But for a Small Moment

Tragedy falls, and takes what cannot be replaced:
Time, moments, milestones,
Togetherness.

Darkest clouds of trouble, a peace destroyed.
Suddenly, senselessly,
Publicly.

Yet night briefly yields, and rays
of love uncommon shine.
Broken hearts together,
United.

Not to supplant, but to illuminate
a journey blessed by grace.
Deeply etched, always
Remembered.

Our truest promise, vitally renewed in her:
To live and love and strive.
Until joyfully reunited, a family
Forever.

Written for Alaina Petty by anonymous. Dedicated to each of the 17 families.
It was only a week prior to February 14, 2018 that our daughter, Alyssa Alhadeff, had selected her course load for the upcoming academic Sophomore year. Honors English, Pre-Calc, Chemistry and Spanish 4 topped her list...had such a bright future ahead of her! Hard to imagine, though, that I now must write about our beautiful 14 year old in the past tense.

Not only an academic talent, Alyssa shone brightly athletically as well. Having begun to play soccer at the age of 3, she held the position as attacking mid-fielder wearing the number 8 with pride. Her unbelievable passing skills, coupled with her ability to communicate as a leader on the field, were paving her way to athletic prowess.

The light of all of our lives was dimmed forever on February 14, 2018. We will spend the rest of our lives trying to:

#LiveforAlyssa
#PlayforAlyssa
#ShineforAlyssa

Scott J. Beigel was 35 years old. Scott was a teacher, a coach, a camp counselor, a son, a grandson, a brother, an uncle, a nephew, a cousin, a friend and a hero. Scott was a very humble young man who never knew how much of an impact he had on others, especially children. Scott loved working with children. Teaching afforded him the ability to continue with one of his life’s passions, working at sleep away camp. Scott’s ultimately wanted to have a positive impact on every child, no matter how young or old, no matter what the issues. Scott did volunteer work in South Africa with under privileged children. It is for this reason that we have combined his two life passions; his love of summer camp and his desire to teach and mentor children, that we started the Scott J. Beigel Memorial Fund. The Scott J. Beigel Memorial Fund is a 501(c)(3) not for profit whose mission statement and purpose is to help send under privileged children to summer camp. We would very much like Scott’s legacy to live on.
Martin Duque Anguiano, Jr. was a smart and driven young man who was taking honors classes and looked forward to taking AP classes and dual enrollment college classes. As committed as he was to his studies, Martin was equally devout in his faith - he prayed every day and regularly attended church. He loved soccer, the FC Barcelona team and anything related to ‘Star Wars.’ He was a JROTC Cadet Corporal who’d received numerous honors. Martin was kind, compassionate, fun-loving, studious and generous with friends and strangers alike. He is greatly missed by his parents Daisy and Martin, Sr., his brothers Miguel, Alex, Andres and Santiago and everyone who knew him.

Nicholas Dworet was Captain of the MSD swim team; he also loved to play water polo. He was a district, regional and state champion. He had a college scholarship in hand with the University of Indianapolis, and with aspirations to swim in the Tokyo 2020 summer Olympics. Nick was selected by faculty as one of twenty, First Class graduating Seniors who excelled in academic achievement, character, community service, and athletic achievement.

We honor Nick for his love of life, his true love Daria, his positive attitude and his respect for what he cherished most...his family and friends. Always on our mind, forever in our hearts, we miss you Nick.
Aaron Louis Feis was a loving husband, devoted father, coach and mentor on and off the field, confidante, and lifelong friend. Aaron always put his family first. Whether it was working an extra job, helping with homework, or cooking with his daughter. Aaron treasured the simple moments. His heart was full of kindness, love and humor. Aaron's greatest joy was to see others reach their potential and achieve their goals. He was a loyal and genuine friend. Aaron's unwavering selflessness was a steady constant. His demeanor put others at ease. Aaron's enveloping presence provided a sense of safeguard that allowed others to be themselves. He will always be remembered as a hero but to those who knew him, he was a hero each and every day.

Jaime Guttenberg was a beautiful, smart, energetic, compassionate and funny 14 year old girl when her life was tragically cut short in the MSD shooting. She should have turned 15 on July 13th and she should be living her life now as a competitive dancer, volunteer to children with special needs, amazing daughter, sister and friend. We should be teaching Jaime to drive, not driving to a cemetery to visit Jaime. We miss our beautiful daughter. We miss her laughter, her voice, her beauty and the energy that she always brought into every room that she entered. And we will love her forever.
Christopher Brent Hixon was a caring, passionate, adventurous and responsible man. He was a wonderful son and brother, incredible father to his two sons and a devoted husband. He was a sailor in the US Navy; both active duty and Reserves, where he served as a Machinist Mate and Military Police officer for 27 years. He was passionate about sports and became an athletic director for the BCPS where he was able to share that passion with his athletes. He was a great leader to his coaches and a true role model for the athletes. He always put others before himself and he had a way of making you feel like you were family. He lived his life helping others and trying to make the world a better and safer place. He will be forever remembered as a hero because he exemplified the motto “If not me, then who?” through his actions every single day.

Luke Hoyer was a quiet soul with a big heart. His friendly face, sweet smile, laid back personality and low-key humor brought happiness to all those around him. He was known as “Lukey Bear” to his family, a nickname his Mom gave him at an early age. Luke loved his family, his friends, his dogs, basketball, Clemson Football, family trips to South Carolina, family trips to the Jersey Shore, Miami Heat, Dwayne Wade and Chicken Nuggets. He could often be found playing basketball at his neighborhood court with friends. He played for many years in the Parkland Basketball League and was a member of several travel basketball teams. He also played football in middle school and was looking forward to trying out for the MSD football team in the fall. Luke led a simple and beautiful life. He didn’t need to say much, just having him around made the room feel warm and welcoming. Luke’s contagious smile and good nature well be greatly missed by those that knew and loved him. He touched many lives and will be felt in many hearts forever. Luke’s parents, his older sister Abby and older brother Jake love and miss him so much everyday! He will always be our Lukey Bear!
Cara Loughran was diligent, determined and to those she loved and cared about, she was fiercely loyal. Her presence combined with her smile and laugh could change the atmosphere in any room. A beautiful soul.

Gina Rose Montalto, age 14, was a special girl who melted the heart of everyone she met. Her infectious smile was there from the start and brightened any room she entered. This was a quality she retained throughout her amazing life. Gina was instant friends with everyone she met. A caring and loving soul, she was often the first to reach out to the new kids in class and welcome them into the neighborhood. She also had a great sense of humor and a penchant for being silly - even goofy at times. Always trying to make things better for others, Gina loved to do volunteer work, especially if it involved helping kids. She was a Girl Scout and active in a local church. Gina was known to all as an avid reader and a talented artist who illustrated for a local magazine. Once she told her mother that she loved books so much she wanted to live in a library. She loved to cook with her Father and her Grandmother, especially during the holiday season. She enjoyed shopping days with her Mom, and NY Jets games with her Dad. In the local recreational leagues Gina played soccer and flag football. Gina was also a bit of a daredevil riding all the extreme roller coasters at the Orlando theme parks with her Mother. Gina loved to surf, snorkel and ski. She loved to do these activities with her best buddy; her brother Anthony. They got along well, and loved each other very much.

Gina joined the MSD Color Guard last winter. She competed through the spring and was a part of the Eagle Regiment as they won the FL state championship in the fall of 2017. She always earned the highest grades in school and had a bright future ahead of her. Gina will be missed not only by her family, but by everyone whose life she touched.
Joaquin Oliver was the most vibrant personality in every room. He was always the life of the party and he loved to love. Even now, I hear how his presence impacted so many people. He always did his best to be there for everyone and be the best friend and best boyfriend he could be. He was persistent, opinionated, and always stood up for what’s right and what’s fair. Everywhere he went he touched someone’s heart and had a special bond with each and every one of them. Joaquin had a strong passion for writing and looking at everything he wrote now, the meaning behind his writings goes so much deeper than expected. As a son he was very kind, warm, spoiled and persistent in what he wanted to get and accomplish. He was always making fun of little things, making jokes and looking for company when he wanted to eat or watch a game. As a brother he adored his sister and he always looked after her. We miss him each and every day; everything we do is for him.

It is impossible to sum up in words all that Alaina was and all she meant to her family, friends & community. Alaina was a vibrant, determined & accomplished young woman, loved by all who knew her. She sought after the beauty in the world and others. Alaina was happiest while spending time with her family and friends, her dogs, working hard and making a difference. To make a difference, Alaina found opportunities to serve others. She served her community through her participation in the Marjory Stoneman Douglas JROTC program and by giving of her time as a volunteer for the “Helping Hands” program of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. As a first-year Cadet, Alaina achieved the highest rank possible for a Freshman. She was awarded ‘Cadet of the Month’ in only her second month, a rare honor for a 1st-year cadet.

While we will not have the opportunity to watch her grow to become the amazing woman we know she would be, we choose to take an eternal perspective. We are grateful for the knowledge that Alaina is a part of our eternal family and that we will be reunited with her. This knowledge and abiding faith in our Heavenly Father’s plan gives us the strength to endure this most difficult trial.

“Live every day as though it’s your last” was her advice to friends and so she lived her life in faith, not fear. Alaina was a light to all who encountered her. Alaina’s light lives on.

Ryan, Kelly, Ian, Meghan & Patrick Petty
Meadow Jade Pollack is forever loved and missed by her family and friends. As the youngest in a family with 10 grandchildren all growing up together in Parkland she was the princess of the family. While Meadow was small in stature, she had such strength and determination. She was a beautiful girl that loved everything pink and girly but also could get dirty outdoors. She aspired to be an attorney and have a family of her own. We will never see her vision of life come true. She will always be our beautiful princess.

Helena Ramsay was a bright and beautiful young lady who had friends of all cultures and creeds. She was very shy and private until you got to know her wonderful sense of humor and wicked wit. Helena was very aware of the challenges facing communities across the globe such as inequality and discrimination, as well as being passionate about environmental issues. Helena’s dreams would have led her on an adventure around the world, traveling to Europe with the possibility of study, listening to the K-Pop bands in South Korea, and an expedition to find the exquisite Pink Dolphins of the Amazon Forest. On the day of the tragedy Helena like so many others who lost their lives acted selflessly and put her classmates first ultimately costing her, her life.
Alex Schachter was a special little boy. He was happy and always smiling. He loved sports. Whether it was playing basketball and football or watching his favorite teams the New England Patriots, Boston Red Sox and Boston Celtics he was always ready to talk smack with his friends. His tenacious defense led to several championships on the basketball court. He worshipped his big brother Ryan. He used to let his little sister Avery play with his hair and give him massages so she could hang out with him and his friends. He used to bond with his older sister Morgan over their love of Japanese TV shows. Alex’s love of music was constant throughout middle and high school. He followed in his grandfather’s footsteps and played the trombone in middle and high school. His hard work and dedication paid off when his band, the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Eagle Regiment Marching Band became state champions several months before his passing. His family founded SafeSchoolsForAlex.org in his honor to protect all children and teachers. Alex is loved and missed every day.

Carmen Schentrup was a beautiful, talented, caring, smart, and witty 16 year old Senior, just a week away from her 17th birthday. Carmen enjoyed spending time with her family and friends, reading, and making others laugh. While Carmen had a silly disposition by nature, she knew how to apply herself, excelling in school and music. Carmen was also involved in a number of clubs and was president of the a cappella club and her church youth group. Like many teenagers, she enjoyed watching TV and going to movies; watching a favorite new show wasn’t uncommon. Always looking to explore the world, Carmen liked to travel, visit national parks, explore museums, and go to concerts. As a National Merit Scholar, with multiple scholarships, she was excited about graduating from Stoneman Douglas and was debating attending either the University of Florida or the University of Washington. We will never know which one Carmen would have picked. Her dream to become a medical researcher and cure ALS cut short before it began. For all of us that knew Carmen, we were sure she was going to change the world. We miss her more than you can know.
Peter Wang was a much beloved and good son, and the adored older brother of Jason and Alex. He was kind, generous and smart and could always be counted on for a smile, a joke or to make others laugh. He was never sad. He embodied the values espoused in his JROTC- honor, duty, respect, loyalty, selfless service and courage- and on that horrific day, Peter held the door so his classmates and peers could safely escape. Peter had his sights set on attending West Point and becoming a pilot. West Point posthumously admitted him to the class of 2025 and granted him the Medal of Heroism. He was a hero and is greatly missed by all who knew and loved him.
Where I’m From

I am from the sketchpad
filled with drawings
From Crayola and Macy’s
I am from the house
with the basketball hoop in front
and the green paint, brown door,
with a pool and a lake in the back
It feels cozy and cool I am
from palm trees, the gardenias
big beautiful white and green
flowers that the smells so good
I’m from the family vacations
and the barbecues with the neighbors,
from Tony, Jen, and Anthony
I’m from the Ginabug and Pickelhead
From I am so brave, strong, and
beautiful and you can be anything
I’m from Christmas trees,
with shining light with glittering
and dangling ornament
I’m from Italy and Ireland,
spaghetti and corned beef.
From the knitting with Grandma
and little purple needles
and soft wool, the brave firefighter,
I am from sunny, warm, rainy,
humid, colorful, tropical.
southern, and flavorful Florida

By Gina Rose Montalto
Life is like a roller coaster

It has some ups and downs
Sometimes you can take it slow
Or very fast
It may be hard to breathe at times
But you just have to push yourself
And keep going
Your bar is your safety
It’s like your family and friends
You hold on tight and don’t let go
But sometimes you might
throw your hands up
Because your friends and family will always be with you
Just like that bar keeping you safe at all times
It may be too much for you at times
The twists,
The turns,
The upside downs,
But you get back up
And keep chugging along
Eventually it all comes to a stop
You won’t know when
Or how
But you will know that it will be time to get off
And start anew.
Life is like a roller coaster.

By Alex Schachter
COMMISSION APPOINTEES

**Commission Chair: Sheriff Bob Gualtieri** is the Sheriff of Pinellas County and has served with the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office for 35 years. Sheriff Gualtieri also serves on the board of directors for the Florida Sheriff’s Association (FSA), the Major County Sheriff’s Association (MCSA) and the Boys and Girls Clubs of the Suncoast.

**Vice Chair: Chief Kevin Lystad,** of Miami Shores, is the Chief of the Miami Shores Police Department. He is the President of the Florida Police Chiefs Association. Chief Lystad serves as Vice Chair of the Commission.

**Sheriff Larry Ashley,** of Okaloosa, is the Okaloosa County Sheriff. Sheriff Ashley has nearly 30 years of law enforcement experience and has earned numerous awards and commendations during his career. He participated in the Governor’s emergency meetings to help develop the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act.

**Chief Asst. State Attorney Bruce Bartlett** – Serving in the State Attorney’s Office for more than 39 years, he has prosecuted or taken part in the prosecutions of some of Pinellas’s most notorious criminals. He has practiced since 1979 and is a graduate of Stetson University’s College of Law.

**Desmond Blackburn,** Ph.D., of Broward County, is the CEO of the New Teacher Center, a national nonprofit that improves public education by training and mentoring new teachers. Dr. Blackburn served as the Superintendent of Brevard Public Schools when appointed to the Commission. He previously worked as a teacher, principal, district trainer, director of school improvement, an area superintendent and as the chief school performance and accountability officer for the Broward County School District. Dr. Blackburn participated in the Governor’s emergency meetings to help develop the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act.

**State Senator Lauren Book,** M.S. Ed, is an internationally respected and renowned child advocate, former classroom teacher and best-selling author. In 2016, she was elected to represent State Senate District 32, which includes portions of Broward County.

**Mike Carroll** of Pinellas County joined Lutheran Services of Florida in 2018 after retiring as the Secretary of the Florida Department of Children and Families ending a state career that spanned more than 25 years within the department. As the longest serving Secretary in the department’s history, Mike led the development of a first-of-its-kind website to allow public review of abuse-related child deaths, giving communities the ability to identify and bridge gaps in local services.

**Douglas Dodd** is a member of the Citrus County School Board. He served in the Citrus County Sheriff’s Office for more than 26 years, retiring as a captain. During his career in law enforcement, Mr. Dodd served as a school resource officer for 10 years.
COMMISSION APPOINTEES

James Harpring is the undersheriff for Indian River County and serves as general counsel to the Sheriff’s Department. He also works as an adjunct professor at Indian River State College and as an instructor at the Treasure Coast Law Enforcement Academy.

Sheriff Grady Judd is the Sheriff of Polk County. Prior to becoming Sheriff in 2004, Sheriff Judd graduated from the FBI National Academy, as well as several other prestigious law enforcement academies, and taught for 23 years at both the University of South Florida and Florida Southern College.

Melissa Larkin-Skinner, MA, LMHC, is the Chief Executive Officer at Centerstone Florida. As a Licensed Mental Health Counselor, she has nearly 25 years of experience in mental health and addictions treatment programs, including hospital, outpatient, crisis, community-based, forensic and child welfare services.

Chris Nelson currently serves as the Executive Director at the State Attorney’s Office for the 10th Circuit. He was former Chief of Police for the City of Auburndale. A graduate of Bartow High School, he started his law enforcement career as a patrol officer with the Bartow Police Department.

Ryan Petty, of Parkland, is the father of Alaina Petty, who was murdered at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. He played an integral role in ensuring the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act moved through the Florida Legislature.

Marsha Powers is a member of the Martin County School Board. She was elected to the School Board in 2012 and re-elected subsequently.

Max Schachter is the father of Alex Schachter, who was murdered at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. Following the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, Schachter advocated for school safety improvements and urged members of the Florida Legislature to enact effective legislation.

In addition, Florida Department of Law Enforcement Commissioner Rick Swearingen serves as a member of the commission, and the following individuals serve as ex officio members:

- Florida Department of Education Commissioner Pam Stewart
- Florida Department of Children and Families Interim Secretary Rebecca Kapusta
- Florida Department of Juvenile Justice Interim Secretary Timothy Niermann
- Florida Agency for Health Care Administration Secretary Justin Senior
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School safety in Florida needs to be improved. We can do more and we can do a better job of ensuring the safety of students and staff on K-12 school campuses. Not all school security changes or enhancements have financial costs, and some only require the will of decision-makers to effect change and hold people responsible for implementing best practices. Safety and security accountability is lacking in schools, and that accountability is paramount for effective change if we expect a different result in the future than what occurred at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (MSDHS) on February 14, 2018.

Accountability starts at the top of every organization, and all leaders have an obligation to ensure not only that the law is followed, but that effective policies and best practices are implemented. Even after the MSDHS shooting and the implementation of new Florida law requiring certain safety measures, there remains non-compliance and a lack of urgency to enact basic safety principles in Florida’s K-12 schools. All stakeholders—school districts, law enforcement, mental health providers, city and county governments, funding entities, etc. — should embrace the opportunity to change and make Florida schools the safest in the nation. There must be a sense of urgency—and there is not, across-the-board—in enhancing school safety.

At its core, basic, effective school safety begins with prevention. Prevention strategies not only focus on target hardening, but include early intervention when youth demonstrate indicators that should be immediately and appropriately assessed and addressed. However, equally important are harm mitigation aspects of school safety, which can be divided into a few key components: identifying the threat at the earliest possible moment; notifying others of the threat; implementing an effective response by those vulnerable to the threat; and stopping the threat as soon as possible. These harm mitigation concepts should be immediately implemented across all Florida K-12 schools. There are more complex, proactive components to school safety that will help prevent violence from occurring, but once an attack has commenced, the focus must be on immediately mitigating the harm, and these basic concepts, as set forth in this report’s recommendations, are essential to that goal.
In addition to schools, law enforcement agencies and all governmental entities across Florida must ensure that they employ the most effective response systems and policies possible. This ranges from non-redundant 911 systems to police radios that work properly to implementing effective command and control concepts. Further, all law enforcement and other first responder personnel must receive the highest level of active assailant training; and they must be properly equipped to stop the threat of an active assailant situation at the first possible moment. Accountability for implementing these best practices rests with these organizations' leaders. In today's world, with numerous lessons learned from prior active assailant events, failure to train appropriately and consistently and properly equip all personnel is simply wrong and unacceptable.

Another key element of school safety is ensuring mental and behavioral issues are properly addressed. Florida’s mental and behavioral health system is underfunded. Florida needs a better case management system, but no case management system can be effective unless there are effective services through which a person can be managed. While more funding is needed, there should first be an evaluation of existing services and service models to ensure they are producing the desired results. The delivery system should focus on evidence-based best practices with specific metrics to measure outcomes. The Commission did not have time this year to do all it needed to regarding mental health and the Commission will further its work in this area during 2019. The legislature added several mental health components during 2018 as a result of Senate Bill 7026 and we should let those new and/or enhanced initiatives take hold and evaluate their effectiveness before making any further changes.

While there were personal and system failures that culminated in the MSDHS shooting and contributed to its magnitude, it is important to be mindful that the one true ‘cause’ that resulted in 34 people being shot and/or killed, is Nikolas Cruz. As we set forth the failures and opportunities for improvement in this report, we must also recognize the many people who acted appropriately by reporting their observations (despite their reports not being acted upon), and the heroes of February 14th who performed admirably, risked their own lives and saved the lives of others.
PREFACE

The Commission held its initial meeting in April 2018 and prioritized its investigative strategy to meet the January 2019 legislative deadline to submit an initial report. Throughout the rest of 2018, Commission investigators interviewed hundreds of witnesses and reviewed a massive amount of evidence, including documents, physical evidence, video and audio recordings, and transcripts of interviews conducted by other investigative entities. The Commission held monthly meetings and heard testimony from a variety of individuals and subject matter experts on wide-ranging topics.

One of the challenges of this investigation has been the numerous and diverse topics that the Commission had to consider in making its recommendations for system improvements, as well as the volume, breadth and scope of the evidence. The Commission investigated Cruz’s life from birth through February 14, 2018. Within the school system, school discipline; juvenile diversion programs; Exceptional Student Education; the behavioral threat assessment processes; physical site security; the on-campus school staff response to the shooting; and state and federal privacy laws, among other areas were considered. With respect to law enforcement, the complicated Parkland 911 system, radio and other communications systems in Florida and Broward County; law enforcement policies; the law enforcement response itself on February 14, including command and control; and access to information and data sharing among agencies were evaluated, as well as medical response and aid rendered to MSDHS victims. Further, because Cruz received extensive mental and behavioral health services, school-based, community-based and private provider mental health systems in Florida and Broward County were also reviewed.

For this Initial Report, the Commission emphasized two major priorities—what happened leading up to the shooting and the law enforcement response. Knowing the true and accurate facts about all the contributing variables leading up to the massacre of February 14 was critical for forming a body of knowledge about certain topics (for example active shooter policies) and enabled the Commission to have a baseline from which to make informed and deliberative recommendations. Further, this knowledge allowed the Commission to make findings that are necessary to drive change. The Commission’s effort
is far from complete; all areas require further investigation and recommendations, which the Commission will continue to work on in 2019.

This Initial Report establishes the facts and timeline of “what” occurred on February 14, 2018. The more complicated question of “how” it happened and how it became one of the largest school mass killing events in United States’ history is more difficult because of many varied contributing causes. The causes include Cruz’s mental and behavioral health issues, people not reporting warning signs or reporting signs that were not acted on by those to whom actionable information was reported, and how Cruz’s behavioral and discipline issues were addressed (or not addressed) by Broward County Public Schools. Also contributing, was the overall lack of adequate or effective physical site security and unenforced or non-existent security measures and policies at MSDHS, as well as the ineffective behavioral threat assessment process at MSDHS.

Further contributing was the unsatisfactory law enforcement response, which includes the flawed City of Parkland 911 system and the flawed and failed Broward County law enforcement radio system. The Broward Sheriff’s Office’s inadequate active assailant response policy, the abysmal response by the school’s SRO, a failed response by some law enforcement officers and supervisors and BSO’s flawed unified command and control of the scene were also identified as areas that need to be addressed.

The report begins in Chapter 1 with a historical overview of targeted K-12 active assailant attacks over the past 20 years. A general historical understanding of these attacks is helpful because while it is universally agreed that there is no accurate or useful profile of the next school shooter, a review of past K-12 targeted active assailant attacks during the last 20 years provides guidance for the best approaches to preventing an attack or mitigating the harm caused by an attack in the future.

Chapter 2 provides the reader a timeline of events as required by the statute. Given all that has been inaccurately reported through social media, by some electronic and print media sources, and false information that has spread by word-of-mouth throughout the
community, it was critical that an independent, complete and accurate timeline be established.

Substantive factual information on a variety of topics relevant to Cruz and the shooting are provided in Chapters 3 through 14. These include physical site security at MSDHS; the school staff's response to the shooting; school safety and security policies and training; the SRO response; the off-campus law enforcement response; medical response; 911 system and radio communications; behavioral threat assessments; site security assessments; mental health; and interdisciplinary data sharing.

The reader is encouraged to read each chapter in its entirety to gain a full understanding of this complex event; we caution against forming opinions based only on summary information. Each of these chapters begins with background and a presentation of facts relevant to the topic being presented. The chapters are divided into sub-sections. Following the facts in each sub-section, there is a “findings” section where the Commission has made determinations regarding the topic. At the conclusion of each chapter there is an aggregated recommendations section for the entire chapter that contains the Commission’s approved recommendations. It is important for the reader to note that the sequence of each chapter is designed so that the facts inform the findings and the findings drive the recommendations. These recommendations touch several disciplines and should be thoroughly discussed and considered at the local, district and state levels of government as appropriate.

The Florida legislature included many positive enhancements to school safety in Senate Bill 7026. Some of those enhancements have been implemented, others are still in progress and some seem to have stalled, or even been manipulated or disregarded. Some of these enhancements, once fully implemented, will have a significant positive impact on school safety. The Commission recommends that the legislature ensure its directives in Florida Statutes, which were addressed in Senate Bill 7026, are fully implemented and that those who are not in compliance are held accountable. The Florida Department of Education should be provided explicit authority to ensure compliance by Florida schools and authorized to sanction those districts that are not in full compliance by a certain date.
PREFACE

Florida’s children deserve a premier education in a safe environment and there is no excuse for not following the law. As this Commission is empaneled until 2023, it will have ample time to assess and report on whether the addition of accountability measures brings forth the compliance and expected public safety outcomes anticipated within Senate Bill 7026. This Commission will continue to proffer recommendations and findings as our work continues. We will not wait, we will be vigilant and we, like the legislature, expect compliance and change with urgency.
Incident Summary

On February 14, 2018, 14 students and three staff members at the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida were fatally shot and 17 others were wounded in one of the deadliest school massacres in the United States’ history.

The gunman Nikolas Cruz, age 19 at the time of the incident, was a former student of Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. Cruz was a troubled child and young adult who displayed aggressive and violent tendencies as early as 3 years old. Cruz struggled in academics and attended several schools. There are reports of behavioral issues at all of the schools he attended. He was under the care of mental health professionals from age 11 until he turned age 18 and refused further services.

At 2:19 p.m. on February 14, 2018, Cruz exited an Uber ride-sharing service at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School armed with a rifle and several hundred rounds of ammunition concealed in a rifle bag. He entered the school through an unstaffed gate that had been opened for school dismissal and made his way toward Building 12 on the north side of campus. He entered the east side of Building 12 through an unlocked and unstaffed door. He made his way through all three floors, firing into classrooms and hallways and killing or wounding 34 individuals. He exited Building 12 and ran across campus, blending in with students evacuating. Cruz was apprehended approximately 1 hour and 16 minutes after the first shots and charged with 17 counts of premeditated murder and 17 counts of attempted murder.

Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public Safety Commission

Following the shooting, a group of Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School students and parents campaigned for gun control and school safety during the 2018 Florida legislative session. On March 9, 2018, Governor Rick Scott signed the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act (MSDHSSPA) into law. This comprehensive legislation focuses on identifying and addressing issues surrounding the tragedy that occurred at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School.

A key component of the legislation was the establishment of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission (Commission), composed of 16 voting members and
COMMISSION BACKGROUND AND SCOPE

4 non-voting members appointed by the Governor, Speaker of the House, Senate President or specified in legislation. The Commission was formed to specifically analyze information from the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting and other mass violence incidents and provide recommendations and system improvements to help mitigate the impacts from and prevent future school shootings.

The Commission was established through 2023. For the initial year, the Commission held monthly public meetings in South Florida between April and November 2018 (October’s meeting was cancelled due to Hurricane Michael), and the Commission’s December meeting was held in Tallahassee. The Commission heard presentations and testimony on the shooting, school safety issues and many other related topics.

Commission Responsibilities and Scope of Report

The MSDHSPSA specified a number of specific considerations and topics that the Commission should address in its initial report to the Governor, Speaker of the House and Senate President. The following is a summary of the tasks as assigned by law.

- Produce a timeline of the incident, incident response and all relevant events preceding the incident.
- Review interactions between the perpetrator and governmental entities such as schools, law enforcement agencies, courts and social service agencies.
- Identify failures to adequately communicate or coordinate regarding indicators of risk or possible threats and whether failures contributed to an inability to prevent deaths and injuries.
- Analyze incident response by local law enforcement agencies and school resource officers, including a review of existing policies and procedures for active assailant incidents at Marjory Stoneman Douglas.
- Evaluate whether the incident response complied with the existing policies and procedures and how those existing policies and procedures compare to national best practices.
COMMISSION BACKGROUND AND SCOPE

- Evaluate whether failures in the policies and procedures, or in the execution of them, contributed to an inability to prevent deaths and/or injuries.
- Provide recommendations for improvements for law enforcement and school resource officer response.
- Provide recommendation for a ratio of school resource officers per school by school type along with a methodology for determining ratio, which must include school location, student population and school design.
- Provide recommendations for improving communication and coordination of agencies that have knowledge of indicators of risk or possible threats of mass violence.
- Provide recommendations for effectively using available state/local tools and resources for enhancing communication and coordination related to indicators of risk or possible threats.

During the Commission's first meeting on April 24, 2018, the requirements of the law were discussed and grouped into specific topic areas. The Commission voted on a list of topic areas to be included in the initial report. They are as follows:

- History of K-12 active assailant events.
- Nikolas Cruz background and timeline.
- Marjory Stoneman Douglas physical structure and security.
- Active assailant response—Broward schools and school board.
- Active assailant response—Broward Sheriff's Office on-campus response.
- Active assailant response—law enforcement officer response by Broward Sheriff’s Office, Coral Springs Police Department and incident command response.
- Other topics: social media, Florida mental health system, Baker Act, privacy laws and threat assessment and management.

During the course of the Commission's investigation and subsequent Commission meetings, other topics were addressed, and these topic areas were slightly modified and reorganized as presented in this report.
COMMISSION BACKGROUND AND SCOPE

Because of the urgency of this issue, the Commission’s initial report was completed within a relatively short timeframe in relation to the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas. In many other similar incidents, such as Columbine High School and Sandy Hook Elementary shootings, post-incident reports and evaluations were completed several years following the events. As a result, several ancillary investigations into the Marjory Stoneman Douglas massacre or parts of the incident were also in the process of being conducted at the same time the Commission was conducting its investigation. This Commission attempted to coordinate with the entities conducting the other investigations so as not to duplicate or interfere with the other investigations, but some of the final reports were not available to the Commission for the purposes of compiling this report. There were also several active legal cases regarding the incident, which impeded obtaining some relevant testimony, documents and other investigative materials. During the Commission’s subsequent years, portions of this report may be amended to take into account new information not available at the time this report was prepared.

Methodology and Information Sources

Following the Commission’s establishment, teams of investigators and analysts from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office were created to assist the Commission in conducting its research, analysis and investigation. These teams were assigned to the topic areas approved by the Commission to collect relevant details and facts through a variety of techniques and resources. Investigators conducted numerous interviews and collected and reviewed thousands of pages of documents, videos, 911 calls and related evidence in order to provide a comprehensive summary of the issues surrounding the Marjory Stoneman Douglas massacre to the Commission. The Commission used all available information resources to compile the findings and recommendations presented in this report.

Members of the Commission were appointed to provide a broad and diverse range of expertise and knowledge. Commission members represent state and local law enforcement, mental health professionals, state and local elected officials, educators, school officials and
parents of victims. For that reason, a number of early meetings were focused on presenting background on relevant topics and issues in order for all Commission members to have an adequate base of information to make informed decisions. Presentations from subject matter experts from around the state and nation focused on a variety of topics regarding past active assailant events, current laws, practices, policies, programs and structural issues that could potentially be relevant to Commission recommendations. Agendas for the meetings are provided in Appendix E.
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The following review of active assailant incidents focuses specifically on targeted school violence attacks that occurred from 1998 until 2018. The United States Secret Service and the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) define a targeted attack or targeted violence as an attack that was planned for days, weeks or months, serves a purpose and seeks to accomplish objectives set by the attacker. A targeted attack can be directed at a selected individual; however, for the purposes of this report, the definition of targeted school attack includes only those attacks that were directed at multiple individuals in a general sense at a K-12 school. Based on these parameters, 46 attacks involving 48 attackers from 1998 to the present were identified within the United States (US).

Prior to 1998, targeted attacks as defined here, were rare within the US. The preponderance of targeted attacks from 1927 to 1997 was by non-students. Over the last 20 years that has shifted. During the most recent 20 years, almost all targeted attacks were perpetrated by insiders, such as students or former students.

It is important to note that the Secret Service, FBI and other researchers have stated that there is no effective profile of an individual to predict who will conduct a targeted attack against a school. No profile is proposed here. However, there are common factors that emerge from the targeted attacks that may assist in designing protection or response.

Targeted attacks can be divided into insider threats and outsider threats. The Department of Homeland Security defines an insider threat as one or more individuals with the access and/or inside knowledge that would allow them to exploit the vulnerabilities of an entity’s security and systems with the intent to cause harm. Among the 46 targeted attacks reviewed that were perpetrated by 48 attackers, 33 of the attackers were students and 10 were former students (insiders). Only five attacks were initiated by strangers (outsiders). Even more telling was that all middle school attacks were by insiders and all but one of high school attacks were by insiders. The attack by an outsider at a high school was by a 56-year-old male that took multiple female hostages in a classroom. Only at the elementary school level were the majority of attacks committed by outsiders.

The age of attackers aligned well with the insider designation. Attackers ranged in age from 11 to 56 years old. Thirty-four (34) of the attackers were 14 through 19 years old.
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One attacker was 20 and one was 22. Six (6) attackers were 13 years old or less, and six (6) attackers were 32 to 56 years old.

The type of weapon utilized varied. Semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic rifles and shotguns collectively made up the majority of weapons. Semi-automatic pistols were the most frequently used weapon. In some cases, explosive devices were also used along with weapons, but with limited success. In one case only an explosive device was utilized. It is noted that at Columbine the perpetrators set in place two explosive devices that if successful would have created a conflagration that killed hundreds. When the two propane bombs they set did not energize, the attackers entered the school, shooting. In two cases, easily obtained, easily concealed edged weapons were used by insiders with success. In the third edged weapon attack, a machete was used and the attacker’s effectiveness was limited by school personnel. Vehicles have been used as weapons in terror attacks including one attack against students at a university in the US. No vehicles were used in any of the K-12 school attacks.

Since most attackers, because of their age, could not legally purchase the weapons utilized, the source of the weapons is a relevant factor. Approximately fifty percent of the weapons were stolen from parents or relatives. All the attackers, aged 11 through 15, obtained their weapons by stealing them from parents or relatives. Beginning at age 16, legal ownership of weapons begins to emerge among the attackers. Some theft from relatives and parents continues in this age group up through 19. Beginning at age 18, legal ownership becomes predominant. However, in the case of the attackers at Columbine, the legality of the weapons purchased came into question. One was by straw purchase and the other by private purchase. In another case, an adult with a felony record for which he was disqualified from purchase constructed a semi-automatic rifle from parts he obtained. Some weapons utilized to commit crimes are stolen by third parties and then purchased by the criminal. It is noteworthy that the weapons used in the targeted school attacks did not fit this pattern.

Mental and behavioral health issues were difficult to precisely identify from the data available. However, in some specific cases where in-depth information was available,
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including the attack at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, mental and behavioral health issues were alleged to be present. The U.S. Secret Service in their studies on targeted school attacks notes that although the prevalence, nature, or role of mental disorder among perpetrators of targeted violence is not clearly understood, it is an important factor. The FBI notes that serious mental disorders, especially psychotic disorders elevate the relationship between an individual and the risk for violence in a small but significant number of events. The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) notes that violence is more common in people with serious mental illness. Importantly, the NIMH concludes that most acts of violence are not committed by those with serious mental illness and that most of the individuals with serious mental illness are not violent.

In the data gathered on the 46 targeted attacks for this report, only one individual was identified as legally “insane” during the trial. There was some evidence in the record to conclude that many of the attackers had been identified as individuals with mental or behavioral health issues of concern prior to the attack. Of those who attacked at the high school level, there was evidence of mental or behavioral health concerns more than half of the time. Information on “leakage,” the concept that an attacker would provide some indication that an attack would likely occur, was difficult to obtain for these cases. It is not uniformly reported. Some evidence of leakage was present in some cases. Past studies indicated leakage was frequent in targeted violence aimed at schools. The Secret Service noted that in 81 percent of the incidents they studied, at least one person had some type of knowledge about the attacker's plan. In 59 percent of the cases, more than one person had knowledge. Friends, acquaintances and classmates were more likely to have knowledge than family members. The time frame of disclosure ranged from a few hours before the attack to months or years prior. In addition to leakage, the Secret Service study noted that 93 percent of the time the attacker's behavior prior to the attack caused adults in contact with the attacker or fellow students to be concerned.

Each school attack was traumatizing irrespective of the outcome. The loss of one life or the wounding of one person is tragic. The data collected included all targeted attacks irrespective of the outcome. In 25 of the 46 attacks, no one was killed during the attack. Five or less persons were killed in 16 attacks. In five attacks, nine or more persons were
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killed. Among the five attacks with the most persons killed, the number of fatalities ranged from 9 to 26.

Some attacks, like the attack at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, had a large number killed and wounded. Other attacks like the Sandy Hook Elementary School, had a large number of persons killed but a small number of wounded. Attacks like the knife attack at a Pennsylvania high school had large numbers of wounded but no persons killed. Three attacks that started at the school resulted in no deaths or wounded. Potential attacks, which were stopped prior to beginning at the school and/or diverted, were not included in this data.

Attacks were stopped in multiple ways. In some instances, attacks were stopped by the attacker themselves without intervention from others or after unsuccessful intervention from others. In these cases, the attacker broke off the attack when they could have continued. The attackers that broke off an attack that they could have continued committed suicide, fled or waited passively for a responder. Other attacks were stopped by the intervention of one or more individuals that approached the attacker and stopped the attack. School personnel were most frequently involved in stopping attacks; school resource officers were less so. In addition, school administrators, teachers or staff members were sometimes among the first individuals killed. Civilians, unrelated to the school, stopped one attack. One attack was stopped by the attacker’s parents who had gone to the school worried that their son had stolen a weapon from the house. One attacker was killed by responding law enforcement that was on patrol at the location of the attack. Several attackers committed suicide in response to pressure from or during a firefight with law enforcement. One SRO was wounded when the attacker was contained and not allowed to further enter the school from inside a classroom where the attack started. Several attackers, including the attacker at Marjory Stoneman Douglas, surrendered to law enforcement after they fled. High school attacks were stopped 11 times by administrators, teachers and staff. School resource officers (SROs) intervened on site in eight attacks. Middle school attacks were stopped five times by school personnel or other civilians and one time by the SRO. Civilians intervened in two of the elementary school attacks, a nearby
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A firefighter intervened in one, and two elementary school attackers—at Sandy Hook and West Nichols Mines—committed suicide.

Other Commission Reports

The FBI and the Secret Service have each issued reports on school shootings and various commissions or study efforts were set up after several school attacks. The first commission was established after the attack at Columbine High School. Another major commission effort followed the Sandy Hook Elementary School attack. Each commission and study effort is different and based on the unique events that existed at the time of the attack.

Columbine Review Commission

The Columbine Review Commission completed their work in 2001, approximately two years after the event. The background for their efforts was an attack by two high school students that had crafted a detailed plan, manufactured multiple explosive devices, and obtained firearms. As a result, the two attackers were active in Columbine for 47 minutes, after which they committed suicide. It took over three hours to clear the building, and one teacher, injured by a shotgun blast, died when medical assistance did not arrive until the end of that time. It is important to note that at the time of the Columbine High School attack, the protocol for active shooter attacks was to contain the situation and wait for a sufficient law enforcement presence prior to entry.

The Commission specifically indicated they did not see school hardening as a priority. Six of the major recommendations included in the Columbine report are listed below.

- First responder active deployment instead of waiting; including training, equipping and interoperable communication to facilitate rapid deployment.

- Utilizing “incident command” and multi-agency preplanning a practice.

- Programs to prevent school violence including parental involvement, information sharing among agencies, leakage capture.
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- Implementing programs to develop a safe school culture including threat assessment teams and an anonymous tip telephone line.

- Information related to juveniles should be shared among law enforcement, courts, probation, schools, social services and mental health agencies.

- Train and equip SWAT members as EMTs for all victims and develop intranet system among hospitals to facilitate patient identification.

National Academies of Sciences

The National Academies of Sciences reviewed six K-12 targeted attacks that resulted in the death of 10 or less persons. They issued their report in 2002. Five of the recommendations from the Academies’ report are provided below.

- Programs aimed at peers’ reporting should be implemented because peers are the most likely source of information related to leakage and most likely to spot changes that occur immediately prior to future violence.

- Schools’ physical security should be improved.

- SROs are a key element in prevention and a clear channel for student safety concerns.

- Gun violence by youth involves weapons from home, and home security for weapons should be strengthened.

- A school safety culture dedicated to the safety of each person at each level that reduces overall violence, including bullying, is an important preventative factor.
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Oregon Task Force

The Oregon state legislature created and funded a task force that issued their foundational report on school shootings in 2014. The task force focused on state-level activities. The task force made four primary recommendations.

- A statewide tip line that can be contacted by text, call and WEB should be established and funded.
- A standardized two-level threat-assessment system that includes a multi-disciplinary, multi-agency team should be funded and required in each school.
- A statewide common database that includes school floor plans should be developed and accessible to planners and first responders.
- A statewide standard set of terminology with specific meaning for practitioners, planners and first responders should be developed and implemented (i.e. lockdown, lock out, shelter in place).

Sandy Hook Advisory Commission

The Sandy Hook Advisory Commission issued a final report approximately three years after the event. The Sandy Hook Advisory Commission issued a very detailed set of recommendations. They provided recommendations on safe school design and operations, gun violence reduction, and reform of the mental health system in extensive detail. In addition to those three areas, six general recommendations from the report are listed below.

- Schools should implement programs creating a safe school climate based on relationships among students and staff.
- State law should be changed to ensure that all law enforcement officers had jurisdiction that allowed them to respond as needed.
 CHAPTER 1. REVIEW OF K-12 ACTIVE ASSAILANT INCIDENTS

- Public agency dispatch centers should be integrated.
- The K-12 curriculum should include an alcohol awareness program.
- Schools should have threat-assessment systems.
- A multi-agency system of information sharing related to students should be developed.

Under the concept term “Safe School Design and Operation,” the Commission provided approximately 150 detailed and specific recommendations ranging in scope from general to particular (i.e. a designation of the order in which all interior doors in all schools should be numbered). Other examples include:

- Classroom and safe-haven areas that lock from the inside;
- Exterior doors capable of a full perimeter shutdown;
- Keys in the hands of substitute teachers;
- Up-to-date roster of all persons at the school;
- Safety and Security training for all administrators/teachers/staff;
- Classrooms and densely occupied spaces set in areas remote from school entry points; and
- An individual assigned to ensure all Safe School Design Standards are met.

Related to the regulation and control of firearms and ammunition, the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission provided wide-ranging and specific recommended changes, many of which would require state or federal legislation. Examples of the recommendations include:

- Increasing background check activities related to firearm purchase and ownership;
- Mandatory registration of firearms;
CHAPTER 1. REVIEW OF K-12 ACTIVE ASSAILANT INCIDENTS

- Limiting the type of firearm that can be privately owned as well as the type of magazine;
- Limitations on ammunition sales and ammunition types, and marking shell casings with specific serial numbers;
- Requiring improved storage standards; and
- Providing for the temporary removal of firearms from an individual based on a judge’s order.

The third area covered extensively by the Commission was community mental health. The Commission provided recommendations covering treatment as well as insurance and payment. Examples of the recommendations follow.

- Systems should be developed that provide holistic integrated mental/physical health care from cradle to grave.
- Providers should be incentivized to integrate physical and mental health services.
- Social-emotional learning should be included in K-12 curriculum.
- Reimbursement rates for mental health care should be increased.
- The definition of “care” should be expanded in insurance coverage.
- A third-party independent appeal system should be developed for denial-of-care determinations.

**Center for the Prevention of Violence**

In 2016, a report prepared by the University of Colorado and the University of Northern Colorado Center for the Prevention of Violence was issued. The report was funded by a private foundation created after the 2013 Arapahoe High School shooting and focused primarily on prevention and behavioral issues. Five of the major recommendations are listed below.
CHAPTER 1. REVIEW OF K-12 ACTIVE ASSAILANT INCIDENTS

- Implement programs including an annual survey aimed at building a safe school climate.
- Implement a “Safe2Tell” program that encourages threat reporting.
- Implement a valid threat-assessment process like V-STAG.
- Implement a validated risk-assessment process.
- Ensure that every threat assessed student has a trusting relationship with one adult.
CHAPTER 2. INCIDENT TIMELINE

The incident timeline was established through the following investigative sources: Broward County Sheriff's Office (BSO) criminal case file, surveillance video, BSO body-worn cameras (BWC)*1, cell phone videos, Coral Springs Police Department (CSPD) police reports, interviews by Florida Department of Law Enforcement – Office of Executive Investigations (FDLE-OEI), after-action reports, cell phone records, crime scene photos, school records/maps, interviews by Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission (MSD-PSC) investigators, BSO and CSPD 911 calls and radio traffic, school surveillance video, and Walmart and McDonald’s surveillance video.

A list of individuals referenced in this timeline and other parts of the report is provided in Appendix A.

1 The timestamp of each BWC varies depending on the frequency of each user docking their device. Investigators are presenting timestamps as accurately as possible after reconciling the differences between these various systems.
At **2:19 pm**, Nikolas Cruz was dropped off by an Uber on Pine Island Road east of Building 12. He was wearing a pair of black pants, a burgundy MSDHS JROTC shirt and a dark-colored ball-cap. He continued west toward Building 12 and during that time he was seen by Campus Monitor Andrew Medina (the details of Medina’s observations are more thoroughly documented in Chapter 3).
CHAPTER 2. INCIDENT TIMELINE

At **2:21:16**, Cruz entered the east hallway doors of Building 12. Students Ashley Baez, Luke Hoyer and Martin Duque entered the building immediately prior to Cruz’s entry.

Cruz made an immediate right turn into the east stairwell. At the base of the stairs, he loaded his semi-automatic rifle and put on a magazine-carrying vest (the vest did not have any anti-ballistic qualities). While Cruz was loading his firearm, student Chris McKenna happened upon Cruz in the east stairwell and saw Cruz with his gun. McKenna told investigators that Cruz said to him “you better get out of here, something bad is about to happen...he told me to run.” McKenna fled out of the east stairwell door of Building 12.

At approximately **2:21:33**, Cruz exited the stairwell and immediately raised the rifle to a firing position, but the rifle did not fire. Cruz lowered the rifle and looked down at it briefly as if inspecting a malfunction or to disengage the safety. He again raised the rifle to a firing position.

At **2:21:38**, Cruz fired the first rounds to the west of the first-floor hallway. Ashley Baez (non-fatal), Martin Duque (fatal), Luke Hoyer (fatal) and Gina Montalto (fatal) were all shot in the hallway. Only Ashley Baez survived her injuries.

Gina Montalto was sitting in the alcove of her classroom, 1215. Luke Hoyer and Martin Duque were standing just outside of that same door, apparently returning to class. Ashley Baez was walking west in the hall and approaching the alcove of the women’s restroom. After the shots, she ran into the alcove of the women’s restroom. Percussion from the gunshots caused dust to fall from the drop-ceiling tiles, which activated the campus fire alarms within a matter of seconds.

At **2:21:40**, after shooting toward Ashley Baez, Cruz turned his rifle toward classroom 1216. It is important to note that Cruz never entered a single classroom in Building 12 and only shot those people in his line of sight in a classroom or hallway. All gunshots were fired into classrooms through the classroom door or the window within the classroom door.

Cruz fired into classroom 1216 on two occasions and between those two instances there were eight victims. Of the eight victims, three were fatalities: Alyssa Alhadeff, Alaina Petty and Alex Schachter. The five wounded victims were William Olson, Genesis Valentin, Justin
CHAPTER 2. INCIDENT TIMELINE

Colton, Alexander Dworet and Kheshava Managapuram. The speed with which this attack happened prevented some students from even having a chance to respond, and at least one student was struck while seated at his desk.

At 2:21:41, Cruz lowered the rifle again. Simultaneously, Ashley Baez ran from the alcove of the women’s restroom. She ran across the hall (south) and into classroom 1210. Baez hid in the classroom with other students and the teacher until she would later be rescued by law enforcement. She suffered a severe, but non-fatal, wound to her left thigh.

After Cruz lowered the rifle, he took a knee in the hall outside of the alcove of classroom 1216. He removed a knit ski-mask and camouflage shirt from the bag and placed these items on the ground, but he never put them on.

From approximately 2:21:48 to 2:22:10, Cruz’s movements were not recorded due to dust affecting the motion-sensor cameras.

At 2:22:13, Cruz was again standing and raised the rifle to a firing position as he was in front of the doors to classrooms 1214 and 1215. Cell phone video from within classroom 1215 recorded sounds of the gunfire and reaction by the students. There were six victims within classroom 1214. The two fatalities from this classroom were Nicholas Dworet and Helena Ramsay. The persons who suffered non-fatal injuries were Isabel Chequer, Samantha Fuentes, Samantha Grady and Daniela Menescal.

Simultaneous to Cruz firing those rounds, the first phone 911 call was received by the Coral Springs Communications Center. The call came from someone inside Building 12.

At approximately 2:22:32, Cruz left the area in front of classrooms 1214 and 1215. During the time Cruz spent in front of classrooms 1214 and 1215, the first 911 call was made (2:22:13) and Deputy Scot Peterson and Security Specialist Kelvin Greenleaf met outside of Building 1 (2:22:14).

From 2:22:33 to 2:22:43, there was a lapse in footage of Cruz’s movements due to dust in affecting the motion-sensor cameras.
CHAPTER 2. INCIDENT TIMELINE

At **2:22:39**, the fire alarms became active within Building 12 and at various locations on campus. Cell phone video from classroom 1213 recorded the activation of the fire alarm and gunshots being fired into neighboring classroom 1216. Cell phone video from classroom 1255 (third floor) captured the very faint sound of gunshots. In response, students joked in a seemingly nervous manner and questioned what the noise was. As the fire alarms activated, students in 1255 screamed in panic.

At **2:22:42**, over 20 students began to sprint from classroom 1250 (third floor) toward the west stairwell. The speed with which they ran and their body language indicates they knew this was not a routine fire drill. Simultaneously, Assistant Principal Winfred Porter moved quickly within Building 1 toward the fire alarm panel in the office of Deputy Peterson.

At **2:22:43**, Cruz was standing immediately outside of the door to classroom 1216 with his rifle raised in a firing position. This was the second time that Cruz fired into classroom 1216.

At **2:22:47**, several students on the second floor ran in a panic into classrooms.

At **2:22:48**, Campus Monitor Chris Hixon opened the double doors to the west end of the first-floor hall in Building 12 and quickly ran east down the hall. Simultaneously, Cruz exited the alcove to classrooms 1216 and 1217 and turned west in the direction of Hixon. Cruz raised his rifle and shot Chris Hixon; causing him to fall to the ground almost immediately. Cruz briefly stood in front of the doors to classrooms 1214 and 1215. During that time, Hixon quickly crawled across the hall and concealed himself behind a wall.

At **2:22:52**, students who were running down the west stairs from the third floor turned around and ran back up toward the third floor. This was the group of students who fled classroom 1250 at **2:22:42**. The time at which they turned around on the stairs coincides with the time at which Cruz shot Chris Hixon. As those students returned to the third-floor hall, they encountered other students who were calmly evacuating from their classrooms in a manner consistent with a fire drill.
By 2:22:57, all students who were on the second-floor hall concealed themselves into classrooms leaving the second-floor hallway empty. No individuals were shot on the second floor. This is also the time at which the fire alarms shut off.

At 2:23:05, Cruz entered the alcove for classrooms 1212 and 1213, where he fired additional rounds. Classroom 1213 had four victims. Of the four victims, Carmen Schentrup was the only fatality. Samantha Mayor, Madeleine Wilford and Ben Wikander all suffered non-fatal injuries. During this time, a large crowd of students was forming in the hall of the third floor and, for the most part, they were casually walking toward the stairs.

At 2:23:14, Cruz exited the alcove for classrooms 1212 and 1213. He continued walking west through the first-floor hall. By this time, well over 100 students were in the east end of the third-floor hall with no indication that a shooter was present in the building. Many students were smiling and apparently engaged in casual conversation because no Code Red was called.

At 2:23:17, Deputy Peterson arrived at the east side of Building 12 as Cruz was approaching the west end of the first-floor.

At 2:23:19, Cruz began to run west through the first-floor hall as Deputy Peterson, Security Specialist Kelvin Greenleaf and Campus Monitor Andrew Medina had just arrived on the east side of Building 12. Chris Hixon was lying on the ground behind a wall in the west end of the first floor.

At 2:23:22, Cruz passed Chris Hixon and shot him additional times. At the same time, students at the top of the east stairwell looked down the stairwell and appeared hesitant to continue downstairs.

At approximately 2:23:25, Campus Monitor Aaron Feis opened the exterior door of the west stairwell on the first floor. Simultaneously, Cruz opened one of the interior doors to that same stairwell so that he was immediately facing Aaron Feis. Cruz immediately raised the rifle and shot Aaron Feis. Coach Feis was fatally wounded and was later found lying on the ground just outside of the same door he had opened. Cruz continued up the west
stairwell to the second floor as Deputy Peterson was making the first radio transmissions (2:23:26) about “possible shots fired.”

