

9 DET. BONASORO: Yeah, it was.

10 CHAIR: And so it was just a training.  
11 And so it was purely coincidence to the  
12 February 14th event. And really thankfully it  
13 happened, because the teachers had nothing,  
14 zero before that, and it helped them to, helped  
15 some of them to some degree, as they said. So  
16 it was purely coincidence.

17 DET. BONASORO: Okay. All the teachers  
18 did indicate that, again, that the Al Butler  
19 training taught them to move the students to a  
20 hard corner of the room where they couldn't be  
21 seen from the window. Again, only two of the  
22 teachers interviewed denoted the hard corner,  
23 hard corner by placing a line of tape on the  
24 floor. Although the hard corner was marked in  
25 two of the classrooms multiple large objects

1 still limited he student's access. The other  
2 teachers that didn't mark the hard corner  
3 advised that the, they did advise their  
4 students of the hard corner procedures, and  
5 again, did not mark it.

6 CHAIR: Senator Book, go ahead.

7 SEN. BOOK: Thank you. When I was  
8 teaching I remember when the fire marshal was  
9 coming to the school, and I'm glad Commissioner  
10 Stewart is not here, like I knew that we had to  
11 like take the hanging things down because it  
12 would like obstruct like the water that would  
13 come down, or like the, you know, like cause  
14 you can't have things hanging. Do we know, or  
15 -- well, obviously it did not, so let me just  
16 say it didn't happen, but one of the things  
17 perhaps is that we could require that there be  
18 no things in hard corners, and that be part of,  
19 you know, what people look for when they do  
20 those things, so that those corners won't be  
21 obstructed, and that just again becomes part of  
22 the culture. And I think we'll get there, but  
23 I remember that being, you know, just a part of  
24 what you couldn't do, and what you knew you had  
25 to do, so just --

1 CHAIR: Well, the question is, is that,  
2 you know, is, you know, are the school  
3 districts across the state willing to  
4 self-implement that, and do they agree, and are  
5 they going to do it in a timely way that  
6 sustain, or does the legislature need to act  
7 and compel it, you know, and that's really the  
8 question. I think it's a no-brainer, and it's  
9 very easy, and it's probably one of the safest  
10 one of the implementations that could be made  
11 that would create a safe environment, but  
12 there's still, obviously there's some  
13 resistance.

14 SEN. BOOK: Well, and it -- and it just  
15 would seem, and this is without any disrespect,  
16 that unless individuals are told to do  
17 something it's not necessarily done, because  
18 I'm not told I have to do it, it's suggested  
19 but it's not on paper.

20 CHAIR: Right. Yeah. And I think that  
21 we're at a juncture, and I think the  
22 legislature is going to be at a juncture, is  
23 the legislature considers 7026 and, and what  
24 needs to be expanded, are one of those things  
25 that just, we just need to say do it, and that

1       you just need to say do it, and just to ensure  
2       that it is going to be done. And there is  
3       probably a list of those things that need to be  
4       considered, they're going to be, and again  
5       similarly to the FSSAT that we have extensive  
6       discussion about, is that left to their own  
7       devices since 2014 some districts decided, even  
8       though it's required by you, and required by  
9       the legislature, some just said we're just not  
10      going to do it. So, you know, there need to be  
11      a list of things that says we've had enough,  
12      times up, and this is what you're going to do.

13           And -- and for a lot of these things that  
14      we're talking about, at least these things,  
15      there can't be a complaint that it's an  
16      unfunded mandate because a lot of these things  
17      don't cost anything. This is just to implement  
18      good policy and make it sustained.

19           SHER. JUDD: And, Mr. Chairman, to back  
20      you up on that, keep in mind that I just  
21      recently, as I repeat yesterday, had an event  
22      where a number two guy of a thirteen thousand  
23      person organization was not going to mark the  
24      rooms for safe zones, so there's your, there's  
25      your sign that we're going to have to mandate

1       this through legislation, because, you know,  
2       when, when the number two guy in a school  
3       district doesn't get it that means a lot of  
4       folks haven't got it.

5               CHAIR: Sheriff Ashley.

6               SHER. ASHLEY: Just a counter point; the  
7       Chair has brought up before that, you know,  
8       unintended consequences, if these heard corners  
9       are sheetrock walls then we're piling, we're  
10      piling folks up into a corner, and remember  
11      that the people we're, that we're training,  
12      could possibly be the next shooter.

13              CHAIR: That's right.

14              SHER. ASHLEY: And so again those  
15      unintended consequence, we make that a  
16      mandatory requirement, if it's a sheetrock  
17      corner, a hard corner, then why not just shoot  
18      through the wall and kill everybody. And so  
19      it's -- it's one of those damned if you do  
20      damned if you don't.

21              CHAIR: Well, point well taken, and but  
22      remember is that what we're trained, and  
23      there's -- there's all kinds of, you know,  
24      we're kind of, you know, down in the weeds with  
25      it, but there's all kinds of nuances with this.

1 Remember is, is that everybody, students, and  
2 teachers, and staff, need options, and what we  
3 ask them to do in considering the model,  
4 whatever the model you want to call it, run,  
5 hide, fight, et cetera, is, is that we're not  
6 saying do this one or that one, what we're  
7 saying is, is that we're going to hopefully  
8 provide you enough training, enough education,  
9 that when it happens you're going to have to  
10 pick the option that fits best, and it may not  
11 be to hide.

12 It may not be to get into the hard corner,  
13 depending upon what the circumstance is, or the  
14 hard corner may be the best option, and get as  
15 low as you can, et cetera, and so, you know,  
16 even when you get into what do you call these  
17 things, and some people call them, you want to  
18 say, well, use plain language and call them  
19 lockdown drills, there can be a problem with  
20 that, because if you're calling them a lockdown  
21 drill and you're using a run, hide, fight,  
22 lockdown, what is somebody going to think,  
23 lockdown means lockdown, hunker down, when the  
24 best response is, is to run.

25 So, you know, they're -- all of this has

1 to be considered, and there's no single thing  
2 in any of this, it's a combination of things,  
3 and best options. But, Sheriff Ashley, I  
4 couldn't agree with you more is, is that you  
5 could by putting somebody to hard corner, you  
6 could be creating a vulnerable situation, it  
7 just depends, but, you know, certainly in this  
8 case, and in others, it is a viable option,  
9 and, and there is -- there is no hundred  
10 percents, and we know that, and you know that,  
11 so but, but what, but if we don't provide  
12 options then we can't get even close to the  
13 goal line. We have to provide options.

14 MR. SCHACHTER: And as a comment to the  
15 Sheriff's -- in relation to that, you know, I  
16 talked about, several months ago about the  
17 safest school in the country in Indiana, and  
18 they, every classroom has to have a protected  
19 space. I think the Chair is absolutely correct  
20 that the kid needs to understand that they're  
21 safe in that classroom. To combat exactly the  
22 point you made is that we need to have, you  
23 know, sections of that classroom that are  
24 protected. In -- in Marjory Stoneman Douglas  
25 we had a company come in that was going to

1 donate a ballistic wall section to make sure  
2 that each individual classroom had a protected  
3 space. So we were going to solve that problem,  
4 the district decided not to do that, but that's  
5 the way you solve that.

6 SHER. ASHLEY: Other opportunities are  
7 creating emergency exits. There's so many of  
8 our classrooms across the state that, one way  
9 in, one way out, so I've made that  
10 recommendation to our school district multiple  
11 times. It's a very expensive recommendation,  
12 but any new school construction should be  
13 required to create emergency exits.

14 CHAIR: Wally, go ahead.

15 DET. BONASORO: Okay. Again now we're  
16 still talking about some of the teachers'  
17 comments during the interviews. The classroom  
18 teachers are not assigned portable radios.  
19 They have to communicate with the front office  
20 via the PA system or by the landline telephone,  
21 or by their own cell phone. Some teachers were  
22 more vocal than others during these interviews.  
23 According to one teacher, Ernest Rospierski,  
24 some teachers did not take code red drills  
25 seriously. He said they were notified in

1 advance that the drill would be conducted, and  
2 didn't want to lose out on instructional time.

3 This next comment unfortunately was stated  
4 by almost every single teacher. They said it's  
5 Parkland, we didn't think anything like this  
6 could happen here. That was the response of  
7 almost every single teacher and staff member  
8 that I interviewed.

9 MR. SCHACHTER: And -- and if I may,  
10 Sheriff, I think that is the problem. That's  
11 what we have to overcome, is that it's been  
12 twenty years since Columbine, and you hit the  
13 nail on the head, that they never thought it  
14 was going to happen in Sandy Hook, and we never  
15 thought it was going to happen in Parkland.  
16 Two days prior to this tragedy it was reported  
17 in a newspaper that Parkland was the safest  
18 place to live in this country, so until people  
19 start realizing that it can happen in their  
20 neighborhood, that they must make their schools  
21 safe, nothing will change, in my opinion.

22 DET. BONASORO: Rospierski further advised  
23 that the first thing that he heard was the fire  
24 alarm, and subsequently began evacuating his  
25 classroom. Once in the hallway, Rospierski

1       said it was at that point where he heard the  
2       first gunshots, or he heard the gunshots. He  
3       also said that the hallways are not equipped  
4       with PA speakers, and while in the hallway he  
5       was unable to hear what was being said over the  
6       PA. He said something was being said but he  
7       was unable to hear.

8             All the teachers that commented said that  
9       they, they sheltered in place, and did so --

10       SHER. ASHLEY: Excuse me.

11       DET. BONASORO: Yes, sir.

12       SHER. ASHLEY: Do we know now what was  
13       being said over the PA?

14       DET. BONASORO: Yes.

15       CHAIR: What's the question, Sheriff,  
16       could you --

17       SHER. ASHLEY: Do -- do we -- excuse me.  
18       Do we know now what was being said over the PA  
19       that he couldn't hear?

20       DET. BONASORO: There were -- there were  
21       two things being said over the PA. The first  
22       was evacuate because of -- and I'll go into  
23       that here in just a second.

24       SHER. ASHLEY: Okay.

25       DET. BONASORO: All the teachers in

1 Building that sheltered in place, that hunkered  
2 down, did so because the, they said the first  
3 thing that they heard was the gunfire so they,  
4 they stayed sheltered in place. All the  
5 teachers in Building 12 that evacuated their  
6 classrooms, they said they did so because the  
7 first thing they heard was the fire alarm. Not  
8 one teacher advised that they heard the code  
9 red being called over the PA. The teachers  
10 reacted to the sound of gunfire or the fire  
11 alarm.

12 All the teachers, every one of them said  
13 that they were unclear if they were allowed to  
14 call a code red, and how to do it. The staff  
15 at, at the high school, the administrative  
16 staff said anyone can call a code red, however  
17 with that said the teachers still stated that  
18 they had no idea how to.

19 MR. SCHACHTER: Can I -- can I ask you  
20 about that? So MSD staff stated anyone can  
21 call a code red, but Wexler, Porter told Wexler  
22 that only the admin was allowed to call a code  
23 red. So that's -- that's what I'm wondering,  
24 if that's the reason nobody else called a code  
25 red.

1 DET. BONASORO: A lot of things from that  
2 Al Butler training changed the way they thought  
3 about the code red stuff, so that, during that  
4 January 11th meeting it was confirmed that, and  
5 by Ty Thompson, and every administrator said  
6 that at that January 11 meeting it was well  
7 known that anybody could call a code red.

8 CHAIR: There's a disconnect between the  
9 administrators and the teachers, and that's  
10 where it is. The administrators say, oh, yeah,  
11 anybody can do it, but when to the teachers and  
12 the staff that's, there's a, there's a  
13 disconnect.

14 DET. BONASORO: And most of the teachers  
15 that we interviewed, and the students  
16 interviewed, perceived the event as though it  
17 was just a drill.

18 CHAIR: Commissioner Dodd.

19 MR. DODD: Did the teachers give any  
20 indication of the school resource officer's  
21 abilities, or anything on campus, was there  
22 anything asked to them, or anything about --

23 DET. BONASORO: We did ask that question,  
24 and it was mixed. Some said that he should  
25 have, he should have been out and about more,

1           that he was in his office a lot. Others said  
2           that he was out and about the appropriate  
3           amount of time.

4           MR. DODD: Was he at the January 11th  
5           training? We Peterson at that training when --

6           DET. BONASORO: I don't know.

7           MR. DODD: Did Peterson -- but it said  
8           clearly that Peterson did not do training with  
9           faculty members, correct, or he had not done --

10          DET. BONASORO: Not any kind of mandated  
11          training. And I only said that because  
12          Peterson, he was a train the trainer type of  
13          guy, so he was the one training people to train  
14          people. He had all this information about  
15          active shooter, he was an SRO forever, so I  
16          just wanted to point out with all that  
17          knowledge that he had he never took the  
18          initiative and got with his administrative  
19          staff to conduct any type of additional  
20          training, or any training whatsoever to help  
21          out.

22          CHAIR: Right. So you weren't here  
23          yesterday, so just remember is that what we saw  
24          in the training yesterday that Special Agent  
25          Massucci did that shows the training that

1           Peterson went to to train the trainer, he never  
2           put that on at MSD.

3           DET. BONASORO:   No.

4           MR. SCHACHTER:   And can I ask you a  
5           question?   Was -- was the security staff and  
6           the campus monitors at Al Butler's training?

7           DET. BONASORO:   Yes.

8           MR. SCHACHTER:   Okay.

9           DET. BONASORO:   Some of the  
10          recommendations, we asked the teachers what,  
11          what would you recommend, and this was just a  
12          list of whatever they said.   To arm, arm  
13          willing staff, more real life scenario  
14          training.   They wanted electrical outlets moved  
15          that were placed in the hard corners so that  
16          they could move their furniture that required  
17          electrical outlets elsewhere in the room.  
18          Equip all teachers with a panic button on a  
19          lanyard.   Make sure the PA system can be heard  
20          in the hallways and outside common areas.   They  
21          wanted problem students should not be placed in  
22          regular classes, and a better camera system.

23          These are some of the highlights of the  
24          administrative staff interviews.   They all said  
25          that all the ingress and egress gates were open

1 in the morning and in the afternoon to allow  
2 foot traffic and vehicle traffic in and out.  
3 They all admitted that the gates were not  
4 staffed appropriately while the gates were  
5 opened. All the administrators advise that  
6 they did not know of a specific school board  
7 policy regarding campus monitors.

8 When I asked them what the campus monitors  
9 did they too stated that their job is to  
10 observe and report, however upon further  
11 questioning and clarifications they admitted  
12 that the campus monitors did a lot more than  
13 just observe and report. They stated that the  
14 campus monitors were each assigned a specific  
15 post to monitor during the course of the day.  
16 All of the administrators stated that they did  
17 not instruct their teachers to set up their  
18 classrooms in a specific way that would keep  
19 the hard corner open.

20 All the administrators advised that the  
21 teachers were instructed to keep their door  
22 locks, and did not have the option to keep  
23 their door locks post the January 11th training  
24 with Al Butler. All the AP said that they  
25 would occasionally walk the school to ensure

1           that the doors were locked.

2           Prior to the January training there was no  
3           definitive answer given by the APs about who  
4           could call a code red. They all kind of had  
5           their own way to answer that, and none of it  
6           was clear. All the APs stated that fire alarm  
7           drills were conducted monthly, however a code  
8           red drill has not been conducted prior to 2/14.  
9           They were all aware of the web based school  
10          safety plan, as well as the emergency flip  
11          chart. All the teachers were provided with the  
12          emergency flip chart, and the teachers, most of  
13          the teachers were not aware of the safety plan  
14          generally.

15          All of the administrative staff knew the  
16          proper protocol to be followed once a code red  
17          was initiated, IE doors locked, go to the safe  
18          or hard corner, turn your lights out, keep  
19          quiet. Principal T y Thompson did state that  
20          it was stated that in the January training,  
21          that anyone could call a code red. He said the  
22          teachers without radios, they would have to  
23          either call the front office via the PA or the  
24          phone, and relay that information to the  
25          office, nevertheless they were still unclear

1           about when or how to call the code red.

2           Four of the five APs stated that they had  
3           no complaints about Deputy Scot Peterson,  
4           however AP Reed did advise that he should have  
5           been out of his office patrolling the campus  
6           more. I just want to talk about, a little bit  
7           what Reed following up with that. She said on  
8           that, on the 2/14 all the APs, AP Reed, Porter,  
9           and Morford, all advised that they did call the  
10          code red via their portable radios. None of  
11          that is confirmed. The first confirmation of  
12          anybody hearing the code red was from Elliot  
13          Bonner. Porter said that he also called the  
14          code red via the school intercom system.

15          AP Reed advised that she received  
16          information from Porter about a gas leak alarm  
17          coming from Building 12. She said that she  
18          responded to the area of Building 12 and  
19          encountered Peterson standing in the breezeway  
20          between Building 7 and 8. We all know where  
21          that is, right? She stated that she clearly  
22          heard a lot of gunshots coming from within  
23          Building 12, and told Peterson, hey, that's  
24          gunfire in there. She said that Peterson had  
25          his gun out, and was talking on his police

1 radio. She told me that she left the area to  
2 help get kids back inside, and thought that  
3 Peterson was going into Building to address the  
4 shooter. Now, it was at this point during the  
5 incident that all the administrators were doing  
6 their thing, and then at some point they all  
7 remained locked down until rescued by law  
8 enforcement. Yes?

9 SEC. KAPUSTA: I'm not sure I recalled  
10 this correctly, but I thought at the beginning  
11 of you presentation Medina was the one who got  
12 Peterson and took him over to Building 12.

13 DET. BONASORO: Yes.

14 SEC. KAPUSTA: So this seems inconsistent  
15 with that.

16 DET. BONASORO: In what way?

17 CHAIR: I don't think everybody can hear  
18 the question. Can you speak into the  
19 microphone a little bit more?

20 SEC. KAPUSTA: Yes, I'm sorry. Okay, I'm  
21 sorry, never mind, I take the question back. I  
22 thought that at the beginning of his  
23 presentation he said that Medina was the one  
24 that went and got Peterson and took him over to  
25 Building 12.

1 CHAIR: He did.

2 SEC. KAPUSTA: I misunderstood this, and  
3 thought that Reed had taken Peterson with her.  
4 Okay, I am with you now. Sorry for that.

5 DET. BONASORO: Yeah. And that concludes  
6 my presentation on topics three and four. And  
7 again, you'll hear a lot more detail from  
8 Sergeant Suess' presentation.

9 CHAIR: All right, does anybody else have  
10 any questions? Mr. Schachter.

11 MR. SCHACHTER: So when was the first code  
12 red called out?

13 DET. BONASORO: Confirmed, by Bonner.

14 CHAIR: It was at 2:24.54, which is three  
15 minutes and sixteen seconds into, after the  
16 first shot.

17 SHER. ASHLEY: That's what was on the PA,  
18 being announced on the PA?

19 DET. BONASORO: No.

20 CHAIR: Radio.

21 MR. SCHACHTER: It was on the school  
22 radio.

23 CHAIR: Right.

24 MR. SCHACHTER: And so when did it  
25 actually get announced on the PA, or did it?

1 CHAIR: I don't know that. John, do you  
2 know?

3 DET. BONASORO: After that. It was after.

4 CHAIR: Wally, do you know?

5 SGT. SUESS: Correct, it was after.

6 CHAIR: It was after that at some point.

7 DET. BONASORO: Yeah, but nobody heard it.

8 CHAIR: So the first, the first time was  
9 on the radio, is what I told you, is 2:24.54,  
10 three minutes and sixteen seconds into it, and,  
11 and beyond that, you know, it kind of became,  
12 it became a non-issue for us because at that  
13 point is, is that the people on the third floor  
14 were already out in the hallways, everybody is  
15 moving, nobody could hear it anyway, and they  
16 couldn't hear it over the fire alarm, so it  
17 became a -- you know, once we found that it  
18 hadn't been announced at all until three  
19 minutes and sixteen seconds into it, and at  
20 three minutes and sixteen seconds he's already  
21 shooting on the third floor, it was, you know,  
22 the thing was about over before the first code  
23 red was called, so we didn't, you know --

24 MR. SCHACHTER: So where was Reed during  
25 this event?

1 DET. BONASORO: She start -- when the --  
2 she was in the administration building. When  
3 the alarm, the fire alarm sounded, she grabbed  
4 her radio to head out to address the fire  
5 alarm. As she was leaving the administration  
6 building she hears Porter yelling, hey, there's  
7 a gas leak at Building 12, which prompted her  
8 to redirect from her normal post that she goes  
9 to during a fire alarm to head over to Building  
10 12 to see what was going on.

11 MR. SCHACHTER: Because she was the  
12 principal that day.

13 DET. BONASORO: She was in charge that  
14 day, yes.

15 MR. SCHACHTER: So she should have been  
16 the one to call -- well, anybody should've, but  
17 so nobody, nobody called the code red. I'm  
18 just wondering why it took so long, why it took  
19 three minutes, and why it was all over by that  
20 time, you know.

21 DET. BONASORO: I think we all are.

22 CHAIR: Senator Book.

23 SEN. BOOK: Thank you. So why did she  
24 think that it was a gas leak?

25 DET. BONASORO: She was moving off of

1 information from Porter. Porter went to the,  
2 the fire alarm --

3 SEN. BOOK: Panel.

4 DET. BONASORO: Panel there in the SRO  
5 office, and the panel was reading gas leak.

6 SEN. BOOK: Okay, so if there was a gas  
7 leak, and we're following the chart or  
8 whatever, that would be a code brown, right?

9 DET. BONASORO: Code brown, so right, so  
10 Porter did get on the PA and try to evacuate  
11 because of the gas leak. Then he hears Bonner  
12 code red, code red, so he reverses the  
13 evacuation and calls the lockdown. Now again,  
14 this is happening over the PA, there's a ton of  
15 chaos, nobody hears anything. Not one person  
16 said that they clearly heard anything going on  
17 on the PA system.

18 SEN. BOOK: Okay. Okay. And -- I'm  
19 sorry. And so typically, and again I know that  
20 right now MSD has a system where if a fire  
21 alarm goes off everybody evacuates, you hear  
22 the fire alarm in every building so you would  
23 assume it's there.

24 DET. BONASORO: That's correct.

25 SEN. BOOK: In a -- and if it was a gas

1           leak, and if the panel was reading gas leak,  
2           would that trigger the fire alarm?

3           DET. BONASORO:   It did.

4           SEN. BOOK:   Got it.   I -- I wasn't sure if  
5           that was because of what was happening in the  
6           building or because it was a gas leak trigger.

7           CHAIR:   Sheriff Ashley, did you have  
8           something?   Okay, anybody else?

9           MR. SCHACHTER:   What time was the fire  
10          alarm triggered, or the gas leak, do we know,  
11          the evacuation?

12          DET. BONASORO:   Shortly after the first  
13          shots were fired, whatever time that was.

14          MR. SCHACHTER:   Really?

15          DET. BONASORO:   That's what caused the  
16          alarm to go off.

17          MR. SCHACHTER:   And then Porter -- what  
18          time did Porter call the evacuation?

19          DET. BONASORO:   Well, Porter calls the  
20          evacuation shortly after that.   Then the kids  
21          are moving around to, to evacuate, he hears the  
22          code red being called by Bonner, and then he  
23          orders the lockdown after that.

24          MR. SCHACHTER:   After, when everybody is  
25          dead already.

1 DET. BONASORO: Yeah.

2 MR. SCHACHTER: Got it.

3 CHAIR: Commissioner Bartlett, you had a  
4 question?

5 ASA BARTLETT: When Reed goes to Peterson  
6 out between 7 and 8 and tells him it's gunfire,  
7 has Bonner already called in the code red?

8 DET. BONASORO: No.

9 ASA BARTLETT: So she acknowledges all the  
10 shots are taking place, and she informed him of  
11 that, and he was just on his radio.

12 DET. BONASORO: Yeah, she assumed that --  
13 she said she looked out at one side and she saw  
14 a bunch of students out, outside in the open,  
15 she hears the gunfire on the other side, so she  
16 said she immediately ran to get those students  
17 safe, and thought that Peterson was going to go  
18 in to address the shooter.

19 CHAIR: And so, just for context too, is  
20 that would have been after -- if he was already  
21 by the 7-8 building when she confronted him, or  
22 saw him, and said, hey, that's gunfire, he had  
23 his gun out, he's by the 7-8 building, that's  
24 after Medina had dropped him off at the east  
25 door of the 1200 building, after he had gotten

1 on the radio and said there's shots fired in  
2 the 1200 building, which the shots he heard  
3 were Feis and Hixon being shot. So he had  
4 already been on the radio, said there's shots  
5 fired, he had already fled from the east door  
6 to his hiding place over there by the 7-8  
7 building, and that's when Reed came up to him  
8 and said there's shots fired in there, he had  
9 his gun out, and he's talking on the radio  
10 again, which we heard those transmissions  
11 yesterday, correct?

12 DET. BONASORO: Yes, sir. Yes.

13 CHAIR: All right. Secretary Carroll, go  
14 ahead.

15 MR. CARROLL: I was just going to ask a  
16 similar question, and my point was what you  
17 just made of it, was that this is the second  
18 person, or actually the third person now that  
19 has shown up by that building and clearly heard  
20 gunshots coming from within that building, and  
21 was not unclear as to where the gunshots were  
22 coming from.

23 I just was wondering, I know we've seen a  
24 lot of the surveillance tape that kind of put  
25 these timestamps with folks, is there -- is --

1 is Reed -- does she show up on any of the  
2 surveillance tapes, so that you get the timing  
3 for when she interacted --

4 SGT. SUESS: No. No, sir, I don't believe  
5 she does.

6 MR. CARROLL: Okay.

7 CHAIR: Secretary Senior, go ahead.

8 SEC. SENIOR: Do we have an idea of how  
9 many students evacuated, and how many sheltered  
10 in place? Was it clear outside of Building 12,  
11 because we're saying, oh, this was over in  
12 three minutes, but it wasn't over, he was in  
13 the top room on the third floor trying to shoot  
14 at people who had evacuated out of the  
15 building, and how -- so do we have an idea of  
16 how many had evacuated, or how many clearly  
17 understood?

18 CHAIR: So -- so he was -- from the time  
19 that he entered the building, which was  
20 2:21.38, and he left at 2:27.54, so he -- from  
21 the time he entered until the time he walked  
22 out that door, you saw on the video yesterday,  
23 is six minutes and sixteen seconds, so the --  
24 but he was in a teacher's lounge for roughly  
25 about two minutes of that, and he was trying to

1       snipe out, he had the bi-pad, and he was  
2       shooting out those windows, and as you heard  
3       the rounds fragmented, but how many students,  
4       you know, I think you heard there's about nine  
5       hundred roughly in the 1200 building, so around  
6       nine hundred that were in play just in the 1200  
7       building, and a whole bunch of them when he was  
8       trying to shoot out that third floor teacher's  
9       lounge were in that courtyard, and if he had  
10      been able to effectively shoot out there would  
11      have been, you know, hundreds, mass, mass  
12      casualties, because he was trying to -- that  
13      was his plan, that's why he had the bi-pod, he  
14      was setting that rifle up so that he could get  
15      an advantage point and use it as a sniper  
16      position.

17           SEC. SENIOR: If he had taken his gun with  
18      him, he ran out with, with students that were  
19      in essence inappropriately evacuating, he could  
20      have shot them there.

21           CHAIR: Correct. Correct. And but, you  
22      know, again, obviously he had his plan, and he  
23      wanted to blend in, and he dropped his gun and  
24      the tactical vest, and a hundred eighty rounds  
25      of ammunition he left on that third floor

1           landing when he fled. Mr. Petty.

2           MR. PETTY: I just want to get a  
3           clarification on a couple of things. So the  
4           gas leak detection, is that a function of the  
5           fire alarm system, it can detect a gas leak?

6           DET. BONASORO: It must.

7           MR. PETTY: Okay. And so would that,  
8           would that then be a code brown, not a code  
9           red?

10          DET. BONASORO: That's correct, yes.

11          MR. PETTY: The -- I'm just going back and  
12          re-reading what code brown says. It says  
13          threat incident to the facility when the best  
14          course of action is to implement a shelter in  
15          place, lockdown, or, or evacuation. Those seem  
16          to conflict.

17          DET. BONASORO: Right. I agree.

18          MR. PETTY: So --

19          CHAIR: I think it's a bridge too far.  
20          They don't even know what a code red is, and  
21          how -- much less code brown.

22          MR. PETTY: No, I understand. I  
23          understand, but the point is if there is, if  
24          there is some other type of emergency, like a  
25          bomb, it would require the administration to

1       communicate to the students and staff in the,  
2       in the facility. If there's a fire alarm going  
3       off, we've already learned that it's difficult  
4       to hear the PA system, or you can't hear the PA  
5       system, so I mean we've got another big problem  
6       here. And I don't know if this is, if this is  
7       just Broward, or if this is similar in all the  
8       other school districts.

9               SEN. BOOK: Well, and just -- and we're  
10       going to get to this, but when I was reading to  
11       prepare for today in the law enforcement  
12       response presentation you have a photo of the  
13       SRO's office, and it has the fire panel.

14              CHAIR: Right. Correct, you're going to  
15       see that here in a few minutes.

16              SEN. BOOK: Okay. So but that's in  
17       Building 1, right?

18              CHAIR: Correct.

19              SEN. BOOK: So let's say there was, and I  
20       know we're going on a bridge too far so thank  
21       you for indulging me, but let's say it was a  
22       chemical leak, how would that, how would that  
23       individual who sees that on that panel  
24       communicate that, via the radio maybe?

25              CHAIR: The only -- the only ways he had

1       on there to communicate were via the intercom  
2       system that were in the classrooms, the PA, in  
3       the classrooms, or the radio. That was the  
4       only way to communicate, except for -- they did  
5       have, you know, they had landline phones, as  
6       you heard about, but in order for mass  
7       communication the only way is the PAs that were  
8       in the classrooms, or the radio that some  
9       people had, and not everybody had radios. And  
10      again not all, and with the radios, they  
11      weren't always on either.

12             SEN. BOOK: Is there a chem, like a chem  
13      lab in that building?

14             CHAIR: I don't know the answer to that  
15      one. John, do you --

16             SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am, in Building 13.

17             SEN. BOOK: Sorry?

18             SGT. SUESS: In Building 13.

19             SEN. BOOK: Okay, so not in the 1200  
20      building necessarily, okay.

21             CHAIR: All right, thanks, Wally.  
22      Appreciate it. Good job. Thank you.

23             DET. BONASORO: Thank you.

24             CHAIR: All right, so the next  
25      presentation we're going to get through before

1 lunch is from Sergeant Suess, and it's a  
2 presentation on the content of Nikolas Cruz's  
3 cell phone and his internet searches. His  
4 phone was seized at the time of this arrest,  
5 and the contents of the phone had been  
6 downloaded, and that's the nature of this  
7 presentation.

8 PRESENTATION CRUZ CELL PHONE CONTENT AND INTERNET  
9 SEARCHES

10 SGT. SUESS: Thank you, Sheriff. One  
11 thing I would like to point out before I get  
12 started, while the four of us are here  
13 presenting to you Special Agent Randy Camp has  
14 worked diligently with us. He wasn't able to  
15 attend this meeting. Special Agent Dan  
16 Mosquera and Mark Hadod from FDLE Miami have  
17 also assisted us. And there is in addition to  
18 that a small army of analysts in Tallahassee  
19 who have been assisting us as well. So they  
20 likely will not be seen, but have provided a  
21 great deal of assistance to us throughout this  
22 investigation.

23 As the Sheriff mentioned we're going to go  
24 over some of the contents that were on Nikolas  
25 Cruz's phone prior. There's some data that

1 does not have a time stamp, some that is in the  
2 weeks leading up to the shooting on February  
3 14th, some communications that he had on the  
4 day of the 14th, and showing some of his  
5 travels as well. I'm also going to cover some  
6 of the firearms which Nikolas Cruz had, and  
7 some brief excerpts of the interviews from the  
8 Snead family.

9 So the data that you're going to see right  
10 now is prior to February 1, 2018 where it does  
11 not have a time stamp. On November 14, 2017  
12 Nikolas Cruz searched the phrase shooting  
13 people massacre. The next day he searched rape  
14 caught on video, and armed robber gets shot by  
15 every customer. It is important to notice that  
16 what we're going to see here will largely  
17 substantiate the information that Detective  
18 Lyons presented that had been told to us by  
19 other people. The advantage here, of course  
20 this is Nikolas Cruz's phone, who presumably  
21 he's the only person that has access to.

22 So in the notes section of his phone on  
23 December 30th he had this note; control your  
24 breathing and trigger pull, you're the one who  
25 sites in the rifle for yourself, adjust the

1 scope, your shooting ability, keep that  
2 adjustment every time, you have to shoot to  
3 yourself, only to oneself, my trigger squeeze  
4 is my one's ability, same thing every time.

5 On January 20, 2018 there was a note;  
6 basketball court full of targets, still  
7 thinking of ways to kill people.

8 The next day; my life is a mess, I don't  
9 know what to do anymore, every day I get more  
10 agitated at everyone because my life is unfair,  
11 everything and everyone is happy except for me,  
12 I want to kill people but I don't know how I  
13 can do it, walk to a part, get someone to pick  
14 me up, I just don't know anymore, but it will  
15 happen soon.

16 This is a screenshot that was within his  
17 phone, and so it's a screenshot of a Wikipedia  
18 article on the 2012 Aurora movie theater  
19 shooting, speaking to I believe Sheriff Ashley,  
20 I believe he mentioned these school shooters,  
21 it has been documented in other instances, they  
22 do their homework, they do research prior to  
23 mass shooting instances.

24 MR. SCHACHTER: Do you know -- do you have  
25 a date of when that screenshot entered into his

1 phone?

2 SGT. SUESS: No, sir. So I have a little  
3 bit of experience with cell phone analysis,  
4 probably enough to make myself dangerous, but  
5 there are people that have explained  
6 essentially some data does not have a time  
7 stamp, but I did look into that matter.

8 These are some images that were on his  
9 phone. The only one with the date time stamp  
10 was the one on the left, November 26, 2017.  
11 You'll see some images here, that it's really  
12 just a sampling of a consistent theme  
13 throughout his phone. This is not everything  
14 that was in there, but if you haven't already  
15 you'll continue to see the theme.

16 MR. SCHACHTER: Do we -- do we have any,  
17 you know, we heard witness testimony of him  
18 bringing dead animals to school, do we have any  
19 -- and I guess none of that was reported to  
20 administration, we have, did any investigation,  
21 so administration never knew that, right, none  
22 of that was --

23 CHAIR: What you heard yesterday in  
24 Detective Lyons presentation, there were a  
25 couple things that were reported, and, you

1 know, I'd just refer you back to the  
2 presentation yesterday. The second half of it  
3 shows what was reported, and then not taken  
4 further. The first part of it, which contains  
5 most of it, people knew about and did not  
6 report to anybody.

7 MR. SCHACHTER: Just it happened so many  
8 times, and bringing all these animals, I mean  
9 the smell in your backpack, I can't -- it's  
10 just seems, I can't imagine that more people  
11 didn't know, you know, it's just crazy.

12 CHAIR: You can't imagine more people  
13 didn't know, over thirty people --

14 MR. SCHACHTER: No, I mean the  
15 administration, teachers, I don't understand  
16 why nobody said anything, it's just --

17 SGT. SUESS: To that point, there are  
18 several photographs of dead animals, and you'll  
19 see a video shortly. These are just various  
20 images, again, this is just a sampling, but  
21 there are, to say there were dozens if not  
22 hundreds or thousands of photographs or images  
23 of guns. Military intrigue would be an  
24 understatement.

25 These are some screenshots that he had

1 from YouTube videos about different types of  
2 firearms. The one on the right, a post on  
3 Instagram about, you know, basically where to  
4 position your finger on a gun to be a more  
5 accurate shot. There were several images with  
6 racial, racially hatred, racially charged  
7 themes.

8 So this individual, who I don't know, he  
9 has this song that Cruz had accessed on YouTube  
10 called the knife game song, and, you know,  
11 we've all seen this at different points in  
12 movies or TVs, but people stabbing the knife  
13 between their fingers. This -- this was  
14 referenced several times on his phone.

15 And image from Instagram, which is more,  
16 it is a cartoon on how to effectively slit your  
17 wrist.

18 These are some images from Marshal County  
19 High School and Columbine High School, where  
20 there had been prior mass shooting instances.

21 Some images of Cruz on the left wearing  
22 ballistic vests and a helmet, and some  
23 additional military themed regalia.

24 So this is the image that Detective Lyons  
25 referenced in one of the interviews, where one

1 of Nikolas Cruz's friends had commented about  
2 how his mother was very liberal minded, he knew  
3 this angered her, so after her passing took his  
4 MAGA hat and inserted it in the mausoleum, took  
5 a picture, and then also you'll see on the left  
6 image taped over her name.

7 So these images have a time stamp, and  
8 this is going to cover a window from February  
9 1st to the 14th of 2018. On February 2, 2018  
10 he took a screenshot of the MSD school  
11 schedule. Between February 1st and February  
12 5th -- so you'll start seeing slides with this  
13 layout. So on the left is a summary of  
14 different types of sites that he visited, on  
15 the right is a specific search phrase that he  
16 would have used. There's not necessarily a  
17 direct correlation between those two columns,  
18 so just please understand that format.

19 The song Pumped up Kicks, I'll explain  
20 that a little more, and you'll see an excerpt  
21 here shortly. It was a song that he accessed  
22 frequently, and there's a video that glorifies  
23 school shootings set to that song, and you'll  
24 see an excerpt here shortly.

25 A photograph taken by Cruz on February 8,

1       2018. Within his notes section dated February  
2       5th is this note, more or less a love note, and  
3       the portions that are highlighted in red we  
4       have added. There are phrases there really  
5       conveys the theme that this is more or less a  
6       suicide note, where he does not expect to be  
7       living much longer. The black boxes we put in  
8       there just to protect the identity of the  
9       female to whom he is speaking.

10               Just to -- I'll read those red parts, so  
11       if I don't die please see me, please be with me  
12       in the afterlife, I wish for you to be in my  
13       will with ever, my will with everything I leave  
14       behind, it belongs to you and my brother, the  
15       half of the cash goes to you and my brother.

16               Between February 6th and 8th, again on the  
17       left you'll see these are the types of websites  
18       that he's accessing, and then on the right  
19       specific phrases that he would have entered  
20       into his phone, such as is killing people easy,  
21       a pest control job, and looking for crime scene  
22       cleaner.

23               So there's going to be several videos here  
24       that were released to the media several months  
25       ago I believe, and I believe they've all been

1 released, absent one. I'm going to play these  
2 briefly for you.

3 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the  
4 open meeting.)

5 CRUZ: All right, so here's the plan. I'm  
6 going to go take a Uber in the afternoon before  
7 2:40. From there I'll go into the, onto school  
8 campus, walk up the stairs, unload my bags, and  
9 get my AR and shoot people down at the main,  
10 what is it, the main courtyard, await, and  
11 people will die.

12 (Thereupon, the video concludes, and the proceedings  
13 continue as follows:)

14 SGT. SUESS: Later in that day there's an  
15 image here of a bird, possibly, you know, shot  
16 with a BB gun in its head. A photograph that  
17 Cruz took later that evening. So the following  
18 day again some types of websites that he is  
19 accessing. You'll see some additional  
20 screenshots, but on psychcentral.com he's  
21 visited a site about homicidal thoughts and  
22 urges. Again the gun theme is presenting  
23 itself consistently. Some of the search  
24 phrases that he's used, therapists for  
25 homicidal.

1           So this screenshot of that specific  
2 article about homicidal thoughts, this  
3 screenshot was within his phone.

4           CHAIR: Hang on a second, John.

5           SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

6           CHAIR: Senator Book, go ahead.

7           SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am.

8           SEN. BOOK: Uber, was he just looking up  
9 Uber, like the process to order an Uber, like I  
10 guess I was just trying to wonder like what --

11          SGT. SUESS: No, ma'am, it was just a site  
12 he went to, and I think it's fairly innocuous,  
13 that particular aspect. It's my understanding,  
14 correct me if I'm wrong, Detective, that he up  
15 to this point did not drive. He didn't have a  
16 car, he didn't know how to drive, so I imagine  
17 Uber was probably one of the more, his more  
18 common modes of transportation.

19          CHAIR: Quick question, Commissioner  
20 Larkin Skinner, I got a question for you. Do  
21 you -- I mean here -- this is February 9th.  
22 Obviously this happens on February 14th. Do  
23 you have any thoughts at all about here, he's  
24 on his cell phone, and he's searching homicidal  
25 thoughts and urges, and then he's also putting

1 in a search phrase, a therapist for homicidal.  
2 Is he -- what's he doing at this point? I know  
3 it may be an unanswerable question, but I'm,  
4 you know, it seems like he's, he's, and he does  
5 the video a couple days before where he's  
6 planned out what he's going to do, and we just  
7 saw that, and now it seems like he's struggling  
8 with whether he's actually going to do this.  
9 Do you have any thoughts on it? If not that's  
10 okay, I just --

11 MS. LARKIN SKINNER: I think you're right.  
12 I think the, the telling thing here is he's  
13 obsessing constantly. I mean it's like a loop  
14 playing in his head, and, you know, it's  
15 interesting -- I know of people that have been  
16 arrested because they search certain things on  
17 the internet, like twenty years ago a guy at my  
18 work got arrested because he was searching  
19 chemicals, and he hit a third chemical which  
20 immediately law enforcement became aware of  
21 somehow, I don't know if they were tracking  
22 that, but they arrested him because he was  
23 going to make meth.

24 And then I know somebody who was hitting  
25 porn sites where there were teens, underage

1 girls, and got arrested, and so I'm really  
2 curious if there's anything like that, if  
3 people are searching terms like homicide, which  
4 is weird because on the one hand you would  
5 search it because you might want to read an  
6 article to do some research, or just to see  
7 what happened in a situation.

8 But the only thing I can say is that this  
9 is scary, and that the only thing I can really  
10 get from it is that he was obsessed with it,  
11 and it was playing over and over in his head.  
12 And maybe some part of him wanted help --

13 CHAIR: That's what -- and that's why I  
14 was just asking for your input, your  
15 professional opinion on it, because it, it  
16 strikes out that he is wrestling with this  
17 because, you know, therapists for homicidal,  
18 you know, five days before he goes and  
19 massacres these people, so just curious in your  
20 opinion. Sheriff Ashley.

21 SHER. ASHLEY: Just since we're talking on  
22 this subject I would just say since this  
23 incident we've just literally had dozens and  
24 dozens of kids make threats towards schools and  
25 individuals, and this is not unusual, to find

1       this type of material on their phones. It's --  
2       it's a lot more common than we would believe,  
3       and Commissioners, I just want you to be aware  
4       of that.

5               CHAIR: Senator Book.

6               SEN. BOOK: Sorry, Mr. Chair. Do we know  
7       how long he spent like on these different  
8       sites, like amounts of time?

9               SGT. SUESS: The only way to know that  
10      really would be -- so the way this is laid out  
11      in the report is it shows the time you access  
12      that site, and then the time you access another  
13      site. So but then you also, you're left with  
14      the opportunity, well, did he access the site  
15      and then set the phone and lock it, go do  
16      something else.

17              SEN. BOOK: And are these in order of his  
18      searches?

19              SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am. So I mean  
20      obviously these are all on February 9th.

21              SEN. BOOK: Like, I mean like it's just  
22      sort of interesting, like you start with  
23      therapists for homicidal thoughts, best AR-15  
24      sites, how to get into a relationship, how to  
25      get a girlfriend, like it's just, see like,

1           it's kind of like all over, you know.

2           SGT. SUESS: He -- he was all over, ma'am,  
3           it's, it is very cyclical, like Commissioner  
4           Larkin Skinner referenced. I mean every day  
5           really it was, it was pornography, Japanese  
6           anime, which are essentially cartoons, and then  
7           guns.

8           SEN. BOOK: Was he watching, like the  
9           amine, was it, was he watching anime or was he  
10          watching like sexual anime?

11          SGT. SUESS: I accessed a few of them on  
12          YouTube, and it was mostly, I don't know much  
13          about it, I know that's sort of a cult  
14          following. There are some sexual I believe,  
15          not specific to Cruz. His were more martial  
16          arts fights, those types of things. None of  
17          the pornography sites that he had visited were  
18          indicative of child pornography, it was all  
19          adult. Frequently various races. So I don't  
20          know if that gives you any insight to his  
21          racial feelings, thoughts.

22          This is a video from February 8, 2018.  
23          This is a dead iguana, and you'll see, he  
24          points it out, but the intestines of this  
25          iguana have been removed.

1 MR. SCHACHTER: Oh, my God.

2 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the  
3 open meeting.)

4 CRUZ: Killed an iguana, 2018, fucker, I  
5 ripped out his organs. I think it's dead.

6 (Thereupon, the video concludes, and the proceedings  
7 continue as follows:)

8 SGT. SUESS: Between February 10th and  
9 11th the theme of the internet searches largely  
10 transition to school shooting related material,  
11 specific shootings such as Marshal County  
12 again, Red Lake Senior High School, a Rolling  
13 Stones article on the AR-15 becoming the mass  
14 shooters weapon of choice, and then again, you  
15 know, pornography, school shooters. He  
16 searched Dollar Tree Parkland where he worked,  
17 the Virginia Tech Massacre, the Columbine  
18 Diary, the Virginia Tech shooting, again  
19 Columbine, several on Columbine.

20 This is a video from February 11, 2018 at  
21 1:47 in the afternoon.

22 (Thereupon, the following video  
23 is played in the open meeting.)

24 CRUZ: Today is the day, the day that it  
25 all begins, the day of my massacre shall begin.

1 All the kids in the school will run, and fear,  
2 and hide. From the wrath of my power they will  
3 know who I am. I am nothing. I am no one. My  
4 life is nothing and meaningless. Everything  
5 that I hold dear I let go beyond your hath,  
6 every day I see the world ending another day.  
7 I live a lone life, life in seclusion and  
8 solitude. I hate everyone and everything.  
9 With the power of my AR you will all know who I  
10 am. I had enough of being told what to do and  
11 when to do. I had enough of being, tell me  
12 that I'm an idiot and a dumbass. When in real  
13 life you're all the dumbass, you're all stupid  
14 and brainwashed by these fucking political  
15 government programs. You will all see. You  
16 will all know who my name is. My love for you,  
17 Angie, will never go away. I hope to see you  
18 in the afterlife. From one day or another you  
19 will end, and we will all die.

20 (Thereupon, the video concludes, and the proceedings  
21 continue as follows:)

22 SGT. SUESS: A few minutes later --

23 MR. SCHACHTER: Can I -- can I ask a  
24 question?

25 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

1 MR. SCHACHTER: Who -- was Angie his ex-  
2 girlfriend?

3 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

4 MR. SCHACHTER: Has she been interviewed?

5 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

6 MR. SCHACHTER: Do we have testimony from  
7 her? Do we have testimony from her? Has the  
8 commission seen that?

9 SGT. SUESS: The commission as a whole I  
10 don't believe has. The interview has been  
11 reviewed by Detective Lyons, and there were  
12 some excerpts from that included yesterday I  
13 believe.

14 MR. SCHACHTER: Did -- did he make any  
15 calls? Did we -- did we look at his call logs?

16 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

17 MR. SCHACHTER: And can you refresh my  
18 memory?

19 SGT. SUESS: That's going to be covered  
20 here shortly.

21 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay. Okay, thank you.

22 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

23 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the  
24 open meeting.)

25 CRUZ: My name is Nik, and I'm going to be

1 next school shooter of 2018. My goal is at  
2 least twenty people with an AR-15 and a couple  
3 tracer rounds. I think I can do a, get done.  
4 The location is Stoneman Douglas in Parkland,  
5 Florida. It's going to be a big event, and  
6 when you see me on the news we'll all know who  
7 I am. You're all going to die, pew, pew, pew,  
8 pew, pew. Ah, yeah, I can't wait.

9 (Thereupon, the video concludes, and the proceedings  
10 continue as follows:)

11 SEN. BOOK: Did these just live on his  
12 phone?

13 SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am. There is no  
14 indication they were transmitted to anybody  
15 else. Then the following days, February 12th  
16 and 13th, again that video I referenced which  
17 glorifies school shootings he's accessed. The  
18 school shooting theme continues, Columbine.  
19 There is actually an active shooter training  
20 video by the Columbus Police Department in  
21 Georgia that he accessed. The video -- it was  
22 a pretty long video. We have no way to know  
23 whether he watched the whole thing or not.

24 There was quite an interest in Eastern  
25 European and Russian military. I don't know

1           where that stems from. A video that is titled  
2           I Put SpongeBob Music Over a School Shooting,  
3           and then you can again just see some of these  
4           search phrases, specifically how long does it  
5           take for a cop to show up at a school shooting.  
6           He identified a school shooting in Finland, and  
7           then searched the phrase I want to die.

8           Continuing with his internet history,  
9           again that Pumped Up Kicks song, additional  
10          videos just really consistent with the same  
11          themes that you've seen throughout.

12          MR. SCHACHTER: I'm sorry, can you just  
13          ask, answer me, so the Pumped Up Kicks, that's  
14          related to Columbine?

15          SGT. SUESS: It is. In a minute, and  
16          you'll see an excerpt of it. And so  
17          essentially what somebody did is they have  
18          taken a made for TV movie and dubbed over the  
19          audio, if I'm using the correct phrase, Ms.  
20          Ellis, about, taking the song and dubbed it  
21          over this made for TV movie. You'll see an  
22          excerpt here in a second. It may help  
23          understand --

24          MR. SCHACHTER: It's a -- it's a -- oh,  
25          okay, it's a movie about Columbine?

1           SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. But it's -- but  
2 not a documentary, it's a reenactment, a  
3 dramatization.

4           Airsoft guns were a pretty common history.  
5 There were some videos about, you know, sort of  
6 stand your ground type cases, law enforcement  
7 officers having to shoot assailants, and then a  
8 song titled Kill Everybody by Skrillex.

9           A screenshot from his phone on  
10 shootersnetwork.com. Just an excerpt from that  
11 song Kill Everybody.

12           Here are some of the phrases from that  
13 song Pumped Up Kicks, and in a second you'll  
14 see, it's a very brief segment of that video.

15       (Thereupon, the following video is played in the  
16                           open meeting.)

17           SONG: All the other kids with the pumped  
18 up kicks better run, better run, I'll grab my  
19 gun, I'll --

20       (Thereupon, the video concludes, and the proceedings  
21                           continue as follows:)

22           SGT. SUESS: So February 13th, the night  
23 before the shooting at 10:06 p.m. he searched  
24 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. A few  
25 minutes later he accessed on YouTube a music

1 video by an artist named Token. The name of  
2 the video is Exception. And so after reading  
3 the lyrics and watching the video it  
4 essentially explains the story of a kid who's  
5 bullied at school repeatedly named Andy. It  
6 shows that after several instances of being  
7 bullied, or beat up, Andy returns to the school  
8 and shoots the two bullies.

9 MR. SCHACHTER: And do we have evidence  
10 that he was bullied? I mean it sounds like he  
11 was the bully.

12 SGT. SUESS: I think it depends on who you  
13 ask honestly. We -- we've -- we've had people  
14 sort of give us both sides of that coin.

15 SEN. BOOK: When -- when we talked  
16 earlier, and we've looked at a lot of this  
17 stuff, it was sort of like indiscriminate. He  
18 wasn't targeting a particular person, it was  
19 really just, you know, and even he says I, my  
20 goal is twenty, twenty people, not this  
21 individual, this individual who hurt me. And  
22 no writings, like the journals that he kept, or  
23 anything that targeted any particular  
24 individual or a group of students, correct?

25 SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am, the themes were

1       made throughout, and we worked closely with  
2       BSO's homicide detectives, and there's, there's  
3       no indication he was targeting any individual.  
4       Obviously he has some thoughts on different  
5       races, but there's no indication he was  
6       targeting any specific race or individual.

7               CHAIR: No, and there were --  
8       unfortunately it seems like everybody who was  
9       shot was just in the wrong place at the wrong  
10      time, because there was, there were some  
11      boyfriends, or former boyfriends of  
12      girlfriends, or current ex- girlfriends, et  
13      cetera, so there was a lot of discussion about  
14      that, but there's absolutely no indication that  
15      anybody who was shot was targeted by him.

16             SEN. BOOK: Well, and I think he -- I know  
17      that this is coming up, but, you know, TJ, he  
18      asks him like where, what classroom are you in,  
19      you know, where are you, so --

20             CHAIR: Right, that's coming up. That's  
21      coming up. And that's -- and that -- and  
22      that's TJ Snead who he was living with, and it  
23      seems like more than likely --

24             SEN. BOOK: He wanted to make sure he  
25      didn't --

1           CHAIR:  -- is that he didn't want to shoot  
2           Snead.

3           SEN. BOOK:  Right.

4           CHAIR:  Is probably what that was.  So  
5           we'll, yeah, we're -- John is going to get into  
6           that.  Go ahead.

7           SGT. SUESS:  So about the Sneads, their  
8           interview with BSO, we took some of the  
9           excerpts from that, and I'm not going to go  
10          through these point by point, it's laid out  
11          pretty, pretty clearly.  But it sounds to be a  
12          fairly normal setup in that residence, in the  
13          sense that they realized that Cruz was down and  
14          out on his luck, trying to give him a place  
15          where he could lay his head essentially.

16          They -- Kimberly Snead, the mother, had  
17          seen him the night before.  In that interview  
18          she didn't really comment on his demeanor,  
19          whether he seemed angry, indifferent, happy,  
20          anything along those lines.  She -- JT did  
21          describe that Cruz had been depressed for  
22          months, which he attributed to the death of his  
23          mother.  They referenced again the fact that  
24          Cruz didn't drive, cook, or do laundry, largely  
25          dependent on other people, and indicated they

1 had no reason to believe that Cruz was a threat  
2 to anybody, and no indication that he would do  
3 something like this.

4 So we're going to focus on February 14th  
5 based on Nikolas Cruz's internet activity, and  
6 then identifying his travels through the Uber  
7 records, and then also through his cell phone  
8 location. So beginning that morning at 6:59  
9 this is just some of the different types of  
10 sites that he visited, references to the KKK  
11 and Nazi related themes, the anime,  
12 pornography, the knife game again. He googled  
13 Parkland, Florida and the Dollar Tree, as well  
14 as school shooter, and again accessed the  
15 Pumped up Kicks song by Foster the People.

16 9:17.11 he attempted a call to JT Snead,  
17 but there's no indication that that phone call  
18 was successful, and then that call was serviced  
19 by a tower just west of the Snead residence, so  
20 you see on the map the approximate location of  
21 the Snead residence, the approximate location  
22 of the tower, that red, or, I'm sorry, black  
23 angled graphic, and then its relation to  
24 Stoneman Douglas on the bottom left corner.

25 Shortly thereafter he engaged in a text

1 conversation with JT Snead. There were again,  
2 up until really just minutes before all of his  
3 cell phone activity is from the Snead  
4 residence. There's no indication that he left  
5 the house that morning, an innocuous  
6 conversation about letting the dog out. Cruz  
7 told JT that his boss called him and said he did  
8 not have to work that day.

9 Shortly thereafter Cruz made a call to the  
10 Dollar Tree, seventeen seconds. Between 12:00  
11 and 1:00 p.m. Cruz engaged in text  
12 conversations with JT and an ex-girlfriend.  
13 The ex-girlfriend was saved in Cruz's phone as,  
14 quote, warning love of your life, end quote.  
15 There was no name attributed to that. We know  
16 who he was addressing, but again in an interest  
17 to try and protect her identity we are not  
18 using her name. He made a single call to her  
19 that was not answered. Cruz and JT engaged in  
20 a conversation about whether or not some female  
21 friends are going to be coming over later that  
22 night for a bonfire. Again, it's Valentine's  
23 Day.

24 Between 1:00 and 2:00 the text  
25 conversations continued with JT and the

1 ex-girlfriend. Cruz is still at the Snead  
2 residence. Cruz asked Snead what time school  
3 ends, which class JT is in, and about the name  
4 of JT's teacher. There were very brief texts  
5 to his ex-girlfriend, but she did not reply  
6 during that time.

7 Between 2:00 and 2:08 Cruz exchanged six  
8 text messages with his ex-girlfriend. He is  
9 still at the Snead residence. She more or less  
10 got on his case for texting him too much, and  
11 not respecting her, and then he says that he  
12 loves her, and always know I love you. So  
13 between 2:08.44 and 2:10.02, and this is more  
14 or less the window when Cruz starts leaving the  
15 residence, there is twelve text messages  
16 exchanged with JT and his ex-girlfriend. The  
17 cell activity changes to a tower east of the  
18 Snead residence. He tells his ex-girlfriend  
19 eat well, sleep well, and behave well. They  
20 continue in conversations, asking if he knows  
21 that she had a boyfriend.

22 SHER. ASHLEY: Excuse me.

23 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

24 SHER. ASHLEY: Is JT at school?

25 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir, he was at school.

1           SHER. ASHLEY: Was he in Building 12?

2           SGT. SUESS: No, sir. Other -- other side  
3 of campus.

4           SHER. ASHLEY: Was anybody that Cruz knew  
5 in Building 12 that we know of at this point?

6           SGT. SUESS: I think we've identified --

7           SHER. ASHLEY: It was the freshman  
8 building, I was just wondering why he picked  
9 Building 12.

10          MR. SCHACHTER: No, there were seniors  
11 there as well.

12          SGT. SUESS: The speculation on my part is  
13 just the location. I mean it's easy to access,  
14 it's in that far northeast corner near the  
15 gates. There's no indication he's targeting  
16 any single individual.

17          So you can see this location, the tower  
18 that his cell phone is now picking up the  
19 signal of, has moved to the east. Between  
20 2:10.09 and 2:14.05 Cruz exchanged twenty-three  
21 text messages with JT and his girlfriend.  
22 These all transitioned to a tower south of the  
23 Snead residence, so Cruz is continuing his path  
24 of travel south getting closer to the campus.  
25 Cruz told JT that he was going to go see a

1 movie, which angers JT because he had convinced  
2 these girls that they were going to come over  
3 later that night. And then Cruz continues with  
4 just the admiring and flattering texts which  
5 he's sending to his ex-girlfriend. You see the  
6 tower now a little further south of the Snead  
7 residence.

8 CHAIR: Before you -- and I don't know,  
9 just on a -- he says in there it's too late  
10 now, it's the second time he's said that.

11 SGT. SUESS: Right.

12 CHAIR: And so it seems like at this  
13 point, you know, where he's waffling, going to  
14 these sites about homicidal therapists, et  
15 cetera, by the time he leaves the house he's  
16 made up his mind what he's doing. Keep going,  
17 John.

18 SGT. SUESS: So as a reminder, Cruz was  
19 dropped off at approximately 2:19 by the Uber,  
20 so between the, just a couple minutes leading  
21 up to that, and then on to 3:45.52, there were  
22 twenty- three text messages and then missed  
23 calls, so calls coming into Cruz's phone. All  
24 this data was serviced off of a tower southeast  
25 of Stoneman Douglas. North Community Park was

1 just south of the Sawgrass Expressway.

2 He sent two text messages to the ex-  
3 girlfriend saying that he loves here. The last  
4 outgoing text to JT were 2:18.46 where he says  
5 you, and then seconds later, tell. We don't  
6 know what that means. Don't know if he was  
7 interrupted. It doesn't make sense, and  
8 there's no clear explanation for what he was  
9 trying to say at that point.

10 All remaining activity were incoming texts  
11 and phone calls. And again just a reminder,  
12 2:21 was the time in which Cruz entered  
13 Building 12, and at 3:36 is the time in which  
14 he was detained by law enforcement,  
15 approximately. That's the tower which all of  
16 that activity took place on.

17 SEC. KAPUSTA: Sheriff.

18 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. Ma'am.

19 SEC. KAPUSTA: May I ask?

20 CHAIR: Yes, Commissioner, go ahead.

21 SEC. KAPUSTA: Did the ex-girlfriend  
22 indicate that as soon as she heard what was  
23 happening on campus that she suspected  
24 anything?

25 SGT. SUESS: No, ma'am, I don't believe

1           so. I'm not sure. Gentlemen, correct me if  
2           I'm wrong. I'm not sure we came across anyone  
3           that in any way expected this, to the point  
4           where they actually thought he would do it.  
5           There were people who said they weren't  
6           terribly surprised, but, you know, they're not  
7           surprised in hindsight, but having the  
8           forethought, I don't think anybody did.

9           CHAIR: Well, there's one person in Chris'  
10          presentation yesterday who was fleeing the  
11          campus who did make reference to him, who said  
12          that I thought he would be the shooter, when  
13          she saw him exiting. So there was -- there was  
14          at least one who made that reference. That was  
15          in the presentation yesterday.

16          SEC. SENIOR: To Cruz himself, right,  
17          saying --

18          MR. SCHACHTER: Yeah.

19          SEC. SENIOR: To Cruz himself.

20          CHAIR: What's that?

21          SEC. SENIOR: She said that to Cruz  
22          himself, right?

23          CHAIR: Yeah, said that to Cruz, because  
24          she was in the pack as they were leaving the  
25          campus, and she thought that if there was a

1 shooting, I thought it'd be you. And that was  
2 in Detective Lyons' presentation yesterday. Go  
3 ahead.

4 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So to reiterate,  
5 there was one firearm that was used during the  
6 shooting that AR-15 style rifle, and he only  
7 had one firearm on him, a Smith & Wesson Model  
8 MP15. It's a semi-automatic firearm. There  
9 were a sling and bi-pod attached to the rifle.  
10 It was purchased on February 11, 2017 at  
11 Sunrise Tactical Supply in Coral Springs. This  
12 is the firearm which he used, and some of the  
13 magazines that were recovered you see have  
14 swastikas etched onto the side of them.

15 The additional six firearms which Cruz  
16 owned are, are listed here. The -- one of the  
17 shotguns that he had also had swastikas etched  
18 on the buttstock. These firearms were stored  
19 at the Snead residence, and then some other  
20 ones at a friend's house, Hunter McCutchen.

21 So James Snead in his interview said that  
22 he had guns hidden at the residence, but he was  
23 under the impression that Cruz did not know  
24 where they were. Some of them were hidden in  
25 the closet where Cruz was staying. They knew

1       that Cruz had multiple guns. They were kept in  
2       a safe. James had a key, and it's not  
3       perfectly clear I would say whether Cruz had a  
4       key or not. The salesman who sold the safe to  
5       Cruz recalled the transaction, and believed  
6       that there were two guns, or I'm sorry, two  
7       keys that came with this safe.

8               James Snead, the father, was under the  
9       impression that the guns and ammo were all kept  
10      safe from one another. JT, Cruz's friend knew  
11      that Cruz had his own ammo stash that he could  
12      have accessed at any point. Cruz kept his guns  
13      and ammo in a safe inside of his room, and  
14      James Snead described Cruz as having an  
15      interest and appreciate for guns.

16             That concludes this presentation. I'm  
17      happy to answer any questions.

18             CHAIR: Mr. Schachter, go ahead.

19             MR. SCHACHTER: When was the murderer  
20      removed from school, or when was his last day,  
21      do we, withdrawn from MSD, do we know that?

22             SGT. SUESS: It was in February of '18.

23             CHAIR: '17.

24             SGT. SUESS: I'm sorry, '17.

25             MR. SCHACHTER: It was '17. His -- his

1 trip with Uber, was this his first Uber trip,  
2 or had he made many others, do we have any --

3 SGT. SUESS: I don't know for certain. I  
4 don't have a specific answer for that, sir.

5 MR. SCHACHTER: And that was using his,  
6 his mother's, his mother had already passed  
7 away, whose credit card was that Uber attached  
8 to?

9 SGT. SUESS: So he had some access to his  
10 mother's account. I don't know the  
11 subscription information on that specific Uber  
12 account.

13 MR. SCHACHTER: He -- he obviously, did he  
14 -- in his wallet did he have multiple credit  
15 cards, or --

16 SGT. SUESS: I don't recall.

17 MR. SCHACHTER: And the money, the money  
18 that he got to buy all these weapons, was that  
19 -- I remember \$7,000 was taken out of his  
20 mother's account, but was that used to buy  
21 these weapons? Do we have any idea where he  
22 got the money to buy these weapons?

23 CHAIR: I don't know, but he was -- we do  
24 know that he was working at Dollar Tree, and I  
25 think his wages as Dollar Tree during the time

1 he worked there -- and they considered him to  
2 be a fine employee, they had no issues with  
3 him, or what he did. I think he made about  
4 \$6,500 at Dollar Tree, so he was buying weapons  
5 during the time he worked at Dollar Tree as  
6 well.

7 MR. SCHACHTER: Does that account for the  
8 cost of these weapons?

9 CHAIR: Hard to tell. Sen. Book.

10 SEN. BOOK: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have  
11 a quick question. This presentation, it says  
12 that he purchased this weapon on February 11th,  
13 and then I remember because I took note, that  
14 in Detective Lyons' presentation that the  
15 murder weapon was purchased on February 18th,  
16 which is significant because that was also the  
17 date that Lynda Cruz adopted him officially.  
18 So I was just like wondering like are, like  
19 when like you look at the psychopathy of this  
20 individual, or the, you know, like, sort of  
21 like the history, so I was just wondering is  
22 that just an, an error, or was it different  
23 dates, like different weapons, or --

24 SGT. SUESS: I'll verify it over our lunch  
25 break.

1 SEN. BOOK: Okay.

2 CHAIR: Commissioner Nelson, go ahead.

3 CHIEF NELSON: On Page 61, or Slide 61,  
4 you said that he had twenty-three text messages  
5 and ten missed calls. Was there anything  
6 significant to the ten missed calls?

7 SGT. SUESS: Some of them as best I recall  
8 were the Sneads trying to locate him much  
9 longer after the shooting. I mean there was --  
10 there were some where the radio traffic, people  
11 had accessed, for instance there was a  
12 gentleman on the west coast who was listening  
13 to BSO's radio traffic, heard that BSO  
14 broadcasted Cruz's phone number, and a  
15 gentleman texted Cruz basically saying, you're  
16 going to get caught, I hope you have a good  
17 time in prison. So it's -- I mean there's  
18 people around the country that had done that.

19 CHIEF NELSON: Thank you.

20 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

21 CHAIR: And -- and Mr. Snead had been  
22 contacted, you'll see this later too, he had  
23 been contacted by Broward Sheriff's Office. He  
24 was working with the Sheriff's Office to try  
25 and find Cruz, and so there were calls. Some

1 of those calls were law enforcement generated  
2 calls to try and find him before he was taken  
3 into custody. Go ahead, one more.

4 MR. SCHACHTER: Yes. You know we've seen  
5 in a lot of these murders their obsession with  
6 Columbine. We -- we saw recently that this,  
7 another murderer who had an obsession with  
8 Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris killed seventeen  
9 people in Chechnya. I see a lot of, you know,  
10 a lot of, he looked at a lot of different  
11 school shootings. Do you think that he was  
12 obsessed with, with Columbine in particular,  
13 and those murderers just in general?

14 SGT. SUESS: I don't think I'm in a  
15 position to make that conclusion. What I can  
16 tell you is he looked at Columbine a lot,  
17 probably more so than the other ones.

18 CHAIR: All right, thanks, John. So we're  
19 going to break for lunch. We'll start again at  
20 1:15. So we'll be in recess until 1:15.

21 (Thereupon, the meeting is in recess, and the  
22 proceedings continue as follows:)

23 CHAIR: All right, we'll go ahead and get  
24 started. We're now going to begin hearing  
25 about the law enforcement response. This

1 presentation will take us through the rest of  
2 the day today, and into tomorrow. We'll use  
3 the same format. I just ask that you hold your  
4 questions unless they're clarifying questions,  
5 and we'll spend a lot of time on this, it's a  
6 very important topic, and something that we've  
7 been waiting to get to. So I'll turn it back  
8 over to Sergeant Suess, and he'll begin. John.

9 PRESENTATION LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO MSDHS

10 SHOOTING

11 SGT. SUESS: Thank you, Sheriff. Senator  
12 Book, to clarify, so the firearm, it was  
13 purchased on February 11th. It was not  
14 released to him until February 18th, so that  
15 explains the disparity in dates. So to explain  
16 a couple of things quickly, each of you were  
17 given essentially a presentation guide. You'll  
18 see that there's an animation here. It  
19 identifies what color dots represent certain  
20 people, or which organization they're from.  
21 There are some, what I've identified as  
22 significant times on there. Arguably every  
23 time is significant in the way this played out.  
24 These are some of the more important ones.

25 You also have the same map the same map

1       that is depicted on this board, so if you want  
2       to reference that it's directly in front of  
3       you, as well as the three story map of Building  
4       12 which is on the board behind Commissioner  
5       Bartlett. And lastly, there's a blueprint of  
6       Building 1 which is quite relevant, and we'll  
7       address that in a little more detail later.

8               So as a review this presentation is going  
9       to largely provide the commission with the  
10      answers specific to Topics 5 and 6, the law  
11      enforcement response. Those were the topics  
12      that the commission agreed upon early on,  
13      several months ago. We're going to cover the  
14      on-campus response by Deputy Scot Peterson, and  
15      the off-campus response by the Broward  
16      Sheriff's Office, Coral Springs Police  
17      Department, as well as some additional  
18      agencies.

19             These are the investigative sources that  
20      we have made use of throughout the  
21      investigation. We have not interviewed every  
22      person related to this event. Some interviews  
23      that were conducted by BSO, for example, we've  
24      had those transcripts, and we've made use of  
25      those. If one individual required a follow up

1           then we located them and asked those clarifying  
2           questions. I would like to point out that both  
3           the Broward Sheriff's Office and Coral Springs  
4           Police Department have cooperated with us  
5           fully, and seemingly without any hesitation,  
6           and given us everything that we've asked for.

7           Sheriff Gualtieri referenced yesterday the  
8           challenge in the time analysis. We were  
9           working off of many systems that have different  
10          time stamps, and so in some ways that was  
11          problematic, but all these times have been  
12          reconciled to an extremely small margin of  
13          error, a few seconds at most. It is important  
14          to notice that the body cameras that the  
15          Broward County Sheriff's Office deputies wear,  
16          they sync each time the user docks their  
17          specific camera. So for example, if Detective  
18          A docks it weekly and Detective B docks it  
19          monthly there could be some time creep there  
20          where their times could be off by a substantial  
21          amount. We have accounted for that as best we  
22          can though.

23               MR. SCHACHTER: Coral Springs does not  
24               wear a body camera, right?

25               SGT. SUESS: Correct. Yes, sir. Broward

1 Sheriff's Office issues some of their deputy's  
2 body cams, and we'll get to the specifics on  
3 that in a moment. You may hear us refer to  
4 them as body cams, body worn cams, BWCs.  
5 They're work in the center of the chest  
6 typically, and you can see an example there on  
7 the vest of one of the sergeants. At times  
8 their hands, or if their rifle is slung in  
9 front of them, it obstructs the view, so keep  
10 that in mind if, if it goes black for a moment.

11 It requires the user to activate the  
12 camera prior to it beginning the recording  
13 process. There are very few cameras that ran  
14 for the duration of the response. There are  
15 some that were turned off intentionally later  
16 on the process after the law enforcement  
17 function, more or less the active response has  
18 come to an end. Some were accidentally turned  
19 off by rifle slings, deputies address that in  
20 their reports, but then you would see that they  
21 would turn them back on shortly thereafter. We  
22 have no indication that anything significant  
23 was left out, or that this was intentional on  
24 anyone's part.

25 So the immense challenge in this

1 presentation in this investigation is due to  
2 the size of the campus, the number of students,  
3 the number of law enforcement personnel for  
4 multiple agencies, as well as fire rescue  
5 personnel and school administrators. There are  
6 a lot of things happening at the exact same  
7 time at different locations on campus, so in  
8 putting that together, obviously that has  
9 helped us piece together a lot of the  
10 information that we needed.

11 Conveying that to you is difficult, so as  
12 we go through this keep in mind there are  
13 always other things happening at other times.  
14 This presentation may make this seem like this  
15 took hours upon hours to fold out. It was a  
16 very brief incident in the grand scheme of  
17 things.

18 In the top left of nearly every side  
19 you'll see two time, two timestamps basically,  
20 so the one in black will be your actual time,  
21 and the one in parenthesis will be a running  
22 clock that's respective to the first shots. It  
23 will be in red if it is prior to the first  
24 shots, and will transition back to black when  
25 it is after Cruz has fired the first shots.

1           As I referenced earlier there's a lot of  
2           things happening at the same time, so please  
3           keep that in mind. For example, from the first  
4           shots until Cruz goes to the second floor is  
5           just over, or just under two minutes. The --  
6           until Cruz begins firing on the third floor  
7           it's just under three minutes, and law  
8           enforcement enters Building 12 just after  
9           eleven minutes. So please keep in mind that  
10          this is all happening very quickly.

11          All maps that you see are oriented north.  
12          There's going to be dots that represent certain  
13          individuals. These are approximations. You'll  
14          see in particular there's an animation where  
15          there are moving dots. We have no way to  
16          necessarily within reason calculate how fast  
17          any given person is moving. We may not know  
18          where that person originated but we know when  
19          they arrived, so they may be, it's an  
20          estimation basically from where they would have  
21          started until they arrived at any given point.

22          As pointed out, so the yellow dots  
23          represent students, the red dots represent MSD  
24          staff, the green dots represent the Sheriff's  
25          Office, and Coral Springs PD is represented by

1 blue. For those of you that are not familiar,  
2 so the Sheriff referenced this very early on in  
3 the commission's meetings, law enforcement is  
4 among the worst organizations in using jargon  
5 specific to our profession, so if we say  
6 something that needs clarification please let  
7 us know. To that end, green is typically  
8 associated with the Sheriff's Office, and blue  
9 with law enforcement, so that may help you,  
10 give a little, help provide you a little  
11 insight as we move along.