A large crowd of students remained on the third-floor landing of the east stairs. Many students were looking down the stairwell and a small number of them continued down the stairs. The east end of the third floor was packed with students, shoulder-to-shoulder, slowly moving toward the east stairwell. There was obvious confusion among these students on the third floor.

At 2:23:30, teacher Ernest Rospierski stopped a group of students who were casually moving toward the west stairwell on the third floor. He turned them around so that they were moving east.

At 2:23:36, Cruz entered the west end of the second-floor hall. He raised his rifle to a firing position, but the hall was empty and he did not fire any rounds at that time. Cruz later shot six rounds into classrooms on the second floor; however no one was hit or injured by these rounds. Cruz continued east in the second-floor hall. It is reported by students who were on the second floor that Cruz made statements to the effect of “no one is here” as he moved down the second-floor hallway.

At 2:23:40, the east end of the third floor was still packed with students. Some students turned back toward the west, traveling against the crowd, but still with no sense of urgency.
At 2:23:43, as Cruz continued past the doors to classrooms 1229 and 1230, he quickly peered in through the windows looking for targets. He saw no targets and continued east through the second-floor hall. These classrooms were occupied but because the second floor treated the incident as an active assailant response, as opposed to a fire evacuation like the third-floor students (above photo), students in the second-floor classrooms were not in Cruz’s line of sight to be shot.

While Cruz was shooting, Deputy Peterson and Security Specialist Greenleaf fled south from the east side of Building 12 toward stairs near the northeast corner of Building 7.

At 2:23:48, Cruz reached the alcove for classrooms 1231 and 1232 (still on the second floor). Deputy Peterson had reached the location near the northeast corner of Building 7 where he would remain for approximately the next 48 minutes. Teacher Ernest Rospierski was standing alone on the third floor landing of the west stairwell looking down the stairs.

At 2:23:51, Cruz fired rounds into classroom 1231 – again, no one was injured or killed by these rounds. This caused an immediate reaction in Mr. Rospierski in the west stairwell, students who had been gathered near the top of the east stairwell and the mass of students in the east end of the third floor. Rospierski quickly went back into the west end of the
third floor as students on the east end turned and began to flee west. Cruz left the alcove for classrooms 1231 and 1232 and continued east on the second floor.

At 2:23:55, Cruz reached the door to classroom 1233, and within seconds, he moved next door to classroom 1234. Cruz fired rounds through the door of classroom 1234, which was occupied. These rounds struck the exterior window on the south side of Building 12. This window was immediately northwest (70 feet) of Deputy Peterson’s location. Simultaneously, students were running up the east stairwell to the third floor and students on the third floor were beginning to return to classrooms.

At 2:23:58, as Cruz was firing into classroom 1234, students were running in a panic west on the third floor toward Mr. Rospierski. He calmly raised his hand to direct them into classrooms. Some students attempted to enter Mr. Rospierski’s classroom, but were unable because the doors automatically locked behind them as they left class.

At 2:24:10, Cruz reached the alcove for classrooms 1235 and 1236. By this point, the east and west ends of the third floor were mostly empty, but a large crowd of students remained in the middle of the third-floor hall.

At 2:24:17, Cruz entered the east stairwell and scanned the stairwell looking for additional targets. Rospierski remained with students outside of his classroom attempting to locate his keys as students were moving into other classrooms.

At 2:24:30, Cruz entered the east end of the third-floor hall where approximately twenty people still remained in the hall.

At 2:24:32, Cruz fired west down the third-floor hall. During the multiple volleys of rounds fired in the third-floor hall, Cruz shot ten people. Of the ten victims, six were fatalities: Scott Beigel (teacher), Jaime Guttenberg, Cara Loughran, Joaquin Oliver, Meadow Pollack and Peter Wang. Four persons suffered non-fatal injuries: Anthony Borges, Marian Kabachenko, Kyle Laman and Stacey Lippel (teacher). Mr. Beigel and Ms. Lippel were at their respective classroom doors holding them open for students as they were shot.
Once Cruz began shooting, Rospierski and approximately nine students ducked into the alcove of his classroom. Joaquin Oliver and Meadow Pollack darted into the alcove of the women’s restroom. Kyle Laman ran into the alcove of the men’s restroom. Joaquin Oliver and Meadow Pollack then quickly exited the alcove of the locked women’s restroom. Pollack ran across the hall to join Rospierski and the other students in the alcove of his classroom doors. Oliver ran to the alcove of the locked men’s restroom, after apparently seeing there was limited room in the alcove of Rospierski’s classroom. The door to the third-floor restrooms had been locked due to ongoing issues with students vaping in the bathroom.

At 2:24:45, Cruz turned around and began to walk east in the third-floor hall while retrieving a magazine from his vest. Rospierski peeked from the alcove of his classroom door and then quickly moved into the neighboring alcove (classroom 1250). Rospierski found the door to that classroom to be locked as well.

At 2:24:50, Cruz turned back around to the west while inserting a new magazine into his rifle. Simultaneously, Rospierski ran from the alcove of classroom 1250 to the west and directed 10 students to flee with him toward the west stairwell. Meadow Pollack had been shot and was lying on the ground and Cara Loughran remained in the alcove, which was out of view of the camera.

At 2:24:54, Campus Monitor Elliott Bonner called the first verifiable Code Red. Radio transmissions by other campus monitors caused Campus Monitor Elliot Bonner to come to Building 12. After seeing Aaron Feis on the ground outside the building and hearing gunshots, he called the Code Red over the school radio system.

At 2:24:58, Cruz raised the rifle to the west and began firing toward the group of students fleeing with Rospierski. Jaime Guttenberg and Peter Wang were shot within feet of reaching the west stairwell. Eight of the ten students who fled with Rospierski made it down the west stairwell. Rospierski remained on the third-floor landing with Jaime Guttenberg who was lying on the ground.
CHAPTER 2. INCIDENT TIMELINE

At **2:25:12**, Cruz reached the alcove for Rospierski’s classroom (1249). He raised the rifle and again shot Meadow Pollack and Cara Loughran.

At **2:25:20**, Cruz entered the alcove to the men’s restroom where Joaquin Oliver had hidden. Cruz raised the rifle and again shot Joaquin Oliver.

At **2:25:26**, Cruz fired additional rounds to the west. Several rounds struck the windows at the west end of the hall.

At **2:25:30**, Cruz reached the door to the west stairwell and unsuccessfully attempted to open the door as Rospierski was concealed behind it.

At **2:25:35**, Cruz left the west stairwell and moved on toward the teacher’s lounge. There were no surveillance cameras in the teacher’s lounge, which was located in the northwest corner of Building 12. While inside that room, Cruz attempted to shoot out the windows on the south and west sides of the room in an attempt to set up a sniper position to target additional victims.

At **2:26:24**, Sergeant B. Reid (CSPD) asked dispatch if there was an active shooter. Dispatch confirmed there was an active shooter at MSDHS.

At **2:26:54**, Officer T. Burton (CSPD) broadcasted over the radio that he had arrived at MSDHS.

From **2:27:03** to **2:27:10**, the body camera of Deputy J. Stambaugh (BSO) captured the sounds of Cruz’s last gunshots. At that point, there were eight BSO deputies on or in the immediate area of campus. In their interviews each of these deputies said heard they gunshots: Sergeant B. Miller, Deputy S. Peterson, Deputy E. Eason, Deputy M. Kratz, Deputy J. Stambaugh, Deputy R. Seward, Deputy A. Perry and Detective B. Goolsby. None of these BSO deputies immediately responded to the gunshots by entering the campus and seeking out the shooter.

At **2:27:10**, Cruz fired the last gunshot.
CHAPTER 2. INCIDENT TIMELINE

At 2:27:12, Rospierski fled the third-floor landing of the west stairwell. He ran down the second floor and took cover behind a locked door until he was evacuated by law enforcement.

At 2:27:35, Cruz entered the west stairwell on the third floor. He placed his rifle vest and 180 live rounds on the ground and ran down the stairs.

At 2:27:54, Cruz exited the west end of Building 12 and fled west between Buildings 6 and 13. Upon reaching the northwest corner of Building 6, he turned left (south), ran south to the southwest corner of Building 9 and continued running southwest toward the group of fleeing students.

At 2:28:00, Deputy Peterson told BSO deputies to stay at least 500 feet away from Building 12.

At 2:29:16, Officer Burton transmitted that Cruz was “...last seen in the three-story building, north parking lot.”

At 2:29:35, Captain J. Jordan and Lieutenant M. DeVita entered Building 1, the administration building.

At 2:29:47, Cruz joined in with a large group of students who were fleeing west toward Westglades Middle School.

At 2:32:42, the first responding law enforcement officers entered Building 12 through the west doors. These were four officers with CSPD, and there were BSO deputies just outside the door.

At 2:37:18, Captain Jordan exited Building 1. She ran to meet with Sergeant I. Sklar (BSO) in the parking lot in front of Building 8. Captain Jordan attempted to use both of his radios but neither of them were working properly.

2:40:00 is the estimated time at which Captain Jordan and Sergeant I. Sklar arrived on Holmberg Road near the west entrance to the student parking lot.

At 2:40:16, the first mass evacuation of students began.
At **2:41:55**, Sergeant Rossman engaged Assistant Principal Porter and Campus Monitor Medina about their observations and the school camera system.

At **2:48:33**, all first-floor classrooms and the office had been searched by law enforcement.

At **2:48:47**, Cruz walked through the Walmart parking lot located at 6001 Coral Ridge Drive, Coral Springs (captured on surveillance video).

At **2:50:40**, Sergeant Rossman (BSO) and Officer Best (CSPD) transmitted over their respective radios that Cruz was last seen on the second floor.

At **2:51:00**, Cruz entered the Subway inside of Walmart where he ordered a drink.

At **2:52:39**, a group of law enforcement officers led by Sergeant T. Garcia (BSO-SWAT) reached the second-floor landing on the west side of Building 12 still believing that Cruz was in the building.

At **2:53:40**, Cruz exited the Walmart.

At **2:54:32**, Sergeant Rossman (BSO) broadcasted that Cruz moved from the third floor to the second floor as if that was occurring in real time. Shortly thereafter, Captain Mock (CSPD) broadcasted the same information over the CSPD radio.

At **2:55:02**, Sergeant Rossman was first notified by Assistant Principal Porter that the information he was receiving from the camera room via the school radio was not live. Rossman would not broadcast that information over the BSO radio for approximately another seven minutes.

At **2:59:59**, Captain S. Robson (BSO-SWAT) arrived north of Building 13 where he met with Captain Jordan.

At **3:00:22**, Captain R. Gallagher (CSPD) broadcasted over the CSPD radio channel that the video was on a delay.

At **3:01:03**, Cruz entered the McDonald’s located at 5741 Coral Ridge Drive, Coral Springs. Within seconds Cruz sat at a table with John Wilford. Unbeknownst to both Cruz and
CHAPTER 2. INCIDENT TIMELINE

Wilford, Wilford’s sister Madeleine had been shot by Cruz and suffered serious but non-fatal injuries.

At 3:02:09, Cruz exited McDonald’s and continued walking south.

At 3:02:20, Sergeant Rossman (BSO) broadcasted over the BSO radio channel that the school surveillance video is on a delay and that Cruz fled Building 12 approximately 20 minutes earlier.

By 3:03:00, 15 victims had been removed from the first floor. 13 of those 15 victims survived their injuries.

At 3:03:22, all second-floor classrooms had been checked by law enforcement.

At 3:07:15, the last surviving victim to be removed by first responders, Anthony Borges, was carried down the stairs from the third floor by law enforcement and SWAT medics. All other surviving victims suffered minor injuries and self-evacuated at the direction of law enforcement.

At 3:08:24, all classroom doors in Building 12 had been checked by law enforcement.

At 3:09:40, law enforcement had gained control of all hallways and stairwells in Building 12.

3:11:20 is the first time at which Deputy Peterson left his position near the northeast corner of Building 7. He arrived there approximately 48 minutes earlier at 2:23:48.

At 3:16:44, Colonel J. Polan (BSO) arrived at the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and took over as the incident commander. The TOC was located in the student parking lot north of Building 13.

By 3:17:45, all classrooms in Building 12 had been accessed by law enforcement.

At 3:17:53, the BSO mobile command center arrived on Pine Island Road near the southeast corner of campus.
CHAPTER 2. INCIDENT TIMELINE

At **3:21:01**, Captain Mock transmitted that he was with BSO and their command staff. This was the first indication that CSPD command staff and the BSO Incident Commander(s) were in direct communication.

At approximately **3:37:45**, Cruz was detained by Officer M. Leonard of the Coconut Creek Police Department approximately two miles southwest of the MSD campus.
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (MSDHS) is located at 5901 Pine Island Rd in Parkland, FL 33076. The school is part of the Broward County Public Schools system (BCPS), which is the sixth-largest school district in the nation and the second-largest in the state of Florida. According to census data from 2017, Broward County’s estimated population was 1.9 million people. The Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in which it lies—Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach—is the 8th largest MSA in the United States with a population of 6.1 million people. The population of Parkland is estimated to be approximately 32,000.

MSDHS opened for students in 1990 to meet the growing population of the incorporated cities of Parkland and Coral Springs. Buildings 12 and 13 were added in 2009 to alleviate overcrowding of the original campus.

The campus sits on 45 acres of land, and there are approximately 14 buildings, which include student classrooms, storage buildings and administration offices. The west end of the campus houses a football field, baseball/softball fields and tennis and basketball courts. Three student parking lots are located at the northeast corner of the property. A visitor parking lot is located on the east side of the campus, and two staff parking lots are on the south side of the campus.

Figure 4. Aerial Photo of Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
CHAPTER 3. MARJORY STONE MAN DOUGLAS HIGH SCHOOL OVERVIEW, SECURITY AND STAFF RESPONSE TO THE SHOOTING

The main entrance of the school is located on the east end of the campus and includes separate visitor and student entrances. Regular school hours are 7:40 a.m. to 2:40 p.m.

On February 14, 2018, 3,090 of the 3,318 enrolled students and approximately 210 staff members were present. Principal Ty Thompson, who has been principal for 6 years and assistant principal for 12 years prior to his promotion, was not on campus the day of the shooting. Assistant Principal Denise Reed was in command. There were four additional assistant principals on campus the day of the shooting: Winfred Porter, Jeff Morford, Ivette Figueroa and Maximo Rosario. School security staff consisted of School Resource Officer Scot Peterson, School Security Specialist Kevin Greenleaf and seven school Campus Monitors: Aaron Feis, Chris Hixon, Andrew Medina, David Taylor, Elliott Bonner, Anna Ramos and Brian Staubly.

3.1 Physical Security

*Campus Physical Security*

The school’s main visitor entrance allows direct access into the administration building through a receptionist and waiting area. Visitors enter directly into the administration building through a single metal door with a glass pane. This visitor entrance is on the east side of Building 1 near the northern side of the building. The main student entrance is on the east side of the school between Buildings 1 and 8. The entrance consists of a 10-foot-tall metal gate with three double-door entries. These doors regularly remain closed, but unlocked and unstaffed. The campus is completely surrounded by a six-foot-tall chain-link perimeter fence. The fence is not anchored at the base and there are no additional security features along the top of the fence. The parking lot entrances are secured by chain-link swinging gates.
On February 14, 2018, the parking lot gates were opened at 5:30 a.m. by maintenance to allow for student and staff parking, school bus and ESE student drop off. The gates were not staffed from 5:30 a.m. until approximately 8:00 a.m. when they were re-secured by campus monitors following the start of school. Throughout the day, the parking lot gates were opened for students who needed to leave campus early. A similar process occurred in the afternoon to prepare for student release at 2:40 p.m. Parking lot gates were opened by campus monitors at approximately 2:15 p.m and left unattended.

There are six pedestrian gates at the east end of the campus and three pedestrian gates at the west end of the school. The pedestrian gates at the west end of the campus remained locked at all times according to the maintenance supervisor; however, the pedestrian gates on the east side of the campus were opened and closed in the same manner as the parking lot gates. Once opened, the pedestrian gates were not staffed.
**CHAPTER 3. MARJORY STONEMAN DOUGLAS HIGH SCHOOL OVERVIEW, SECURITY AND STAFF RESPONSE TO THE SHOOTING**

**Findings:**

1. Cruz arrived at MSDHS on February 14, 2018 at approximately 2:19 p.m. in an Uber that dropped him off on Pine Island Road to the east of the Building 12. Cruz entered the MSDHS campus through an open and unstaffed pedestrian gate that had been opened by Campus Monitor Andrew Medina for afternoon dismissal. Cruz exploited this open and unstaffed gate, and it is what allowed him initial access to the campus. This open and unstaffed gate was a security failure.

2. Unlocked and opened gates were regularly left unstaffed for long periods of time on the MSDHS campus. School administrators cited a lack of personnel as the explanation for the unstaffed and open gates. This explanation is unacceptable, as leaving open perimeter gates unstaffed is a breach of effective security protocols.

3. The overall lack of uniform and mandated physical site security requirements resulted in voids that allowed Cruz initial access to MSDHS and is a system failure.

**Building 12 Physical Security and Warning Systems**

Building 12 is a three-story building on the north side of campus that opened for students in 2009. There are 30 classrooms, plus teacher-planning and break rooms on the west end of each floor. Building 12 had a capacity of approximately 900 students and 30 teachers. At the time of the shooting, there were approximately 800 people present in the building.
Building 12 has metal entrance/exit doors on the east and west sides that lead into the first-floor hallway. Stairwells on the east and west side of the building allow access to the first, second and third floors of the building. Each stairwell has a single-door access on the first floor that allows access directly into the stairwell from outside. Male and female bathrooms are located near the west end of each level.
As opposed to the original structures on campus that are made of concrete block, the newer buildings, including Building 12, have interior walls constructed of drywall. The classroom doors are made of metal with an 8-inch-wide pane of glass in the doors. The doors on the older construction buildings are also metal with a 5-inch-wide glass pane.

The first-floor doors on the east and west sides of Building 12 remained unlocked throughout the day and were unlocked at the time of the shooting. The amount of foot traffic utilizing that building throughout the day was cited as to why the doors were not kept locked. Andrew Medina said that around December 2017 he suggested to Greenleaf or Porter that one of the Building 12 entrances be locked so that all of the foot traffic could be monitored going in and out of the building, but the suggestion was not implemented.

The bathrooms on the first and third floor of Building 12 were locked on the day of the shooting. Administration made the decision to lock the bathrooms to combat a “vaping” problem occurring inside the bathrooms. Students needing to use the bathroom while in Building 12 were instructed to go to the second-floor bathrooms where a campus monitor was located to monitor traffic in and out.
Individual classroom door locks could only be locked from outside the door. The teacher would have to exit their classroom and use a key to lock the door. There was no way to lock the door from within the classroom. A quarter turn of the key would allow the door to be opened, but still remain locked after closing the door. A full turn of the key would unlock the door and kept the door unlocked after closing. A full turn in the opposite direction would then relock the door and allow for the door to remain locked after closing.

Building 12’s fire alarm system was installed by Bass United Fire and Security Systems. Although Building 12 was constructed at a later date, the system was fully integrated with the rest of the buildings on campus. The main control panel for the fire system is located inside of the school resource officer’s office, which is housed inside Building 1. The detectors inside Building 12 are placed 30 feet apart in the hallways on all floors and are linked by refracted or reflected beams of light.

Dozens of exterior cameras covered the school’s 12 buildings and 45-acre campus on February 14, 2018. These external cameras did not capture Cruz’s arrival on campus as he walked across the parking lot to the Building 12, but they recorded the path Cruz took after the shooting while fleeing. Thirteen cameras were located within Building 12—three on each floor at the east and west ends of the hall, and two located in each stairwell. There are
no cameras located inside of the classrooms in Building 12. A camera located in the east stairwell of Building 12 captured Cruz entering the building and preparing his weapon. It also captured a brief exchange Cruz had with a student before the shooting began. Cruz was then seen leaving the stairwell and entering the first-floor hallway, where he immediately began shooting victims. Recordings from the various cameras show Cruz as he moved down the hallways and fired into classrooms and at victims in the hall, and as he moved up and down the stairwells. Due to the surveillance system being motion-activated, there was a several-minute gap in recording between the time Cruz entered and exited the teacher's lounge on the third floor as there was no movement in the third-floor hallway and no cameras were located within the lounge.

Each classroom is equipped with a landline telephone and a public address system (PA) system. The PA system is activated by flipping a switch affixed to the wall and provides two-way communications. There are no speakers for the PA system in the common areas or hallways.

Each classroom in Building 12 was set up differently according to teacher preference. Broward County Public Schools does not have a specific policy related to classroom set-up. The district states they allow teachers to set up their classrooms as they see fit to provide educational instruction and inspire learning as long as they do so in a safe manner and provide clear paths of egress in an emergency. The only legal requirements for classrooms set-up references the Florida Fire Prevention Code/Life Safety code, which states that means of egress shall be continuously maintained, free of all obstructions or impediments in the case of fire or other emergency.

In regard to school safety and security, a safe zone or hard corner is an area of the classroom that cannot be seen by someone looking through a window(s). It does not mean the area is reinforced with any protective materials or barriers. The fire code does not prohibit or reference safe zones/hard corners. On February 14, two of the 30 classrooms in Building 12 had defined hard corners where teachers had placed tape on the ground to identify the safe areas. There were also multiple classrooms with obstructions in the hard corners, such as student and teacher desks, bookshelves and audio/video equipment. The
two classrooms with identified hard corners were obstructed with unmovable objects that prevented the denoted hard corners from being effective.

Findings:

1. Cruz entered Building 12 through the east unlocked door. This unlocked and unstaffed door allowed Cruz access to Building 12 and is a security failure.

2. All of the classroom doors in Building 12 could only be locked from the exterior. Teachers inconsistently locked classroom doors and some doors were unlocked the day of the shooting. Teachers were reluctant to enter the halls to lock the doors. The lack of an established policy on the locking and/or staffing of doors and gates on campus is a security failure.

3. School administrators’ decision to lock the first- and third-floor bathroom doors prevented students, including Ashley Baez, Meadow Pollack and Joaquin Oliver, from entering the bathroom as a place of safety to avoid being shot.

4. The fire alarm activated because a beam of light was disrupted by the muzzle flash, smoke from the gun and/or dust created by the ceiling tiles moving from the percussion of the gunshots. No pull stations were triggered or pulled anywhere on campus.

5. The fire alarm in Building 12 triggered the alarm throughout campus. The fire alarm system at MSDHS was immediately activated with no delay, which is not a preferred practice. Exterior video cameras were inadequate to cover the exterior of Building 12 and other areas of the Stoneman Douglas campus.

6. Most school personnel were inadequately trained in how to operate the MSDHS camera system. This lack of familiarity and training adversely affected law enforcement response.

7. The school district does not allow law enforcement live, real-time remote or independent access to school campus video systems. Law enforcements’ inability to independently live view the cameras hindered the law enforcement response and caused safety issues because they were unable to determine if Cruz was still in the building. This delay also hindered victim rescue and medical response.
8. There were no PA system speakers in the school building hallways and exterior areas, which prevented effective use of the school’s intercom and/or PA system to communicate the Code Red and provide directions to students and staff. The lack of an effective communication system prevents building occupants from effecting an active assailant response and moving to a place of safety; this is a breach of effective school safety best practices.

9. The fire alarm caused confusion among students and staff in Building 12. Some treated the event as a fire alarm (evacuation) and some treated it as an active shooter situation (hiding in place). As set forth in section 3.2, the lack of a called Code Red contributed to students and staff not treating this incident as an active shooter event and that put students and staff at risk because they used evacuation protocols, not active assailant response protocols.

10. The glass windows in the classroom doors allowed Cruz line-of-sight access to target his victims, and there were no pre-designated window coverings for teachers to quickly cover their classroom door windows.

11. Only two of the 30 classrooms in the Building 12 had marked hard corners. To the extent that students attempted to hide in the classrooms’ hard corners they were mostly inaccessible due to teachers’ desks and other furniture occupying the space. There was inadequate space in many classrooms’ hard corners, and some students were squeezed out of the hard corners. Because classrooms lacked effective hard corners and/or students were not directed to hard corners, some students were forced to seek cover in an area visible to Cruz. Cruz only shot people within his line of sight, and he never entered any classroom. Some students were shot and killed in classrooms with obstructed and inaccessible hard corners as they remained in Cruz’s line of sight from outside the classroom. The District’s failure to mandate and implement hard corners or safe areas in every classroom was a safety breach that contributed to students being shot.

12. Some teachers said that although they could use the intercom or PA to contact the front office, they did not want to risk harm by making their way to the
CHAPTER 3. MARJORY STONEMAN DOUGLAS HIGH SCHOOL OVERVIEW, SECURITY AND STAFF RESPONSE TO THE SHOOTING

button. The classrooms lacked effective two-way communication systems (very few school personnel had school-issued radios).

13. Some bullets traveled through the penetrable parts of the structure. Had Cruz intentionally shot through these materials, the amount of casualties could have been greater. The use of non-impenetrable construction materials is safety vulnerability.

14. The storm-resistant glass on the third-floor teacher’s lounge mitigated the number of people shot because the rounds fragmented and prevented Cruz from effecting his sniper position. Despite trying to shoot from his sniper position, Cruz had 180 rounds of ammunition left when he abandoned his gun and fled the school.

3.2 BCPS and MSDHS Active Assailant Response Policies and Training

On February 14, 2018, Broward County Public Schools and Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School did not have an established active assailant response policy. There were no written and trained-on policies regarding Code Red and lockdown procedures.

There were two documents available to school staff related to school safety. The “Emergency Preparedness Manual” was a 151-page document available on the district’s website. The manual outlined emergency procedures for various incidents such as: medical and weather emergencies; air-quality alerts; bees, wasps and hornets; chemical spills; elevator emergencies; fire emergencies; flooding; mail-handling guidelines; lightning alerts; tornado emergencies; and utility failures. The “School Safety Plan” contained generic information relating specifically to MSDHS. Each school in the district had a similar document with information pertaining to the specific school. Neither document included information related to active shooter or assailant procedures or protocol.

Each school in the district is required to have a Safe Team. The Team is comprised of the principal, assistant principals, security specialist, campus monitors, facility maintenance staff, SROs and teacher representatives. The MSDHS Safe Team would occasionally meet following a fire drill to debrief and discuss school safety concerns.
The only training MSDHS staff had on active assailant response procedures occurred on January 11, 2018. Detective Al Butler of the Broward County Schools Special Investigations Unit conducted emergency code training at MSDHS. Broward County Schools utilizes a seven-colored emergency code system. Each color is associated with a suggested course of action in each instance (e.g., code black is a bomb threat, code blue is a medical emergency).

Administration, teachers, maintenance and support staff all attended the training by Detective Butler. A portion of the training focused on discussing the various color codes and what to do in each instance.

In an interview with Detective J. Curcio (BSO), Detective Butler stated that he was not aware of his PowerPoint presentation or any other documents addressing the establishment or identification of hard corners. Despite the PowerPoint presentation not including direction to establish hard corners, MSD-PSC investigators learned from Detective Butler and teachers that his training included an open discussion on what to do during a Code Red. Teachers said that Butler provided them with basic training on how to respond to a Code Red, which included: keep the doors locked at all times, shut off all lights, cover door windows, move the students to a hard corner of the classroom and remain quiet.

On December 15, 2017, prior to the training Assistant Principal Porter met with Steven Wexler, a retired Secret Service Agent, who had regularly served as a guest speaker at the school and developed a positive rapport with students and staff. Assistant Principal Porter met with Wexler to discuss campus security and solicit feedback. Porter and Wexler conducted a drive-through of the campus, and Wexler noted that the open and unattended gates should be locked at all times. He also noted that the potential existed for someone to position themselves on the Sawgrass Expressway and shoot at evacuating students and staff. Wexler assessed the rest of campus and placed notes on doors denoting potential vulnerabilities. The school implemented some of Wexler’s recommendations to varying degrees, such as training on existing emergency codes, locking exterior gates that were not being staffed when open, providing substitutes with identification badges while on campus, assigning a campus monitor in front of the school. Medina was later assigned this role.
Findings:

1. The lack of a called Code Red on February 14, 2018—because there was no policy, little training and no drills—left students and staff vulnerable to being shot, and some were shot because they were not notified to lockdown. This was most evident on the third floor of Building 12.

2. The lack of a formal Code Red or similar active assailant response policy and training in the Broward County Public Schools led to school personnel not knowing or clearly understanding the criteria for calling a Code Red, who could call it or when it could be called.

3. The District did not have and still does not have a formal, written and disseminated Code Red policy.

4. Even after the hour-long emergency code training with Al Butler in January 2018, teachers and MSDHS staff were still unsure as to the correct procedure required to call a Code Red and who could call a Code Red. As recently as late fall of 2018 during interviews of current MSDHS teachers and other staff, they indicated they are still unclear as to who can call a Code Red and under what circumstances.

5. There were no Code Red drills at MSDHS in the year preceding the shooting.

6. Multiple teachers stated that Butler’s training in January 2018 was useful because they did not have any prior Code Red training. After the training, administrators and campus monitors found most of the teachers locked their classroom doors. However, administrators and campus monitors did continue to find some doors around the campus unlocked and even propped open. These teachers were reminded to keep the doors shut and locked.

7. All teachers in Building 12 who sheltered in place did so because the first thing they heard was gunfire, not because they were notified of an active shooter on campus. This was especially true on the second floor.

8. All teachers in Building 12 who evacuated their classrooms did so because the first thing they heard was the fire alarm and had not been notified of a Code Red.
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9. Not one teacher in Building 12 stated that they heard the Code Red being called over the PA. The teachers reacted to the sound of gunfire or the fire alarm. (The Code Red announcement over the PA was not made until Cruz had finished shooting all his victims and was entering the third-floor teacher’s lounge, which was too late to meaningfully notify anyone.)

3.3 School Administration and Security Staff Response on February 14, 2018

In addition to the School Resource Officer Deputy Scot Peterson (a detailed summary of Deputy Peterson’s actions is provided in Chapter 4), the school had eight individuals assigned to school security functions: School Security Specialist Kelvin Greenleaf and seven school Campus Monitors: Aaron Feis, Chris Hixon, Andrew Medina, David Taylor, Elliott Bonner, Anna Ramos and Brian Staubly. Assistant Principal Denise Reed, who was in charge the day of the shooting, and assistant principals Winfred Porter, Jeffrey Morford, Ivette Figeroa and Maximo Rosario have various roles and responsibilities during school emergencies.

In reviewing the campus monitors’ response, it is critical to consider their actions or inaction in light of the fact that they had been provided with no formal training on their specific roles and there was no policy outlining the role of campus monitors. The only known exception to the lack of training was the brief one-hour emergency code presentation by Al Butler for all school personnel in January 2018.

Security Specialist Kelvin Greenleaf

Kelvin Greenleaf was the supervisor of the campus monitors and he was asked about his knowledge of Code Reds and who could call them. He stated, “It was clear. It was said many a time that anybody can call a Code Red. The first person who witnesses whatever there is can call it.” When asked who made that clear to him Greenleaf stated, “Mr. Porter, Detective Butler. Those are the main two.” Greenleaf then went on to say, “We were always talking
about, you know, emergency situations, who can call a Code Red, and it's been said multiple times in several meetings.”

Greenleaf said in his interviews that he heard Campus Monitor Medina’s transmissions on the radio in which Medina notified Campus Monitor Taylor about a suspicious person (Cruz) on campus. Greenleaf said he also heard subsequent radio transmissions by Medina about a weird sound from Building 12.

Greenleaf was first seen on surveillance footage at approximately 2:22:02 when he exited his office and entered the common area of Building 1. Greenleaf’s office was near the northwest corner of Building 1. Cruz fired his first shots approximately 24 seconds earlier; presumably the radio transmissions about hearing suspicious sounds were what caused Greenleaf to leave his office. As Greenleaf exited his office he quickly held a radio up to his mouth. He was followed by Campus Monitor Staubly.

At approximately 2:22:15, Greenleaf exited through the east door of Building 1. Deputy Peterson had arrived just north of that location seconds earlier. Greenleaf could not hear gunshots at that point. He told Peterson that he was going south to Assistant Principal Rosario’s office to get keys to the golf cart.

Greenleaf quickly walked south along the east side of Building 1 and knocked on a door just north of a parked golf cart. Greenleaf waited for approximately three seconds after knocking on the door and then turned back north in the direction of Building 12. He began to run north along the east side of Building 1 toward the main courtyard between Buildings 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8, and he was followed by Deputy Peterson.

Greenleaf and Peterson met with Medina near the southeast corner of the courtyard. At 2:22:51, video showed Peterson and Greenleaf riding on the golf cart as Medina drove them north toward Building 12. Greenleaf said that Medina and Peterson were in conversation with each other but he could not hear what they were saying since he was hanging onto the rear of the cart. Greenleaf stated that he saw Peterson on his BSO radio during this time, but from radio timestamps we know that to not be true.
Medina drove the golf cart north on the east side of the courtyard and then between Buildings 7 and 8 toward Building 12. The golf cart emerged from between Buildings 7 and 8 at approximately 2:23:15, and two seconds later it passed out of the range of the surveillance cameras.

Greenleaf said that he and Peterson were dropped off by Medina, and Peterson told him to get back since he did not have a weapon. Greenleaf heard approximately five to seven gunshots coming from Building 12. Greenleaf described hearing Campus Monitor Bonner call a Code Red, and he said that both he and Staubly reiterated that Code Red. However, we know that a Code Red was not called by Bonner until approximately 2:24:54; by that point Peterson and Greenleaf would have already fled south to the area near the northeast corner of Building 7.

At approximately 2:23:44, Greenleaf and Peterson ran south from the east side of Building 12 toward the northeast corner of Building 7 after having spent approximately 27 seconds on the east side of Building 12. While running south Greenleaf was waving students away from Building 12. Greenleaf remained near Peterson in that area appearing to keep a diligent eye on the area and keeping people away from Building 12.

Any transmissions Greenleaf may have made regarding a Code Red would have come after 2:24:54 when Bonner made the first Code Red call.

At approximately 2:25:11, Staubly joined Greenleaf and Peterson near the northeast corner of Building 7.

At approximately 2:25:47, Greenleaf ran south from the northeast corner of Building 7. Greenleaf stated in his interview that he went on to ensure that large numbers of students and staff were secured inside of the auditorium. After doing that he came across Assistant Principal Jeff Morford.

At approximately 2:28:32, seven minutes after Cruz fired the first shots, Greenleaf and Morford ran into the north end of Building 1.
At approximately 2:31:17, ten minutes after Cruz fired the first shots, Greenleaf and Morford entered the camera room after having evacuated students to other areas. Other than stepping out for brief periods of time, they remained in the camera room until approximately 3:03 when they were confronted by law enforcement attempting to clear Building 1.

**Campus Monitor Andrew Medina**

Campus Monitor Andrew Medina has been the subject of several interviews during this investigation. The first was conducted by the Broward Sheriff's Office and was conducted prior to detectives having the chance to review the school surveillance videos. There have been some disparities between Medina's statements over the different interviews, disparities which extend beyond the expected differences when people give multiple statements about the same incident.

Medina was asked about his knowledge of Code Reds. He explained “From what I’m told, a Code Red would—you’re announcing that there’s an issue going on whatever like that and then you—I announce it to my superiors and my superiors will make the call from there to either, you know, lock down the school or lock down the perimeter or call for more reinforcements or whatever. That was my knowledge of the Code Red.” Medina, like all other school employees, confirmed there had never been a Code Red drill. Medina described the Code Red training in January 2018 with Detective Al Butler as lasting approximately one hour and fifteen minutes. Medina said, “they told us that we could call a Code Red,” but said he was taught “you have to see like a gun. You have to hear like gunshots.”

Medina was the first school employee to see Nikolas Cruz enter the MSD campus. Medina stated that he was near the southeast corner of the administration parking lot and just north of the entrance to the bus loop at the time he saw Cruz. To his north he saw an Uber car stopped on Pine Island Road. A male subject walked from Pine Island Road west onto
campus through the pedestrian gate which he had opened minutes earlier and the male then began to jog west. Medina did not know who the intruder was at that time.

Medina said that he began to drive north in his golf cart to approach Cruz. Once on his golf cart Medina radioed to Campus Monitor David Taylor that there was a “suspicious kid” on campus. Medina described him as being suspicious because he kept his head lowered down; he contrasted this with the normal behavior of students who seemed to have little shame for skipping class or jumping the fences.

As Cruz continued west onto campus, Medina continued north on his golf cart. Medina drove north over a curb which was south of the bike racks and east of Building 8. At that point, Cruz looked back toward Medina in apparent response to the noise of the golf cart going over the curb. That is when Medina said that he recognized Cruz but could not recall his name. Medina said at that time he was too far from Cruz to say anything to him. Medina said that Cruz then ran toward the east doors. In his initial interview with BSO, Medina described the bag as a “nice-sized duffle bag.” He said that sometimes ROTC and the color guard carry similar bags. At approximately the same time Cruz looked back at Medina, Taylor asked Medina which side Cruz was coming to and Medina told him it was the east side.
In his interview with BSO, Medina stated that he knew Cruz was not a student at that time and that he had withdrawn the prior year due to ongoing issues. In his interview with MSD-PSC investigators, Medina said that he was unaware at that time whether Cruz was or was not a student. Medina said that he continued toward Building 12 when he heard the first “bang” coming from Building 12 and described to BSO detectives that noise prompted him to get back on his golf cart.

In reviewing Medina’s interviews, he indicates that he pursued Cruz the entire time but was just not able to reach him in time. A review of the surveillance video paints a different picture. At 2:21:11, Medina drove north on the east side of Building 8, toward the parking lot north of Building 8, and east of Building 12. The cart began to slow immediately and by 2:21:13 the cart had come to a complete stop. The cart remained stationary for 15 seconds.

In his interview with MSD-PSC investigators, Medina was shown this surveillance footage and asked “Why is it you aren’t still going after Cruz? There’s somebody coming on the campus who shouldn’t be there who you know as crazy boy.” Medina said that he had already radioed ahead to Taylor making him aware of the intruder “...like we usually do.”

Medina went on to describe how he was conflicted about what to do, he said, “So, I’m contemplating to myself should I go and go see what’s going on or should I just stay out and do—and do my job out in the front of the thing. So, look, took about 10, 15 seconds until I said, well, I’m going to go and start headed that way to where, you know, where he went in to go see if Taylor needed any help.”

In contrast, toward the end of his interview with BSO, Medina made several statements that indicate Medina had a concern that something more dangerous than a mere intruder was taking place:

- “Something inside me told me not to approach him”
- “Report like...do what we’ve been taught...report it.”
- “Just let him go, and report it and make sure your boy inside (Coach Taylor) is good...I called him on the radio, ‘Coach Taylor, be careful because a suspicious kid’s coming inside that building.’”
- “I really wish I would have stopped him before and we would have saved all those...but there wasn’t really anything I could do about that. I was just doing my job of what they trained us to do.”
- “I don’t know if he had a handgun. Maybe he could have had a handgun in the pocket.”

School surveillance video confirmed that at 2:21:28, Medina continued to drive north and out of sight of any cameras. Based on where he would reappear on the cameras seconds
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later, it is known that Medina did indeed continue in the general direction of the east doors of Building 12. From where Medina was located at approximately 2:21:32, he would have been in a position to see student Chris McKenna sprinting from the east side of Building 12 after he had just seen Cruz with a rifle. Cruz began to fire at 2:21:38, and at 2:21:42 Medina’s golf cart was seen quickly driving south from the east side of Building 12 toward the walkway between buildings 7 and 8.

Medina’s statement coincides with the video at this point and he said that he continued driving south upon hearing the first noises. Video confirmed that Medina had a radio in his hand. However, based on Medina’s statement, it would not be until later that it occurred to him that the noises were gunshots. Medina said that while driving south he got on the radio and said there were “suspicious noises” (BSO interview) or “strange sounds” (MSD-PSC interview) coming from Building 12—he described them as “two bangs, like almost kind of like a firecracker, smoke bombs.” Medina said that he heard additional unidentified staff getting on the radio and talking about the noises possibly being firecrackers.

Medina said that he did not call a Code Red as he was focused on going to get help. He said “When I heard the two bangs inside the building, I just—I just was—I just went on instinct to go get Peterson to go get some help to go inside this building to find out what’s going on because it was some strange noises going on in there. Stuff that we’ve never heard before—I never heard before; you know what I mean.” Medina said that he heard Bonner call a Code Red while he was driving to get help; however, we know that a Code Red would not be called for approximately another three minutes.

Medina continued south into the main courtyard which was in the middle of Buildings 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8. He continued toward the southeast corner of that courtyard where he met with Deputy Peterson and Security Specialist Kelvin Greenleaf. At 2:22:51, video showed Peterson in the front passenger seat of a golf cart as it turned to the north to travel toward Building 12. Medina said that when he met up with Peterson he did not recall Peterson saying anything to him. Medina said that he gave a description of Cruz to Peterson (at this point, Medina could still not recall Cruz’s name).
Medina drove the golf cart north on the east side of the courtyard and then between Buildings 7 and 8 toward Building 12. The golf cart emerged from between Buildings 7 and 8 at approximately 2:23:15, and two seconds later it passed out of the range of the surveillance cameras. Medina said it was not until he began to return the east side of Building 12 with Peterson and Greenleaf that he realized the loud noises were gunshots. Medina quickly left the east side of Building 12 at Peterson’s direction. Video showed that he continued to the southeast and then to the east side of Building 8.

At approximately 2:28:29 Medina picked up Officer T. Burton—the first CSPD officer on scene—and delivered Burton on his golf cart to the north side of Building 8.

At approximately 2:23:39, law enforcement officers encountered Medina near the southeast corner of Building 1. Officers gathered intelligence from Medina about his observations and information about the campus. Approximately ten minutes after law enforcement met with Medina, he began to explain to them what he saw when the intruder arrived. In that explanation he said he saw the intruder “…with like a rifle-bag or something.” Regardless of his statements in multiple interviews, investigators believe this recollection (21 minutes after the first shots were fired) to be the most genuine and accurate reflection about what Medina knew at the time he first saw Cruz.

**Campus Monitor David Taylor**

Campus Monitor Taylor was asked about his understanding of a Code Red. He explained “Code Red, my interpretation of a Code Red would be from you know, since the training with Detective Butler, primarily an active shooter or an immediate threat as somebody or persons or staff on campus. It doesn't have to be a shooter; it could be somebody wielding a knife or something like that.” Taylor, like all other staff members, said he had never participated in a Code Red drill. Taylor was asked about when you can and can't call a Code Red, and he responded, “You know, I don't recall the specific verbiage, but I remember, like if you see a gun or somebody with a gun, call a Code Red and anybody—they said anybody can call a Code Red.”
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At the time Nikolas Cruz was dropped off on Pine Island Road, Campus monitor David Taylor was on the west end of the second-floor hallway of Building 12. He had been assigned to this location to monitor the second-floor restrooms due to ongoing problems with students vaping in the restrooms. The restrooms on the first and third floors of Building 12 had been locked so that all students had to use the second-floor restroom which could more easily be monitored by a single campus monitor.

At the time Cruz was dropped off—roughly 2:19—Taylor could be seen on school surveillance video casually standing outside the restrooms using his cell phone. At approximately 2:20:13, Taylor lifted his hand toward the microphone on his school radio indicating there was some transmission over the radio causing this reaction. Taylor then left his location and began to very casually walk east on the second-floor hall. That time at which Taylor began using his radio—2:20:13—is the time at which Medina made his first transmission in regard to an intruder on campus.

At approximately 2:20:28, Taylor made a U-turn and turned to walk west on the second-floor hallway in the direction from which he had come, again with his hand on his microphone. With an obvious sense of urgency, Taylor began to walk toward the west stairwell again with his hand on his microphone. After an approximately three-second pause in front of the men's room, Taylor resumed walking to the west stairwell still with his hand on his microphone and with a sense of urgency.

Taylor continued down the west stairwell at a slight jog. He exited the stairwell into the first-floor hall at approximately 2:20:57 and continued east. Taylor’s pace slowed at this point, and he briefly engaged a student outside of the first-floor restroom. Taylor disengaged from that student and continued east in the main hall toward the doors which Cruz would enter within seconds. However, entering the door ahead of Cruz were Ashley Baez (later suffered non-fatal injuries), Luke Hoyer (later suffered fatal injuries), and Martin Duque (later suffered fatal injuries). Additionally, student Chris McKenna had just exited classroom 1216 and was walking in the same direction as Taylor—but ahead of Taylor—toward the east doors.
At 2:21:16, Cruz entered the east doors behind Baez, Duque and Hoyer. Cruz was carrying a black, soft-sided rifle bag. At the time Cruz entered the east doors Taylor was in front of the water fountains between the men’s and women’s restrooms. Taylor was facing in the direction of the east doors, and in his interview he said that he saw Cruz in a burgundy shirt carrying a three-foot-long duffle bag. He recognized Cruz as he entered through the doors.

Two seconds later, at 2:21:18, Cruz made an immediate right into the east stairwell. Simultaneously, Taylor made a U-turn and pivoted so that he was now traveling back to the west stairwell from which he came. As Taylor turned, he again had his hand up by his microphone. After walking a few steps Taylor began to jog toward the west stairwell. In his interview Taylor stated that he did this anticipating that Cruz went into the east stairwell to go up the stairs; Taylor planned on going up the west stairwell to intercept Cruz on an upper floor.

As Taylor went into the west stairwell, Cruz was in the east stairwell with student Chris McKenna where McKenna was told by Cruz to flee. Taylor jogged up the west stairs as Cruz exited the east stairwell into the first-floor hallway.

At 2:21:38, Cruz fired the first shots as Taylor was approaching the second-floor landing of the west stairwell. Taylor immediately transitioned from a jog to a sprint and ran into the west end of the second-floor hall. Taylor stumbled and fell to the ground as the student ahead of him began running east down the second-floor hall.

Taylor continued to the door of an office/storage area and used his keys to unlock a door. By 2:21:53, Taylor had concealed himself inside this room where he would remain until he was evacuated by law enforcement at 2:40.

In his interview, Taylor said that while he was in that office area he recalled two or three people discussing firecrackers over the radio; he specified that he believed one of the voices was female. Taylor was not certain but believed he made a transmission indicating that they were not firecrackers and said that he attempted to call a Code Red. Again, the only Code Red was called by Bonner, not Taylor.
Taylor heard Assistant Principal Porter announce an evacuation order over the PA system and then later heard a Code Red called on the radio. He never heard a Code Red called over the PA system but said that he was also focused on the gunshots. Taylor believed he heard Campus Monitor Bonner say, “Coach Feis is down,” and definitely heard Campus Monitor Bonner say, “That’s not fireworks. That’s gunfire. Code Red, Code Red, Code Red.”

Taylor remembered hearing Deputy Peterson asking for radio silence while he spoke with someone in the camera room (we know the persons in the camera room to be Assistant Principal Morford and Security Specialist Greenleaf). He also recalled hearing Deputy Peterson asking where the gunshots were coming from.

In his interviews Taylor stated that he is familiar with and has experience with firearms. Taylor’s experience is significant because of his statement that he saw Cruz was carrying a “three-foot long duffle bag” as he entered Building 12. The bag Cruz carried into the building was obviously a rifle bag and that would have been even more obvious to someone experienced with firearms like Taylor. Taylor also stated that at the time Cruz entered Building 12 he recognized Cruz and Taylor acknowledged he previously had discussions with others about Cruz becoming a school shooter. Given his familiarity with guns, recognition of Cruz and knowledge of concern over Cruz’s past behavior, Taylor was in a position to identify Cruz as an imminent threat and notify others, but he did not.

**Campus Monitor Aaron Feis**

Campus Monitor Feis was fatally wounded in the shooting. As a result, his actions and movement can be retraced only through limited surveillance footage and witness statements.

Campus Monitor Medina said that, minutes prior to opening the gates on Pine Island Road (where Cruz entered), he and Feis were engaged in conversation. Feis did not appear on camera until approximately 2:21:47 as his golf cart could be seen on the northern end of campus near the west gate to the student parking lot. This was approximately ten seconds
after Cruz fired the first shots. Feis drove south in his golf cart in the direction of the north side of Building 13.

At approximately 2:21:58 (20 seconds after the first shots had been fired), Feis met with student Chris McKenna in the parking lot directly north of Building 13. In his interview, McKenna said that he told Feis there was someone with a gun inside Building 12.

At approximately 2:22:25, Feis parked his golf cart on the north side of Building 13 with McKenna riding on the back. Feis could be seen holding his school radio in his hand. Feis walked McKenna to the doorway, unlocked the doors and directed McKenna inside. As Feis was closing the door the fire alarm directly next to the door became active.

By 2:22:49, Feis had returned to his golf cart and began to drive to the area between Buildings 12 and 13 from the north.

By 2:23:09, Feis parked his golf cart between Buildings 12 and 13 and began to walk east toward the west side of Building 12. Feis approached the single door on the west side of Building 12 that led directly into the west stairwell. While Feis himself was not seen opening that door, a flood of sunlight entered the stairwell at 2:23:25. Simultaneously, Cruz entered the stairwell from the door separating the stairwell and the west end of the first floor so that Cruz was immediately facing Feis. Cruz raised the rifle and fired thereby fatally wounding Feis. Feis would later be found immediately outside of the exterior west stairwell door.

It is unknown why Feis did not call a Code Red after being told by a student that there was someone with a gun inside Building 12.

**Campus Monitor Chris Hixon**

Campus Monitor Hixon was fatally wounded in the shooting. As a result, his actions and movement can be retraced only through limited surveillance footage and witness statements.
At approximately 2:22:43, Campus Monitor Hixon was seen on camera sprinting northeast toward the east doors of Building 12. At that same time, Feis was on the north side of Building 13; Medina was in the courtyard with Peterson and Greenleaf; and Taylor was behind a locked door on the second floor of Building 12.

At 2:22:48, Hixon opened the double doors to the west end of the first-floor hall in Building 12 and quickly ran east down the hall. Simultaneously, Cruz exited the alcove to classrooms 1216 and 1217 and turned west in the direction of Hixon. Cruz raised his rifle and fired, causing Hixon to fall to the ground almost immediately.

Hixon quickly crawled to cover near an office doorway between the elevator and the men's restroom. Cruz ran by Hixon at approximately 2:23:22 and fired additional rounds at him. Hixon remained alive and was pulled toward the west doors by law enforcement at approximately 2:33:43. Law enforcement assisted Hixon onto a golf cart and transported him to the triage area. Hixon was later pronounced deceased.

**Campus Monitor Brian Staubly**

Campus Monitor Brian Staubly stated that the first thing on February 14 that caused him concern was hearing fellow Campus Monitor Andrew Medina’s radio traffic about firecrackers in the 1200 building. He said he was in Building 1 when he heard these transmissions. Surveillance video substantiated his statement and showed that, at approximately 2:22:02, he exited the office of Kelvin Greenleaf which was located inside Building 1.

Staubly said that he went toward the 1200 building between Buildings 7 and 8. Surveillance video showed that at approximately 2:22:30, Staubly exited the west side of Building 1. This was as Greenleaf and Peterson were walking south toward a golf cart on the west side of Building 1. Staubly paused briefly and watched Greenleaf and Peterson to the south.
At approximately 2:22:35, Staubly began to walk north from Building 1 toward Building 12 through the main courtyard. Staubly continued north past Medina’s golf cart toward Building 12. He said as he was continuing north he was passed by Medina, Peterson and Greenleaf on the golf cart. As he was moving toward Building 12 he did not hear any gunshots.

At approximately 2:25:11, Staubly joined Greenleaf and Peterson near the northeast corner of Building 7. He said that he first heard a single gunshot. He saw students in the north parking lot and went to direct them away from Building 12. Surveillance video showed that, at approximately 2:25:38, he walked north beyond Deputy Peterson toward the north parking lot while waving his arms. Within seconds he turned around, and by 2:25:53 he had returned to the area immediately next to Deputy Peterson near the northeast corner of Building 7. Staubly described that sometime around this point the gunshots could be heard “one after the other and it was loud.” He estimated hearing at least 10 to 12 gunshots and said, “I was pretty sure the gunshots were coming from inside the 1200 building.”

Surveillance video showed that at approximately 2:26:42 Staubly ran south between Buildings 7 and 8 while waving student Brandon Huff away from Building 12. He said that he then worked to get some of the students into the auditorium (Building 8). Staubly, a guidance counselor and substitute teacher, got students into the auditorium and sheltered with them there. Staubly described how law enforcement officers began to arrive and assisted in gathering the students in the auditorium.

In regard to hearing a Code Red being called, Staubly said, “I never heard Code Red...I’m just going to be honest with you, I never heard Code Red come across the radio. The first time I heard Code Red was when the AP, Ms. Reed, was running at me and I was running that way and she was yelling ‘Code Red, Code Red.’” Staubly said that he did not call a Code Red because “my focus then was to get the kids away from the building.”
Campus Monitor Anna Ramos

Campus Monitor Ramos said that she was near the media center (Building 2) when she first became aware that something unusual was taking place. Ramos said she heard Medina and Taylor speaking over the radio about firecrackers. She did not recall hearing any transmission about an intruder entering Building 12. After the transmissions about possibly hearing firecrackers she heard Feis say something to indicate they were not firecrackers. She could not recall any more details about those radio transmissions.

After that radio traffic, Ramos heard the fire alarm activate. She then heard Assistant Principal Porter over the PA system announce that everyone needed to evacuate. Students and staff then began to evacuate. Shortly thereafter she heard Deputy Peterson announce “Code Red” over the radio. Ramos then began to direct students and staff to shelter in classrooms. Ramos did not hear any gunshots.

While Ramos was sheltering she heard Assistant Principal Morford and Deputy Peterson in conversation over the radio. Morford was relaying his observations from the camera room to Peterson.

Campus Monitor Elliott Bonner

Campus Monitor Elliott Bonner said that the first thing that caused him to realize something unusual was taking place on February 14 was when he heard the fire alarm. His typical assignment during a fire alarm is to respond to Building 7, and that was where he was going on the day of the shooting. He said that he also heard radio traffic about firecrackers and something about someone getting out of an Uber, but Bonner did not specify the order in which those transmissions occurred and did not identify the person(s) making the transmissions.

Surveillance video showed that at approximately 2:23:24, Bonner exited the south side of Building 6. He got onto his golf cart and drove north along the west side of Building 6 and then east between Buildings 6 and 13 in the general direction of Building 12.
At approximately 2:24:44, Bonner was seen on a camera driving east in his golf cart between Buildings 6 and 13. At that time, Cruz was on the east end of the third floor of Building 12. Approximately five seconds later, Bonner approached the southeast corner of Building 13. Bonner said in his interview that he saw Feis lying on the ground and heard what he knew to be gunshots. Bonner stopped his golf cart and put it in reverse. He returned between Buildings 6 and 13 traveling backwards to the west.

Bonner said did not specify whether he saw Peterson or not but said that “I really wasn’t paying attention for anybody once I knew those were gunshots.” When asked if he knew where the gunfire was coming from Bonner said, “Absolutely...the 1200 building”

Surveillance video showed Bonner holding his radio up to his mouth as he was driving in reverse. Several witnesses said that the first Code Red was called by Bonner and they heard it over the school radio. While there is no recording of just school radio traffic, investigators can say with high confidence that the first Code Red on campus was called by Bonner at approximately 2:24:54, 3 minutes and 16 seconds after Cruz fired the first shots.

This determination is partly based on surveillance video from the southwest corner of campus. Prior to the Code Red being called, students and staff were walking away from Building 9 in a calm manner—very much consistent with evacuation for a fire drill. The fire alarm had gone off just a couple minutes earlier, and these students and staff were responding to that limited information. Within seconds of Bonner holding his radio up to his mouth, these students and staff reacted almost simultaneously. They all transitioned from a calm evacuation to panic. They scattered in different directions, some running south and others running back toward the building.

Bonner described hearing additional school radio traffic from Peterson trying to locate the shooter.

All assistant principals were inside of Building 1—the administration building—at the time they became aware of events related to the shooting. On February 14, 2018, there were only two cameras inside of Building 1, so the movements of the administrators could only be tracked to a limited extent.
Principal Ty Thompson

Principal Thompson was not present on campus on February 14, 2018.

Assistant Principal Winfred Porter

Assistant Principal Winfred Porter was located in Building 1, the administration building, when Cruz came on to campus at 2:19.

After hearing the fire alarm he said that he went to Deputy Peterson’s office where the panel was located. It appears that the fire alarm was the first event that put Porter into motion as it relates to responding to the shooting. At 2:22:40, Porter was seen on the east side of Building 1 walking quickly toward the fire alarm panels which were located in Deputy Peterson’s office.

At approximately 2:22:50, Porter and fellow assistant principal Jeff Morford converged on the door to Peterson’s office. Porter said that the panel indicated “smoke or gas.” He described after seeing that he called an order to evacuate the campus; multiple individuals said they recalled hearing Porter say to evacuate. Porter explained that he can access the PA system from any landline phone by entering a code, but he described that the PA microphone near his office was the more effective way to transmit.

At approximately 2:23:22, Porter emerged from Peterson’s office and back into the common area of Building 1. He then jogged south through the western hall of Building 1 and returned within approximately 20 seconds.

At approximately 2:23:49, Porter ran to the area near the PA system. It should be noted that the PA system is partially concealed from the camera view so it cannot be determined with certainty when Porter was actually using the PA—it can only be stated that he was approaching the area of the PA. On the other hand, it could be said that he passed the PA and continued south out of view of the camera.
As Porter reemerged from the area near the PA system at approximately 2:23:56, he held his radio up to his mouth as if he transmitting. He ducked down and appeared to be looking out of the windows to the east.

At approximately 2:24:08, Porter emerged from behind the reception desk on the east side of Building 1 and approached an unidentified male. He and the male appeared to exit the east side of Building 1 at 2:24:15, and Porter returned at 2:24:32. He continued through the building to the west side of Building 1.

At approximately 2:24:51, Porter approached the west doors for Building 1—these were the same doors which Kelvin Greenleaf exited in response to hearing Medina’s radio traffic. Porter left the range of the camera, but we know from exterior cameras that he did not exit Building 1 completely; he was either just inside the door or holding the door open for students who would enter shortly thereafter. During the time at which Porter was out of view of the camera, Campus Monitor Bonner called the first Code Red at 2:24:54. Porter accurately said that he heard a Code Red called over the school radio when he was near Deputy Peterson’s office.

Seconds later, students just outside of the doors where Porter was standing began to run in a panic toward east doors of Building 2. Approximately eight students/staff entered the west doors of Building 1 where Porter had been standing.

Porter said that after hearing the Code Red on the radio he announced Code Red over the PA system. At approximately 2:25:13, Porter returned into view of the camera on the west side of Building 1. He very quickly walked and then ran to the area near the PA system and arrived by 2:25:22. This is the earliest point at which Porter would have called a Code Red over the PA system. As Porter stepped away from the PA system he again held his radio up to his mouth as if he was transmitting.

When it was pointed out to Porter that multiple people said they called a Code Red, he explained that that if multiple people attempt to transmit simultaneously via their radios “the communication doesn’t come through.”
At approximately 2:25:35, Porter quickly walked north toward doors on the north side of Building 1 close to the eastern edge. He left the view of the camera, but it appears he opened the doors for students to enter due to the fact that seconds later approximately 20 students came into view of the camera along with Porter. He appeared to be directing the students south when he looked to the west and saw an additional large group of students entering the west side of Building 1. Porter quickly walked over to that group of students and appeared to be directing them to safety near the camera room and Greenleaf’s office. During this time Porter was again seen holding the radio up to his mouth as if transmitting.

From approximately 2:27:00 to 2:28:35, Porter was quickly moving around Building 1 and at times out of view of the camera. He appeared to be looking out the windows and trying to assess the area to ensure safety for those inside of Building 1. When he returned into view at 2:28:36, he was shutting off the lights in the western half of Building 1.

At 2:28:54, Porter and Morford approached the door to the camera room and Porter led a group of students from the camera room south through the west hall of Building 1. He remained out of view of the camera until approximately 2:30:53. He returned to the north end of the building with Morford.

At approximately 2:31:12, Porter briefly appeared to be using his cell phone as he was near the east reception desk.

At approximately 2:31:27, Porter let Captain Jordan and Lieutenant DeVita back into Building 1. They had arrived earlier at 2:29:35 but had since gone back outside. Porter said he recalled seeing Captain Jordan and Lieutenant DeVita inside the administration building but did not recall much interaction with them. He said “you guys got here so fast. I don’t know—I don’t really recall much more than that.” As they entered, Porter had his phone up to his ear and appeared to be pointing to the west side of Building 1. Andrew Medina followed Jordan and DeVita inside those east doors.

At approximately 2:33:21, Medina exited the east doors of Building 1 and within approximately 20 seconds he would be confronted by Deputy Greetham on the east side of Building 1.
After letting Jordan and DeVita back into Building 1 (2:31:27) until approximately 2:36:15, Porter largely remained in the north end of Building 1 and mostly visible on cameras. He at times was engaged in brief conversations with both Medina and Morford. He appeared to have minimal conversation with Jordan and DeVita.

Porter was last seen inside Building 1 at 2:36:15 when he walked south through the east hall of Building 1. Porter said that as he was checking on the students throughout the offices when he saw Coach Medina outside. He went to go tell Medina to come in, but he was confronted by law enforcement at gunpoint and told to come outside. This happened on the south side of Building 1 at approximately 2:41:36 as captured on BSO body cameras.

As thoroughly outlined in Chapter 5, Porter went on to assist law enforcement with communicating with Morford and Greenleaf who were reviewing the surveillance video. In regard to the surveillance video review with Sergeant R. Rossman (BSO), Porter said that he was under the impression that the video being watched by Assistant Principal Morford and Kelvin Greenleaf was not live; details of the confusion surrounding this issue is discussed in Chapter 5.

At approximately 3:03:19, at the direction of Sergeant Rossman, Porter and Medina went with him to the staging area beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. Porter continued to work with law enforcement and assist where he was able to do so.

**Assistant Principal Jeff Morford**

Morford said that he was in his office when he heard the fire alarm activate. Surveillance video showed that, at approximately 2:22:39, Teresa Basilone (office manager) and Morford exited his office. Morford was holding a radio in his hand. He continued to Deputy Peterson’s office where the fire alarm panel was located.

At approximately 2:22:50, Morford and fellow assistant principal Winfred Porter converged on the door to Peterson’s office where the alarm panel was located. When Porter told him that the alarm was for gas, he started working to evacuate the students
from an area near the main courtyard. At approximately 2:23:24, a subject consistent in
appearance with Morford was seen walking toward the main courtyard from the northwest
corner of Building 1.

At approximately 2:24:16, Morford was seen walking north at the northeast corner of the
main courtyard near Campus Monitor Staubly. He reached the southwest corner of
Building 7 and turned around to go back south toward the courtyard. By 2:24:41 Morford
left the view of a camera at the southeast corner of Building 7 and continued south along
the west side of Building 8.

Morford said that he could not remember who called the Code Red but he did hear it over
his school radio. The Code Red was first called at 2:24:54 by Campus Monitor Bonner.
Morford would have been in or near the auditorium, Building 8, at the time the Code Red
was called. He worked with other personnel to move students into the auditorium.
Morford did not hear any gunshots as he was outside.

Morford said that once he knew the process had begun to get students into the auditorium
and there were an adequate number of staff members he said, “my first thought was I
needed to get the (school) bells off.” He went into Building 1 and turned off the bells and
locked the side and front doors. Surveillance video showed that at approximately 2:28:40,
Basilone ran to the north doors of Building 8 and let both Morford and Greenleaf into
Building 1. Morford’s location from 2:24:41 to 2:28:40 was not documented on video.

At 2:28:54, Morford and Porter approached the doors to the camera room. Morford said
that he believed he went to the camera room at the direction of Deputy Peterson. There
were multiple students seeking shelter in there. Porter led them away from that room and
south inside of Building 1.

At 2:29:35, Morford exited the camera room and went across the hall toward Peterson’s
office. He returned into view at 2:30:00.

At 2:30:22, Morford continued south in Building 1 down the west hall and out of view of the
camera. He returned into view of the camera at 2:30:54 with Porter.
At 2:31:18, Morford followed Greenleaf into the camera room. Morford said that Greenleaf sat at the surveillance system while he was in there with him. Greenleaf rewound the footage trying to get information to relay over the radio, and he said that he and Greenleaf did that without any direction.

At 2:32:18, Morford exited the camera room and went to the east side of Building 1 where Porter and Medina were located. At 2:33:17, he approached the PA system, and this is presumably when he deactivated the school bell system.

At 2:34:06, Morford held his radio up to his mouth as if he was transmitting over his radio. Captain Jordan passed by Morford during this time and there did not appear to be any exchange between the two of them.

By 2:34:49, Morford had returned to the west side of Building 1 and entered Deputy Peterson’s office on the northwest corner of Building 1. He exited Peterson’s office at 2:35:22.

At 2:35:27, Morford entered his office which was on the west side of Building 1. He exited at 2:35:41 with his phone up to his ear. He remained on the phone until he left the view of the camera as he went into the camera room at 2:36:58; this was after apparently being summoned to the room by Greenleaf.

At 2:44:14, Morford exited the camera room. He continued east and then south through the building, and, by 2:45:40, he returned back into the camera room. He remained in the camera room until 3:04:49. During that time (3:02:52), Greenleaf had exited and was confronted by law enforcement. When Morford exited, he engaged the law enforcement officers in conversation. These law enforcement officers were a group of SWAT officers which included Officer C. Ryen (Margate PD).

At approximately 3:07:50, Morford returned into the camera room and was followed by a law enforcement officer who appeared to be a deputy sheriff. This deputy would continue to escort Morford within Building 1 until the recording stopped at 4:21:01. During that time, Morford went in and out of his office and the camera room.
He appeared to be using his radio and cell phone. In his interview, Morford made reference to Maximo Rosario coming to the camera room, but he was never seen entering the camera room up to the time that the recording stopped at 4:21:01.

With regard to the confusion about whether the surveillance video was live or not, Morford said specifically that he told law enforcement over the radio that the footage was not live. BSO body camera footage revealed that Morford was indeed communicating with Deputy Peterson and Porter over the school radio (this was after Porter left Building 1 at the direction of law enforcement) about their observations on the surveillance video.

Morford said that after law enforcement arrived inside of Building 1 they were trying to locate a photograph of Nikolas Cruz. He got his yearbook, ripped out a picture and gave it to the law enforcement officers.

**Assistant Principal Maximo Rosario**

Assistant Principal Maximo Rosario said that he was in the guidance office (inside Building 1) meeting with the guidance director when he became aware that something unusual was taking place. He was first alerted when he heard the fire alarm (2:22:39). He did not have his radio with him at the time, so he first went to his office, also in Building 1, and picked up his radio. Rosario then continued to Peterson’s office, which is when he was first seen on camera—at 2:23:07—as he walked north through the west hall of Building 1 toward Deputy Peterson’s office. Porter notified him that the alarm originated in Building 12.

At 2:23:20, Rosario exited Building 1 and walked south along the west side of Building 1. He got onto his golf cart (this was the same golf cart on the west side of Building 1 which Greenleaf and Peterson approached moments earlier), and, by 2:23:44, he began driving northwest from Building 1. By 2:24:01, he reached the southeast corner of the main courtyard.

At approximately 2:24:18, Rosario reached the northwest corner of the main courtyard. While on the east side of Building 6, he stopped briefly and spoke with an unidentified
individual who appeared to be a male student. Rosario said he drove through the courtyard and toward the west side of Building 12. At that time, he was under the impression he was merely responding to a fire alarm. Rosario said that he was listening to his radio but could not recall who was speaking at that point.

At approximately 2:24:42, Rosario was visible on his golf cart driving north by a stairwell on the north side of Building 5 as he entered an open area between Buildings 5, 6, 12 and 13. He was southwest of Building 12. He was slowing or stopped until approximately 2:24:56 which was two seconds after the Code Red was called at 2:24:54. Rosario then drove north and intercepted two students who were walking north. The student stopped, turned around and ran south as Rosario exited his golf cart near the northwest corner of Building 7.

Rosario said that he parked his golf cart near the senior courtyard, and it was not until he was near Building 12 that he heard the first Code Red being called. Rosario said he heard Morford first call a Code Red. From his location he was not able to see Feis lying on the ground. He did see Peterson to his east by the staircase “opposite the 1200 building.” Bonner said, “the only thing I could tell is that he had a radio in his hand.”

After hearing the Code Red and exiting his golf cart, Rosario walked a few feet north and had his radio held up to his face as if he was transmitting on his radio. Seconds later he turned to the south and began walking toward a stairwell on the north side of Building 5 and waved students away from him (south) with both hands.

Rosario said while he was outside of Building 12 he heard loud banging noises that “sounded to me like gunshots.” He saw students coming from the 600 and 700 buildings, and he told them to return to their classrooms. He saw the head custodian, Eddie Suarez, and he told him to have the students/staff return to their classes.

From 2:25:48 to 2:26:15, Rosario was out of view of the camera as he walked west toward the east side of Building 6. At that time, he returned to an area near his golf cart which was near the northwest corner of Building 7.
At 2:26:28, Suarez appeared near the stairs south of Rosario’s location and walked north toward Rosario.

At 2:26:39, Rosario quickly flinched and then ran south; by watching only the video it is not clear why he flinched. However, at this time Cruz was in the third-floor teacher’s lounge, and we know that Cruz shot south from windows on the west end of that building. At approximately that same time, Peterson again transmitted over his BSO radio, “I hear shots fired.” Based on all of these facts it is a reasonable conclusion that at this point Cruz was shooting at Rosario and Suarez and that is why Rosario flinched. Suarez fled south behind the stairwell and Rosario returned to his golf cart while holding his radio up to his mouth. Were it not for the hurricane windows, both Rosario and Suarez may have been additional victims.

At 2:26:50, Rosario drove toward the west side of Building 7 and then south away from Building 12. Ten seconds later, he began speaking with Suarez behind the stairwell at the north end of Building 5. At 2:27:08, Suarez got into the golf cart with him, and they both continued south. They looped around, and at 2:27:23, Suarez got out of Rosario’s cart and ran to his. By 2:27:45, both Rosario and Suarez were in their respective carts and had gone in opposite directions. Rosario said that he instructed Suarez to get his staff and have them seek shelter. Rosario continued south along the east side of Building 5.

Rosario described hearing Assistant Principal Ivette Figueroa as she was near the 900 building. Figueroa was on the radio asking where she should go. He told her that he would come to her location to help evacuate students.

At 2:27:59, Rosario reached the southwest corner of the main courtyard.

At 2:28:41, Rosario continued south out of view of the camera along the west side of Building 3 toward the south end of campus. At 2:30:12, a golf cart was seen on the south side of Building 9 approaching the hundreds of students that were fleeing toward Westglades Middle School. Rosario could not be positively identified but the appearance of the cart and individual in the cart are consistent with Rosario’s statement. Rosario waited on the south end of campus until the last students fled and Deputy D. Yurchuck drove past
him toward the group of students. He then followed the patrol car and left the screen at 2:32:37. Rosario said he did not see anything concerning about the law enforcement response.

Assistant Principal Ivette Figueroa

Assistant Principal Ivette Figueroa said that she was in her office when she learned something unusual was taking place. She described hearing a campus monitor talk about someone moving across campus with a black bag. During her interview, Figueroa referred to this as a “black bag” and on another instance she called it a “black backpack.” Figueroa was relatively new to MSD and was not able to recognize the voices of the security monitors unless they identified themselves. As a result, the only voice she recognized over the radio was transmissions by Rosario.

Figueroa’s explanation of what she remembered was somewhat unclear but she explained that “this happened so fast, it was like seconds.” She described hearing another campus monitor inside Building 12 and making reference to firecrackers. Around that time she heard the fire alarm, and at that point she had not heard a Code Red called. Figueroa explained that she grabbed her radio and “run to my post because in my mind, I’m thinking that the firecrackers, the smoke probably triggered the alarm in the building.”

Figueroa was first seen on surveillance cameras at approximately 2:23:13 as she was walking toward the west doors of Building 1. She exited Building 1 approximately seven seconds later and continued toward the southeast corner of the main courtyard. By approximately 2:24:16, Figueroa reached the area where Buildings 2 and 5 meet. She continued southwest through a smaller courtyard.

By 2:24:50, Figueroa reached the southeast corner of Building 4 and remained in that general area until approximately 2:26:41. At that time, the Code Red had not yet been called by Bonner.
In her interview she described her assigned post as being behind the portables; however, on February 14 there were no portables and this appears to be a reference to portables that were added south of Buildings 4 and 9 after the shooting.

At approximately 2:26:11, while standing alone on the south side of Building 4, Figueroa looked around and raised her arms out to her side as if she was asking “what’s going on?” Simultaneously, students were calmly walking south along the west side of Building 3 with no apparent knowledge that a Code Red had already been called. At 2:26:41, Figueroa walked south from Building 4 with the students who were walking toward the south end of campus. At approximately 2:27:19, students on the south side of campus began to walk west toward Westglades Middle School.

Figueroa said that when she reached her assigned location the students were already evacuating. She explained that there were over one thousand students there when this changed to a Code Red. When she heard the Code Red called, she took her whistle and began to blow it. She could not say for certain who called the Code Red but said, “I know that it was either Rosario or Porter, one of the APs. I do remember Porter telling me, ‘Figueroa, evacuate,’ and then that’s what I knew that I had to take the kids out.” After hearing the Code Red, she realized she would not be able to get them all back in, so she directed the students away from campus. She did not hear gunshots.

**Assistant Principal Denise Reed**

Assistant Principal Denise Reed said that she was in her office (inside Building 1) on February 14 when she heard the fire alarm. She grabbed her phone and radio and ran down the hall toward the alarm panel in Peterson’s office. She was first seen on surveillance video at approximately 2:22:54 as she walked north through Building 1 past the PA system and to the area behind the west reception desk. She began to walk west through the hall connecting the east and west reception desks, but at 2:22:59 she quickly turned around and walked back south in the west hallway and out of sight of the cameras. By 2:23:10, she returned into view of the camera and continued west through Building 1.
At 2:23:23, she passed by Porter just south of Peterson’s office and continued toward the west doors.

Reed said that Porter told her the alarm indicated “gas” from Building 12. She told Porter she was going that way. It was not clear from the video if there was any discussion between Porter and Reed, but if there was it would have been very brief as neither of them stopped moving as they passed each other.

Reed exited the west side of Building 1 at approximately 2:23:28, approximately eight seconds after Rosario went through those same doors. She quickly continued walking northwest from Building 1 toward the main courtyard. Reed said that she went to the 800 building to make sure that all of the students got out. She left the view of the camera at 2:23:32 and was not seen again on video until 2:24:20.

At approximately 2:24:14, teachers Brandy Hermosillo and Cindi Helverson walked north between Buildings 7 and 8 toward Greenleaf and Peterson. Seconds later they were stopped by Greenleaf and urgently directed south, away from Building 12.

At 2:24:20, as she was near the southeast corner of Building 7 near Morford and Staubly. At that time they were all walking north between Buildings 7 and 8 in the general direction of Deputy Peterson’s location. At approximately 2:24:25, Staubly, Morford, Reed, Helverson and Hermosillo appeared to have a brief exchange with each other which lasted less than 10 seconds. Helverson and Hermosillo fled into a classroom on the southeast corner of Building 7.

During that exchange, at approximately 2:24:28, Reed entered the alcove for a door to the east side of Building 8. She left that alcove at approximately 2:24:35 and continued north between Buildings 7 and 8. At 2:24:45, Reed entered the alcove for another door on the east side of Building 8 which was farther north from the first door. As she appeared to be holding her radio up to her mouth, Reed entered that door and went into Building 8 at 2:34:47, approximately 7 seconds prior to Bonner calling the Code Red.
Reed said, as she was in that area, she saw students were beginning to evacuate. She also saw Deputy Peterson with his gun drawn and observed that “he’s in a little bit of a panic on the radio” and “I hear the gunfire in the building going off.” Reed said that she looked to Peterson and said, “that’s gunfire in there” to which he replied, “yes.” Reed continued to explain her exchange with Peterson: “He said, ‘Yeah, get out of here,’ or whatever. So, I left him, thinking he’s going to go in that building....”

While it cannot be said definitively that Reed did not make any comments to Peterson, it is extremely unlikely that she did so. As Reed was approaching the northern door of Building 8 she was walking assertively and never broke her stride. There was no instance in which she paused to assess the gunshots, no hand gestures or body language which would be consistent with a high stress environment, and the closest she got to Deputy Peterson appeared to be approximately thirty feet. To read the transcript of her interview it paints a picture of someone standing next to Peterson and engaged in a dialogue. It can definitively be said that Reed and Peterson were never standing next to each other in conversation about their observations.

Reed said after hearing the gunshots she called a Code Red and believed she made a reference to gunfire or lockdown. Reed said she went into Building 8 to ensure that the students were in lockdown. It cannot be ruled out that as Reed was going into Building 8 (2:34:47) or immediately thereafter that she called or attempted to call a Code Red. Reed said she turned off her radio as soon as she got into Building 8.

Reed described moving the students into the band room, raising the band stands, put a cover on the door, turned off the lights and sat in the room with the students. She told two other staff members that if the shooter came in then she would “jump him,” and she referenced the saying “run, hide, fight.” Reed remained in Building 8 until she was evacuated by law enforcement.
Findings:

1. Several staff who had an opportunity to call a Code Red failed to do so, and there is no evidence to support the claims of other staff members that they called a Code Red.

2. Campus Monitor Elliott Bonner called the first Code Red at MSDHS on February 14, 2018. This occurred at 2:24:54, 3 minutes 16 seconds after Cruz fired the first shots, and while Cruz was approximately halfway down the third-floor hallway shooting students. While there are other staff members who claim to have called a Code Red, there is no evidence to support those claims.

3. Campus Monitor Andrew Medina was the first school employee to observe Cruz walk onto the MSD campus. Medina saw Cruz carrying a bag that was obviously a rifle bag—Medina admitted on video that he recognized that the bag Cruz was carrying was a rifle bag, and Medina identified Cruz as a threat. Medina failed to act appropriately by not calling a Code Red, and that failure allowed Cruz to enter the Building 12 without the building’s occupants being notified to implement an active assailant response (Code Red). Further, even after hearing gunshots Medina failed to call a Code Red. There are veracity issues with Medina’s post-incident statements regarding what he knew and what he did and did not do.

4. After student Chris McKenna informed Coach Aaron Feis that Cruz was in Building 12 with a rifle, Coach Feis proceeded to Building 12. Coach Feis had a school radio, but did not call a Code Red.

5. Medina notified Campus Monitor David Taylor via school radio that Cruz was entering the Building 12. Taylor saw Cruz enter the building but Taylor did not call a Code Red. Taylor was experienced with guns and recognized Cruz when he entered Building 12 as someone they had previously discussed as being a potential school shooter. Taylor’s inaction by not calling a Code Red was inappropriate and delayed notification to others of the active shooting.
RECOMMENDATIONS:

Section 3.1 Recommendations:

Everyone’s goal is to prevent another active assailant attack, and physical site target hardening is an essential component of accomplishing that goal. While there are funding challenges and some laws, rules or regulations may be impediments to better “hardened” schools, our schools’ greatest vulnerabilities exist because of voids in basic security policies and strategies—such as effective Code Red policies, communications/notification systems, locked doors, limited access to campuses and designated hard corners or safe areas within student occupied spaces—that will mitigate harm. Before considering more advanced prevention-based target-hardening school safety strategies through additional funding and/or law changes, which we support, schools must ensure basic harm mitigation procedures and safeguards are in place immediately.

While the goal of school security is to prevent another tragedy, the reality is that another active assailant event will occur, and the real questions are when, where, and what is in place to quickly stop the attacker and mitigate the harm. Harm mitigation entails identifying the threat at the first possible moment, immediately notifying others of the threat and everyone on campus immediately reacting to the threat by implementing effective active assailant response protocols.

More funding is needed to ensure adequate school security and prevention measures, but cost will always be a factor in school-hardening decisions; therefore, districts need to establish priorities. It is recommended that districts implement a tiered approach to campus hardening that begins with basic harm mitigation concepts that are of little or no cost and those that may be implemented quickly. After basic concepts have been implemented, districts should then consider more advanced security measures, specifically those focusing on prevention and those that involve technology and/or law changes. Tables 1 through 4 in Appendix B provide a suggested level-based approach to enhancing campus site security.
Further, there are a number of subject matter experts and organizations that provide expert advice on school hardening. The State should engage these experts through the FDOE Office of Safe Schools (OSS) to establish guidelines and best practices for campus hardening across Florida.

The OSS should also conduct a complete review of target-hardening practices currently or planning to be utilized, recommendations highlighted in other state’s school safety reports, and those developed by organizations such as the Partner Alliance for Safer Schools.

Prior to August 2019, the OSS, using this review and information received from experts, should provide the districts with a tiered list of best practices that will allow schools to develop a plan to enhance and phase in security levels over time as budgets and resources allow. The list should be reviewed and revised annually as new technologies are identified. This recommendation **does not** mean districts should wait to implement reactive harm-mitigation policies, procedures or best practices, such as requiring hard corners or safe areas in every classroom in the state.

The legislature should also consider creating a permanent body in the vein of the Connecticut School Safety Infrastructure Council to oversee physical site security of schools. The Connecticut legislature created this Council of subject matter experts to oversee school security infrastructure, provide consistency and ensure compliance with best practices.

Based on the incident, all Florida school districts must **implement the following harm-mitigation strategies immediately.** The Florida Legislature needs to mandate compliance with these strategies and establish consequences and significant sanctions for non-compliance, including financial sanctions and removal from office.

a) School security is the function of all school personnel and students. All staff should have clearly established roles and responsibilities that are outlined in a written policy and procedure manual provided to all personnel. The school security staff and/or “safety team” should regularly meet and train on proper
protocols and procedures in emergency situations and coordinate with law enforcement.

b) All school campus gates must remain closed and locked, and when opened for ingress and egress they should be staffed to prevent unauthorized campus access.

c) Doors leading to instructional classrooms or student-occupied space and for ingress/egress to campus or a specific building should remain locked during school hours, and if they are open they should be staffed. All teachers should be able to lock doors from within the classroom, and keys should be on their person at all times.

d) Every district and school should have a written, unambiguous Code Red or similar active assailant response policy that is well known to all school personnel, parents and students. The policy must make unequivocally clear that all personnel are empowered to activate emergency active assailant response procedures and that those procedures are to be immediately implemented upon notification.

e) Every school must have an effective communication system through which everyone on campus can see and/or hear—and immediately react to—a called Code Red or similar active assailant response notification.

f) Classrooms should establish safety measures, such as hard corners or other safe areas, and teachers should have the ability to cover door windows quickly.

g) Schools should evaluate and give consideration to the appropriateness of locking bathrooms doors,

h) All districts should establish a system to ensure compliance and accountability with these requirements and consequences for noncompliance.

These measures may not in and of themselves stop the assailant; however, they represent the best and most immediate methods to slow the attacker until police or other personnel can foil the attack.
There are a myriad of additional physical site security enhancements that will help active assailant prevention efforts. These proactive enhancements are costly and some are complex. It also has to be considered that not all of these options are applicable in every district or in every school. While we provide some specific recommendations, we have tried to suggest the concept and leave the actual implementation options up to local consideration and further analysis by subject matter experts. For specific prevention and additional school site hardening recommendations, see Appendix B.

Section 3.2 Recommendations:

Every school district in Florida must have a well-developed, written, distributed, and trained upon active assailant response policy. All school personnel must be held accountable for knowing and following the policy, and it should unambiguously, and in an understandable manner, clearly establish the roles and responsibilities and actions of all persons on campus to identify threats, notify others of threats and respond to threats. The policy should be at the district level, and each school should have an additional school-specific policy that addresses the idiosyncrasies and unique characteristics of each school and its population.

The FDOE Office of Safe Schools should be required to approve each district’s policy, and each superintendent should be required to approve each school’s policy. In the case of charter schools, the policy should be approved by the board of directors and the Office of Safe Schools.

Section 3.3 Recommendations:

Campus monitors or their equivalent are common in Florida schools. Monitors are a cost-effective security supplement to SROs; however, monitors must be carefully selected, have clearly defined roles and responsibilities and be well trained according to current best practices.
On February 14, 2018, Deputy Scot Peterson of the Broward County Sheriff’s Office was the only School Resource Officer (SRO) assigned to Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (MSDHS). In Florida, the SRO is a certified law enforcement officer employed by a municipal police department, sheriff’s office or a school board police department, and as such, works under the policies and procedures of his or her agency. Deputy Peterson, who had been a law enforcement officer for 32 years, was a SRO for approximately 28 years. He was the SRO at MSDHS for 9 of those 28 years.

4.1 Deputy Scot Peterson’s Actions on February 14, 2018

As previously stated, Deputy Peterson was the only SRO/armed person assigned to 3,300 students at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School on February 14, 2018. Westglades Middle School, which is adjacent to MSDHS, had one SRO assigned to that school, but he was not on campus that day because of training.

Deputy Peterson was not issued a body-worn camera (BWC) due to his position being funded by the City of Parkland. The City of Parkland had not yet provided funding so that BWCs could be issued to their contract deputies. At the time of the shooting, Deputy Peterson was wearing a standard patrol uniform, but he was not wearing his ballistic vest. Surveillance video from the school confirmed that Deputy Peterson had both his agency radio and his school radio on his shirt lapels. Deputy Peterson wore a handgun on his gun belt, but there is no indication that he had a rifle readily accessible.

Surveillance video confirms that Deputy Peterson was inside or immediately north of Building 1 at the time he first became aware that this incident had begun. He was waiting for a parent to arrive at school for an unrelated matter. In his statement to the Broward Sheriff’s Office on February 16, 2018, Deputy Peterson said that he heard Campus Monitor Medina say that he thought he heard a firecracker in the Building 12. Deputy Peterson stated that he was in his office at the time he heard this but video indicates he was on the north side of Building 1.

At approximately 2:22:13, Deputy Peterson walked west to the northwest corner of Building 1. At approximately the same time Deputy Peterson reached the northwest corner
of Building 1, Kelvin Greenleaf (School Security Specialist) exited the west side of Building 1, and they were facing each other.

The following is a summary of Deputy Peterson’s statements to Detective J. Curcio, BSO Homicide, on February 16, 2018. Deputy Peterson stated that as he and Greenleaf met with each other he looked for a golf cart but did not see one. He pointed out that typically they will get on a golf cart when responding to address an incident. He said to Greenleaf, “I don’t know about this,” and they both began running north toward Building 12. After approximately five steps the fire alarm began. They continued running north past Building 7, and, within approximately 10 feet of getting to Building 12, he heard gunfire. Peterson stated, “I thought it was outside. It was so loud…and so close I…I thought it was probably outside.”

From surveillance video review we know Deputy Peterson’s statement regarding the events to be false. As Peterson and Greenleaf met near the northwest corner of Building 1, they both walked south along the west side of Building 1 toward a golf cart that was parked on the side of the building. Greenleaf knocked on a nearby door attempting to get keys to the cart. Peterson had his left hand near his school radio in a manner consistent with someone transmitting on the radio. There were no witnesses who testified that Deputy Peterson was transmitting anything at that time. Greenleaf and Peterson turned around and began walking north along the west side of Building 1. Greenleaf began to run north and Peterson then began to run north. Within seconds the fire alarm was active at various locations on campus.

Additional review of surveillance video and statements from Medina and Greenleaf revealed that at as they reached the southeast corner of the main courtyard, Greenleaf and Peterson met with Medina who was on his golf cart. At 2:22:51, video showed Peterson in the front passenger seat of a golf cart as it turned to the north toward Building 12.

At approximately 2:23:15, the golf cart carrying Medina, Peterson and Greenleaf traveled north into the courtyard area between Buildings 7 and 12. Two seconds later it passed out of the range of the surveillance camera as it reached the southeast corner of Building 12. At that time, Cruz had just left the alcove for classrooms 1212/1213 and was moving west on
the first floor. Twenty-one victims had already been shot, nine of whom were fatally wounded.

Campus Monitor Medina stated that he dropped Peterson off near some water pipes which were immediately next to the east doors of Building 12. Medina said he made a right U-turn in his golf cart and did not see anything that Peterson did or did not do after that point.

Security Specialist Greenleaf said that he and Peterson were dropped off between Buildings 7, 8 and 12. In their respective interviews, both Peterson told Greenleaf say that Peterson told Greenleaf to leave the area since he did not have a weapon. This is evidence that Peterson knew there were gunshots and that they posed an immediate threat. Greenleaf said that Peterson did not approach the east doors, he did not look into the windows, and he did not access his keys or ask Greenleaf for his keys. Greenleaf said that Peterson had his firearm drawn and seemed “stressed.” Greenleaf estimated that he heard 5 to 7 gunshots coming from within Building 12.

In his interview with BSO, Deputy Peterson said the gunfire was so “clear and loud at that point I knew it was close to this building, but I wasn’t even sure if it was in the building, was it outside the building, but I knew it was close.” Peterson did not see muzzle flashes or see anything come from the windows. Upon being asked how many rounds he heard, Peterson said, “It wasn’t many, two, three.”

Deputy Peterson told BSO detectives that he was on his school radio “yelling lockdown, lockdown, Code Red, Code Red.” There is no evidence that this took place. Based on numerous witness statements from those who heard a Code Red called on the school radio, the only person who called a Code Red was Campus Monitor Elliot Bonner.

Records provided by BSO revealed that at 2:23:26, Deputy Peterson interrupted a dispatcher who was trying to raise him and Deputies Hanks and Seward. Deputy Peterson stated. “Be advised we have possible, uh – could be firecrackers. I think we’ve got shots fired. Possible shots fired. 1200 building.” This transmission took place while Peterson was out of view of any cameras and on the east side of Building 12 with Greenleaf.
Surveillance video showed that at 2:23:30 Medina began driving south and then east in his golf cart away from the east side of Building 8.

Deputy Peterson described how he then went back to an area near Buildings 7 and 8. Surveillance video revealed he and Greenleaf left the east side of Building 12 at approximately 2:23:44. At that time, Cruz was nearly halfway down the second-floor hall as he was quickly moving east. Peterson and Greenleaf spent approximately 27 seconds on the east side of Building 12 during which time Greenleaf heard 5 to 7 shots coming from within Building 12. Peterson never entered or attempted to enter.

At 2:23:48, Deputy Peterson reached his hiding place at the base of a stairwell at the northeast corner of Building 7. Deputy Peterson would remain at this location for approximately 48 minutes. Surveillance video showed at 3:11:20, well after Cruz fled the campus and other law enforcement officers had entered Building 12, Peterson ran north. That was the time Peterson left this position after fleeing there from the east door to Building 12 when he heard gunshots. Peterson described this location in the following manner to BSO, “I’m taking a position on the east side of the doorway. And I can also see down the sidewalk looking out west. I get a good...I get a good two dimensional of...of that whole building at that point.”

Peterson’s second radio transmission was at 2:23:55 when he said, “…make sure we got – get some units over here. I need to shut down Stoneman Douglas, the intersection.”

At 2:23:58, Cruz fired approximately three rounds in classroom 1234. Classroom 1234 was on the south side of the second floor of Building 12. The rounds were fired in a southeasterly direction which was approximately in the direction of Peterson; however, there is no evidence to suggest that Cruz knew Peterson was in that area. Some of the rounds fired by Cruz struck windows on the south side of Building 12. According to BSO, Peterson’s location was approximately 70 feet south of Building 12.

In regard to the gunshots, Peterson said in his interview with BSO, “And my concern was because I didn’t know if the shots were coming out of the building, or were they coming somewhere out on this west side somewhere ‘cause it sounded like it might’ve been even
outside.” He went on to say, “I’m keeping cover on the east side of the building to keep them cover with my firearm directed towards the doors, possible with an anticipation if maybe the... the if the shooter or whoever it was which someone maybe was going to come out of this door.”

Peterson next described in his interview the arrival of Officer T. Burton, CSPD, who Peterson knew from previous interactions. However, prior to Officer Burton’s arrival there were multiple other radio transmissions and actions which are relevant in evaluating Peterson’s response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2:24:14</td>
<td>Peterson: “17 Juliet 3. We’re talking about the 1200 building, it’s going to be the building off of Holmberg Road.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:24:24</td>
<td>Peterson: “We don’t have any description yet, we just hear shots, appears to be shots fired.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:24:32</td>
<td>Cruz made it to the east end of the third floor and began firing. Cruz went on to fire 61 rounds on the third floor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:24:35</td>
<td>Peterson: “I’m over on the south side over by the 700 building.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:25:08</td>
<td>Deputy Kratz: “Tango 2, I hear shots fired by the football field, shots fired by the football field.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:25:18</td>
<td>Peterson: “17 Juliet 3. We’re looking at the 1200 building. It’s gonna be the 300 building. It’s gonna be, uh, right off of Holmberg Road by the senior lot.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:25:38</td>
<td>Peterson: “Get the school locked down, gentlemen.” {It is possible that Peterson meant to transmit this over his school radio directing the campus monitors to initiate a Code Red. This may explain Peterson’s belief that he called a Code Red.}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:25:42</td>
<td>Deputy Kratz: “Sounds like there’s some students say they thought it was firecrackers, but we’re not sure, by the football field.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:25:56</td>
<td>Peterson, in response to Deputy Kratz: “Uh, 26 (received). Yeah. We also heard it over by inside the 1200 building.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:26:00</td>
<td>Peterson: “We’re locking down the school right now. Make sure there’s no pedestrian traffic anywhere on Holmberg Road.”</td>
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</table>
2:26:10 – Peterson: Video showed that he had his firearm drawn and pointed directly north of his location.

2:26:40 – Peterson: “I hear shots fired.”

2:27:03 – Deputy Stambaugh’s body camera recorded the five final gunshots.

2:27:50 – Deputy Perry broadcasted that he was trying to get the fence open to move to Building 13. Deputy Goolsby was with Deputy Perry as well.

2:27:54 – Cruz exited the west doors of Building 12.

2:28:00 – Peterson: “Broward, do not approach the 12 or 1300 buildings. Stay at least 500 feet away at this point.”

At 2:29:09, Officer Burton was seen on surveillance video being dropped off by Medina near the north side of Building 8, northeast of Deputy Peterson’s location. Officer Burton was an SRO from Coral Springs Police Department. Peterson saw that Officer Burton had a rifle with him and had taken cover near a tree. Deputy Peterson said he told Officer Burton, “I heard a couple shots, haven’t heard anything since....” Surveillance video showed Deputy Peterson making unknown hand gestures in the direction of Officer Burton approximately 20 seconds after his arrival.

Officer Burton stated that when he arrived he took a position among some cars and a tree. He saw Peterson had his firearm drawn and that Peterson was looking east and west. Peterson told him that the shooter may be in the parking lot.

At 2:33:48, Officer Burton was approached by Sergeant Kozlowski and Officer Best, both of CSPD. After a brief conversation, Officer Best ran south to Deputy Peterson’s location. In an interview with Officer Best he stated that he asked Deputy Peterson for additional details. Officer Best said that Deputy Peterson responded, “Shots fired. The shooter is on the second or third floor.”

At approximately 2:36, a group of approximately 18 law enforcement officers—many of whom were carrying rifles—entered the east end of Building 12. Deputy Peterson had a
clear view of this group entering Building 12; however, he remained at his position near the northeast corner of Building 7.

At 2:41:46, a group of CSPD officers and Lieutenant M. DeVita (BSO) approached Deputy Peterson’s location from the south. Lt. DeVita stated that Deputy Peterson was on his school radio talking with someone who had been watching the cameras and was in the process of trying to track the suspect on camera. Sergeant Rossman’s body camera captured audio from a nearby school radio that confirmed Peterson was in communication with Assistant Principal Morford as he and Greenleaf were reviewing the surveillance video.

Lt. DeVita went on to say that Peterson had his gun drawn and it was down by his side. He described Peterson as “…like the rest of us, I think, really stressed, really high-strung at the time.” Lt. DeVita said from that location next to Peterson he could see Deputy Seward holding the east doors of Building 12 open as students and staff were fleeing. He heard Deputy Seward yell to Peterson asking for his keys. Lt. DeVita was not sure that Peterson heard Deputy Seward, so Lt. DeVita told Peterson to give him his keys. Lt. DeVita took Peterson’s keys and ran them up to Deputy Seward.

At 3:11:20, Deputy Peterson ran north from area northeast of Building 7 toward the east side of Building 12. This is the first time that Peterson left his retreated-to position near the northeast corner of Building 7. Peterson’s location had only a single surveillance camera (camera 54), and it recorded him from a distance. However, it was a unique location in that, regardless of whichever direction he would have left, it would have been captured on any one of multiple cameras.

Around the time Peterson went to the east side of Building 12, Lieutenant C. Cardinale (Sunrise Police Department) responded to Building 12. He recalled seeing Deputy Peterson on the east side of Building 12. Lt. Cardinale saw Peterson pacing back and forth on the east side of Building 12 saying, “Oh my God. Oh my God.” Lt. Cardinale looked at Peterson and asked, “Who the fuck are you?” Peterson responded, “I’m the SRO.” Lt. Cardinale asked, “What’s the deal? What’s going on?” While pacing back and forth and breathing heavily, Peterson replied, “I don’t know. I don’t know…Oh my God, I can’t believe this.”
Captain R. Gallagher (CSPD) was among the first responders to MSDHS, particularly to the east side of Building 12. He said that at some point he recalled seeing Deputy Peterson on the east side of Building 12. Captain Gallagher recalled hearing radio traffic on Peterson’s school radio from persons inside the camera room monitoring the cameras.

The commanding officers of BSO’s SWAT team, Lt. C. McCoy and Captain S. Robson, both confirmed that Peterson was eventually brought inside Building 13 to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). The investigation revealed that the TOC was still outside at 3:45 p.m. Therefore, it was after 3:45 p.m. that Peterson went to the TOC and drew a diagram of the campus for the various SWAT teams to use as a guide while clearing the campus.

It is unknown what Peterson did from the time he left Building 7 at 3:11:20 until he went to the TOC at 3:45 p.m.

Deputy Peterson’s interview with NBC’s *The Today Show* took place more than three months after the shooting. In that interview, Deputy Peterson provided answers to various questions that were inconsistent with his training by BSO and inconsistent with common law enforcement practices.

In the interview with *The Today Show*, Deputy Peterson called into question his ability to hear the shots stating, “out...when you’re outside there, and, and that building, it’s a three-story, it’s a hurricane-proof building. You can, it’s hard to even hear.” The Commission was provided with a body camera recording from Deputy J. Stambaugh who arrived on Holmberg Road as Cruz was firing from the third-floor teacher’s lounge. Deputy Stambaugh’s body camera captured approximately the five final gunshots that Cruz fired. The sounds of gunshots were definitively identifiable on his body camera, despite Deputy Stambaugh’s body camera being covered by his ballistic vest and the fact that he was approximately four times farther away from Building 12 than Peterson.

Peterson continued in the interview with *The Today Show* saying, “I believe there was a sniper. So, in my mind, I’m thinking to myself there’s possibly maybe somebody up in there shooting out, but I didn’t think they were shooting at the kids, I thought they were shooting out at the building, outside.” Peterson’s actions indicate otherwise. He remained in a
mostly visible position north of Building 7, which would be an extremely dangerous position if he truly believed there was a sniper. Peterson made no radio transmissions indicating to other deputies that there was a sniper and in fact indicated the shots were coming from within the building. Had Peterson truly believed there was a sniper, when he was dropped off at the doors to Building 12 he was in an ideal position to enter the building and confront the sniper, as the sniper would have been facing toward the windows.

When Peterson was confronted on The Today Show about why he did not go inside Building 12 to try and locate the shooter, he stated, “What I was trained is you contain the area.” A review of BSO’s training plans reveals this is inconsistent with what he was trained to do in response to an active shooter. Peterson had been given training on single-deputy, two-person and team responses to active shooters. It is well-known within the law enforcement community that the response after the shooting at Columbine High School is no longer to contain and wait for SWAT; the proper response is to move toward the sound of gunfire and engage the suspect(s).

The Broward County Sheriff’s Office Homicide Unit conducted an interview with Deputy Peterson on Friday, February 16—two days after the shooting. At that time BSO did not have the ability to review the external school surveillance video as the FBI had taken custody of the footage upon the request of the Broward State Attorney’s Office. BSO’s interview was conducted in order to gather a statement from Deputy Peterson about his observations. At the time of this interview, BSO had no reason to suspect that Deputy Peterson had violated any agency policies or engaged in any wrongdoing.

The Broward County Sheriff’s Office first became aware of issues with Deputy Peterson’s response to the MSDHS shooting when it gained access to the exterior video surveillance recordings from the FBI on February 20, 2018. The Sheriff’s Office confronted Peterson about his failed response, and he resigned from the Broward Sheriff’s Office. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement – Office of Executive Investigations attempted to interview Deputy Peterson in regard to their criminal investigation into the law enforcement response, but Deputy Peterson’s attorney declined that interview. Deputy Peterson was issued a subpoena to appear before the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public
CHAPTER 4. ON-CAMPUS SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER RESPONSE TO THE SHOOTING

Safety Commission the week of November 12, 2018. Deputy Peterson did not appear before the Commission. His lawyer provided a statement and presented the Commission with a lawsuit challenging the subpoena.

Deputy Peterson sat for interviews with the *Washington Post* and *The Today Show* in early June 2018. Those interviews are the only statements made by Deputy Peterson in regard to his response to the shooting since his response was called into question. In evaluating Deputy Peterson’s response, the Commission has considered Deputy Peterson’s interviews with BSO and the media, Deputy Peterson’s training file, surveillance video, body camera footage and witness statements.

**Findings:**

1. Former Deputy Scot Peterson was derelict in his duty on February 14, 2018, failed to act consistently with his training and fled to a position of personal safety while Cruz shot and killed MSDHS students and staff. Peterson was in a position to engage Cruz and mitigate further harm to others, and he willfully decided not to do so.

2. There is overwhelming evidence that Deputy Peterson knew that the gunshots were coming from within or within the immediate area of Building 12. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that Peterson attempted to investigate the source of the gunshots. In fact, the statement of Security Specialist Greenleaf confirms Peterson did not attempt to identify the source of the gunshots, and, by all accounts—including surveillance video—Peterson retreated to an area of safety.

3. Confusion in identifying the source of gunshots due to echoes around the structures was eliminated as an excuse for Peterson not entering Building 12 due an abundance of evidence including, but not limited to:
   - Peterson had been told by Medina that the noises were coming from within Building 12.
   - Peterson was dropped off at the doors to Building 12.
   - Peterson repeatedly referenced Building 12 on his BSO radio.
   - Peterson told Officer Best that the shooter was on the second or third floor.
   - In his BSO interview, Peterson identified the gunshots as coming from within or in the immediate area of Building 12.
4. On February 14, the BSO law enforcement response to MSDHS was hindered in part by MSDHS School Resource Officer Scot Peterson’s erroneous directions and other improper information he relayed over BSO’s main radio channel 8A, including directing responding deputies to shut down nearby intersections and requesting no pedestrian traffic anywhere on nearby roads.

5. Peterson instructed deputies to stay at least 500 feet away from the 12 or 1300 buildings. These instructions conflict with current law enforcement response procedures to active shooter situations. Law enforcement officers should try to eliminate any immediate threat even if that requires approaching gunfire and danger.

6. Deputy Peterson responded to the area of Building 12 within approximately 1 minute 39 seconds after the first shots were fired. Prior to his arrival 21 victims had already been shot, nine of whom were fatally wounded. This makes clear that seconds matter and that SROs cannot be relied upon as the only protection for schools. Even if there is a rapid response by an SRO, it is insufficient in and of itself to safeguard students and teachers.

4.2 Deputy Peterson’s Training

In 1986, Deputy Scot Peterson completed a 400-hour course for BSO’s Corrections Deputy Academy. Two years later, Deputy Peterson received his Basic Law Enforcement Recruit certification. In 1991, Deputy Peterson completed a 40-hour School Resource Officer Course. Deputy Peterson completed in-service Active Shooter Training three times during his career: in 2007, 2012 and 2016.

Deputy Scot Peterson attended at least 126 other in-service and career development courses throughout his career.

Since 2008, Deputy Peterson attended annual Florida Association of School Resource Officers (FASRO) Conferences. These week-long conferences for SROs and school administrators provided training to address current issues facing school safety, security
and crime prevention. In 2017, one of these conferences included a four-hour presentation on school shootings and a discussion of the evolution of law enforcement active shooter response to the single-officer response.

According to BSO records, Deputy Peterson's most recent in-service training for an active shooter response was on April 19, 2016. Four hours was allocated to this training topic with a limited section dedicated to scenario-based training. Deputy Peterson attended the Broward County Joint Law Enforcement Active Killer course. This was also known as a “train the trainer course.” This course was designed to train law enforcement officers to instruct school faculty and other personnel about target hardening, lockdown procedures and what to expect when law enforcement officers responded to the school for an active shooter. It also taught safe actions and reactions for students and faculty when law enforcement encountered them during an active shooter situation. The Broward Sheriff's Office chairs this training group for all law enforcement agencies in Broward County. Deputy Peterson was part of a cadre of 8-10 instructors who taught active assailant response procedures and tactics to school personnel at two different elementary schools. As of August of 2018, all Broward County elementary schools received this training. Broward County middle school training began in August of 2018.

Other than Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training there is no mandated training for SROs, including no requirement for training in single officer response to an active assailant.

**Findings:**

1. BSO trained Deputy Peterson on active shooter response, and he was familiar with solo-deputy response protocols. Peterson knew through his training that the appropriate response was to seek out the active shooter and not “containment.” (Containment is the unaccepted practice of setting a perimeter and waiting for the shooter to exit the building or waiting for other deputies or SWAT to arrive before entering as a group.)

2. Peterson knew that an active shooter situation called for a Code Red response. Based on interviews conducted with MSD school personnel, Deputy Peterson never called out a Code Red over the school radio.
3. Deputy Peterson was an SRO for 28 years, and that likely provided him a great deal of experience in some aspects of being an SRO. However, in his case, it may have also contributed to his inadequate response to this shooting.

4. SROs typically are not faced with many high-risk, high-stress situations such as domestic violence calls, robberies, shootings, etc. As a result, they are not afforded the chance to maintain and exercise their tactical skills other than in training scenarios. For that reason, it is of the utmost importance that SROs be provided with frequent, thorough and realistic training to handle high-risk, high stress situations.

5. At the time of the incident, Deputy Scot Peterson did not have a ballistic vest or a patrol rifle with him.

4.3 Broward County SRO Structure and Staffing Levels

There are approximately 230 K-12 public schools in Broward County. Fourteen different Broward County law enforcement agencies provide the SROs for Broward County public schools. In Fiscal Year 2017/2018, BCPS had 166 contracted SROs from among the 14 agencies. On February 14, 2018, BSO had 46 SROs for 57 schools. BSO contracts with 13 cities for police services, and 10 of the 13 include SRO coverage. SROs typically serve many roles, including law enforcement officer, teacher, counselor and mentor.

Decisions regarding SRO staffing in Broward County were made between the city in which the school was located and the School District. Funding was a significant factor in SRO staffing decisions. Cities and the School District share the cost of each SRO, and they negotiate the amount each will pay.

Prior to this incident, BSO did not have a dedicated SRO unit. BSO decentralized its SRO unit in response to budgetary issues around 2007. The common practice is for agencies to have an SRO unit and those SROs report to an SRO supervisor, typically a sergeant. That sergeant is responsible for supervising, training and evaluating the performance of their SROs.
In an interview with Captain Jordan, she explained that Deputy Peterson reported to a detective sergeant who supervised detectives within the Parkland District. She estimated that Deputy Peterson would likely see his sergeant “weekly if not more than that” but “probably not daily.”

In an interview with Deputy Peterson’s supervisor, Sergeant G. Molamphy, he said that, on February 14, he was the supervisor for four detectives and five SROs. When asked how frequently he saw his SROs, he responded, “Very infrequently.” Molamphy said that he would try to see his SROs at their schools at least once a week. They would meet as a group approximately once a month.

In an interview with Colonel J. Polan (commander of BSO’s Department of Law Enforcement), he stated that since the shooting BSO has made some adjustments to its organizational structure. While there still is not an SRO unit, there are some districts in which sergeants have the sole responsibility of supervising SROs. These sergeants who supervise SROs all answer to a sergeant working at headquarters, and that sergeant reports to a chain-of-command headed by Colonel Polan. Additionally, SROs have been moved from the Department of Community Services and moved under his command in the Department of Law Enforcement. However, Colonel Polan stated that, in other districts, SROs still answer to a district sergeant in the same manner in which Peterson reported to a detective sergeant.