12 It has not been lost on the investigators  
13 that this was a very rapidly unfolding event,  
14 utter chaos. There's never going to be a  
15 perfect law enforcement response to any  
16 incident whatsoever. It doesn't matter which  
17 organization is approaching that incident.  
18 There is a tremendous number of personnel and  
19 moving parts happening in a very short period  
20 of time, so please consider that as we are  
21 identifying some of the issues that we've seen.  
22 That being said, as mandated in those last two  
23 lines in the statute we've been given a job to  
24 do, and we have done that.

25 To provide you with some background, so

1 just you understand how some of these agencies  
2 view their response to this incident, Broward  
3 Sheriff's Office obviously had the Fort  
4 Lauderdale Airport shooting that occurred not  
5 long ago at all. They experienced the same  
6 radio problem which you've heard about at great  
7 length. They also identified, and we heard  
8 about it through the course of several  
9 interviews, the part of the problem they had  
10 was the overwhelming response to the scene  
11 itself resulted in congestion.

12 Cars parking really anywhere they could  
13 find a spot was eventually problematic, that  
14 emergency vehicles couldn't move about freely.  
15 It's not specific to BSO, in the time that  
16 we've evaluated the MSD incident we've also  
17 looked at other mass casualty incidents, that's  
18 a consistent theme, and something that law  
19 enforcement agencies continue to work on.

20 So you're aware, Coral Springs Police  
21 Department on February 14th, the chief at the  
22 time was Tony Pustizzi. He announced his  
23 retirement the preceding November. His final  
24 day was March 2nd. The current police chief is  
25 Clyde Parry. He was one of two deputy chiefs

1 on February 14th, so just so you understand  
2 that was a ball that already had been set in  
3 motion.

4 It's important also that you understand  
5 that you do not equate the command post with  
6 the command bus. The location of the command  
7 post is something that was a source of  
8 confusion in the law enforcement response, so  
9 just please don't see the command bus and  
10 assume that must be where the incident  
11 commander is, where all the decisions are being  
12 made.

13 Special Agent Massucci referenced  
14 yesterday the rule of plus one, so just to give  
15 you some background on law enforcement,  
16 basically you always have to consider there's  
17 an additional threat. So an example, if an  
18 officer responds to a bank robbery and they  
19 find a bad guy with a gun in the lobby you have  
20 to assume there's one more, or plus one, so  
21 there's another bad guy behind the counter. If  
22 you find that second guy assume there's a third  
23 one hiding in the bathroom. So even when law  
24 enforcement learns over the radio that Cruz has  
25 fled they can't then just, you know, holster

1       their guns, and assume everything is fine, they  
2       still have to proceed as if there are  
3       additional threats, whether it's another  
4       shooter, IEDs, something to that affect.

5             Detective Bonasoro covered the MSD  
6       background pretty thoroughly. Just to  
7       reiterate, Broward SO provides law enforcement  
8       services, and Coral Springs Fire provides fire  
9       services for the City of Parkland. The  
10      surveillance cameras for Building 12 are motion  
11      activated. As a result there are some times  
12      where there are gaps in footage. It's not a  
13      result of it being edited or redacted in any  
14      way, it's just if somebody runs across the  
15      screen but they're so far away the camera may  
16      not pick it up, so you might not see that  
17      person. At other times, as some of you saw on  
18      the video yesterday within Building 12, the  
19      cloud of debris that fell from the ceiling  
20      resulted in obscuring Cruz's movement inside  
21      the building.

22             Building 12 and building, the 1200  
23      Building, you'll hear those phrases used  
24      interchangeably, and code red and lockdown,  
25      again those often get used interchangeably.

1 Detective Bonasoro covered at length the school  
2 personnel administrators.

3 That's the approximate location of  
4 Stoneman Douglas as it relates to Broward  
5 County. The majority of the commission members  
6 have been up there. It's, you know, just off  
7 the Sawgrass Expressway, which is a major  
8 thoroughfare down here. To the left, or the  
9 west, are the Everglades. And then to the  
10 north is Palm Beach County.

11 So on this campus map you see Westglades  
12 Middle borders Marjory Stoneman Douglas High  
13 School directly to the west. To the north is  
14 Holmberg Road. To the right, or the east, is  
15 Pine Island Road, or Coral Springs Drive.  
16 Those phrases are often used in interviews, and  
17 you'll hear on body cams them used  
18 interchangeably. If you're north of the  
19 Sawgrass it's Pine Island. If you're south  
20 it's Coral Springs Drive. And then to the  
21 south, again the Sawgrass Expressway.

22 There's two gates to the student parking  
23 lot on the north end of campus. I'm going to  
24 refer to those as the west gate and east gate,  
25 so if you hear me say that, and I say west

1 gate, please don't assume I'm talking about a  
2 gate on the west side of campus, it's just  
3 those two gates on the north side.

4 Again to orient you, so you have the  
5 tactical operations command, or the TOC.  
6 You'll hear that acronym used several times.  
7 It ended up being established north of Building  
8 13, and eventually moved into Building 13. The  
9 fire rescue command post was established at the  
10 intersection of Pine Island Road and Holmberg  
11 Road. The mobile command buses eventually join  
12 up together near the southeast corner of campus  
13 on Pine Island Road near the bus loop, and then  
14 just south of that beneath the Sawgrass  
15 Expressway you'll see there's the staging area.  
16 And we'll go into more detail about the role of  
17 that staging area.

18 An overview of some of the significant  
19 locations, so the MSD campus is encircled with  
20 the white dotted line. To the left, or west,  
21 is the Walmart to which Cruz later fled, along  
22 with a significant number of students. South  
23 of that is a McDonalds, where several students  
24 fled there as well. Cruz went there, which we  
25 will cover, and law enforcement pursued him

1           there, just honestly missing him by a few  
2           minutes.

3           And then further south, approximately two  
4           miles from the MSD campus, is the location  
5           where Cruz was arrested.

6           SEC. KAPUSTA: May I ask a question real  
7           quick?

8           SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am.

9           SEC. KAPUSTA: Between the middle school  
10          and the high school, is there actually a road  
11          or driveway there, or there is not, it's just  
12          like a land border?

13          SGT. SUESS: So -- yes, ma'am, so you see  
14          just -- so there's two baseball, well, a  
15          baseball field and a softball field, so the  
16          one, the one further north, or the one closer  
17          to the top, you'll see there's that roadway  
18          that stops about halfway down. That's the  
19          entrance to Westglades Middle School, and so  
20          that stops, you make a right turn, or a  
21          westbound turn, and then you can get closer to  
22          campus, pick up your kids, what have you.

23          SEC. KAPUSTA: Thank you.

24          SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am. So just backing  
25          out further, this is the greater Broward County

1 area. You will see BSO headquarters in the  
2 bottom right in the City of Fort Lauderdale.  
3 They have numerous satellite offices, or  
4 district offices, and you'll see some of those  
5 in a minute. Coral Springs PD, their  
6 headquarters is much closer to MSD. And then  
7 of course the MSD campus very near the northern  
8 border of Broward County.

9 Markham Park is a large park that seems to  
10 serve many roles. It's important that you know  
11 on February 14th the BSO SWAT team was there  
12 training, so they were on duty, some of them  
13 actually on the range practicing firing, so the  
14 vast majority of BSO SWAT team responded from  
15 Markham Park. It's about a nineteen mile  
16 drive. Obviously if you're going lights and  
17 sirens it's not going to take nearly as long as  
18 it would the rest of us.

19 On February 14th, these are the cameras  
20 that were at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High  
21 School. This is not every single camera, but  
22 these are the ones that were most significant,  
23 and pertinent to our investigation. Since  
24 February 14th this system has been changed.  
25 There are additional cameras, a great deal

1 number of cameras that have been added, and  
2 within, with Building 12. Actually I'll cover  
3 that here in a minute.

4 So Senator Book, you referenced earlier  
5 about Building 12 being added, and Building 13,  
6 and obstructing certain views. So these are  
7 the three cameras that were most relevant  
8 around Building 12, and the approximate range  
9 which each of them covers. And we're going to  
10 go through each of those to help you understand  
11 a little better about each camera.

12 So Building 13 you can see is on the  
13 northwest corner, I'm sorry, this Camera 28 is  
14 on the northwest corner of Building 13 and  
15 points to the northeast. It's a great angle,  
16 and in theory should cover a lot of things, but  
17 you can see that it is so far away from certain  
18 valuable angles which we need it's hard to tell  
19 when things are happening. We know there's a  
20 great deal that happened in the distance on  
21 this camera, but it just, the sensitivity was  
22 not great enough to pick up movement. Those  
23 two red dots that you see on there, or the red  
24 ovals, those are people, and for all intents  
25 and purposes they look like ants, so we really

1        couldn't tell, certainly can't identify the  
2        individual, and you can hardly tell which  
3        uniform, which color uniform they are wearing.

4            Camera 30 is in between Buildings 12 and  
5        13. You can see it covers a very valuable  
6        area, but it's also a very small area. It's a  
7        small window which that covers, but it does  
8        provide a great deal of insight about the  
9        movement of certain individuals.

10           On the southeast corner of Building 13 is  
11        the camera which has largely been, largely been  
12        circulated throughout the media. So that's on  
13        the southeast corner of Building 13 facing to  
14        the east. It picks up Deputy Peterson's  
15        movement, as well as other students and staff,  
16        which you'll see. Those -- the red circle in  
17        the distance are two law enforcement officers.  
18        Again, by and large we can't identify, you  
19        know, what color uniform they're wearing, or  
20        which agency they're affiliated with.

21           Within Building 12 there are these  
22        cameras, three on each floor, and then four  
23        between the two stairwells. The cameras in the  
24        stairwells cover, they overlap, so within  
25        Building 12, absent in the classrooms, so the

1 hallways and the stairs we have very good  
2 footage that gave us very clear information  
3 about what happened inside that building.

4 So neither the Broward Sheriff's Office  
5 nor the Coral Springs Police Department have  
6 dash mounted cameras within their vehicles, so  
7 that's not a record we were able to access.  
8 Deputies assigned to the City of Parkland did  
9 not wear body cameras. That's an agreement  
10 reached between BSO and the City of Parkland,  
11 and something that potentially one of them may  
12 be able to answer the why of that issue.  
13 Deputies on the County budget in some contract  
14 cities are issued body cams. Some of the  
15 Broward Sheriff's Office vehicles had GPS  
16 records, and Coral Springs Department, Coral  
17 Springs Police Department had GPS records.

18 CHAIR: It does seem -- on that issue,  
19 just so, is that it seems to be, with the  
20 contract cities it seems to be financially  
21 driven, from what we are hearing, and that may  
22 be something, if anybody has the interest, but  
23 it seems to be with equipment, that if the  
24 contract city pays for it then the deputies  
25 have it. So you do have inconsistent equipment

1 among the deputies in Broward County depending  
2 upon whether, what contract city they're in, so  
3 that would explain why some of them had body  
4 cameras and some did not.

5 Yes, Sheriff, go ahead.

6 SHER. ASHLEY: And I think we know this,  
7 or I think we've heard it before, the cameras,  
8 were they, in the school, did they have a time  
9 delay, or --

10 SGT. SUESS: No, sir. Those are  
11 synchronized through the National Time  
12 Standard, something to that affect. And that  
13 was really used as our baseline. We corrected  
14 all other times to match the school camera  
15 system.

16 CHAIR: They weren't -- they weren't time  
17 delayed, but they are, but they're motion  
18 activated, so then there's a difference, but,  
19 but they're not real time so they're not  
20 continuously running. So when you go there you  
21 may have it where it's, you know, 2:56, then  
22 the next thing you see is 3:56 because there's  
23 no motion.

24 SHER. ASHLEY: There's no motion,  
25 movement.

1           SHER. JUDD: And the assumption is that  
2 these cameras are not monitored.

3           SGT. SUESS: Correct. And just to  
4 clarify, Sheriff Ashley, so the time delay has  
5 obviously already been brought in the media  
6 about, are they watching live footage or not.  
7 We'll get to that part, and, and what led to  
8 that confusion, but it's my understanding that  
9 there's no reason that any individual who knew  
10 how to work the system couldn't go and watch  
11 live feed, and then they could rewind if need  
12 be.

13          SHER. ASHLEY: Thank you.

14          SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So this same map  
15 again showing the MSD location, and the  
16 approximate location of BSO's Parkland District  
17 Office. So Parkland for all intents and  
18 purposes is essentially an island with Broward  
19 County. It's surrounded by the Everglades to  
20 the west, Palm Beach County to the north, and  
21 then municipalities to the south and the east.  
22 So those three municipalities, Coconut Creek,  
23 Coral Springs, and then Margate, each have  
24 their own police departments. This is largely  
25 the main reason Coral Springs was the initial

1 responder in such great quantity, is sheer  
2 proximity. The other nearest BSO deputies are  
3 in these other districts, which are cities  
4 contracted with Broward County.

5 So the school resource officer, or school  
6 resource deputy was Deputy Peterson on February  
7 14th. Deputy India was the SRO on the 14th at  
8 Westglades Middle. He was at BSO's  
9 headquarters in Fort Lauderdale on that day  
10 attending training. There was not a deputy  
11 there in his place. SROs carry an agency radio  
12 and a school radio. The school radios are not  
13 recorded. Surveillance video shows that Deputy  
14 Peterson had both radios on him at the time of  
15 the shooting. You will hear in some of the  
16 body cam transmissions, if a deputy with his  
17 body cam on is standing next to somebody that  
18 has a school radio we're able to pick up some  
19 of the school radio transmissions, so that has  
20 given us a little bit of insight, but that's,  
21 that's very sporadic, and there's, we certainly  
22 don't have a full accounting of what was  
23 transmitted on the school radio.

24 So in a minute we're going to play an  
25 animation, which I would like to thank Ms.

1 Ellis and Mr. Sotullo, who worked diligently on  
2 this, it far exceeds my abilities with a  
3 computer, but again despite having this  
4 animation, which I think will clarify a lot of  
5 things, there's so much happening at any given  
6 time on this animation that it's still  
7 difficult to digest, so the plan is to play  
8 this animation. I'm going to stop it as  
9 infrequently as necessary to point out key  
10 moments to try and give you a concept of how  
11 quickly this unfolded. Tomorrow when this ends  
12 we're going to play the animation again start  
13 to finish with no interruptions. You should  
14 have more of a framework for how to  
15 conceptualize this.

16 I want to point out a few things. So that  
17 first yellow arrow, you see those soundwaves,  
18 again green for the Sheriff's Office, blue for  
19 law enforcement, so if you hear radio traffic,  
20 or a 911 call, associate that color with the  
21 agency to which that is being attributed. The  
22 time in the top left, again that's just a  
23 running clock of the actual time. The time at  
24 the center is pretty self-explanatory, the time  
25 from which the first shots were fired by Cruz.

1           There's three bars there that indicate  
2           where Cruz is within Building 12, and where he  
3           is in terms of which level he is located on.  
4           It doesn't identify east to west where he is,  
5           but if you see on Building 12 the black dot  
6           that says Cruz, that will give you a general  
7           idea of where he is east to west inside that  
8           building.

9           At the top right you will see when the  
10          fire alarms come on, and then that will  
11          disappear when the fire alarms have shut off.  
12          It's a pretty brief period of time. And then  
13          you see that orange camera, so that orange  
14          camera correlates to the surveillance video  
15          that you see on the left side of the screen.  
16          That orange camera will move around depending  
17          on which screen you are currently viewing.  
18          (Thereupon, the video is played and narrated in the  
19                  open meeting.)

20                 SGT. SUESS: There is no audio currently,  
21                 it will come on shortly, but this is the  
22                 approximate location in which Medina was  
23                 located as Cruz arrives.

24                 MR. SCHACHTER: Is he running?

25                 SGT. SUESS: It depends. He was moving

1 quickly at least. I don't know if he was  
2 exactly running at that point. So this is a  
3 point, approximately the point just before Cruz  
4 enters the east side of Building 12. You'll  
5 see Medina is directly next to that bike rack.  
6 And you can see Medina on the screen in the  
7 golf cart. So at approximately this point  
8 student Chris McKenna leaves Building 12, runs  
9 out the east doors north, and along the west  
10 side. He's the yellow dot, and you'll see him  
11 move here shortly. This is approximately the  
12 same time that campus monitor Andrew Medina  
13 begins to drive north in his golf cart in the  
14 general direction of the east side of Building  
15 12. And we'll expand on that shortly.

16 So you see the white SUV? Just in front  
17 of that is Chris McKenna. He's continuing to  
18 run west, and you'll see him, he meets up with  
19 campus monitor Aaron Feis within seconds.

20 (Thereupon, the audio begins on the video.)

21 OPERATOR 911: 911, what's your emergency?

22 CALLER: Hello, we're at Stoneman Douglas  
23 High School, and I think there's a shooter --  
24 Hello?

25 OPERATOR 911: Are you still there? Talk

1 to me please.

2 (Thereupon, a dial tone is heard.)

3 OPERATOR 911: 911, what is your  
4 emergency?

5 CALLER: Yes, I just got a call from  
6 Douglas High School, a female --

7 (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
8 continues:)

9 SGT. SUESS: So you see at this point the  
10 fire alarms are on. This is also the same  
11 point that which campus monitor Chris Hixon  
12 enters the west end of Building 12.

13 (Thereupon, the video continues playing and the  
14 following audio is heard.)

15 -- on line, they believe there is a  
16 shooter at the school.

17 Okay, at Douglas High School in what city?  
18 Yes, in Parkland. 5901 Pine Island. Okay,  
19 5901 Pine Island? Yes. Okay, let me see if  
20 they're working anything there. And it's  
21 second hand information from a student?

22 A female -- a female called in. It  
23 sounded like possible shots in the background.  
24 I think I heard five or six in two different  
25 bursts.

1 17Juliet3, 17Bravo3, 17Bravo4 --

2 (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
3 continues:)

4 SGT. SUESS: So you see on the southwest  
5 edge of Building 6 there's a red dot for campus  
6 monitor Elliot Bonner. One of the  
7 commissioners asked earlier, I don't recall  
8 about other campus monitors responding to  
9 hearing the radio traffic, so we presume this  
10 would have been campus monitor Bonner hearing  
11 the radio traffic deciding I need to get to  
12 Building 12.

13 CHAIR: And this is at that point that we  
14 talked about where, because you hear Peterson,  
15 this is the transmission we played yesterday  
16 when Peterson says there's shots fired, and you  
17 can see Peterson has been dropped off by Medina  
18 and Greenleaf, and this is where Peterson is at  
19 the east door, and those shots he's talking  
20 about, as you'll see Hixon had been shot in the  
21 leg, as you saw yesterday, and he had moved  
22 over to the wall, and then Cruz is moving down  
23 there.

24 So this is -- so this is where Peterson is  
25 when he hears those shots, he's right at the

1 east door.

2 (Thereupon, the video continues playing and the  
3 following audio is heard.)

4 We have possible -- it could be  
5 firecrackers. I think we got shots fired.  
6 Possible shots fired, 1200 Building.

7 Attention all units in District 15,  
8 possible shots fired at 5901 Pine Island Road  
9 at Stoneman Douglas High School, possible shots  
10 fired at Stoneman Douglas.

11 (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
12 continues:)

13 CHAIR: Stop it right there. See right  
14 there where you see, that's Peterson  
15 hightailing it away from the door, from those  
16 shots. Those images you see right there,  
17 that's, that's Peterson.

18 SGT. SUESS: And next to him is Kelvin,  
19 excuse me, Kelvin Greenleaf, the security  
20 specialist.

21 (Thereupon, the video continues playing and the  
22 following audio is heard.)

23 En route -- 1584 en route. 17Juliet3,  
24 make sure we got different units over here. I  
25 need to shut down Stoneman Douglas, the

1 intersection.

2 10-4. 1729 is en route -- 10-4. --  
3 what's the address? 5901 Pine Island.  
4 17Juliet3, we're talking about the 1200  
5 building. It's going to be the building off of  
6 Holmberg Road.

7 I need descriptions, I'm coming up on  
8 Westglades Middle.

9 We don't have any description yet, we just  
10 hear shots, but it appears to be shots fired.

11 I'm over on the south side over by the 700  
12 building.

13 Tango -- shutting down eastbound Holmberg  
14 at the divide of Westglades and the high  
15 school.

16 17Bravo1, I'll get the west side of  
17 Stoneman on Holmberg.

18 (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
19 continues:)

20 SGT. SUESS: So at this point campus  
21 monitor Bonner is approaching the southwest  
22 corner of Building 12. Being a veteran he  
23 recognizes what he hears to be gunshots, sees  
24 Coach Feis lying on the ground, and within  
25 seconds, and it will be identified here, is

1           when he calls the first code red, three minutes  
2           and sixteen seconds after Cruz began firing.  
3       (Thereupon, the video continues playing and the  
4           following audio is heard.)

5           7Juliet4 responding. Julia -- Tango2, I  
6           hear shots fired by the football field. Shots  
7           fired by the football field. Shots fired by  
8           the football field heard. 17Juliet3, we're  
9           looking at the 1200 building. It's going to be  
10          the 300 building. It's going to be right off  
11          of Holmberg Road by the senior lot.

12          Get the school locked down, gentlemen.  
13          Attention all units now working this Signal 33,  
14          go to Bravo channel for regular traffic. Some  
15          students say they thought it was firecrackers,  
16          but we're not sure, by the football field.

17       (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
18           continues:)

19          SGT. SUESS: So in the northwest corner of  
20          the student parking lot you see the yellow dot.  
21          That's Kyle Laman, who suffered not fatal  
22          injuries. That's an approximation of his  
23          location. He know somewhere in that parking  
24          lot Sergeant Heinrich from Coral Springs, the  
25          off- duty sergeant met up with him, and would

1 eventually help him west from that location,  
2 and later meet up with some BSO deputies.

3 MR. SCHACHTER: So Kratz just stays there?

4 CHAIR: Mr. Schachter, you have to speak  
5 into the microphone.

6 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay. So Officer Kratz,  
7 he just stays there?

8 SGT. SUESS: Deputy Kratz, in that general  
9 area, but we are going to very thoroughly vet  
10 that issue. We're going to talk about it at  
11 length.

12 (Thereupon, the video continues playing and the  
13 following audio is heard.)

14 We also heard it was over by inside the  
15 1200 building. We're locking down the school  
16 right now. Make sure there's no pedestrian  
17 traffic anywhere on Holmberg Road.

18 -- 51 Unit advising 51 --

19 (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
20 continues:)

21 SGT. SUESS: So at this point, you'll hear  
22 the radio transmission in a second, is when  
23 Sergeant Reid by pure happenstance comes across  
24 a Coral Springs Fire Deputy Chief running down  
25 the hall of the shared administration building,

1 and that's what prompts Coral Springs to then  
2 respond. Realize that at this point Nikolas  
3 Cruz is in the third floor teacher's lounge.  
4 Everyone has already been shot.

5 (Thereupon, the video continues playing and the  
6 following audio is heard.)

7 I just had one of the fire admin go by me  
8 and make reference to an active shooter at  
9 Douglas. Anything to that?

10 10-4 Taylor23, we are, there is an active  
11 shooter working at Douglas, multiple gunshots  
12 are being fired.

13 (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
14 continues:)

15 SGT. SUESS: So at this point this body  
16 cam is from Deputy Stambaugh, so he's already  
17 exited his vehicle, and you'll see this video  
18 again in particular. So he's at the rear of  
19 his agency vehicle getting his ballistic vest.  
20 You'll see he puts it on over the camera, then  
21 moves it and then puts it on the front of his  
22 vest. This camera actually records Cruz, the  
23 last gunshots which Cruz fired, the audio,  
24 which sort of helps you understand, again  
25 Commissioner, as you pointed out, the proximity

1           in which Peterson had to Building 12. Deputy  
2           Stambaugh is much further away, so it calls  
3           into question Deputy Peterson's statement about  
4           how much he heard and when he heard it.

5       (Thereupon, the video continues playing and the  
6           following audio is heard.)

7           We can hear them in the background. Our  
8           911 lines are blowing up. We have multiple  
9           units on the phone. Some are giving EMD, and  
10          it is confirmed. (unintelligible) -- shot being  
11          fired. All units --

12       (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
13           continues:)

14          SGT. SUESS: So when Cruz fired that final  
15          shot, starting on the left, Deputy Eason was at  
16          Westglades Middle, Deputy Kratz was on Holmberg  
17          along with Deputy Stambaugh, Sergeant Miller,  
18          Deputy Seward. Deputies Goolsby and Perry were  
19          at a gate in the process of coming south  
20          towards Buildings 12 and 13.

21          MR. SCHACHTER: Can I -- can I ask you a  
22          question?

23          SGT. SUESS: Yes.

24          MR. SCHACHTER: It seems like --

25          CHAIR: Into the microphone, Mr.

1 Schachter.

2 MR. SCHACHTER: It seems -- it seems like  
3 there's a lot of BSO just at the top of the  
4 screen, and it seems like it's taking a long  
5 time for them to get inside, but is that just  
6 because we've stopped the camera?

7 SGT. SUESS: We're going to go through it  
8 again, really on a second by second basis, and  
9 I imagine it will answer all your questions.

10 (Thereupon, the video continues playing and the  
11 following audio is heard.)

12 -- make sure nobody comes inside -- I need  
13 a unit to -- Bravo3, we need somebody to shut  
14 down Holmberg at Pine Island. Units to shut  
15 down Holmberg, advise. Holmberg's shut down.  
16 Building 13 and the 900 building, we have shots  
17 fired, I'm trying to get the fence open.

18 Building 13 and 900 building. No, do not  
19 approach the 12 or 1300 building.

20 Stay at least 500' away at this point.

21 Stay away from 12 and 1300 building. Units go  
22 to the north side. Units go to the North side  
23 of the school.

24 (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
25 continues:)

1           SGT. SUESS: So Officer Burton, as you see  
2           there on the east side of Building 1, he's the  
3           first on-duty Coral Springs officer to respond.  
4           It's important to remember he has heard nothing  
5           that has been transmitted over BSO's radio, and  
6           BSO had no indication that he is there, at  
7           least based off radio traffic.

8           (Thereupon, the video continues playing and the  
9           following audio is heard.)

10          -- 2 I got a victim with a gunshot to the  
11          right leg. He's got a gunshot to the right  
12          leg, come to the west end of the high school by  
13          the football field.

14          (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
15          continues:)

16          SGT. SUESS: At this point you see, so  
17          north of the football/soccer field,  
18          approximately at this point Deputy Marchese has  
19          joined up with Sergeant Heinrich and Kyle Laman  
20          as they're on the south side of the fence and  
21          he's on the north side of the fence. On Pine  
22          Island Road you see Captain Jordan and  
23          Lieutenant DeVita. They are riding in the same  
24          vehicle, and they ultimately pull into the  
25          administration parking lot. And you'll see

1           them later on camera. Actually as they pull in  
2           you see Burton and Medina continuing north.  
3       (Thereupon, the video continues playing and the  
4           following audio is heard.)

5           GSW right leg west end by the football  
6           field.

7           Juliet39 White male ROTC uniform. White  
8           male ROTC uniform. Burgundy shirt. Burgundy  
9           shirt. Juliet39, last seen in the three story  
10          building north parking lot.

11       (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
12           continues:)

13          SGT. SUESS: So that information also  
14          Burton got from Andrew Medina. That  
15          transmission by Officer Burton, it cannot be  
16          emphasized enough how much that improved Coral  
17          Springs' response. They got a very clear  
18          direction, three story building, north side of  
19          campus. It's the only three story building, so  
20          even if you've never been there you know  
21          exactly which building you need to go to.

22       (Thereupon, the video continues playing and the  
23           following audio is heard.)

24          The building in the north parking lot.  
25          Julia39, is he still shooting?

1           Jacob saying it's a male in a hoodie. He  
2           could not describe, with at least an AR-15,  
3           it's not an AK-47.

4           -- 54 I'm with Douglas' SRO getting info.  
5   (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
6           continues:)

7           SGT. SUESS: So at this point Officer  
8           Burton has taken up a position next to a tree  
9           in the north parking lot, and you'll see  
10          photographs of it shortly. He and Deputy  
11          Peterson are able to communicate at that point  
12          just by yelling back and forth with one  
13          another.

14   (Thereupon, the video continues playing and the  
15          following audio is heard.)

16          Sierra2 call out SWAT for them. 10-4  
17          Sierra2. -- north side of -- by Building 13 --  
18          -- if you can hook up with Coral Springs  
19          Dispatch, I was advised by one of their  
20          officers possibly three additional victims in  
21          the three story building, possible suspect with  
22          an ROTC uniform, hook up with them and verify.

23   (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
24          continues:)

25          MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant.

1 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

2 MR. SCHACHTER: Can you tell me why all  
3 the officers were staging outside? Is that  
4 because he told everybody to wait 500 yards  
5 away?

6 SGT. SUESS: We spoke with each deputy, or  
7 officer in sort of this what we'll call a first  
8 wave, and they all gave their reasons, and  
9 we're going to go through each of them shortly.

10 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay.

11 CHAIR: Yeah, Mr. Schachter, just give  
12 him, just give him time on that. It's a  
13 significant part of the presentation. This is  
14 just the animation, so we're not even into the  
15 presentation, so just give it time.

16 (Thereupon, the video continues playing and the  
17 following audio is heard.)

18 17Sierral -- 17Sierral -- I know there's  
19 lots going on. Do we have a perimeter set up  
20 right now, and, and everybody's clearing out of  
21 the school?

22 That's negative.

23 (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
24 continues:)

25 SGT. SUESS: So again that's the group of

1 law enforcement officers, the first wave  
2 really, moving towards Building 12, but again  
3 you can't really tell who is who. So you'll  
4 notice throughout the presentation sort of  
5 these groups of law enforcement, both Coral  
6 Springs and BSO joint together into different  
7 groups. We refer to them by the name of the  
8 person who really had taken charge of that  
9 group. So this is the Mazzei group. You'll  
10 see there's a Mock group, and a Garcia group.  
11 The Mock and Mazzei groups are both blue, just  
12 because at that point it was primarily Coral  
13 Springs PD. There were BSO deputies within  
14 these groups as well.

15 (Thereupon, the video continues playing and the  
16 following audio is heard.)

17 17Sierral. 17Sierral -- -- multiple gulf  
18 units en route. Gulf units are en route.

19 17Sierral go ahead. 17Sierral, I want to make  
20 sure that the perimeter is set up, and it's  
21 full -- all the kids are getting out, so we  
22 need, we need to shut down around these  
23 schools. -- have a place where we're setting  
24 up for all the units coming into the area.

25 10-4. They advising that the school is on

1 lock --

2 We don't have a command post set up, we  
3 have a perimeter around it. We have two unit,  
4 two teams going in checking right now.

5 10-4, which way are they going into the  
6 school?

7 Ending -- entering from the north side  
8 through the parking lot, the students parking.  
9 (Thereupon, the video is paused and the narration  
10 continues:)

11 SGT. SUESS: So you see this group in the  
12 southeast corner of campus next to Building 1  
13 forms, it's the Greetham group. He's a Broward  
14 Deputy who has a body cam, and another deputy,  
15 Sergeant Rossman, show up at this location.  
16 They eventually are joined by Andrew Medina and  
17 Assistant Principal Winfred Porter. Those  
18 cameras in that location is pivotal. This is  
19 where the confusion over the delay in  
20 surveillance video originated, and we're going  
21 to go through that thoroughly. But if you hear  
22 us refer to the Greetham group, they're on the  
23 east side of Building 1.

24 (Thereupon, the video continues playing.)

25 SGT. SUESS: And you'll see there are

1 times where the animation is sped up just so it  
2 doesn't drag on quite as long.

3 (Thereupon, the video concludes, and the proceedings  
4 continue as follows:)

5 SGT. SUESS: So that's where the animation  
6 ends. You will see that we will cover, we'll  
7 pick up at that point where Captain Jordan  
8 joins up with Deputy Perry.

9 SHER. ASHLEY: Chair?

10 CHAIR: Yeah, Sheriff Ashley, go ahead.

11 SHER. ASHLEY: I don't know how difficult  
12 it would be, but is there any way to take it  
13 back to where Cruz leaves Building 12?

14 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

15 SHER. ASHLEY: I'm just trying to see  
16 where, if Peterson can see him from his  
17 position leaving the building.

18 SGT. SUESS: He had the opportunity.  
19 Whether he was looking that way or not I don't  
20 know.

21 (Thereupon, the animation is replayed at the  
22 specific portion.)

23 SHER. ASHLEY: Is Peterson -- Cruz --  
24 after he comes out of the building?

25 SGT. SUESS: No, sir. He makes a left

1 turn, and basically turns south between  
2 Buildings 12 and 13, and then makes a right  
3 turn, so he's traveling west between Buildings  
4 13 and 6. So he would have had the vantage  
5 point if he was looking that way.

6 CHAIR: So there's a sidewalk from where  
7 Cruz, where Peterson was by the 7-8 building,  
8 it's on the south side of the 12 building, so  
9 it's like a, if you will a sidewalk, an  
10 alleyway, but it's -- and so Cruz comes out of  
11 the west end of the 13 building. Peterson  
12 could have seen him because he zigzagged, so he  
13 comes out like this and then goes this way, and  
14 it's a straight line of site down there, so he  
15 could have seen it if he was watching. Right  
16 there, see, and Peterson -- and that's the --  
17 that's the sidewalk, or that walkway that  
18 Peterson has a straight line, line of sight of  
19 unobstructed if he's looking, and he wasn't  
20 hunkered down behind the wall.

21 SHER. ASHLEY: Thank you.

22 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So we're going to  
23 go through Deputy Peterson's interview with the  
24 Broward Sheriff's Office. This took place on  
25 Friday February 16th. Detective John Curcio,

1 the lead investigator, interviewed Deputy  
2 Peterson. It is vital to know the deputy, I'm  
3 sorry, Detective Curcio nor anyone else in the  
4 Broward Sheriff's Office had the chance to  
5 review the school video. It had been turned  
6 over to the FBI for them to do the forensic  
7 extraction, so they would not have had the  
8 information to confront him about inaccuracies  
9 in his statement.

10 CHAIR: So just to bring that full circle,  
11 because it's important, is, is that, and this  
12 has come up, is, and I know somebody is going  
13 to ask it, is, is that why didn't Broward act  
14 sooner, is, is that all this video that you  
15 just saw on the outside, all of it is, is that  
16 the server had been taken, and it had been  
17 given to the FBI and sent to Quantico, and it  
18 wasn't until the following Tuesday after this  
19 interview that the Broward Sheriff's Office  
20 first put eyes on any of this video.

21 So when they were interviewing, and  
22 Detective Curcio is interviewing Peterson, they  
23 had nothing to inquire of Peterson about,  
24 nothing to ask why are you saying this when the  
25 video is inconsistent, nothing to base their

1 questions on of Peterson, or to evaluate or  
2 analyze his answers against, other than  
3 Peterson said it, and they accepted it at face  
4 value because they did not have this video.

5 It wasn't until they got access to the  
6 video -- this is on a Friday. The shooting is  
7 on a Wednesday. They interviewed him on  
8 Friday. It wasn't until the following Tuesday  
9 that they actually got this video, so -- and  
10 then after that Peterson refused to answer any  
11 questions, so the only statements that we have  
12 from Peterson are the initial Friday 16th  
13 statements, and he has never been asked about  
14 these contradictions that are in the video.  
15 And so Broward had none of this when they  
16 interviewed him.

17 SGT. SUESS: So Deputy Peterson's  
18 statement was that he was waiting in or near  
19 Building 1 for the father of a student to  
20 arrive for an unrelated matter. He heard  
21 Medina on the school radio say that he thought  
22 he heard firecrackers in Building 12. He says  
23 that he ran out of his door and met up with  
24 Greenleaf, Kelvin Greenleaf, again, the  
25 security specialist. He said that while he was

1 running north the fire alarm activated, he and  
2 Greenleaf ran the entire way to Building 12.  
3 Based on video we know that this is not true,  
4 and he got on the golf cart with Andrew Medina.

5 He says that upon getting within  
6 approximately ten feet of Building 12 he heard  
7 gunfire, and said the gunfire was, quote, clear  
8 and loud, at the point I knew it was close to  
9 this building, but I wasn't even sure if it was  
10 in the building, was it outside the building,  
11 but I knew it was close. He did not see muzzle  
12 flashes or anything coming from the windows.  
13 He was asked how many rounds do you think you  
14 heard, and he said, quote, it wasn't many, two,  
15 three.

16 He said --

17 MR. SCHACHTER: How many -- how many were  
18 actually --

19 SGT. SUESS: In the time that he was in  
20 earshot of Building 12 a tremendous number,  
21 dozens.

22 He says that he broadcasted shots fired  
23 over his radio, and directed all other deputies  
24 to shut down Pine Island Road and Holmberg. He  
25 told Kelvin Greenleaf to get away since he's

1           unarmed. That obviously cuts against the  
2           possibility of it being fireworks. There's no  
3           reason to tell somebody to get away from  
4           fireworks if you don't have a gun.