**Findings:**

1. One SRO per campus is inadequate to ensure a timely and effective response to an active assailant situation.
2. BSO does not have a unified command and control unit in place for the SRO program. As a result, the supervisory structure of the program creates an environment for inadequate supervisory checks and balances.
3. BSO’s decentralized supervisory structure of its SRO program raises concerns about whether Peterson was adequately supervised.
RECOMMENDATIONS:

SRO Structure

BSO and all law enforcement agencies should ensure their SROs are part of a single unit and that they are closely supervised. A single unit and centralized supervisory structure provides SRO supervisors the ability to effectively communicate with and evaluate the officers and deputies at the various schools.

It should be made clear to all stakeholders that the primary responsibilities of the SRO shall be the enforcement of the laws and the safety and security of the campus, students and school personnel. The SRO may still have teaching and counseling duties, but these are secondary to that of safety and security.

SRO contracts between the law enforcement agencies and school boards should require a high level of information sharing between the SRO and school administrators. The contract should also state that: 1) the SRO or applicable law enforcement agency shall have access to educational/disciplinary records provided by the school; 2) decisions regarding law enforcement actions are solely within the discretion of law enforcement officers and that school administrators shall not interfere with law enforcement decisions; and 3) have consistent operating procedures, staffing levels and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the SRO and school personnel.

All SROs should be issued patrol rifles and ballistic vests and have those items immediately available to them on school campuses.

SRO

School Resource Officers (SROs) should receive frequent, thorough and realistic training to handle high-risk, high stress situations, especially single-officer response training.
SROs should be among the most well-trained and well-equipped law enforcement personnel to confront active-shooters. In order to do so, SROs should receive annual training in this area.

The SRO’s immediate supervisor should regularly walk the school with each SRO to discuss the layout of the school and to identify vulnerable target areas and effective methods of response.

SROs should receive adequate training on records laws, and there should be a required number of hours focusing on trauma-informed care, socio-emotional learning, restorative justice problem solving and cultural competence.

**SRO/Guardian Ratio**

There shall be a minimum of at least one law enforcement officer on every middle and high school campus and a minimum of one law enforcement officer or guardian on every elementary school campus. Each allocation of law enforcement officer/guardians must be staffed sufficiently to provide for an immediate backup and an appropriate and timely response consistent with the circumstances of an emergency situation.

A model for SRO staffing ratios is provided below. A point value would be used under this model to determine how many SROs and/or guardians should be dedicated to a particular campus.

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2 *The FDOE and Legislature should identify, define and enumerate what constitutes a public high school, middle school and elementary school, to exclude online, private, singular room specialty schools and collegiate high schools, which already have college campus police providing security.*
CHAPTER 4. ON-CAMPUS SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER RESPONSE TO THE SHOOTING

**Factors**

1. School population to include staff and teachers
   - Less than 500
   - 500-1000
   - 1000-1500
   - 1500-2000
   - 2000-2500
   - 2500-3000
   - 3000-3500
   - More than 3500

2. School Design – Campus design
   - Single building
   - Multiple buildings (connected – closed walkways)
   - Multiple buildings (connected – open walkways)
   - Multiple buildings (not connected)
   - Distance between buildings

3. School Design – Physical barriers
   - Campus perimeter fenced/walled
   - Single point access
   - Multiple point access

4. School Design – Security
   - Camera systems
     - Passive monitoring
     - Active monitoring
       - Personnel with continuous monitoring
       - Personnel with intermittent monitoring

5. Proximity to other schools
6. School location
   - Urban
   - Suburban
   - Rural

7. Staff to student ratio:
   - 10:1
   - 15:1
   - 20:1
CHAPTER 4. ON-CAMPUS SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER RESPONSE TO THE SHOOTING

Guardian Program

School districts and charter schools should permit the most expansive use of the Guardian Program under existing law to allow personnel—who volunteer, are properly selected, thoroughly screened and extensively trained—to carry concealed firearms on campuses for self-protection and the protection of other staff and students.

School districts and charter schools should not restrict the existing Guardian Program only to dedicated guardians, and all districts should expand the guardian eligibility to other school employees now permitted to be guardians.

Further, the Florida legislature should expand the Guardian Program to allow teachers who volunteer—in addition to those now authorized—who are properly selected, thoroughly screened and extensively trained to carry concealed firearms on campuses for self-protection, and the protection of other staff and students in response to an active assailant incident.

The Legislature should modify Florida Statute 30.15 (1)(k) to state that upon, a majority vote of the School Board, the sheriff shall establish a Coach Aaron Feis Guardian Program to aid in the prevention or abatement of active assailant incidents on school premises.

SRO and Guardian Funding

Senate Bill 7026 appropriated $500,000 in recurring funds and $67,000,000 in nonrecurring funds from the General Revenue Fund to the FDOE to allocate to sheriff’s offices that establish a school Guardian Program pursuant to Section 30.15, Florida Statutes. The funds are to be used for costs related to screening and training, with a one-
time stipend of $500 provided to school guardians who participate in the school Guardian Program.

It also appropriated $97,500,000 in recurring funds from the General Revenue Fund to the FDOE for the Safe Schools Allocation. Each school district and developmental research school receives $187,340 of the funds, increasing each district’s minimum amount of Safe Schools Allocation funding to $250,000 in combination with the funds appropriated in the FEFP for 2018-19. The balance of the funds is distributed to school districts based on their proportionate share of total unweighted full-time equivalent student enrollment. School districts must use the funds exclusively for hiring or contracting for school resource officers pursuant to Section 1006.12, Florida Statutes.

The Florida Legislature should: increase safe schools allocation for school resource officers and/or guardians, provide adequate recurring funding for the Guardian Program and consider increased funding for individuals who are hired solely to fill the role of guardian; allow for the use of school safety funding between different categories based on need and amend current version of Senate Bill 7026 to allow for safe schools allocation to be used for new or existing school resource officers; and restore local authority to public school boards to levy up to a half mill without a referendum for law enforcement officers or guardians, or other direct school security expenses.
CHAPTER 5. OFF-CAMPUS LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO THE SHOOTING

On February 14, 2018, the City of Parkland’s law enforcement and fire/EMS services were provided through contracts with the Broward County Sheriff’s Office (BSO) and the Coral Springs—Parkland Fire Department.

The Broward County Sheriff’s Office contracts with multiple Broward County cities to provide law enforcement services in lieu of the cities maintaining their own police departments. The Sheriff’s Office assigns a captain to each of its contract cities, and the captain serves as the commanding officer of deputies within that city—the captain is the de facto chief of police for that city. The captain works closely with the city government but reports to a BSO major who oversees a region of the county. On February 14, 2018, BSO Captain Jan Jordan was the City of Parkland’s captain. The Broward County Sheriff’s Office, as the police provider for Parkland, was the law enforcement agency principally responsible for responding to the MSDHS shooting.

BSO employs approximately 5,400 people. Sheriff Scott Israel has been the Broward County Sheriff for six years. In addition to the conventional sheriff’s office services like law enforcement, corrections and court security, BSO also provides fire and EMS services to unincorporated Broward County and several contract entities (not Parkland).

The city of Coral Springs is located immediately south of Parkland and has its own police and fire departments. The Coral Springs Police Department (CSPD) has approximately 90 to 100 officers on duty during any given weekday.

These officers are assigned to a variety of functions including patrol and detective responsibilities. CSPD has approximately 14 officers, two sergeants and one lieutenant assigned to patrol on day shift. The city is divided into six patrol zones. The northern boundary of Coral Springs is the south end of the MSDHS campus.

The Chief of Police for Coral Springs Police Department on February 14, 2018, was Tony Pustizzi. Chief Pustizzi announced his retirement several months prior to this shooting. Clyde Parry, who was one of two deputy chiefs on the day of the shooting, now serves as the Chief of Police. Because MSDHS is located outside of the Coral Springs Police Department’s jurisdiction, its officers did not initially respond to the shooting at Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School. However, once CSPD officers and command staff responded, they were instrumental in searching for the suspect and victim rescue.

5.1 Off-Campus Law Enforcement Office Response

An Uber driver dropped Nikolas Cruz off at the Pine Island Road entrance to MSDHS at 2:19 p.m. on February 14, 2018. Cruz entered the campus through an open and unstaffed pedestrian gate. Campus Monitor Andrew Medina observed Cruz walking toward Building 12 and the details of Medina’s observations are more thoroughly documented in chapter 3.

Cruz entered the east doors of Building 12 at 2:21:16. He made an immediate right turn into the east stairwell, and, at the base of the stairs, Cruz loaded his semi-automatic rifle. Cruz also put on a magazine-carrying vest (the vest was not a ballistic vest). While Cruz was loading his firearm, student Chris McKenna entered the east stairwell by coincidence and saw Cruz. McKenna told investigators that Cruz stated, “you better get out of here, something bad is about to happen...he told me to run.” McKenna fled out of the east stairwell door of Building 12.

Cruz exited the stairwell and at 2:21:38 and fired the first rounds to the west in the first-floor hallway. Ashley Baez (non-fatal), Martin Duque (fatal), Luke Hoyer (fatal) and Gina Montalto (fatal) were all shot as they were in the hallway. The first magazine in Cruz’s rifle contained only six rounds, and he then had to reload the rifle with another magazine. Cruz would reload his rifle five times while in Building 12.

The first time any law enforcement agency was notified of the shooting (other than Deputy Peterson) was at 2:22:13, which is 35 seconds after Cruz fired the first shots. The notification was a cell phone 911 call received by the Coral Springs 911 center from a student within a Building 12 classroom.

Because Coral Springs provides fire/EMS and not police services to Parkland, the 911 call-taker initiated an emergency medical response by Coral Springs fire/EMS. The call-taker also contacted the Broward Regional Communications Center so they could dispatch Broward Sheriff’s Office deputies. Despite the shooting taking place just outside CSPD’s
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jurisdiction, the Coral Springs 911 center did not make any on-duty CSPD officers aware of the shooting for over four minutes after receiving the first 911 call.

The first time any off-campus law enforcement officer (BSO or CSPD) was notified of the shooting was at 2:23:22. After the Broward Regional Communications Center received the call from the Coral Springs 911 center, a Broward Regional Communications Center dispatcher called for Deputies Peterson, Seward and Hanks. Peterson was the MSDHS SRO and Seward and Hanks were on-duty patrol deputies assigned to the city of Parkland. Seconds into that transmission, the dispatcher was cut off by Deputy Peterson, who stated that there were “possible shots fired” in Building 12. At that point, all deputies who were listening to BSO radio channel 8-Alpha would have been able to hear Peterson’s transmission, and that would have initiated the off-campus response. Peterson’s transmission took place nearly two minutes after Cruz fired the first shots. At the time Peterson made that transmission Cruz had already shot 23 people on the first floor, 11 of whom were fatalities. Seconds later, Cruz shot and killed Campus Monitor Aaron Feis, who was the 24th victim on the first floor.

At approximately 2:24:14, Peterson transmitted, “We’re talking about the 1200 building, it’s going to be the building off of Holmberg Road.” Deputy M. Kratz responded asking for a description and said he was coming from the area of Westglades Middle School. Seconds later, Kratz was the first deputy to arrive on scene, and he remained on Holmberg Road. At approximately 2:24:35, Kratz stated over the BSO radio, “I’m shutting down eastbound Holmberg at the divide between Westglades (Middle School) and the high school.” Approximately 40 seconds prior to that, Peterson told responding deputies, “I need to shut down Stoneman Douglas, the intersection.”

In his interview, Deputy Kratz stated that he saw three school buses driving toward MSDHS in the eastbound lanes and that he was aware that elementary schools were in the process of releasing students. Due to seeing the buses and hearing Deputy Peterson’s transmission, he chose to stop the buses in that area.

Immediately after Deputy Kratz transmitted that he was at “Holmberg at the divide between Westglades (Middle School) and the high school” (2:24:35), Deputy E. Eason
transmitted, "I'll get the west side of Stoneman on Holmberg" (2:24:40). BSO’s GPS records reveal that, at 2:25:07, Deputy Eason was 0.3 miles north of Holmberg Road and 0.7 miles north of the position he would later take on the east side of the Westglades Middle School campus. This means that when Deputy Eason made the transmission that he would go to the “west side of Stoneman on Holmberg,” he would have been even further from campus; however, due to limited GPS records, the exact distance is unknown. Nevertheless, the distance would have been how long it took Eason to travel in 27 seconds. We know that Deputy Eason ended up bypassing the entire MSDHS campus, including Building 12 where gunshots were being heard, and he went to Westglades Middle School. Eason was far away from MSDHS when he volunteered to go to Westglades Middle on the opposite side of the MSDHS campus and this raises concerns about Eason’s actions. We will revisit Deputy Eason’s response later in this chapter.

At 2:25:08, Deputy Kratz transmitted that he heard gunshots by the football field. In their interviews, several deputies said this transmission caused them to suspect that the shooter(s) had moved to that location or that there was perhaps a second shooter. In his interview, Deputy Kratz stated that the gunshots he heard sounded as though they were 30 – 40 feet away from him. This does not appear to be an unrealistic conclusion on Kratz’s part; although Cruz was much further away than Kratz believed, Cruz was firing in Kratz’s general direction, but there is no evidence that Cruz was actually targeting Kratz. Kratz was north of a six-foot-tall chain-link fence, which had banners on it and obstructed his view of the campus. He also was unable to see through the bleachers of the football/soccer field. He described how he went to his trunk to retrieve his rifle.

Deputy Kratz’s transmission about hearing shots near the football field was one of the reasons given by Deputy Eason in his interviews as to why he went to the east side of the Westglades Middle School campus. Eason was asked, “What made you park there versus anywhere else on that campus?” He replied, “I believe when I was getting there I heard a deputy say shots by the football field.” Evidence disproves Eason’s assertion. The first transmission making reference to football fields occurred 28 seconds after Eason said he would go to the “west side of Stoneman on Holmberg.”
GPS records from BSO reveal that by 2:25:12 Kratz had reached the north side of the football field on Holmberg Road. The above-referenced radio transmission by Kratz indicates that he was there just prior to this GPS data showing him there, but the GPS data confirms Kratz's location.

At 2:25:18, Deputy Peterson transmitted, “We’re looking at the 1200 building. It’s gonna be the 300 building. It’s gonna be, uh, right off of Holmberg Road by the senior lot.” Peterson clearly knew it was the “1200 building,” and investigators believe that Peterson intended to say that it was the three-story building, not the 300 building.

At 2:25:31, Sergeant Heinrich, who was an off-duty CSPD sergeant volunteering with the MSDHS baseball team, was running east from the baseball field in the direction of Building 12. He crossed paths with Campus Monitor Bonner who was fleeing west on his golf cart. Campus Monitor Bonner told Heinrich that there was a Code Red, active shooter. Sgt. Heinrich was unarmed and wearing shorts and T-shirt.

By 2:25:35, Cruz had fired all rounds that injured and/or killed all victims. Cruz was on the third floor and fired additional rounds, but all remaining gunshots were from the third-floor teacher’s lounge on the west side of Building 12. These additional gunshots through the teacher’s lounge windows were an effort by Cruz to snipe victims outside the building from his elevated position. As additional deputies arrived and heard gunshots, those shots were all attempts by Cruz to shoot out the windows and shoot people below who were evacuating the campus.

At 2:25:42, Deputy Kratz stated over BSO’s radio, “sounds like there’s some students say they thought it was firecrackers, but we’re not sure, by the football field.” In his interview, Deputy Kratz said that he attempted to get information from students fleeing MSDHS, and those students made references to fireworks and firecrackers.

At 2:25:53, surveillance video showed Sergeant Heinrich walking north on the west side of Building 13. As he continued north toward the student parking lot he encountered injured (non-fatal) student Kyle Laman and assisted him in getting emergency medical treatment.
GPS records from BSO revealed that at 2:25:58 (4 minutes 20 seconds after the first shots) Deputy R. Seward arrived on scene. In Deputy Seward’s interview he described approaching from the east on Holmberg Road and crossing through the intersection with Pine Island Road. He continued west on Holmberg Road and made a U-turn north of the west gate that provided access to the student parking lot (north of Building 13). He began driving east on Holmberg Road and parked on the south side of Holmberg Road near the east gate.

Deputy Seward told investigators that he was in the 6300 block of Holmberg Road at the time he heard radio traffic about the shooting. That location is approximately 2.7 miles east of the MSDHS campus on Holmberg Road. He responded to that specific area north of campus due to hearing Peterson refer to Building 12 and having prior knowledge of where Building 12 was located. Deputy Seward was uncertain if he saw any other law enforcement vehicles on Holmberg Road.

While pulling onto the curb along Holmberg Road Deputy Seward heard “five or six very, very loud – very, very loud (gunshots)...they sounded like bombs...I didn’t know exactly where they were...I knew they were on campus somewhere.” He said that the gunshots sounded as though they were coming from west of Building 12. After hearing the gunshots, Deputy Seward heard someone broadcast that shots were heard by the football field and a request for bolt cutters.

Deputy Seward did not immediately move toward the area of the gunshots, and instead he went to the rear of his vehicle to get his ballistic vest and then went behind his engine block (north of his car) to put on the vest. Deputy Seward remained on Holmberg Road until he approached Building 12 at 2:37 p.m., approximately 11 minutes after his arrival. This was captured on Dep. J. Johnson’s body camera.

At 2:26:00, Deputy Peterson transmitted, “We’re locking down the school right now. Make sure there’s no pedestrian traffic anywhere on Holmberg Road.”

At 2:26:08, the first radio transmission from a BSO supervisor occurred. Lt. S. O’Neill from the nearby North Lauderdale district said he would be responding, and he also directed North Lauderdale motorcycle units to respond.
At 2:26:24, Sergeant B. Reid (CSPD) transmitted over CSPD’s main radio channel and asked if dispatch had information on an active shooter. The dispatcher confirmed that there was an active shooter at MSDHS and that they were hearing gunshots in the background of the 911 calls. Sergeant Reid inquired on the radio because he saw Coral Springs Fire Department Division Chief Moser running through the joint CSPD/CSFD administration building, and Sgt. Reid asked Division Chief Moser where he was going. Division Chief Moser told Sgt. Reid of the active shooter at MSDHS. Sgt. Reid’s inquiry about the shooting with the Coral Springs Communications Center is what led to on-duty CSPD officers becoming aware of the shooting and then rapidly responding to the scene.

At 2:26:31, Deputy J. Stambaugh arrived on Holmberg Road north of Building 13 as established by his body camera. Stambaugh had been at a nearby private school working an off-duty detail. As he exited his vehicle, Stambaugh’s body camera video showed Building 12 to the south and an individual running west on the sidewalk on the south side of Holmberg Road toward the west gate. While the image of the individual is not explicitly clear, investigators reasonably believe the image was that of Detective B. Goolsby (BSO). Deputy Stambaugh continued to the rear of his vehicle to retrieve his ballistic vest. Deputy Stambaugh said that prior to this incident he did not wear a vest. He was not issued a rifle. Gunshots were heard on the recording from Deputy Stambaugh’s body camera as he put on his ballistic vest. Despite hearing the gunshots, Stambaugh did not move toward the campus.

At 2:26:54, CSPD Officer T. Burton broadcasted that he was on scene at MSDHS. Officer Burton later said in an interview that this transmission was made shortly before he had actually arrived on campus (this is not an uncommon practice).

At 2:27:03, Detective Goolsby (BSO) transmitted, “We definitely have shots being fired.” Goolsby's transmission was followed by some static on the radio resulting in unintelligible traffic. That static was then followed by the end of a transmission by Deputy Kratz, “...right by the football field.”

The shots heard by Detective Goolsby (BSO), which led to that transmission at 2:27:03 are the same five gunshots that were captured on the body camera of Deputy Stambaugh as he
was on Holmberg Road putting on his ballistic vest. The gunshots were loud and distinct. Stambaugh remained next to his vehicle for several minutes, even as Cruz fled Building 12. The volley of shots, which began at 2:27:03 and lasted until 2:27:10, were the final shots fired by Cruz.

It has been established that Cruz fired his last shots from 2:27:03 to 2:27:10, and we know that by this point the following seven BSO deputies were on scene: Sergeant B. Miller, Deputy E. Eason, Deputy M. Kratz, Deputy J. Stambaugh, Detective B. Goolsby, Deputy A. Perry, and Deputy R. Seward. Each of those deputies stated in their interviews that they heard gunshots. We have covered the arrival of Deputies Stambaugh and Kratz. We will now discuss the response by the remaining five deputies who heard gunshots.

Sergeant B. Miller stated that he was at the BSO Parkland Office when he heard the radio traffic about the shooting (approximately 1.3 miles from MSDHS). He said that he heard an estimated three to four gunshots as he was arriving and described them as “...rapid, sounded outside, did not sound muffled at all.” Due to the gunshots sounding as though
they were outside and because Deputy Peterson was directing traffic to be shut down, he believed the shooter was outside.

Sergeant Miller said that he experienced radio problems early on in the response and that he repeatedly tried to get on the radio to coordinate a response. “I was controlling the scene as best I could,” said Sergeant Miller. Miller said he was “trying to get resources and people in places to help” and expressed a concern about parents coming to pick up their children. Despite Sergeant Miller’s claims, his first radio transmission was at 2:32:08, approximately ten minutes after the first radio traffic about the shooting and approximately five minutes after his arrival. In that first transmission Miller raised dispatch but was cut off by Deputy Eason. Thirty-four seconds later Miller requested that dispatchers send the helicopter and K-9. There is no evidence to suggest that the throttling problems would have begun by the time Miller made his first transmissions. In fact, the evidence is that the radio throttling issues did not begin until approximately seven minutes after Miller arrived. There is also no evidence that Miller effectively “directed resources” and no evidence that he directed deputies toward the gunshots that he heard upon his arrival.

Sergeant Miller said after his arrival that he went behind his vehicle and put on his vest. He recalled seeing Deputies Seward and Hanks and heard Deputy Hanks tell him that he was going inside (Deputy Hanks said in his interview he did not hear gunshots; investigators believe that Hanks arrived shortly after Cruz’s last volley of shots).

This chapter has already evaluated aspects of Deputy Eason’s response, but to recap: Eason was the deputy who at 2:24:40 stated, “I'll get the west side of Stoneman on Holmberg.” He made this statement immediately after Deputy Kratz said, “I'm shutting down eastbound Holmberg at the divide between Westglades (Middle School) and the high school.” At 2:25:07, Eason’s GPS showed him to be on Pine Island Road approximately 0.3 miles north of Holmberg Road and approximately 0.7 miles of where he would arrive on the east edge of the Westglades Middle School campus. Eason stated in his interviews that he heard gunshots, so we know that he was either on—or in immediate proximity—the MSDHS campus at 2:27:03.
Deputy Eason stated during interviews that he was leaving Heron Heights Elementary where he was assisting with traffic control and was going east to handle another call. This put Deputy Eason approximately 1.9 miles north of the MSDHS campus at the time he heard the radio traffic about the shooting. By comparison, Deputy Seward was 2.7 miles from campus and he arrived on Holmberg Road by 2:25:58. Even after multiple interviews with Deputy Eason, it was not clear when he arrived on campus, and investigators found his statements to be both vague and contradictory. A fact that can be established is that Deputy Eason’s body camera began recording at 2:28:03 when he was on the east side of the Westglades Middle School campus near the MSDHS baseball field. A review of known times regarding Eason is as follows:

- 2:24:40 – Eason said, “I’ll get the west side of Stoneman on Holmberg.”
- 2:25:07 – Eason’s GPS showed him to be on Pine Island Road 0.3 miles north of Holmberg Road and 0.7 miles north of his destination, the east side of the WMS campus.
- 2:27:03 – Cruz’s final volley of gunshots began; Eason was on or in immediate proximity to the campus to hear those shots.
- 2:28:03 – Eason’s body camera began recording as he was on the east side of the WMS campus near the MSDHS baseball fields.

The excessive time associated with Eason’s response raises multiple concerns, including:

- Eason volunteered to take a position on the west side of campus when he came from the east—particularly because there was another deputy (Kratz) who just said he was at that same location (west of campus).
- Assuming Eason travelled toward campus urgently, he should have travelled the 0.3 miles to the northeast corner of campus in approximately 30 seconds (if traveling at 40 mph). That would have put him on campus at approximately 2:25:37 which is approximately the same time Cruz entered the teacher’s lounge on the third floor and began shooting. However, we know that Eason bypassed the MSDHS campus and continued to the east side.
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of the Westglades Middle School campus, a distance of approximately 0.7 miles. Again, assuming he continued in an urgent manner he should have been able travel that distance in approximately one minute (if traveling at 40 mph). That would have put Eason on the east side of campus at approximately 2:26:07. Given how long it took Eason to get to the school, there are issues as to whether Eason actually travelled in an urgent manner. If Eason travelled urgently as he should have, then the issue is what Eason was doing—or not doing—up until 2:28:03 when his body camera turned on. Regardless of what he was doing, Eason did not move toward the sound of the gunshots on the MSDHS campus.

During interviews with Eason, investigators attempted to address these concerns. Eason stated that he was previously the SRO at Westglades Middle School and served there for approximately eight months. Prior to his interview with the investigators, Eason reviewed the footage from his body camera. He could not recall where he was when he activated his body camera and initially said he could not recall if he had to put on his vest. Later in that same interview, Eason stated, “I believe I put on my vest when I got there so I had to redo the camera when I arrived on scene, I had actually put my camera off my shirt and put it onto the vest. So, it took a few seconds to do that, I had to find a place to put it on.” It is concerning that within a matter of seconds during the interview Eason transitioned from not remembering whether he put his vest on to remembering specific details about how he put his vest on as it related to his body camera.

Deputy Eason stated that he “probably” had the windows down in his car due to the fact he does that frequently while on patrol. He remembered pulling up near a deputy and said he believed that deputy was the one who made a transmission about hearing shots near the football field. This is likely a reference to Deputy Kratz who was on Holmberg Road north of the football/soccer field.

In one interview, Deputy Eason described hearing gunshots after getting out of his car “as soon as I got there” and from the direction of the high school. In his interview with MSDPSC investigators, Eason said, “I’m not sure exactly when I heard it (gunshots), if I was
approaching the school or when I got there but it could have been anywhere between six and a dozen total.” He also stated, “I didn’t know where they were, the gunshots, but I already saw the deputies there (on Holmberg), and so I passed them.”

Deputy Eason was asked, “What made you park there (west side of MSD campus) versus anywhere else on that campus?” to which he replied, “I believe when I was getting there I heard a deputy say ‘shots by the football field.’” This is inaccurate because Eason stated over the radio that he would go to the “west side of Stoneman on Holmberg” 28 seconds before there was any reference to the football fields.

Deputy Eason said, “My main focus at that point was to lock down Westglades and make sure no kids were out there and get them inside.” He referenced his brief time as an SRO at WMS and said, “I knew upon responding that the SRO was not on scene at that school….“ Evidence also disproves this claim by Deputy Eason. At 2:32:08, Deputy Eason attempted to raise the WMS SRO, Deputy J. India. Eason asked, “Hey, India do you have Westglades locked down?” This transmission was five minutes after Eason is known to have arrived on the WMS campus when he turned on his body camera. If Eason knew that India was not on campus as he claimed, why then was he asking India if the school was on lockdown?

Investigators asked Eason, “Was there something that prevented you from entering MSD’s campus to go towards or possibly towards where you thought the gunshots were?” Eason said, “Well, I didn’t know where they were, the gunshots.” Again, evidence disproves this claim by Deputy Eason. At 2:29:34, Deputy Eason’s body camera revealed that he approached some civilians on the baseball field and asked them if they heard the gunshots as he gestured in the direction of the MSDHS campus. Eason said that he heard “at least a dozen, at least.”

Numerous concerns exist about Deputy Eason’s response and his explanations.

Next, Deputy A. Perry was one of the seven deputies who heard gunshots upon his arrival, putting him on scene by 2:27:03 at the latest. Perry stated he was working as an SRO at Park Trails Elementary School (1.3 miles from MSDHS) when he heard the radio transmissions. He put on his vest, collected his rifle and magazines and drove to the scene.
Deputy Perry arrived on Holmberg Road from the east and parked in the left-hand turn lane to make a left turn (south) into the west gate of the student parking lot. He went to that specific location because he believed that he heard Deputy Peterson reference Building 12 and he knew from prior experience where Building 12 was located. Perry stated that upon his arrival he saw Detective Goolsby (BSO) on Holmberg Road near his trunk. Around the time Perry exited his vehicle and approached the west gate, Perry heard three to five gunshots.

Deputy Perry and Detective Goolsby (BSO) approached the west gate of the student parking lot where Detective Goolsby (BSO) unlocked the pedestrian gate (Goolsby was already in possession of keys to the exterior gates of all Broward County schools because he lived on a school campus). At 2:27:50, Deputy Perry transmitted, “We have shots fired. I’m trying to get open – the fence open.” Based on this transmission, we know that Perry and Goolsby were at the west gate by 2:27:50 at the latest (again, due to hearing gunshots we know they were more likely there by 2:27:03).

While at the gate, Deputy Perry saw CSPD Sergeant Heinrich in the northwest student parking lot with injured student Kyle Laman. Deputy Perry transmitted over the radio that he received information from a parent about the shooting; Deputy Perry clarified in his interview that was actually a reference to Sgt. Heinrich who Perry knew from prior contact. In one of his interviews, Deputy Perry made reference to also hearing radio traffic about hearing gunshots near the football field.

Deputy Perry said he believed that the gunshots were coming from an area near the northwest corner of Building 6. Perry said he came to this conclusion due to hearing the gunshots, seeing Kyle Laman and Sergeant Heinrich in the northwest parking lot, radio traffic from Deputy Kratz about the football field and radio traffic from Deputy Marchese being with an injured student near the entrance to Westglades Middle School.

Deputy Perry said that he continued south and took a position behind a car on the north side of Building 13 “waiting for people to arrive and we’re looking because we’re hearing nothing.” He remembered seeing Coach Feis lying outside of Building 12 and bullet holes on the west end of the third floor. He was under the impression that the shooter had been
on the west side of Building 13 shooting at Building 12 and Coach Feis from the west. Deputy Perry was asked why he did not approach the basketball court where he thought the shots were coming from, and he said that Detective Goolsby (BSO) went ahead of him to do that. Deputy Perry remained behind that vehicle for an extended period of time. He would later be joined behind the car by Captain Jan Jordan. Those details will be examined later in this chapter.

Detective Goolsby (BSO), like Sergeant Miller, was at the BSO-Parkland office when he heard the radio traffic about the shooting. He parked on Holmberg Road between the west and east gates of the student parking lot. He approached the west pedestrian gate at approximately the same time as Deputy Perry and it was then that he heard gunshots; this was most likely the last volley of gunshots that took place at 2:27:03. We know that at 2:27:50, Deputy Perry stated “We have shots fired. I’m trying to get open – the fence open.” Detective Goolsby (BSO) accurately determined that the gunshots were coming from between Buildings 12 and 13. Goolsby saw Kyle Laman and Sergeant Heinrich and attempted to get some intelligence from Laman about the shooting. Goolsby then directed them west toward the other deputies (Kratz and possibly Marchese).

Detective Goolsby (BSO) said that he went south toward the southeast corner of Building 13, and, at some point while advancing, he lost track of Deputy Perry. He saw the holes on the third floor of Building 12 but could not determine whether the rounds had penetrated the glass from inside or outside of the building. Goolsby said he did not continue further south on campus due to not having heard gunshots for a couple of minutes. He remained on the west side of Building 12 and would later be joined by additional officers and deputies.

Deputy J. Stambaugh was the deputy whose body camera recorded Cruz’s final shots from 2:27:03 to 2:27:10 while Stambaugh was putting on his ballistic vest. Stambaugh stated that he knew the gunshots were coming from the campus but he could not tell where on campus they were coming from. He recalled seeing two deputies inside the fence; these individuals would have been Detective Goolsby (BSO) and Deputy Perry. Deputy
Sambaugh said that he remained by his vehicle on Holmberg Road because the gunshots had stopped.

Deputy Sambaugh’s body camera showed that as he was moving his body camera to the front of his ballistic vest Deputy Peterson stated over the radio, “Make sure I have a unit over in the front of the school, make sure nobody comes inside the school” (2:27:30). Sambaugh took a position behind his patrol vehicle as Deputy Seward (also on Holmberg Road) said that a deputy was needed to shut down Holmberg Road at Pine Island Road (2:27:42).

At approximately 2:27:49, as deputies were on Holmberg Road (Miller, Seward, Sambaugh and Kratz), at the MSDHS west gate (Perry and Goolsby) and the WMS campus (Eason), Officer T. Burton transmitted on the CSPD channel that he was on the south side of the school and he needed more details. It was at approximately that same point (2:27:50) that Deputy Perry made the transmission that he and Goolsby were at the west pedestrian gate to the student parking lot. This occurred as Sambaugh took a position behind his vehicle. Approximately ten seconds later Peterson transmitted, “Broward, do not approach the 12 or 1300 buildings. Stay at least 500 feet away at this point” (2:28:00). Sambaugh went on to stay behind his vehicle for several more minutes which will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter. As that was all taking place, Cruz exited the west side of Building 12 (2:27:54) and ran west between Buildings 6 and 13.

2:28:03 is the point at which Deputy Eason’s body camera began recording as he was on the eastern edge of the WMS campus next to the MSDHS baseball field. Students were seen running west through the fields toward WMS. Approximately 3 minutes had elapsed since Eason had been 0.7 miles from his current location.

At 2:28:08, Officer Burton transmitted over CSPD’s main channel, “Units go to the north side, units go to the north side of the school.” By that point, Burton had met with Campus Monitor Andrew Medina on the east side of Building 1. Medina provided information to Officer Burton about the location of the shooting and the suspect description. Approximately 20 seconds later, Burton was captured on a camera between Buildings 1 and 8 as he was walked north. He got onto the golf cart with Medina and they continued
north. Medina told Burton that Building 12 was where the shooting had taken place but made no mention of Peterson. Simultaneously, Captain J. Jordan and her executive officer, Lieutenant M. DeVita, were pulling into the administrative parking lot east of Buildings 1 and 8.

At 2:28:39, Lt. S. O’Neill transmitted over the radio that Crime Suppression Team (CST) deputies needed to set-up for an active shooter response upon their arrival.

At 2:28:43, Captain Jordan and Lieutenant DeVita were seen on surveillance video running to the main entrance of Building 1, which was near the northeast corner of Building 1.

At 2:28:46, Deputy L. Marchese stated over the radio, “I have the gunshot victim...he’s by the entrance to Westglades (Middle School) on the west side of the school.” Deputy Marchese was referring to Kyle Laman, who was still being escorted by Sergeant Heinrich to the west. Laman and Heinrich were inside (south of) the six-foot-tall chain-link fence. Marchese provided security for them as they fled west and then south toward the baseball fields.

In his interview, Deputy Marchese stated that he did not hear gunshots upon his arrival. He approached on Holmberg Road from the west at which point he encountered Laman and Heinrich. He described how he encountered radio problems while trying to call for Fire Rescue.

CSPD GPS records revealed that, at 2:28:50, Officer D. Fernandes was driving north on Pine Island Road approaching Holmberg Road on his agency motorcycle. In his interview, Officer Fernandes stated that he blocked traffic for other patrol vehicles that were coming in behind him. Officer Fernandes said that as he arrived on Holmberg Road he saw deputies. He asked the deputies if they were going onto the campus, and at least one of them said they were not. Officer Fernandes told the deputies that he and other CSPD officers were going onto campus, which they did. The deputies who Fernandes observed and spoke with, and who stayed on Homberg Road as opposed to entering the campus included Sergeant Miller.
Deputy Hanks arrived after Miller and Seward and sometime between the final gunshot (2:27:10) and the arrival of Officer Fernandes (2:28:50). In his interview, Deputy Seward said he saw Deputy Hanks arrive east of his location and run toward Sergeant Miller. He saw Officer Fernandes on Holmberg Road but quickly lost sight of him and did not know where he went. Seward saw approximately three to four CSPD cars arrive east of his location. He had no interaction with any of those officers but recalled one of them asking Sergeant Miller if he could open the gate.

Deputy Hanks said that when he arrived on Holmberg Road from the east he did not hear any gunshots. Deputy Hanks was not issued a body camera due to being on the Parkland budget.

In his interview, Hanks said that, upon arrival, he saw Sergeant Miller west of him on Holmberg Road and also saw Deputy Seward on Holmberg Road. Deputy Hanks recalled hearing radio traffic about shots and injuries near the football field. He had no knowledge of the building numbers at the MSDHS campus.

Deputy Hanks said that once he arrived he exited his vehicle and took cover behind his vehicle for a few seconds to get his bearings. He was joined by an unidentified CSPD officer behind his vehicle. Deputy Hanks said he left his vehicle and ran west past Sergeant Miller who was at his car.

At approximately 2:28:53, Assistant Principal Jeff Morford and AP Porter evacuated students who had been sheltered in the camera room inside of Building 1. Morford and Greenleaf eventually went on to review the surveillance video and share their observations over the school radio with both Deputy Peterson and Assistant Principal Winfred Porter.

At approximately 2:28:54, Officer Burton broadcasted the suspect description as a white male with an ROTC uniform, burgundy shirt. This would have been information he obtained from Campus Monitor Medina.

At approximately 2:29:06, Deputy Perry transmitted, “We don’t know (where the shooter is) but we’re entering the building in front of the 13 building. Building 13. (Goolsby) and myself are entering.” Deputy Marchese then asked, “Does anybody have bolt cutters? I
can’t get this kid out of the fence. He’s stuck in the fence, I need bolt cutters.” Deputy Kratz responded by saying that “the coach (Heinrich) is with him, see if he can help him over the gate.”

At 2:29:09, Medina drove near the northeast corner of Building 8 in his golf cart with Officer Burton in the passenger seat. Mediana dropped Burton off in that general area and he took cover near a tree in the southwest corner of the parking lot near the east side of Building 12. Simultaneously, Cruz was fleeing south on the west side of campus between the tennis courts and Building 9.

At 2:29:16, Officer Burton transmitted over the radio “...last seen in the three-story building, north parking lot.” During the course of interviews, several CSPD officers identified this radio transmission as the sole reason that they knew where to go. Building 12 is the only three-story building on campus. That, coupled with the fact that it is on the northeast corner of campus, made Burton’s transmission extremely effective. Because there was no radio interoperability with CSPD, only officers on CSPD’s radios would have heard this transmission; it would not have been heard by BSO deputies.

At approximately 2:29:20, CSPD’s GPS records show that Officer Harrison—another motorcycle officer—also arrived on campus. Harrison arrived from the west on Holmberg Road and parked his motorcycle north of the football fields near Deputies Kratz and Marchese. In his interview, Harrison described seeing an unidentified deputy (presumably Kratz) stopping traffic, and he then passed by another deputy (likely Marchese) getting his rifle from his trunk.

At 2:29:20, Deputy Peterson was seen on the surveillance video making hand gestures in the direction of Officer Burton. Officer Burton said in his interview that he saw Peterson had his gun drawn in a “low-ready” (waist level and pointed straight ahead) position and was looking east and west. He was told by Deputy Peterson that the shooter may be in the parking lot. Officer Burton said in his interview, “I felt it was my job to lock that (the parking lot) down, and if there was going to be gunfire, I was going to fire back...so I was trying to prevent some type of ambush or if the suspect wanted to try to escape, if he was hiding in the parking lot, I’d be right there.”
At 2:29:33, Detective Goolsby transmitted over the radio, “Let’s get a command post set up on the south side of the Sawgrass in Coral Springs off of Pine Island. The gate for the student entrance is unlocked. We need to get units in here so we can start trying to find this guy.” This was the first attempt—other than Peterson’s transmissions—to try and provide specific direction to the responding deputies; no supervisor from BSO-Parkland, including Sgt. Miller, had transmitted anything over the radio to this point.

At approximately the same time Deputy Goolsby transmitted, Deputy Eason was still on the east side of the WMS campus. He spoke with some civilians at the baseball field and asked them if they heard the gunshots as he motioned his hand toward campus. Eason said to them that he heard the gunshots, “at least a dozen, at least.” Simultaneously, Cruz was running west to join the group of students who were fleeing to WMS.

At 2:29:35, Kelvin Greenleaf let Captain Jordan and Lieutenant DeVita into the east doors of Building 1. Captain Jordan could be seen manipulating her radio and holding her cell phone up to her ear. She went on to move back and forth between the doors on the east and north sides of Building 1. Captain Jordan’s actions at this point are described in more detail in section 5.2,

At approximately 2:29:42, Officer Burton transmitted over the CSPD radio that the suspect was no longer shooting and that he is with the MSDHS SRO getting more information. Seconds later, Cruz joined the group of fleeing students and blended into the crowd. He followed the crowd to the nearby Walmart.

At 2:30:04 a dispatcher broadcasted over CSPD’s main channel that there were three people shot inside of room 1216. BSO had information at that time that people had been shot in Building 12, but BSO did not have the specific classroom number because deputies could not hear the transmission on the CSPD radio.

CSPD’s GPS records reveal that, at 2:30:20, Officers Wilkins, Dougherty, and Whittington arrived in the area of the MSD campus.
2:30:30 is the estimated time at which Sergeant Myers, Sergeant Mazzei, Detective Monzon and Officer Wilkins arrived on Holmberg Road near the west gate. They then entered the west doors of Building 12 and were the first law enforcement officers to enter the building.

This group of CSPD officers is the group described by Deputy Hanks in his statement. Again, investigators suspect that Hanks arrived sometime between the final shot (2:27:10) and the arrival of Officer Fernandes (2:28:50). Deputy Hanks said that while he was near Sergeant Miller he saw about five officers and a deputy running toward campus. That deputy was likely Deputy Volpe. Deputy Hanks said of this group, “They were obviously together in a line running with purpose…it looks like they know exactly where they’re going and that’s where I need to be.” Deputy Hanks ran toward this group and joined up with them. Deputy Hanks ended up being the first deputy inside Building 12.

At approximately 2:30:40, Detective Monzon transmitted over his radio that he was on the north side of the scene by Building 13 and with two deputies preparing to move forward. It could not be determined exactly which deputies these were, but it would have been Goolsby, Perry, Hanks and/or Volpe (we do know that Hanks and Volpe were the only two who approached and entered Building 12).
In an interview with Officer Wilkins, he said that as he was in the group moving toward Building 12 when they came across a deputy behind a tree. Officer Wilkins did not know the deputy by name, but the location where he was seen and the deputy’s description is consistent with that of Deputy Perry. Officer Wilkins said that the deputy had his rifle trained on the third floor of Building 12 and said that the shooter was on the third floor. The deputy said to Wilkins and Monzon, “We all can’t stand behind this tree, we’re gonna get shot.”

In Deputy Perry’s interview, he said that he had taken a position behind a car “waiting for people to arrive and we’re looking because we’re hearing nothing.” Investigators asked Perry why it was that when the CSPD officers and Deputy Volpe passed by him he did not join them, and he said, “If I leave this area, he can run out the gate, he can circle back around and ambush, someone has to do overwatch...if I leave this spot, who’s going to cover this area?”

At approximately 2:30:46, Deputy Kratz stated that he had been approached by an unidentified officer and told there were three additional victims inside Building 12 and also told that the shooter was wearing an ROTC uniform. Based on Kratz’s location, investigators believe this information had been given to him by Officer Harrison.

At 2:31:30 (9 minutes, 52 seconds after the first shots), Captain Jordan was the first BSO supervisor/administrator to transmit over the radio. She asked, “I know there’s a lot going on, do we have a perimeter set up right now and everybody cleared out of the school?” Captain Jordan was inside or in the immediate area of Building 1 at the time she made that transmission. In response, Deputy Peterson said, “We’re in supposed lockdown right now. Nobody’s leaving the school. Everybody knows it’s a lockdown.”

At 2:31:47, Officer Burton transmitted that he was on the “east part of the three-story building in the parking lot with my long gun.”

At 2:31:49, an unknown person transmitted over the BSO radio, “We might want to consider somebody up on the Sawgrass to the south of the school.” This was the only statement made regarding getting somebody onto the Sawgrass Expressway and was a significant fact in evaluating Deputy Stambaugh’s response.
At 2:31:49, as depicted on his body camera Deputy Greetham arrived on the southeast corner of the MSD campus in the bus loop. He exited his vehicle and slung his rifle. There were approximately four CSPD cars and a law enforcement motorcycle present when Greetham arrived. Greetham unsling his rifle and went to the trunk of his vehicle to put on his ballistic vest. Deputy Greetham went on to spend one minute and seven seconds unslinging his rifle, removing his body camera and other equipment, put on his vest, reattaching the body camera and again slinging his rifle. During that time, another deputy approached Greetham, and Greetham told him to wait “while I get dressed.” It appeared from the video that Greetham had not been wearing a vest and this was Greetham’s standard patrol ballistic vest and not an additional rifle-plate vest that he was putting on.

At approximately 2:31:50 (10 minutes, 12 seconds after the first shots), a group of law enforcement officers could be seen running south from the west gate on Holmberg Road toward the west side of Building 12. The poor image quality prevented identification of the individuals or the color of their uniforms but investigators are highly confident this group included Sergeant Mazzei (CSPD), Sergeant Myers (CSPD), Detective Monzon (CSPD), Officer Wilkins, Officer Harrison, Deputy Volpe, Detective Goolsby (BSO) and Deputy Hanks. This first group to approach Building 12 will be referred to in this report as the Mazzei Group.

At approximately 2:31:57, Deputy D. Yurchuck drove west along the south side of the MSDHS campus paralleling the Sawgrass Expressway. He was approaching the rear of the group of fleeing students that he had identified as being vulnerable and unprotected.

At 2:32:00, Captain Gallagher (CSPD) told officers on CSPD’s main channel that the building they needed to go to was the three-story building on the northeast corner of campus. Captain Gallagher’s children attended MSD so he had a unique familiarity with the campus.

At 2:32:08, Sergeant Miller transmitted across BSO’s channel for the first time; however he only raised the dispatcher saying “17 Delta 2” (Sgt. Miller’s call sign) and was then cut off by Deputy Eason. The transmission by Eason was the one in which he asked the WMS SRO if he had Westglades Middle School locked-down. Immediately after Eason’s transmission Deputy Stambaugh stated, “I’ll go up to the Sawgrass south of the school.”
CHAPTER 5. OFF-CAMPUS LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO THE SHOOTING

This transmission by Deputy Stambaugh came 12 seconds after someone suggested getting a deputy on the Sawgrass Expressway. In his interview, Deputy Stambaugh stated that he went to the Sawgrass because the dispatcher asked “numerous times.” The BSO radio traffic contradicts Stambaugh’s assertion and establishes that there was a single transmission asking for someone to go to the Sawgrass Expressway. Prior to getting into his car to leave Holmberg Road, Deputy Stambaugh had been behind his car for approximately five minutes, since 2:32:10. During that time, he called for another nearby deputy or officer (unidentified) to come over by him. Also during that time, a CSPD officer arrived in a marked vehicle, gathered his rifle and advanced south toward campus, while Stambaugh remained behind his car.

Deputy Stambaugh’s body camera showed that he then entered his vehicle and as he was preparing to leave he was approached by Chief Frank Babinec of Coral Springs Fire Department. Deputy Stambaugh told Chief Babinec there were “three people down” and directed Chief Babinec to go farther west.

Deputy Stambaugh’s body camera and one of the school surveillance cameras captured him leaving the school. As officers and deputies were running southeast from the west gate toward Building 12 Deputy Stambaugh’s vehicle drove west—away from campus—on Holmberg Road. Deputy Stambaugh continued on a path traveling approximately 3.8 miles over five and a half minutes until he arrived at the Sawgrass Expressway south of Stoneman Douglas. Upon reaching that location, Deputy Stambaugh took out binoculars and provided overwatch for the southern side of the MSD campus.
Deputy Stambaugh’s interview revealed one of the more unusual exchanges about the last time he attended active shooter training. An investigator asked him about the last time he attended active shooter training and he said he could not remember. To try and narrow down the time frame, the following exchange took place:

Q: 20 years ago?
A: No, not 20 years ago.

Q: 10 years ago?
A: I couldn’t give you a time. It was a long time ago.

According to BSO records, Deputy Stambaugh attended active shooter training on February 08, 2016. It was obvious Stambaugh had no recollection of his active shooter training in 2016.

At approximately 2:32:22 Sergeants Mazzei and Myers were seen on a school camera sprinting to the west side of Building 12. Sergeant Mazzei had a rifle slung across his chest,
and Sgt. Myers had his handgun pointed up toward the second and third floors where the damaged windows could be seen.

In his interview, Sergeant Myers—a member of the CSPD SWAT team—commented on why he only had his handgun, “I made the decision to go in with my handgun. I have an AR-15 and a .308 (rifle) in my trunk. The decision to go into my trunk and unsecure the AR-15 in my mind would take too long. I felt like every second mattered, and I made the conscious decision to run in with my handgun instead of arming myself with the rifle, knowing full well that the rifle was one thousand times better than the handgun...I had to make the decision that seconds mattered.”

Detective Goolsby (BSO) said that he saw CSPD officers run toward Coach Feis and check on him. He said that he heard the officers speaking about getting into Building 12 which did not make much sense to him. Goolsby said that due to both Feis and Laman being outside and the sound of the gunshots sounding as though they were also outside, he assumed the shooter was outside. Goolsby said he did not recall hearing much radio traffic at all and did not hear anything about Building 12. He knew Building 12 as the 900 building. Goolsby said he maintained coverage to the south as the officers went into Building 12. He later checked Feis and looked into Building 12 where he saw several officers advancing through the building.

At 2:32:31, Officer Burton again broadcasted over CSPD's radio channel the suspect description: white male dressed in an ROTC uniform with black pants and a burgundy shirt.

At 2:32:42, 11 minutes and 4 seconds after the first shots, Sergeant Miller made his first radio transmission of any substance. He requested that dispatch have the helicopter and K-9 units respond. He made this transmission from behind his car on Holmberg Road. Sergeant Miller had been on scene for at least 5 minutes and 39 seconds (Miller arrived at 2:27:03 at the latest, the time at which Cruz began to fire the last volley of rounds).

Simultaneous to Miller’s transmission, the first law enforcement officers entered the west end of Building 12: Sergeant Mazzei, Sergeant Myers, Detective Monzon, and Officer Wilkins—all officers with the Coral Springs Police Department. Deputy Hanks, Deputy Volpe, Detective Goolsby (BSO) and Officer Harrison were just outside of the door or in that
immediate area while their sergeant (Miller) remained on Holmberg Road. The CSPD officers encountered Campus Monitor Hixon as he was lying on the ground. Hixon was still alive but was unable to communicate with the officers.

Due to the limited and inadequate surveillance video surrounding Building 12, much of the exterior law enforcement response was not captured on video. As an example, Detective Monzon (CSPD) was not identified on any exterior cameras, but we know him to be the second person inside Building 12.

Deputy Volpe did not have a body camera assigned to him due to being on the Parkland budget. He said in his interview that he responded from the east and parked on Holmberg Road near the west gate. He did not hear any gunshots, putting his arrival sometime between 2:27:11 and approximately 2:30:30. Volpe said that he briefly took cover and then followed a group of officers and deputies (the Mazzei Group) toward Building 12. Volpe described seeing Deputy Perry in the parking lot north of buildings 12 and 13 providing “overwatch” in that area.

It was around this same time that Officer Harrison joined the Mazzei Group, and he was seen running with the Mazzei Group toward the west side of Building 12.

Five seconds after the Mazzei Group entered the west end of Building 12, four law enforcement officers were seen on camera walking north along the east side of Buildings 1 and 8. One of these officers appeared to be Sergeant B. Kozlowski. As Sgt. Kozlowski moved north, he was directing officers to form teams and take positions at the various points of egress in order to apprehend the suspect if he fled.

At approximately 2:32:54, Captain Jordan raised dispatch saying, “17 Sierra 1,” but was then cut off by Detective E. Gonzalez (BSO). Detective Gonzalez (BSO) transmitted that multiple SWAT deputies were in the process of responding. Captain Jordan then went on to say, “I want to make sure that we have a perimeter set up and the school (unintelligible), all the kids are getting out, but we need to shut down around this school. Does the Delta unit (sergeant) have a place where we’re setting up for all the units coming into the area?” Sgt. Miller responded saying, “We don’t have a command post set up. We have a perimeter around him. We have two teams going in checking right now.” (Sergeant Miller was still on
Holmberg Road near the east gate.) Captain Jordan asked which way they were going into the school, and Sgt. Miller said, “Entering from the north side through the parking lot where the students park.” Deputy Perry added, “We’ve got a team entered the 900 building on the first floor. West side of the 900 building on the first floor, they went in.” In his interview, Deputy Perry stated that he believed that Building 12 was actually called the 900 building. At that time of these transmissions, Captain Jordan was inside or in the immediate area of Building 1.

At approximately 2:33:39, Deputy Greetham and a CSPD officer approached the southeast corner of Building 1 where they encountered Andrew Medina. This group would continue to grow and include additional CSPD and BSO personnel. This group will be referred to as the Greetham Group.

At approximately 2:33:43, Detective Monzon (CSPD) and Officer Wilkins pulled Mr. Hixon toward the west doors of Building 12. 12 minutes and 5 seconds had elapsed since the first shots and the first evacuation from Building 12. Once Chris Hixon moved outside, deputies and officers worked to get Mr. Hixon onto the rear of a golf cart.

At approximately 2:33:48, officers were seen on surveillance video approaching the northeast corner of Building 8. This was an area very near Officer T. Burton. Among this group of officers were Sergeant Kozlowski (CSPD) and Officer R. Best. Approximately 25 seconds later and after a brief conversation with Officer Burton, Officer Best ran southwest from that location toward Deputy Peterson’s location at the northeast corner of Building 7. The surveillance video confirmed that Officer Best ran to Deputy Peterson’s location. Officer Best told investigators that he asked Deputy Peterson, “Hey, brother, what’d we got?” Deputy Peterson responded, “Shots fired. The shooter is on the second or third floor.” Officer Best said that he then yelled this to Sgt. Kozlowski.