5           Deputy Peterson claimed that he was on the  
6           school radio yelling lockdown, lockdown, code  
7           red, code red. It's unlikely this took place,  
8           as other witnesses said the campus monitor  
9           Bonner was the first person to call a code red.  
10          During ASAC White's presentation you heard the  
11          radio traffic about Peterson says let's  
12          lockdown the school, gentlemen, or something to  
13          that affect. It's speculation, my personal  
14          belief is potentially Peterson meant to  
15          transmit that over his school radio, telling  
16          everyone to lock down, but transmitted over his  
17          agency radio instead.

18          He described taking a tactical position on  
19          the northeast corner of Building 7, and said,  
20          quote, my concern was because I didn't know if  
21          the shots were coming out of the building or  
22          were they coming somewhere out on this west  
23          side somewhere, because it sounded like it  
24          might have even been outside.

25          He said I'm keeping cover on the east side

1 of the building to keep, to give them cover,  
2 with my firearm direct towards the doors if the  
3 shooter was going to come out of this door. He  
4 described Officer Burton's arrival, and the  
5 arrival of additional law enforcement. Deputy  
6 Peterson said that he heard radio traffic about  
7 hearing shots near the football field, and  
8 speculated that the shooter may have fled in  
9 that direction. Deputy Peterson said after  
10 Lieutenant DeVito's arrival he ran up to that  
11 building.

12 CHAIR: Now go -- before you go back just,  
13 because you went over it kind of quickly, just  
14 go, this is important, go back to Slide 35 for  
15 a minute.

16 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

17 CHAIR: And -- and in there just --  
18 because all this video you just watched is, is  
19 that, you know, Peterson said that he and  
20 Greenleaf, and again this is untested when it  
21 was asked of him, and when he made this  
22 statement, he stated that he and Greenleaf ran  
23 the entire way to Building 12, but based on  
24 video we know that's not the case. We know  
25 based on the video they're using the golf cart,

1       so it begs the question, is that why would he  
2       make a statement like that, you know?

3               And all -- and one of the conclusions that  
4       you could draw from that is, is that he was  
5       trying to explain, and buy himself time,  
6       because he didn't know it was captured on  
7       video, he didn't know he'd be tested, so that  
8       when he didn't act, he's trying to create more  
9       distance, and more time, and more space for  
10      himself, meaning it took longer for him to get  
11      to Building than it did. But now the video  
12      shows he took a golf cart, he got there, and he  
13      got dropped off at the east door, so that's a  
14      very, very significant inconsistency.

15             SGT. SUESS: Deputy Peterson said after  
16      Lieutenant DeVito arrived he ran up to the  
17      building and handed his keys off to someone on  
18      the east side of Building 12. We have some  
19      other interviews that contradict the way that  
20      that played out. And he described having  
21      Assistant Principal Morford review surveillance  
22      video. We do know from some body cam footage  
23      that picked up the school radio that Deputy  
24      Peterson was in communication with Assistant  
25      Principal Morford, who was in the camera room.

1           So on June 5th and 6th the Today Show  
2           aired an interview with Deputy Peterson, so  
3           beyond the statement to BSO, the Today Show,  
4           and the Washington Post I believe it was, those  
5           are the only three statements that have been  
6           given in any fashion. I'm going to just point  
7           out a few snippets of that interview.

8           He says as we approached near the building  
9           I heard two to three loud shots. I immediately  
10          stopped, and I'm thinking to myself, oh my God,  
11          I hear shots outside. I thought they were  
12          gunshots, and I thought they were outside  
13          immediately, and the first thing I thought was  
14          shooting at us.

15          CHAIR: How many times did you hear in the  
16          video, in the audio the last couple of days,  
17          how many times did you hear him say that the  
18          shots are coming from inside the 1200 building?  
19          Go ahead.

20          SGT. SUESS: Deputy Peterson went on to  
21          say I remember it in my mind, thinking like the  
22          Las Vegas shooting, I thought to myself is  
23          someone shooting out from the windows. And he  
24          responded to the reporter Savannah, because  
25          it's so difficult to be out when you're outside

1           there, and that building, it's a three story,  
2           it's a Hurricane proof building, you can, it's  
3           even hard to hear.

4           It's not lost on us either in the, between  
5           all of us investigating this, the decades of  
6           experience, some scenes it is very difficult to  
7           hear where gunshots are coming from, if you're  
8           at an apartment complex or, or schools. Due to  
9           overwhelming evidence it's perfectly clear he  
10          knew they were coming from within Building 12,  
11          so please don't view that as we've just  
12          dismissed that. We've considered that, and  
13          rule it out.

14          SEC. SENIOR: If -- if you thought there  
15          was a sniper would you say, was there something  
16          you'd specifically say there too? He didn't  
17          say anything about that.

18          SGT. SUESS: I would hope if I was  
19          responding the deputy there would say there's a  
20          sniper. That's good information you would want  
21          to know.

22          He commented about the thickness of the  
23          glass being difficult to, or interfering with  
24          his ability to hear. After it was pointed out  
25          by the interviewed that Peterson referred to

1 the 1200 building three times on the radio he  
2 said because I believed there was a sniper, so  
3 in my mind I'm thinking to myself there's  
4 probably maybe, or possibly maybe somebody up  
5 there shooting out, but I didn't think that  
6 they were shooting at the kids, I thought they  
7 were shooting out at the building outside.

8 CHAIR: Senator Book, go ahead.

9 SEN. BOOK: But I mean when you talk about  
10 it's a very thick, when he says it's a very,  
11 it's a very thick glass, hard to hear, we know  
12 at least when Coach Feis opened the door, then  
13 he was right here, that back door is right  
14 there --

15 CHAIR: So -- so Feis opened the building  
16 -- Peterson is on the east side of 12. Feis  
17 opened the door on the west side of 12.

18 SEN. BOOK: The west side. But it's not  
19 -- but my point is it's not that fair.

20 CHAIR: No. But also remember what  
21 Sergeant Suess just pointed out to you as well,  
22 and remember the gunshots, and you're going to  
23 hear more about this, and you're going to see  
24 this more extensively, is, is that remember  
25 Deputy Stambaugh's body camera, and the

1 gunshots you can hear on Stambaugh's body  
2 camera, which are way up on Holmberg Road, so  
3 if that body camera way up on Holmberg Road is  
4 capturing those gunshots as it was, and that's  
5 a considerable distance, and Peterson is  
6 literally feet away, so of the body camera up  
7 on Holmberg Road is capturing the gunshots  
8 there's no doubt that Peterson was hearing the  
9 gunshots, especially those gunshots that were  
10 coming out those windows.

11 SEN. BOOK: Of the windows on the second  
12 floor.

13 CHAIR: Right. Right. So.

14 SGT. SUESS: And Commissioner Senior, to  
15 your point, I'm sorry, Secretary Senior, if  
16 there was a sniper in there then where he was  
17 dropped off at the doors is a perfect position  
18 to be, because then presumably the sniper is  
19 looking out the window, then you can go in and  
20 confront the sniper from behind. So it -- it's  
21 a -- it's a lousy excuse at best.

22 CHAIR: Commissioner Schachter, go ahead.

23 MR. SCHACHTER: Well, he arrived at the  
24 golf cart with Greenleaf and Medina, and Medina  
25 testified in that BSO video that when they got

1 to the front of the building they heard the  
2 percussion of these rounds going into our loved  
3 ones, so he heard it as soon as he arrived at  
4 the front of the building, right, Sheriff?

5 CHAIR: Right. And -- and he gets on the  
6 radio right there, and he says gunshots inside  
7 the 1200 building. You heard that now a few  
8 times, so, you know, by his own statements he  
9 was at the east door, he says he hears  
10 gunshots, and then he makes the decision to  
11 retreat. I mean it's pretty clear. It's not  
12 pretty clear, it is clear.

13 SEN. BOOK: I'm sorry to -- he doesn't  
14 have any -- like he -- like I'm -- I'm not  
15 asking this because -- I mean like we've --  
16 we've asked, does he have any hearing issues,  
17 like none, right, like so it's like not even --  
18 I -- I --

19 CHAIR: He ran. He didn't want to go in.

20 SEN. BOOK: And -- and for forty-five  
21 minutes.

22 CHAIR: Right.

23 SEN. BOOK: And didn't move.

24 CHAIR: Right.

25 SEN. BOOK: At all.

1 CHAIR: Right. Even after all the entry  
2 teams went in, and all the Coral Springs  
3 officers and Broward deputies went in, he still  
4 sat there and watched.

5 MR. SCHACHTER: Do any officers say to him  
6 come on, let's go?

7 SEN. BOOK: What are you doing?

8 CHAIR: No, they were focused on their  
9 job, and what they needed to do.

10 SHER. ASHLEY: But -- but didn't the  
11 assistant principal that went to Medina, or  
12 went to Peterson, say there's shots being  
13 fired?

14 CHAIR: Yeah, that was Denise Reed. She  
15 went to him -- and then remember she went to  
16 him and said that's gunshots, that's gunshots,  
17 he had his gun out, and then she left to go  
18 deal with something thinking that he was  
19 heading in as she was leaving.

20 SHER. ASHLEY: So a civilian knows where  
21 the gunshots are coming from, tells him, and he  
22 still doesn't react.

23 CHAIR: Right.

24 MR. SCHACHTER: He's a coward.

25 CHAIR: Yeah, Commissioner Bartlett.

1           ASA BARTLETT: It's important to know too  
2           that Medina in his statement said that the told  
3           Greenleaf and Peterson in the golf cart the  
4           description of Cruz going in, and said he  
5           recognized the guy going in as a student  
6           carrying the case, so no mention anywhere in  
7           any of his transmissions at all are anything  
8           about a description, or anything about that  
9           Medina maintains he told Peterson about that.  
10          So Peterson would have known one person went  
11          in, and that would have given him more of an  
12          incentive to follow in and go see, and not have  
13          to, you know, sit out there and wait around.

14          MR. CARROLL: Who drove? Was it Medina  
15          who picked him up in the golf cart?

16          CHAIR: Yes.

17          MR. CARROLL: So he -- so Medina saw the  
18          guy go in, heard the gunshots, and then he  
19          wants us to believe that he rode with Medina  
20          back to the building, dropped him off at the  
21          front of the building, and that whole way  
22          Medina never said I just saw this kid go in  
23          with a rifle --

24          CHAIR: No, that's what Commissioner  
25          Bartlett is saying, he did --

1 MR. CARROLL: No, well, I'm saying that he  
2 wants us to believe --

3 CHAIR: No, oh, he wants us to believe --  
4 oh, right. Right.

5 MR. CARROLL: -- a heck of -- and he  
6 wants us to believe this, and the rest of the  
7 stuff that I'm reading here with this interview  
8 is absolutely -- gosh.

9 CHAIR: Well, remember the interview that  
10 BSO did, they didn't have the benefit of any of  
11 this, and then he did this totally scripted  
12 self-serving un-tested quote interview with  
13 the Today Show, and, and that so he crafted his  
14 narrative that he wants everybody to accept,  
15 which is full of falsities.

16 SEN. BOOK: To even say it never dawned on  
17 me in those first few minutes that there was an  
18 active shooter inside, like what --

19 CHAIR: So he's not telling the truth. I  
20 mean this is -- you can't make sense -- you  
21 can't make sense of that which doesn't make  
22 sense, and it doesn't, so you can't -- you're  
23 not going to be able to figure this out because  
24 it's all a bunch of lies to cover it up. So  
25 you can't make sense of it because it's

1 fictitious. Commissioner Dodd.

2 MR. DODD: One of the radio transmissions  
3 through did say early on, he mentioned the  
4 football field though, right, shots, didn't he  
5 say shots were coming from the football field?  
6 Was that ever any radio transmission on the  
7 school radio? Did he pick that up from someone  
8 else that may have said that, or, because  
9 that's even further away?

10 DET. BONASORO: Deputy Kratz, when he  
11 arrived on Holmberg Road is the first person to  
12 transmit that he, anything about the football  
13 fields, and that's well after Deputy Peterson  
14 has already taken up his position on the north  
15 side of Building 7.

16 MR. DODD: Okay, so Peterson was not the  
17 one that had mentioned anything about shots  
18 coming from the football field.

19 SGT. SUESS: The only thing he says is, he  
20 acknowledges the deputy that says that, but he  
21 doesn't --

22 MR. DODD: I got it.

23 CHAIR: And the reason why Kratz is saying  
24 that is because at that juncture Cruz is firing  
25 west out of a third floor teachers' lounge, and

1       so that's why Kratz is saying that. But, you  
2       know, Peterson certainly could have  
3       countermanded that and said that --

4               SEC. SENIOR: He ran into a student that  
5       was hit.

6               CHAIR: -- that they were not coming from  
7       the football field, they're coming from within  
8       the building, as Denise Reed noticed, as  
9       Peterson noticed himself, and -- so but the  
10      reason why Kratz said that is because remember  
11      those fragmented rounds are going through that  
12      Hurricane glass, and that's what he's hearing,  
13      that's what Kratz is hearing. Go ahead.

14              SEC. SENIOR: I was just saying there,  
15      there was an injured student out there too, so  
16      they're hearing shots fired, and they're seeing  
17      someone who was shot there, right, one of the  
18      kids was out there.

19              CHAIR: Correct.

20              MR. CARROLL: And I agree, but that was  
21      toward the tail end of this incident, and it  
22      was on the opposite side of the building.  
23      Being there, and as close to where he was  
24      standing, and, and from that take that you  
25      played where the officer was way out in the

1           parking lot, because I've also been out there,  
2           it's a pretty clear sound, and he's ten times  
3           closer.

4           SGT. SUESS:   Yes, sir.

5           MR. CARROLL:   What -- what this simulation  
6           points you though, and I'm, and I'm glad you  
7           did this because it reiterates to me that, you  
8           know, from a preventive standpoint Medina, and  
9           the stuff leading up to it, if there was  
10          something done that they could have got him, it  
11          should have been done, quite frankly, before he  
12          even got in the building.  Once he was in the  
13          building the only person, and even Peterson  
14          when he got there a lot of the carnage was  
15          already done on the first floor, he could have  
16          prevented him from going up to the second floor  
17          or the third floor, and based on the simulation  
18          he was the only one who had a gun who could  
19          have prevented that, and he elected not to do  
20          it, because the other officers that were  
21          responding weren't in a position to do  
22          anything, they weren't even there yet so, and  
23          that simulation I think is pretty striking, and  
24          points that out.

25          So there were many failures.  He has to be

1 the biggest failure in this I think, the  
2 biggest disappointment. It's -- it's --

3 CHAIR: Sheriff Judd.

4 SHER. JUDD: And enter to back up what you  
5 said, let's make no mistake about it, he was a  
6 law enforcement officer what, thirty-one,  
7 thirty- two years, and had been a school  
8 resource officer for twenty-eight years, he was  
9 cop in name only. He wasn't a true law  
10 enforcement officer, a police officer, or a  
11 cop. I'm not making excuses for him, he was in  
12 that position, he had that title, because if  
13 he'd been a real cop he'd have run in there  
14 with that gun. So let's don't live under the  
15 illusion that he's a real cop, because he's  
16 not.

17 MR. SCHACHTER: I do want to remind  
18 everybody he won SRO of the year in 2014.

19 CHAIR: Commissioner Stewart.

20 COMM. STEWART: Yeah, I agree with what  
21 you're saying, Sheriff, however one of the  
22 things that has come up several times in this,  
23 and I think you even support, is the guardian  
24 program would indicate that even a civilian who  
25 has been trained to shoot a gun would stop

1           forty-three out of forty-six.

2           SHER. JUDD: The reality of it is had he  
3           been appropriately trained, and responded,  
4           everyone is trained, and he was trained --

5           COMM. STEWART: Responded is the issue.

6           SHER. JUDD: -- to go in and deal with  
7           that, but he wasn't a real cop. He -- he --  
8           and I say a real cop, he wasn't, he wasn't  
9           willing to take the fight to the guy. He's --  
10          he was what, fifty-four, fifty-five years old,  
11          and he goes I ain't running in there. If he  
12          had been a real cop, if he had been a real  
13          guardian, as the way, the way guardians are  
14          trained, he would have run in there.

15          So I mean as we go through this process,  
16          and we go, well, why didn't the deputy go in  
17          there, because he's a deputy in name only.

18          CHAIR: You got to have the right mindset,  
19          you know, and, you know, as we know from those  
20          forty-six active K-12 shooting events in the  
21          last twenty years the majority of them, the  
22          majority of them are not stopped by law  
23          enforcement officers, so it goes to the point,  
24          is, is that the absolute majority of cops do  
25          have the right mindset, but you don't have to

1 be a cop to have the right mindset. And this  
2 is where those of us that are using the  
3 guardians, and they are properly trained, and  
4 properly equipped, is, is that they are equally  
5 capable of neutralizing that threat and killing  
6 the person that's trying to kill everybody  
7 else, so what's most important is, is you have  
8 the right mindset, and you have the willingness  
9 to act when you're called to act.

10 SHER. JUDD: And we had teachers with the  
11 right mindset that were running in with no guns  
12 to try to act, so it's just whether or not  
13 you're willing --

14 CHAIR: You didn't -- you know, you didn't  
15 see, and I'll say it again, Ernie Rospierski is  
16 an unsung hero. You didn't see him on the  
17 third floor when he sees Cruz, which he's  
18 corralling kids, he's not hightailing, or going  
19 cowering in a corner, he's doing, unarmed, so  
20 it's all about having that right mindset. And  
21 there were several teachers, as I said earlier  
22 there are several teachers and school personnel  
23 that saved lives that day, you know, and  
24 unfortunately Peterson did what he did, and  
25 didn't do what he should have done.

1           And it's extremely clear, and, and yes,  
2           is, is that, remember, when he first heard the  
3           shots where was Cruz. Cruz was at the west end  
4           of the first floor getting ready to execute  
5           Coach Hixon, and getting ready to, and he had  
6           just shot, and shooting Coach Feis, and if  
7           Peterson had gone into that building and chased  
8           after Cruz, and just laid down rounds, and  
9           started shooting, then he could have prevented  
10          Cruz from moving to the second floor, and  
11          certainly could have prevented him from going  
12          to the third floor. Those are just the facts.  
13          Go ahead.

14               MR. SCHACHTER: Six people lost their  
15          lives on the third floor, and it's evident that  
16          he could have saved their lives. But back to  
17          what Sheriff Grady mentions as far as the  
18          training goes, saying that Deputy Peterson was  
19          not properly trained, we heard testimony  
20          yesterday that said that he was trained. So,  
21          number one, do you agree with that, and number  
22          two, how do we make sure moving forward to try  
23          to, you know, and I know mindset is obviously  
24          extremely important, but I'm not law  
25          enforcement so I'm asking because of this, how

1 do we make sure that our deputies, if they're  
2 not trained are trained, and have the proper  
3 mindset.

4 SHER. JUDD: He was exposed to the  
5 training, but he did not have the will or the  
6 determination to go in. He had spent  
7 twenty-eight years on a school campus. He had  
8 not spent twenty-eight years in the street in a  
9 detective position facing bad guys every day,  
10 and when it comes time, when go time was there  
11 he didn't have the intestinal fortitude to run  
12 in, or protect those children, like some of the  
13 teachers. It's -- as -- as Sheriff said it's a  
14 mindset, it's a determination. He didn't have  
15 it. And you can be exposed to a lot of  
16 training, but if you're not willing to act on  
17 it when the time comes, and he wasn't, and  
18 that's, that's the bottom line. And he didn't  
19 react as a cop because he wasn't --

20 CHAIR: Secretary Kapusta, go ahead.

21 SEC. KAPUSTA: So if I could ask a  
22 question on that note, is it a product of being  
23 a school resource officer for twenty-eight  
24 years, or is it a product of just who he, how  
25 he is made up?

1           SHER. JUDD: I think the number one thing  
2           is the product of how he made, is made up.  
3           That would create an environment for him to  
4           want to be a school resource officer for  
5           twenty-eight years, because it's traditionally  
6           a day shift job, lots of time off, you deal  
7           with students and problems, you're a helper,  
8           you're a supporter, but you don't anticipate a,  
9           a war. And -- and it came war time, and he  
10          wasn't a warrior.

11          SEC. KAPUSTA: So should they be rotated  
12          out of that position from time --

13          SHER. JUDD: We -- you have to monitor the  
14          people, the individual, because if you rotate  
15          too often you don't have the experience you  
16          need, because there's a vast responsibility to  
17          being an SRO other than being a warrior, but  
18          you have to be aware of that. And sometimes,  
19          quite frankly, you don't know if the person  
20          really can charge in until the day comes that  
21          they really need to charge in, and --

22          CHAIR: Think about -- I'm sorry, go  
23          ahead. Keep going.

24          SHER. JUDD: Go ahead.

25          CHAIR: Remember, go back to too, and you

1 get to that point, is that is it a product, and  
2 I don't know that we know the answer to it, but  
3 the fact is, is that Broward had at the time a  
4 decentralized SRO structure. Remember he  
5 didn't report to a sergeant and have  
6 supervision within a school resource officer  
7 unit, it was decentralized, and his supervisor  
8 was an administrative sergeant in Parkland who  
9 had collateral responsibilities who had  
10 infrequent contact with him.

11 Remember we heard all about that, and  
12 maybe once a week talked to him on the phone,  
13 and, you know, that's, you know, part of it,  
14 where you're learning your people, you know the  
15 people, and, you know, there -- sometimes --  
16 you're only going to know so much, and you're  
17 really not going to know for sure how  
18 somebody's going to react until they're faced  
19 with it, but does all that contribute to it?  
20 It certainly is probative in a discussion. Go  
21 ahead.

22 SEN. BOOK: Thank you, Mr. Chair. And to  
23 Commissioner Judd's point, if you were a real  
24 cop, if you were a real human being I think you  
25 would have gone in, but --

1           SHER. JUDD: Exactly.

2           SEN. BOOK: Did he have a bulletproof vest  
3 on? Did he have --

4           CHAIR: No.

5           SEN. BOOK: He did not. Okay.

6           SHER. JUDD: And -- and it's important, we  
7 give psychological testing and evaluations  
8 before we hire people, and quite frankly that's  
9 one of the issues that we screen out, because  
10 there are some people that legitimately just  
11 don't have the personality to, to fight.  
12 They'll actually stand there and allow  
13 themselves to be shot, or stabbed, or beat, and  
14 not respond, they just don't have the  
15 personality. So we are looking back to  
16 presuppose that he went through all of that  
17 evaluation before they hired him; he may have  
18 never had the personality to, to fight, and it  
19 just was never tested because he spent so many  
20 years as an SRO.

21           MR. SCHACHTER: How old was he?

22           CHAIR: He was in his fifties.

23           SHER. JUDD: Fifties. Fifty-four was it?

24           CHAIR: Yeah.

25           MR. SCHACHTER: Fifty-four.

1 CHAIR: Sheriff Ashley, go ahead.

2 SHER. ASHLEY: Commissioners, I just want  
3 us to understand that Peterson is not an  
4 anomaly. We've had cowards throughout the  
5 ranks of military and law enforcement well  
6 before this, so it's not, it's not normal, it's  
7 not an everyday occurrence, but they exist, and  
8 have existed since man.

9 SHER. JUDD: And part of it is not that  
10 they want to turn and run, but it's that fight  
11 or flight, and nobody screened out the fact  
12 that they can't fight.

13 CHAIR: Go ahead, John.

14 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So the interview  
15 with Savannah Guthrie confronted Deputy  
16 Peterson to an extent, asking him basically if  
17 you don't know where the shots are coming from  
18 why not go investigate it, and he responds what  
19 I was trained is you contain the area. It's  
20 important to point out this is inconsistent  
21 with BSO's active shooter policy, and the  
22 training that was provided to Deputy Peterson.  
23 Again they ask why not run up there and see if  
24 he, see if there is a shooter shooting out from  
25 Building 12. His response, it just never

1       dawned on me those initial first few minutes  
2       because I never believed there was even an  
3       active shooter inside.

4               He's confronted about why did that not  
5       occur to him due to the frequency of school  
6       shootings, and he said when I heard these shots  
7       outside I didn't even think that someone was  
8       inside the building, and it just didn't even,  
9       those first several minutes, because my mind  
10      was racing.

11             MR. SCHACHTER:  Since -- since we're  
12      talking about, we're talking about Peterson,  
13      what were his evaluations by his supervisor?

14             SGT. SUESS:  Positive.  I mean as you  
15      referenced it was not long before he was  
16      recommended as deputy of the year for the  
17      Parkland District.

18             MR. SCHACHTER:  So I mean I certainly, we  
19      have to recommend a ratios to schools, and a  
20      number of SROs as per our statute, but, you  
21      know, I would love to have some kind of  
22      consensus from, from you guys that are the  
23      experts to try to help prevent this problem.  I  
24      know there's got to be something that we can  
25      put in the statute to try to, try to eliminate

1       this from happening, or if it's his age that  
2       you think did it, or his twenty-eight years  
3       there, I'd certainly love to have some, give  
4       the state some direction, because this could  
5       happen again if these situations mirror --

6               CHAIR:  There's -- there's no magic wand  
7       for that, Mr. Schachter, you know, is that you  
8       can certainly make the case that he was in  
9       place too long, he was soft, that he was in a  
10      cush position, and that's why he was there, he  
11      really didn't want to do police work, but I can  
12      tell you that I've seen people that have been  
13      in the same position for fifteen, twenty,  
14      twenty-five years, that no question have acted  
15      and reacted appropriately even though they've  
16      been in positions for a long time, so you can't  
17      pigeonhole this, you can't stereotype, you  
18      can't categorize everybody in one mold, and it  
19      really needs to be evaluated on an individual  
20      basis.

21             There is nothing to put in the statute  
22      about that, that's really got to be something  
23      that each individual agency, and through their  
24      supervision, try and know their people the best  
25      they can, and make the best decisions that they

1 can based upon that evaluation. Sometimes just  
2 bad things happen, and sometimes you'll never  
3 know how somebody is going to react until  
4 they're called to react no matter what you do.  
5 And that's just the reality.

6 MR. SCHACHTER: Obviously they thought  
7 that he was qualified enough, he was the  
8 trainer of the trainers, I mean it just --

9 CHAIR: Well, he was the trainer of the  
10 trainers, but he never trained on it either.  
11 But, you know, again, he was never tested, so  
12 he has never tested, and because he is never  
13 tested there was no way for them to know that  
14 he was going to react this way.

15 SHER. JUDD: The best you can hope for,  
16 Mr. Schachter, is to mandate that in the  
17 process of hiring that there's a complete and  
18 thorough personality profile that goes into the  
19 hiring process, which there is with most  
20 agencies, because some people just can't fight.  
21 They, no matter, they'll stand there and take a  
22 beat down before they have the personality to  
23 fight back. Others, that we don't want in the  
24 business, will fight you when they ought to be  
25 talking to you, so, so we screen on both sides

1 of that equation.

2 This guy was twenty-eight years in that  
3 position, the question that remains to me is  
4 what did they have when they hired him in the  
5 first place, and what interested in him staying  
6 that long. But that day he was not going to  
7 fight, certainly by himself he was not going to  
8 fight, and that's abundantly evidence.

9 CHAIR: All right, go ahead, John.

10 SGT. SUESS: So that's the location of  
11 Deputy Peterson's office, on the northwest  
12 corner of Building 1. The image of his office,  
13 you see there's two fire panels there. There's  
14 the one for the preexisting structures, the  
15 second added for the additional buildings.  
16 There's a single door on the west side of his  
17 office, so that's facing directly west, some  
18 windows on the north side, and then another  
19 door that leads into the main area off of  
20 Building 1.

21 So we're going to begin the timeline here,  
22 at the point in which Nikolas Cruz arrived on  
23 Pine Island Road. We don't know if it was, to  
24 the second, we don't know if he was dropped off  
25 at 2:19.01 or 2:19.59, or anywhere therein.

1       The distance from Pine Island to the east doors  
2       of Building 12 is approximately 120 yards. One  
3       of the investigators timed that walking it.  
4       It's approximately a minute forty-three  
5       seconds, and at a jog approximately a minute  
6       and four seconds.

7               This is the same image you've seen  
8       previously pointing out the SRO office. This  
9       -- so this image, you're essentially above Pine  
10      Island and Holmberg looking southwest. You see  
11      Building 12, and the approximate path of travel  
12      by Cruz from Pine Island Road. This is the  
13      gate which Cruz traveled through. It was  
14      obviously open at that time, had just been  
15      opened by campus monitor Medina, and you can  
16      see Building 12 in the distance.

17             This is the east side of Building 12. The  
18      dark double doors that lead into the main  
19      hallway, and then the lighter colored door that  
20      leads into the, directly into the east  
21      stairwell. That's the same door that student  
22      Chris McKenna fled out. I point out those  
23      water pipes, as that's a landmark that campus  
24      monitor Medina used in his interview.

25             So Medina denied having any history with

1 guns, hunting, or the military. We ask that  
2 just to try and identify how much exposure he  
3 has with gunshots, or hearing them. When it  
4 comes to Cruz, he was unaware of him bringing  
5 knives or ammo to school, threatening to shoot  
6 up the school. He had heard rumors of Cruz  
7 hurting animals. He commented that the  
8 previous year the campus monitors had a  
9 discussion that if anyone would shoot up the  
10 school it would be Nikolas Cruz. He referred  
11 to Cruz as, quote, that crazy kid, and  
12 described really the most significant issue  
13 with Cruz is him wearing a camouflage mask  
14 jumping out and scaring other students.

15 Medina stated that he was on the, off of  
16 Pine Island Road, and if you look at the map  
17 there he identified, you'll see it, and I'm  
18 sure there are slides, but somewhere between  
19 this bus loop and the southeast corner of the  
20 administration parking lot. He saw the Uber  
21 car stopped on Pine Island Road, saw Cruz walk  
22 through the pedestrian gate, then Cruz began  
23 jogging west. He raised -- yes, ma'am.

24 SEC. KAPUSTA: I'm sorry. So if he  
25 entered --

1           SGT. SUESS: Cruz entered approximately  
2 right there.

3           SEC. KAPUSTA: And Peterson was in his  
4 office at that time?

5           SGT. SUESS: So as best I recall -- it's  
6 not exactly clear from the Peterson's  
7 statement. I think he does say he's in his  
8 office. It looks like from the video he's  
9 probably on the north side of Building 1. I'm  
10 not sure how consequential that is though.

11          SEC. KAPUSTA: You said it takes about a  
12 minute and four seconds to get to Building 12?

13          SGT. SUESS: No, ma'am. Well, for Cruz,  
14 yes, ma'am.

15          SEC. KAPUSTA: For Cruz.

16          SGT. SUESS: From Pine Island to the east  
17 side of Building 12.

18          SEC. KAPUSTA: And do you know how long it  
19 would take Peterson to get from Building 1 to  
20 where the bike racks are located?

21          SGT. SUESS: Not by walking or running, we  
22 didn't time that. We know he was on a golf  
23 cart. We don't -- we can't give you an exact  
24 time, we don't have that. Yes, ma'am. So  
25 Medina said that he radioed to campus monitor

1 David Taylor. Again, he's on the second floor  
2 west end of Building 12, that there was a,  
3 quote, suspicious kid on campus. Medina said  
4 he was suspicious because he kept his head  
5 lowered down, and Medina identified he was  
6 still on, you know, near that south end of the  
7 campus.

8 Medina said he drove his golf cart north  
9 to approach Cruz, and then later again radioed  
10 Taylor telling him that this person, this  
11 intruder was approaching Building 12. So on  
12 this map you see that's the approximate  
13 location of Medina and Cruz at the time that  
14 Medina saw Cruz.

15 It's important to note also, so on --  
16 really all these parking lots are full with  
17 cars, so just keep that in mind. Later that  
18 presents a tactical problem for these first  
19 responders, just you have no idea who's hiding  
20 in cars, or are there IEDs in the cars. Those  
21 -- those are things that you have to consider  
22 in this situation.

23 So Medina said that after Cruz passed by  
24 that bike rack Medina's cart went up a curb.  
25 That noise prompted Cruz to turn and look back

1 at Medina. Medina said he recognized Cruz's  
2 face, but he couldn't recall his name. But  
3 instantly recognized him from his prior  
4 contacts.

5 SHER. ASHLEY: Before you go --

6 CHAIR: Sheriff Ashley, go ahead.

7 SHER. ASHLEY: Before you go further,  
8 Medina drove north in his golf cart to approach  
9 Cruz, radioed David Taylor that someone was  
10 approaching Building 12, and the door was  
11 unlocked?

12 SGT. SUESS: To Building 12, yes, sir.

13 SHER. ASHLEY: Did David Taylor say why he  
14 didn't lock the door once he said that he had a  
15 suspicious student?

16 SGT. SUESS: I don't know -- even if he  
17 sprinted I don't know if David Taylor could  
18 have made it to the first floor east door at  
19 that point.

20 SHER. ASHLEY: So no monitor was on the  
21 first, or --

22 SGT. SUESS: Correct.

23 CHAIR: They had -- because the first  
24 floor bathrooms, they had the bathrooms that  
25 were locked, so Taylor was in there guarding

1 the bathroom. So he was the only one in there.  
2 And remember they kept the east and the west  
3 door unlocked. There was the discussion  
4 previously from Medina requesting that they  
5 lock the west door, and that they only use the  
6 east door, and then that it be staffed, and  
7 that's where he was told, no, we don't have the  
8 staffing to do that. Remember you heard that  
9 all earlier. That's what they're talking  
10 about, because the east and the west door were  
11 left open all the time.

12 SHER. ASHLEY: But Taylor never made an  
13 effort, or didn't, decided not to go try to  
14 confront whomever this was that --

15 CHAIR: You can see it on the video, and I  
16 think you're going to show it, John, you'll see  
17 it, Taylor, Taylor actually sees Cruz and  
18 hightails it the other way, so you'll see that.  
19 He -- once he sees Cruz come through the door  
20 he does a, an abrupt U-turn, and hightails it  
21 up the stairs. You'll -- you'll see that. He  
22 runs.

23 MR. SCHACHTER: My -- my -- sorry. My  
24 question is back two slides. The previous year  
25 the campus monitors had a discussion that if

1 anybody would shoot up the school it would be  
2 Cruz. Do you know who he had that conversation  
3 with?

4 SGT. SUESS: So, yes, sir. David Taylor,  
5 Andrew Medina, and I believe it was in David  
6 Taylor's interview they specified Mr. Taylor  
7 said to Assistant Principal Morford that if  
8 Cruz is going to shoot anybody it would be you  
9 first, basically. So we don't know who else  
10 was there, they said there were other campus  
11 monitors.

12 MR. SCHACHTER: Was there a, something  
13 that precipitated this conversation?

14 SGT. SUESS: No, sir, not that I recall.

15 MR. SCHACHTER: I wonder how that  
16 conversation, you know, got started. But was  
17 anything, any actions taken as a result of this  
18 conversation, this very, very disturbing  
19 conversation?

20 SGT. SUESS: No, sir. This conversation,  
21 the way it was portrayed to us is more water  
22 cooler talk, for lack of a better phrase. It  
23 wasn't a formal meeting.

24 MR. SCHACHTER: Yeah. Unfortunately I  
25 wish they would have taken it a little bit more

1           serious and done something.

2           MR. CARROLL: With -- with respect to what  
3 Medina radioed, and that's why I'm confused,  
4 because, you know, it looked like to me that  
5 when Taylor first got that he was on the second  
6 floor, he didn't seem to rush so it didn't seem  
7 urgent. Even when he got to the first floor he  
8 kind of gave a kid a fist bump, or some type of  
9 acknowledgement, and he did see him come in,  
10 and Cruz immediately ducked in, and again it  
11 didn't seem like there was any sense of urgency  
12 because he didn't start running at that point.

13          SGT. SUESS: Right.

14          MR. CARROLL: Until he got the second --  
15 when the camera picks him up on the second  
16 floor after the gunshots started, by that time  
17 he was running, because he slid across the  
18 floor and into the janitor's closet.

19          CHAIR: Right. Right, because he heard  
20 the, heard the gunshots.

21          MR. CARROLL: But -- but he didn't seem to  
22 be reacting with the sense of urgency had the  
23 message been what it should have been --

24          SGT. SUESS: I completely agree.

25          MR. CARROLL: -- and so I question what

1 the message was to him.

2 SGT. SUESS: I think more or less it was,  
3 and again this is speculation on my part based  
4 off what we know, but I think it more or less  
5 was there's an intruder on campus, he's coming  
6 your way, just a heads up.

7 MR. CARROLL: Yeah, okay.

8 SEC. KAPUSTA: And you said that happens  
9 daily?

10 SGT. SUESS: No, ma'am, I believe one of  
11 the other investigators may have referenced  
12 that. The campus monitors painted the picture  
13 about kids are skipping class daily, or jumping  
14 fences. I don't find that difficult to  
15 believe.

16 SEC. KAPUSTA: Right. But do we know how  
17 often an, and intruder comes onto the campus?

18 SGT. SUESS: No, ma'am.

19 MR. SCHACHTER: We heard testimony  
20 yesterday that, that several kids and a mother  
21 told Morford that, that the murderer was going  
22 to do exactly what he was going to do, and  
23 here's another instance of a conversation  
24 involving Morford knowing that Cruz was a major  
25 threat, and was going to shoot up the school.