At approximately 2:34:18, while still responding to the scene Lt. O’Neill told Sgt. Miller that he was going to set up a staging area beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. Sgt. Miller acknowledged that transmission but said he was pinned in by the other cars and he could not move. Captain Jordan then directed that responding deputies stage on the south side of the Sawgrass Expressway and that deputies could move in from the south.
Lt. O’Neill’s body camera showed that he experienced some minor problems with his radio prior to making that transmission. This point, 2:34:18, is approximately the point at which it seems BSO began to experience the throttling problems with their radios.

Approximately one minute after Chris Hixon was pulled from Building 12, Detective Monzon (CSPD) returned inside Building 12 and Deputy Hanks entered Building 12. Deputy Hanks was the first deputy to enter Building 12, 1 minute 45 seconds after CSPD first entered.

At approximately 2:34:47, Captain Brad Mock (CSPD SWAT Commander) arrived near the northeast corner of Building 8 near Officer Burton’s location. Captain Mock became an integral part of the law enforcement response within Building 12 and directed much of the building clearing.

At approximately 2:35:00, Officers Whittington, Dittman, Carvalho and Fernandes approached the east gate on Holmberg Road and then entered the east side of Building 12 approximately one minute later. These officers encountered a locked gate which slowed their ability to advance onto campus. Officer Whittington kept a set of personally owned bolt cutters in his trunk. He retrieved them from his trunk and used them to force entry through this gate.

Sergeant Miller (BSO) and Deputy Seward would have been in very close proximity to this same gate, but they remained by their cars on Holmberg Road. Other officers and deputies arrived in this area around the same time or shortly thereafter, specifically Detective J. Johnson (BSO) and Deputy C. Carbocci.

In his interview, Officer Whittington stated that upon his arrival he saw deputies behind (north of) their vehicles taking cover. He saw two deputies and a sergeant. These individuals were Sgt. Miller and Deputy Seward. The third person was possibly Deputy Hanks or another unidentified deputy. Officer Whittington was one of several officers who attributed Officer Burton’s transmission giving the description of Building 12 as the only reason he knew where to go.
At approximately 2:35:04, a BSO dispatcher broadcasted that they received a call from CSPD advising that the shooter is on the north side of the parking lot. The dispatcher indicated this information was received from a student approximately three to five minutes ago.

At approximately 2:35:08, Deputy Hanks entered the first-floor office followed by Detective Monzon (CSPD). They located an uninjured adult female and evacuated her out of the west doors. She was turned over to Officer Harrison who escorted her northwest from Building 12. Officer Harrison stated in his interview that after escorting her away from Building 12 he later returned to the east side of Building 13. Detective Goolsby said that he recalled being approached by Officer Harrison, and they checked the doors to Building 13, which were locked.

At approximately 2:35:18, Officer Schmidt transmitted over CSPD’s radio that BSO had a team enter the first floor. Over approximately the next one and a half minutes there were additional transmissions from Deputy Chief Parry (CSPD) and Captain Mock trying to determine whether BSO had entered Building 12.

At approximately 2:35:27, Officer Wilkins and Deputy Volpe were seen on a surveillance camera driving north from the west side of Building 12 in a golf cart. Deputy Volpe was leaning over his seat to the rear, holding on to Chris Hixon to keep him from falling off the golf cart.

At approximately 2:35:54, Deputy Chief S. Backer was seen on the body camera of Deputy Moniz near the southeast corner of campus by the bus loop. From interviews we know that Deputy Chief Backer, Deputy Chief C. Parry and Captain G. Soberon—all of CSPD—rode to the scene in one car. The three of them would have arrived shortly before this moment.

Captain Soberon (CSPD) stated that, upon their arrival, the deputy chiefs advanced onto campus. He remained on Pine Island Road trying to locate the command post and eventually worked to established command-and-control operations. Captain Soberon recalled asking a BSO lieutenant where the command post was located; however, that lieutenant said he did not know.
CHAPTER 5. OFF-CAMPUS LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO THE SHOOTING

At approximately 2:36:00 (14 minutes and 22 seconds after the first shots were fired), approximately 18 law enforcement officers (deputies and officers) converged outside of the east doors to Building 12. Over the next two minutes they would filter into the east doors and enter the same hallway in which the Mazzei Group was operating. This group on the east side was comprised of approximately 14 officers and four deputies. Among the officers were Captains Mock and Gallagher. This group will be known as the Mock Group.

Even as this large group of law enforcement officers formed and entered Building 12—all within approximately 70 feet of Deputy Peterson—Peterson remained near the northeast corner of Building 7 in a place of personal safety. Peterson never made any effort to enter Building 12 and help rescue victims or seek out the suspect.

At approximately 2:36:06, within the Greetham Group there was discussion about whether to advance onto campus or hold their position. An unidentified person within that group said that, since there was no active shooting and SWAT was responding, they should hold their position. Deputy Greetham commented, “He's bunkered somewhere.”

Simultaneous to that conversation, Lt. O'Neill was still responding from the North Lauderdale district. He directed responding units to shut down northbound traffic on Coral Springs Drive and said that area would be used for staging.

At approximately 2:36:10, Sergeant Mazzei could be seen on the west end of Building 12 waving his hand to the east. Through interviews we know this was done in an attempt to avoid a friendly fire situation due to the Mazzei Group being on the west end of the first floor and the Mock Group being on the east end of that same hall. There was still a significant amount of dust and debris in the air causing reduced visibility. Sergeant Mazzei notified the Mock Group that they (the Mazzei Group) would move to the second floor and that the Mock Group would continue to advance west on the first floor.

At approximately 2:36:17, Detective J. Johnson’s body camera began recording as he was gathering his rifle and thigh holster. Detective Johnson parked north of the east gate on Holmberg Road, and, seconds later (2:36:46), his camera captured Sgt. Miller still standing behind a car on Holmberg Road.
At approximately 2:36:32, Lieutenant McCoy notified Captain Jordan over the radio that the entire SWAT team was responding to the scene.

At approximately 2:36:50, as captured on his body camera, Detective Johnson ran south from Holmberg Road through the east gate. Detective R. Valdes was following behind him. As they continued south to the east side of Building 12 they encountered Deputy Carbocci and Deputy Seward, who were still several feet north of the east doors but advancing toward the building. While Deputy Carbocci’s time of arrival cannot be pinpointed based on BSO’s GPS data, it does show that Deputy Seward arrived on Holmberg Road at 2:25:58, and he was present for Cruz’s final shots at 2:27:03; Seward had been on Holmberg Road for approximately 11 minutes.

Deputy Seward remained at the east doors of Building 12, holding the door open as students fled. At some point, from the east side of Building 12, he saw Deputy Peterson to his south. He recalled detaining several students in ROTC uniforms based on the suspect description he had up to this point. Eventually, Deputy Seward went to the mobile command bus on Pine Island Road but he did not enter Building 12.

At the same time those deputies were advancing south from Holmberg Road to the east doors of Building 12, Lt. DeVita went to the main gates between Buildings 1 and 8 and let six law enforcement officers onto the campus. This group advanced west on campus and went on to check on students sheltering in the auditorium.

At 2:37:15, the Mazzei Group began to advance up the west stairwell of Building 12 toward the second floor. This group included eight CSPD officers and Deputy Hanks.

At 2:37:18, Captain Jordan exited the east side of Building 1 and went northeast in the direction of the vehicle in which she and Lieutenant DeVita had arrived. Captain Jordan had been inside or in the immediate area of Building 1 (administration building) for approximately 7 minutes and 36 seconds.

As seen on Detective Valdes’ body camera, at approximately 2:37:33, while just outside of the east doors of Building 12, Captain Gallagher was directing Deputy Seward to use his radio in order to start directing other deputies to secure other buildings. Deputy Peterson
and Officer Best were seen on surveillance video standing near the northeast corner of Building 7. In the background of body camera video, a BSO radio could be heard throttling several times at this point.

At approximately 2:37:42, Captain Jordan met with Sergeant I. Sklar in the parking lot east of Buildings 1 and 8. Both Jordan and Sklar stated in their interviews that Captain Jordan attempted to use Sklar’s portable and in-car radios, but neither of them worked. Jordan directed Sklar to take her to the north side of campus, and he did so.

At approximately 2:38:11, BSO Lt. O’Neill arrived on scene beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. Lt. O’Neill was the shift commander for the North Lauderdale district. During his response, he provided direction to deputies about establishing a staging area for other responding deputies. Lt. O’Neill worked diligently after he arrived to clear Pine Island Road and identify specific lanes for law enforcement and EMS use. Lt. O’Neill’s involvement is more thoroughly detailed in section 5.2.

At approximately 2:38:15, Sergeant Rossman (BSO) and Deputy Chief Backer (CSPD) joined the Greetham Group on the southeast corner of Building 1. Rossman would go on to have an integral role in the review of surveillance video. The Greetham Group would continue to grow and members of the group would fragment off for various tasks.

At 2:38:26, the Mazzei Group began to reach the second-floor landing in the west stairwell of Building 12. This was the first time that law enforcement had accessed any part of Building 12’s second floor.

At 2:38:37, Detective Johnson (BSO) pulled Martin Duque (fatal) from the doors of classrooms 1214/1215 and out of the west doors of Building 12. Simultaneously, other law enforcement officers pulled Gina Montalto (fatal) and Luke Hoyer (fatal) from the doorway into the hall.

At approximately 2:38:54, Chief Pustizzi (CSPD) was seen on Lt. O’Neill’s body camera running north on the west side of Pine Island Road just north of Building 12. Chief Pustizzi’s role and the content of his interview will be more thoroughly discussed in section 5.2
Chapter 5. Off-Campus Law Enforcement Response to the Shooting

At the same time Chief Pustizzi was running north on Pine Island Road, Lt. Feeley was seen on the southeast corner of Building 1 with the Greetham Group. He would not remain there long, and, within approximately the next ten minutes, he returned beneath the Sawgrass Expressway where he met with Deputy Chief Parry (CSPD). Lt. Feeley's role and the content of his interview will be more thoroughly discussed in section 5.2.

At 2:39:00, as deputies were carrying Martin Duque (fatality) from Building 12 on the east side, Detective Valdes was providing cover for them by pointing his rifle toward the second and third floors. Due to radio throttling, Valdes made six to eight attempts prior to being able to transmit. Within seconds of transmitting, a golf cart arrived on scene, and deputies and officers worked together to load Martin Duque onto the cart and drive him to the triage area at Pine Island Road and Holmberg Road. Martin Duque was later pronounced deceased.

At 2:39:58, the Mazzei Group entered the west end of the second-floor hallway. Some officers remained in the stairwell looking up the stairs in anticipation that Cruz might come downstairs. By this point the Mock Group had approached doors to the first four classrooms on the first floor of the east side of Building 12. The Mock Group continued to advance west on the first floor as the Mazzei Group continued east on the second floor.

At approximately 2:40:00, Captain Jordan and Sergeant Sklar arrived at the north end of campus. We know from Jordan's interview that upon arriving there she continued south toward the north side of Building 13 and took a position behind a car next to Deputy Perry. Jordan's role will be more thoroughly discussed in section 6.2.

At 2:40:16, the first mass evacuation of students from Building 12 occurred. A large number of students and staff were evacuated from classroom 1216 and directed out of the east doors, and they ran east to Pine Island Road.

At 2:40:16, Officer Popock escorted Samantha Grady (non-fatal injuries) from classroom 1214 and directed her out of the east doors with other students. Among those students was an ROTC student in a formal uniform who was detained by Detective Valdes. This fact illustrates the disparity in information between BSO and CSPD due to no radio interoperability. CSPD knew that the suspect had a casual ROTC uniform consisting
of a burgundy shirt and dark pants, while BSO deputies erroneously believed that Cruz was wearing the traditional formal ROTC uniform (light blue dress shirt, dark blue dress pants). As a result, deputies ended up detaining several students in formal ROTC uniforms on the east side of Building 12. Valdes made several attempts to get on his radio and inquire about what he should do with the ROTC student, but he repeatedly encountered the throttling problem.

By 2:41:16, the Mock Group had approached doors for the first five classrooms on the east end of the first floor. The Mazzei Group had approached the second-floor offices and the first classroom on the west end of the first floor. As the Mock Group progressed they were evacuating students out of the east doors of Building 12.

At approximately 2:41:36, Campus Monitor Andrew Medina and Assistant Principal Winfred Porter were seen on Sgt. Rossman’s body camera on the south side of Building 1 near the Greetham Group. Within seconds, Medina and Porter would both go on to provide valuable intelligence to Sgt. Rossman and other law enforcement personnel.

At approximately 2:41:46, Lt. DeVita, Sergeant DeRosa (CSPD), Detective Schroy (CSPD), and Officer Dejnak approached Deputy Peterson and Officer Best from the south, between Buildings 7 and 8. Section 4.1 more thoroughly details their observations and interaction with Deputy Peterson.

At approximately 2:41:50, in response to Detective Valdes stating he was with a student in an ROTC uniform, Sergeant Miller stated that he was having problems with his radio.

At approximately 2:41:58, Deputy Bienkievitz’s body camera began recording as he was on the south side of Building 2. There was at least one deputy with him and they were quickly joined by other officers and deputies, and a strong perimeter was established directly south of the MSDHS campus.

At approximately 2:42:22, Sergeant Sklar asked over the radio, “Who is out with an administrator that has access to the camera system and the school?” Sgt. Miller responded, “Peterson would be the one that would have access to where the cameras are.” Dispatch
then asked, “Does anyone know where Peterson is?” There was no response by Peterson. Peterson was still hiding at the northeast corner of Building 7.

At approximately 2:42:30, while near the southeast corner of Building 1, Andrew Medina began to give Sgt. Rossman (BSO) a narrative about what he saw and what he did in response to initially seeing Cruz enter the campus. He described seeing Cruz walk onto campus from an Uber “…with like a rifle-bag or something….“ Medina has been interviewed multiple times since this shooting and provided varying statements about what he saw. Investigators believe that this statement—given spontaneously without any forethought or counseling—is the most credible statement about what Medina saw and knew at the time he saw Cruz—that he knew Cruz was carrying a rifle bag. Medina said that he radioed the other campus monitor (David Taylor) as soon as Cruz went into Building 12 and he heard loud bangs.

At approximately 2:42:55, Sergeant Sklar again attempted to locate someone with access to the camera system: “We need somebody with the camera system ASAP. Where’s the principal? Who’s with the principal? And we need to start making a plan here.”

By 2:43:00, the Mock Group had approached the doors to the first six classrooms on the east end of the first floor. They had evacuated injured and non-injured civilians along the way. The Mazzei Group had approached the second-floor offices, the second-floor restrooms and the first two classrooms on the west end of the second floor.

Cell phone video from a student inside of classroom 1213 showed law enforcement officers as they entered the class. The students were all huddled into the hard corner of the classroom where the teacher’s desk and other items were located, some students were even hiding beneath the teacher’s desk. Law enforcement officers asked if anyone was injured and the students replied “yes.” Three students suffered non-fatal injuries, Ben Wikander, Samantha Mayor, and Madeleine Wilford. Carmen Schentrup suffered fatal wounds and was not taken out of the classroom at that time. Madeleine Wilford was not evacuated at that time either due to law enforcement’s assessment that she had died. She was later reevaluated by a BSO SWAT Medic and evacuated; she survived her injuries.
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The cell phone video showed Sergeant B. Kozlowski (CSPD) lifting Ben Wikander from the ground and carrying him toward the door. Sgt. Kozlowski began asking for help and he was assisted by Deputy G. Volpe. Students remained in the corner crying and in obvious emotional distress. Sergeant G. Vullo (CSPD) then bent down to pick-up Samantha Mayor off the ground, and he handed her off to Officer J. Maclean. Sgt. Vullo then directed the students to follow him into the hall. Sgt. Vullo and other law enforcement officers directed the students down the hall, and the students continued out of the east doors toward Pine Island Road.

As the evacuation of 1213 was taking place, at 2:43:11 Deputy Greetham responded to Sgt. Sklar’s request to find an administrator with access to the camera system. As captured on Greetham’s body camera, he asked Medina if he had access to the camera system, and Medina said he did. Greetham then stated over the radio that he is with someone who has access to the cameras. Greetham began to lead Medina toward the south doors of Building 1 but was stopped by Sgt. Rossman. Sgt. Rossman stated that he wanted to slow down and get information from Medina and Porter.

At approximately 2:43:40, Captain B. McKeone (CSPD SWAT Executive Officer) and Sergeant J. Heinrich were seen near the southwest corner of Building 13 while walking east toward Building 12. Sergeant Heinrich was wearing gym shorts, a T-shirt and tennis shoes. He now had a ballistic vest and latex gloves and was carrying a handgun that Captain McKeone had given to him. Prior to this Sgt. Heinrich had escorted Kyle Laman to the west end of the MSD campus—very near where Deputy Eason initially responded—and turned Kyle Laman over to emergency medical personnel.

By 2:44:00, the Mock Group had approached the doors for the first seven classrooms on the east end of the first floor, and the Mazzei Group had approached the second-floor offices, second-floor restrooms and three classrooms on the west end of the second floor. The Mock Group continued to advance west, and the Mazzei Group continued to advance east.

At 2:44:32, Sgt. Rossman broadcasted a description of Cruz that he obtained from Medina: black hat, maroon ROTC shirt, and black pants.
At 2:44:54, CSPD broadcasted over their main channel that they were patching with BSO’s channel.

At 2:45:16, Chief Pustizzi directed responding units who were not in the school to take a perimeter position due to not knowing where the shooter was located.

At 2:45:22, Medina told AP Porter that the deputies needed to go see the cameras. AP Porter asked if he needed to take them now, and Deputy Greetham stated that they were going to wait for SWAT.

At 2:45:58, Sgt. Kozlowski and Officer Maclean carried Ashley Baez from classroom 1210 and east on the first floor. Ashley suffered a severe but non-fatal injury to her upper left thigh. They loaded her onto a golf cart where Detective Valdes and Deputy Carbocci applied a tourniquet to her leg and transported her to emergency medical personnel. Ashley Baez survived her injuries.

As Detective Valdes’s body camera continued to record, it captured the chaos of the triage area. Within a very small space were numerous fire/rescue vehicles, emergency medical personnel, patrol cars, a SWAT armored vehicle and students running in a panic.

By 2:46:00, the Mock Group had approached the doors to nine of the ten classrooms on the first floor. They reached the first-floor restrooms but were unable to access them due to the doors being locked. Simultaneously the Mazzei Group continued to advance east on the second floor. They reached the second-floor offices, second-floor restrooms and the three western-most classrooms.

At 2:46:33, Detective Goolsby (BSO) was on the east side of Building 13 and transmitted, “Don’t let anyone enter the school, law enforcement-wise, unless they are coming from the north. We have only secured the first third of the north end; if anyone comes in through the hallways, we are going to have a problem. Don’t let anybody else come in this direction but the north.” In an interview with Goolsby, investigators learned that he transmitted this direction because Captain McKeone (CSPD) and Sergeant Heinrich (CSPD) approached him from the south, and, because of the direction from which they came coupled with Sergeant Heinrich wearing civilian clothes and carrying a gun, Goolsby said that he nearly shot
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Sergeant Heinrich. Goolsby’s direction over the BSO radio that all responding units only come onto campus from the north was again only heard by BSO deputies due to no radio interoperability with CSPD. Goolsby’s transmission could not be heard by those who caused him the concern to begin with—CSPD officers.

At 2:46:34, as they were standing next to each other on the east side of Building 1 Sgt. Rossman heard Assistant Principal Porter comment that there were people in the camera room. Sgt. Rossman directed Assistant Principal Porter to call Assistant Principal Morford. Porter then contacted Morford who was in the camera room with Security Specialist Kelvin Greenleaf. This began a process in which Morford relayed to Porter what he witnessed on the surveillance cameras; Porter then relayed the information to Sgt. Rossman, and Sgt. Rossman relayed the information to deputies on BSO’s radios. This chain of relays resulted in confusion for responding deputies and ultimately contributed to slowing the law enforcement response.

Investigators asked Sgt. Rossman why he did not want to go into the camera room with Porter and Medina, he stated, “I’m not going to allow a civilian back into that situation...I still wasn't 100% sure where the shooter was, so I’m not going to allow him back into an unknown and having to go through tactically clearing...there was already somebody in the camera room that we could relay information out. So I chose that as my option rather than going back into a situation with civilians that aren’t trained and having to protect them.”

Sgt. Rossman and Deputy Greetham’s body cameras also provided segments of school radio traffic. At various times, the body cameras recorded audio transmissions from the school radios being held by nearby school employees. On several occasions, Deputy Peterson was heard engaging in communication with AP Morford as Morford was in the camera room. Greenleaf was watching the camera system, and Morford was communicating his observations to both AP Porter and Deputy Peterson. Captain Gallagher (CSPD) and Officer Best were near Deputy Peterson at various times, and they were able to transmit over CSPD’s radios what Morford was transmitting to Peterson.

At 2:46:42, Chief Pustizzi directed that a command post be established in front of the school sign at Pine Island Road and Holmberg Road. This was the same intersection where Coral
Springs Fire Rescue had established their command post and the triage area. The CSPD command post ended up not being established at that location.

At 2:46:49, as seen on Detective Johnson’s (BSO) body camera, he approached Officer Carvalho near the first-floor women’s restroom and asked him if they had cleared the restroom. Officer Carvalho told Detective Johnson that the door was locked and they could not get inside. Deputies and officers went on to discuss the need for a pry bar and asked if anyone else had one. Detective Johnson attempted to use his pocket knife to force entry but was unsuccessful. Detective Johnson then approached another officer who was guarding the men’s restroom and learned that door was also locked. As this was taking place additional members of the Mock Group were continuing west on the first floor.

At 2:47:15, Sergeant Rossman directed AP Porter to direct AP Morford over the school radio to follow the suspect on the video. Sergeant Rossman still believed at that time that Morford and Porter were watching a live feed video of Cruz’s actions.

At 2:47:52, Detectives Alfin and Gariepy (CSPD-SWAT) left the Greetham Group and traveled north on the east side of Buildings 1 and 8 and continued on toward the east side of Building 12.

BSO continued to experience radio problems. There were two segments of what appeared to be radio silence; however, each period of silence was followed by a dispatcher responding to Captain Jordan. It appears that only the communications center could hear Captain Jordan, but no one else could hear her transmissions.

At approximately 2:47:58, Detectives Polo and Schaub reached the west gate on Holmberg Road and approached Sergeant T. Garcia (BSO SWAT). Detectives Polo and Schaub were assigned to a Crime Suppression Team (CST) and had been assigned body cameras. These body cameras in particular provided a tremendous amount of information for the MSDPSC investigation. CST detectives are similar to a street-crimes unit and receive additional tactical training from the BSO SWAT team. On February 14, BSO SWAT team members did not have body cameras.
As Detectives Polo and Schaub approached Sgt. Garcia on Holmberg Road, there were at least 10 marked and unmarked law enforcement vehicles on Holmberg Road, they mostly appeared to be CSPD patrol cars. A deputy and an unidentifiable deputy or officer were seen standing behind (north of) vehicles on Holmberg Road while facing toward campus.

At 2:48:07, as more thoroughly outlined in section 5.2, Lt. O’Neill stopped a deputy with a rifle from going onto campus. Lt. O’Neill told the deputy he was not needed and that SWAT was present on scene. This was inaccurate, only a small contingent of SWAT deputies were on Holmberg Road at that time and less than half of Building 12 had been cleared.

At 2:48:33, the Mock Group entered the Building 12 first-floor office. By that point all classrooms and the office on the first floor had been searched. The bathrooms and interior office doors that were locked had not been searched. As is standard practice, law enforcement would go on to conduct secondary and tertiary searches of these rooms. Simultaneously, Sergeant Sklar made reference to his radio not working properly.

As the first-floor offices were being cleared by the Mock Group, Officer C. Ryen walked north from beneath the Sawgrass Expressway and approached Lt. S. O’Neill. Officer Ryen was an off-duty Margate Police Department SWAT officer. He responded to the scene from his residence because his daughter attended MSDHS. Officer Ryen was wearing gym clothes, a rifle-plate vest, and had his rifle slung across his chest; he was in no way readily identifiable as a law enforcement officer. In his interview, Officer Ryen stated that he did not have his radio with him.

Lt. O’Neill told Officer Ryen that there were enough people on scene with rifles and that the SWAT team was there—again, a small contingent of BSO SWAT was on Holmberg Road and less than half of Building 12 had been cleared. Officer Ryen focused on getting to the school and told Lt. O’Neill that his daughter was in the school. Lt. O’Neill attempted to calm Ryen. Lt. O’Neill wisely told Officer Ryen that he needed to meet up with his SWAT team in an attempt to avoid self-deployment. Officer Ryen turned and walked south toward the Sawgrass Expressway. Lt. O’Neill went on to remind deputies on BSO’s channel that the southbound lanes of Pine Island Road were for EMS and the northbound lanes were for law enforcement.
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At 2:48:38, Deputy Pianelli’s body camera began recording as he was on Pine Island Road near the entrance to the bus loop. Deputy Pianelli had been directed to keep Pine Island Road clear for emergency traffic. Deputy Pianelli directed multiple individuals to the command post which he self-identified as being at the Sawgrass Expressway. However, no command post had been established at this point as the incident commander (Captain Jordan) was in the parking lot north of Building 13.

At 2:48:40, Sergeant Garcia (BSO-SWAT) yelled east on Holmberg Road to Detective Gonzalez (BSO-SWAT) and Deputy Sherlock (BSO-SWAT). He motioned for them to come to his location. Garcia, Gonzalez and Sherlock had not been at the range with the rest of the SWAT team, and as a result they were able to respond more quickly. Detectives Polo and Schaub waited by Garcia.

As that was taking place, at 2:48:47, Cruz walked through the Walmart parking lot located at 6001 Coral Ridge Drive, Coral Springs.

At approximately 2:49:11, Officer Wilkins and Deputy Carbocci drove south onto campus after dropping Ashley Baez at the triage area. Simultaneously, Sergeant Garcia led Detectives Gonzalez, Polo, Schaub and Deputy Sherlock south onto campus through the western pedestrian gate that had been unlocked by Detective Goolsby. This group will be referred to as the Garcia Group.

As the Garcia Group ran south, they briefly split as Garcia and Sherlock continued to the west side of Building 13, where they met up with Captain McKeone (CSPD), Sergeant Heinrich (CSPD), Detective Goolsby (BSO) and Officer Harrison. Detectives Gonzalez, Schaub and Polo joined Captain Jordan and Deputy Perry behind a vehicle north of Building 13. Deputy Perry was standing behind the vehicle with his rifle pointed south. Captain Jordan was kneeling behind the front of the car with her radio in one hand and her handgun in the other hand. At some point, Sergeant I. Sklar, along with his K-9, joined the deputies behind the vehicle with Captain Jordan.

While behind the vehicle, Captain Jordan and Deputy Perry gave Gonzalez, Polo and Schaub a brief overview of the campus layout and what they knew to that point. Deputy Perry appeared to have a decent understanding of the campus layout and details about Building
12. Deputy Perry pointed out deceased Campus Monitor Aaron Feis and the damage to the third-floor windows caused by the gunshots. Perry identified Building 12 or 13 as the last place the suspect had been seen and seemed to indicate that was the same area where shots had last been fired. Gonzalez, Schaub, Polo and Sklar remained with Captain Jordan and Deputy Perry for approximately one and a half minutes.

Simultaneous to Perry briefing part of the Garcia Group, the Mazzei Group continued to advance east on the second floor.

As the Garcia Group was outside of Building 12, Deputy Chief Parry (CSPD) approached Lieutenants O’Neill and Feeley at the staging area at Pine Island Road and the Sawgrass Expressway. As more thoroughly explained in section 5.2, Deputy Chief Parry tried to locate Captain Jordan by approaching Lts. O’Neill and Feeley. The lieutenants seemed unsure of where Captain Jordan was located and did not have a way to contact her. Jordan was still the incident commander at that point.

At 2:50:29, Deputy Perry asked Captain Jordan to patch radios with CSPD in order to see what they have done since they had been in the building. There was no audible response from Captain Jordan.

At 2:50:31, Detectives Alfin and Gariepy (CSPD-SWAT) entered the east of Building 12. These were the two detectives who advanced north from the Greetham Group at 2:47. Detectives Alfin and Gariepy met with Captain Mock who appeared to be giving them direction. The detectives continued west through the first floor and met up with the Garcia Group once they entered Building 12.

At 2:50:40—as the Garcia Group was still outside of Building 12—Sergeant Rossman engaged in conversation with AP Porter about what was being viewed in the camera room. In response to a school radio transmission from Morford, Porter stated “He went on the second floor.” Sgt. Rossman asked “He’s on the second floor?” to which Porter replied, “He went on the second floor from what they saw.” Porter later said, “He saw him on the second floor.” Sgt. Rossman then transmitted, “The subject was last seen on the second floor now, last seen on the second floor.” This and future exchanges between Porter and Rossman appear to be riddled with miscommunication and confusion over tense; Porter
seemed to understand that historical footage was being viewed while Rossman believed it was live footage. As a result, Rossman transmitted the information as if it was in real time. As an example, as Gonzalez, Schaub, Polo and Sklar were behind the vehicle with Jordan and Perry when they heard Rossman’s transmission that the subject “was last seen on the second floor.” In response, Polo stated aloud, “Second floor! Second floor!” The broadcasting of misinformation had a negative effect on the law enforcement response. While Rossman was attempting to transmit that information, he encountered the throttling problem repeatedly. Additionally, as Sgt. Rossman was transmitting information about Cruz being on the second floor, Officer Best also transmitted over the CSPD radio that the suspect was “last seen on the second floor.” Officer Best heard that over Deputy Peterson’s school radio.

At approximately 2:51:00, Cruz entered the Subway inside of Walmart where he ordered a drink. As that was taking place, Deputy Eason was in the parking lot of WMS telling parents to roll-up the windows in their cars; the parents were there to pick up their children, but WMS was on lockdown. Deputy Eason received a phone call from an unknown person and stated, “I heard the gunshots. They were a few feet away from me...yeah, yeah, I’m okay but I was at the school when the shots were coming out.”

At approximately 2:51:07, Lt. Feeley asked dispatch over the radio for the location of the command post. Dispatch told him that BSO was staging at the south side of the Sawgrass Expressway. This took place almost immediately after a conversation between Deputy Chief Parry, Lt. O’Neill and Lt. Feeley during which Deputy Chief Parry was trying to locate Captain Jordan. This illustrates that a command post had not been established, several individuals believed the command post was beneath the Sawgrass Expressway and some (Lt. O’Neill for example) knew the incident commander was somewhere on the north end of campus. Issues regarding not having an established and communicated command post at that point in the incident will be further discussed in the next section.

At 2:51:14, Gonzalez, Polo, Schaub and Sklar sprinted south from the parking lot toward the west doors of Building 12. Garcia and Sherlock joined up with them and the Garcia Group then entered Building 12 through the west hallway doors at 2:51:31. At approximately that
same time, the Mazzei Group reached the alcove for classrooms 1231/1232. They stopped advancing in apparent response to Officer Best and Captain Mock’s transmissions about the shooter being on the second floor, and they remained in this alcove for approximately ten minutes. By that point, the first-floor classrooms had been cleared by the Mock Group and five of the second-floor classrooms, the restrooms and office had been cleared by the Mazzei Group.

At 2:51:34, Morford transmitted over the school radio that Cruz was on the east side of the second floor and they were trying to track him to the third floor. Porter relayed that information to Rossman, but Rossman did not broadcast that information. Rossman and other deputies/officers in the Greetham Group became engaged with directing people away from the campus toward Pine Island Road.

At 2:52:08, Margate Officer Ryen approached Deputy Pianelli on Pine Island Road in front of the bus loop. This was just north of the location where Officer Ryen previously approached Lt. O’Neill and was directed to meet with his SWAT team. Officer Ryen told Deputy Pianelli that his daughter was inside the school. Deputy Pianelli gave Officer Ryen a brief summary of what he knew about the shooting and response. Officer Ryen continued northwest across Pine Island Road toward campus.

Officer Ryen stated in his interview that he went on to approach the campus from the south. This is significant, because Officer Ryen did not have his radio and would not have known about Detective Goolsby’s (BSO) transmission at 2:46:33 that instructed all responding units to respond only from the north in order to avoid a friendly-fire situation. What Goolsby was trying to avoid almost came to fruition later on because Officer Ryen and a group of other officers were nearly involved in a friendly-fire situation with BSO. The media reported Officer Ryen’s criticism of the law enforcement response, but Ryen knew little about what was occurring because he did not have a radio.

At approximately 2:52:18, thirty minutes since the first shots had been fired, the Garcia Group moved up the west stairs of Building 12. Constant radio communication was heard on Detective Polo’s body camera. These discussions concerned having deputies from other districts respond, where to stage those deputies and requests for administrators to call one
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another. Detective Polo frustratedly said aloud “they need to clear the fucking air, man.” This frustration by Polo illustrated the problem with the law enforcement response by BSO taking place on a single radio channel. Not providing the tactical responders in a high-risk situation unrestricted access to a radio channel was dangerous and created unnecessary additional risks. This was a failure on the part of the incident commander, who at that time was still Capt. Jordan. By that point the BSO response should have been split into two channels—one for the tactical response and one for administrative and logistics.

At approximately 2:52:39, the Garcia Group began to reach the second-floor landing of the west stairwell in Building 12. This group had grown to 11 law enforcement officers, and it included mostly SWAT team members from both BSO and CSPD. As they reached that landing, the deputies and officers engaged in conversation about how they were operating on different radio channels.

At approximately 2:52:55, while beneath the Sawgrass Expressway, Lt. O'Neill told Deputy Chief Parry that no more CSPD officers were needed on the campus. He asked Deputy Chief Parry to have his officers go to the staging area. There is no evidence that Lt. O'Neill had been given that direction by anyone. At that point, still less than half of Building 12 had been cleared.

At approximately 2:53:13, Detective Gonzalez entered the west end of the second-floor hall and saw the Mazzei Group as they were further east. The Mazzei Group was still holding their position at classrooms 1231/1232 and facing east. They had approached five of the ten classrooms on the second floor. No law enforcement officer had been on the third floor by that point.

Seconds later Captain Robson and the dispatcher discussed over BSO's channel about where parents should stage. This occurred while the Garcia Group was on the second-floor landing believing Cruz was about to descend and is another example of why there should have been a dedicated tactical channel.

At 2:53:24, while the Garcia Group was on the second-floor landing, Morford broadcasted over the school radio that Cruz was leaving the third floor and “going back down toward the second floor.” This transmission included conversation with Deputy Peterson. The
audio was captured on Sgt. Rossman’s body camera as AP Porter was holding his school radio very near Sgt. Rossman’s body camera. Cruz had actually left the third floor at 2:27:35, which meant there was actually a 26-minute delay in the surveillance video review. While Porter was on his cell phone, Rossman asked him, “Is this live intel?” Rossman pointed to Porter’s radio and Porter replied, “Yes sir, this is live.” Rossman again asked “This is live?” Porter replied “This is live.” Rossman then told Porter to get off the phone because “I don’t know the school like you do. I need this information to relay it on the radio.” Medina then held out his radio for Rossman to use, and Rossman rejected it. He told Medina, “When I tell you to ask a question give me an answer.” Porter hung his phone call and said that he was speaking with “our director.”

Once Rossman gained both Medina and Porter’s attention he asked, “Where was he last seen? This is live? Right now?” Porter replied, “This is live.” Medina said, “They just said he walked back down to the second floor” and went on to explain that Morford said the suspect went to the third floor and back down to the second floor.

During that exchange, the CSPD mobile command bus arrived at the staging area beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. In his interview, Captain Soberon commented that once their command bus arrived he was able to make numerous copies of maps of the MSD campus that they had access to prior to this event. Captain Soberon stated that he, along with Chief Pustizzi, Deputy Chief Backer and Deputy Chief Parry, began running command operations from that location.

At 2:53:40, Cruz left the Walmart and continued south toward a McDonald’s on the south side of the Sawgrass Expressway.

At 2:53:52, Sergeant Garcia and Detective Gonzalez entered the west end of the second-floor hallway where they watched the Mazzei Group further to the east.

At 2:54:00, Deputy Sherlock’s body camera captured Detective Gonzalez attempting to use his radio as he was near the west hall windows. Gonzalez frustratedly said, “I can’t key up.” In his interview, Detective Gonzalez spoke about his frustration with the radios while inside Building 12. He described looking outside of Building 12 and seeing multiple law enforcement officers with their guns pointed at the building. His immediate fear was that a
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deputy or officer outside would see something that caused them to shoot into Building 12, and personnel inside the building would be shot by friendly fire. Gonzalez said, "I tried to get on the radio to say under no circumstance, even if he’s in here and he’s shooting out the window, don’t shoot at him because you’re going to start shooting not only cops, but the kids that are in the school." Gonzalez said that the plan they were trying to implement was for deputies and officers outside to take cover while the deputies and officers inside moved to address any threats.

At 2:54:09, Sgt. Mazzei transmitted over CSPD’s channel that he was going to have students shelter in the classrooms until they found the shooter. Seconds later, Sgt. Mazzei walked away from the Mazzei Group and moved west in the second-floor hall to meet with Sgt. Garcia where they engaged in discussion.

At 2:54:32, Sgt. Rossman broadcasted, “They are monitoring the subject right now. He went from the third floor to the second floor. Third to the second floor...stand-by for further, they’re monitoring him right now...the subject is now back down on the second floor. He was on the third, back on the second floor now, of the 1200 building.” This transmission was based on the conversation which Rossman and Porter had at 2:53:24. While making this transmission Rossman again experienced severe problems with his radio. Immediately after making this transmission Porter began to correct Rossman and explain that the footage was not live.

As Rossman transmitted about the suspect going down to the second floor, the Garcia Group immediately reacted by raising their rifles up the west stairwell in anticipation of the suspect descending the stairs.

At 2:54:38, multiple law enforcement officers from various agencies had gathered on Pine Island Road near the bus loop entrance. Chief Pustizzi was among these individuals.

At approximately 2:54:42, Sergeant Miller was seen on a body camera standing on the north side of Holmberg Road pointing out to other deputies the area from which he last heard gunshots. Miller had backed even further away from the MSD campus and was still at the location he assumed upon arrival over 30 minutes earlier. Simultaneously, Chief
Pustizzi was seen on Pine Island Road near the bus loop speaking with other unidentified law enforcement officers.

At approximately 2:54:46, Captain Mock broadcasted that the suspect was on video moving from the third floor to the second floor. Captain Mock had multiple deputies around him, and their radios would have likely been the source for Mock to get that information which Rossman had transmitted seconds earlier.

At approximately 2:54:59, three to four BSO SWAT deputies and SWAT Medic G. Bradley entered the east end of Building 12. Up until this point, CSPD officers had been at the base of the east stairs with their guns trained on the stairwell in anticipation the suspect might descend those stairs. Law enforcement had isolated their movement to the west stairwell to reduce any risk of friendly-fire incidents. Within seconds, two SWAT deputies advanced up to the landing halfway between the first and second floors and maintained that position until they later received direction from Detective B. Hays.

At 2:54:59, 33 minutes 21 seconds after the first shots, law enforcement had not progressed any further in Building 12 because they believed Cruz was descending from the third floor. The Mazzei Group remained at the alcove for classrooms 1231/1232. The Garcia Group remained on the second-floor landing of the west stairwell and two BSO SWAT deputies were on the landing between the first and second floors of the east stairwell. Approximately half of Building 12 had been cleared at this point.

At approximately 2:55:02, Sgt. Rossman had finished his transmission in which he said, “They are monitoring the subject right now. He went from the third floor to the second floor....” Porter realized that Rossman broadcasted that information as if it was taking place in real time. While pointing to his school radio, Porter said, “You’re asking me if this is live intel? Is that where he is right now? That’s where they last saw him on the camera.” Rossman never seemed to acknowledge that key statement by Porter. He got distracted by additional radio traffic and asked Porter if they were still talking about the three-story tan-and-white building which Medina confirmed for Rossman. Rossman would not broadcast that the video was not being watched live for another 7 minutes 18 seconds.
Deputy Greetham asked Porter if he was able to view a live surveillance feed on his phone, and Porter replied that he could not. Porter said he could pull up a live feed if someone would take him inside Building 1. Deputy Greetham told Porter that SWAT deputies were the only ones who could take him inside. Porter, trying to expedite the process, pointed to a group of nearby individuals and asked, “Is that SWAT? Can they take me inside?”

While Rossman, Greetham, Porter and Medina were having that discussion, deputies and officers in the west stairwell discussed the nature of the video review. One asked, “Are they watching live?” to which another stated, “They’re watching live.” Meanwhile, deputies and officers had their rifles trained on the upper floor of the stairwell.

At 2:55:26, Detective Gonzalez called out to Sgt. Garcia as he was in the west end of the second-floor hall. Gonzalez told him, “I can’t key up here. There’s no comms (meaning he couldn’t use his radio). I gotta go back outside.” Gonzalez then ran down the west stairwell and out of the west doors of Building 12.

As investigators reviewed the school surveillance video, it was clear that Detective Gonzalez acted as a “runner” by communicating with others in person due to failed radio communications. Gonzalez frequently ran up and down the west stairwell passing messages back and forth. Detective B. Hays (BSO-Swat) was also later identified as another primary “runner.”

At 2:55:36, CSPD’s armored vehicle arrived near the northeast corner of Building 13.

At 2:55:48, AP Porter implored nearby deputies and officers to go into the camera room he pointed out the proximity of the doors that they could use to get into Building 1. Porter explained that he would be able to view a live feed in his office while Morford and Greenleaf could continue to look at the recorded feed. Someone in the Greetham Group asked Porter if he had keys, and he said he did; he then turned them over to a deputy/officer in that group. Porter explained that Building 1 was secure and that they locked that building down quickly.

At 2:56:02, Deputy Sherlock (BSO-Swat) directed Detective Hodgson (CSPD-Swat) to take additional officers with him to the landing in the west stairwell between the second
and third floors. Detective Hodgson and Officer Schmidt advanced up those stairs, and, upon seeing a victim – Jaime Guttenberg – lying on the ground, they continued to the third-floor landing.

At 2:56:29, Chief Pustizzi transmitted over the radio that officers were to assume there was a second shooter and to hold perimeter positions. This is a concept common to law enforcement known as the “plus one rule.” The premise is to always anticipate finding one more—or “plus one”—threat. If you find one suspect, assume there is a second. If you find the second suspect, assume there is a third, etc... This was a theme seen throughout the response and something referenced by command staff in their interviews as one of the factors that influenced their decision making.

At 2:56:36, Chief Pustizzi asked Deputy Pianelli, “Are you guys on our channel or no?” Deputy Pianelli replied, “No, they didn’t patch.”

At 2:57:00, Detective Gonzalez entered the west end of Building 12. He told Captain Mock to tell his SWAT officers in the armored vehicle to not fire into Building 12, which Captain Mock repeated over CSPD’s main channel. Gonzalez then attempted to use his radio again, and after it failed to work he frustratedly asked aloud “Why can’t I key up?” This sort of coordination between Captain Mock, Detective Gonzalez and Detective Hays (BSO SWAT runners) continued. The three of them worked together, and Captain Mock became the de facto incident commander inside of Building 12. Due to his radio working, position as the CSPD SWAT commander, and experience with both SWAT teams, he was able to assist in coordinating movements throughout Building 12.

At 2:57:03, Deputy Peterson and Morford were engaged in conversation on the school radio about tracking Cruz through Building 12. Peterson asked Morford, “Do you have any visual on him?” Morford responded, “No, Scot, we do not. We’re still trying. The last thing we see is he’s still on the third floor. But again, that’s still 2:27.” Peterson told Morford to continue watching the cameras.

At 2:57:11, Colonel Polan attempted to locate the incident commander over the radio. Captain Jordan responded to dispatch with her call sign, 17 Sierra 1, but no additional transmissions from Captain Jordan were audible.
At 2:57:44, Deputy Greetham’s body camera captured Deputy Peterson telling Morford to keep all the monitors open as they review the surveillance video. Porter then said, “See, they’re looking at recorded feeds, not live feeds.” Sgt. Rossman would not broadcast the fact there was a delay for approximately another four minutes.

At 2:57:56, after AP Porter turned his keys over to law enforcement, civilians began evacuating from the south end of Building 1. Many of these students were special needs students who required additional attention and consideration. Sgt. Rossman and AP Porter both addressed the students coming out into the open, which distracted them from the video review. Sgt. Rossman approached a CSPD sergeant and lieutenant and asked them, “Why are we taking them out if they’re sheltered in place?” He pointed out how evacuating the students were complicating their efforts.

At 2:57:58, Detective Hays (BSO-SWAT) and Captain Mock engaged in conversation on the west end of the first floor. Detective Hays would later go on to communicate information to SWAT deputies in the east stairwell.

Simultaneously, Detectives Alfin and Hodgson and Officer Schmidt (CSPD) reached the third-floor landing in the west stairwell. Upon reaching that landing they located Jaime Guttenberg who had suffered fatal injuries. They also located Cruz’s gun and vest on the landing. The Mazzei Group remained in the alcove for classrooms 1231/1232.

At 2:58:06, Detective Gonzalez again approached Sgt. Garcia in the second-floor hallway. He told Sgt. Garcia that the radios were not working and said, “I’m going to call Robson and tell him to send guys here.” Detective Gonzalez began to use his cell phone when Detective Polo offered Detective Gonzalez his radio. Detective Gonzalez tried to use the radio but again heard a noise indicating the radio was not transmitting, to which Gonzalez responded, “I can’t fucking key up.” Gonzalez returned to using his cell phone.

At 2:58:22, Captain Mock and Sergeant Mazzei engaged in a conversation about movement through Building 12. Captain Mock told Sergeant Mazzei that SWAT was staging on the second floor of the east stairwell and they would not enter the second floor until the Mazzei Group reached the end of the hall. Captain Mock directed that, at that point, the Mazzei Group would join with those SWAT deputies and continue up to the third floor. Sgt. Mazzei
told Captain Mock that they had cleared about half of the second floor and students were sheltered in place. This type of coordination continued on CSPD’s channel and Detectives Gonzalez and Hays continued to meet with Captain Mock in person.

At 2:58:28, while on the south side of Building 2, Deputy Bienkievitz asked aloud, “Why didn’t they patch these channels?” Another law enforcement officer nearby stated, “That’s the first thing they should have done.”

At 2:59:09, AP Morford transmitted over the radio that Cruz fled the building without his gun. AP Porter relayed this to Sgt. Rossman; however, Sgt. Rossman was engaged with the students being evacuated from Building 1 and did not immediately broadcast it over the BSO radio. Shortly thereafter, CSPD officers in the Greetham Group announced that Cruz had fled Building 12. They would have heard Captain Gallagher transmit that on their radio at 3:00:22. Captain Gallagher obtained that information from Deputy Peterson as they were near each other.

In the background of Sgt. Rossman’s video, Medina was heard telling AP Porter, “His name is Nick – Nick something…wore the camo mask last year, scaring kids with the camo mask.”

At 2:59:17, BSO's armored vehicle parked behind the CSPD armored vehicle and north of Building 13. Multiple SWAT deputies exited the rear of the vehicle and remained in that general area.

At 2:59:23, after coordinating with Captain Mock on the first floor (at 2:57:58), Detective Hays motioned to the two SWAT deputies on the landing between the first and second floor to move north.

At 2:59:49, Captain Robson arrived on scene and pulled into the parking lot behind the BSO armored vehicle, north of Building 13.

At 3:00:31, Deputy Pianelli engaged in conversation with multiple people about the location of the command post, and he directed three people to the command post beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. This exchange is more thoroughly detailed in section 6.2.
CHAPTER 5. OFF-CAMPUS LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO THE SHOOTING

At 3:00:33, AP Morford broadcasted over the school radio that the suspect “ran out – like towards, um, the basketball courts. He ran out towards the shed and then turned left at the shed and ran towards the basketball courts.”

At approximately 3:00:39, an unknown individual broadcasted that they were trying to locate the incident commander. Dispatch notified that person that Captain Jordan’s radio was not working. Deputy Perry, who was with Captain Jordan behind the car in the north parking lot, broadcasted that Captain Jordan was next to him and that she was now “backing out and she’s making her way to the command post. Her radio was (out of service).” That unknown individual stated that he did not see a command post and that because they have a unified response they needed to get her with Coral Springs PD. Captain Robson then transmitted that he is with Captain Jordan and that if CSPD SWAT was on scene then they needed to come to his location “in the front” by the BearCat. This is the first known time that a BSO commanding officer had attempted to coordinate the law enforcement response with CSPD.

At 3:01:03, Cruz entered the McDonald’s located at 5741 Coral Ridge Drive, Coral Springs.

At 3:01:05, CSPD SWAT officers on the third-floor landing, in the west stairwell, opened the door and saw Peter Wang lying on the ground. Wang suffered fatal injuries.

At 3:01:06, the Mazzei Group left their positions in the alcove of classrooms 1231/1232 where they had been since 2:51:31 (elapsed time: 9 minutes, 35 seconds). They resumed advancing east on the second floor.

Almost forty minutes after the first shots, the Mazzei Group resumed advancing eastward on the second floor. BSO SWAT deputies were waiting to meet up with the Mazzei Group in the east stairwell. The Garcia Group was on the second-floor landing of the west stairwell. Three CSPD officers made it to the third-floor landing of the west stairwell. Fifteen classrooms had not been approached by law enforcement at that point.

At 3:01:15, Lt. O’Neill engaged Sergeant G. Matonak and Captain G. Soberon (CSPD) in conversation beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. This was in response to Captain Robson’s transmission that if CSPD SWAT was present they were needed at his location (3:00:39).
Lt. O’Neill told Captain Soberon and Sgt. Matonak that CSPD SWAT was needed at the command post. In response, Sgt. Matonak asked, “Where is the command post?” Captain Soberon said, “We’ve been asking where the command post is. We’re about to set up our own.” Lt. O’Neill stated, “We can’t get on the fucking radio. That’s the problem.” In response, Captain Soberon stated, “Well, we’re not patched.” Lt. O’Neill turned and made several attempts to transmit on his radio, but he was unable to do so; his radio emitted the noise associated with throttling.

At 3:01:17, Cruz sat at a table in McDonald’s and spoke with MSDHS student John Wilford. Unbeknownst to both Cruz and Wilford, Cruz had shot John’s sister Madeleine, and she remained in classroom 1213 with serious injuries. John explained that during their conversation Cruz became somewhat assertive in asking for a ride after learning that John’s mother was coming to pick him up.

At 3:01:18, Morford broadcasted over the school radio that Cruz was running by the tennis courts and provided a clothing description. Porter relayed that information to Sgt. Rossman.

At 3:01:25, Detective Gonzalez (runner) again left the second-floor landing, ran downstairs and continued out of the west doors of Building 12. He returned upstairs approximately one minute later.

At 3:01:47, Captain Robson transmitted over BSO’s radio that due to radio problems he needed everyone who was not on scene to get off the channel. He stated that he was with Captain Jordan next to the SWAT BearCat in front of Building 13 on the north side.

At 3:01:51, CSPD SWAT Medic Parrinello called Captain Mock on the radio and tried to locate any more victims so they could communicate with fire/rescue staging. Captain Mock explained they had victims inside and were working to evacuate them.

At 3:02:07, CSPD SWAT team members on the third-floor landing, in the west stairwell, yelled down to officers on the second-floor landing as they pointed east down the hall. This was regarding Anthony Borges, who was lying in the middle of the hall with serious, but non-fatal injuries. That prompted other officers and deputies to come up to the third floor.
Simultaneously, the Mazzei Group continued east and had approached seven of the ten classrooms on the second floor.

At 3:02:09, Cruz left McDonald’s behind John Wilford. Cruz continued walking southeast into a residential neighborhood.

At 3:02:18, Detectives Hays and Gonzalez—the two runners—ran toward each other on the first floor and met in the center of the hall. Captain Mock then walked toward them while gesturing and talking.

At 3:02:20, Sergeant Rossman broadcasted that the subject was seen on video exiting the school about 20 minutes prior. He broadcasted that Cruz fled to the south and joined in with the group of fleeing students as they were going west. Twenty minutes had elapsed since the Greetham Group first met with Porter (2:41:55), and seven minutes had elapsed since Porter first mentioned there was a delay (2:55:02).

At 3:02:46, officers and deputies entered the west end of the third-floor hall and advanced east toward Anthony Borges who was lying in the middle of the hall. The Mazzei Group had approached nine of the ten classrooms on the second floor.

At 3:02:51, Greenleaf exited the camera room and was met by law enforcement officers. This was the first time a law enforcement officer approached the area of the camera room. Officer C. Ryen was among the officers in this group that was clearing Building 1.

At 3:03:19, Sergeant Rossman directed AP Porter and Medina to come with him to the staging area. They ran southeast toward the Sawgrass Expressway.

At 3:03:22, deputies and officers converged on the last door on the second floor, classroom 1237. All classroom doors on the second floor had been approached by law enforcement. Law enforcement had taken control of both the first- and second-floor hallways and both stairwells up to the second floor. Simultaneously, officers and deputies continued to advance toward Anthony Borges who was laying in the middle of the third-floor hall.

At 3:03:23, Detective Gonzalez exited the west end of the first floor and waved a group of seven SWAT deputies toward Building 12. He was talking on his cell phone prior to and after waving these additional SWAT deputies inside. Seconds later, those seven deputies
were captured sprinting toward the west doors of Building 12. This group had breaching tools. SWAT Medics S. Franklin and T. Noland were also present. They met with Detective Gonzalez and followed him up the west stairs to the third floor.

At 3:03:51, Officer Schmidt pulled Anthony Borges onto the third-floor landing as those additional SWAT deputies were coming up the west stairs. Detective Polo (BSO) and Officer Schmidt began assessing and treating Borges. They identified multiple gunshot wounds and began to apply a tourniquet. Within approximately 15 seconds, SWAT Medic Franklin joined them and began to lead the treatment of Anthony Borges. The medics and law enforcement officers worked together to load Borges onto a soft litter and they carried him out of the building. Anthony Borges was then placed onto a golf cart and transported to the triage area and later to a hospital.

At 3:03:54, Sergeant Miller arrived beneath the Sawgrass Expressway as captured on Lt. O’Neill’s body camera.

At 3:04:10, Captain Mock reached the second-floor landing and communicated with personnel on that floor. He appeared to exchange hand gestures with Detective Monzon (CSPD-SWAT) who was on the east end of the second floor.

At 3:04:54, Sergeant Rossman arrived at the staging area with AP Porter and Medina.

Beginning at 3:05:09 and continuing for the next 40 seconds, 13 additional BSO SWAT team deputies ran to the west side of Building 12. SWAT Medic T. Mormelo was also in that group.

At 3:05:30, Deputy Greetham was inside the southeast corner of Building 1 with CSPD officers. This was the area from which some of the special needs students had been evacuated. As Officer Ryen and other officers were continuing south down the west corridor inside Building 1, Deputy Greetham was in the southeast corner of the building with his rifle pointed to the west. Deputy Greetham quickly raised his rifle to a firing position in response to seeing or hearing Ryen and the other officers and he then immediately lowered the rifle. This almost resulted in a friendly fire situation.
At 3:05:31, Colonel Polan learned from dispatch that Captain Robson was at the “front of the school” near the armored vehicle. Colonel Polan had not yet arrived on scene.

At 3:05:51, a group of more than ten SWAT deputies and officers joined together on the west end of the third floor. They began to advance east down the hall.

At 3:06:33, Captain Robson stated that he needed Fire/Rescue “in here” so he could get five victims into ambulances. Captain Robson had given direction to his SWAT deputies to also use the armored vehicle as an ambulance if necessary and to also run over the chain-link fence to expedite the process.

At 3:06:34, Deputy Mondesir was approached by a captain with the Ft. Lauderdale Police Department on Pine Island Road. The captain inquired about which channel BSO was using and the deputy told him 8-Alpha. The deputy cautioned him that “Coral Springs is getting closer intel than we are.” This is a significant statement because it shows how obvious it was that CSPD had better information than BSO.

By 3:06:52, 45 minutes after the first shots, the BSO/CSPD SWAT element on the third floor had cleared the third-floor teacher’s lounge on the west end of the third floor and approached three classroom doors.

At 3:08:00, Captain Gallagher, Deputy Peterson and Officer Best were all visible near the base of the stairs on the northeast corner of Building 7.

By 3:08:00, the third-floor BSO/CSPD SWAT element had approached seven out of ten classroom doors and cleared the third-floor lounge. Twenty-four seconds later, they had approached every classroom door on the third floor.

At 3:08:31, BSO SWAT Medic Bradley and CSPD SWAT Medic Ceciliano entered the east end of Building 12.

At 3:09:22, Detective Polo entered classroom 1213 where Medic Bradley was assessing Carmen Schentrup (fatality). Medic Bradley stated, “She’s going to be (deceased), but I want to double-check.” Lt. McCoy (BSO SWAT Executive Officer) entered the room as well. After checking on Carmen Schentrup, Medic Bradley exited room 1213.
At 3:09:40, Sergeant Myers (CSPD) and BSO SWAT deputies converged at the top of the west stairwell. Forty-eight minutes and two seconds after the first shots were fired, law enforcement had gained control of all halls and stairwells inside Building 12. They would still need to force entry into some classrooms, restrooms and interior office doors.

At 3:09:41, Deputy Kratz broadcasted that he learned from a baseball coach that the suspect was Nikolas Cruz.

At approximately 3:10:15, Deputy Chief Less (Coconut Creek Police Department) approached Sergeant Rossman and Lt. Feeley at the staging area beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. He asked if the command post was at that location and he was told it was. Shortly thereafter, Deputy Chief Backer also arrived at the staging area.

At 3:11:04, after approaching numerous rooms on the first floor and expressing confusion about which rooms had been cleared, Detective Polo stated aloud that they needed “spray paint or a marker or something.” Detective Polo was now on the first floor and was not present when that floor had been cleared of any threats or victims.

At 3:11:20, Deputy Peterson ran north from Building 7 to the east side of Building 12. This was the first indication that Peterson left his hiding position despite an overwhelming law enforcement presence for over 30 minutes. In an interview with Lt. Cardinale (Sunrise PD), he said that he arrived on the east side of Building 12 and saw Deputy Peterson pacing back and forth while breathing heavily. He asked the deputy who he was and he said, “I’m the SRO.” Lt. Cardinale asked Peterson, “What’s the deal? What’s going on?” and Peterson said, “I don’t know. I don’t know...oh my God, I can’t believe this.”

At 3:11:34, while on the first floor, CSPD SWAT Medic Ceciliano asked Detective Polo, “Where do you guys need a medic?” Medic Ceciliano stated that he did not have radio communication with anyone. Detective Polo told him to stay with him as they ran eastdown the first-floor hall.

At approximately 3:11:45, Captain Soberon (CSPD) approached Sergeant Rossman (BSO) at the staging area and asked him which channel they were using. Sgts. Rossman and Miller told Captain Soberon they were on 8A.
At 3:12:30, SWAT Medics Mormelo, Bradley and Ceciliano made it to the west end of the third floor via the west stairwell. Large crowds of students were being evacuated toward the west stairwell in the third-floor hall.

At 3:13:28, Deputy Marchese expressed frustration to Deputy Eason about the radios not working and said the radios were “busy, busy, busy, busy.”

At 3:13:43, Chief Pustizzi arrived at the staging area. He and Deputy Chief Lees engaged in a conversation about organizing the response.

At 3:15:59, Medic Ceciliano walked down the third-floor hall, asking, "What channel are we on?"

At 3:16:24, deputies at Walmart asked a crowd of students if anyone knows Nikolas Cruz. A student came forward and provided a physical description of Cruz. The student searched social media apps on his phone but was unable to locate additional details. He told the deputies that Cruz worked at the Dollar Tree.

At 3:16:44, Colonel Polan arrived at the TOC north of Building 13. Colonel Polan broadcasted over BSO’s radio channel 8A that he was at that point assuming command as the incident commander (the actual transmission came from Captain Robson because Colonel Polan’s radio was not clearly transmitting).

At 3:17:24, Deputy Pianelli spoke with Captain Morse about the frustration of CSPD having more current information than BSO. He described CSPD’s radio traffic as being about 10 minutes ahead of BSO’s and expressed frustration with the radios not being patched.

At approximately 3:17:25, Chief Pustizzi (CSPD), Deputy Chief Backer (CSPD), Lt. O’Neill (BSO) and Sergeant Rossman (BSO) had a brief exchange about the need to patch radios or to share radios.

At 3:17:45, law enforcement gained access to classroom 1249. This was the last classroom to be accessed by law enforcement.

At 3:17:53, BSO’s mobile command center arrived on Pine Island Road north of the staging area. Ten seconds later, Captain Jordan was seen on Deputy Pianelli’s body camera just
north of the recently arrived BSO mobile command center. This was the first indication that Captain Jordan had left the north side of campus. Her arrival at that time was consistent with the statements of Colonel Polan and Captain Jordan that, upon his arrival, she was directed to establish the command post on Pine Island Road.

At 3:20:28, dispatch told all deputies who had not been assigned a position to switch to a different radio channel, 7-Bravo. Fifty-eight minutes and 50 seconds after the first shot, this was the first indication that a second radio channel was being used for the BSO response.

At 3:21:03, deputies located another student at Walmart who was friends with Jameson “JT” Snead. The friend provided deputies with information about Cruz and contact information for JT’s father, James Snead. Deputy Valdes later used that information to contact James Snead to try and get information regarding Cruz’s location.

At 3:23:33, CSPD’s mobile command bus moved from beneath the Sawgrass Expressway and pulled alongside BSO’s mobile command center. This is the area from which Captain Jordan and various other law enforcement command staff worked to coordinate various aspects of the response.

At 3:24:16, while still at Walmart, Detective Valdes encountered significant radio problems while trying to broadcast information he had learned about Cruz and the Snead family. It took Detective Valdes approximately 12 attempts prior to being able to transmit.

At approximately 3:27:46, Detective Valdes called James Snead from Walmart. James told Valdes that his son, JT, said that Cruz was at a nearby McDonald’s. Valdes and other law enforcement officers left Walmart and traveled to that McDonald’s.

At approximately 3:30:40, Deputy Morales’s body camera began recording as he was on the northeast corner of Building 7. Deputy Peterson was no longer at that location.

At approximately 3:32:32, Detective Valdes and several other law enforcement officers arrived at McDonald’s. They searched the restaurant trying to locate Cruz. Twenty seconds later, Detective Valdes received a call from James Snead. Snead asked Valdes to have deputies go by his house because he could not get in touch with his wife. During this call
Detective Valdes obtained Cruz’s cell phone number and provided it to the communications center to assist in locating Cruz.

At 3:37:45, Officer Leonard with Coconut Creek PD was driving through a residential neighborhood approximately two miles southwest of MSDHS when he saw a subject matching Cruz’s description. Officer Leonard detained Cruz at gunpoint, and, with help from backup officers, they took Cruz into custody.

By 3:42:06, the Tactical Operations Center was still outside. Investigators learned that this was eventually moved into Building 13.

**Findings:**

1. While several deputies have been identified as not properly responding to hearing gunshots, many other deputies responded in the proper manner by running to the scene, seeking out the shooter, providing medical aid and evacuating victims.

2. The sporadic functioning of BSO’s radios undoubtedly hindered BSO’s response. To an unknown extent, the school structure itself also hindered the radio functionality.

3. Several uniformed BSO deputies were either seen on camera or described taking the time to retrieve and put on their ballistic vests, sometimes in excess of one minute and in response to hearing gunshots. Deputy sheriffs taking time to retrieve vests from containers in their cruisers, removing certain equipment they were wearing so that they could put on their vests, and then replacing the equipment they had removed all while shots were being fired, or had been recently fired is unacceptable and contrary to accepted protocol, under which the deputies should have immediately moved toward the gunshots to confront the shooter. Absence of a policy requiring deputies to wear ballistic vests while on-duty unnecessarily delayed their preparedness to respond.

4. Several BSO deputies arrived on Holmberg Road, just north of Building 12 while shots were being fired, and most of them heard the shots. These deputies have been identified as Kratz, Eason, Stambaugh, Perry, Seward and Goolsby. These deputies remained on Holmberg Road and did not immediately move toward the gunshots to
confront the shooter. The deputies’ actions appear to be a violation of accepted protocol under which the deputies should have immediately moved toward the gunshots.

5. Law enforcement officers within Building 12 became confused over which rooms had been cleared and which rooms had not been cleared. BSO SWAT used a color-coded glow stick method to mark certain rooms, but the inherent shortcoming in that system is that the glow sticks can easily be kicked out of place. BSO needs a more effective system for its SWAT Team to denote cleared room other than glow sticks.

6. City officials, school board members, county commissioners and other politicians were unnecessarily present at the command post in the early stages of the response. Their presence interfered with command-and-control operations.

7. There was abundant confusion over the location of the command post and the role of the staging area. This stemmed from an absence of command and control and an ineffective radio system.

8. While not law enforcement’s fault, the school’s staff lacked adequate training and the ability to operate the camera playback system. The fact that law enforcement erroneously believed for a considerable amount of time that Cruz was still in the building and was being watched on camera misled officers and deputies and adversely affected their decision-making and victim rescue efforts.

9. The Broward County Public School’s decision not to allow law enforcement live and real-time direct access to the school camera systems in Broward County, including the system at MSDHS, severely affected law enforcement efforts to locate Cruz and delayed victim rescue efforts.

10. Coral Springs Police officers consistently praised their training as preparing them for a proper response. Without hesitation, each officer knew the active shooter training they had received annually for the past several years. They had no difficulty in identifying the proper response to an active shooter.
11. On the other hand, Broward Sheriff’s Office deputies remembered that they attended training in the past few years, but some could not remember the last time they attended active shooter training. Some BSO deputies could not even recall the type of training they received. Several were specific in referencing that their policy states that deputies “may” go toward the shooter. BSO’s training was inconsistent at best, and was reflected in their poor response to this active shooter event.

12. A significant number of officers and deputies said that additional training would be beneficial; however, they also said that no amount of training can totally prepare you to face such an event.

5.2 Incident Command and Control

A coordinated response is necessary when there are multiple agencies and personnel responding to any incident, especially an active assailant incident. It is essential that there be effective command and control and that requires a single designated person—who is clearly identified—serving as the incident commander. It is essential that the incident commander direct the effort and serve as the final decision-maker.

Law enforcement organizations have a para-military structure with a well-defined chain-of-command—deputies/officers answer to sergeants, sergeants answer to lieutenants and so on, up to the sheriff/police chief. When it comes to incident command, all agencies follow the National Incident Command System known as ICS.

Under ICS and consistent with universally accepted protocols, the highest ranking person on scene is not necessarily the incident commander. As an example, the sheriff or police chief who is present at the scene of a major incident will usually have duties other than scene management, and the incident commander will usually be a captain, major, colonel, deputy chief or someone of equivalent rank. The person who assumes initial command may be relieved of incident commander duties by someone of a higher rank when the higher ranking person formally announces that he/she is taking over as the incident commander.

Formally or informally, incident command is practiced daily by law enforcement agencies. Daily calls are handled by line supervisors as “incident commanders,” while incidents that
require a heavy personnel and asset response will involve higher-ranking individuals. For example, a response to a fight might involve a sergeant and four deputies/officers, while a response to a bank robbery might involve a lieutenant, two sergeants and twelve deputies/officers. In those examples, the sergeant and lieutenant would serve as the incident commander respectively. In an active assailant situation with hundreds of personnel responding, the incident commander would usually be a higher-ranking person.

In response to any incident, the incident commander serves as the person who oversees the response, directs personnel and assets and determines the need to call up additional personnel and assets. Deputies and first-line supervisors are typically focused on dealing with a fairly singular task, while the incident commanders are responsible for looking at the entire response and considering “the big picture.”

In larger responses, incident commanders typically establish a command post. That command post may be as simple as using a white board on the hood of their vehicle, or it may involve calling out a mobile command bus, bringing together commanders of various bureaus within an agency or even outside agencies.

In large mass-casualty incidents (MCIs) such as this shooting, natural disasters or civil unrest, it is best practice for incident commanders to establish a unified command. This unified command involves bringing together agency heads from multiple organizations and disciplines to ensure that all resources can be directed to any given need in a prompt and effective manner.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides the following description for this system:

The Incident Command System (ICS) is a management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures and communications operating within a common organizational structure. ICS is normally structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas: command, operations, planning, logistics ... [and] finance/administration. It is a
fundamental form of management, with the purpose of enabling incident managers to identify the key concerns associated with the incident—often under urgent conditions—without sacrificing attention to any component of the command system.

The immediate responders to MCIs—as was the case in the MSDHS shooting—are almost always local law enforcement and fire/rescue. State and federal law enforcement are typically not far behind and offer additional resources related to the immediate response but serve in a support role to the local officials. State and federal agencies are typically not “first responders.”

The incident commander in these coordinated responses is usually the senior ranking member of the agency to which the response is most applicable. If fire/rescue and law enforcement both respond to a massive warehouse fire, the fire chief or his designee would serve as the incident commander with law enforcement serving a supporting role. In responses such as the MSDHS shooting where there has been a mass shooting and the suspect is at large, the sheriff or his designee would serve as the incident commander with fire/rescue serving a supporting role.

The shooting at MSDHS on February 14, 2018, occurred in the City of Parkland. Recall that Parkland contracts with BSO for law enforcement services and Coral Springs Fire Department for fire and emergency medical services. The fact that Parkland is at the northern end of the county and surrounded by three municipalities with their own police departments resulted in BSO-Parkland deputies largely being isolated from other BSO deputies. There were no bordering BSO service areas from which a large number of deputies could quickly respond to assist BSO-Parkland deputies. Coral Springs Police Department officers were the closest backup officers to Parkland deputies. This, in and of itself, would not be a problem provided that BSO-Parkland and the neighboring municipal police departments have effective communications with each other, which they did not.

The first 911 call regarding the MSDHS shooting occurred at 2:22:13, and under existing 911 call routing protocols the call was received by the Coral Springs Police Department/Coral Springs 911 center. To reiterate, CSPD does not have jurisdiction in
Parkland and does not provide police services to Parkland. The Coral Springs dispatcher received information that it was a shooting in progress. Nationwide, it is common practice that the 911 center would view this incident as a primarily law enforcement response with fire/rescue responding to the area until law enforcement notified them that it was safe for fire/rescue to enter the scene. Within the first responder community, fire/rescue waiting for clearance by law enforcement to enter a scene is typically referred to as “staging.” Fire/EMS waits in close proximity to an incident but not at the scene, away from any known direct threats.

As more fully discussed in Chapter 7, due to this 911 call being received by Coral Springs and the incident occurring in Parkland, the Coral Springs 911 center did not treat it as a law enforcement response and transferred the call to Broward Regional 911 Center that dispatches BSO. After receiving the transfer from Coral Springs, Broward Regional 911 Center broadcast this call to BSO-Parkland deputies, while the Coral Springs Communications Center dispatched fire/rescue to respond to the area of MSDHS and did not provide the information to on-duty CSPD officers.

The first BSO supervisor to transmit over the radio was Lieutenant S. O’Neill at 2:26:08, almost three minutes after Peterson first transmitted that there were “shots fired.” Lieutenant O’Neill was a patrol commander from the BSO-North Lauderdale district. He notified dispatch that he was responding and directed all of his district’s motorcycle deputies to respond as well. In Lieutenant O’Neill’s interview, he stated that he was at the North Lauderdale Criminal Investigations Office when he heard the radio traffic about the shooting. He directed Crime Suppression Team detectives to respond to the scene as well.

Prior to leaving the office, Lt. O’Neill printed a Google Maps map of the MSDHS campus due to having no familiarity with the school. Lt. O’Neill stated in his interview that the focus of the initial response, for which Captain Jordan was responsible, appeared to be on rescuing victims and not “active killer mode.” He observed that the radio traffic appeared to be about locating victims and trying to acquire bolt cutters. He said that while he was responding there were multiple discussions over the radio about a command post, but he had a general understanding that it was on the north side of the campus. Upon his arrival,
he heard Captain Jordan on the air, and he assumed that she was the incident commander. Captain Jordan was the highest ranking person on scene, and it was her district/city.

At approximately 2:26:24, nearly five minutes after the first shots and four minutes after the first 911 call, Sergeant Reid (CSPD) inquired over CSPD’s main radio channel about the shooting after learning of the shooting from a fire chief running past him in the hall in the joint Coral Springs police/fire administration building. Coral Springs dispatch confirmed there was active shooting at MSDHS and that resulted in a large-scale response by CSPD including their chief, deputy chiefs and several captains. Coral Springs did not dispatch the call or initiate a police response until Sgt. Reid’s inquiry because it was treating the incident as a fire/EMS event.

At approximately 2:26:56, Sergeant Thyroff from District 15 stated that “all (crime suppression team detectives) were en route” from District 15.

At 2:27:03, just 5 minutes and 25 seconds after Cruz fired the first shots, BSO had seven deputies (eight including Deputy Peterson) and a sergeant either on the MSD campus or in immediate proximity. At that point, Sergeant B. Miller was the on-duty Parkland patrol sergeant and the only supervisor on scene, and as such he was responsible for directing the law enforcement response. Despite his responsibility and as more thoroughly covered in the previous section, Sergeant Miller remained on Holmberg Road, and he claimed that he did so for the purposes of directing the response. However, Sergeant Miller’s actions are inconsistent with his claim. Sergeant Miller’s first radio transmission was not made until 2:32:08; approximately 10 minutes 30 seconds after Cruz fired the first rounds and approximately 5 minutes after Sgt. Miller’s arrival. More importantly, any law enforcement officer—regardless of rank—who arrives at the scene of an active shooter while shots are still being fired has an obligation to pursue the sound of those gunshots and confront the shooter, but Sgt. Miller remained behind his car in a position of personal safety.

The Commission recognizes that BSO experienced a severe radio failure which hindered communications; however, there was no indication that the radio system was throttling upon Sergeant Miller’s arrival, and there is no evidence that radio issues precluded Sergeant Miller from transmitting at that point. The decision by Sergeant Miller to not
pursue the sound of gunshots and/or to direct his deputies to do so was among first supervisory failures.

At approximately 2:27:49, Officer T. Burton, the first on-duty CSPD to arrive at MSDHS arrived on the south side of Building 1. Within the following minute and a half he went on to provide specific and detailed direction to CSPD officers on the building to which they needed to respond.

At 2:28:39, Lieutenant O’Neill directed that CST deputies “set up for active shooter response when you get (on scene).” Lt. O’Neill stated that he made this transmission after recognizing a lack of direction from other supervisors/command staff on the radio. He knew that his CST deputies and motor units were capable of responding appropriately to the active shooter, but he wanted to remind them that “regardless of what you’re hearing on the radio (absence of direction), that we’re doing an active-shooter response.”

By 2:28:43 (7 minutes 5 seconds after the first shots were fired), Captain Jan Jordan had reached the MSDHS campus. Captain Jordan was the commanding officer of BSO-Parkland. She rode to the scene with her executive officer, Lieutenant M. DeVita. Captain Jordan and Lieutenant DeVita ran from their vehicle to the administration building (Building 1).

In her interview, Captain Jordan said that she attempted to coordinate a response on her radio while responding, but she was not able to do so. She heard radio traffic about different locations such as the football field and the north parking lot. While responding, she began operating under the assumption that shots were no longer being fired because she heard no additional radio traffic about gunshots. Captain Jordan stated that as she was arriving at the school she began hearing the throttling noise. She expressed a concern that if she went farther onto campus her radio would become less effective (it is not uncommon for school buildings to interfere with radio traffic). Based on a review of the facts and evidence, it does not appear that the throttling began for approximately another five minutes.

The first attempt to establish a command post and provide direction to responding units was at 2:29:33. Detective B. Goolsby transmitted, “Let’s get a command post set up on the south side of the Sawgrass in Coral Springs off of Pine Island. The gate for the student
entrance is unlocked. We need to get units in here so we can start trying to find this guy.” Sgt. Miller, Lt. DeVita and Captain Jordan were all on scene by this point; however it was a BSO-Parkland detective who began to provide direction to responding units.

Captain Jordan’s first radio transmission was not until 2:31:30 in which she said, “I know there’s a lot going on, do we have a perimeter set up right now and everyone cleared out of the school?” While on-scene personnel would presume that upon Captain Jordan’s arrival at the scene she would be the incident commander, there was no transmission that she was indeed on scene, identifying that she was the incident commander or that she had established a command post. While Captain Jordan’s initial transmission was not wrong per se, it was not focused on what should have been the primary objective of an active shooter response: seek out the killer and eliminate the threat. Captain Jordan asked whether the school had been cleared out without having a clue where the killer was and whether clearing the school at that point would have been more detrimental or beneficial.

Captain Jordan had remained inside or within the immediate area of Building 1 (administration building) for approximately seven and a half minutes when she left at 2:37:18. During that time, based on a review of surveillance video and interviews with Captain Jordan and school staff, there was extremely limited interaction between Captain Jordan and the school administration. Captain Jordan repeatedly walked back and forth between two doors on the north and east sides of Building 1. Captain Jordan did not attempt to get a map of the school, identify the presence of surveillance video, or coordinate with administrators in gathering additional details. Captain Jordan stated she recalled hearing from a school staff member that the shooting was within Building 12.

Investigators reviewed the surveillance video within Building 1 prior to interviewing Captain Jordan. On that video she was seen using her cell phone and appearing to make a phone call. In the interview Captain Jordan was asked who it was she was calling from inside Building 1. Captain Jordan said she did not remember making a phone call. When told that she had indeed been using her cell phone, she speculated that she was trying to call Sergeant Miller.
CHAPTER 5. OFF-CAMPUS LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO THE SHOOTING

At approximately 2:32:22, Sergeant Mazzei, Sergeant Myers, Detective Monzon and Officer Wilkins—all of CSPD—led a response to the west doors of Building 12 from Holmberg Road. They were joined by Deputies Hanks, Volpe, Goolsby and Officer Harrison.

At approximately 2:32:42, Sergeant Miller (BSO) requested that dispatch send the helicopter and a K-9 unit. Simultaneously, CSPD sergeants and officers were the first law enforcement officers to enter Building 12 through the west doors. Sergeant Miller remained on Holmberg Road while sergeants from neighboring Coral Springs led an active assailant response into Building 12.

At approximately 2:32:54, Detective E. Gonzalez notified Captain Jordan that multiple SWAT units were responding to the scene.

At approximately 2:33:04, Captain Jordan transmitted, “I want to make sure that we have a perimeter set up and the school (unintelligible), all the kids are getting out, but we need to shut down around this school. Does the (sergeant) have a place where we’re setting up for all the units coming into the area?” Sergeant Miller responded, “We don’t have a command post set up. We have a perimeter around him. We have two teams going in checking right now.” Captain Jordan asked which way they were going into the school, and Sergeant Miller said, “Entering from the north side through the parking lot where the students park.” During this exchange, Captain Jordan was inside or in the immediate area of Building 1 and Sergeant Miller was standing on Holmberg Road north of Building 12. The Captain was closer to the school than the Sergeant and the Sergeant was standing back watching what others were doing.

At approximately 2:34:18, Lieutenant O’Neill (BSO) broadcasted that he had a staging location underneath the Sawgrass on Coral Springs Drive (also referred to as Pine Island Road). Body camera footage revealed Lt. O’Neill experienced minor difficulty in making this transmission. This appears to be the approximate point at which radio throttling began.

Captain Jordan then directed that all responding units stage at that location and that they approach the campus from the south. We learned from several BSO interviews that, at the 2017 Ft. Lauderdale Airport Shooting, the rapid influx of a large number of emergency
vehicles hindered the law enforcement and emergency medical response. This has also been a consistent theme in other mass casualty incidents. The staging area allows large numbers of personnel and assets to be in the immediate area of the scene for rapid deployment to an area of need as opposed to having the scene overrun with first responders having no direction or guidance.

In particular, Lt. O’Neill pointed out that, from the Ft. Lauderdale Airport Shooting, they learned to place an emphasis on “staging, staging, and staging.” He went on to say, “The tactical - the critical incident’s going to end very soon. And then it’s going to be all about recovery operations,” adding that this would be more difficult in a school due to the number of victims.

At approximately 2:34:47, Captain B. Mock (CSPD) arrived near the northeast corner of Building 8 and in close proximity to Building 12. Captains Mock and Gallagher (CSPD) were the first command-level law enforcement officers in the immediate area of Building 12. At the time Captain Mock was the CSPD SWAT commander.

At approximately 2:35:54, Deputy Chief Backer was seen on the body camera of Deputy Moniz near the southeast corner of the MSDHS campus. From interviews we know that CSPD command staff members Deputy Chief Backer, Deputy Chief Parry and Captain Soberon all arrived at MSDHS together. The three of them would have arrived shortly before this footage was captured on the body camera.

At approximately 2:37:42, Captain Jordan met with Sergeant I. Sklar (BSO) in the administration parking lot in front of Buildings 1 and 8. Both Captain Jordan and Sergeant Sklar stated in their interviews that Captain Jordan unsuccessfully attempted to use Sergeant Sklar’s portable and in-car radios due to her radio not working.

By 2:38:00, CSPD Captain Mock and more than ten officers/deputies had entered the east end of Building 12. School surveillance video and body cameras showed that Captain Mock had taken control of this group and directed their movement throughout the first floor of Building 12.
At 2:38:11, BSO Lt. O’Neill arrived beneath the Sawgrass Expressway on Pine Island Road. This area served the staging area for responding personnel. Lt. O’Neill worked feverishly to clear Pine Island Road of parked vehicles and to keep the roadway clear for additional responding units. He designated a single lane for emergency medical vehicles and the other for law enforcement. Lt. O’Neill was very focused and worked hard to create a staging area and clear paths of travel. However, as will be more fully developed later in this section, Lt. O’Neill’s extensive effort to clear the roadway was so extensive that it actually hindered the law enforcement response into Building 12.

Lt. O’Neill stated that the initial command operations appeared to be focused on patient rescue and not on the active-killer response. He elaborated saying “It was simply, we found another victim, another victim, get some bolt cutters, that type of thing...never, you know, we’ve got the guy barricaded in this room.” He said that during his response he heard radio traffic referencing a command post and believed that “generally, it was on the north side of the school.” Lt. O’Neill recalled hearing Captain Jordan over the radio who he said would “naturally” be the incident commander. He described the initial command structure as being “ineffective” because Captain Jordan was “not engaged with the problem.” Lt. O’Neill said that Captain Jordan seemed to have a “dream-like” nature to her speech.

At 2:38:54, Chief T. Pustizzi (CSPD) was seen running north on Pine Island Road immediately north of the Sawgrass Expressway. This footage was captured on the body camera of Lt. O’Neill. Chief Pustizzi stated in his interview that upon his arrival he saw some of his officers stopping traffic and others running toward campus. He had some level of familiarity with this location due to CSPD SWAT having previously trained at MSDHS. Chief Pustizzi said that he made contact with Captain Soberon, and they attempted to locate a command post but were unable to find one. He learned from Captain Soberon that other officers and command staff from CSPD were handling the tactical response. Chief Pustizzi said that he directed that a command post be established and he was unaware whether BSO had an incident commander at that time.

Simultaneous to Chief Pustizzi running north on Pine Island Road, Lt. S. Feeley (BSO) was seen at the southeast corner of Building 1 with the Greetham Group. Within approximately
ten minutes, Lt. Feeley returned to the Sawgrass Expressway and would join the efforts to establish a staging area. Lt. Feeley stated that he heard Captain Jordan on the radio and assumed that she was the incident commander. Lt. Feeley said that he did not have any problems with his radio.

At approximately 2:39:00, the first evidence that BSO’s radios experienced a significant failure was captured on the body camera of Detective R. Valdes. Valdes was on the east side of Building 12 and escorting deputies as they carried a victim away from the building. It took him approximately six to eight attempts to transmit on his radio prior to successfully transmitting.

2:40:00 is the estimated time at which Captain Jordan and Sergeant Sklar reached the north side of campus near the west gate to the student parking lot. We know from Captain Jordan’s interview that she continued south toward the north side of Building 13 and took a position behind a car next to Deputy Perry. Captain Jordan was the highest-ranking BSO deputy on scene at that point and had still not established a command post.

Captain Jordan stated in her interview that she met with Deputy Perry and Detective Goolsby (BSO) behind a car on the north side of Building 13. The investigation revealed that Goolsby was not behind the car at that time, but we do not consider Captain Jordan’s statement intentionally deceptive. Captain Jordan said that Deputy Perry pointed out to her the bullet holes on the west end of Building 12 and Coach Feis laying on the ground, and Perry told her there were law enforcement teams inside of Building 12. Captain Jordan said that she continued to have radio problems. She attempted to use Deputy Perry’s radio, but his radio did not work either.

At approximately 2:40:10, Deputy Chief Parry (CSPD) was seen near the southeast corner of Building 1. He cautioned all the law enforcement officers in that group that they did not know where the shooter was and they needed to watch behind them.

At approximately 2:40:18, Sergeant Rossman and Deputy Chief Backer engaged in a brief exchange as they were near the southeast corner of Building 1. They discussed the need for patching radios, establishing an incident command and obtaining a map of the school. Deputy Chief Backer directed his communications center to patch the radios with BSO.
Sergeant Rossman went on to point out to Deputy Chief Backer that BSO’s command post was on the south side of the Sawgrass Expressway.

To be clear, the area beneath the Sawgrass Expressway was the staging area. BSO’s incident commander, Captain Jordan, was on the north side of campus on Holmberg Road. Very few people—if any—knew that though, as Captain Jordan failed to identify herself as the incident commander and she did not identify the location of a command post.

At this point (2:40, approximately 18 minutes after the first shots were fired), Captain Jordan was on the north side of campus with Deputy Perry. Captain Mock (CSPD) was leading a group clearing the first floor of building, and CSPD Sergeant Mazzei was leading a group clearing the second floor of Building 1. Deputy Chiefs Backer and Parry of CSPD were near the southeast corner of Building 1. A staging area had been established beneath the Sawgrass Expressway by Lt. O’Neill (BSO). Multiple fire/rescue engines, ambulances and administrative vehicles had driven north from the Sawgrass Expressway on Pine Island Road. They were establishing their fire/EMS command post and triage area at Pine Island Road and Holmberg Road. A law enforcement command post of any sort—let alone a unified command post—had not been established, and none of the command staff from BSO, CSPD or CSFD were in direct communication.

At approximately 2:40:39, Captain Steve Robson (BSO SWAT Commander) inquired over the radio asking where the command post was located. Captain Robson was not yet on scene at this time. He had been at the hospital with a family member. Captain Robson said that as he was responding he was under the impression that the shooter was still present and he was waiting to hear someone on the radio establish command and control of the response but that did not happen. He described sustained and prolonged radio problems, which hindered his ability to coordinate the response.

The communication center notified Captain Robson the command post was on the south side of the Sawgrass Expressway in the City of Coral Springs. He responded, “Confirm with the incident commander that is where they want SWAT to respond.” Dispatch replied, “That is the staging area for now. (Sergeant Miller) can you advise further?” While encountering radio problems, Detective Goolsby and Sergeant Miller collectively identified
the north parking lot as where SWAT was needed to respond. Again, there was confusion about where people should go because command and control had not been effectively established.

As that exchange was taking place on BSO’s radio, Captain Soberon (CSPD) asked his communications center about patching channels with BSO and asking where their command post was located. He pointed out that without radios being patched that BSO and CSPD were in effect conducting two separate operations.

In his interview, Captain Soberon stated that upon his arrival he knew that Deputy Chiefs Parry and Backer had advanced toward campus. He remained on Pine Island Road to focus on command and control. Captain Soberon approached a BSO lieutenant and asked where the command post was located; the lieutenant said he did not know. Captain Soberon worked to clear Pine Island Road and try to establish command operations.

At approximately 2:40:42, Deputy Chief Parry told other law enforcement officers that they needed to start getting Building 1 locked down. Deputy Chiefs Parry and Backer then walked southwest toward the south sides of Buildings 1 and 2.

At approximately 2:41:27, a K-9 deputy approached BSO Lt. O’Neill near the staging area and asked where the command post was located. Lt. O’Neill directed the deputy to the north side of campus but was unable to specify where the command post was located.

At approximately 2:41:50, Sergeant B. Miller broadcasted over the radio that he was having problems with his radio.

At approximately 2:42:22, Sergeant Sklar attempted to coordinate the response by trying to identify the location of Peterson or any other deputy who was with an administrator who has access to the cameras. Sergeant Sklar identified the void in the command response and stated, “...we need to start making a plan here."

At approximately 2:43:40, Captain McKeone and Sergeant J. Heinrich (CSPD) approached the south side of Building 13. Captain McKeone, the CSPD SWAT executive officer, had loaned a spare ballistic vest and firearm to Sgt. Heinrich after they turned Kyle Laman over
to emergency medical personnel. Captain McKeone went on to the east side of Building 13 and remained there for several minutes thereafter.

At approximately 2:45:16, Chief Pustizzi (CSPD) directed units who were not on campus to take a perimeter position due to the shooter’s location being unknown. Shortly thereafter he directed that a command post be established at Pine Island Road/Holmberg Road.

At approximately 2:46:33, Detective Goolsby again attempted to coordinate a response by directing all responding units to come in from the north in order to avoid a friendly-fire situation.

At approximately 2:47:52, dispatch could be heard responding to transmissions by Captain Jordan; however Captain Jordan’s transmissions could not be heard.

At approximately 2:48:07, Lt. O’Neill was approached by a deputy while near the staging area. The deputy was quickly walking north on Pine Island Road toward the campus while carrying a rifle. Lt. O’Neill stopped the deputy and told him they did not need anyone else on scene with a rifle and that SWAT was there. However, Sergeant T. Garcia, Detective Gonzalez and Deputy Sherlock (BSO-SWAT) were the only SWAT personnel on scene; and they were on Holmberg Road. Additionally, only half of the second floor and none of the third floor had been accessed by law enforcement. There is no indication that Lt. O’Neill had been given any information that would have caused him to stop other deputies from approaching the scene. Lt. O’Neill went on to explain to the deputy how they were going to clear the roadway and make use of the different lanes of traffic.

At approximately 2:48:33, Sergeant Sklar made reference to his radio not working properly.

At approximately 2:49:39, Detectives Gonzalez, Polo and Schaub (BSO) ran south from Holmberg Road and met up with Captain Jordan and Deputy Perry as they were still behind a car north of Building 13. Captain Jordan was behind the car with her radio in one hand and her handgun in the other.

In her interview, Captain Jordan recalled attempting to also use Deputy Perry’s radio as they were behind the car but said his radio would not work. She said that she was
preparing to use her cell phone in order to call the communications center in order to try to resolve the problem with the radios when Captain Robson arrived. Captain Robson did not arrive on the north end of campus until approximately 20 minutes after Captain Jordan arrived. This means Captain Jordan was on scene for approximately 20 minutes with no established command and control.

Sergeant Garcia and Deputy Sherlock (both of BSO SWAT) ran to the east side of Building 13 where Captain McKeone (CSPD) and other officers/deputies were watching the west side of Building 12.

At approximately 2:49:50, BSO dispatch broadcasted that they had a radio channel (SWAT 1) available for the SWAT team to use. Captain Robson responded stating that they would remain on the main channel (8A) in order to organize their response.

At approximately 2:50:05, Deputy Chief Parry (CSPD) approached Lieutenants Feeley and O’Neill (BSO) at the staging area near the Sawgrass Expressway. Deputy Chief Parry inquired about the location of Captain Jordan. Lt. O’Neill told Deputy Chief Parry that she was at the command post which he believed was “on the northwest corner” (while there was no command post, there had been no prior references to a command post being on a northwest corner—the incident commander, Captain Jordan, was behind a car north of Building 13).

Deputy Chief Parry identified himself to the BSO lieutenants as the deputy chief for CSPD and said, “I’d love to set up a command post and start systematically scratching out where we’ve got, where we’ve searched, what we haven’t.” Lt. O’Neill told Deputy Chief Parry that he would have to go to the command post to do that and that their current location was for staging. Lt. Feeley—in an apparent reference to the location of the command post—stated “they (dispatch) said it’s on the south side of the Sawgrass.” Lt. O’Neill told Deputy Chief Parry he would have to find out where Captain Jordan was. He went on to explain that he did not have her phone number because he does not work for her. Lt’ O’Neill asked Lt. Feeley for her number, and Lt. Feeley stated that he responded to the scene so quickly he forgot his cell phone.
As Deputy Chief Parry was attempting to locate Captain Jordan near the staging area, Captain Jordan was still behind the vehicle with Deputy Perry north of Buildings 12 and 13. Deputy Perry asked Captain Jordan “Can you patch through with Coral Springs and see what they’ve done ‘cause they’ve been in the building?” There was no audible response from Captain Jordan. In sum, there was no command post or command structure in place, and the highest ranking BSO deputy on scene, Captain Jordan, was being asked by a deputy sheriff to find out from the neighboring police department what was going on inside of the building where the killings occurred because the BSO commander did not know.

At approximately 2:50:31, Captain Mock was approached by Detectives Gariepy and Alfin (CSPD-SWAT) who had just entered the building. He could be seen on surveillance video giving them direction, and they ultimately went to the other end of the hall and joined up with BSO SWAT to advance up to the second and third floors. Simultaneously, Captain Soberon and Chief Pustizzi (both from CSPD) were seen on Pine Island Road near the bus loop on the southeast corner of campus. Captain Soberon was communicating with Deputy Pianelli about keeping the roadway clear for additional emergency vehicles. Chief Pustizzi was slightly north of them speaking with an unidentified deputy.

Almost immediately after the conversation between Deputy Chief Parry, Lt. O’Neill and Lt. Feeley about locating Captain Jordan, Lt. Feeley asked dispatch over the radio for the location of the command post. Dispatch told him that BSO was staging at the south side of the Sawgrass Expressway. BSO dispatch did not know of a command post.

At approximately 2:51:28, after being asked by the communications center, Captain Jordan said that she needed additional deputies from a neighboring BSO district to respond. She also requested that Lieutenant Feeley call her cell phone. This was taking place as BSO SWAT team members and other deputies were entering the west side of Building 12.

The summary at 2:51:00, which was approximately 30 minutes after Cruz fired the first shot, is as follows: Captain Jordan—the incident commander—was located in the parking lot immediately north of Building 13 behind a car. Captain Mock (CSPD) was coordinating the response inside Building 12. Deputy Chief Backer (CSPD) was on the south side of campus coordinating a perimeter. A law enforcement staging area had been established.
beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. Deputy Chief Parry had approached Lts. O’Neill and Feeley at this staging area and was trying to locate the BSO command post; however, neither lieutenant knew where the command post was located—unbeknownst to them, there was no command post. Multiple Coral Springs Fire Department vehicles had converged at the intersection of Pine Island Road and Holmberg Road and established the fire department command post. A law enforcement command post had not been established, and a unified command post had not been established.

At approximately 2:51:31, approximately 30 minutes after the first shots were fired, Sergeant T. Garcia (BSO-SWAT) led a team of BSO deputies into the west end of Building 12. This team included three SWAT deputies, crime suppression team detectives, and a K-9 handler. They were joined by four CSPD SWAT team officers who had already been inside Building 12, and they continued up to the second and third floors.

As this group was going up the stairs under the impression that they were searching for the suspect, there was nearly constant radio traffic causing Detective Polo to say aloud, “...they need to clear the fucking air, man.” At that time there was discussion between the communications center and commanding officers about establishing a staging area and where to have responding units arrive. Establishing a staging area is absolutely necessary; however, the logistical/support issues should have moved to another channel, allowing the deputies in the tactical setting (Building 12) to have exclusive use of the primary radio channel. It is an officer-safety issue for deputies engaged in a tactical operation not to have a dedicated radio channel. The failure to split the channels can be attributed to ineffective incident command by BSO, including no command post to coordinate and implement this transition.

At approximately 2:52:55, Lt. O’Neill approached Deputy Chief Parry beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. Lt. O’Neill told Deputy Chief Parry that no more officers were needed on campus and that they were needed at the staging area. There is no evidence to suggest that Lt. O’Neill had been given that direction by Captain Jordan or any other individuals who had information about what was happening within Building 12. At that point, still only
approximately half of the second floor and none of the third floor had been cleared by law enforcement.

At approximately 2:53:35, the CSPD command bus arrived at the staging area beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. Captain Soberon stated in his interview that upon the arrival of the command bus he was able to access a map of the MSDHS campus and print multiple copies. He described how at that point he, Deputy Chief Parry and others began to establish command operations.

At approximately 2:54:42, Sergeant B. Miller was seen on a body camera standing on the north side of Holmberg Road pointing out to other deputies the area from which he last heard gunshots. Sergeant Miller had not moved from his location since his arrival on Holmberg Road.

At approximately 2:54:46, Captain Mock transmitted over CSPD radio traffic that the suspect was moving from the third to the second floor. Captain Mock's source for this information would have had to have been a nearby BSO deputy as Sergeant Rossman had broadcasted the same information over BSO radios seconds earlier. The information was incorrect due to the miscommunication over viewing rewound video versus a live video feed.

At approximately 2:56:29, Chief Pustizzi directed his officers to assume that there was a second shooter and to hold their perimeter positions.

At approximately 2:56:36, Chief Pustizzi was speaking with Deputy Pianelli—a motorcycle deputy directing traffic—and asked him, “Are you guys on our channel or no?” Deputy Pianelli replied, “No, they didn't patch.”

At approximately 2:57:00, Detective Gonzalez approached Captain Mock on the first floor of Building 12. He directed Captain Mock to tell CSPD SWAT officers outside to not fire inside Building 12 unless absolutely necessary. Captain Mock later transmitted this information over the CSPD main channel.

At approximately 2:57:11, Colonel Jim Polan broadcasted over the BSO radio in an attempt to try and locate the incident commander. Captain Jordan responded and dispatch asked
for her location. There was no response by Captain Jordan. Due to the static on the radio
and Captain Jordan's lack of a response, it appears as though she was unable to transmit.

At 2:57:58, Detective B. Hays (BSO-SWAT) and Captain Mock were engaged in discussion
on the first floor. Detective Hays then ran to the east stairwell and appeared to give
direction to two BSO SWAT deputies in the stairwell. Seconds later, Captain Mock and
Sergeant Mazzei (BSO-SWAT leading the second-floor group) engaged in communication
over the radio about the location of different groups within Building 12.

A review of surveillance videos, body camera videos and radio traffic reveal that Captain
Mock largely served as the ad hoc incident commander for the tactical operations inside
Building 12. Early on, Capt. Mock led the response of a large group that was clearing the
first floor. Once that was complete, he served as a source of information and
communication in conjunction with Detectives Gonzalez and Hays (BSO-SWAT). Detectives
Hays and Gonzalez had become runners as a result of the BSO radio failure. Due to Captain
Mock having a functioning radio, he was able to coordinate the movement of Sergeant
Mazzei and his group on the second floor. Captain Mock later went to the second and third
floors to oversee the response. There was however a transition period on the third floor
when the response became more heavily dominated by BSO SWAT, and it appeared their
team leaders took over.

At approximately 2:58:30, Major Ed Grant (BSO) responded to the staging area beneath the
Sawgrass Expressway and approached Lt. O'Neill. Major Grant asked, “Which one’s the
command post?” to which Lt. O'Neill said, “Jan’s (Jordan) handling it. I have no idea.” Major
Grant asked if he knew where Captain Jordan was and he said, “It’s on the north side of the
school somewhere.” Major Grant continued walking north on Pine Island Road.

At approximately 2:59:49, BSO SWAT commander Captain S. Robson arrived on scene. He
arrived off Holmberg Road through the west gate of the student parking lot. Captain
Robson stated upon his arrival he met with Sergeant C. Hickox (BSO SWAT) who told him
that they too were having radio problems. Captain Robson assumed command of BSO
SWAT operations and directed Sergeant Hickox and the remainder of the SWAT team
inside the building. Captain Robson said that he then began establishing a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and a command post at the rear of his SUV.

At approximately 3:00:22, Captain Gallagher broadcasted over CSPD’s radio that BSO had just advised that they had the suspect on video running out the west side of Building 12. This was likely information Captain Gallagher received from Deputy Peterson, who was in communication with the school staff inside the camera room. This caused the Mazzei Group on the second floor to again advance east on the second floor as they had been stationary in response to radio traffic that Cruz was on the second floor.

At approximately 3:00:19, Major Grant (BSO) had walked north from the staging area and greeted Deputy Pianelli and Chief Pustizzi near the bus loop. An unknown deputy pulled up to them and asked where the command post was and Deputy Pianelli pointed south and directed the deputy to the Sawgrass Expressway. Deputy Pianelli’s body camera revealed that Chief Pustizzi and Major Grant appeared to continue in conversation but the details of their conversation could not be discerned. Deputy Pianelli turned to Major Grant and Chief Pustizzi and said, “They got it set south of the Sawgrass, they were setting it up over there,” in an apparent reference to the command post. Major Grant responded, “They said it was down here—like where Jan Jordan was.” Deputy Pianelli responded, “They have, like, two areas. I don’t know if Jan’s on the north side and we have something—all the guys that are showing up are on the south side.” An unidentified sergeant pulled up on scene and Deputy Pianelli pointed him to the Sawgrass Expressway telling him that everyone was meeting up “down there.” In his interview, Major Grant said that during that time he asked Chief Pustizzi where the command post was located and Chief Pustizzi said he did not know. BSO Major Grant expressed dismay that, by that far along in the response, Chief Pustizzi was not aware of where the command post was located.

At approximately 3:00:39 hours, an unknown individual broadcasted over the BSO radio that they were trying to locate the incident commander. Dispatch notified that person that Captain Jordan’s radio was not working. Deputy Perry broadcasted that Captain Jordan was next to him and that she was now “backing out and she’s making her way to the command post. Her radio was (out of service).” That unknown individual stated that he
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did not see a command post and that because they have a unified response they needed to get her with Coral Springs Police Department. Captain Robson then transmitted that he was with Captain Jordan and that if CSPD SWAT was on scene they needed to go to his location “in the front” by the BearCat. This was the first known time that a commanding officer with BSO attempted to coordinate the law enforcement response with CSPD.

Captain Jordan arrived next to Deputy Perry at approximately 2:40:00, and Captain Robson arrived at approximately 3:00:39. Based on Deputy Perry’s radio transmission and Captain Jordan’s interview, it can be established that Captain Jordan remained behind the vehicle with Deputy Perry immediately north of Building 13 for approximately 20 minutes. During that time a command post was not established, and there is no evidence that Captain Jordan had or even attempted any communication with the commanding CSPD officers. Captain Jordan stated that as Captain Robson arrived she was preparing to call the communications center to address the radio problems. It is unknown why Captain Jordan did not make that effort during the prior 20 minutes while she was behind the car with Deputy Perry.

Captain Robson stated in his interview that while he was at the rear of his SUV establishing the TOC, he was approached by Captain Jordan. The following exchange took place with Captain Robson during his interview with MSD-PSC investigators:

Q: Do you recall any of your conversation with her (Jordan), did she provide you with any information or intel?
A: Not that I recall.

Q: Okay. So she didn't tell you anything about, you know, this is the building we're looking at, or we have this many people inside, or there's somebody in the video room, anything to that effect?
A: Not that I recall.

Conversely, Captain Jordan stated that she briefed Captain Robson on the information that she had up to this point. Captain Robson stated upon his arrival he assumed he was the incident commander. He did not recall any specific discussion with Captain Jordan about
who the incident commander was. Captain Robson explained that even after learning that the suspect fled he had concerns such as “...is there a second offender, is there a second shooter, are there IEDs, other things that just because he’s gone doesn't mean the threat is over. So that was our still concern with the campus.”

At approximately 3:00:39, Captain Robson transmitted that if CSPD SWAT was present that he needed them at his location (north of Building 13). In response, Lt. O’Neill—at the staging area—approached Sergeant Matonak and Captain Soberon, both of CSPD. Lt. O’Neill told the two CSPD officers that CSPD SWAT was needed at the command post. In response, Sgt. Matonak asked, “Where is the command post?” Captain Soberon said, “We’ve been asking where the command post is. We’re about to set up our own.” Lt. O’Neill stated, “We can’t get on the fucking radio. That’s the problem.” In response, Captain Soberon stated, “Well, we’re not patched.” Lt. O’Neill turned and made several attempts to transmit on his radio, but he was unable to do so; his radio emitted the noise associated with throttling.

At 3:01:47, Captain Robson broadcasted over BSO’s channel 8A that, due to radio problems, he needed everyone who was not on scene to get off that channel.

At approximately 3:01:51, CSPD SWAT Medic Parrinello called Captain Mock to try to locate any additional victims in order to communicate with fire/rescue personnel. Captain Mock explained that they had victims inside and were working to evacuate them. Seconds later, as seen on surveillance video, Detectives Gonzalez and Hays (BSO SWAT deputies who had become runners) met on the first floor. Captain Mock walked toward them gesturing and talking.

At approximately 3:03:54, Sergeant B. Miller arrived at the staging area beneath the Sawgrass Expressway.

At approximately 3:04:10, Captain Mock reached the second-floor landing and was seen communicating with personnel on that floor. He and Detective Monzon (CSPD SWAT) appeared to be in communication and gesturing with each other.
At approximately 3:05:31, while still responding to the scene, Colonel Polan learned from dispatch that Captain Robson was at the “front of the school” near the BearCat.

At approximately 3:07:30, Deputy Pianelli obtained the most current suspect description from Chief Pustizzi. Approximately one minute later, he broadcasted that description over the BSO radio.

At approximately 3:10:15, Deputy Chief Less (Coconut Creek Police Department) approached Sergeant Rossman and Lt. Feeley at the staging area beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. He asked if the command post was at that location, and he was told it was. Shortly thereafter Deputy Chief Backer also arrived at the staging area.

Investigators conducted an interview with Deputy Chief Lees. He said that he became involved in command operations but only because of retiring from BSO after approximately 29 years and serving as the former SWAT commander. Deputy Chief Lees said that, if he had not had the extensive experience with the other agency’s (BSO) command staff and experience as the SWAT commander, he would have likely not become so heavily involved.

Deputy Chief Lees said he directed his SWAT commander to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and that he went on to locate the command post. While on Pine Island Road he saw Lt. DeVita and asked him where the command post was located. Lt. DeVita directed him beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. Deputy Chief Lees remembered meeting with Deputy Chiefs Parry and Backer. He could not recall who from BSO was present at that time. Deputy Chief Lees stated operations such as this can be “confusing, overwhelming, a lot of personnel, a lot of staffing.” Initially, no one was able to identify to him who the incident commander was. “It seemed like Coral Springs...was running the show from what I could see, for the most part,” said Deputy Chief Lees.

At approximately 3:11:45, Captain Soberon (CSPD) approached Sergeant Rossman (BSO) at the staging area and asked him which channel they were using. Sgts. Rossman and Miller told Captain Soberon they were on 8A.

At approximately 3:13:43, Chief Pustizzi arrived at the staging area. He and Deputy Chief Lees engaged in a conversation about organizing the response. Fifty-two minutes after the
first shots were fired, there were a tremendous number of law enforcement personnel from multiple agencies on scene; however, there was no unified command. Captains Jordan and Robson from BSO were north of Building 13 while Chief Pustizzi and his command staff were beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. To complicate matters, the command staff from both agencies were operating on separate radio channels. Fire/Rescue’s command post was at Pine Island Road and Holmberg Road.

Sergeant M. Kallman arrived at the staging area. Sergeant Kallman led BSO’s incident management team, which operates the mobile command bus and provides logistical support to large-scale incidents. Sgt. Kallman was seen on body cameras providing direction to multiple individuals—including lieutenants—about organizing the logistical response. At one point he was approached by Lt. Feeley and asked if he was taking over as the incident commander; Sgt. Kallman said he was not.

At approximately 3:16:44, Colonel Polan arrived at the TOC north of Building 13. Colonel Polan broadcasted over BSO’s radio channel 8A that he was the incident commander (to be clear, Colonel Polan’s radio transmissions were not clearly transmitting, and Captain Robson made this transmission for him). Almost an hour after the shooting began, this was the first time that there was a clear declaration to all BSO deputies as to who was the incident commander. However, since CSPD and BSO were still operating on separate channels, CSPD officers would not have heard this transmission.

In his interview, Colonel Polan said he had taken the day off and was approaching a movie theater when he got a call notifying him of the shooting. While responding to the scene he listened to his radio and attempted to locate the incident commander. In his interview, he described hearing throttling on his radio. Once he arrived, he parked north of Westglades Middle School and walked to the TOC where he met with Captains Robson and Jordan. They both provided him with a brief summary of the response to this point. Colonel Polan stated that upon his arrival he believed the shooter was still inside the building.