1 Did we interview Morford after hearing this,  
2 that he had this conversation?

3 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir, we did.

4 MR. SCHACHTER: And did he deny it, as he  
5 did the other?

6 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir, he did.

7 MR. SCHACHTER: Not surprised.

8 CHAIR: All right, go ahead, John. Wait.  
9 Mr. Petty, go ahead.

10 MR. PETTY: I was trying to find in my  
11 notes, but to Commissioner Carroll, to your  
12 question, Medina, at some point we've heard,  
13 right, identified it as a, as a gun bag, and  
14 says he didn't approach Cruz because he thought  
15 he might have a handgun, however he didn't  
16 relay that information to Taylor it appears,  
17 because Taylor doesn't seem to be acting with  
18 any sense of urgency, to your point. So I'm --  
19 I'd be interested to know what Mr. Medina said  
20 over the radio.

21 CHAIR: Which -- which is not recorded,  
22 yeah, so.

23 SGT. SUESS: So Medina says as his golf  
24 cart goes over the curb it causes Cruz to look  
25 back, at which point he recognizes Cruz from

1 prior interactions. Medina said that he was  
2 too far from Cruz at that point to say anything  
3 to him. So in the interview with BSO he  
4 described Cruz as carrying a, quote, nice sized  
5 duffle bag, and he said sometimes ROTC and the  
6 color guard carry similar bags. He also said  
7 that Cruz was not a student, and he had  
8 withdrawn the prior year due to ongoing issues.  
9 In our interview he said he was unaware whether  
10 Cruz was or was not a student at that time.

11 So this next map shows the approximate  
12 location of where Cruz and Medina were located  
13 at the time Cruz would have turned and seen  
14 Medina. So this image, you're on the east side  
15 of Building 8, so I'm going to point with the  
16 laser pointer here, approximately this area  
17 looking north. So the bike racks are to your  
18 right in that large rectangular box, and then  
19 the smaller square box is the gate through  
20 which Medina would have traveled. If you go up  
21 to that gate and look to the left, or  
22 northwest, you're able to get a view of  
23 Building 12.

24 Continuing with the interviews of Andrew  
25 Medina, Taylor said that he asked Cruz which

1 side Medina was coming in, and Medina told him  
2 the east side. Medina said that after he and  
3 Cruz saw each other Medina, or I'm sorry, Cruz  
4 began to run toward Building 12. He said as  
5 Cruz continued, I'm sorry, as -- Medina said as  
6 he continued towards Building 12 is when he  
7 first heard the gunshots, we'll talk about that  
8 a little later, and said that he then turned  
9 south towards the courtyard and radioed that  
10 there was suspicious noises at the time he  
11 heard those shots.

12 Medina said he heard additional  
13 unidentified staff getting on the radio and  
14 talking about those noises possibly being  
15 firecrackers. He said he did not call a code  
16 red because his focus was on going to get help.  
17 He said that he first heard Bonner call a code  
18 red when he was in route to pick up Deputy  
19 Peterson. We know this to not be true. And  
20 we'll go through the code red issue shortly.

21 MR. PETTY: Detective, wouldn't --  
22 wouldn't the fast way to get help be a radio?

23 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So Medina said --

24 SEC. KAPUSTA: A cell phone too.

25 SGT. SUESS: -- that he told Peterson what

1 Cruz was wearing. He did not recall Peterson  
2 saying anything to him. Medina said that it  
3 did not occur to him that those suspicious  
4 noises were gunshots until he was approaching  
5 the east side of Building 12 with Peterson. He  
6 said after he dropped Peterson off near the  
7 water pipes Peterson told him to leave. He  
8 heard Peterson repeatedly saying active shooter  
9 on his BSO radio. We know it was actually  
10 shots fired that was being transmitted. Medina  
11 said he quickly left that area, and did not see  
12 what Peterson did or did not do.

13 So these are some quotes that are  
14 significant from the BSO interview which  
15 several of the commissioners have referenced.  
16 Medina said that something inside him told him  
17 not to approach Cruz, said that he should just  
18 report it like we've been taught, he said just  
19 let him go and report it, and make sure your  
20 boy inside, referring to Coach Taylor, is good.  
21 He expresses regret, wishing that he would have  
22 stopped Cruz, and then says he did not know if  
23 Cruz had a handgun, maybe he could have had a  
24 handgun in the pocket.

25 From our perspective this sort of lends

1 credence to the theory that Medina knew  
2 something more sinister than a trespassing was  
3 taking place.

4 MR. SCHACHTER: And -- Sergeant.

5 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

6 MR. SCHACHTER: When -- when Medina says  
7 do what we're taught and just report it several  
8 times, why, why do you think he said that, and  
9 what is he talking about?

10 SGT. SUESS: I think he realizes that his  
11 efforts were inadequate, and he's trying to  
12 find a way to provide some sort of cover for  
13 that.

14 MR. SCHACHTER: You don't think that he  
15 was taught to just report it?

16 SGT. SUESS: I'm not sure he was taught  
17 very much at all. Based off what we heard  
18 there was no training offered.

19 So as we go through, return to the  
20 timeline, and again the prior time stamp that  
21 you saw was at 2:19 when Cruz was dropped off.  
22 So about a minute and a half before the first  
23 shots were fired campus monitor Taylor was on  
24 the west end of the second floor. It was  
25 evident that he began to use his radio, and was

1 walking toward the east end of the hall.

2 We conducted an interview with David  
3 Taylor as well. He was unaware of Cruz's  
4 issues about brining knives or ammo to school,  
5 as well as threats to shoot up the school. He  
6 also referenced that conversation with the  
7 school campus monitors and Assistant Principal  
8 Morford about Cruz's potential to be a school  
9 shooter, and it was in Taylor's conversation  
10 that he referenced that Morford would likely be  
11 the first target. Taylor confirmed --

12 MR. PETTY: Sergeant, again --

13 SGT. SUESS: -- that he was notified via  
14 the radio of a --

15 CHAIR: Hang on, John. Go ahead.

16 MR. PETTY: Apologies. I'm going back to  
17 Medina on the radio for just a moment.

18 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

19 MR. PETTY: Would Peterson have been able  
20 to hear that transmission?

21 SGT. SUESS: If his radio was on, yes,  
22 sir. We got no indication the school radios  
23 don't work at any given location.

24 So again, Taylor confirmed that he  
25 received the radio traffic about a suspicious

1 individual on campus. Yes, sir.

2 MR. SCHACHTER: They joked that, that Cruz  
3 would likely be coming, his first target. Do  
4 we have any reason why that, that was, what  
5 interactions did Morford have with Cruz --

6 SGT. SUESS: Morford had been identified  
7 by Taylor as, I believe the phrase he used is  
8 riding that kid, that there were several issues  
9 between them.

10 MR. SCHACHTER: Riding that kid. And so  
11 can we get more details about that?

12 SGT. SUESS: About what in particular,  
13 sir?

14 MR. SCHACHTER: Well, I mean this just  
15 goes the point that Morford knew what a threat  
16 he was, he had been warned about him, and for  
17 him to say that he, he wasn't told by those two  
18 kids and the mother, and he wasn't told before,  
19 now for them to admit that he was riding that  
20 kid, it totally invalidates that argument.

21 SGT. SUESS: So in the interview with --  
22 we conducted a second interview with him, and  
23 we confronted him on some of these issues,  
24 expressed out concern about the  
25 inconsistencies, and we really just reached a

1 crossroad where, I mean there's -- he gave his  
2 statement, about he either denied it or didn't  
3 remember things happening. There's really not  
4 much else we could do other than ask him.

5 MR. SCHACHTER: And so did Taylor explain  
6 what he meant by riding that kid? Obviously  
7 there was a lot of interactions with him. I'm  
8 just trying to get some details.

9 SGT. SUESS: Right. No, sir, I don't  
10 recall any elaboration from Morford on that.  
11 Morford I would characterize, and again  
12 gentlemen if I misspeak correct me, but I would  
13 say Morford largely minimized his contact with  
14 Cruz.

15 MR. SCHACHTER: Of course he did. And  
16 what about, I mean there's got to be other  
17 corroborating witnesses to riding that kid, it  
18 sounds like he had a lot of interactions. Did  
19 any of the staff, would Broward County be able  
20 to provide records of interactions? I don't  
21 know if that's available or --

22 CHAIR: There's nothing like that, Mr.  
23 Schachter. There's nothing like that. And  
24 remember, two things keep -- one is that  
25 Morford, we pressed Morford, and the

1 investigators interviewed him a couple times,  
2 and his classic response to everything is I  
3 don't recall, I don't recall, I don't recall.  
4 And second is, is that keep it in perspective,  
5 is, is that the last time that Cruz was on that  
6 campus was February of '17, and all these  
7 contacts, et cetera, and the issues, were prior  
8 to February of '17, and this incident happened  
9 in February of '18, so, you know, he was gone  
10 for a year, and that has to be kept in mind as  
11 we're evaluating.

12 MR. SCHACHTER: I -- I'm fully cognizant  
13 of that, but I want the commissioners to  
14 understand this guy is still on campus, okay,  
15 he's still there protecting our children, and  
16 if he is not telling the truth that needs to be  
17 uncovered, and he needs to be removed  
18 immediately.

19 CHAIR: And again, with this information,  
20 I'll say it, is, is that we were -- now that  
21 this has been presented to the commission then  
22 this information will be presented to the  
23 Broward County School Board, or Broward County  
24 School Superintendent, but they don't have a  
25 lot of this information, and they will have it

1 after it's been presented to you.

2 MR. SCHACHTER: And did Broward County  
3 never received any statements from any of these  
4 APs; is that your understanding?

5 CHAIR: I can't say any, but remember is,  
6 is that we asked them not to conduct their  
7 investigation, their inquiry while this was  
8 ongoing, for a lot of significant and valid  
9 investigative reasons, and so we will now  
10 provide them with this information.

11 MR. SCHACHTER: But, Chairman, that was in  
12 August when we requested that, when, when you  
13 called the superintendent. They still had five  
14 months to do something when they decided to do  
15 nothing.

16 CHAIR: Go ahead, John.

17 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. And so as Taylor  
18 went down the west stairs, I'm sorry, to  
19 clarify, there was no description over the  
20 radio, according to Taylor, about Cruz carrying  
21 anything. Taylor said he went down the west  
22 stairs, and down the hall, saw someone in a  
23 burgundy shirt carrying a three foot long  
24 duffel bag. He did not recognize Cruz as he  
25 entered the door, according to Taylor.

1           He said that he turned and went up the  
2           west stairs in order to cut off Cruz,  
3           anticipating that because Cruz was going in the  
4           east stairwell he must be going upstairs, and  
5           that was his plan. Taylor said he heard the  
6           gunshots while in the stairwell, and at that  
7           point he fled into the closet. He recalled  
8           hearing someone over the PA telling people this  
9           was not a drill, and that they needed to  
10          evacuate. Mr. Taylor said he never heard a  
11          code red called over the PA, but heard  
12          Assistant Principal Porter announce an  
13          evacuation order over, over the PA prior to  
14          hearing a code red called on the radio.

15          Taylor said that he heard transmissions  
16          about firecrackers over the radio, two or three  
17          people, and one of them may have been female.  
18          He believes he also made a transmission  
19          indicating that they were not firecrackers. He  
20          recalled hearing Deputy Peterson ask for radio  
21          silence while he spoke with somebody in the  
22          camera room, believed he heard Coach Bonner, or  
23          campus monitor Bonner say Feis is down, and he  
24          definitely heard campus monitor Bonner say  
25          that's not fireworks, that's gunfire, and

1 repeatedly said code red.

2 So approximately a minute seventeen  
3 seconds before the first shots from a camera on  
4 the south side of Building 13 you can see  
5 Sergeant Heinrich, again, off-duty Coral  
6 Springs officer, watering the baseball field.

7 At about 2:20.24 Ashley Baez, Luke Hoyer,  
8 Martin Duque, walk north between Buildings 7  
9 and 12, I'm sorry, between Building 7 and 8  
10 toward Building 12. Throughout the  
11 presentation if you see the NF or F, NF stands  
12 for non-fatal wounds, F stands for fatal  
13 wounds, or fatality fifty-nine seconds prior to  
14 the first shot campus monitor Taylor has  
15 already turned around so that now he's now  
16 walking west on the second floor towards the  
17 west stairwell. He began walking with purpose,  
18 and it was evident that he was somehow using  
19 his radio. So he had an earpiece with a wire  
20 with a microphone attached to it, so you could  
21 tell he was somehow making use of his radio.  
22 Approximately forty-one seconds before the  
23 first shot he reached the base of the west  
24 stairwell on the first floor, then made a right  
25 turn so that he was traveling east towards the

1 east doors, the same doors that Cruz would  
2 enter shortly thereafter.

3 Approximately twenty-seven seconds prior  
4 to the first shot Medina drove north on the  
5 east side of Building 8. So if you look at the  
6 map, and you, you saw the map earlier in the  
7 presentation, he's essentially between the bike  
8 rack and the northeast corner of Building 8,  
9 and you'll see a video in a second. The golf  
10 cart comes into view at approximately 2:21.11,  
11 parked by 2:21.13, and remains stationary until  
12 2:21.28. Medina was slowing, and the cart was  
13 stationary for seventeen seconds. During that  
14 time Medina was facing north, and also during  
15 that time at 2:21.16, so about three seconds  
16 after Medina stopped Cruz entered the east door  
17 of Building 12.

18 We showed this video to Medina and asked  
19 him what it was he was doing during that time,  
20 and he said that he followed their standard  
21 practice, was to not necessarily pursue  
22 somebody but to radio ahead to the next campus  
23 monitor, making them aware of the situation.  
24 So this is a still image. You see Medina's  
25 cart in the distance, again between the

1 northeast corner of Building 8 and the bike  
2 rack. On the map that illustrates the  
3 approximate location of Medina. And so on the  
4 side by side video you'll see as Cruz enters  
5 the stairwell on the east end of Building 12,  
6 and you'll see Medina's cart come into view. A  
7 graphic will pop up identifying the point at  
8 which Medina fired. I'm sorry, Cruz fired the  
9 first shot.

10 MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant, did you ask  
11 Taylor why he did not call a code red?

12 SGT. SUESS: I do not recall if he was  
13 asked why. We can review the transcript if  
14 necessary.

15 MR. SCHACHTER: But he didn't, he did not.

16 SGT. SUESS: Correct.

17 MR. SCHACHTER: Do we have a time that he  
18 was, you know, when he was there? Like at what  
19 point did he hear the shots, what point could  
20 he have called a code red? He was there on the  
21 second floor, right?

22 SGT. SUESS: Taylor?

23 MR. SCHACHTER: Yeah.

24 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir, he was on the  
25 second floor.

1 MR. SCHACHTER: He heard everything.

2 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

3 MR. SCHACHTER: And didn't call code red.  
4 I certainly would like to know why.

5 SGT. SUESS: Would the commission like me  
6 to play that video again?

7 CHAIR: Yeah, play it again. Yeah, let's  
8 just play it again. Let this -- it's like  
9 everybody, they didn't know -- we've talked  
10 about it, is that the general answers they got  
11 were nobody gave any answers, because they  
12 didn't know, they weren't sure, they --

13 MR. SCHACHTER: They just heard a month, a  
14 month prior --

15 CHAIR: It wasn't clear to them --

16 MR. SCHACHTER: Come on.

17 CHAIR: They -- they all said that it  
18 wasn't clear to them as to who could call it  
19 when. Some of them were told that they, you  
20 know, they had to hear gunshots, they had to  
21 see a gun, or didn't, wasn't sure, that was the  
22 consistent theme of all the answers to the  
23 questions on that topic.

24 MR. SCHACHTER: Except -- except for  
25 Medina, when he said I was going to do what I

1 was told, and I was only, I was only told just  
2 to report it, and not --

3 CHAIR: Okay, go ahead. Go ahead, John.

4 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. Mr. Medina starts  
5 driving north at that point.

6 CHAIR: Medina is driving north to go get  
7 Peterson.

8 SGT. SUESS: Well, so he -- he drives  
9 north, and I believe in his interview he stated  
10 at that point he decided more or less on second  
11 thought maybe I should go investigate, so he  
12 was heading generally towards the east side of  
13 Building 12, and then upon hearing the gunshots  
14 turns and heads south to go get Peterson.

15 So at 2:21.16 Cruz entered the east doors  
16 to Building 12. Campus monitor Taylor was  
17 walking toward Cruz in front of the women's  
18 room on the first floor. Ashley Baez, Martin  
19 Duque, and Luke Hoyer were walking west in  
20 front of Cruz toward campus monitor Taylor, and  
21 Chris McKenna was walking toward Cruz in the  
22 east stairwell.

23 So this camera is on the west side of the  
24 first floor of Building 12, so that is the back  
25 of campus monitor Taylor, and in the distance,

1       it's very hard to tell on the still image, but  
2       it's Nikolas Cruz walking in. When you watch  
3       the moving video you can see that he is holding  
4       the, the large bag. This is a camera that is  
5       in the middle of the first floor facing west,  
6       so Taylor at this point is facing toward Cruz.  
7       Twenty seconds prior to the first shot Cruz  
8       entered the east stairwell in Building 12, and  
9       about that point, about the same time Cruz  
10      entered the stairwell is when Coach Taylor  
11      turned around and walked west on the first  
12      floor. Cruz was carrying the soft sided rifle  
13      bag at that time.

14             So that's the moment at which Taylor  
15      begins to turn around. The rifle bag which  
16      Cruz was carrying, as you saw in Detective  
17      Bonasoro's presentation. This is the vest  
18      which Cruz had in the bag and put on, and later  
19      discarded on the west stairwell third floor,  
20      and the magazines that were inside of that  
21      vest. It is not a ballistic vest, it's just  
22      made to carry ammunition.

23             Excuse me. Yes, ma'am.

24             SEC. KAPUSTA: Do the doors on the  
25      stairwells in east floor have an individual

1 lock on them? Could Taylor have locked the  
2 doors on two and three, and then --

3 SGT. SUESS: I do -- I do not know off the  
4 top of my head. Detective Bonasoro, do you  
5 recall, on the stairwell doors?

6 DET. BONASORO: If they were locked?

7 SGT. SUESS: If they have locks.

8 SEC. KAPUSTA: If they have locks, so  
9 theoretically he would not have been able, Cruz  
10 would not have been able to get to the second  
11 or third floor if they were able to lock those  
12 doors in the stairwell?

13 DET. BONASORO: It's different, it's a  
14 different locking mechanism. It requires a  
15 special key, so it would have been very  
16 difficult to lock those doors expeditiously at  
17 any time.

18 SEC. KAPUSTA: Did Taylor have that key?

19 DET. BONASORO: I'm sure he did. I don't  
20 know for a fact.

21 SGT. SUESS: We didn't ask him that  
22 question specifically.

23 SEC. KAPUSTA: Okay.

24 SGT. SUESS: So fourteen seconds prior to  
25 the first shot McKenna entered the east

1 stairwell. McKenna told BSO detectives that he  
2 said, that Cruz said to him, he told me you  
3 better get out of here, something bad is about  
4 to happen, he told me to run. Seconds later  
5 McKenna fled east outside of Building 12.  
6 That's the moment at which McKenna entered, and  
7 at the bottom of the image you can see the, the  
8 front of the barrel, and the sight for the  
9 rifle.

10 So at 2:21.38, and you notice the second  
11 time stamp there, we're at zero seconds, so  
12 this is what all times will be based on moving  
13 forward, Cruz entered the first, I'm sorry,  
14 entered the first floor at the east end of the  
15 hall and fired the first round. Baez, Duque,  
16 Hoyer, and Montalto were in that hallway and  
17 shot. Campus monitor David Taylor transitioned  
18 from a jog to a sprint up the west stairwell.  
19 So that next image is approximately the moment  
20 at which Taylor realizes shots are being fired.

21 Four seconds after that shot Andrew Medina  
22 drove south on the east side of Building 12,  
23 continued south between Buildings 7 and 8, and  
24 a school radio was visible in Medina's hand.  
25 Again that's just a still, a screen shot from

1       that video which you saw just a little bit  
2       earlier. Approximately nine seconds after the  
3       first shots McKenna is picked up on the camera  
4       between Buildings 12 and 13 fleeing to the  
5       west. Seconds later he would meet up with  
6       campus monitor Feis.

7               We conducted a follow up interview with  
8       McKenna to confirm what he did or did not tell  
9       Feis, and McKenna said that he told Feis there  
10      was somebody with a gun inside Building 12.  
11      Fifteen seconds after the first shot Andrew  
12      Medina has reached the northeast corner of the  
13      main courtyard near the southeast corner of  
14      Building 7. So you'll see in some of these  
15      slides, you still see the three story layout of  
16      Building 12. That's just to let you know what's  
17      happening inside of Building 12 as we're still  
18      talking about other areas of campus.

19             Twenty-four seconds after the first shot  
20      security specialist Greenleaf exited his  
21      officer, followed by campus monitor Brian  
22      Staubly. Greenleaf held his radio up to his  
23      mouth as if he was transmitting on the radio.  
24      We conducted an interview with Kelvin  
25      Greenleaf. He also recalled hearing Medina's

1 radio transmission which specifically addressed  
2 Taylor notifying him about a suspicious person  
3 on campus. Greenleaf recalled hearing  
4 subsequent transmissions about a weird sound.

5 Greenleaf exited Building 1, but at that  
6 point he did not hear any gunshots. He told  
7 Peterson, and you'll see the image in a moment,  
8 you've seen it in the media as well, that, when  
9 they're on the west side of Building 1, that he  
10 was going to go to Assistant Principal  
11 Rosario's office and get the key for the golf  
12 cart. Greenleaf said once Medina picked up he  
13 and Peterson they were in conversation in the  
14 cart, being Medina and Peterson, but he could  
15 not hear what they were saying. You'll see in  
16 a moment Greenleaf is riding on the back of the  
17 cart holding onto the two support bars.

18 So this video has been released to the  
19 public. I'll play it here shortly. This video  
20 is from Classroom 1215, and the teachers for  
21 this is Ivy Schamis.

22 (Thereupon, a video is played in the open meeting,  
23 and the proceedings continue as follows:)

24 SGT. SUESS: So approximately a second  
25 after that video was filmed the first 911 call

1 was made to Coral Springs.

2 (Thereupon, the following 911 call is played in the  
3 open meeting.)

4 CSCC: 911, what's your emergency?

5 CALLER: Hello, we're at Stoneman Douglas  
6 High School, and I think there's a shooter --

7 CSCC: Hello? Are you still there? Talk  
8 to me please.

9 (dial tone)

10 (Thereupon, the 911 call concluded, and the  
11 proceedings continue as follows:)

12 MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant, were those shots  
13 that we heard into my son's classroom?

14 SGT. SUESS: In that video we do not know,  
15 sir. So approximately thirty-six seconds after  
16 the first shot Greenleaf exited the west side  
17 of Building 1, where he would meet up with  
18 Peterson. Peterson and Greenleaf appeared to  
19 engage each other in conversation, and it  
20 appeared that Peterson was using his school  
21 radio at that point. We have no way to know  
22 what he was transmitting at that time.

23 Students on the west end of the second  
24 floor are still moving about pretty casually,  
25 with no indication that anything is going on.

1        So this is the image which you've all seen  
2        several times by now, Greenleaf coming out of  
3        Building 1. Deputy Peterson had just come to  
4        that same west side. Peterson is the person  
5        further left.

6                Forty-five seconds after the first shot  
7        Coach Feis arrived on the north side of  
8        Building with student Chris McKenna. He as  
9        holding a radio in his hand, Coach Feis that  
10       is, and he assisted McKenna into the north  
11       doors of Building 13. So you see, this is  
12       simultaneous to what I just explained, this is  
13       the moment at which they arrived on the north  
14       side of Building 13, and in the bottom right  
15       you see the image showing it on the map, where  
16       they were located.

17               Fifty-five seconds after the first shot  
18       Peterson and Greenleaf walk south to get a golf  
19       cart. You can see the golf cart in that image.  
20       Peterson was using his school radio, which is  
21       on his right lapel, his right shoulder, and  
22       they quickly turn back north. Seconds later  
23       Kelvin Greenleaf begins running north in the  
24       direction of Building 12, and Deputy Peterson  
25       follows suit. At this point a student on the

1 west end on the second floor is still walking  
2 around casually.

3 Approximately one minute and one second  
4 after the first shot the fire alarms become  
5 active at various parts on campus. This is not  
6 all the fire alarms, but just to illustrate to  
7 you there were several alarms active at this  
8 point. As those fire alarms began Cruz is  
9 still on the east end of the first floor. The  
10 video you'll see in a moment is where Nikolas  
11 Cruz was shooting into a nearby classroom.  
12 Peterson and Greenleaf, this is the point at  
13 which they began running north, and Feis is  
14 still with McKenna on the north side of  
15 Building 13.

16 It's important to know as you're watching  
17 this these students are in the hard corner, but  
18 you will see there, are crammed in there, and  
19 there are several students hiding under the  
20 desk.

21 (Thereupon, a video is played in the open meeting,  
22 and the proceedings continue as follows:)

23 SGT. SUESS: This next video was recorded  
24 from the third floor, and this was captured  
25 from social media, so the format in which it

1 plays is a little different. You can hear the  
2 gunshots from the third floor, but it is  
3 extremely faint, and very difficult to hear.  
4 But this video very clearly illustrates the  
5 beginning of complete confusion on the third  
6 floor about what it happening.

7 (Thereupon, the following video is played in the  
8 open meeting:)

9 SPEAKER: Bro, what the -- I know you -- I  
10 now you --

11 SPEAKER: No, I'm going behind the  
12 cover --

13 SPEAKER: It sound like somebody in the  
14 bathroom.

15 SPEAKER: Sh.

16 SPEAKER: It sound like some --

17 (screams)

18 (Thereupon, the video concluded, and the proceedings  
19 continue as follows:)

20 SGT. SUESS: Approximately a minute and  
21 three seconds after the first shot the first  
22 Coral Springs 911 call was transferred to the  
23 Broward Regional Communications Center. At  
24 that same time students in Ms. McCoomb, Ms.  
25 McCaul, I apologize for any names I

1 mispronounce during this presentation, but  
2 classroom 1250, about twenty-three students  
3 flee out of that classroom. This will -- yes,  
4 sir.

5 CHAIR: Go ahead, finish this slide, then  
6 we're going to take a break.

7 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So at this moment,  
8 for those of you that watched the video  
9 yesterday, and you saw this, the video of  
10 students on the third floor, the large group,  
11 this is really when this begins. These  
12 students flee out of this classroom, begin to  
13 go down the third floor stairwell on the west  
14 side. They later hear gunshots, shortly  
15 thereafter hear gunshots, go back up into the  
16 third floor hall and move east, so they then  
17 get joined by that other group of students.  
18 Well over a hundred go to the east stairwell  
19 and start to go down.

20 You can tell that they are very leery and  
21 apprehensive about going down, they hear  
22 additional gunshots, which results in every one  
23 fleeing to the third floor, and the mass, the  
24 vast majority of those students then taking  
25 cover inside of the classrooms. So this was

1       also the point at which Mr. Porter quickly  
2       starts walking towards the alarm panel in  
3       Deputy Peterson's office.

4               CHAIR:   Okay, so why don't we take a  
5       break.   Here's where we are, just for context,  
6       and I think that we need to go, we'll take  
7       about a fifteen minute break.   Well come back  
8       at 3:35.   But we need to probably go until 5:30  
9       tonight.   I know we're set to stop at 5:00, but  
10      at least we need to go to 5:30.   We're on Slide  
11      103, and there are about 650 slides in this  
12      presentation, so we need to go a little bit  
13      longer tonight I think to make sure we -- we  
14      have to have this done to stay on track by  
15      midday tomorrow.   So let's take fifteen  
16      minutes, comes back at 3:35.

17      (Thereupon, the meeting is in recess, and the  
18      proceedings continue as follows:)

19               CHAIR:   All right, we'll go ahead and  
20      start again, and continue on with the  
21      presentation.

22               SGT. SUESS:   Yes, sir.   So again, we're  
23      just after a minute beyond the first shots  
24      being fired.   Students have begun quickly  
25      evacuating in the third floor.   Students on the

1 second floor, again, have heard something.  
2 It's evidence by their body language that they  
3 change from a casual walk to panic, more or  
4 less. 2:22.49 campus monitor Hixon entered  
5 through the west doors of Building 12. Cruz  
6 was still at the door in the alcove for 1216  
7 and 1217, and began to turn in Hixon's  
8 direction.

9 At about that same time Peterson and  
10 Greenleaf have joined Medina on his golf cart.  
11 You can see in that image in the bottom right  
12 Peterson is on the front right seat as they are  
13 making a U-turn essentially. At the same time  
14 campus monitor Hixon was shot, and AP Porter  
15 entered Peterson's office where the alarm  
16 panels were located. Approximately a minute  
17 and fifteen seconds, Cruz stepped into the  
18 alcove for Classrooms 1214 and 15, and within  
19 seconds campus monitor Hixon crawled across the  
20 hall and behind a partial wall.

21 A minute and nineteen seconds, the last  
22 students on the second floor have left the  
23 hallway, so at this point everyone on the  
24 second floor has concealed themselves inside of  
25 a classroom. The first alarms at this point

1 begin shutting down at various locations on  
2 campus, and it is evident again from body  
3 language that the students on the third floor  
4 are still confused. Students are walking in  
5 different directions, and it's obvious that  
6 they aren't exactly clear on what is happening,  
7 or where they should be going.

8 Yes, Mr. Schachter.

9 MR. SCHACHTER: Why did the fire alarms  
10 shut down, was that something that, they shut  
11 them down?

12 SGT. SUESS: Mr. Porter did, yes, sir.  
13 Obviously not under the knowledge that there is  
14 an active shooter taking place at this point.

15 So at a minute and a half after the first  
16 shots Coach Feis parked his golf cart between  
17 Buildings 12 and 13, so he's already secured  
18 Chris McKenna inside of Building 13. Cruz  
19 moved to the alcove for Classrooms 1212 and  
20 1213, and students on the third floor are  
21 really casually walking. So that initial panic  
22 seems to have subsided for a little bit, and  
23 there's just a very large crowd of students on  
24 the third floor. And you'll see some still  
25 images in just a minute depicting that group.

1 Yes, sir?

2 MR. SCHACHTER: But the -- Bonner called  
3 the code red much later, right?

4 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

5 MR. SCHACHTER: So he -- if Porter shut  
6 the fire alarms down why didn't he call a code  
7 red; do we know?

8 SGT. SUESS: Why didn't Porter call a code  
9 red?

10 MR. SCHACHTER: Yeah.

11 SGT. SUESS: He hadn't by this point.

12 MR. SCHACHTER: He had not.

13 SGT. SUESS: No, sir.

14 MR. SCHACHTER: So that's what I'm asking,  
15 why didn't he? He shut the fire alarms off  
16 because he knew some, it wasn't a fire.

17 SGT. SUESS: There's no indication at this  
18 point to Porter that there was an active  
19 shooter taking place. Bonner has not called a  
20 code red. Porter is inside of Building 1, a  
21 couple hundred yards, maybe a hundred yards  
22 from Building 12.

23 MR. SCHACHTER: Why did he shut the fire  
24 alarm down?

25 SGT. SUESS: That was their standard

1 practice. Detective Bonasoro interviewed him

2 --

3 SEC. SENIOR: Was it -- was that the one  
4 indicating gas leak? Is that the one he --

5 SGT. SUESS: Correct, that's the only  
6 alarm that would have taken, was activated that  
7 day. There is a lot of questions -- if you ask  
8 us very specific questions on certain issues we  
9 may not have the answer. I mean we've --

10 MR. SCHACHTER: No problem.

11 SGT. SUESS: -- we've done, or reviewed  
12 hundreds of interviews, but if there's an  
13 answer you need we're happy to get it for you  
14 as best we can. So approximately, at that same  
15 time as we were just speaking Feis, that's his  
16 location between Buildings 12 and 13, as  
17 Peterson, Medina, and Greenleaf are moving  
18 north between Buildings -- and 8. You see them  
19 depicted there on the bottom right. The large  
20 group of students remained on the third floor  
21 casually continuing on to the east stairwell.

22 So this is that group of students. It's  
23 difficult because of the lack of clarity in the  
24 screen, and students moving around, but I took  
25 that approximately thirty second span and tried

1 to count the students, and there is well over a  
2 hundred twenty-five students that are inside of  
3 the third floor acting very calm, for lack of a  
4 better phrase. There is some students, you can  
5 tell, seem a little more panicked, but other  
6 students are on their phone in casual  
7 conversation, laughing, joking.

8 At about that same time Medina, Peterson,  
9 and Greenleaf continue north from Building 7  
10 and to the east side of Building 12. In that  
11 top right photograph you see the two yellow  
12 circles. So these are students that are  
13 evacuating Building 7 directly south of  
14 Building 12, again under the premise of this is  
15 a fire alarm. They're just going about their  
16 normal routine. So they have no knowledge of  
17 the shooter being next to them in Building 12.

18 At 2:23.17 Medina, Peterson, and Greenleaf  
19 reach the southeast corner of Building 12. So  
20 they leave the screen, but this is the point at  
21 which we are attributing to Peterson being on  
22 the east side of Building 12. Yes, sir.

23 MR. DODD: You had mentioned David Taylor  
24 when he got the, he went to the second floor,  
25 and we haven't heard anything more about

1 Taylor. Where did he --

2 SGT. SUESS: So he went into a closet and  
3 remained there.

4 MR. DODD: Right. And at what time did he  
5 come out?

6 SGT. SUESS: Once law enforcement got  
7 there. They're -- they go -- you know, you  
8 used to be cop, they're clearing each room,  
9 room by room, they find him and take him out.  
10 So going back to the interview with Andrew  
11 Medina, again those are those water pipes which  
12 he referenced where he dropped off Peterson.  
13 He made a right turn, and again said he did not  
14 see anything which Peterson did or did not do.

15 We spoke with Kelvin Greenleaf about what  
16 he recalled from that interaction on the east  
17 side of Building 12. He identified the  
18 location as between Building 7, 8, and 12. He  
19 recalled Peterson telling him to get back  
20 because he did not have a weapon. He said that  
21 Peterson did not approach the east doors, he  
22 did not look in the windows on the door, he did  
23 not access his keys, and did not ask Greenleaf  
24 for his keys. The keys were not necessary, the  
25 door was unlocked, but we asked that specific

1 question to try and glean was there anything  
2 proactive within Deputy Peterson would have  
3 done at that time, and by all accounts there  
4 was not.

5 He described Peterson as having his weapon  
6 drawn and seeming stressed. Greenleaf said he  
7 heard five to seven gunshots coming from  
8 Building -- during this time. Greenleaf also  
9 identified Bonner being the first person to  
10 call a code red. It hasn't happened at this  
11 point yet, though, so just to clarify that.  
12 Greenleaf stated that he later repeated the  
13 code red over the radio at least twice, but did  
14 not recall anybody acknowledging that code red.  
15 And it's been well established the PA system  
16 cannot be heard outside.

17 So approximately a minute and forty-two  
18 seconds after the first shot Cruz began to run  
19 towards the west stairs on the first floor.  
20 You can see the students are in the east  
21 stairwell at this point. There is visible  
22 apprehension on their faces. Obviously I can't  
23 read minds, but in their body language it's  
24 apparent some of them want to go down but are  
25 concerned to do so, or fearful to do so. Some

1 students do end up making it down, and just  
2 continue down, and do so safely.

3 Approximately a minute forty-five seconds  
4 after the first shot Cruz walked by campus  
5 monitor Hixon and fired additional rounds at  
6 him. These rounds were not immediately fatal.  
7 He was alive until law enforcement responded.  
8 So this is the point in which campus monitor  
9 Bonner exited the southwest corner of Building  
10 6. He would get onto his golf cart and  
11 continue on to Building 12. You see at the  
12 three story map on the left side Cruz is moving  
13 now towards the west stairwell, and that red  
14 dot represents Feis, so this is at the point in  
15 which Feis is approaching the west stairwell.

16 A minute forty-seven seconds after the  
17 first shot is when Feis and Cruz meet at the  
18 west stairwell, where Feis was fatally wounded.  
19 One minute forty-eight seconds after the first  
20 shot Deputy Peterson is still on the east side  
21 of Building 12. At the same -- well, within  
22 seconds of the BSO dispatcher attempting to  
23 raise Deputy Peterson, Deputy Hanks, and Deputy  
24 Seward, Deputy Peterson interrupts to broadcast  
25 that he also hears these gunshots.

1 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is  
2 played in the open meeting:)

3 DISPATCH: 17Bravo3, 17 Bravo --

4 SPEAKER: 17Juliet3, please be advised we  
5 have possible -- it could be firecrackers, I  
6 think we got shots fired, possible shots fired  
7 1200 Building.

8 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
9 the proceedings continue as follows:)

10 SGT. SUESS: So approximately a minute  
11 fifty-two seconds after the first shot Mr.  
12 Rospierski approached a group of students that  
13 was casually moving towards the third floor  
14 west stairwell and turned them around toward  
15 the east. At that same time Medina drove south  
16 away from the east side of Building 12, and  
17 students on the north side of Building 7 south  
18 of Building 12, it becomes apparent they  
19 realize something more grave than a fire alarm  
20 is taking place. Those students turn in a  
21 panic and run back towards Building 7, where  
22 they take shelter. There is still a great  
23 number of students on the third floor near the  
24 east stairwell.