Colonel Polan stated that he directed Captain Jordan to set up a command post on Pine Island Road. Her primary role was to ensure the perimeter was secure. Colonel Polan recalled communicating with Captain Jordan on both the radio and phone, and he described
both devices failing at various times. He remained at the TOC until approximately 9:00 p.m. and served as the incident commander. He described his primary role as ensuring that the entire campus was cleared and secured. Col. Polan was not present at the command post that had eventually been established by the Sawgrass.

At approximately 3:17:25, Chief Pustizzi (CSPD), Deputy Chief Backer (CSPD), Lt. O’Neill (BSO) and Sergeant Rossman (BSO) had a brief exchange about the need to patch radios or to share radios.

At approximately 3:17:53, the BSO mobile command bus arrived near the southeast corner of campus and immediately north of the staging area on Pine Island Road. Seconds later, Captain Jordan was seen on Deputy Pianelli’s body camera immediately north of the recently arrived mobile command bus. This was the first indication that Captain Jordan left the north side of campus.

At approximately 3:20:28—nearly an hour after the first shots—the Broward County Regional Communications Center directed all deputies who had not been assigned to a position to switch to radio channel 7-Bravo. This was the first indication that BSO began to use a second channel to coordinate their response. At the same time, Lt. O’Neill approached Captain Jordan near the staging area and asked her who was managing the response; she responded, “Polan just took over as the incident commander.” Minutes later, the CSPD mobile command bus pulled-up alongside the BSO mobile command bus, and this became the command post. However, the incident commander, Colonel Polan, was at the TOC on campus.

In her interview, Captain Jordan stated, at that time, she viewed her primary role as being responsible for setting up and coordination of supporting roles at the mobile command bus, including:

- Finding a safe place for fleeing students and staff
- Identifying witnesses for the investigation
- Family Reunification
- PIO/Media Relations
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Captain Jordan recalled multiple commanders from various agencies being present at the mobile command bus. The following individuals were persons seen on a body camera at the command post:

**BSO**

- Major Holmes
- Major Osgood
- Captain Jordan
- Captain Rsende
- Lt. DeVita
- Sergeant Miller
- Sergeant Kallman
- Sergeant Rossman

**CSPD**

- Chief Pustizzi
- Deputy Chief Backer
- Captain Soberon

**Coconut Creek Police Department**

- Deputy Chief Lees

**Unidentified individuals from the FBI were also present.**

Captain Soberon (CSPD) stated that, once the command buses were set up, CSPD turned over operations to BSO, and that was the first time he saw Captain Jordan. Captain Soberon stated in his interview that it seemed to him BSO supervisors/command staff got too entrenched in the response and did not establish any command and control. It did not appear to Captain Soberon that BSO had a single person at the command bus who was running operations. Captain Soberon was also one of several individuals who identified too many non-essential people (elected officials) at the command bus and that their presence hampered command and control.
A review of body camera footage showed that a BSO lieutenant assigned a deputy to escort County Commissioner Michael Udine while he was near and on the CSPD command bus. This is an example of at least two individuals, Commissioner Udine and his escort deputy, being unnecessarily present in the middle of the operational command post.

Chief Pustizzi was asked to assess operations at the command bus. Chief Pustizzi—having over 30 years law enforcement experience, including 17 years on SWAT and five years as a SWAT commander—prefaced his comments by stating, “I don’t think any of us are prepared for the magnitude of that kind of call.” Nevertheless, he was frustrated due to there not being a single incident commander. He recalled that eventually two BSO majors at the command post identified Captain Jordan as the incident commander. Chief Pustizzi said that Captain Jordan eventually sought assistance from Chief Pustizzi and Deputy Chief Lees.

Deputy Chief Lees described Major Holmes introducing Captain Jordan to everyone as the incident commander, even though Col. Polan had assumed incident command at that point. He recalled witnessing BSO’s radio problems and Captain Jordan telling him that she had not been able to communicate on her radio. Deputy Chief Lees described the radio failure as “incomprehensible” and conceded that a problem of that magnitude would hinder any law enforcement response. Deputy Chief Lees expressed dismay to see that the white boards on the command bus were blank and there did not seem to be any documentation of assignments or responsibilities (white boards are typically used to organize an operational response on a command bus).

Deputy Chief Lees said that the command post did not seem to have strong leadership or cohesion but said that Captain Jordan made attempts to bring the command staff together. When asked about operations on the command bus, Deputy Chief Lees responded, “Listen, Jan Jordan was overwhelmed. She was overwhelmed. I could see it. I tried to help her.” Deputy Chief Lees recalled telling Captain Jordan, Sergeant Kallman (BSO) and CSPD command staff that they needed to split the tactical channel and command/logistics channel. Body camera footage showed Deputy Chief Lees and Chief Pustizzi discussing this beneath the Sawgrass Expressway. Deputy Chief Lees also expressed frustration with
persons being at the command post whose presence was not necessary, specifically county commissioners, school board members and city officials.

Sergeant Kallman spoke favorably about Captain Jordan describing her as performing “very well” and “excellent.” He said she responded “responsibly” and “professionally” and with a great deal of dedication. He described how she used her knowledge of Parkland to identify nearby local schools and getting them on lockdown. When provided with Deputy Chief Lees’ assessment of Captain Jordan being overwhelmed, Sergeant Kallman said that “we were all overwhelmed that day.” Sergeant Kallman himself provided some structure and organization to the response. After both command buses were set up, he was speaking with Lt. O’Neill about reunification and said that they would have to go onto the bus to document their steps. Sgt. Kallman then approached Captain Jordan as she was speaking with other command staff and sternly said, “I need you three inside (on the bus).” Despite stating that Captain Jordan performed “well,” the sergeant seemed to have provided direction to Capt. Jordan.

At approximately 3:21:01, Captain Mock transmitted over CSPD’s main channel that he was with BSO’s command (at the TOC) and coordinating the clearing of buildings. This transmission came nearly one hour after the first shots were fired, and it was the first indication that CSPD command staff and the BSO incident commander(s) (at that time Col. Polan) were in direction communication with each other.

Lt. W. Phillips’s (BSO) body camera began recording at 3:42:06 (1 hour 20 minutes after the first shots) when he was at the TOC, which was north of Building 13. The TOC appeared to be operating off the hood of a vehicle where Lt. Phillips was documenting notes on a white board. Among the individuals present:

- Sheriff S. Israel
- Executive staff: Colonel J. Polan, Colonel J. Dale, and Lieutenant Colonel DiMaggio
- BSO SWAT: Captain Robson, Sgt. Garcia and Sgt. Hickox
- CSPD SWAT: Captain Mock
- Detective Goolsby
At approximately 3:45:57, Detective Hays (BSO-SWAT) gave Lt. Phillips a sheet of paper on which SWAT had been keeping track of where casualties were located.

In conclusion, there was a failure by the Broward Sheriff's Office to establish effective command and control. The on-duty first-line supervisor, Sergeant B. Miller, remained on Holmberg Road despite hearing gunshots, and he provided no direction to the responding deputies. Lieutenant DeVita and Captain Jordan failed to communicate with Sergeant Miller and took no steps to direct the deputies other than trying to determine if the school was on lockdown and inquiring whether a command post had been established. The absence of strong leadership and direction undoubtedly contributed to an ineffective response. Many of these initial command-and-control failures occurred at a time prior to the radio throttling problem beginning.

A law enforcement command post of any sort was not established until the arrival of Captain Robson a little after 3:00 p.m. when he set up the Tactical Operations Center. Based on the interviews with Captains Jordan and Robson, there did not appear to a clear transition or delineation of roles.

It was not until Colonel Polan’s arrival at approximately 3:16 (almost an hour after the first shots) that anyone from BSO identified themselves as the incident commander. After Colonel Polan’s arrival, he remained at the TOC but directed Captain Jordan to set up a command post on Pine Island Road. This resulted in the incident commander (Polan) being separated from the command post and commanders from other agencies, and in Captain Jordan’s role being poorly defined and confused by others. Captain Jordan was introduced by two BSO majors to others at the command post as the incident commander; however she was not the incident commander. If the only role of the TOC was to supervise the tactical response and clear the campus, Captain Robson (BSO’s SWAT commander) would have been well qualified to lead that task and able to report the progress back to the command post where Colonel Polan, as the incident commander, should have been stationed.
It is obvious from a review of video evidence and statements that there was a great deal of confusion about where the command post was located. In the early stages of the response, many people mistakenly believed that the staging area beneath the Sawgrass Expressway was the location of the command post, and they were erroneously directed there accordingly by dispatchers and deputies alike. It was not until around approximately 3:13 p.m. that this area began to serve as a command post of sorts, and that was purely by default, due to Chief Pustizzi (CSPD), Deputy Chief Lees (CCPD), Deputy Chief Backer (CSPD), Captain Soberon (CSPD), Lieutenants O'Neill and Feeley (BSO) and Sergeant Kallman (BSO) all being at the same location. Unfortunately, despite all of these key individuals being present in one place, they were not in direct contact with the incident commander.

Findings:

1. Sergeant Miller was the first responding supervisor, and he arrived on Holmberg Road at least by 2:27:03. By his own statements he heard 3 to 4 shots upon arrival. Miller was not wearing his ballistic vest and took time to put it on. Miller was on scene for approximately 7 minutes before BSO’s radio throttling began; therefore, radio capacity issues did not exist at the time of Miller’s arrival. Miller failed to coordinate or direct deputies’ actions and did not direct or coordinate an immediate response into the school. Miller was observed behind his car on Holmberg Road and he did not initiate any radio transmissions until approximately 10 minutes after arriving on scene. Sergeant Miller refused and failed to assume responsibility for supervision of the scene.

2. Captain Jordan failed to timely establish an incident command and was ineffective in her duties as the initial incident commander. While Captain Jordan experienced radio problems that hindered her ability to transmit, nobody reported receiving command-and-control directions from Jordan in person. Jordan spent approximately the first 7 minutes after her arrival in the Building 1 office and then transitioned to a position of cover in the north parking lot behind a car with Deputy Perry.
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3. There was confusion over the location of the command post, staging area and tactical operations center (TOC). After taking over as the incident commander, Colonel Polan remained at the TOC and was not present at the command post. Colonel Polan’s absence at the command post confused others as to who was the incident commander.

4. The law enforcement command post and fire department command post were separate; they should have been unified. Both command posts took an excessive amount of time to establish.

5.3 Active Assailant Response Policies and Training BSO and CSPD

**The Broward County Sheriff’s Office**

The Broward Sheriff’s Office Active Shooter policy (SOP 4.37) states: “If real-time intelligence exists, the sole deputy or a team of deputies may enter the area and/or structure to preserve life. A supervisor’s approval or on-site observation is not required for this decision.” The policy states that the deputy contact team will continue until the subject has surrendered, barricaded himself, the subject’s hostilities have been stopped or the contact team has been relieved by SWAT. This policy was revised on March 28, 2016.

The Coral Springs Police Department active shooter policy (General Order #221) states: “If real-time intelligence exists, the sole officer or team of officers shall enter the area and/or structure to preserve life, and they will be referred to as the contact officer/team.”

A significant difference between the two policies is found in two small words. BSO states that deputies “may” pursue the threat while CSPD’s policy stated officers “shall” pursue the threat. In his testimony to the Commission, Sheriff Israel defended use of the word “may” stating that he wanted his deputies to exercise discretion and he did not want them engaging in “suicide missions.”

The policy of both agencies identifies threat level zones where victims may be treated for injuries. The “hot zone” is an area where an immediate threat or active shooter is present. The “warm zone” is an area where law enforcement has a stronghold and the threat has
been neutralized or contained. The "cold zone" is a safe zone where first responders can treat victims and there is no active threat.

BSO began Active Shooter training in 2007 during its annual in-service training for all law enforcement deputies. All deputies, up to the rank of Colonel, are mandated to attend Active Shooter training.

The 2007 training emphasized a law enforcement rapid response but recommended that deputies wait for backup until a four- or six-man team could be formed. Deputies were instructed to deploy in a “diamond or quad formation” to enter a building. No other deputies were to enter a building when a team was deployed. Other responding deputies were to set up perimeter and evacuation points. In this 2007 training, a deputy’s primary responsibility was to eliminate the threat, and they were not to stop to help injured persons until the environment is safe.

In 2012 and 2013, all BSO law enforcement deputies attended an eight-hour “Solo Response to an Active Shooter” course. Deputy Scot Peterson attended this training on August 16, 2012. The majority of this course (six hours) was dedicated to tactical movement and shooting drills with different weapon platforms while engaging an active shooter. The deputies were instructed to use concealment and cover while shooting. Approximately one and one-half hours of the course demonstrated and practiced “solo response” to an active shooter with live-fire scenarios.

The most recent BSO Active Shooter in-service training began in 2015 and finished in early 2017. The training was divided into two separate courses, one four-hour course focused on active shooter response tactics and the other four-hour block focused on forming and operating Rescue Task Forces. Deputy Scot Peterson attended the both blocks of training on April 19, 2016. Participant capacity was 18 to 24 deputies per class. According to BSO’s lesson plan, only 90 minutes of the four-hour active assailant response training was reserved for scenario or practical exercises. With 90 minutes of scenario training and 18 to 24 deputies per class, the scenario repetitions per deputy was inherently limited. During the 2015 curriculum deputies were instructed to move toward the threat or active shooter
using the “bounding overwatch” tactic. Bounding overwatch is a military tactic, also called “leapfrogging,” utilizing two or more deputies moving toward the threat.

The four-hour Rescue Task Force (sometimes referred to as RTF) portion of this training involved BSO deputies working with BSO Fire/Rescue personnel to provide medical aid to injured people. Deputies practiced the bounding overwatch tactic to get personnel to victims. Fire/Rescue personnel instructed deputies how to apply tourniquets, bandages and other combat medicine.

**Coral Springs Police Department**

The Coral Springs Police Department began training their officers for a single-officer response to an active shooter in 2013. CSPD has continued to build its active assailant training off of the single-officer response concept for the past five years, and CSPD incorporated single-officer response into its Rescue Task Force training as well as tactical maneuvers. All Coral Springs Police Department officers, including the Chief of Police, attend its annual in-service active shooter training. The CSPD eight-hour active shooter course also implemented a rifle course to simulate engagement of an active shooter while moving, limited penetration tactics, how to deal with explosive devices or IEDs, and tactical medicine techniques. The CSPD active shooter training was scenario based, and officers were instructed that they should immediately go toward the gunfire and engage the shooter. If there is no active gunfire, the officers should navigate the area to search for the shooter.

**Findings:**

1. BSO deputies had some level of knowledge and familiarity with their active shooter policy. Several of them referenced that their policy states that they “may” enter a building or structure to engage an active shooter.
2. Sheriff Israel inserted the word “may” in the BSO policy, and it is insufficient and fails to unequivocally convey the expectation that deputies are expected to immediately enter an active assailant scene where gunfire is active and to
neutralize the threat. The use of the word “may” in BSO policy is inconsistent with current and standard law enforcement practices.

3. Some deputies could not remember the last time they attended active shooter training.

4. Some deputies could not recall what type of active assailant training they received.

5. CSPD officers had a high level of knowledge and familiarity with their active shooter policy. Many reference that the policy states they “shall” engage the threat.

6. All CSPD officers remembered their active shooter training because they attended the training on an annual basis. Many of the officers praised the quality of their training and the equipment that they are provided.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Broward County Sheriff’s Office should conduct a thorough internal review and address all of the actions or inactions of personnel on February 14, 2018.

The Broward County Sheriff should conduct an internal review into the conduct of deputies Kratz, Eason, Stambaugh, Perry, Seward, Goolsby and Sgt. Miller. If there is cause to believe their actions violated agency policy, the Sheriff should conduct a formal internal affairs investigation and take whatever action he deems appropriate.

All Florida public schools, including charter schools, specifically the Broward County school system, should immediately provide law enforcement with live and real-time access to all school camera systems. The schools districts should provide law enforcement with adequate training to access and operate the cameras.

All Broward County law enforcement and fire/EMS agencies should establish protocols for a unified command at all MCIs or similar incidents. Every Florida county should be required to have a major incident unified command inter-local agreement that establishes the protocols for a unified command structure.
The incident commander shall be present at the command post and follow established Incident Command System protocols.

A staging area outside the command post shall be standard protocol for meeting arriving elected officials.

BSO should revise its active assailant policy to make unequivocally clear that deputies are expected to immediately seek out an active assailant and that “containment” is not the policy of BSO.

BSO should increase the frequency of its active assailant training. With the number of deputies who cannot recall the training or recall the last time they attended, it does not seem to be resonating with deputies, especially those who responded to MSDHS.

CJSTC and individual law enforcement agencies should require single-officer response to active assailant training.

All law enforcement agencies must have a proactive active shooter response policy, which includes immediately responding to and stopping the threat.
The term “first responder” is used to identify individuals that respond to emergency situations; this includes law enforcement, firefighters and emergency medical personnel. From this group, law enforcement officers were the first ones to enter Building 12, and this occurred 4 minutes and 48 seconds after Cruz fled Building 12. When law enforcement officers entered, they presumed that Cruz was still inside of the building as they had no knowledge to indicate that Cruz fled prior to their arrival. At that time, 33 victims remained inside of the building, and they suffered injuries ranging from minor to fatal while numerous other students and teachers were sheltered in classrooms within the building. One victim died just outside the building.

The medical response began at 2:33:43 when law enforcement officers removed the first victim, Campus Monitor Chris Hixon, from the west end of the first-floor hallway. The medical response continued until all of the victims were either confirmed deceased or removed and transported to local hospitals.

Fire Department and EMS personnel established staging/triage areas near the campus to treat the surviving victims and to arrange for the emergency transportation to local hospitals.

By 3:03 p.m., fifteen victims had been removed from the first floor of Building 12 by law enforcement officers and moved to the triage area for treatment and transportation. Thirteen of these 15 victims survived. The 15 victims were identified and removed within 31 minutes of the initial law enforcement entry into Building 12. By 3:20 p.m., all victims from Building 12 had been identified, removed or pronounced as deceased.

All patients were transported by ambulance from the triage center to one of two local hospitals. Both hospitals were level one trauma centers. Broward County has a regional protocol where all trauma patients are brought to one of three trauma centers. Two of the three trauma centers accept pediatric patients. In Broward County, a pediatric patient is defined as a person under the age of 16.
In this incident all of the trauma centers offered to accept the juvenile patients. Based on the number of patients, hospital staffing and number of beds, the dispatch centers did not have to deviate from the established protocol or divert patients to alternative facilities.

6.1. SWAT and Tactical Medics

Once they arrived, tactical medics (sometimes referred to as SWAT medics or tac medics) were exclusively utilized inside of Building 12 to provide the advanced medical assessments and treatment. All tactical medics are part of SWAT teams, and they train as a unit with their SWAT teams. They also train to respond to events such as mass casualty incidents (MCI). Their primary responsibility is to provide medical care to the SWAT team and members of the community requiring aid during MCIs and other high risk situations.

The primary difference between tactical medics and other paramedics, including those participating in rescue taskforces, is their position on the SWAT team and their ability to operate in hot zones, which are areas where there is a known or reasonably potential immediate threat to life such as an area where an active shooter could directly engage people. This is covered in more detail in Chapter 5.3 regarding BSO and CSPD active assailant response. A warm zone includes areas that have been at least initially cleared by law enforcement officers or where the threat has been isolated and the risk is minimal or has been mitigated. The warm zone may be considered “clear” but not “secure.” Tactical medics operate in the hot zones, while rescue taskforces operate only in warm zones. As more fully set forth below, rescue taskforces are ad hoc groups of paramedics and law enforcement officers deployed to provide medical treatment with the officers’ sole role of providing security to the paramedics while they treat patients.

All tactical medics are paramedics. They are trained and certified in advanced life support in the same manner as all other paramedics. When tactical medics are selected for the SWAT teams they receive additional training related to SWAT operations and the application of their medical training in high-risk situations (hot zones).

The tactical medics who operated within Building 12 were assigned to SWAT teams from the Broward Sheriff’s Office, Coral Springs Police Department and Ft. Lauderdale Police
CHAPTER 6. FIRE DEPARTMENT / EMS RESPONSE AND VICTIMS’ EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT

Department. Medics from each of those teams train monthly with their respective SWAT teams. BSO and FLPD medics carry firearms for the purpose of self-defense while the CSPD medics are not armed.

A mass casualty incident (often shortened to MCI and sometimes called a multiple-casualty incident or multiple-casualty situation) is any incident in which emergency medical services resources face a high number of severely injured people and/or mass casualties. The procedures for defining, assessing and treating patients at an MCI have been defined on a national level by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).

Under NFPA protocol, the medic will make the initial assessment of the patient based on a visual/auditory observation and a quick review of the patient’s vital signs, including breathing, pulse and pupillary response. Most guidelines state that the medic should dedicate no more than 60 to 90 seconds on any patient (10 to 15 seconds on apparently deceased victims) at a scene of an MCI. All of these guidelines are well established and ingrained in the training, but paramedics and tactical medics can extend or modify these guidelines based on conditions and circumstances that arise during an MCI. All tactical medics make a practice of re-checking patients.

There are multiple triage systems in use around the world. According to the US Department of Health and Human Services – Chemical Hazards Emergency Medical Management, the START (Simple Triage And Rapid Treatment) method “remains the most commonly used mass casualty triage algorithm in the US.” Within this system, the following definitions are provided for the color-coded triage levels:

- **Black/Expectant**: Victim unlikely to survive given severity of injuries, level of available care, or both. Palliative care and pain relief should be provided.
- **Red/Immediate**: Victim can be helped by immediate intervention and transport. Requires medical attention within minutes for survival (up to 60).

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3 https://chemm.nlm.nih.gov/startadult.htm
6.2 Rescue Taskforces

In Broward County, the Rescue Task Force (RTF) program was established and implemented to facilitate a quicker medical response to patients in areas identified as warm zones. RTFs are a relatively new concept in the first-responder community. Rescue Task Forces differ from tactical medics in that RTFs are ad hoc groups formed at an incident and they are not trained or equipped to enter hot zones. RTFs are comprised of front line law enforcement officers and firefighter/paramedics; that is to say, patrol officers team up with firefighter/paramedics assigned to an engine or ambulance. It is becoming more common that fire departments are providing their firefighter/paramedics with ballistic helmets and vests to facilitate the use of RTFs.

The RTF will almost always include individuals that have not trained together, and if they have trained together it would have been at the most basic level. The law enforcement officers provide protection for emergency medical personnel as they enter the warm zones. The purpose of an RTF is to locate victims, provide them with immediate medical care and then evacuate them to more advanced levels of emergency medical care. This is different than a law enforcement response to an active shooter, which is to neutralize and stop the threat.

The police and fire departments for the City of Coral Springs have established RTF polices and have trained together in RTF concepts (as a reminder, Coral Springs Fire Department provides fire/EMS services for Parkland). BSO and its Parkland deputies have not trained with CSFD in RTF concepts. Some CSFD personnel suggested or considered utilizing RTF teams; however, due to Building 12 being designated a hot zone, they were not utilized.
6.3 Medical Response Timeline within Building 12:

The medical response began with law enforcement personnel, prior to arrival of the tactical medics, and continued through the transportation and arrival at hospitals.

2:32:42 The first law enforcement officers entered Building 12 on the west side.

2:33:43 The first victim, Chris Hixon, was pulled from the first floor of Building 12 toward the west doors. Hixon was transported to the triage area but did not survive.

2:39:08 Law enforcement pulled Martin Duque out of the east doors and Building 12 and transported to him to the triage area on a golf cart. He was later pronounced deceased.

2:39:58 Law enforcement officers entered the west end of the second-floor hall.

2:40:16 Law enforcement began to evacuate classroom 1216. Five injured students were evacuated out of this classroom. There were four victims who suffered injuries that were considered less severe: William Olson, Genesis Valentin, Justin Colton and Alexander Dworet. Kheshava Managapuram was the fifth non-fatal victim in this class. He suffered serious to life-threatening injuries but he survived.

2:41:03 Law enforcement officers assisted injured student Samantha Fuentes out of classroom 1214. Fuentes suffered serious but non-life-threatening injuries. She was taken to the triage area and then transported to a hospital. She survived her injuries.

2:41:16 Law enforcement officers escorted Samantha Grady out of classroom 1216 with serious injuries. She was taken to the triage area and then transported to a hospital. She survived her injuries.
The two remaining non-fatal victims from classroom 1214, Isabel Chequer and Daniela Menescal, suffered less-severe injuries and evacuated with the remaining students in classroom 1214. They both survived their injuries.

2:43:22 Injured student Ben Wikander suffered serious injuries. He was carried out of classroom 1213 by law enforcement officers. Wikander was taken to the triage area and transported to a hospital. He survived his injuries.

2:43:49 Samantha Mayor suffered a serious injury and was carried out of classroom 1213 by a law enforcement officer. She was taken to the triage area, transported to a hospital and she survived her injuries.

2:44:01 The remaining uninjured students were evacuated from classrooms 1212 and 1213.

2:45:58 Ashley Baez was carried out of classroom 1210 by a law enforcement officer. She was carried out of the east doors of Building 12. As documented on a BSO body camera, Detective R. Valdes applied a tourniquet to her leg while they were being driven on a golf cart to the triage area. Ashley Baez was turned over to emergency medical personnel and transported to the hospital. She survived her injuries.

2:54:59 The first BSO tactical medics entered Building 12 through the east door.

2:56:17 BSO tactical medics Bradley assessed two victims (Luke Hoyer and Gina Montalto) located in the first-floor hallway and confirmed they were deceased. He applied black triage tags to the victims.

2:57:32 Medic Bradley entered classroom 1213 and reassessed Madeleine Wilford. Approximately five minutes later she was removed by law enforcement officers and Medic Bradley. Wilford suffered life-threatening injuries but survived.
3:03:52 Anthony Borges was pulled onto the third-floor landing of the west stairwell by law enforcement officers. He suffered life-threatening injuries. The deputies and officers immediately began to provide medical care and applied tourniquets to his extremities.

3:04:15 Medics Noland and Franklin arrived on the third-floor landing of the west stairwell; Noland assessed Jaime Guttenberg, and Franklin took over care of Anthony Borges.

3:04:26 After assessing Jaime Guttenberg, Medic Noland moved on to assist Medic Franklin in providing emergency medical care to Anthony Borges.

3:06:52 Medic Mormelo arrived on the third-floor landing and was advised by Noland to perform an assessment of the other victims. Medic Mormelo completed another assessment of Jaime Guttenberg.

3:07:15 Victim Anthony Borges was carried from the third-floor landing by medics and law enforcement officers. He was carried to a golf cart and then driven to the triage area. He was then transported to a hospital. He survived serious, life-threatening injuries.

3:08:45 Jaime Guttenberg was moved from the third-floor landing to the first floor by Medic Mormelo and a law enforcement officer.

3:09:18 Mormelo reassessed Jaime Guttenberg. He confirmed that she was deceased. Mormelo also re-assessed the condition of Aaron Feis and confirmed he was deceased.

3:12:30 Medics Mormelo, Bradley, and Ceciliano arrived on the west end of the third floor.

3:19:30 Medics completed assessing the remaining victims in the third-floor hallway (Joaquin Oliver, Meadow Pollack, Cara Laughran, Peter Wang and Scott Beigel). The victims were confirmed deceased.
By 3:20 p.m., first responders had removed all surviving victims or identified all remaining victims as deceased. This occurred approximately 48 minutes after law enforcement officers entered Building 12 and approximately 59 minutes after the shooting began. BSO SWAT team members went on to conduct additional searches of Building 12, and medics went on to conduct an additional round of assessments of victims who remained inside.

3:36:32 Gina Montalto was again assessed by FLPD tactical medics who had self-deployed and were unaware that she had previously been declared deceased. One of the FLPD medics thought he felt a pulse carried her out of Building 12. The two medics arrived one hour after the initial entry into Building 12 and their assessment of this victim was conducted well over an hour after she had been shot. She was transported to the hospital, but again declared deceased.

Findings:

1. There is no evidence that any victims at MSDHS did not receive appropriate medical care.
2. There is no evidence that law enforcement commander’s decision to not authorize rescue taskforces affected anyone from receiving appropriate and timely medical care. Rescue taskforces are only appropriate to operate in the “warm zone,” and not the “hot zone”. Building 12 was a “hot zone”, therefore, the decision to not use Rescue Task Forces (RTFs) at MSDHS was the correct decision.
3. There is no evidence that any medical personnel (doctors, etc.) who arrived at the scene were inappropriately denied access to the Building 12 to provide medical care. The tactical medics followed the standard procedures of an MCI to identify, assess and tag the patients within Building 12.
4. The first law enforcement officers to enter Building 12 acted appropriately and consistent with their training when they first removed victims who were verbal and/or conscious during the initial 7 to 14 minutes.
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5. The lack of a clearly identified Command Post (CP), coupled with BSO command personnel being split between the CP area and the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), impeded communication with fire department command staff.

6. Radio communication problems, including the lack of interoperability and throttling affected the tactical operations inside of Building 12, including the medical response.

7. The FLPD medics, who self-deployed into Building 12 without dispatch or briefing, should not have entered the building without approval. The officer at the door did not direct the medics to BSO medics or brief them on conditions. The officer at the door should not have allowed these medics into the Building 12 without authorization or notification to the on-scene personnel already in the building. These self-deployed medics conducted their assessments while not seeing or ignoring the black tags on the victims’ arms and legs identifying them as deceased. These medics entered the building and conducted their patient assessments well over one hour after the first emergency personnel entered the Building 12.

8. The FLPD medics claim of “feeling a pulse” from Gina Montalto was medically incorrect. The removal of this patient was unnecessary and created a false perception that medical care was not provided in a timely manner.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Self-deployment is going to occur in any significant event, and it must be managed. Law enforcement and fire departments in each county should have established agreements governing self-deployment and establishing response protocols to avoid inappropriate deployments.

Law enforcement agencies are encouraged to formalize Rescue Task Force protocols with fire/EMS agencies and to train with them on a regular basis.

Fire and EMS providers must be part of the unified command at any MCI or other significant event, and fire/EMS should not have a separate command post from law enforcement.
As previously stated, on February 14, 2018, the City of Parkland’s public safety services were provided through contracts with two separate agencies: the Broward County Sheriff’s Office and Coral Springs/Parkland Fire Rescue. Parkland’s decision to contract with two different agencies for its police and fire/EMS services caused two issues: 1) communications interoperability and 2) 911 call routing.

Due to the nature of large-scale mass casualty or active assailant events and the amount of first responders present on scene, law enforcement communication interoperability issues are frequently found in these situations. These issues are magnified when agencies, such as BSO and CSPD, have separate communications systems. In general, communications interoperability refers to the ability of emergency responders to effectively talk with each other and/or share data through computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems, despite having otherwise different communications platforms.

The 911 issues are different than interoperability issues; the 911 issues surround Broward County’s Regional Communications system and Coral Springs not participating in that regional system. Coral Springs maintains its own independent 911 call center from which it dispatches its police and fire departments. This means Parkland’s fire/EMS response is dispatched from Coral Springs and its law enforcement response is dispatched by Broward County Regional Communications (BSO).

Due to a decision made by the City of Parkland, when anyone in Parkland calls 911 from a cell phone their calls go to the Coral Springs 911 center. If the call is a law enforcement emergency, after an initial screening the caller is transferred to Regional Communications. If the Parkland caller calls 911 from a landline phone the call goes to Broward Regional Communications, and if the caller needs fire/EMS the caller is transferred to Coral Springs for dispatch.

### 7.1 Communication Timeline

The following is the communication timeline from when Cruz began shooting until the first CSPD officer arrived.
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2:21:38 Cruz began shooting on the first floor of the 1200 building.

2:22:13 Coral Springs received its first 911 call that there was a shooter at MSDHS. Gunshots were heard by the Coral Springs dispatcher during this call.

2:22:41 28 seconds later, Coral Springs transferred the 911 caller to BSO.

2:22:59 18 seconds after transferring the 911 call to BSO, Coral Springs created a Coral Springs Fire Department call in its CAD system. Because Coral Springs is the fire/EMS provider for Parkland, they treated their initial responsibility as a fire/EMS response and not as a law enforcement response.

2:23:25 Cruz had already shot 24 people on the first floor of the 1200 building and began ascending to the second floor.

2:23:26 Peterson transmitted on the BSO radio that there were possible shots fired in the 1200 building.

2:23:28 1 minute and 15 seconds after receiving its first 911 call and 47 seconds after transferring that caller to BSO, Coral Springs dispatched fire department units to MSDHS for an “active shooter.” No Coral Springs police units were dispatched at this time.

2:23:31 Coral Springs received another 911 call from a female student caller within classroom 1214 at MSDHS who told Coral Springs that someone shot into her classroom, someone was bleeding and shots were now coming from upstairs. This call occurred 1 minute and 18 seconds after the first 911 call.

2:23:37 Cruz began shooting on the second floor.

2:23:37 BSO dispatcher broadcasted over their radio that there were shots being fired at MSDHS. This is 56 seconds after BSO received its first transferred 911 call from Coral Springs.
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2:23:55 Peterson gave directions over the BSO radio for responding deputies to shut down intersections around MSDHS.

2:24:17 2 minutes and 39 seconds after he started shooting, Cruz began his ascent to the third floor where he shot 10 additional people.

2:24:24 Peterson announced over the BSO radio (which could not be heard by Coral Springs) that he heard shots being fired. Cruz had fired out the second-floor window above where Peterson was standing outside the 1200 building.

2:24:32 Cruz began shooting people on the third floor.

2:24:35 The first responding BSO unit (in addition to Peterson), Deputy Kratz took up a traffic position to shut down an intersection on Holmberg Road as directed by Peterson. Deputy Kratz was north of the 1200 building. Deputy Kratz assumed the traffic position adjacent to the 1200 building 51 seconds before Cruz stopped shooting and 3 seconds after Cruz began shooting on the third floor.

2:24:56 An entry was made by Coral Springs in its police CAD system that “people bleeding everywhere,” but no Coral Springs police officers had been dispatched and no broadcast had been made on the Coral Springs police radio—all transmissions up to this point were on the BSO radio and Coral Springs officers could not hear those transmissions.

2:25:08 BSO Deputy Kratz transmitted on the BSO radio that he heard shots by the football field, which is west of the 1200 building.

2:25:12 Coral Springs broadcasted over its fire department radio that rescue and engines were responding and they were getting multiple calls.

2:25:26 Cruz fired rounds at the window on the west end of the third-floor hallway and 4 seconds later entered the third-floor teacher’s lounge. Cruz had shot 34 people within 3 minutes and 52 seconds. While Cruz attempted to snipe
people from the third-floor teacher's lounge windows he did not shoot anyone after this time.

2:25:38 Peterson transmitted over the BSO radio and tells other deputies to get the school locked down.

2:26:00 Peterson transmitted over the BSO radio that they were locking down the school and instructed other deputies to make sure there was no pedestrian traffic anywhere on Holmberg Road. No initial responding BSO deputies went to the 1200 building.

2:26:16 4 minutes and 3 seconds after it received the first 911 call, Coral Springs announced on its police “information” channel (not primary dispatch channel) that there was an active shooter at MSDHS.

2:26:24 9 seconds later, a CSPD sergeant transmitted on the CSPD main dispatch channel and stated that he had just run into someone from the Coral Springs Fire administration and asked Coral Springs dispatch if it had information about an active shooter at MSDHS.

2:26:35 4 minutes and 22 seconds after receiving its first 911 call, Coral Springs broadcasted on its main police radio that there was an active shooter at MSDHS.

2:26:54 19 seconds after CSPD’s first police radio broadcast of the incident, CSPD Officer Burton arrived at MSDHS. This was 4 minutes and 41 seconds after Coral Springs received its first 911 call and after the shooting had stopped.

2:27:54 Cruz exited the 1200 building from the west exit, which was at the opposite end of the building from where Officer Burton and Deputy Peterson were positioned.

2:28:00 Peterson transmitted over the BSO radio and instructed all responding units “do not approach the 12 and 1300 buildings. Stay at least 500 feet away at
CHAPTER 7. INCIDENT COMMUNICATIONS, INTEROPERABILITY AND 911, RADIO, AND COMPUTER-AIDED DISPATCH (CAD) SYSTEMS

...this point." The BSO dispatcher then transmitted for units to “stay away from 12 and 1300 building.”

2:28:39 Despite this direction, Lt. O’Neill transmitted over the BSO radio for units to set up for an active shooter response when they arrived.

2:29:06 BSO deputy transmitted that they were entering the building in front of the 13 building (1200 building).

7.2 911 System

Routing procedures of 911 calls originating from within the City of Parkland differ depending on whether the call was made via cellular device or landline phone. On February 14, 2018, and still today, all cellular 911 calls from Parkland are received at the Coral Springs 911 call center. All landline 911 calls from Parkland are received at the Broward Regional Communications Center. Parkland calls requiring a law enforcement response are supposed to be transferred by CSPD to the Broward Regional Communications Center. On average, ten 911 calls per day are transferred from the CSPD 911 call center to Broward Regional Communications for Parkland, Tamarac, Margate, Coconut Creek, Pompano and North Lauderdale.

CSPD received at least 130 911 calls on February 14, 2018 related to the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (MSDHS) in Parkland. CSPD’s 14 emergency 911 lines filled up quickly, and the calls started rolling over to the non-emergency lines, including administrative and Emergency Operations Center (EOC) lines. EOC lines were not recorded that day. All other calls were recorded, but because of a system update and quick turnaround answering calls, several calls were recorded into single files without individual timestamps which created difficulties for 911 call analysis.

The majority of the 911 calls received were parents and/or family members calling to report the incident or inquire further information about the shooting. The first 911 call was received by Coral Springs at 2:22 p.m. from a female student at MSDHS informing dispatch of the shooting. Gunshots were clearly heard in the background of the call. The CSPD
dispatcher then transferred the call to BSO within 28 seconds although the caller was no longer heard on the line after the transfer. The length of call times ranged from approximately five seconds to 17 minutes. More than 10 calls were placed on hold with a hold time ranging from approximately 18 seconds to one minute.

BSO received approximately 81 911 calls on February 14, 2018, related to the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland. At 2:22:41, BSO received the first call regarding the shooting which was a transfer call from a CSPD operator. The CSPD operator advised he received a call from a female stating there was a shooter at MSDHS. The CSPD operator said the female called in and he heard possible shots in the background—five or six in two different bursts. The CSPD operator also stated he had another caller advising that someone was shot in the 1200 building. He then stated CSPD had rescue going out, but they would not be able to go in until it was clear to enter. CSPD operator stated that there was one confirmed patient at that point. The BSO operator advised deputies were responding and they were receiving calls as well.

BSO received the next call at 2:24:14, which was another transfer call. This time the call came from the Boca Raton 911 center in Palm Beach County informing BSO of the shooting. The transferred caller relayed information regarding students hiding and shots heard in the 1200 building. The caller also stated some students were hiding in the auditorium. At 02:24:19, BSO received the first call that came directly into the Broward County Regional Communications Center, aside from the transfer calls. The caller advised that her son called her about the shooting. The BSO operator advised that the call was in for dispatch with multiple police officers and fire rescue on the way.

Seventy-four 911 calls were received between the first transfer from CSPD to BSO at 02:22:41 until 03:39:00 when Cruz was in custody. An additional seven calls were received after Cruz was in custody. The majority of the calls received were parents and/or family members calling to report the incident or inquire for further information regarding the shooting. The length of call times ranged from approximately 19 seconds to 25 minutes. About seven calls were placed on hold with a hold time ranging from approximately two
seconds to two minutes. BSO transferred two callers; one caller was transferred to a translator line for language translation, and the other caller was transferred to a Plantation operator for proper jurisdiction handling.

911 Transfer Issues

On February 14, all cellular 911 calls from Parkland were received at the Coral Springs 911 center. This meant that the majority of all calls received that day went to Coral Springs, which does not provide police services to Parkland. The procedures in place at that time instructed CSPD not to dispatch its own police officers but to transfer 911 calls to the Broward Regional Communications Center for law enforcement response by BSO. This process required the caller to explain their emergency to the CSPD dispatcher and then repeat it to the BSO dispatcher after the transfer. Four of the 911 calls received by the Coral Springs 911 center were transferred to the Broward Regional Communications Center. Only one of the four calls were transferred successfully.

It took CSPD 28 seconds to transfer the initial 911 caller from its communications center to BSO, and BSO another 41 seconds to process the same information. In total, it took 69 seconds from the time the first call was received by CSPD until a BSO dispatcher first attempted to notify any law enforcement personnel of the shooting. Cruz had already shot all 24 first-floor victims by that time.

Coral Springs Communications Center received at least twelve 911 calls before there was any CSPD radio traffic notifying on duty CSPD officers of the shooting. The first Coral Springs police radio traffic indicating an active shooter at MSDHS was at 2:26pm, which was 4 minutes after Coral Springs received the first 911 call.

The following breakdown will provide additional information regarding the four attempted transfer calls from CSPD to BSO:

1.) 2:22:41 - Successful transfer. CSPD call-taker called BSO North Region and relayed information from the first Coral Springs 911 call, including gunshots heard and that someone was shot in the 1200 building. The phone line was still connected,
but the caller could not be heard on the transfer. This call is designated as a “successful transfer” because Coral Springs was able to use call tracking to determine the caller was inside MSDHS; however, the BSO dispatcher was never able to speak directly with the caller.

2.) 2:26:27 - Attempted transfer. CSPD call-taker received a call from a male stating the shooting was occurring at the “Freshman Building” near the student lot and two people were hurt. The CSPD call-taker attempted to transfer the caller. The caller could not be heard on the transfer. The CSPD call-taker relayed that the shooter was in the student parking lot on the north side of the school.

3.) 2:28:20 - Incomplete transfer. A male caller advised Coral Springs of shooting at MSDHS and that there were two people bleeding in room 1214. He also advised the door was locked, but the shooter shot through the window. Dispatcher stated she would transfer the caller to BSO, but the audio file ended and it is unknown if the call was ultimately transferred.

4.) 02:58:31 - Successful transfer. Caller advised BSO that the shooter was wearing a military-type Kevlar vest and that there was a possibility of three shooters.

Findings:

1. The 911 system on February 14, 2018, and the current 911 system in Parkland—which routes all Parkland 911 calls from cellular phones to Coral Springs delays a swift and effective response police response by BSO. All Parkland 911 callers from cell phones who need police assistance have to explain their emergency to the Coral Springs dispatcher who then tells the person to standby while Coral Springs calls Broward County Regional Communications. The Coral Springs dispatcher then tells the BSO dispatcher that they have a caller on the line with a police emergency, and the 911 caller repeats the reason for needing the police all over again to the BSO dispatcher.
In many instances, the original 911 caller hangs up before being transferred to BSO by Coral Springs, and this hinders the BSO dispatcher because they are unable to speak directly to the caller needing police help in Parkland. This also creates an officer-safety issue for Parkland deputies because they cannot obtain updated information while responding to the emergency because the caller hung up and the dispatcher cannot reestablish contact with the caller. Many callers also become frustrated because they have to explain their emergency a second time and they do not understand the necessity of the redundancy.

This call-transfer system prohibits BSO from receiving direct 911 calls from its service area in Parkland and creates a situation, as it did on February 14, 2018, where there is an information void adversely affecting an effective law enforcement response. Specifically because of this system being in place on February 14, it took 69 seconds before the first law enforcement officer was notified. At that point, Cruz had already shot 23 people on the first floor of Building 12.

2. The system is designed for Coral Springs to transfer all 911 law enforcement calls it receives from Parkland to BSO. On February 14, 2018, Coral Springs transferred very few calls it received, and this resulted in BSO, as the primary response law enforcement agency, not having all of the specific information known to Coral Springs. This affected BSO’s response. On February 14, 2018, the Coral Springs 911 communications center initially treated the MSDHS shooting solely as a fire/EMS event because it provided fire and emergency medical services to Parkland, not police response. Coral Springs waited 4 minutes and 22 seconds from the time it received the first call of shots fired at MSDHS until it dispatched its first Coral Springs police officer. By that time, Cruz had completed all of the shooting. Coral Springs could not effect a quicker response by BSO because it had to transfer the call to BSO and Coral Springs could not directly communicate via radio with BSO Parkland deputies.

3. The decision to route all Parkland 911 calls that originated from cell phones to Coral Springs and not to Broward Regional Communications (BSO) was made by the City
of Parkland. The call transfer process delayed the law enforcement response to MSDHS on February 14, 2018. The City of Parkland has the authority to decide where its 911 calls are routed and the City can change the routing process at will.

4. BSO brought the Parkland 911 call workflow issues to the City of Parkland in 2014.

5. Coral Springs 911 rollover calls went to its unrecorded emergency operations center phone line and other unrecorded non-emergency lines. None of the Coral Springs 911 rollover calls were transferred to a secondary 911 call center.

6. There were no known 911 calls received from landline phones within Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School.

7.3 Law Enforcement Computer-Aided Dispatch Systems (CAD)

Computer-aided dispatch (CAD), also called computer-assisted dispatch, is a method of dispatching emergency services assisted by computer. It can either be used to send messages to the dispatchee via a mobile data terminal (MDT) and/or used to store and retrieve data (i.e. radio logs, field interviews, client information, schedules, etc.). The central idea is that persons in a dispatch center are able to easily view and understand the status of all units being dispatched. CAD provides displays and tools so that the dispatcher has an opportunity to handle calls for service as efficiently as possible. CAD operates in the communications centers and in the mobile environment within officer’s cruisers and fire trucks. CAD compliments but does not replace radio communications.

Broward County maintains a CAD consortium, which includes 25 municipalities, three non-municipality contracts, and Broward County’s unincorporated areas. Motorola is the vendor that provides the CAD services.

CSPD maintains its own CAD system separate from BSO. There is no interoperability between the CSPD and BSO CADs, and they cannot see each other’s data. The operator answers the 911 call and generates a call for service by entering it into the CAD system. Once the call is generated in CAD, it is automatically pushed to the correct dispatcher responsible for assigning fire and law enforcement units.
Coral Springs 911 center entered CAD data in the Coral Springs Fire Department CAD well before it made any entries in the CSPD CAD. In total, CSFD had over 90 CAD entries and CSPD had over 230 CAD entries. The first CSFD CAD entry was entered at 02:22:59, whereas the first CSPD CAD entry was not entered until 02:24:56. As noted, Coral Springs 911 initially treated the shooting as an EMS event, and it notified CSFD first for response.

Since February 14, 2018, CSPD has changed internal procedures, and it now requires entry into both CSFD and CSPD CADs and also requires notification to the shift supervisor of any major events, including those in neighboring jurisdictions, in order to better coordinate effective law enforcement response to major incidents.

**Findings:**

1. Coral Springs and BSO have independent CAD systems, so officers and deputies cannot see each other’s calls in addition to not being able to hear each other’s calls on the radio. There is no electronic data sharing of CAD data between Coral Springs and BSO.

2. There are no known substantive issues regarding the actual entries made into the BSO or CSPD CAD systems on February 14, 2018, other than that CSPD and BSO officers and deputies could not view each other’s CAD data.

3. The initial CAD entry into the Coral Springs Fire Department CAD rather than the Coral Springs Police Department CAD significantly delayed the law enforcement response. (Note: The Coral Springs Police Department has revised its policy since the shooting and the on-duty shift commander is now notified immediately of all significant incidents occurring in neighboring jurisdictions and the shift commander decides whether to dispatch CSPD units outside the city).

4. Different law enforcement agencies using different CAD systems within the same county creates information silos and barriers to sharing emergency information as well as delaying responses to emergency calls.
7.4 Law Enforcement Radio Systems

Wireless communications interoperability specifically refers to the ability of emergency response officials to share information via voice and data signals on demand, in real time, when needed, and as authorized. Government agencies rely on Land Mobile Radio (LMR) systems to support voice two-way radio communications for personnel in the field to communicate. Not all radio systems are the same. They are referred to as two-way radio systems because they can transmit and receive a signal.

CSPD and BSO operate independent radio systems. The agencies rely on radio patching to communicate with each other; however, they could not talk to each other on February 14, 2018 because BSO could not effect the radio patch. Under Broward County protocol, BSO was responsible for effecting that patch but because BSO did not have the CSPD channel in its dispatch console it could not patch the channels. Further, BSO deputies had difficulty transmitting on their radios because of “throttling”—all of which resulted in the use of hand signals, yelling, and confusion at MSDHS. CSPD and BSO were essentially running two separate response operations. While BSO experienced throttling issues, CSPD never eclipsed 48 percent capacity of their own police radio usage.

BSO manages control and assignment of radio talkgroups⁴ to ensure accessibility. Radio talkgroups and radio channels are often used synonymously. Portable radios can have hundreds of talkgroups programmed based on the user’s position and rank. Talkgroup access varies and is based upon radio fleet map⁵ programming. Every city in Broward County has different fleet maps. All fleet maps have both zone-specific and countywide talkgroups. BSO has a very robust fleet map which can hold more than 30 zones. Portable radios can maintain 16 talkgroups per zone. All Broward County 911 centers (Regional and independent) have access to shared countywide mutual-aid talkgroups.

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⁴ Talkgroups are radio channels utilized by law enforcement for communication to dispatch and their talkgroup partners.
⁵ Fleet mapping is programming the trunked radio system to function according to operational requirements; it determines how the system for each user group is controlled.
The host agency has ownership of the tactical talkgroup assigned to work the response. The assignment will be a talkgroup within their zone (easily accessible) that does not require zone maneuvering. All inbound resources or mutual aid (law enforcement or fire/EMS) will be either directed to access the working talkgroup (provided they have access on their portable radios) or to a secondary/alternate mutual-aid talkgroup that is patched into the working talkgroup. Host agency field users actively engaged in the working incident are never directed to move talkgroups away from their primary zone unless absolutely necessary because of officer safety concerns. If inbound users do not have access to the declared talkgroup, a radio patch will be initiated.

Project 25, or “P25” as it is referred to, is the national standard for design and technology of two-way radio communication systems. As agencies upgrade and acquire new systems, they should be P25-compatible so that less interoperability issues are encountered in the future. Coral Springs acquired a new radio system in 2015 that was P25-compliant. The Coral Springs radio system provides complete interoperability through patching with every radio system in the county that exists today. The system has three total tower sites, with one each located in Coral Springs, Margate and Coconut Creek. The CSPD radio system has 11 channels, 83 talkgroups and 1134 users; this includes public safety and local government. The daily average capacity usage of the radio system is between 18-19%. There are roughly 200 users that are on the radio system at any given time. On February 14, 2018, CSPD never eclipsed 48% capacity of police radio usage.

CSFD has five tactical talkgroups and six additional talkgroups for special operations or training. Their radio coverage includes eight fire stations and fire administration, and equates to roughly fifty users a day. On February 14, 2018, CSFD patched three channels together to support fire response operations.

**Patching**
Both CSPD and Plantation PD operate independent radio systems which can cause limitations in communicating with BSO. Interoperability is restricted to either shared countywide talkgroups or radio patching, and fast-moving events are more difficult due to the unavailability of primary resources found within the Regional System. Patching results in field users immediately connecting with other users who are occupying different talkgroups on possibly different zones. Patching is seamless to the field user, has no field user radio manipulation and is easy to execute. However, patching can cause some limitations including restraint of talkgroup resources available, limited presentation of Independent 911 center resources and inclusion of too many resources in a patch, which can degrade quality. On February 14, BSO did not have the CSPD primary police channel to patch with BSO’s main radio channel 8A. A request was made by BSO to CSPD for a patch to 14JointOps2, a mutual-aid channel.

**Throttling**

Radio throttling was a significant issue on February 14, 2018. Throttling was unique to BSO and did not occur with the CSPD radio system. Throttling prevents radio transmissions and occurs to prevent the radio system from crashing due to its capacity being exceeded. Throttling usually occurs when there are an unusually large number of radio users accessing the system at the same time. Throttling creates a communications paralysis. At certain times, it took several attempts for officers to transmit or receive transmissions over the radio. The throttling created a delay in communication between responding deputies. Several agencies responded to the school, but throttling issues caused difficulties coordinating response. For instance, SWAT teams inside the 1200 building tried to communicate with officers outside the building who had rifles pointed toward the building, but they could not hear each other. In sum, the BSO radio system is old, its demand exceeds its capacity, and it crashes when too many users are on the system.

**Findings:**

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A Patch Group is a group of linked talkgroups that allows radio users to communicate with each other while on separate radio systems. Think of a patch as a three way conference call. When radio talkgroups are patched, all patched users can hear all radio traffic and transmit across both systems.
1. Due to the independent communications systems of BSO and Coral Springs the agencies do not share a radio channel. On February 14, 2018, neither CSPD nor BSO patrol units had each other’s radio channels in their portable radios. Further, BSO dispatch did not have the CSPD radio channel in its dispatch console. CSPD recently authorized BSO to install its radio channel in its dispatch consoles, and BSO-Parkland deputies now have CSPD radio channels in their portable radios.

2. The lack of radio interoperability and the BSO throttling issue hampered the response and caused officer-safety issues. The BSO system currently in use can only accept about 250 inbound requests per minute, whereas the new system that will be implemented will have a much higher capacity reaching about 750 inbound requests per minute.

3. BSO and CSPD not being able to communicate on the same radio channel or through patched channels affected the law enforcement response and caused information voids and silos. A patch was attempted on February 14, 2018, but it failed because BSO did not have CSPD’s channel in its dispatch console. BSO could not patch what it did not have.

4. While there existed common mutual-aid channels that officers and deputies could have used, there was inadequate common knowledge that the channels existed, and personnel were not trained in how to easily access the channels. Moreover, it would have been cumbersome, impractical and tactically unsound to go through the process of switching to a mutual-aid channel while actively responding to the MSDHS shooting.

5. The lack of capacity caused radio “throttling” during BSO’s response to the MSDHS shooting and resulted in BSO deputies and command staff not being able to transmit on their radios. The BSO radio throttling also hampered effective command and control.

6. Because BSO SWAT could not effectively communicate via radio, SWAT had to use hand signals, cell phones and “runners” to communicate in person due to the radio failures.
7. The same radio problems also happened during BSO’s response to the Ft. Lauderdale Airport shooting in January 2017.