25 CHAIR: Senator Book, go ahead.

1           SEN. BOOK: Thank you. I just want to  
2           make sure that I understood that. These  
3           students on Slide 123 that are standing outside  
4           realize something more grave was happening and  
5           ran back.

6           SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am.

7           SEN. BOOK: That would be because they  
8           heard gunfire?

9           SGT. SUESS: So those specific students,  
10          and I don't recall any of them by name, I don't  
11          recall if they actually heard gunfire. The --  
12          the presumption that we're operating with is  
13          that Medina as he's leaving, and Peterson and  
14          Greenleaf, we know at different times they're  
15          also telling students to evacuate. We don't  
16          know if it's happening at that very moment, but  
17          this is the same time Medina is leaving.

18          SEN. BOOK: So they just know that  
19          something really bad is happening in the 1200  
20          Building, and to go away.

21          SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am. You know, I  
22          don't know if it's -- we didn't show all of  
23          these images to each person we interviewed and  
24          said at this point, you know, what do recall  
25          doing or saying. We know that the people on

1 the east side of Building 12 at various times  
2 were telling students to get away.

3 So just shy of two minutes past the first  
4 shots being fired by Cruz, Cruz has made it to  
5 the west end of the second floor. He does have  
6 the firearm raised, but he's not firing any  
7 shots at this point. He fires into two  
8 classes. One of them was empty. There was  
9 nobody at all in that class. And another one  
10 he just shoots through the window, but nobody  
11 on the second floor is killed or injured.

12 A minute fifty-nine second, one minute  
13 fifty-nine seconds after the first shot BSO  
14 broadcasts about the active shooter.

15 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is  
16 played in open court:)

17 DISPATCH: Attention all units in District  
18 15, possible shots fired at 5901 Pine Island  
19 Road at Stoneman Douglas High School, possible  
20 shots fired at Stoneman Douglas High School.

21 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
22 the proceedings continue as follows:)

23 SGT. SUESS: So two minutes and two  
24 seconds this large mass of students is still on  
25 the third floor near the east stairwell. You

1 can tell the students are all looking in  
2 different directions. There's no clear  
3 direction on who should be going where, or what  
4 is happening. Cruz is almost halfway down the  
5 second floor moving towards the stairwell that  
6 he would later go up.

7 Two minutes and five seconds after the  
8 first shot students on -- so there's a catwalk,  
9 a second floor hallway, for lack of a better  
10 phrase, between Building 7 and 8, so from  
11 standing at that location you can see the east  
12 side of Building 12. So these students, and  
13 you see the one circled in red, see Medina, I'm  
14 sorry, Peterson and Greenleaf, as they are  
15 running south toward them from the east side of  
16 Building 12. Seconds later after that still  
17 image these students turns and then begin to  
18 move south away from Building 12.

19 Two minutes and six seconds after the  
20 first shot Medina drove south on the east side  
21 of Building 8, so that map on the top right,  
22 the red dot further to the right is Medina.  
23 The other red dot and the green dot are  
24 Greenleaf and Peterson running south to the  
25 northeast corner of Building 7. Peterson and

1 Greenleaf spend approximately twenty-seven  
2 seconds on the east side of Building 12.

3 Two minutes and seven seconds, Mr.  
4 Rospierski has gone to the top of the west  
5 stairwell, and looks down the stairs to try and  
6 identify what is happening. So as Peterson has  
7 reached the northeast corner of Building 7 he  
8 turns towards Building 12, reaches up to his  
9 BSO radio on his left shoulder. Students still  
10 on the third floor are near that east stairwell  
11 door.

12 So most commissioners have been out there  
13 to the school, and I know it's been quite a  
14 while since we've been out there, so this image  
15 is Peterson's location, but it's just a little  
16 closer than that camera that captures his  
17 movement. So the -- on the left side of that  
18 you'll see there's a very large fence. That  
19 fence was not there on February 14th, that has  
20 since been erected. Deputy Peterson took that  
21 location near the red oval, and there's a few  
22 different images here.

23 So this perspective in the next few images  
24 that you'll see, this is essentially where  
25 Deputy Peterson was standing. So to the left

1       you'll see that that's stairwell by which  
2       Deputy Peterson had taken cover. The red oval,  
3       that's classroom 1234. That is the classroom  
4       through which Cruz fired the rounds that  
5       Peterson would have, in all likelihood had been  
6       the loudest rounds, which Peterson would have  
7       heard. So this is just turning to the right  
8       slightly.

9               So this tree is the location that Officer  
10       Burton would take upon his arrival. Again, as  
11       we're moving through this chronologically he's  
12       not there yet, but just remember this image,  
13       and that's the location that he would take,  
14       which afforded he and Deputy Peterson the  
15       chance to communicate back and forth.

16              Two minutes thirteen seconds after the  
17       first shot Cruz fired rounds into classroom  
18       1231. These are the rounds that really caused  
19       the students in the east stairwell to realize  
20       that something bad is happening. That's when  
21       they all turned, and that's really when mass  
22       panic on the third floor sets in.

23       (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is  
24       played in the open meeting:)

25       SPEAKER: 17Juliet3 -- you got to get some

1 units over here. I need to shut down Stoneman  
2 Douglas, the intersection.

3 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
4 the proceedings continue as follows:)

5 SGT. SUESS: Two minutes and twenty  
6 seconds after the first shot Cruz reached the  
7 alcove for Classroom 1234, and fired those  
8 shots, which are in the general direction of  
9 Peterson. There's no evidence to suggest that  
10 Cruz knew Peterson was there. It just appears  
11 to be coincidence. Two minutes and twenty-two  
12 seconds after the first shot students fleeing  
13 west on the third floor reach, some of them I  
14 should say, reach Mr. Rospierski, who is  
15 pointing them towards classrooms. Multiple  
16 students attempt to enter his classroom, but  
17 were unable to do so, as Detective Bonasoro  
18 explained he forgot his keys, or left his keys  
19 when he was evacuating his classroom.

20 At about that same time there's some  
21 additional traffic from Deputy Peterson and  
22 Deputy Kratz, who was the first other BSO  
23 Deputy to be on scene.

24 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is  
25 played in the open meeting:)

1 DISPATCH: 5901 Pine Island --

2 SPEAKER: 17Juliet3, we're talking about  
3 the 1200 Building, it's going to be the  
4 building off of Holmberg Road.

5 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
6 the proceedings continued as follows:)

7 SGT. SUESS: So two minutes and  
8 thirty-nine seconds after the first shot Cruz  
9 entered the east stairwell to travel up the  
10 east stairs towards the third floor. Students  
11 on the third floor are still trying to get into  
12 classrooms. And in the bottom right image you  
13 see Peterson at the northeast corner of  
14 Building 7.

15 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is  
16 played in the open meeting:)

17 SPEAKER: We don't have any description  
18 yet, we just hear shots, but appears to be  
19 shots fired.

20 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
21 the proceedings continue as follows:)

22 CHAIR: So that's not true, he had a  
23 description from Medina, right?

24 SGT. SUESS: Correct. Yes, sir, I believe  
25 Medina said that he gave Peterson a

1 description.

2 CHAIR: Right, in the -- in the golf cart  
3 he gave a description.

4 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

5 CHAIR: Right.

6 SGT. SUESS: Two minutes and fifty seconds  
7 after the first shot Rospierski you can tell  
8 was attempting to calm students, trying to get  
9 them into classrooms, so on that third floor  
10 image on the left side, you see the red dot,  
11 there are some students there with Rospierski,  
12 and Cruz has reached the third floor stairwell,  
13 and is preparing to enter the east end of the  
14 third floor.

15 At two minutes and fifty-four seconds Cruz  
16 began shooting west in the third floor hallway.  
17 Teacher Scott Beigel was fatally wounded while  
18 holding his door open. Joaquin Oliver, Meadow  
19 Pollack, and Anthony Bourges were shot around  
20 this time as they were standing in the middle  
21 of the hall.

22 MR. SCHACHTER: And, Sergeant, were they,  
23 can you -- are we going to get into the fact  
24 that Meadow and Joaquin were trying to get into  
25 the bathroom that was locked?

1           SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. Within seconds of  
2           that they do try and get into the third floor  
3           restroom.

4           MR. SCHACHTER: After he starts to shoot  
5           in the hallway?

6           SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. They are not able  
7           to do so, and then quickly flee across the hall  
8           south towards the alcove, where for Mr.  
9           Rospierski's class, Joaquin continued into the  
10          adjacent bathroom. I don't recall which was  
11          men's, which was women's, so he went from one  
12          alcove to the next.

13          MR. SCHACHTER: And which -- and which  
14          administration officer made the decision to  
15          lock the bathrooms?

16          SGT. SUESS: I do not know. I don't know  
17          if we reached a --

18          DET. BONASORO: Mr. Porter.

19          SGT. SUESS: Porter made that decision.  
20          And did you ask him why?

21          CHAIR: It was for vaping. Remember it  
22          was for vaping. The third and the first floor  
23          restrooms are locked because the students were  
24          vaping in them. And that's why they put Taylor  
25          outside the second floor restroom. It's the

1           only restroom that was open, was the second  
2           floor, because they were having a vaping  
3           problem with the students in the bathrooms.  
4           That's why they locked them.

5           MR. SCHACHTER: Do we know how long they,  
6           the bathrooms were locked, like did they just  
7           start this, was this for a month, the whole  
8           year, do we have any idea on time frame?

9           SGT. SUESS: Detective Bonasoro is saying  
10          that had just started.

11          MR. SCHACHTER: It had just started.

12          SGT. SUESS: So two minutes and fifty-four  
13          seconds after the first shot masses of students  
14          are exiting other buildings, but they again are  
15          exiting in a very calm manner. They are still  
16          under the impression that this is a fire drill.  
17          And these two images, the next screen, you'll  
18          see a map of where they're located.

19          MR. PETTY: Sergeant, Porter had turned  
20          the fire alarm off at that point.

21          SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

22          MR. PETTY: Is it still procedure to  
23          evacuate the buildings when the fire alarm is  
24          shut off?

25          SGT. SUESS: I don't know if the procedure

1 is that well defined. Detective Bonasoro did a  
2 lot more involvement as far as school  
3 procedures and policies. You know, obviously  
4 we come from a very policy heavy profession, so  
5 there's a policy for nearly everything. I  
6 don't get the impression that the school board  
7 operates in any way the same manner.

8 MR. PETTY: I had that same impression.  
9 But these kids are out -- we know what Cruz is  
10 about to do, and they're now out walking  
11 unprotected, they have no idea what's going on,  
12 they're walking very casually. The fire  
13 emergency appears to be over, the alarms are  
14 off, but --

15 SGT. SUESS: Yeah, I think it's a matter  
16 of they hear a fire drill, even though it was  
17 shut down pretty quickly the teachers interpret  
18 it as, or I guess this is another fire drill,  
19 so they just move ahead with that. They --  
20 they never got any information to counter it  
21 other than, you know, correct me if I'm wrong,  
22 I don't know if there's a sense, when they do  
23 an actual fire drill do they let the alarm run  
24 for five seconds, for twenty seconds, for three  
25 minutes, I don't know.

1           MR. PETTY: Well, had there been an  
2 announcement over the PA at this point into the  
3 other classrooms, and what was that  
4 announcement? I'm seeing a yes.

5           DET. BONASORO: There was an announcement.  
6 The announcement was to, they referred to it as  
7 a gas leak. So he called for the evacuation  
8 over the PA regarding the, the readout on the,  
9 on the box on the inside of the SRO, so they  
10 evacuated there. It wasn't 'til we hear,  
11 Porter hears Bonner screaming code red, where  
12 he reverses the code black for the evac to a  
13 code red, code red at that point. But at that  
14 point there's a lot of people in the hallway,  
15 and nobody heard what was happening over the  
16 PA.

17          MR. PETTY: I just -- well, obviously in  
18 Building 12, but in the other buildings -- it's  
19 still, what, almost thirty seconds before we're  
20 going to hear the code red called?

21          SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

22          MR. PETTY: Yeah.

23          SGT. SUESS: If -- I mean if you're asking  
24 for a good explanation I don't have one. I  
25 don't think there is one.

1           MR. PETTY: Well, we've already identified  
2           the policy as being shelter in place or  
3           evacuate, and so we've got to, the school  
4           district needs to fix that, it's got to be one  
5           or the other. I don't know what the right  
6           answer is, but we've need to pick one.

7           SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

8           MR. PETTY: But still, when the, when the  
9           fire alarms are turned off we have kids now  
10          walking around with no idea what's going on.  
11          This could have -- this could have been  
12          significantly worse.

13          SGT. SUESS: I completely agree.

14          CHAIR: And, you know, against the  
15          backdrop is, is that until Butler's training in  
16          January there had not been any. In the  
17          preceding time there not had been one code red  
18          drill. If you don't train this is what you're  
19          going to get, and, and you got chaos, and an  
20          appearance of chaos because that's what it was.

21          SEN. BOOK: And I just want to also point  
22          out from the last presentation I believe it was  
23          Porter, was told by the, no longer was an FBI  
24          agent, that someone could, you know, open fire  
25          from the Sawgrass and --

1 CHAIR: Right, but he did talk -- that was  
2 to Wexler, correct. Right.

3 SEN. BOOK: Right. I mean --

4 CHAIR: Right.

5 SGT. SUESS: So just shy of three minutes  
6 past the first shot Deputy Peterson transmits  
7 that he's over by the south side, I think  
8 referring to the south side of Building 12 by  
9 the 700 building. Deputy Kratz transmits that  
10 he is shutting down eastbound Holmberg at the  
11 divide between Westglades Middle and the high  
12 school. So again to reference this map it's  
13 really the west end of the football field.  
14 This is the general area to which Deputy Kratz  
15 is referring.

16 MR. SCHACHTER: Had he told everybody to  
17 stage 500' away yet?

18 SGT. SUESS: No, sir. We'll cover that.  
19 So two minutes and fifty-seven seconds, Kratz  
20 location is established approximately here.  
21 This was confirmed later by some GPS records  
22 provided by Broward Sheriff's Office that at  
23 the latest put Deputy Kratz at this location by  
24 2:25.12. And you'll see that Cruz is still on  
25 the east end of the third floor.

1           So we're going to go through the eight  
2           deputies, well, seven in addition to Deputy  
3           Peterson, their statements, the interviews that  
4           they have provided about what they saw, what  
5           they heard, what they knew. So we're going to  
6           go through each of those in the next several  
7           slides.

8           So Deputy Kratz has approximately thirty  
9           years in law enforcement. He last attended  
10          active shooter training with BSO on September  
11          9, 2015, and he said as he was approaching  
12          campus he saw three school buses driving  
13          towards Marjory Stoneman Douglas. He was aware  
14          that elementary schools were in the process of  
15          releasing students, so that caused his concern  
16          to be for the students traveling east on  
17          Holmberg Road.

18          He tried to get information about the  
19          shooter from students who were fleeing, and he  
20          recalled some of them referencing fireworks, or  
21          firecrackers. To him the gunshots sounded as  
22          though they were thirty or forty feet from him  
23          as he was, from the area on the east end of the  
24          football field. He made reference to there  
25          being only a fence between him and where he

1           thought the shots were coming from. So Deputy  
2           Kratz' point of view, as he's on the north side  
3           of the fence on Holmberg Road, or on the right  
4           of way, there's the six foot fence, there's  
5           very large banners obstructing your view of  
6           that, and then you're looking at the back of  
7           the football stands, so his view is largely  
8           obscured from where he is.

9           He expressed a concern about climbing up  
10          that fence, which, you know, from a tactical  
11          standpoint is a very bad place to be, where  
12          you've got your gun holstered and you're fully  
13          exposed on that fence, so that was some of the  
14          explanation of his concerns at that point.  
15          Deputy Kratz returned to the trunk of his  
16          vehicle and get his rifle. He said that he saw  
17          Kyle Laman being helped by Sergeant Heinrich as  
18          they were moving to the west.

19          Going back to the chronology, this happens  
20          later, but I'm just going to go through Deputy  
21          Kratz' statement about what he said he  
22          experienced. He said that he started to escort  
23          Sergeant Heinrich, who again is unarmed and not  
24          in uniform, and Kyle Laman, to the west. He  
25          turned Kyle Laman and Sergeant Heinrich over to

1 Deputy Marchese, who would arrive shortly after  
2 that moment. He said he did not continue east  
3 due to hearing no more gunshots, and he had no  
4 description of the suspect.

5 He described Coral Springs officers coming  
6 to his location and taking cover near his  
7 vehicle, and their vehicle, as he tried to  
8 explain to them what he knew. Officers told  
9 him that there were three victims inside  
10 Building 12, which the officer said he learned  
11 from Coral Springs dispatch, and Deputy Kratz  
12 relayed this over the BSO radio.

13 Deputy Kratz said that he remained in this  
14 area directing students away from Building 12,  
15 and from campus, and trying to keep the roadway  
16 clear for emergency vehicles. Much later on he  
17 went on to assist with crowd control and  
18 traffic direction.

19 MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant, can I ask you a  
20 question. It seems, you know, we heard  
21 testimony on the training, and Deputy Kratz  
22 hasn't had active shooter training in over  
23 three years, you know, I'm not in law  
24 enforcement, but I mean what do, what is normal  
25 best practices?

1 CHAIR: It varies. You know, as I said  
2 yesterday Coral Springs trains every year.  
3 Broward has cycles of training, but they have  
4 exponentially more deputies. They have  
5 fourteen hundred law enforcement deputies, so  
6 the training goes in cycles. Not everybody is  
7 going to go every year in an agency that size.

8 MR. SCHACHTER: And he was -- he was BSO?

9 CHAIR: Kratz is, yes.

10 MR. SCHACHTER: And, okay, so yesterday,  
11 if there's fourteen hundred deputies, and I  
12 thought there had been twelve hundred that were  
13 trained in 2017, he was one that missed it?

14 CHAIR: Those numbers aren't -- those --  
15 those numbers you just said are not accurate,  
16 is, is that in 2018 they have put about twelve  
17 hundred through. In 2017 they only had about  
18 --

19 MR. SCHACHTER: Sixty -- sixty -- okay.  
20 That's right. That's what I meant.

21 CHAIR: -- sixty something go through,  
22 because they were, because they were  
23 emphasizing other training. You can see from  
24 their numbers that their emphasizing other  
25 courses, which is not unusual because you have

1 to pick and choose. You can't send everybody  
2 to do training every year on everything,  
3 especially in an agency that size, so their  
4 training was cyclical, and you're not just  
5 going to get everybody through every year.

6 SGT. SUESS: So we're three minutes and  
7 two seconds after the first shots. Deputy  
8 Eason transmits I'll get the west side of  
9 Stoneman on Holmberg. It's important to  
10 remember that five seconds earlier Deputy Kratz  
11 transmitted I'm shutting down eastbound  
12 Holmberg at the divide between Westglades  
13 Middle and the high school, so immediately  
14 after Deputy Kratz makes that transmission  
15 Deputy Eason says that he's essentially going  
16 to the same place.

17 Three minutes and six seconds after the  
18 first shot campus monitor Bonner drove east  
19 toward Building 12 on the south side of  
20 Building 13. Cruz is still near the east end  
21 on the third floor, as Mr. Rospierski and  
22 students have taken cover in the alcove to his  
23 classroom. Three minutes and eleven seconds on  
24 the camera you're able to see that Sergeant  
25 Heinrich shuts off the water and sprints

1           towards Building 12. Again, he was unarmed and  
2           did not have a vest.

3           Campus monitor Bonner at this point  
4           reaches the southeast corner of Building 13,  
5           where he hears the gunshots, and sees campus  
6           monitor Feis lying on the ground. He stopped  
7           moving forward at that point, so on this map  
8           you see the approximate location of those three  
9           individuals.

10          MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant, what is the  
11          significance of Sergeant Heinrich shutting off  
12          the water?

13          SGT. SUESS: No, that because earlier on  
14          he was out there watering the baseball field,  
15          so it's very easy to see at that point he shuts  
16          off the water. That's when it's occurred to  
17          him something is going on.

18          MR. SCHACHTER: I understand. Okay, thank  
19          you for explaining that.

20          COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, if I can just  
21          make sure you guys are not talking at the same  
22          time, because I can't get it on the record  
23          separately.

24          MR. SCHACHTER: Sure. Sorry about that.

25          SGT. SUESS: Three minutes and twelve

1 seconds past the first shot Nikolas Cruz was  
2 reloading his firearm and walking east in the  
3 hall. So he had turned his back towards  
4 Rospierski and the other students that were  
5 taking cover. Again, Rospierski and the  
6 students were unable to enter the classroom,  
7 and then they tried to, well, Mr. Rospierski  
8 tried to get into Ms. McCaul's door, but wasn't  
9 able to do so to that, because that door was  
10 locked as well. So Rospierski after moving to  
11 that classroom then gets the students, and they  
12 feel west on the third floor.

13 So you see Cruz, this camera is on the  
14 east end of the third floor. The red circle is  
15 just pointing out his firearm is unloaded at  
16 this point, there's not a magazine in the  
17 magazine well. He does have a magazine in his  
18 right hand. Mr. Rospierski leaves the students  
19 that are in the alcove to his classroom and  
20 goes to the alcove where for Ms. McCaul's  
21 classroom. After realizing that door is locked  
22 as well he directs the students to flee with  
23 him west on the third floor towards the third  
24 floor stairwell.

25 SEN. BOOK: How far is that from that

1 alcove, because I see the exit, that would be  
2 the stairwell?

3 SGT. SUESS: So from Mr. Rospierski's door  
4 to the stairwell, I haven't been in that  
5 building in a while. If I had to estimate,  
6 twenty, thirty feet approximately.

7 CHAIR: Maybe a little longer.

8 SGT. SUESS: Okay. Three minutes and  
9 fifteen seconds after the first shot large  
10 groups of students gather on the south and west  
11 sides of Building 9, still in a manner  
12 consistent with a fire drill. The students are  
13 moving about very casually with no knowledge of  
14 anything of the shooting taking place.

15 Three minutes and fourteen seconds,  
16 Deputies Perry and Volpe, Parkland deputies say  
17 over the radio that they are going to be  
18 responding as well. Three minutes and sixteen  
19 seconds after the first shot is when campus  
20 monitor Bonner calls the first code red. He is  
21 south of Building 13. You can see in that  
22 image he's holding the radio up to his mouth,  
23 and it's during this time that Rospierski is  
24 leading students west on the third floor hall.

25 SEN. BOOK: That's forty feet.

1           SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am. We -- we can try  
2           and get you a better measurement down the road  
3           if you want, but --

4           CHAIR: And you know, for them -- and it's  
5           only over the radio. Not everybody had a  
6           radio, and it wasn't over the PA system.

7           SEN. BOOK: Well, it was more just for the  
8           point of that's how far --

9           CHAIR: Into the event it was.

10          SEN. BOOK: Everything had gone.

11          CHAIR: Absolutely. Right, it was -- it  
12          was -- Cruz is about, about halfway down the  
13          hallway, so those last victims, Meadow Pollack,  
14          and the ones that were in the alcove, and then  
15          just before he went into the teacher's lounge,  
16          so it's right at the end of the event. Go  
17          ahead.

18          SGT. SUESS: And again, you know, I'm  
19          pointing out the time since the first shots,  
20          but we've gone through a hundred and sixty-four  
21          slides. This has only been three minutes and  
22          sixteen seconds. A lot has happened in a very  
23          short period of time. So seconds after campus  
24          monitor calls that code red staff and students  
25          on the west side of Building 9 react to the

1 code red being called. You know there's no  
2 recording of the school radio so it's largely  
3 based off of statements that we were given, and  
4 some video that you'll see in a second, that we  
5 have come to the conclusion that that is when  
6 the first code red was called.

7 So if you watch this video in the  
8 highlighted area the lady standing there in a  
9 burgundy shirt and dark shorts, a teacher, an  
10 administrator, coach, I'm not quite sure, but  
11 you will see watching her, she's the first  
12 person to react. She -- I believe it's her  
13 left arm she throws up, and all these students  
14 prior to that moment are very calm and  
15 collected, after she does that you can tell the  
16 body language changes drastically.

17 (Thereupon, a video is played in the open meeting,  
18 and the proceedings continue as follows:)

19 SGT. SUESS: So based on Assistant  
20 Principal Porter's statement that he did not  
21 call the first code red until hearing campus  
22 monitor Bonner call it over the radio, it is  
23 not until after this point that Porter calls  
24 over the PA that there is a code red, notifying  
25 everyone else, everyone else that can hear him

1           on a PA that is.

2           CHAIR: Anybody notice when the code red  
3           is called where do the students go, back into  
4           the school. And there's other video of it too.  
5           It goes back to the lack of training, and the  
6           lack of -- because there's other ones you'll  
7           see later, and there's video where at one point  
8           later on they're actually bringing kids back  
9           into the campus, because it was chaos. And --  
10          and they weren't drilled enough, there were no  
11          drills, so you got, you know, a code red is  
12          called, she's turning them back into the  
13          campus, and you can see other ones with, back  
14          in the, even in the 100 building, et cetera,  
15          you can see them literally bringing kids back  
16          into the, into the school.

17          SEN. BOOK: And then -- I'm sorry to  
18          interrupt, Mr. Chair. I -- these kids -- I  
19          notice the young lady, she has balloons in her  
20          hands right here, backpacks, like typically, I  
21          mean it's been a while since I was in high  
22          school, believe it or not, but you don't take  
23          your backpacks with you during a fire drill,  
24          you don't take your balloons with you when  
25          you're on a fire, you know, during a fire

1 drill. I --

2 SGT. SUESS: So, Senator, what I can tell  
3 you -- I'm sorry to interject.

4 SEN. BOOK: No, no, I'm just --

5 SGT. SUESS: In speaking with some of  
6 these students, some of them thought positively  
7 of this fire drill, it's the second one, it's  
8 near the end of the day, so they thought, oh,  
9 we're just going to leave early.

10 CHAIR: Right.

11 SGT. SUESS: So maybe -- maybe that's what  
12 some of them were thinking at that point.

13 CHAIR: Secretary Carroll, go ahead.

14 MR. CARROLL: Just to reiterate that,  
15 because it was about fifteen minutes from the  
16 end of the day. But to go back to what the  
17 Sheriff said about bringing them back to  
18 school, I thought it was strange, because I  
19 don't know what the young man told Feis when he  
20 went to him, but I just thought it was strange  
21 that as he went back to Building 12 he brought  
22 the kid back with him. To me it was like he  
23 was bringing the kid back into harm's way.  
24 Now, I know he deposited him in Building 13,  
25 but it was strange, even that reaction, where

1           he brings him back to where he just saw this  
2           kid with a rifle and, and this kid clearly knew  
3           that there was shooting going on that building,  
4           and he brings him back. Just nothing makes  
5           sense here.

6           SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

7           MS. LARKIN SKINNER: I have a question.  
8           So that staff member clearly did not hear the  
9           code red over the PA system, because we've  
10          already established the PA system, there's no  
11          speakers outside, or in common areas, correct?

12          SGT. SUESS: Well, the code red wouldn't  
13          have been called yet over the PA.

14          MS. LARKIN SKINNER: Okay, so how --

15          SGT. SUESS: She hears it over the radio.

16          MS. LARKIN SKINNER: So she hears --  
17          that's just what I wanted to clarify, thanks.

18          SGT. SUESS: She heard Bonner directly.

19          MS. LARKIN SKINNER: Okay, so she heard  
20          the very first code red by Bonner.

21          SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am.

22          MR. SCHACHTER: But that was on the school  
23          radio, right?

24          SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir, correct. Correct.

25          MR. SCHACHTER: And then Porter is the

1 first one that he changes the evacuation order  
2 and calls a code red on the PA.

3 SGT. SUESS: Correct.

4 MR. SCHACHTER: Got it.

5 SGT. SUESS: So three minutes and  
6 twenty-one seconds, so I'm going to try and  
7 point out any time we watch a video, because  
8 that again can be misleading on the chronology.  
9 That video was twenty seconds, so we're sort of  
10 going back in time a little to the beginning of  
11 that video. So four seconds after that code  
12 red was called Rospierski and those students  
13 were entering the west stairs, where Cruz again  
14 began shooting. This is where Jamie Guttenberg  
15 and Peter Wang would end up being fatally  
16 wounded.

17 Three minutes and twenty-three seconds  
18 after the first shot seven of the ten students  
19 in Mr. Rospierski's group fled down the west  
20 stairwell. Kyle Laman would join, join them  
21 shortly thereafter, and at some point while  
22 fleeing he was shot in the ankle.

23 So we're going to talk a little bit about  
24 Deputy Eason, and some of the data that we've  
25 gathered on him, and some of the statements

1           that he had provided. If you recall he's the  
2           individual that five seconds after Kratz said  
3           he was going to the west side of campus he  
4           transmitted essentially the same thing. GPS  
5           records from Broward SO show the green dot, so  
6           when that, the map on the right side of the  
7           slide, that green dot corresponds to the green  
8           dot on the map on the left side, showing the,  
9           approximately the same location.

10           Deputy Eason would have .3 miles north of  
11           Holmberg Road at 2:25.07. Twenty-seven seconds  
12           earlier is when he transmitted that he would go  
13           to the west side of the MSD campus, so  
14           obviously the shortest route for him to get  
15           there would be following that yellow line on  
16           the map on the left side, south on Holmberg,  
17           west on -- I'm sorry, south on Pine Island,  
18           west on Holmberg, and then south onto the  
19           Westglades campus, where he would end up at  
20           that red dot. You can see in doing so he  
21           drives past all buildings on the MSD campus, in  
22           particular Building 12 where the red box is  
23           located. Cruz's final shot would not be fired  
24           until 2:27.10, and we'll talk more about that  
25           in a little bit.

1           Three minutes and thirty seconds after the  
2           first shot there's additional -- this is when  
3           Deputy Kratz first transmits about shots being  
4           heard by the football field.

5       (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is  
6           played in the open meeting:)

7           SPEAKER: Daniel2, I hear shots fired by  
8           the football field. Shots fired by the  
9           football field.

10          DISPATCH: Shots fired by the football  
11          field heard.

12       (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
13          the proceedings continue as follows:)

14          SGT. SUESS: As a reminder, Deputy Kratz  
15          is the one who explained he's got the fence  
16          barrier, the football field, the shots sound  
17          much closer to him. Three minutes and  
18          thirty-three seconds campus monitor Brian  
19          Staubly walked north between Building 7 and 8,  
20          where you see Kelvin Greenleaf has his radio in  
21          his hand. It's evidence on the video that Mr.  
22          Greenleaf is directing students away from  
23          Building 12, and away from his location. Cruz  
24          is still on the third floor, approximately  
25          halfway down the hall.

1           A second later Cruz continued past Meadow  
2           Pollack and Carol Loughran, and fired rounds at  
3           them as they were in the alcove of Mr.  
4           Rospierski's door. Cruz would continue on and  
5           into the alcove where Joaquin Oliver was  
6           hiding, had taken cover, and fired additional  
7           rounds at him. As we referenced earlier we  
8           identified Deputy Kratz' location based off of  
9           his radio transmission. We also made reference  
10          to his GPS. This is that time by at the latest  
11          Deputy Kratz was on Holmberg Road near the west  
12          end of the football field.

13           Three minutes and forty seconds after the  
14          first shot Deputy Peterson makes another  
15          transmission.

16          (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is  
17               played in the open meeting:)

18           SPEAKER: 17Juliet3, we're looking at the  
19           1200 building, it's going to be the 300  
20           building, it's going to be right off of  
21           Holmberg Road by the senior lot.

22          (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
23               the proceedings continue as follows:)

24           SGT. SUESS: Three minutes and forty-eight  
25           seconds after the first shot Cruz fired

1 additional, or I'm sorry, fired rounds at the  
2 window on the west end of the third floor hall.  
3 This is when he would have begun his attempts  
4 to start sniping out of those upper windows,  
5 and campus monitor Staubly was visible standing  
6 next to Deputy Peterson.

7 So these are crime scene photographs taken  
8 by BSO. This is looking at the window at which  
9 Cruz was shooting out of, so you can see how  
10 the, the damage to that window. In the  
11 distance you see the building, are Westglades  
12 Middle, you see the football field, the track,  
13 just to sort of give you a lay of the land, and  
14 help orient what you're seeing.

15 At three minutes and fifty-two seconds, as  
16 you saw in the video yesterday, Cruz approached  
17 the stairwell and attempted to open the door  
18 where Mr. Rospierski had concealed himself. He  
19 put his foot at the bottom of that door to keep  
20 Cruz from opening it. At three minutes and  
21 fifty-three seconds as campus monitor Bonner is  
22 fleeing to the west in his golf cart he comes  
23 across Sergeant Heinrich, who is continuing to  
24 move east on campus.

25 MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant.

1           SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

2           MR. SCHACHTER: So -- so the murdered was  
3 not able to go through that door because  
4 Rospierski blocked him. What did he do then?

5           SGT. SUESS: We're getting there. He --  
6 he -- we'll get there.

7           MR. SCHACHTER: Okay. Okay.

8           SGT. SUESS: And here we are. So Cruz  
9 left that stairwell door and turned, and would  
10 go into the teacher's lounge. All remaining  
11 gunshots fired by Cruz would have been fired  
12 from inside that teacher's lounge. So this is  
13 a view from inside the teacher's lounge. This  
14 is a window facing south. You see the, to the  
15 right the damage from some of the attempted  
16 shots.

17          CHAIR: He fired through those windows,  
18 and then he, he tried to open the windows, but  
19 he couldn't figure out how to open them. And  
20 you can see where he had tried to open the  
21 windows, so very fortunate that those were  
22 Hurricane resistant windows and he couldn't  
23 fire through them, and then he couldn't figure  
24 out how to open them, because there were  
25 hundreds of kids in that courtyard below that

1           were fleeing to the west at that time.

2           MR. SCHACHTER: In -- and one page back he  
3           fired rounds at the window on the west end of  
4           the third floor. Was he trying to do to the  
5           same thing there?

6           CHAIR: Yes. He had -- and he had -- and  
7           he had just finished shooting Peter Wang at the  
8           point, and then he fired through the windows,  
9           and Peter Wang was underneath the windows that  
10          he was shooting out of. And then from there is  
11          when he went into the third floor lounge. He  
12          shot out the window of the door to the  
13          teachers' lounge, he went in, tried to shoot  
14          through windows, tried to open the windows,  
15          couldn't, and once he figured out that he  
16          wasn't being effective, then that's when he  
17          fled. Mr. Petty, go ahead.

18          MR. PETTY: You just pointed it out, Mr.  
19          Chair, the, the one room that he accessed by  
20          shooting a window out was unoccupied.

21          CHAIR: Correct.

22          MR. PETTY: Had he done that in any of the  
23          classrooms and entered --

24          CHAIR: This would have been a more  
25          devastating event than it already is. Senator.

1           SEN. BOOK: I know, Mr. Chair, that he  
2           spent quite a bit of time -- I apologize. I'm  
3           sorry. I know he spent quite a bit of time in  
4           the teachers' lounge. Did he -- he didn't -- I  
5           would imagine he didn't spend that entire time  
6           shooting out the window.

7           CHAIR: A lot of it. I mean, you know, we  
8           don't know exactly how many rounds. I can tell  
9           you that, though, that there were, he reloaded  
10          in there, because there were magazines found in  
11          there. He had set up a bi-pod on the gun, and  
12          was trying to shoot from the bi-pod. So he was  
13          in the teachers' lounge from about 3:52 until  
14          about, I'm sorry, from about 2:25.30 to about  
15          2:27.35, and that's when he hit the stairs. So  
16          he was in there for about two minutes.

17          SEN. BOOK: So -- and across from that  
18          window is the, is Building 13.

19          SGT. SUESS: Yes, ma'am. So on this  
20          particular image in the bottom left, that white  
21          building, that's Building 13. Some of the  
22          fragments from these projectiles actually ended  
23          upon the roof of Building 13.

24          SEN. BOOK: Right. So when you say that  
25          -- when you say they're projectiles on the

1 roof, so did stuff go through?

2 CHAIR: Yeah, some did, the fragments.  
3 When they went through the roof, they did go  
4 through but they fragmented, they broke up. So  
5 there's two windows in the teacher's lounge.  
6 One goes west, and one goes south, so he had  
7 two angles there. So when you go into the  
8 teacher's lounge it's kind of like, the windows  
9 are kind of like this, so some of those are  
10 facing directly to the west, and some are  
11 facing to the south.

12 SEN. BOOK: Thank you.

13 SGT. SUESS: Just another image looking to  
14 the west. And again that's Building 13, the  
15 white building. The silver is the awning on  
16 the east side of Building 13. So the golf cart  
17 down there, if you can see, that's Coach Feis'  
18 golf cart, where he would have left it. So  
19 three minutes and fifty-nine seconds, a very  
20 large group of students had fled east toward  
21 Pine Island Road between Buildings 1 and 8. A  
22 staff member goes over, or several staff  
23 members I should say, and bring those students  
24 back onto campus.

25 MR. SCHACHTER: Which staff member?

1           SGT. SUESS: I do not recall his name off  
2           the top of my head, but we do have, have their  
3           names.

4           MR. SCHACHTER: And when you interviewed  
5           them what was their rationale?

6           SGT. SUESS: I don't recall that we have,  
7           that we interviewed them at this point. Yeah,  
8           in a chaotic situation I don't know what they  
9           were doing. I think it's been well established  
10          they were not well trained on what to do.

11          SEN. BOOK: I'm sorry, can I ask my --

12          SGT. SUESS: Four minutes and --

13          SEN. BOOK: I'm sorry, I have a -- is that  
14          -- and this is for the law enforcement in the  
15          room who kind of studied this like for a long  
16          time, lots of time, is it human nature to want  
17          to just go back to what you believe to be your  
18          safe space, and they believed their classroom,  
19          or like their school, like -- no -- no.

20          CHAIR: I -- I don't think that that's --  
21          I mean anybody else wants to weigh in on it, I  
22          don't think that that's intuitive that way. I  
23          think that the, the intuition should be is, is  
24          to get the heck out of there, and to get as far  
25          as you can as fast you can. And why anybody

1 with that situation would come back, unless  
2 they were directed to come back, and these kids  
3 were being brought back on -- and so you see  
4 that a few times. It really doesn't make any  
5 sense because, you know, the training, and  
6 everybody's heard it, right, run, hide, fight,  
7 so run and get away.

8 So but -- but again, they weren't trained,  
9 and, and if you have no training you've got not  
10 muscle memory, you've got no, you're going to  
11 react how you train, and if you're not trained  
12 this is how you react, you don't appropriately.

13 SHER. JUDD: Also -- also you get a mob  
14 mentality. Wherever the first one runs they  
15 all run.

16 CHAIR: Right.

17 SHER. JUDD: So when -- when one or two  
18 broke and run one way, and everybody is  
19 panicked, they all followed the leader.

20 SGT. SUESS: It's four minutes, this is  
21 that transmission I referred to earlier, again  
22 speculation on my part, Peterson maybe meant to  
23 transmit this over the school radio. Four  
24 minutes and four seconds after the first shot  
25 Deputy Kratz makes a reference to firecrackers,

1 I'm not sure, but he's by the football field.  
2 Four minutes and nine seconds after the first  
3 shot Kelvin Greenleaf ran south from Deputy  
4 Peterson's location. He described in his  
5 interview he went on to get students to secure  
6 in the auditorium, Building 8. Deputy Staubly  
7 would return to Peterson's location.

8 SEC. SENIOR: One second. Just going back  
9 to 186, hasn't Kratz already seen a wounded  
10 student at this point?

11 SGT. SUESS: No, sir, I don't believe so  
12 at this point. And there's -- the only thing  
13 we would have to really put a time frame to  
14 that would be any radio traffic. There's no  
15 video over there. There's no body cams. So  
16 it's largely narrowing it down to a window.

17 CHAIR: But go to back to -- remember too  
18 -- and this is, you know, bringing it up  
19 yesterday, but remember at this juncture is  
20 that all these calls are going into the Coral  
21 Springs communication center, and if the calls  
22 were going into the BSO communication center  
23 they already know it was the 1215, the 1216,  
24 they already had that, they knew it wasn't on  
25 the football field, they knew it was in 1200

1 building, they were hearing shots in the 1200  
2 building. But the channel that he's  
3 transmitting on right now, this channel he's  
4 transmitting on is, is not being heard by  
5 anybody that has that knowledge, and has that  
6 information, because all that information is  
7 sitting over in Coral Springs.

8 And that's why when he transmits this, and  
9 he says that they thought it was firecrackers,  
10 and thought but we'[re not sure it's by the  
11 football field, is that Coral Springs had a  
12 plethora of information, specific classrooms,  
13 heard shots fired, et cetera, and, and but  
14 nobody on the BSO channel had that information  
15 to say no, it's not on the football field,  
16 here's the classroom, here's the building,  
17 we're hearing shots et cetera. So that's the  
18 situation.

19 SGT. SUESS: And to that point, the  
20 deputies are also being told by Peterson to  
21 block traffic.

22 CHAIR: Right.

23 SGT. SUESS: The transmission has not  
24 occurred about staying away yet, but --

25 SEC. SENIOR: Okay.

1 CHAIR: Go ahead, Mr. Petty.

2 MR. SCHACHTER: When --

3 MR. PETTY: Just for my understanding --

4 CHAIR: Hang on. Go ahead, Mr. Petty.

5 MR. PETTY: Just for my understanding  
6 though did, was Kratz able to hear Peterson on  
7 the radio?

8 CHAIR: Yes.

9 MR. PETTY: So I know the information was  
10 sitting with Coral Springs, but BSO did have  
11 some information, they had a deputy on scene  
12 relaying some information, weren't they all  
13 hearing it?

14 CHAIR: Yes, Kratz -- Kratz would have,  
15 would have heard it, or should have heard it,  
16 as far as, you know, Peterson's transmissions,  
17 yes.

18 MR. PETTY: Okay.

19 CHAIR: Right. But not the specifics, you  
20 know, as far as, you know, the classroom, the  
21 classroom numbers, and all of that.

22 MR. PETTY: He wouldn't have that. He had  
23 building and shots fired, right?

24 CHAIR: Sure. Yeah, absolutely. And he  
25 would have heard, and he would have had that,

1           yes, that's, that's true. Mr. Schachter.

2           MR. SCHACHTER: When you -- did you  
3           interview Officer Staubly, and I'm just curious  
4           why he didn't go into the building.

5           SGT. SUESS: Well, Staubly is a campus  
6           monitor. He works for the schools.

7           MR. SCHACHTER: Staubly is a campus  
8           monitor. Got you. Got you. Yeah, thank you.

9           SGT. SUESS: Yes. Yes, sir. And  
10          Detective Bonasoro just reminded me, and  
11          throughout the course of these interviews, and  
12          we asked several deputies what, what did they  
13          recall hearing at that time -- some of these  
14          interviews were done months afterwards. Some  
15          of them have gone back and listened to the  
16          radio traffic, which obviously is going to skew  
17          their memory. And it's not -- again, it's not  
18          lost on us, I mean this is a, none of us have  
19          experienced responding to an incident of this.

20          I mean we've been to shootings, and bar  
21          fights, and bank robberies, that are all just  
22          chaotic in and of themselves, but some of these  
23          deputies don't recall hearing certain  
24          transmissions, which is not unusual, and we'll  
25          get to this point later, radio traffic in, or

1 radio transmissions in Parkland, even on a good  
2 day, it's been explained to us are not great  
3 just due to its proximity.

4 MR. PETTY: So they -- so they may have  
5 heard something, they may not have heard  
6 something. The throttling issue with the  
7 radios hadn't begun yet, right?

8 SGT. SUESS: I don't believe so.

9 CHAIR: No. No.

10 MR. PETTY: Okay. But obviously under  
11 stress --

12 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So after Greenleaf  
13 got the students in an auditorium he came  
14 across Assistant Principal Morford. Later they  
15 would go into Building 1 and begin reviewing  
16 the surveillance video. So you see Sergeant  
17 Heinrich here. He starts moving north towards  
18 that student parking lot. So this is on the  
19 southwest corner of Building 13. He's walking  
20 north between Buildings 10 and 13, where he  
21 would later encounter Kyle Laman.

22 This shows the approximate travel of  
23 Sergeant Heinrich as he leaves the baseball  
24 field. He would encounter campus monitor  
25 Bonner, continue north between those buildings,

1 where he would meet up with Kyle Laman  
2 somewhere in that general area. So in response  
3 to Deputy Kratz' transmissions about hearing  
4 shots by the football field Deputy Peterson  
5 says that we also heard it over by inside the  
6 1200 Building.

7 Four minutes and twenty seconds after the  
8 first shot based off of Broward's GPS records  
9 Deputy Seward arrived on Holmberg Road north of  
10 the MSD campus. He was not seen approaching  
11 the west doors of Building 12 until  
12 approximately 2:37, about ten minutes after the  
13 final shot had been fired, and eleven minutes  
14 after his arrival. So this shows the  
15 approximate travel of Deputy Seward. This is  
16 based both on his GPS, and then also in his  
17 statement where he provided a diagram showing  
18 his path of travel. So he goes west on  
19 Holmberg, makes a U-turn, and then parks by the  
20 east gate. Later he would continue south  
21 towards the east side of Building 12.

22 Deputy Seward has thirty eight years as a  
23 law enforcement officer amongst several  
24 agencies. He last attended active shooter  
25 training on August 19, 2015. He's worked as a

1 deputy in Parkland for seventeen years. He is  
2 one of the deputies that referenced radio  
3 problems in Parkland on any given day. He was  
4 in the 6300 block of Holmberg Road when he  
5 heard the shots fired call from Deputy  
6 Peterson, and he responded to that location due  
7 to hearing Peterson refer to Building 12, and  
8 having prior knowledge of where Building 12 was  
9 located on the campus. He could not recall if  
10 he saw any, any other vehicles on Holmberg Road  
11 when he arrived.

12 Deputy Seward said that as he was pulling  
13 onto the curb he heard, quote, five or six  
14 very, very loud, very, very loud, referring to  
15 gunshots, they sounded like bombs, I didn't  
16 know exactly where they were, I knew they were  
17 somewhere, they were on campus somewhere.  
18 After hearing these shots he heard someone  
19 broadcast that there were shots by that  
20 football field, and that same person asking for  
21 bolt cutters.

22 Deputy Seward said that the gunshots  
23 sounded as though they were coming west of the  
24 1200 building. He went to the rear of his  
25 vehicle to get his vest, and then went behind

1 his engine block to put his vest on. So he  
2 went to the north side of his car. He saw  
3 Deputy Hanks pull up east of his location and  
4 run towards Sergeant Miller. Deputy Seward saw  
5 officer -- and again, this is just his  
6 statement on what he recalls. This is moving  
7 ahead in our chronology. But he saw Officer  
8 Fernandes on Holmberg Road, but quickly lost  
9 sight of him, and did not know where he went.  
10 He saw additional CSPD cars arrive,  
11 approximately three or four of them east of his  
12 location. He didn't have any interaction with  
13 them, but recalled one of them asking Sergeant  
14 Miller if they could cut open the gate.

15 Deputy Seward said that he followed these  
16 officers onto campus. Once he reached Building  
17 officers had already entered through the east  
18 doors. At some point while he was on the east  
19 side of Building 12 he saw Deputy Peterson to  
20 his south. Deputy Seward largely remained at  
21 the east door holding the door open as students  
22 and staff were fleeing. He assisted in  
23 detaining multiple students in ROTC uniforms  
24 based on the description.

25 So you'll see as this plays out it's

1 important to note BSO largely operated under  
2 the premise that the suspect was wearing an  
3 ROTC uniform, so a light blue shirt and a dark  
4 blue uniform pant, whereas we know Medina is  
5 wearing a, I'm sorry, Cruz is wearing a  
6 burgundy polo with an ROTC logo and dark pants.

7 Seward said that he eventually went to the  
8 mobile command bus on Pine Island Road. So  
9 going back to our chronology, four minutes and  
10 twenty- two seconds after the first shot Deputy  
11 Peterson transmits.

12 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is  
13 played in the open meeting:)

14 SPEAKER: We're locking down the school  
15 right now. Make sure there's no pedestrian  
16 traffic anywhere on Holmberg Road.

17 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
18 the proceedings continue as follows:)

19 SGT. SUESS: At four minutes and  
20 thirty-two seconds Deputy Peterson appears to  
21 have his firearm drawn and pointed at the east  
22 side of Building 12. Cruz is still in the  
23 teacher lounge on the third floor. This is the  
24 point in which Sergeant Reid inquires based  
25 off, inquires about the active shooter based

1 off the fire chief crossing paths with him.

2 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is  
3 played in the open meeting:)

4 SPEAKER: I just had one of the fire admin  
5 go by and make reference to an active shooter  
6 at Douglas, anything to that?

7 DISPATCH: 10-4 Taylor23, we are, there is  
8 an active shooter working at Douglas, multiple  
9 gunshots are being fired. We can hear them in  
10 the background. Our 911 lines are blowing up.  
11 We have multiple units on the phone, some are  
12 giving EMD, it is confirmed.

13 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
14 the proceedings continue as follows:)

15 SGT. SUESS: So throughout our interviews  
16 we heard several officers from Coral Springs  
17 reference this transmission as what prompted  
18 them to move. It was administrators in  
19 meetings, detectives at their desks, officers  
20 on traffic stops, they hear this transmission,  
21 and that's what sets CSPD's response into  
22 motion.

23 So four minutes and fifty-three seconds,  
24 based off Deputy Stambaugh's body cam, we know  
25 that he arrived on Holmberg Road north of

1 Building 13. This is a screen shot from his  
2 body cam. This is the same camera you heard  
3 the gunshots on in the animation, and you'll  
4 see that video again shortly. From that body  
5 cam you see an individual in the red circle  
6 running west on the south side of Holmberg  
7 Road. We believe this is possibly Deputy  
8 Goolsby, and we will get to him in a minute.  
9 But you see Building 12 in the distance.  
10 Again, Cruz is still in the teachers' lounge.

11 This is Deputy Stambaugh's body cam.  
12 We'll play that for you, and you'll see this is  
13 basically the point he puts the car into park,  
14 and then ends, this runs approximately two  
15 minutes I believe. You will hear the gunshots.  
16 They begin at approximately 2 -- I'm sorry,  
17 yes, 2:27.03. So this time it's in UTC, so the  
18 19 you see in the top right, pretend like that  
19 is a 2, and it's 2:26, not 19:26.

20 (Thereupon, the body cam video is played in the open  
21 meeting:)

22 SPEAKER: Unit3, we're going to Bravo. I  
23 hear shots fired.

24 DISPATCH: Shots fired -- all units --  
25 shots fired, stay on Main.

1 SPEAKER: -- shots -- (unintelligible)

2 SPEAKER: -- make sure nobody comes inside  
3 the school.

4 DISPATCH: I need the units --

5 SPEAKER: Bravo3, we need somebody to shut  
6 down Holmberg at -- Pine Island.

7 DISPATCH: We need to shut down Holmberg,  
8 advise.

9 SPEAKER: Holmberg is shut down -- 900  
10 building, we have shots fired -- we're trying  
11 to get the fence open.

12 DISPATCH: Unit13 at 900 Building.

13 SPEAKER: No, do not approach the 12 or  
14 1300 building, stay at least 500' away at this  
15 point.

16 (Thereupon, the body can video concluded, and the  
17 proceedings continue as follows:)

18 CHAIR: Yes, Sheriff Ashley, go ahead.

19 SHER. ASHLEY: Is the Broward County  
20 Sheriff, this deputy, was he on-duty or  
21 off-duty?

22 SGT. SUESS: He was working an off-duty  
23 detail at a nearby school.

24 SHER. ASHLEY: Are they required -- do  
25 they have a policy to wear their vests while on

1 duty?

2 SGT. SUESS: So that's been a point of  
3 contention at BSO between the union and the  
4 administration, it's my understanding. Sheriff  
5 Israel may be able to give a better  
6 explanation, but it's my understanding that the  
7 policy is a mandatory wear, but if you sign a  
8 waiver then you can opt out of wearing it.

9 CHAIR: But -- but it was not -- but, and  
10 to be clear, it was not a mandatory wear policy  
11 at that time. My understanding, since that  
12 time they have implemented a mandatory wear  
13 policy, but because of whatever with the union  
14 is they can sign something to opt out of it.  
15 That is a question for Sheriff Israel. He can  
16 further clarify if that's not correct tomorrow,  
17 but at that time on February 14th BSO did not  
18 have a mandatory wear policy.

19 SHER. ASHLEY: Thank you.

20 CHAIR: Senator Book.

21 SEN. BOOK: Thank you. I just want to  
22 make sure that when I heard them say stay on  
23 main, that's like the main channel.

24 CHAIR: Right, main -- main channel --  
25 main channel.

1           SEN. BOOK: Okay, so like, that's like  
2           when you talked, when we talked about at some  
3           point like somebody decided to do, like go,  
4           stay on one channel, had nothing to do with --

5           CHAIR: They -- they -- they took to --  
6           this is all on a channel they call 8A, it's the  
7           main radio channel for that area, and they were  
8           take - - taking people not related to this  
9           event to another channel.

10          SEN. BOOK: Got it.

11          CHAIR: That's all that is.

12          SGT. SUESS: So as a reminder that video  
13          was about a minute and a half, so we're  
14          stepping back. Four minutes fifty-seven  
15          seconds after the first shot Coral Springs  
16          dispatch broadcasts.

17          (Thereupon, a radio transmission is played in the  
18                           open meeting:)

19          DISPATCH: All units remain at 10-3,  
20          remain at 10-3 for the active shooter at  
21          Douglas High school.

22          (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
23                           the proceedings continue as follows:)

24          SGT. SUESS: The 10-3 is just a reference  
25          to emergency traffic only, so if you're going

1           to say something on the radio basically it  
2           needs to be very important. Five minutes and  
3           one second after the first shots student  
4           Brandon Hough walked north in the direction of  
5           Deputy Peterson, and was waived away by  
6           Stauble. Both student Brandon Hough and  
7           Stauble fled south from this location.

8           Four minutes and fifty-seven seconds,  
9           Peterson again makes a transmission about  
10          hearing shots fired.

11         (Thereupon, a radio transmission is played in the  
12                 open meeting:)

13                 SPEAKER: We're going to Bravo. I hear  
14                 shots fired.

15                 DISPATCH: Shots fired.

16                 SPEAKER: Shots fired --

17         (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
18                 the proceedings continue as follows:)

19                 SGT. SUESS: Five minutes and fifteen  
20                 seconds Officer Burton transmits that he is at  
21                 MSD. Again, he said he made this transmission  
22                 a little bit before arriving. It's not that  
23                 uncommon of a practice within law enforcement.

24         (Thereupon, a radio transmission is played in the  
25                 open meeting:)

1                   SPEAKER: Juliet39 -- Douglas.

2           (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
3           the proceedings continue as follows:)

4                   SGT. SUESS: So five minutes and  
5           twenty-five seconds deputy, or I'm sorry,  
6           Detective Goolsby transmits that we definitely  
7           have shots being fired, and Deputy Kratz again  
8           makes a reference to the football field.

9           (Thereupon, a radio transmission is played in the  
10           open meeting:)

11                   SPEAKER: 17Ninja4, we definitely have  
12           shots being fired.

13                   DISPATCH: All District 7 units go to  
14           Bravo.

15                   SPEAKER: Tango2 -- right by the football  
16           field.

17           (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
18           the proceedings continue as follows:)

19                   SGT. SUESS: So simultaneous to this  
20           Deputy Stambaugh's body cam recorded the,  
21           approximately the five final gunshots. Cruz is  
22           still inside of the teachers' lounge. Based  
23           off this we know that Deputies Perry and  
24           Detective Goolsby were on Holmberg Road, based  
25           on their interviews and radio traffic. So

1 Detective Goolsby says over the radio he hears  
2 the gunshots, and we know from Deputy Perry's  
3 interview that Deputy Goolsby was present when  
4 he arrived. They each said that they heard  
5 approximately three to five gunshots. Sergeant  
6 Miller, Deputy Kratz, Deputy Seward, and Deputy  
7 Eason, were all on or near the campus at this  
8 time as well because they also heard the  
9 gunshots.

10 So there are eight deputies, including  
11 Deputy Peterson, that heard gunshots, the dates  
12 next to each name is the last time they  
13 attended active shooter training. The  
14 asterisks represents that those three deputies  
15 are the only ones for whom BSO has GPS records.  
16 Sergeant Heinrich was the only Coral Springs  
17 officer who heard the gunshots, but again, he  
18 was off-duty at that time.

19 These are the approximate locations where  
20 each deputy was at the time they heard the  
21 radio traffic from Deputy Peterson about shots  
22 being fired. Beneath their name is the  
23 approximate distance to the MSD campus.

24 MR. SCHACHTER: My question is if, you  
25 know, how do we understand -- okay, so they

1 haven't had, you know, active shooter training  
2 in a long time, how would their have actions  
3 been different if they had training more  
4 recently, is a question that I have, and --

5 SGT. SUESS: I'm not sure there's really a  
6 fair answer to that. I mean it's, it's a  
7 hypothetical. I mean it's worth pondering I  
8 think, but I would leave that to the commission  
9 for discussion if they decide.

10 MR. SCHACHTER: I would -- I would  
11 certainly love, you know, the experts on the  
12 commission to give me their opinion. I don't  
13 know if this is the right time, but I just  
14 would like that answer.

15 CHAIR: It's a hypothetical. I don't know  
16 that it can be answered. You know, would they,  
17 would they have done anything differently, I  
18 can't answer that, you know. We'll get into  
19 this a little bit more, you know, about -- and  
20 some of them are the ones, as you noticed  
21 earlier, did stay up on Holmberg Road, and I  
22 think there's some fair questions about whether  
23 it was appropriate for them to stay on Holmberg  
24 Road, but let's -- you'll see it a little bit  
25 more. Let's get into it further. Secretary

1 Kapusta, go ahead.

2 SEC. KAPUSTA: Do you know how long  
3 between BSO receiving the first call and  
4 arrival on the campus, do you know how long  
5 that took?

6 SGT. SUESS: So how long from the first  
7 time BSO got the first 911 call until the first  
8 deputy arrived?

9 SEC. KAPUSTA: I could figure that out. I  
10 can work on it tonight and have an answer for  
11 you in the morning.

12 SEC. KAPUSTA: I'd be curious to know in  
13 addition to that how long it was between when  
14 the other --

15 MR. SCHACHTER: Coral Springs.

16 SEC. KAPUSTA: Coral Springs, yes.

17 CHAIR: So -- so Coral -- so Coral  
18 Springs, remember Coral Springs, okay, they did  
19 not dispatch this until four minutes and  
20 twenty-one seconds into it. Okay, so it was  
21 four minutes and twenty-one seconds after the  
22 first 911 call, and then, and then deputy, or  
23 Officer Burton was, announced that he was there  
24 about nineteen seconds late.

25 SEC. KAPUSTA: So I guess my question is

1 more from the first time Coral Springs received  
2 the first 911 call until the transmission went  
3 to BSO, and then BSO -- so how much time lapsed  
4 between the call to Coral Springs before BSO  
5 got their first call, and then BSO actually  
6 arriving on campus.

7 SGT. SUESS: Okay. Yes, ma'am. I don't  
8 have those off the top of my head, but we can  
9 work --

10 CHAIR: The answer -- the answer to that  
11 is, is BSO was on campus because Peterson was  
12 on campus, but -- but -- but so it's sixty-nine  
13 seconds, right, it's sixty-nine seconds from  
14 the time that the first 911 call until the  
15 first dispatcher at BSO put voice to  
16 microphone, was sixty-nine seconds. And -- and  
17 that's when Peterson acknowledged it. And the  
18 previous slide shows where everybody was when  
19 the first radio traffic occurred.

20 MR. CARROLL: But I -- as a follow up to  
21 that, because from the time Cruz entered that  
22 building, and because I do think it's startling  
23 that when it was broadcast that Coral Springs  
24 was able to have somebody on the scene in  
25 nineteen seconds, so that sixty-nine -- I guess

1 I'm trying to figure out because when you saw  
2 the simulation I don't think any of the  
3 officers were in a place, I think four minutes  
4 and something, I don't recall what it was, but,  
5 but most of the killing took place in that four  
6 minute period and, and with the exception of  
7 Peterson the other officers weren't in a  
8 position to enter that building until, until  
9 after that four minute mark, so I guess what  
10 I'm trying to get to is eventually if this  
11 radio or the 911 system worked more efficiently  
12 what's the best -- can we get an estimate -- if  
13 that thing worked efficiently and, and that  
14 call was handled a different way, what's the  
15 best possible response time that we would have,  
16 and when do you think a deputy, or someone  
17 other than Peterson would have been on the  
18 scene, cause, cause I don't know what that is.

19 SGT. SUESS: An estimate, I'd say within  
20 ninety seconds there would have been another  
21 deputy or officer there. Now, it may not have  
22 been a deputy, it may have been a Coral Springs  
23 officer, or somebody else, but --

24 MR. CARROLL: But there would have been a  
25 law enforcement response you think within a

1 minute and a half if, if --

2 SGT. SUESS: Once the transmission has  
3 been made.

4 MR. CARROLL: Right.

5 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir, over the radio. I  
6 mean provided that Coral Springs and BSO are on  
7 the same channel, or have a shared  
8 communications center, something to that  
9 affect. That's an estimate though.

10 CHAIR: Sheriff -- Sheriff Ashley go  
11 ahead.

12 SHER. ASHLEY: If we go back to the  
13 earlier presentation where the scenario  
14 actually played out there were plenty of  
15 deputies there. They were all shutting down  
16 traffic rather than responding to the building  
17 and the shooting, and that was at the direction  
18 of Peterson. So there were a lot of officers  
19 there very quickly, they just didn't get the  
20 right direction from the --

21 CHAIR: Well, you know, and I said -- I  
22 think it's a fair question. This is something  
23 I think that, that where we're going to go with  
24 this is I think we need to turn it over to the  
25 Broward County Sheriff's Office, and turn it

1 over to Sheriff Israel, and I think that this  
2 is something they need to look into further.  
3 We're jumping a little ahead here. You'll see  
4 more of it. Sergeant Miller, who was -- you  
5 saw that in the animation, you'll see more of  
6 this now, Sergeant Miller, who was there fairly  
7 immediately, who was the first supervisor on  
8 the scene, and off the top of my head, but I  
9 believe it's three minutes plus before he even  
10 gets on the radio, and he never moved.

11 And so, you know, and they're up there  
12 hearing the shots fired on Holmberg Road, and  
13 yes, Peterson is on campus, and yes, Cruz is  
14 still in the building, and they're hearing the  
15 shots, I think the question has to be asked,  
16 it's a hard question, I don't like asking it  
17 but it has to be asked is, is that why didn't  
18 they move toward the building. You've got  
19 seven deputies on Holmberg Road, why didn't  
20 they move. Why did Eason come all the way down  
21 Pine Island, come west on Holmberg, and then go  
22 south and go over to Westglades Middle? Why  
23 didn't he pass the school? Why -- you know,  
24 those are questions that are probative, that,  
25 that, that need to be addressed, and I think

1           that the Sheriff needs to address those.

2           What the outcome is I can't tell you, but  
3           those are things that, that need to be  
4           addressed. You know, the issue about Stambaugh  
5           getting out of his cruiser, hearing shots,  
6           going to the back of the cruiser and getting  
7           his vest out, and putting the vest on -- and  
8           there's one that you're going to hear coming up  
9           here, and you might hear it later today or  
10          tomorrow, there's another deputy in there that  
11          talks about telling people to hold on, wait  
12          until I get dressed, because he's got to put  
13          his vest on.

14          You know, and it's a hard thing to say,  
15          but, you know, I don't have a mandatory wear  
16          policy in our agency, but if you don't wear a  
17          vest and you're out there on patrol taking  
18          calls, is that your butt better go in there  
19          without the vest because that's what you signed  
20          up to do, and it's your choice, and if you're  
21          not going to wear a vest then you need to go  
22          in. You don't get to get dressed first, your  
23          tail end needs to get in there and take care of  
24          business. And, you know, when you're sitting  
25          there hearing shots, and you're putting your

1 vest on, I think it begs the question about  
2 whether you should be sitting there putting  
3 your vest on or whether your tail end needs to  
4 be hightailing it into where those shots are  
5 coming from.

6 SHER. ASHLEY: And -- and another -- I  
7 would just make the point that I think those  
8 deputies, or at least my outside looking in  
9 view is were misdirected by the person that was  
10 on scene closest to the action, and was, and  
11 they were being directed to do something that  
12 was not, not in training.

13 CHAIR: And -- and some of the shots that  
14 they heard were before they were getting those  
15 directions from Peterson, so you're correct,  
16 but, but some of that was being heard by them  
17 before Peterson started talking about stay back  
18 500', before he was giving the direction about  
19 the traffic. So I -- I absolutely agree with  
20 you, and anything after that, anybody after  
21 that, there's no cop in the world that isn't  
22 going to respond to what that guy who is on  
23 scene who is giving you direction about, so I  
24 wholeheartedly agree with that, but what I'm  
25 talking to is prior to that direction being

1 given.

2 SGT. SUESS: And to that point in that  
3 video with Deputy Stambaugh earlier, that video  
4 ended at the point where Peterson said stay  
5 500' away, so there was a period, and just  
6 rough estimate, maybe thirty seconds where  
7 Stambaugh is behind his car, so which begs the  
8 question for those thirty seconds what's,  
9 what's your mind set, why are you already  
10 taking a position of cover.

11 MR. SCHACHTER: And the reason, you know,  
12 obviously, you know, everybody was shot in a  
13 little over three minutes, but could, if  
14 officers have gotten in there sooner could they  
15 have saved some of the lives?

16 CHAIR: You know, that's an unknown, you  
17 know, and the only one, as many of you  
18 observed, and I think it's accurate, the only  
19 one that was clearly in a position to do  
20 anything that would have made a difference was  
21 Scot Peterson. And that's the only thing  
22 that's clear. The rest of it, you know, it's,  
23 it's not that clear.

24 MR. SCHACHTER: Why -- what time was the  
25 first deputy there outside of Peterson?

1 CHAIR: Let's get through this. You'll  
2 see it as you get into it. We need to let it  
3 evolve.

4 SGT. SUESS: So at that time of the --  
5 2:27.03, when Cruz begins firing the last  
6 volley of shots, these are the deputies, again  
7 that you saw in the amination, their location,  
8 approximate location as it relates to Building  
9 12. So we're going to go into Sergeant  
10 Miller's response. He arrived traveling west  
11 on Holmberg Road, and parked approximately  
12 north of Building 12. He would remain there,  
13 exit his vehicle, remain in that general area,  
14 and much later on, and you'll see this tomorrow  
15 sometime, he later goes down to the mobile  
16 command buses on Pine Island Road.

17 Sergeant Miller has been with BSO for  
18 thirty-two years, last attended active shooter  
19 training June 7, 2016. He was at the BSO  
20 Parkland office when he heard the radio  
21 traffic. He estimated that he heard  
22 approximately three to four shots as he was  
23 arriving. He described them as rapid, sounded  
24 outside, did not sound muffled at all. He  
25 believed the shooter was outside due to the way

1 the shots sounded, and because Peterson was  
2 directing roads to be shut down. He got behind  
3 his vehicle and put on his vest. He saw  
4 Deputies Seward and Hanks, and Deputy Hanks  
5 told him that he was going in. He directed  
6 Coral Springs to cut the gate. We did not hear  
7 from any Coral Springs officers that they had  
8 been directed by Sergeant Miller to cut the  
9 gate.

10 He directed officers and Deputy Seward  
11 toward campus. Again, that's the statement  
12 from Sergeant Miller, that is what he is  
13 saying. At this point he is unaware if any  
14 other law enforcement other than Peterson is on  
15 campus. He recalled hearing radio traffic  
16 making reference to the football fields. He  
17 expressed a concern about parents coming to  
18 school to pick up their children. He  
19 referenced radio problems beginning early on.

20 He said that he repeatedly tried to get on  
21 the radio to coordinate the response. He said,  
22 quote, I was controlling the scene as best I  
23 could, end quote, and went on to reference how  
24 radio problems hindered his ability. He said  
25 that I was trying to get resources and people

1 in places to help, eventually I got a K-9 to me  
2 to deploy. And I said earlier, he later would  
3 show up to the staging area, or the mobile  
4 command buses.

5 Moving on to Deputy Perry. So he arrived  
6 in the same direction as Sergeant Miller,  
7 parked his car approximately north of Building  
8 13, exited his vehicle, ran south to a gate  
9 where Detective Goolsby he saw unlocking the  
10 gate. Detective Goolsby, due to living on  
11 another campus, is my understanding, has a key  
12 to the exterior gates of all schools. Deputy  
13 Perry continued south, where he would later  
14 stop at a vehicle, and he in our interview  
15 pointed out that the area near the basketball  
16 courts, so to the west side of Building 6, is  
17 where he thought the shots were coming from.  
18 And the thought that the shooter potentially  
19 was shooting toward the west side of Building  
20 12.

21 Deputy Perry has been with Broward SO for  
22 twenty-three years, and last attended active  
23 shooter training November 18, 2015. He was  
24 working as an SRO at Park Trails Elementary  
25 when he heard the radio traffic. That school

1 is approximately 1.3 miles from MSD. He said  
2 that he put on his vest, collected his rifle  
3 and magazines. When he arrived he saw  
4 Detective Goolsby on Holmberg Road near his  
5 trunk. Deputy Perry parked in the left hand  
6 turn lane which provided access to the west  
7 gate. He heard approximately three to five  
8 shots while either exiting his car or  
9 approaching the west gate.

10 He saw Sergeant Heinrich in the northeast  
11 parking lot. Heinrich was the parent who Perry  
12 would reference on the radio. So you'll hear  
13 traffic later where Perry makes reference to  
14 hearing something from a parent. It's actually  
15 Sergeant Heinrich. Heinrich yelled to Perry  
16 and Goolsby from the fence, and Deputy Perry  
17 recalled hearing radio traffic about the  
18 football field.

19 Deputy Perry said that Goolsby had keys,  
20 and unlocked the west gate. Deputy Perry never  
21 saw Deputies Marchese, Kratz, or Eason, who  
22 would have been west of his location on  
23 Holmberg Road. He heard Deputy Peterson  
24 identifying Building 12, but Perry was under  
25 the impression that Building was Building 9.

1 He was just under the belief that that was the  
2 name of that building. He would transmit on  
3 his radio, we're just going to Building 13 and  
4 the 900 building. He said that the shots  
5 appeared to be coming from the area north of  
6 the basketball courts, or near the basketball  
7 courts based on hearing them, seeing Kyle Laman  
8 and Sergeant Heinrich in the north parking lot,  
9 Deputy Kratz' radio traffic about shots being  
10 near the football field, and Marchese talking  
11 about being near Westglades Middle with an  
12 injured student.

13 Deputy Perry said that he approached a  
14 position behind or north of a car on the north  
15 side of Building 13, quote, waiting for people  
16 to arrive, and we're looking because we're  
17 hearing nothing. He said he saw the bullet  
18 holes on the third floor of Building 12, and  
19 saw Coach Feis lying on the ground. He thought  
20 someone had been on the west side of Building  
21 13 shooting at the west side of Building 12 at  
22 Coach Feis. We asked him why he did not  
23 approach the basketball court where he thought  
24 the shots were coming from, and he said that  
25 was what Detective Goolsby had gone to do.

1 Deputy Perry stated that a Coral Springs  
2 officer approached him to his east, and that a  
3 group of Coral Springs officers ran past him  
4 towards Building 12. This group included,  
5 would have included Coral Springs Officers and  
6 Deputies Volpe and Hanks. In a later interview  
7 with Coral Springs Officer Wilkins he described  
8 an individual who is consistent in appearance  
9 with Deputy Perry. He said this deputy was  
10 standing behind a tree as Officer Wilkins and  
11 Detective Monzon approached him, and this  
12 deputy said we can't all stand behind this  
13 tree, we're going to get shot.

14 Deputy Perry did not join those Coral  
15 Springs officers and Deputy Volpe approaching  
16 Building 12 because, quote, if I leave this  
17 area he can run out the gate, he can circle  
18 back around and ambush, someone has to do an  
19 over- watch, if I leave this spot who's going  
20 to cover this area. He said that Captain  
21 Jordan later jointed him behind that car.

22 Detective Goolsby arrived in the same  
23 fashion as Sergeant Miller and Deputy Perry.  
24 He parked his vehicle north of Building 12, ran  
25 west towards the gate which Deputy Perry

1 previously identified. He described moving  
2 south through a parking lot, having some  
3 exchange with Heinrich, and then moving south,  
4 where he went towards the east side of Building  
5 13. Detective Goolsby has been with Broward SO  
6 for twenty-two years, and last attended active  
7 shooter training on May 17, 2016.

8 He explained that he was at his desk in  
9 the Parkland district upon hearing the radio  
10 traffic. I explained where he parked. He said  
11 upon reaching the west gate he heard the final  
12 five gunshots, and believed that those shots  
13 were coming from between Buildings 12 and 13,  
14 so an accurate assessment on his part. He  
15 described Deputy Perry being near him. He saw  
16 Kyle Laman and Sergeant Heinrich. He tried to  
17 get some information from Kyle Laman, and went  
18 on to direct them west toward the other  
19 deputies.

20 He went south towards the southeast corner  
21 of Building 13. He saw the holes in the  
22 windows on the third floor of Building 13, but  
23 could not tell if those projectiles had gone  
24 from outside inside or inside to the outside.  
25 After continuing to Building 13, that's when he

1 lost track of Deputy Perry, who remained at the  
2 vehicle in the north parking lot. Goolsby said  
3 he did not advance further south onto campus,  
4 as he had not heard shots for a couple minutes.  
5 He recalled being approached by Officer  
6 Harrison, and they checked the doors to  
7 Building 13, which were locked. He did not  
8 recall hearing much radio traffic at all, and  
9 did not hear any transmissions about Building  
10 12.

11 Detective Goolsby said he also knew  
12 Building as the 900 Building. He described  
13 Coral Springs officers running to check on  
14 campus monitor Feis, and he spoke about them  
15 going into Building 12. It did not make sense  
16 to him because Feis had been outside, Laman was  
17 outside, so he anticipated that the shooter was  
18 also outside.

19 Deputy Volpe joined officers on the west  
20 end of Building 12 and assisted Coral Springs  
21 officers with Chris Hixon, who had been pulled  
22 out of Building 12 by this point. Goolsby said  
23 that he maintained coverage to the south as  
24 they went in. So basically looking to the  
25 south in possible anticipation that the

1 shooter, or another shooter, may come from that  
2 direction. Goolsby said that he later went to  
3 check on Feis again, and looked into Building  
4 12, where he saw several officers advancing  
5 through the building. He later saw Captain  
6 Jordon among the cars north of Building 13. He  
7 recalled Captain McKeone from Coral Springs and  
8 Sergeant Heinrich joining him from the south.

9 He explained that he almost shot Sergeant  
10 Heinrich due to Sergeant Heinrich's clothing.  
11 So at this point Heinrich had made it to the  
12 west end of MSD, met with Captain McKeone.  
13 Captain McKeone gave Sergeant Heinrich an extra  
14 ballistic vest and a handgun. So he sees  
15 Heinrich coming around dressed like that, and  
16 his initial reaction is this is probably not a  
17 cop. Detective Goolsby then transmits over the  
18 radio that all additional responding officers  
19 need to come from the north to try and avoid  
20 that friendly fire situation.

21 CHAIR: Senator Book, go ahead.

22 SEN. BOOK: In terms of some of his  
23 comments and recollections, when Goolsby said  
24 he went back to check on Coach Feis again, two  
25 things, one, when we've talked about like what

1 do you do during an active shooter, and I, it  
2 always struck me because I don't, that you have  
3 to step over somebody who's hurt to stop  
4 whatever is happening.

5 CHAIR: Correct.

6 SEN. BOOK: Like is everything already  
7 stopped at this point, or is that like, no, so  
8 this was -- okay -- and --

9 CHAIR: Nobody has gone into the building  
10 at this point.

11 SGT. SUESS: But at this point the  
12 gunshots would have stopped. So this is sort  
13 of where you're -- the law enforcement response  
14 is going to be fluid. If you hear gunshots you  
15 need to go to them.

16 SEN. BOOK: Right.

17 SGT. SUESS: If they stop for a few  
18 minutes you slow down and become more  
19 methodical, you're searching for the suspect.  
20 If you hear gunshots again, okay, then it's  
21 time to pick up speed again, go back towards  
22 those gunshots.

23 SEN. BOOK: I understand. I just wanted  
24 to make sure that I understood.

25 MR. CARROLL: I'm confused about the

1 comment where it said Deputy Volpe joined  
2 officers on the west end of the building, of  
3 Building 12 with Hixon. So they entered the  
4 building and --

5 SGT. SUESS: Well, again, this is just  
6 going through Goolsby's statement, so we're  
7 jumping ahead chronologically. So I apologize  
8 if that is confusing. So what happened,  
9 eventually when law enforcement officers  
10 entered Building 12 they remove Chris Hixon  
11 from the building and put him on a golf cart.  
12 So Goolsby is explaining as they move Hixon out  
13 Volpe, Deputy Volpe goes to help those officers  
14 get Mr. Hixon onto a golf cart.

15 So Deputy Eason approached in the same  
16 direction on Holmberg Road, continued past the  
17 campus, and went south. So that green box  
18 represents approximately where he parked his  
19 car on the, really the border, for lack of a  
20 better phrase, between MSD and Westglades.  
21 He's been with Broward SO for eighteen years,  
22 last attended active shooter training on April  
23 28, 2016.

24 Deputy Eason said he was previously the  
25 SRO at Westglades Middle School. He said that

1 he had reviewed his body cam footage prior to  
2 the interview which we conducted with him. He  
3 explained that he was leaving Heron Heights  
4 Elementary, where he was assisting with traffic  
5 control, and he was going east to handle  
6 another call when he heard the radio traffic.  
7 He could not recall where he was when he  
8 activated his body cam. Initially he said he  
9 could not recall if he had to put his vest on  
10 when he responded to the scene.

11 He later in that same interview said,  
12 quote, I believe I put my vest on when I got  
13 there, so I had to redo the camera when I  
14 arrived on scene, I had actually put my camera  
15 off my shirt and put it onto the vest, so it  
16 took a few seconds to do that, I had to find a  
17 place to put it on. He said in the interview  
18 that he probably had the windows down in his  
19 car. He passed another deputy and patrol  
20 vehicles on Holmberg Road. Deputy Eason is not  
21 issues a rifle.

22 In one of the interviews he described  
23 hearing shots after getting out of his car,  
24 quote, as soon as I got there, end quote, and  
25 from the direction of the MSD campus. In

1 another interview he claimed he could not tell  
2 where the shots were coming from, or where he  
3 was when he heard those shots. He said, quote,  
4 I'm not exactly sure when I heard gunshots, if  
5 I was approaching the school or when I got  
6 there, but it could have been anywhere between  
7 six and a dozen total.

8 Deputy Eason was asked what made you park  
9 there on the west side of the MSD campus,  
10 versus anywhere else on that campus, and he  
11 said I believe when I was getting there I heard  
12 a deputy say shots fired by the football field.  
13 The evidence would contradict Deputy Eason's  
14 statement. As a reminder, at 2:24.35 Deputy  
15 Kratz transmits he's shutting down Holmberg  
16 Road between Westglades and MSD. Immediately  
17 thereafter Deputy Eason says that he's going to  
18 go to essentially the same location, and it's  
19 not until 2:25.08 that Kratz says that he hears  
20 shots by the football field. Well, we know  
21 that Deputy Eason arrived on the west side of  
22 MSD after, I'm sorry, prior to the transmission  
23 by Deputy Kratz.

24 Deputy Eason stated that his focus was on  
25 the football field, and he was worried middle

1 school kids might have been outside as well.  
2 He said, quote, I was the SRO there, and I knew  
3 upon responding that the SRO was not on scene  
4 at that school. Again evidence would  
5 contradict Deputy Eason's statement. At  
6 2:28.03 his body cam begins recording as he's  
7 on the border between MSD and Westglades  
8 Middle. Four minutes later at 2:32.08 he asks  
9 over the BSO radio, ask the SRO if the campus  
10 is on lockdown. So this illustrates that he  
11 did not have knowledge that the SRO was not on  
12 campus, otherwise he would not be asking him if  
13 the campus was on lockdown.

14 Deputy Eason was asked in his interview  
15 was there something that prevented you from  
16 entering MSD's campus to go towards, or  
17 possibly towards where you thought the gunshots  
18 were. He said, well, I didn't know where they  
19 were, the gunshots, but I already saw the  
20 deputies there so I passed them. I don't know  
21 if they were BSO or Coral Springs, I don't  
22 know, but that's when I passed them and went  
23 down to the west gate there on the west side.

24 Reminder, in an earlier interview he said  
25 he heard gunshots as soon as he got there, and

1 from the direction of the school. On his body  
2 cam, and you'll see the video shortly, he  
3 points to the area of Building 12, and  
4 identifies that as where the gunshots were  
5 coming from. Yes, sir.

6 SHER. ASHLEY: Any theory on the  
7 inconsistencies, why?

8 SGT. SUESS: I think it may be another  
9 situation where he realizes his response was  
10 inadequate, and he's trying to come up with  
11 some reason.

12 So we just went through quite a few  
13 interviews. Going back to the chronology,  
14 we're at five minutes and twenty-six seconds  
15 after the first gunshot. Again, this is the  
16 time in which the final shot is heard on Deputy  
17 Stambaugh's body cam.

18 (Thereupon, the body cam video is played in the open  
19 meeting:)

20 SPEAKER: I hear shots --

21 DISPATCH: All District 7 units go to  
22 Bravo.

23 (Thereupon, the body cam video concluded, and the  
24 proceedings continue as follows:)

25 SGT. SUESS: So Deputy Stambaugh remained

1 on Holmberg Road for approximately five minutes  
2 next to his vehicle. After someone suggested  
3 getting a deputy onto the Sawgrass Expressway  
4 he left Holmberg Road and drove south to the  
5 end of campus, I'm sorry, to the south end of  
6 the campus. So this is where Deputy Stambaugh  
7 arrived north of Building 13. He's been with  
8 BSO for twenty-four years. He attended active  
9 shooter training most recently February 8,  
10 2016. He was working an off-duty detail when  
11 he heard Deputy Peterson's radio traffic. He  
12 did not recall hearing any other radio traffic.  
13 He did not wear a vest prior to the shooting,  
14 and he did not have a rifle.

15 Upon arrival he heard the gunshots, and  
16 knew they were coming from campus, but could  
17 not tell from where on campus they were  
18 originating. He saw two deputies inside of the  
19 fence. He could not identify them, but these  
20 deputies are almost certainly Goolsby and  
21 Perry. He said that he stayed by his vehicle  
22 because the shots had stopped. While waiting  
23 by his vehicle he called for another deputy or  
24 officer to come over by him. This was seen on  
25 his video. It appears that a Coral Springs

1 officer pulled up next to him, exited his car,  
2 and then moved south toward campus. We're not  
3 able to identify which officer that is.

4 He claimed in an interview the dispatch  
5 asked several times for someone to go to the  
6 Sawgrass Expressway, and that was why he went  
7 there. We know from radio traffic there was a  
8 single request to have someone on the Sawgrass  
9 Expressway, and twelve seconds after that  
10 request he responded saying that he would go.

11 Chief Babinec from Coral Springs Fire  
12 approached Deputy Stambaugh while still on  
13 Holmberg Road, and Deputy Stambaugh told him  
14 there is, quote, three people down, and that  
15 Babinec needed to go further west. It took  
16 Stambaugh five and a half minutes to get to his  
17 position on the Sawgrass Expressway.

18 CHAIR: Explain -- explain when he got on  
19 the Sawgrass what he did.

20 SGT. SUESS: So at that point he had  
21 binoculars, and he took essentially an  
22 over-watch position, watching the campus, and  
23 that's, that's where he stayed. He stayed --

24 CHAIR: How did he get there?

25 SGT. SUESS: That map is coming up in just

1 a minute, Sheriff.

2 CHAIR: Okay. All right.

3 SGT. SUESS: After not being able to  
4 recall when he last attended active shooter  
5 training MSD investigators asked twenty years  
6 ago, then he said, no, not twenty years ago,  
7 ten years ago, and he said, no, I couldn't give  
8 you a time, it was a long time ago. Deputy  
9 Stambaugh attended active shooter training  
10 February 8, 2016. It was not uncommon during  
11 our interviews for deputies to have a difficult  
12 time remembering the last time they attended  
13 active shooter training, and what type of  
14 training they received, whether it was a  
15 lecture, PowerPoints practical exercises,  
16 drills.

17 MR. SCHACHTER: I mean it just, it just  
18 points out that it's not on the top of their  
19 mind. If -- if they're not training every  
20 year, you know, I would defer to you gentlemen,  
21 but that's what it says to me.

22 CHAIR: It -- it was -- it was perplexing  
23 at the time. I can tell you that this caused  
24 us, and I had a discussion with Sheriff Israel  
25 about this, and it caused us to go back to

1 training, and come back down for more  
2 interviews, to get all the records of  
3 everybody, because when we got this  
4 information, and he said he hadn't been to  
5 active shooter training, you know, twenty  
6 years, ten years ago, I was stunned by that,  
7 and so -- because it didn't make any sense,  
8 because we know they do training, and it raised  
9 the question as to why. So we went back and  
10 got it, and in fact he's wrong, as you can see  
11 he did, he had been, you know, a couple years  
12 previously, so, you know, I don't know the  
13 answer to it, and but it was something that  
14 perplexed us over the last several weeks, and  
15 as this came out, this only came out in the  
16 last several weeks, but why he would say it was  
17 ten years ago, and why others had trouble  
18 recalling it, so it, it's a valid question that  
19 we haven't been able to figure out.

20 MR. SCHACHTER: What about when you asked  
21 the other officers and deputies on scene, did,  
22 were they able to recall, oh, I went two years  
23 ago, or I went three years ago?

24 CHAIR: No, just what Sergeant Seuss just  
25 said is, is that a lot of them, they couldn't

1 recall. Whatever it is it didn't resonate with  
2 them enough for them to be able to recall it  
3 when they were asked. Sheriff Judd, go ahead.

4 SHER. JUDD: Or -- or do they not want to  
5 admit that they had been trained to do  
6 something different than the response? None of  
7 this makes sense.

8 CHAIR: It -- it doesn't make sense, so in  
9 trying to figure it out, I mean that's, that  
10 certainly is a valid, could be an explanation  
11 for, we don't -- we don't know, but it doesn't  
12 make sense that somebody would say, is that I  
13 haven't been to active assailant training in  
14 twenty years, in ten years, and others would  
15 say that, what were you taught, I don't really  
16 remember, I don't really, you know, does it, is  
17 it because it wasn't enough, because it was a  
18 four hour block, and you look at the lesson  
19 plan during that four hour block, some of the  
20 actual time for drills was like only ninety  
21 minutes, did they not get enough reps.

22 I don't know the answers to those  
23 questions, but those are the things that we  
24 have been tossing around and trying to figure  
25 out, trying to put some explanation to this,

1           because it didn't make sense to us that people  
2           wouldn't remember that in conjunction and  
3           context with this incident.

4           MR. SCHACHTER: You know, when you say  
5           that, you know, they, they do other training,  
6           did, when you looked through the training did  
7           you, did you say, oh, that makes sense, or they  
8           should have spent more time on active training,  
9           looking at all the training that the, you know,  
10          was given to them?

11          CHAIR: There's no question that the  
12          Broward Sheriff's Office does a lot of  
13          training.

14          MR. SCHACHTER: No, I understand that, but  
15          I'm talking about --

16          CHAIR: And -- and they -- and that they  
17          have a dedicated training unit that does a lot  
18          of training, there's no question about that.

19          MR. SCHACHTER: But I'm saying should they  
20          have been training more on active shooters.

21          CHAIR: You know, I'm not going to offer  
22          an opinion on that. I -- and I don't know --  
23          they did a lot of training on it. It was  
24          cyclical training, as I said, and in an agency  
25          that size from my experience you're going to

1       have cyclical training because you can't get  
2       everybody through all the time, every year  
3       there's other requirements of training that you  
4       have to give, so it is clearly appropriate in  
5       my view that you have cycles of training, and  
6       that you, over a period of time you'll have  
7       people that go through the various blocks of  
8       it. I think it's common, and in an agency that  
9       size it's appropriate.

10       SHER. JUDD: Understand there's also  
11       training on Hurricanes, recover, riots, crowd  
12       control, and I can go on and on, and on, and  
13       on. There -- there is a litany of things that  
14       you have to keep folks trained up on, and so  
15       it's not uncommon that you can't train  
16       everything every year because there's just not  
17       enough hours or money.

18       CHAIR: They got to -- they got to be on  
19       the street doing the job at some point, you  
20       know what I mean, they have to -- training is  
21       important, but they can't train all the time.  
22       Secretary Carroll, go ahead.

23       MR. CARROLL: To me the, the big thing  
24       here is -- and I understand the chaos, and I've  
25       never had to put myself in that position so, so

1 I don't want to judge others, but clearly by  
2 some the response was inadequate. What  
3 disappoints me more is the answer by some here  
4 are not credible, and one of the things we look  
5 for in law enforcement is, A, that they are  
6 going to be the one, that Sheriff Judd said, is  
7 going to run through the door, but we also need  
8 them to be credible, and, and not only don't I  
9 believe this is credible, but I take it from  
10 this last slide it was a little bit passive  
11 aggressive, because this is serious business,  
12 and when we're asking when you last got that  
13 training we're trying to determine whether the  
14 response was inadequate because you were poorly  
15 trained so that we can fix it, so for you to  
16 not even give that any thought, and, and just  
17 the response, and the nature of the response,  
18 indicates to me it was a passive aggressive  
19 response. It's disappointing.

20 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

21 MS. LARKING SKINNER: I would just mention  
22 that Commissioner Ashley here was keeping track  
23 of the number of years of experience, and I  
24 think it's worthy to note none of these  
25 deputies were new. They've had significant

1 time here, and that makes you wonder about  
2 culture, and about complacency setting in. We  
3 are all human beings, and so I don't know that  
4 we'll ever find the answer, like you said, why  
5 people do what they do ultimately, but I think  
6 given the sheer numbers of deputies, plus the  
7 years of experience, there does have to be a  
8 question about culture and complacency.

9 SHER. JUDD: And there -- there's an old  
10 maxim that if we had to fight wars with men  
11 over forty-five there would be no wars. So  
12 when you - - when you -- this -- this was the  
13 perfect storm, and these backup cars that are  
14 arriving, they truly don't know what's  
15 happening, and if they're hearing that shots  
16 are fired, or they're coming from the football  
17 field, or they're coming from Building 1200, or  
18 they're coming from 900, and even when you get  
19 there and you hear the crack you can't isolate  
20 that because it kind of echoes, and you, you've  
21 got a parking lot full of cars, so in essence  
22 when you, when you look at the cars that are  
23 pouring in after the fact you go, okay, I  
24 understand why they're trying to get their  
25 bearings.

1 But then you look and you see that Coral  
2 Springs right, ran right to the building, so  
3 what did they know, maybe on another frequency,  
4 that these deputies didn't know, or were these  
5 deputies responding to Peterson, who was there  
6 and giving them instructions, and when you're  
7 the responding cars and the guy on the ground  
8 there tells you go here, go there, do this, do  
9 that, that's what you do, with the  
10 understanding that he knows and is reacting  
11 appropriately.

12 So there's a lot of dynamics all at work  
13 right in the middle of this vast emergency, and  
14 that's the hard part to sort out.

15 MR. SCHACHTER: Sergeant, when was the  
16 date of the, the active shooter at the airport,  
17 was that in 2016?

18 SGT. SUESS: I think it was more recent  
19 than that.

20 MR. SCHACHTER: I don't think it was 2017.

21 CHAIR: It's too -- it's too late in the  
22 day. I don't remember.

23 MR. SCHACHTER: The -- the -- the reason  
24 I'm asking is be -- the reason -- I'm sorry?

25 CHAIR: When was the --

1 MR. SCHACHTER: One year prior, so it was  
2 20 -- okay, so it was 2017. And they had  
3 almost all of their officers trained in 2017  
4 with active shooters. You said twelve hundred  
5 had gone through --

6 CHAIR: No. No. No. No. You keep  
7 saying that. The twelve hundred is in 2018.  
8 It was sixty-two in 2017. But remember, when I  
9 say they're trained, it isn't like that they  
10 hadn't received previous training. As we saw  
11 yesterday they've been training in cycles with  
12 active assailant trainer, and active shooter  
13 training since 2007, so just because in 2016  
14 that there are only sixty-two that went  
15 through, those are the sixty-two they cycled  
16 that year because their emphasis in '17 was on  
17 other training.

18 But people had been through in '16 in  
19 greater numbers, in '15 in greater numbers, in  
20 '14, so just because they only did sixty-two in  
21 '17 doesn't mean that their deputies did not  
22 have active assailant training. They did.  
23 Those are just the numbers they cycled through  
24 in that particular year.

25 MR. SCHACHTER: And when you say training,

1 is it just like an eight hour course; is that  
2 what it is?

3 CHAIR: So -- we went through this  
4 yesterday. At that point, okay, at that point  
5 they had two blocks of instruction, a four hour  
6 block in active assailant response, and a four  
7 hour block in rescue task force response. Now  
8 they've combined it, and it's an eight hour  
9 block that is both covering active assailant  
10 and rescue task force, and so far this year  
11 they've got about twelve hundred through. So  
12 it was different back in '17. Now it's -- now  
13 it's an eight hour day.

14 SHER. ASHLEY: Can I ask one more  
15 question?

16 THE COURT: Go ahead.

17 SHER. ASHLEY: On the -- on the original  
18 simulation when the vehicles started arrive,  
19 and you saw the green dots start to, out on  
20 Holmberg, or whatever the --

21 SGT. SUESS: Holmberg, yes, sir.

22 SHER. ASHLEY: Holmberg Road. Then you  
23 saw the blue dots come. And then you saw the  
24 blue dots go through the gate.

25 SGT. SUESS: Right.

1           SHER. ASHLEY: And some of the green dots  
2 followed, but the blue dots went through the  
3 gate.

4           SGT. SUESS: Right.

5           SHER. ASHLEY: Was that because they had  
6 either -- have you uncovered anything that  
7 would lead you to believe that they did that  
8 because they had more information --

9           SGT. SUESS: Absolutely.

10          SHER. ASHLEY: -- or was that self-  
11 initiative?

12          SGT. SUESS: No, sir, absolutely, Officer  
13 Burton transmitting the three story building on  
14 the north end of campus, and, you know, they  
15 had received these 911 calls where it's being  
16 identified, specific room numbers where  
17 students had been shot.

18          SHER. JUDD: So they had better  
19 information.

20          SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir, undoubtedly they  
21 had better information. And -- and as we  
22 progress you'll see that unfold a little more.  
23 And some deputies, in particular Deputy Hanks,  
24 and we'll evaluate his statement, but long  
25 story short, he gets behind a car to orient

1       himself, he didn't hear any gunshots, but sees  
2       a group of Coral Springs officers bee lining  
3       towards Building 12, so he says I think, well,  
4       they look like they know where they're going,  
5       I'll join them. And that's what he did, and he  
6       ends up being the first deputy inside Building  
7       12.

8               CHAIR: So, John, let's get through a few  
9       more, and then when we get to a certain point  
10      here we'll stop, and then we have public  
11      comment. But let's get through a few more.

12             SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So back to the  
13      chronology. Five minutes thirty-five seconds  
14      after the final, I'm sorry, after the first  
15      shot, Mr. Rospierski makes it down the west  
16      stairwell. Cruz is still inside of the  
17      teachers' lounge at this point. Students on  
18      the southwest corner of campus begin walking  
19      west towards Westglades Middle School. This is  
20      about two and a half minutes after the code red  
21      had been called. Prior to this point, again,  
22      these students were gathering in a pretty  
23      casual manner.

24             This is the type of crowd which Nikolas  
25      Cruz was looking for. This is what he hoped

1       for. This is what he described in his videos.  
2       Five minutes and fifty-two seconds after the  
3       first shot Deputy Peterson transmits that he  
4       needs a unit by the front of the school, make  
5       sure nobody comes inside. Shortly after Mr.  
6       Rospierski went down the stairs, and Mr.  
7       Rospierski ended up going into the second  
8       floor, and he hid in a, in a office there with  
9       a locked door, Cruz sets his rifle and vest  
10      down on the third floor landing and ran down  
11      the stairs.

12           Deputy Seward transmits that they need  
13      somebody to shut down Holmberg at Pine Island,  
14      and dispatch attempts to locate a deputy to do  
15      that. Six minutes and eleven seconds after the  
16      first shot Officer Burton transmits that he  
17      needs more details, and he's on scene on the  
18      south side of the school. It's obvious that  
19      Officer Burton is there at this point, because  
20      you can hear in the tone of his voice, his  
21      cadence, you can hear the heavy breathing.

22           Six minutes and twelve seconds after the  
23      first shot Deputies Perry and Goolsby were  
24      present at the west gate by at least this  
25      point, based on the fact that Deputy Perry

1 transmits we're going to the Building 13 and  
2 the 900 building, we have shots fired, I'm  
3 trying to get the fence open. So we know they  
4 were there sooner because they heard the final  
5 gunshots. But if nothing else this really  
6 reinforces it, based off what the deputy says.  
7 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is

8 played in the open meeting:)

9 SPEAKER: Holmberg is shut down. We're in  
10 front of Building 13 of the 900 building. We  
11 have shots fired. I'm trying to get the fence  
12 open.

13 DISPATCH: Building 13 and 900 building.

14 (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
15 the proceedings continue as follows:)

16 So this is the gate which Detective  
17 Goolsby would have unlocked. Six minutes and  
18 sixteen seconds after the first shot Cruz exits  
19 the west end of Building 12 and ran southwest.  
20 So six minutes and sixteen seconds have elapsed  
21 since the first shot was fired. Six minutes  
22 and twenty-two seconds is when Deputy Peterson  
23 transmits about staying away.

24 (Thereupon, the following radio transmission is  
25 played in the open meeting:)

1                   SPEAKER: No, do not approach the 12 and  
2                   1300 building, stay at least 500' away at this  
3                   point.

4                   DISPATCH: Stay away from 12 and 1300  
5                   buildings.

6                   (Thereupon, the radio transmission concluded, and  
7                   the proceedings continue as follows:)

8                   MS. LARKIN SKINNER: Can I just ask what  
9                   is the significant of 500', why 500'?

10                  CHAIR: Who in the world knows?

11                  MS. LARKIN SKINNER: Okay, I just wasn't  
12                  sure.

13                  CHAIR: It makes no sense to even say it,  
14                  much less that distance, so.

15                  SGT. SUESS: And additionally, I mean  
16                  nobody -- regardless of what he believed,  
17                  whether it was a sniper, or somebody inside,  
18                  your last transmission isn't going to be to  
19                  stay away. I mean you're going to -- I would  
20                  like to think you'd tell the deputies, all  
21                  right, well, here's a safe route, I need more  
22                  people with me, and then we would go approach  
23                  it. It makes no sense.

24                  MR. SCHACHTER: What were the  
25                  conversations between Burton and Peterson based

1 on --

2 SGT. SUESS: We'll get into that when  
3 Officer Burton arrives.

4 MR. SCHACHTER: Okay, great. Thank you.

5 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir. So this is when  
6 Deputy Eason's body cam begins recording. And  
7 again, he's on the west end of the MSD campus.  
8 About three minutes earlier is when he was .3  
9 miles north of Holmberg Road, and .7 miles from  
10 where he ended up on the west end of campus.  
11 So three minutes have elapsed since he had to  
12 travel and extremely short distance. This is  
13 the point when his body cam comes on. Based  
14 off his interview we couldn't get any  
15 clarification on when he turned it on, or why  
16 there was a delay.

17 You could see students were still fleeing  
18 the campus at this point, and Cruz was still  
19 fleeing west from Building 12. So there's  
20 Deputy Eason's location, and the map on the  
21 right, you see the green dot, that's where he  
22 was at 2:25.07. So at 2:28.03 his camera  
23 begins recording as he's on the west side of  
24 this campus.

25 SHER. ASHLEY: Again, do you have a theory

1           on that?

2           SGT. SUESS: No, sir. We tried to get a  
3           clear explanation, but he couldn't give -- I  
4           mean the only person that could give a clear  
5           explanation couldn't. At six minutes and  
6           thirty seconds Officer Burton transmits that  
7           units need to go to the north side of the  
8           school. This would have been based off  
9           information he received from Andrew Medina  
10          after Medina picked him up in his golf cart.

11          This is the point at which Deputy Perry  
12          makes a reference to a parent, who is actually  
13          Sergeant Heinrich, saying there's a child down,  
14          have fire rescue stage an area. So six minutes  
15          and fifty-one seconds after the first shot  
16          Officer Tim Burton walked north on the east  
17          side of Building 1. He was the first on duty  
18          Coral Springs officer on scene. He was  
19          approached by Medina in the golf cart. Burton  
20          got onto the golf cart with Medina. Medina  
21          identified Building 12 to him as the scene, but  
22          made no mention of Peterson.

23          Almost simultaneously Captain Jordon and  
24          Lieutenant DeVita pull into the administration  
25          parking lot. Cruz was fleeing south on the

1 west end of the campus at this time. So to  
2 look at the map, somewhere in this area east of  
3 Building is where Officer Burton and Andrew  
4 Medina meet up. This is the video camera  
5 between Buildings 1 and 8. It's difficult to  
6 see, but again, if you're watching the moving  
7 video it's easier to pick out. But Medina and  
8 Burton are on the golf cart, they're going  
9 north on the east side of Building 1. Captain  
10 Jordan and Lieutenant DeVita are traveling  
11 south on Pine Island Road, and they pull into  
12 this parking lot on the east side of Buildings  
13 1 and 8.

14 Six minutes and fifty-four seconds after  
15 the first shot Kelvin Greenleaf and Assistant  
16 Principle Morford entered the north end of  
17 Building 1. If you refer to this map that's  
18 the layout of Building 1, help you understand  
19 sort of the layout. The top right corner,  
20 you'll see there's two doors. The one on the  
21 north end of that building is the door through  
22 which Greenleaf and Morford travel. Slight  
23 left of that you see the red box that says CR.  
24 That's the camera room where they ultimately  
25 would move into.

1 CHAIR: And, John, I think that's a good  
2 point. Why don't we just stop there.

3 SGT. SUESS: Yes, sir.

4 CHAIR: Okay, we'll pick it up tomorrow.  
5 We have public comment. First Tony Montalto.  
6 As always we just ask everybody to please try  
7 to keep your comments to three minutes. Mr.  
8 Montalto, you are recognized.

9 PUBLIC COMMENT

10 MR. MONTALTO: Today marks nine months  
11 since the loss of my beloved daughter, the loss  
12 of Commissioner Petty and Schachter's fantastic  
13 children, the loss of heroic staff members  
14 Hixon, Feis, and Beigel, as well as all the  
15 other wonderful children that were murdered  
16 that day. I must ask is there no outrage among  
17 the commissioners regarding the fact that none  
18 of the security folks on campus just did the  
19 right thing and moved to stop the shooter as he  
20 walked towards the 1200 Building?

21 Too often in our society today, and  
22 clearly with respect to this incident, the  
23 desire to do the right thing is missing. We  
24 all need to come together and begin to look out  
25 for one another. That simple premise, a desire

1 to help others, may have prevented this entire  
2 incident.

3 The families represented here today do not  
4 support the Chairman's decision not to subpoena  
5 the teachers from the 1200 building who did not  
6 cooperate with the investigation. It is not  
7 because of a lack of compassion or concern for  
8 their well-being, but instead through a desire  
9 to learn the truth, after all, that is the  
10 reason this commission exists. We must ask why  
11 the decision not to subpoena or take witness  
12 statements under oath was not put to the entire  
13 commission. One person, no matter how well  
14 intentioned, should not have made the decision  
15 without a public discussion.

16 We find it uninspiring that many of the  
17 statements were not done while under oath. We  
18 have seen a constant stream of evidence  
19 suggesting a culture of sweeping issues under  
20 the rug, teachers feeling unsure they could  
21 speak freely, and other participants making  
22 conflicting or self-serving statements. How  
23 can this commission and the public have the  
24 confidence that we have received truthful  
25 answers to this inquiry?

1           Although the preliminary report is due in  
2           January I am not sure that this body is done  
3           gathering evidence or interviewing those with  
4           relevant knowledge regarding this terrible  
5           tragedy. We are all counting on you to do a  
6           great job. Thank you.

7           CHAIR: Next is Fred Guttenberg.

8           MR. GUTTENBERG: Thanks Tony, for calling  
9           out nine months. It's almost surreal, but it's  
10          been an overwhelming number of surreal moments,  
11          to think that on the nine month anniversary is  
12          the day we're getting these details. It just  
13          -- in the nine months everything that could  
14          possibly be overwhelming to us just continues.

15          I want to say a few things. And, number  
16          one, I want to thank you all for your work,  
17          because I am hopeful that we will get to the  
18          bottom of every failure. I also want to remind  
19          all of it could have happened in any school in  
20          any county, in any Sheriff's jurisdiction, and  
21          so for me what comes out of this commission, I  
22          hope it's able to be meaningfully implemented,  
23          but here's my concern.

24          I've lost my belief in heroes, because  
25          they didn't show up on the day that I needed

1       them most, that Max needed them most, that Ryan  
2       needed them most, that Tony, and Jennifer, and  
3       Lori needed them most. We've lost our belief  
4       in heroes.

5               Just today, and thankfully I guess I was  
6       in the right room of people so I passed it on,  
7       on Facebook I received a message from somebody  
8       in another county in Florida seeking help  
9       because apparently these kids were starting a  
10      fight club, and they were talking about  
11      bringing an AK-47, an adult found out about it,  
12      reported it, and was told nothing could be done  
13      because the kid said he wasn't, didn't say he  
14      was bringing it to school, and she, the adult  
15      couldn't get anybody to take it seriously.

16             Again, fortunately I'm in the right room  
17      of people today, and I did get some help from  
18      some in this room, but this is here in Florida.  
19      This will happen again, because if we don't get  
20      people -- I am so thankful for all of you, but  
21      I have news for you, it can happen in your  
22      counties too, and other schools, because of the  
23      human potential for failure or fright, and so I  
24      am really concerned as to how we change the  
25      culture.

1           Let's face it, all, we're living in a  
2           culture now where guns are out there, and, and  
3           if we don't deal with that reality, we could  
4           lock down the school, we could build a solid  
5           perimeter, my, my horrible fear from that day  
6           is actually what if the shooter didn't go in,  
7           and as the thousands of kids were walking onto  
8           and off that campus at the end of the day he  
9           was waiting outside that perimeter while my two  
10          kids were walking out together.

11          I hope as part of this commission's work,  
12          because not one word has been said about it  
13          while I've been here, there's some discussion  
14          about how do we keep children from getting  
15          guns, how do we keep children who intend harm,  
16          who are telling us in every way possible, from  
17          being able to get weapons. And my hope is that  
18          you all give a wish list as to changes in law  
19          that you would like to see, because I can tell  
20          you you have a room full of parents here right  
21          now who have gotten really engaged in this  
22          process with legislatures. If there is  
23          anything that we can change in law to help  
24          insure that you have the tools you need to go  
25          reach out to these kids before they cause harm

1 I would love to be able to help you all do  
2 that. So I thank you for your time.

3 CHAIR: Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Guttenberg.  
4 Next is Ivy Schamis.

5 MS. SCHAMIS: Hi there. I missed most of  
6 it because I had to come after school. My name  
7 is Ivy Schamis. I teach at Stoneman Douglas.  
8 I've been there for eighteen years. I've been  
9 teaching in Room 1214 for ten years, since the  
10 building was erected, and there have been so  
11 many safety issues, all along I guess we felt  
12 so safe in the school we never really addressed  
13 it, so much I did tell my students that if  
14 there was an active shooter good luck to us  
15 because there's really nowhere to hide, there  
16 was nowhere to hide in that classroom.

17 The thing that really bothers me, and my  
18 husband and I talk about constantly, is that  
19 window that was in the door. So I know the 911  
20 calls was, was it locked, was your door locked.  
21 The door was locked, thank God, but truthfully  
22 if it wasn't locked it didn't matter because  
23 that window, and I know you guys saw the  
24 building, it's, the door, it's a metal door,  
25 but it's a very large long glass non-bullet

1 proof window right in the center of the door,  
2 and that's how the shooter got in and, and  
3 killed Nick and Helena, and injured four kids  
4 in my class as well.

5 And we were all hovering in the corners,  
6 which he could have easily shot through those,  
7 the walls as well, so it was not, certainly not  
8 fortified, and certainly not safe. And I don't  
9 know how those windows were in there, because  
10 if you -- like I was cowering in the corner  
11 waiting for a hand to come right through, and  
12 that's how, that's how the Coral Springs Police  
13 Department got in, the SWAT team got in, but  
14 you, all you had to do was reach your hand into  
15 that, into that window and open the door. It  
16 was super easy, so that was not safe.

17 The other thing I want -- and -- and so  
18 they move us into portables with not only those  
19 windows but wider and longer windows, so I  
20 don't even understand that as well. So -- they  
21 could be horizontal. I'm not sure the reason  
22 for the windows, but that's, that's super  
23 unsafe, and I've felt that ever since I was in  
24 the building for ten years.

25 The other thing, quickly, is the

1       bathrooms. I don't understand that either. I  
2       worked there for ten years. I'm in that  
3       building. I love teaching there. I do not  
4       understand why the bathrooms were locked all  
5       the time. And I know you answered a question  
6       about it being a new thing, that's not a new  
7       thing. That's not a new thing, it happened all  
8       the time, and for years. So if kids were doing  
9       whatever it was in the bathroom they should  
10      have been monitored instead of been locked, and  
11      I see now it would have been a safe place for  
12      some kids to go. Thank you.

13             CHAIR: Thank you. All right, we'll be in  
14      recess until 8:30 tomorrow morning. Thank you.


15             (Thereupon, the meeting concluded.)  
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C E R T I F I C A T E

(STATE OF FLORIDA)

(COUNTY OF MIAMI-DADE)

I, JENNIFER FOLSOM, Reporter, certify that I was  
authorized to and did report the foregoing  
proceedings and that the transcript is a true and  
correct transcription of my notes of the  
proceedings.



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JENNIFER ANN FOLSOM, Reporter

Commission Number: GG186702

Expires: 02/15/2022

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