8. Coral Springs has expressed concern over the county’s radio replacement plan and has no plans to join the regional communications system even when the new radio system is in place.

9. CSPD portable radios are equipped with GPS so that the Coral Springs communications center knows the precise location of every officer at all times. BSO does not have this technology, and their ability to know the precise locations of deputies is limited.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Law enforcement agencies should be required to have communications interoperability with all other law enforcement agencies in their county. The methodology for accomplishing this is immaterial, but the interoperability is essential.

If an agency asks another agency for access to their primary dispatch radio channels, it should be mandated that the agency honor the request.

Law enforcement agencies should tactically train their personnel so they are familiar with all radio functionality.

Florida law should require that all primary 911 call centers have the ability to directly communicate via radio with the first responder units for which they are receiving 911 calls without having to transfer calls.

All public safety agencies should work toward consolidation of 911 call centers and eliminate the 911 call transfer process.

School districts and law enforcement agencies should strive for radio interoperability.
8.1 Pre-Incident- Cruz’s Birth through February 13, 2018

The following timeline represents key dates and periods during Nikolas Cruz’s life prior to February 14, 2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 24, 1998</td>
<td>Nikolas Cruz was born to his biological mother in Plantation, FL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 18, 1999</td>
<td>Nikolas Cruz was adopted by Roger Cruz (born in New York on June 14, 1937) and Lynda Kumbatovich (born in New York on September 25, 1949). (Roger and Lynda married in 2002.) They resided at 6166 NW 80th Terrace, Parkland, FL, from Cruz’s adoption until August 27, 2010. Cruz’s younger biological half-brother, Zachary, was also adopted by Roger and Lynda Cruz on or about February 21, 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 – 2001:</td>
<td>Cruz was enrolled at Young Minds Learning Center, 6530 State Road 7, Coconut Creek, FL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002:</td>
<td>Nikolas Cruz was enrolled at Tutor Time in Boca Raton, FL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1, 2002:</td>
<td>Roger Paul Cruz and Lynda Marie Cruz were married Broward County.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Range</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15, 2002 – August 25, 2003</td>
<td>Nikolas Cruz attended Country Hills Elementary School, 10550 Westview Drive, Coral Springs, FL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 8, 2004</td>
<td>Roger Cruz died at age 67 of natural causes at home. Nikolas was 5 years old when Roger died.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 19, 2004 – June 2011</td>
<td>Cruz attended Coral Springs Elementary School, 3601 NW 110 Ave, Coral Springs, FL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 22, 2011 – February 5, 2014</td>
<td>Cruz attended Westglades Middle School, 11000 Holmberg Road, Parkland, FL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It was during middle school that Cruz was referred to the PROMISE Program for vandalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 6, 2014 – January 13, 2016</td>
<td>Cruz attended Cross Creek School (ESE Center), 1010 NW 31st Avenue, Pompano Beach, FL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 13, 2016 – February 2017</td>
<td>Cruz attended Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, 5901 NW Pine Island Road, Parkland, FL.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
November 25, 2016: | Cruz started employment as a cashier at the Dollar Tree store located at 5943 W. Hillsboro Blvd in Parkland, FL. He worked at Dollar Tree until the shooting.

January 2017 | The Cruz family moved to 8442 Lakeview Trail, Parkland, Florida.

February 8, 2017: | Cruz was enrolled at the BCPS Off Campus Learning Center (OCLC), 7578 Pines Blvd, Pembroke Pines, FL.

August 21, 2017: | Cruz was enrolled at the Henry D. Perry Education Center, 3400 Wildcat Way, Miramar, FL.

November 1, 2017: | Lynda Cruz died at age 68 in the hospital of natural causes.

November 1, 2017: | After their mother’s death, Nikolas and Zachary moved in with the Deschamps family.

November 28, 2017: | After an altercation with the Deschamps family, Nikolas Cruz moved in with the Snead family.

December 15, 2017: | Cruz enrolled at the Dave Thomas Education Center, 4690 Coconut Creek Parkway, Coconut Creek, FL.
8.2 Cruz Contacts

The following is a summary of Cruz’s contacts with various organizations and individuals prior to February 14, 2018. As previously established, perpetrators of targeted attacks often give some indication of their plans to other individuals, either directly or indirectly.

Between the time Cruz was 3 years old in January 2002 and the time he was 19 years old in January 2018, there were 69 documented incidents where Cruz threatened someone, engaged in violence, talked about guns or other weapons or engaged in other concerning behavior.

As early as 3 years old, Cruz exhibited violent behavior. These incidents and behaviors were regular and frequent throughout Cruz’s life. There were incidents prior to the MSDHS shooting where Cruz arguably committed crimes, albeit minor ones, but he was never charged with a criminal offense prior to the shooting.

Cruz’s Prior Contacts with the Broward County Sheriff’s Office

Prior to February 14, 2018, BSO had a total of 43 contacts with the Cruz family. Of the 43 contacts, 21 involved Nikolas Cruz alone or both Nikolas and Zachary Cruz. Twenty-two of the incidents involved only Zachary Cruz. Of the 21 incidents involving Nikolas Cruz, most were minor and warranted no further law enforcement action. Two of the incidents warranted additional follow-up that was not conducted. BSO conducted internal affairs investigations to evaluate the response by two of their deputies. Both deputies were found to have violated BSO policy and were disciplined. (See Appendix C for deputy discipline information.)

Those 21 instances involving Nikolas Cruz were comprised of:

- Children Fighting or Running Away: 9
- Nikolas Acting Out Toward His Mother (Domestic): 4
- Follow-Up to Previous Call: 1
Response to 9/16 Threat Assessment: 1
Complaint of Cruz Shooting Chickens: 1
Complaint about Instagram Posts Involving Guns: 2
Field Interview Report (FIR): 1
Family Friends Calling BSO Warning About Cruz: 2

November 8, 2008: Joelle Guarino called BSO and advised that Nikolas Cruz hit her child in the head with a rock. The call type was changed to juvenile disturbance. The parents of both children agreed to not pursue the matter with the police.

May 17, 2012: A deputy was dispatched to a call from Lynda Cruz at her residence. She advised that her teenage children were out of control, destroying the home and fighting.

August 5, 2012: Lynda Cruz called BSO and reported that her children were throwing water balloons at the property. The call notes indicated that the deputy assisted her with disciplinary action for her teenage sons.

August 19, 2012: Lynda Cruz called BSO and reported that her children were fighting and not listening to her.

August 22, 2012: Lynda Cruz called BSO because her two teenage children were cursing and being disrespectful.

November 1, 2012: Lynda Cruz called BSO because her children were fighting about the computer.

November 27, 2012: Lynda Cruz called BSO because Nikolas Cruz hit her with a plastic hose from the vacuum cleaner. Nikolas was not home when the deputy arrived.

November 27, 2012: Lynda Cruz called BSO to return because Nikolas had returned home. The deputy spoke with Nikolas Cruz about how he had been disrespectful to his mother by hitting her with the plastic hose.
November 28, 2012: Lynda Cruz called BSO because her two teenage children ran away from home. They left out a window and fled on foot. The children were both located and returned home. The CAD notes indicated that Henderson Behavioral Health also responded to the scene.

January 15, 2013: Lynda Cruz called BSO after Nikolas Cruz threw objects in the home. He was angry because he lost the privilege to play video games. He locked himself in his bedroom but the deputies were able to push into the room. Nikolas Cruz was cooperative after contact was made. Nina Barela from Henderson Behavioral Health also responded to the home.

October 12, 2013: Lynda Cruz called BSO to report both of her teenage sons as missing. They were located at a nearby residence.

January 22, 2014: Lynda Cruz called BSO to report that she had had a verbal altercation with her son, Nikolas Cruz.

June 29, 2014: Lynda Cruz called BSO because of a verbal argument with her two sons.

November 20, 2014: Deborah Cooper called BSO because Nikolas Cruz shot her chickens with an airsoft gun. It was later determined that one of the chickens died. Cooper did not wish to pursue charges after finding out that Nikolas Cruz was developmentally delayed.
February 5, 2016: Joelle Guarino called BSO because Nikolas Cruz had posted a photograph on Instagram of himself with a gun. Deputy E. Eason handled the call for service. The photograph had been removed and was not observed by a deputy. The post included a statement similar to “I am going to get this gun when I turn 18 and shoot up the school.” Deputy Eason did not complete an incident report but made entries into the CAD stating, “No threats noted and info forwarded to (SRO) Peterson at school.” After the shooting on February 14, this incident was investigated by BSO internal affairs and the deputy was disciplined for not thoroughly acting on the information.

September 28, 2016: Based on Commission interviews with MSD personnel, it was determined that the MSD administration conducted a threat assessment on Cruz due to reports concerning Cruz’s patterns of behavior, resulting in Cruz being prohibited from carrying a backpack to school. A Baker Act evaluation was conducted, but it was determined that Cruz did not meet the criteria for an involuntary examination. A search of the residence revealed no firearms.

June 21, 2017: Deputy Swadkins conducted an FIR of Nikolas Cruz because he was riding a bicycle at night with no headlight.
November 1, 2017: Katherine Blaine called BSO from out of state the day Lynda Cruz died. She reported that Nikolas Cruz had weapons and was supervising his 17 year old brother. This was a request for BSO to conduct a welfare check of Nikolas and Zachary because their mother died that day. No report was written. After the shooting on February 14, Blaine told BSO that Lynda Cruz had confided in her that approximately three months earlier that Nikolas Cruz had knocked out three of her teeth.

November 30, 2017: Mary Hamel, a friend of the late Lynda Cruz, called BSO from out of state. Deputy G. Treijs handled this call for service via the telephone. Hamel reported that Nikolas Cruz had weapons and wanted to join the military to kill people. Hamel reportedly stated that Cruz “might be a Columbine in the making” and was a threat to kill himself. Deputy Treijs did not complete an incident report but entered CAD notes that Cruz was autistic and it was unknown was Cruz was located. He directed Hamel to call the Lake Worth Police Department due to that being Cruz’s last known location.

After the shooting on February 14, this incident was investigated by BSO internal affairs and the deputy was disciplined for not thoroughly acting on the information.

Cruz Contact with Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office

The Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office (PBSO) had significantly less contact with Nikolas Cruz. These contacts occurred at a time after Lynda’s death when Cruz was living with Rocxanne Deschamps’s family in Lake Worth, Palm Beach County. Cruz was friends with Rocxanne’s son.
On November 24, 2017, the PBSO responded to a call at the Deschamps residence. Rocxanne called because Cruz reportedly buried a firearm in her yard. No police report was written and the CAD notes contained little information.

On November 28, 2017, the PBSO responded to a call in which Rocxanne alleged Cruz hit her son. A police report was written, but a waiver of prosecution was signed. Notes from the original call for service indicated Cruz said he would leave, go get a gun and come back. The first set of CAD notes also indicated Cruz had just bought a gun from Dick’s Sporting Goods the previous week and was going to pick it up. The caller also stated that Cruz had a lot of ammunition and had held a gun to people’s heads in the past.

Following this incident that Nikolas Cruz moved in with the Snead family.

_Cruz’s Treatment by Henderson Behavioral Health_

Much of the information surrounding Cruz’s mental health and educational treatment is confidential under Florida and federal law. The chronology in Appendix F contains detailed treatment information and is available to readers with authorized access.

_Cruz’s Treatment and/or services by Other Providers._

Based on Commission interviews, it was determined that Cruz received extensive mental health treatment and school-based treatment from multiple providers. Over a nine-year period, Cruz regularly received hundreds of hours of therapy sessions from Henderson Behavioral Health. Moreover, Cruz also received additional educational services and behavioral care from multiple other providers for many years. To the knowledge of the Commission, Cruz did not receive any treatment in the months immediately preceding the February 14, 2018, shooting.
CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY OF CRUZ’S LIFE AND CONTACTS PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 14, 2018

Other Cruz contacts

There were several of Cruz’s peers who knew Cruz to express hatred toward specific races or social groups. Cruz had been known to make statements such as, “I wish all the Jews were dead,” or, in reference to the shooting at the Pulse nightclub, “I’m glad they killed all those gay people.” Another student said he knew that Cruz did not like black people and that he wanted to shoot them. Cruz also expressed an interest in hate groups such as Nazis, Hitler, and the KKK. He was known to use phrases such as “White Power.” Several people spoke of seeing swastikas drawn on his personal belongings.

Corroboration of these witness statements was found on the ammunition magazines recovered from Building 12, as they had swastikas etched into them. A review of his cell phone contents included numerous images associated with Nazism and the KKK.

Numerous people—mostly fellow students—knew of Cruz to have a history of killing small animals such as squirrels, toads and lizards. A former classmate spoke of Cruz bringing a dead animal to school in a lunchbox and showing it to her and other students. Another former MSD student spoke of Cruz killing a duck with a tire iron and remembered Cruz posting pictures on Instagram of a dead toad. This was one of the reasons this student and his classmates joked that Cruz would become a school shooter. Another student spoke of Cruz showing him a picture of a decapitated cat. Yet another student spoke of Cruz and another friend posting images of images of these dead animals on Snapchat. Evidence to support these statements was also found in the images on Cruz’s cell phone.

Some of these same individuals referenced Cruz’s interest in the military and firearms or other weapons. Cruz was known to post photographs of him wearing gas masks and body armor while holding weapons. Several witnesses spoke of seeing Cruz’s social media posts, which showed him with firearms or knives. He was also known to bring knives to school, and some witnesses saw Cruz’s guns (off-campus) first-hand. One student saw Cruz looking up on a school computer how to make a nail bomb. One of Lynda Cruz’s friends spoke of Cruz’s obsession with firearms and how it made her nervous. Again, a review of Cruz’s cell phone reveals internet activity and images of a consistent theme.
Multiple witnesses spoke about Cruz’s violent behavior. A bank teller who had extensive contact with Lynda Cruz spoke at length about Cruz threatening to kill Lynda or telling Lynda to kill herself and that Cruz would then burn down the house. She described how Lynda would have bruises on her wrists and, when asked about them, Lynda said that Cruz had fought with Lynda over her purse. Lynda went so far as to tell the bank teller that “if anything happens to me, you know it was Nick.” This bank teller came forward after the shooting to report her observations but did not report anything prior to the shooting. Other family friends spoke of Cruz pointing guns at Lynda and threatening her. Cruz threatened a fellow student, saying that he would kill her, rape her and hurt her family.

A former co-worker of Cruz at the Dollar Tree spoke of an instance when her mother came into the store. The mother attempted to offer some words of wisdom to Cruz due to him leaving MSD. Cruz responded to the mother saying that he could go shoot up the school and he could shoot her as well. Neither the Dollar Tree employee nor her mother reported this to anyone until after the February 14 shooting.

Cruz told one student, “I’m so tired of everyone being mean to me, I just can’t take it, I want to shoot up the school.” When the student confronted Cruz about this, Cruz said he was joking. This same student had information about Cruz killing animals for fun.

A small number of Cruz’s peers had information about Cruz being suicidal or depressed. Cruz had shown one of his classmates scars on his arm from when he cut himself. The friend with whom Cruz was living attributed some of Cruz’s depression to the death of his mother. However, another friend spoke of how Cruz thought it was funny to put his Make America Great Again hat next to the urn of his deceased mother due to her opposing political beliefs.

So rampant were the concerns about Cruz that one student who saw Cruz while fleeing MSD commented to him, “I’m surprised you weren’t the one who did this.”

One student reported to MSD staff member Lauren Rubenstein that Cruz was suicidal. Rubenstein has declined interviews with MSD-PSC investigators; however, the BCPS General Counsel is working to facilitate an interview in the near future.
provided by BCPS was a handwritten note which appears to substantiate the fact that Rubenstein attempted to pass this information on to MSD administration.

Another student spoke of seeing a pattern of concerning behavior, which he reported to administration. Among that behavior: Cruz looked up guns on his school computer; Cruz told him he had shotguns; Cruz mimicked shooting birds on campus; he heard that Cruz brought knives or bullets to school; Cruz posted weapons on his Instagram page; and Cruz said he liked seeing people in pain. This student said that he had recently seen a video outlining warning signs for potential school shooters. The student saw many of these warning signs in Cruz and reported them to Assistant Principal Jeff Morford in his office approximately halfway through the 2016/2017 school year. The student was confident that he specifically said Cruz was a threat to shoot up the school.

The student could not recall Cruz's name, but the administrator pulled up a photograph of Cruz on his computer and showed it to the student. The student confirmed that the photograph of Cruz was the person to whom he was referring.

The student stated that a law enforcement officer was also present in the office for this discussion, but he could not confirm it was Deputy Peterson. According to the student, neither Morford nor the deputy seemed particularly concerned about this information. Morford cautioned the student against creating unnecessary fears and told the student that he should Google “autism,” implying that Cruz was autistic. He also told the student that Cruz did not have any shotguns. Morford told the students that Cruz was being sent to an alternative school and that they did not need to worry. The student believed he made this report on a Friday and said that he did not believe Cruz was in the class the following Monday and he had not seen Cruz since then.

The student said that another student went with him to the front office but at the time of the interview he could not recall the fellow student’s name. In the following days, the student’s father notified an MSD-PSC investigator of this fellow student’s name.
Investigators contacted this fellow student and his mother who wanted to only speak by phone and declined to have the interview recorded, but the conversation was witnessed by two MSD-PSC investigators.

The fellow student provided a statement which largely corroborated the statement of the first student. This student had some confusion on whether these concerns were expressed to Assistant Principal Morford or Principal Ty Thompson. The mother interjected that the report was made to Thompson and she knew that because she met with Thompson the following day about this same matter and she described Thompson as being dismissive of her concerns.

Investigators determined the statements of these students to be highly credible, particularly those of the first student. The statements included specific detail and information which would not have been otherwise known to these students. Additionally, the statements were not so consistent as to give the impression that they were rehearsed as part of students conspiring against school personnel.

Investigators conducted follow-up interviews with both Thompson and Morford and specifically addressed the issue of two students bringing concerns to them about Cruz being a threat to the school. Both Thompson and Morford adamantly denied that this ever took place. Investigators found Morford to be remarkably absent-minded in remembering details about various events and/or being intentionally deceptive.

8.3 Cruz’s School Discipline Records

BCPS documented nearly 70 incidents involving Cruz in its incident-based computer system. BCPS’s disciplinary referral system (DMS) also contained nearly 55 school incidents involving Cruz.

Much of the school information regarding Cruz is confidential under Florida and federal law because it is part of Cruz’s “student record.” The chronology in Appendix F contains detailed information and is available to readers with authorized access.
8.4 Prior Information Received by the FBI Regarding Cruz’s Concerning Behavior

It was widely reported and confirmed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) soon after the MSD shooting that that FBI had previously received tips concerning Nikolas Cruz. Due to inadequate handling of these tips, the FBI subsequently opened an internal investigation after the MSD tragedy.

The first tip was received on the FBI Public Access Line (PAL) on September 25, 2017, from Ben Bennight in Mississippi. Bennight, who was unknown to Cruz, reported a video on YouTube stating, “I’m going to be the next school shooter,” made by a user identified as “nikolas cruz.” The information was forwarded to the Mississippi FBI office for follow up and the tipster was interviewed. However, it was determined there was not enough information available to positively identify the poster of the video and the tip was closed on October 11, 2017. Efforts to serve legal process on YouTube or Google that could have potentially identified the poster were not made.

The second call to the FBI PAL was placed on January 5, 2018, by a friend of the Cruz family, Mary Hamel. Hamel had become increasingly concerned about postings Cruz was making on Instagram and feared he would actually follow through on threats to harm others by perpetrating a school shooting. During the thirteen-minute phone call, Hamel provided details of Cruz’s gun purchases, animal mutilations, escalating temper and Cruz’s Instagram usernames. The name, address and phone number for the Snead family was also provided, which was the residence where Cruz was residing at the time due to the death of his mother. After some initial searches by the call-taker, the tip was closed out after it was labeled as having no lead value. It is not clear at this time exactly why the lead was labeled as having no value and closed without being forwarded to a local FBI office for further evaluation.

Requests were made to have the FBI make a presentation to the Commission explaining the handling of tips received regarding Cruz. The FBI declined to make a formal presentation, but did provide a letter addressed to the Commission (see Appendix D) detailing actions...
they have taken as a result of the MSD shooting that are aimed at improving the evaluation and dissemination of similar information reported to the FBI by the public. Per the letter, the PAL has transitioned from a call-intake center to an operations center, which will allow for more staffing to properly analyze and forward information in a timely manner to the appropriate FBI field office. Staff also now receives Threat-to-Life and Guidance on School Shooting trainings that aim to help employees better identify potential threats so the information may be forwarded accordingly.

Additionally, a tiered system has been implemented that will allow for better prioritizing of calls. Tier 1 calls are classified as general information and nuisance calls, while Tier 2 calls are classified as having a Potential Lead Value (PLV). Calls with a PLV relate to reports of “threat-to-life, counterterrorism and criminal matters within the FBI’s purview.” Each synopsis of a Tier 2 call is automatically scored using a key threat word list. Calls that are designated as having No Lead Value (NLV) but contain at least one identified key threat word are required to be reviewed by a Supervisory Special Agent before the tip is closed.

An updated Standard Operating Procedure has been implemented for PAL to ensure consistency in the call-taking process. PAL’s technology system is continuing to undergo upgrades that will help assist call-takers in documenting information from calls accurately. Additionally, all threat-to-life and counterterrorism-related calls will now be reviewed by a quality management team.

No further information was provided to the Commission by the FBI regarding the specifics of the internal FBI investigation into the handling of the tips related to Cruz.

8.5 Cruz’s Social Media Posts

As a result of the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School on February 14, 2018, subpoenas were served on several Instagram accounts that were believed to have links to Nikolas Cruz. The dates the posts were made are not entirely clear from the records returned. The following information was contained in the Instagram posts:
Cruz said: "I do and don't care I have my life and I wanna fucking kill people."

In another comment, in response when asked who he wanted to kill, Cruz replied: "Random fucking people man fuck people I'll kill them all."

A conversation and a post by Instagram user cruz_nikolas discussed a firearm purchase and displayed an advertisement for a Maverick Arms, model 88, 12 gauge shotgun. The user listed as cruz_nikolas said, “I plan on getting this but I need more information on it so if someone could give me advice on how much I’m spending and background checks (misspelled) please to god let me know. I plan on putting a scope on it for accuracy.” It is confirmed that Nikolas Cruz actually did purchase a Maverick Arms 12 gauge shotgun from Dick’s Sporting Goods in Boynton Beach, Florida, on December 9, 2017.

A user named cruz-nikolas posted pictures on Instagram showing various weapons. These posts were located and linked to Cruz:

- “Im going watch them sheep fall fuck antifa I wish to kill as many as I can."
- “iam going to kill them in the future."
- “I whana shoot people with my AR-15."
- “I wanna die Fighting killing shit ton of people."
- “I am going to kill law enforcement one day they go after the good people."

### 8.6 Cruz’s Internet searches and digital images

Cruz’s cell phone was seized at the time of his arrest and searched pursuant to a search warrant. The following analysis contains relevant internet searches, websites visited, photographs, and notes Cruz electronically wrote and stored on his cell phone.

**November 14, 2017** | Internet search for “shooting people massacre”
**November 15, 2017** | Internet search for “rape caught on video” and “armed robber gets shot buy every customer”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date/Time</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 26, 2017</td>
<td>Cruz holding a rifle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| December 30, 2017 10:27 pm   | A note with this date/timestamp was within the Notes section of Cruz’s phone:  
                                | “Control your breathing and trigger pull. Your the one who sights in the rifle for yourself. Adjust the scope to your shooting ability. Keep that adjustment every time you have to shoot to yourself only to oneself. My trigger squeeze is my ones ability. Something every time.” |
| January 20, 2018 5:58 pm     | A note with this date/timestamp was within the Notes section of Cruz’s phone:  
                                | “Basketball court full of Targets still thinking of ways to kill people” |
January 21, 2018 3:35 pm  A note with this date/timestamp was within the Notes section of Cruz’s phone:

“My life is a mess idk what to do anymore. Everyday I get even more agitated at everyone cause my life is unfair. Everything and everyone is happy except for me I want to kill people but I don’t know how I can do it. Walk to a park, get someone to pick me up I just don’t know anymore but it will happen soon.”

February 01 – February 05, 2018  Cruz visited pornography websites and accessed the song “Pumped Up Kicks”

February 02, 2018  Screenshot of the MSDHS schedule
| February 05, 2018 | 2:56 pm | Cruz dressed in camouflage |
February 05, 2018

A note with this date/timestamp was within the Notes section of Cruz’s phone:

“My love towards her grows, without her I’m nothing all this madness inside is about to Burst without her I have nothing I wish we could love, I wish we could live, but at the the end to her it’s probably nothing, but that’s ok cause I love her, I love you my angel (name redacted) if I don’t die please see me it will bring happiness to me I want to love, I want to be in love with you, forever and ever with no end insight :’) even if I’m raped to death you will always be on my mind that’s how much my love is for you, I see you not as a person but a soul lover a love that will never be broken. I’m in love with you (name redacted) my love. you have been the sweetest, gentle being of my heart I love you. please be with m in the after life my dearest sweet heart :’) I will always dream about you even if I do stupid things your nothing but love in my life I can’t stand a day without you even after I been a worthless trash can. I wish for you to be my will with my everything I leave behind it belongs to you and my brother the half of the cash goes to you and my brother as my hatred grows my love grows towards to one person my dear love”
February 06 – February 08, 2018
Cruz visited websites of the following nature:

- Video on how to build an Airsoft assault rifle
- Anime cartoons
- Video on the Kardashian family
- Banking
- Political articles
- Pornography
- Spot.com – Searching a Coconut Creek location
- Asian mail-order brides

Cruz’s search history included the following phrases:

- “is killing people easy”
- “pest control job”
- “crime scene cleaner”

February 08, 2018 2:39 pm
Cruz made a video depicting the ground, his leg, and arm which was in a black cast. In the video Cruz appeared to be speaking to himself and he stated:

“Alright. So here’s the plan. I'm gonna go take Uber in the afternoon before 2:40. From there I'll go into the – onto the school campus, walk up the stairs, unload my bags and get my AR and shoot people down at the main – what is it – the main courtyard. Wait and people will die.”
February 08, 2018 4:25 pm  Image of a dead bird with apparent trauma

February 08, 2018 7:31 pm  Image of Cruz
February 09, 2018  | Cruz visited websites of the following nature:

- Pornography
- Psychcentral.com: Homicidal Thoughts and Urges
- Various websites on rifle scopes
- Japanese anime
- Videos on depicting people defending themselves with guns
- Banking
- Videos on ghosts/poltergeists
- Uber
- Gmail

Cruz’s search history included the following phrases:

- “little teen porn (porn)”
- “how to use a compass”
- “therapist for homicidal”
- “best ar-15 sights“
- “how to get into a relationship“
- “how to get a girlfriend“
- “how not to be afraid of the girl you like“
- “reckloose (recluse)“
- “grand theft“
- “water tube“
February 09, 2018 9:16 am

Screenshot for an Ask the Therapist article on psychcentral.com entitled Homicidal Thoughts and Urges.

February 09, 2018 2:14 pm

Cruz made a video depicting a dead iguana with its organs lying on the ground next to it. Cruz lifted the iguana by its tail and dangled it around. In the video he said, “Killed iguana. 2018. Fucker. I ripped out his organs. Think it’s dead.”
February 10 – February 11, 2018

Cruz visited websites of the following nature:

- Pornography
- Banking
- Japanese anime
- Wikipedia: School Shooting
- Wikipedia: Marshal County High School Shooting (KY)
- Wikipedia: Red Lake Senior High School (MN)
- Videos made by Virginia Tech shooter
- Columbine documentaries
- AK-47 Combat Tribute Music Video
- Columbine dramas
- Virginia Tech shooting documentaries
- Philippine Special Forces fighting ISIS
- Police shooting videos
- Documentary on school shooting simulator

Cruz’s search history included the following phrases:

- “hot middle school girl in dress”
- “porn uniform”
- “womens viagra for sale”
- “school shooters”
- “ar-15”
- “dollar tree parkland, fl”
- “virginia tech massacre”
- “columbine diary”
- “ar-15 close quarter combat”
- “real combat footage”
- “school shooter footage”
February 11, 2018 1:47 pm  
Cruz made a video depicting the ground, his shoe and a portion of a bike tire. In the video he appeared to be speaking to himself as he said, “Today is the day. The day that it all begins. The day of my massacre shall begin. All the kids in school will run in fear and hide. From the wrath of my power they will know who I am. I am nothing. I am no one. My life is nothing and meaningless. Everything that I hold dear I let go beyond your half. Every day I see the world ending another day. I live a lone life, live in seclusion and solitude. I hate everyone and everything. With the power of my AR you will all know who I am. I had enough of being told what to do and when to do. I had enough of people telling me that I’m an idiot and a dumbass. When in real life you’re all the dumbass. You’re all stupid and brainwashed by these fucking political government programs. You will all see, you will all know who my name is. My love for you (name redacted) will never go away. I hope to see you in the afterlife. One day or another you will end and you will all die.”

February 11, 2018 1:55 pm  
Cruz made a video with the camera pointed at his face. In the video he said: “Hello. My name is Nick and I’m going to be the next school shooter of 2018. My goal is at least 20 people. With an AR-15 and a couple tracer rounds I think I could get it done. Location is Stoneman Douglas in Parkland, Florida. It’s going to be a big event. And when you see me on the news, you’ll all know who I am. (Laughter) You’re all going to die. (Cruz then mimicked the sounds of gunshots).”

February 12 – February 13, 2018  
Cruz visited websites of the following nature:

- Scenes from shooting video games with
“Pumped Up Kicks” playing
- Columbine documentaries
- Active shooter training video by Columbus Police Department
- Russian army recruiting videos
- Pro-Ukranian army campaign video
- Japanese anime
- “I put Spongebob Music Over a School Shooting”
- Columbine/Pumped Up Kicks
- Gun range videos
- Videos of dogs catching/killing rabbits
- Videos about YouTubers turned killers
- Russian dance/music videos
- Norwegian military recruitment video
- Scenes from movies Platoon, Lord of War, and Falling Down
- Scenes from Russian science-fiction action movie
- Videos about human prosthetics incorporating robotics
- Videos of Airsoft guns
- Trailers for violent video games
- Cop confrontation videos
- “Kill Everybody” by Skrillex – Song

Cruz's search history included the following phrases:
- when a girl says ok
- school shooters
- pistol grip shotgun
CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY OF CRUZ’S LIFE AND CONTACTS PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 14, 2018

- can I buy a pistol grip shotgun in Florida
- How long does it take for a cop to show up at a school shooting.
- pekka shooting (Finland)
- i wanna die
- good songs to play while killing people
- school shooting mv

February 12, 2018
7:15 pm
Screenshot of an online forum on shootersnetwork.com specific to pistol grip shotguns.

February 13, 2018
9:56 pm
Cruz visited a site to play "Kill Everybody" by Skrillex. An excerpt of those lyrics:
*I want to kill everybody in the world!*
*L O V E L O V E, oh..*
*I want to eat your heart!*
*I want to kill!*
*I want to kill!*
*I want to kill!*
*I want to kill!*

February 13, 2018
10:01 pm
Cruz visited a video on YouTube entitled, “School Shooter Hype Music Video.” This video took footage from a show, Zero Hour: Massacre at Columbine High, which reenacted the Columbine High School shooting. However, the song “Pumped Up Kicks” replaced the audio so that it glamorized the school shooting. An excerpt of the lyrics for that song:
*All the other kids with the pumped up kicks*
*You better run, better run, faster than my bullet*
*All the other kids with the pumped up kicks*
*You better run, better run, outrun my gun*
**CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY OF CRUZ’S LIFE AND CONTACTS PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 14, 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 13, 2018 10:06 pm</td>
<td>Cruz searched Google: “marjory Stoneman douglas high school.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 13, 2018 10:11 pm</td>
<td>Cruz visited a video on YouTube which was the music video for the song “Exception” by Token. The video and lyrics portray the story of a student named Andy. Andy was repeatedly bullied at school. The day after he was beat up by the bullies, Andy returned and shot the bullies as well as a student who did not stick up for him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 14, 2018</td>
<td>Internet activity began at 6:59 a.m. and included the following:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Moskau (Moscow) by Dschinghis Khan (song)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Video clip from Wolfenstein video game, KKK and Nazi themes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Japanese anime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Various YouTube shows and video compilations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Pornography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Knife Game song</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Google search: “parkland fl” and “parkland fl dollar tree”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Google search: “school shooter”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- “Pumped Up Kicks” by Foster the People (song)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Until Cruz left the Snead residence, sometime around 2:09 pm, all communications on his cell phone were with an ex-girlfriend and his friend, James “JT” Snead, with whom he was living. Cell phone records revealed all communications originated from a cell tower which serviced the area around the Snead residence on the northern edge of Parkland.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:17:11 am</td>
<td>Cruz attempted a phone call to JT Snead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:17:39 am</td>
<td>Cruz engaged in a text conversation with JT Snead. Cruz asked JT if he could let the dogs outside. Cruz told JT that his boss called him and said he did not have to work that day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:19:29 am</td>
<td>Cruz made a 17 second call to the Dollar Tree, 5943 W. Hillsboro Blvd, Parkland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00 pm –</td>
<td>Cruz engaged in separate text conversations with JT Snead and Cruz’s ex-girlfriend. The ex-girlfriend was saved in Cruz’s phone under the name “Warning Love of Your Life.” Cruz made a single nine-second phone call to her. Cruz attempted to engage his ex-girlfriend in conversation but she told him to leave her alone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00 pm –</td>
<td>Cruz continued in text conversations with JT and his ex-girlfriend. Cruz’s only texts to his ex-girlfriend were “Hello” and “...it’s very important”; she did not reply during this hour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:00 pm –</td>
<td>He asked JT what time school ended, which class JT was in and who was JT’s teacher.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:00 pm –</td>
<td>Cruz exchanged six text messages with his ex-girlfriend. She chastised Cruz for texting her too much. He told her, “I love you...You will always know I love you”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2:08:04 – 2:10:02 pm

Cell phone activity during this timeframe was serviced by a tower east of the Snead residence and consistent with the path of travel to MSDHS.

Cruz exchanged 12 text messages with JT and his ex-girlfriend.

He told JT that he had to tell him something important soon.

Cruz told his ex-girlfriend, “Eat well, sleep well, and behave well my love”. She asked Cruz, “You know I have a boyfriend, right?” Cruz responded, “Doesn’t matter anymore…I love you”.

2:10:09 – 2:14:05 pm

Cell phone activity during this timeframe was serviced by a tower south of the Snead residence and consistent with the path of travel to MSDHS.

Cruz exchanged 23 text messages with JT and his ex-girlfriend.

He told JT he was going to a movie which angered JT because he got a girl to agree to come to their house, Cruz responded “too late now”.

Cruz continued to express admiration for his ex-girlfriend texting her, “Your the love of my life…you’re the greatest person I have ever meet”.

2:16:54 – 3:45:52 pm  Cell phone activity during this timeframe was serviced by a tower immediately southeast of MSDHS.

During this timeframe, at 2:19 pm, Cruz arrived at MSDHS. Cruz’s phone had 23 text messages and 10 missed calls when it was recovered, but most of this activity occurred after Cruz left his phone behind at the scene and was the result of inbound calls/texts.

Cruz sent two texts to his ex-girlfriend saying “I love you”. The last outgoing texts were to JT Snead; the meaning of these texts is not understood. At 2:18:46 Cruz sent “Yo”, and at 2:18:57 he sent “Tell”.

8.7 Cruz’s Gun Purchases

On September 30, 2016, Nikolas Cruz was issued a Florida identification card that he needed to purchase firearms. Cruz used a single firearm during the shooting, and it was the only firearm he had in his possession on February 14, 2018. The firearm was a Smith and Wesson, model MP-15 semi-automatic firearm. A sling and bi-pod were attached to the rifle. The firearm was lawfully purchased on February 11, 2017, at Sunrise Tactical Supply in Coral Springs, Florida. Eight 30- and 40-round capacity magazines were recovered from the scene.
Cruz purchased a total of seven firearms, listed below:

- **December 3, 2016:** Cruz purchased a 500A 12 gauge shotgun from Advanced Firearms in Margate, Florida.
- **February 11, 2017:** Nikolas Cruz purchased a Smith & Wesson M&P 15 rifle from Sunrise Tactical Supply in Coral Springs, Florida. This was the murder weapon used at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School.
- **May 8, 2017:** Nikolas Cruz purchased a Ruger ZZ rifle from Advanced Firearms in Margate, Florida.
- **October 20, 2017:** Nikolas Cruz purchased a Hi-Point 995TS rifle from Advanced Firearms in Margate, Florida.
- **December 9, 2017:** Nikolas Cruz purchased 2 Maverick Arms / Mossberg model 88 12 gauge shotguns from Dick's Sporting Goods in Boynton Beach, Florida.
- **January 19, 2018:** Nikolas Cruz purchased a Century Arms RAS47 rifle from Gun World of South Florida located in Deerfield Beach, Florida.

**Findings:**

1. The majority of Cruz’s contacts with BSO before the shooting did not involve criminal activity and most were initiated by Lynda Cruz because Nikolas and his brother were misbehaving or had run away. Most of BSO’s contact with Cruz and his family prior to the shooting did not appear at the time to warrant additional action other than what was taken in response to the call at the time.

2. At least 30 people had knowledge of Cruz’s troubling behavior before the shooting that they did not report or they had information that they reported but it was not acted on by people to whom they reported their concerns.
3. There are at least six people who stated that they brought concerns about Cruz and his behavior, including discussions about Cruz being a “school shooter” to MSDS Assistant Principal Jeff Morford. Morford denies every one of these reports or claims he does not recall the reports and/or discussions. Morford’s veracity in denying knowledge or recollection of these incidents is questionable.

4. The FBI failed to appropriately process and respond to the information it received regarding Cruz. The FBI has taken remedial measures to rectify the flaws in its processes and system that allowed the failure to occur.

5. The Broward County Sheriff’s Office failed to appropriately process and respond to the information it received regarding Cruz in November 2017, and it disciplined the deputy for not properly investigating the incident.

6. Cruz made several social media posts that raised concerns about his behavior. Like so many other situations, there were missed indicators of targeted violence by Cruz in these posts. Cruz had a widely known fascination with guns and the military and a history of animal abuse, which are all primary indicators of future violent behavior.

7. Whether at-school behavior, behavior at home or acts toward his mother (mostly unreported), there were several missed opportunities to engage Cruz in the judicial system through arrest for various offenses. The offenses were mostly minor but plentiful, and, by not arresting Cruz, the judicial system did not have an opportunity to identify and address his systemic and troubling behavior.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Broward County Public Schools should conduct an internal investigation regarding Assistant Principal Jeff Morford to determine whether information was known and/or reported to him regarding Cruz that he should have acted on, and if he had that knowledge whether he violated any District policies. BCPS should take appropriate action it deems necessary as a result of its investigation.
It is extremely important that people report concerning behavior that they see and hear, and, in order to do so, reporting platforms must be easily accessible and anonymous. FortifyFL was recently unveiled by the State and is an excellent opportunity for everyone to report concerning activity that will be immediately received by law enforcement.

Schools should be required to notify students of FortifyFL, promote its use by advertising the app on campus and in school publications and install the app on all student-issued computer devices. Education about and publication of reporting platforms must be continuous and ongoing by the schools. Future updates to the application should explore the possibility of two-way live dialogue functionality.

Every school district should implement a policy that requires its personnel to report all indicators of suspicious student behavior to an administrator. The administrator should be required to document the report and his/her disposition of the information (e.g. referred to threat assessment team, unsubstantiated). The policy should require that the disposition of all threats of school violence be reviewed at least by the school's principal—if not by a higher authority—and reported to the threat assessments team, which has mandatory law enforcement participation.
CHAPTER 9. CRUZ’S SERVICES BY MENTAL HEALTH PROVIDERS

Nikolas Cruz was identified as having behavioral health issues as early as three years old; however, Cruz was never diagnosed with a serious mental illness. Cruz received school-based services from the time of enrollment and first began receiving outside mental and behavioral health care by at least the age of 11. He received both public and private mental health services from a variety of individuals and organizations as set forth below. (Specific information regarding Cruz’s treatment by mental health providers is confidential by law, and summaries of that treatment are included in Appendix F provided to readers with authorized access to that information).

9.1 Cruz’s Services by Mental Health Providers

Much of the information surrounding Cruz’s mental health and educational treatment is confidential under Florida and federal law. The chronology in Appendix F contains detailed treatment information and is available to readers with authorized access.

Cruz’s Treatment and/or services by Other Providers.

Based on Commission interviews, it was determined that Cruz received extensive mental health treatment and school-based treatment from multiple providers, including Henderson Behavioral Health (HBH).

Henderson Behavioral Health, also referred to as HBH or Henderson, was established in 1953. It provides mental health services in Broward County, Florida. It also provides services to other Florida counties. Over a nine-year period, Cruz regularly received therapy sessions—amounting to hundreds of total hours of therapy—from Henderson Behavioral Health.

Moreover, Cruz also received additional education-based treatments and additional behavioral care from multiple providers for many years, including Exceptional Student Education (ESE) services from Broward County Public Schools. To the knowledge of the Commission, Cruz did not receive any treatment in the months immediately preceding the February 14, 2018, shooting.
Findings:

1. Cruz had several different public and private mental health providers. There was some care coordination, but no master case management. No single health professional or entity had the entire “story” regarding Cruz’s mental health and family issues, due, in part, to an absence of communication between providers and a lack of disclosure by the Cruz family.

2. Cruz received extensive mental and behavioral health services until he turned 18 and decided himself to stop treatment.

3. Because of his decision to stop treatment, Cruz was not under the care of any mental health provider at the time of the shooting. Cruz’s last contact with HBH was more than one year before the shooting.

9.2 Baker Act

The Florida law allowing individuals to be taken into custody for a mental health evaluation went into effect in 1972 and is referred to as the Baker Act. The law was enacted to encourage voluntary mental health care instead of involuntary commitments to long-term psychiatric facilities. Prior to the Baker Act, a person as young as 12 years of age could be placed for an indefinite period in a state hospital with no substantial due process.

The only time Cruz was ever evaluated for a Baker Act was on September 28, 2016, for reportedly threatening self-harm.

The Baker Act evaluation process begins when an individual that meets specific criteria refuses voluntary examination. In order for a person to be taken to a receiving facility for an examination, they must meet three criteria:

1. There has to be a reason to believe that the person has a diagnosable mental illness, meaning they have to be diagnosed, or thought to be diagnosed, with something like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder or major depression. (Being under the influence of drugs or being considered developmentally disabled are not causes for involuntary examination or placement.)
2. They individual refuses voluntary examination, or, because of situational circumstances, the referring authority is unable to determine whether an examination is necessary.

3. Without care, the person is likely to suffer from neglect resulting in a real and present threat of substantial harm that can’t be avoided through the help of others, or there is a substantial likelihood that without care or treatment the person will cause bodily harm to self or others in the near future, as evidenced by their recent behavior.

An involuntary examination can be initiated by one of three ways:

1. A circuit court judge can enter an ex parte order based upon sworn testimony that directs a police officer to pick up the individual and take them to a Baker Act facility.

2. A sworn law enforcement officer has the authority to involuntarily initiate Baker Act proceedings by examination based upon what they observe.

3. A physician, clinical psychologist, psychiatric nurse or a clinical social worker (as defined by statute) may execute a professional certificate stating that they have examined an individual in the previous 48 hours, and they believe the individual meets the criteria for an examination.

According to records kept by the Baker Act Reporting Center, in 2017 approximately 199,000 individuals were referred for evaluations under the Baker Act. Approximately 50% of the referrals were initiated by law enforcement; approximately 2% were initiated by the courts; and the remainder were initiated by medical professionals designated under law. About 60% of cases were based on harm alone (56% harm to self; 21% harm to self and others; 5.5% harm to others); about 25% based on harm and self-neglect; and about 10% based on self-neglect alone.
A Baker Act referral is for a maximum period of 72 hours. Prior to the end of the 72-hour period, an initial evaluation must have been completed. Depending on the results of that evaluation:

1. The person must be released because they do not meet specified criteria, unless they have been charged with a crime.
2. The person gives expressed and informed consent to undergo voluntary treatment on an inpatient or an outpatient basis.
3. A petition for involuntary placement is filed with the circuit court by the administrator of the designated long-term mental health facility.

The vast majority of individuals are either released, or they agree to voluntary treatment. In 2017, only 1,787 people were in a state civil psychiatric hospital. Less than one percent of those that went in for an involuntary examination in Florida were adjudicated mentally incompetent (a judge determined they should be involuntarily committed to a state hospital).

The Baker Act is primarily used for evaluation and the absolute majority of people evaluated are released from the Baker Act facility to pursue follow-up care on their own. The common notion that a Baker Act results in mental health treatment or long-term care is wrong. In most cases people are evaluated at the Baker Act facility (functioning as a crisis stabilization unit) and released well before the maximum 72-hour evaluation period.

**Firearms and the Baker Act**

Baker Act referral for evaluation is not a disqualifying criteria for possession, purchase or ownership of a firearm. If you have been adjudicated incapacitated by the court (deemed incapable of taking care of oneself and in need of a guardian), you can still buy or possess a firearm in Florida. The mental health prohibition against owning, possessing or purchasing guns only applies to people who have been adjudicated mentally incompetent by a judge, which, again, is less than one percent of the people who are Baker Acted. A Baker Act for
evaluation is not adjudication by a judge, even if the Baker Act evaluation is court-ordered. It is a prevalent misconception that a Baker Act disqualifies someone from gun purchase, possession or ownership rights.

Law enforcement may temporarily seize firearms from a person they Baker Act when there is proof of threatened harm against someone else. If the threatened harm is only self-harm, there is no authority to seize the person’s guns in conjunction with the Baker Act.

Senate Bill 7026 provided the ability for law enforcement officers to seek Risk Protection Orders. Law enforcement may seek a Risk Protection Order from a judge that requires a person who threatens self-harm or harm against another to surrender their firearms for up to one year if certain criteria are met.

Findings:

1. There is no evidence that a Baker Act evaluation was not performed on Cruz, when warranted. There is also no evidence that the Baker Act evaluation conducted on September 28, 2016, reached an improper determination that Cruz did not meet the criteria that day for an involuntary examination.

2. If Cruz had an involuntary examination under the Baker Act it would not have disqualified him from gun purchase, possession or ownership rights under then-existing law or current law.

3. While a Baker Act evaluation does not result in gun purchase, possession or ownership disqualification, the MSDHSPS Act does provide a mechanism for law enforcement to obtain a court order preventing some individuals from gun purchase, possession and ownership.
RECOMMENDATIONS:

The issues surrounding mental health care are complex. The Commission will address this area further and provide additional recommendations beyond those detailed below to the legislature by January 15, 2020.

Mandatory Duty to Warn

The legislature should amend Section 394.4615 of the Florida Statutes and require that mental health providers release pertinent clinical information related to the threat and require that they warn others of threatened harm by a patient. Currently, the duty to warn is permissive, and warning is not required. The law should require that the provider notify law enforcement and that law enforcement warn the person threatened as necessary to protect their safety.

School-Based Services

- School districts should be required to establish agreements with Community Behavioral Health Providers to provide in-school mental health services in order to increase system collaboration, to improve clinical/behavioral information sharing, and to ensure availability and continuation of mental health care for youth and families when school is not in session.

- To the extent permitted by law, including exceptions that generally prohibit the release of protected health information, private providers should share information with school-based providers and coordinate care.

- The sharing of information should be mandated when there is a threat of harm to school personnel and/or students.

- Schools should be required, as permitted, to share student mental health information with community-based providers.
CHAPTER 9. CRUZ’S SERVICES BY MENTAL HEALTH PROVIDERS

School Mental Health Records

- School mental health and counseling records should be included in each student’s school record, and that record should accompany the student to each school they attend within the district, as well as follow the student if they switch districts.
- Based on the current laws and rules in place, rulemaking from the Department of Health (DOH) and/or legislative action would likely be required to mandate that mental health records travel with the student. Additionally, there is an ongoing legal workgroup related to Senate Bill 7026, which is researching, among other items, the legal capabilities of the data sharing required by Senate Bill 7026; it may be beneficial to collaborate with the workgroup and DOH on this issue.

Screening and Referral for Services

- The legislature should require by statute that any student referred for developmental delay and/or behavioral issue testing and screening be tested within 45 days of the referral, and that the student be provided a referral for resources and/or services within 30 days of the testing/screening if needed.

Case Management

- Consider targeted case management for children and young adults (ages 13 – 25) who are high utilizers of mental health services, who are receiving school- and community-based mental health services and/or who have been identified as a potential threat in the school environment to improve information sharing and ensure coordination of services.
- Use a blended funding approach to SEDNET using school- and community-based behavioral health funding sources to facilitate cost sharing and improve information sharing and care coordination of school- and community-based intervention services.
10.1 Broward County School Discipline System

There are a number of state laws regarding school discipline, including Section 1006.07, Florida Statutes (setting forth school district duties related to student discipline), Section 1006.13, Florida Statutes (addressing zero tolerance policies), and the Every Student Succeeds Act as set forth in the Florida Administrative Code).

Broward County School uses a Discipline Matrix\(^\text{7}\) across the district to assign punishment for school discipline issues. The District defines the Discipline Matrix as a tool for administrators to respond appropriately when students have committed serious violations under the Code of Student Conduct. The Matrix is designed to offer consistency at all levels across the District so that students are disciplined fairly from school to school when their behavior requires punishment beyond the classroom. There are two different versions of the Matrix: one to assign consequences to elementary students (grades K-5) and one to assign consequences to secondary students (grades 6-12).

Broward County Schools maintains two systems that track student conduct; one is an incident system, and the other is a disciplinary referral system. BCPS documented nearly 70 incidents involving Cruz in its incident computer system. BCPS’s disciplinary referral system (DMS) contained nearly 55 school incidents involving Cruz.

Much of the school information regarding Cruz's discipline and the documented incidents are confidential under Florida and federal law because it is part of Cruz’s “student record.” The chronology in Appendix F contains detailed information regarding incidents and discipline and is available to readers with authorized access.

10.2 Overview of Florida Juvenile Diversion

Juvenile diversion is an intervention strategy that attempts to prevent children from entering the formal juvenile justice system while still holding them accountable for their actions. The primary goal of diversion programs is to reduce recidivism or the occurrence

\(^{7}\) https://www.browardschools.com/discipline-matrix
of problem behaviors without having to formally utilize the justice system. The pre-arrest diversion concept is based on the idea that while young people may commit minor crimes for which they need consequences, arrests for incidents are usually unnecessary and may be a barrier to future success. Diversion programs are also designed to be less costly than formal court proceedings by reducing the burden on the court system.

There are various types of juvenile diversion programs across Florida. Program type and availability varies by court district. Broward County, which is located within the 17th Judicial Circuit, has a number of alternatives to formal processing of cases involving juveniles. Some involve direct referral to diversion, while others involve collaborative programs or services, such as the civil citation process or the PROMISE program.

10.3 PROMISE Program

The PROMISE (Preventing Recidivism through Opportunities, Mentoring, Interventions, Support & Education) program was designed to address and reduce school based arrests for minor offenses. It was jointly developed in 2013 by a group called “Eliminating the School House to Jail House Pipeline”, which included representatives from the Broward County School Board, school administrators, law enforcement, the Public Defender’s office, the NAACP and the Southern Poverty Law Center. The following non-violent, misdemeanor offenses qualify as PROMISE-eligible events:

1. Alcohol – Possession / Use / Under the Influence
2. Alcohol Sale / Attempted Sale / Transmittal
3. Assault / Threat (no harm or injury)
4. Bullying
5. Disruption on Campus (Major)
6. Drug – Use / Possession / Under the Influence
7. Drug Paraphernalia - Possession
8. False Accusation Against School Staff
9. Fighting – Mutual Combat
10. Harassment

11. Theft – Petty <$300

12. Trespassing

13. Vandalism/Damage to Property <$1,000

Depending on the offense, students are assigned to PROMISE for three to 10 days, as determined by Discipline Matrix. Students participating in PROMISE are assigned to the Pine Ridge Educational Center where they receive on-site intervention services, which include counseling, coping skills, conflict resolution and pro-social behaviors. Upon successful completion, a transition plan is developed and shared with school staff. District staff provides follow-up support to the school to assist with proper implementation of the plan. In order to avoid external suspension and/or referral to the juvenile justice system, the student must fully and successfully complete all assigned activities and all requirements of the PROMISE program. Students can be referred to PROMISE up to three times each school year.

Cruz's school records indicate that, on November 25, 2013, while Cruz was 15 years old and an 8th grade student at Westglades Middle School, he damaged a sink faucet in a school bathroom. Records also indicate that a parent-teacher conference was scheduled and that Cruz was considered to be PROMISE Program-eligible. On November 26, school records indicate Cruz was assigned to the PROMISE Program for three days—on November 26 and December 1 and 2, 2013. Records are inconsistent and inconclusive as to whether Cruz actually attended the PROMISE program. Beginning in 2014, Broward County Schools began capturing PROMISE attendance in the general school attendance database called TERMS. The database used in 2013 did not communicate with the TERMS school attendance database and records indicate Cruz's presence at both Westglades and PROMISE on November 26. TERMS shows Cruz absent at Westglades on December 2, 2013 and PROMISE records also show Cruz absent at PROMISE the same day. There is also a note from a Westglades counselor who confirmed that Cruz was absent from Westglades on
December 2, 2013. It is unknown whether Cruz actually participated in the PROMISE Program as assigned.

**Findings:**

1. Cruz’s actions for which he was referred to PROMISE would have constituted a misdemeanor charge of vandalism or damage to property under $1000, or criminal mischief, as it is formally known under Florida law. Under PROMISE criteria, when a student commits a first-time misdemeanor vandalism, the school administrator is not required to consult with law enforcement. However, a second or subsequent vandalism incident mandates consultation with law enforcement.

2. If Cruz had been referred to the juvenile justice system for not completing PROMISE, it is probable that he would have been referred to a Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) diversion program for first-time misdemeanor offenders. Alternatively, if Cruz had been arrested on November 25, 2013 for vandalism; he would have been transported to a juvenile booking center and immediately released to his mother, because Florida law would not have allowed DJJ to detain Cruz for this offence. If the case had then been prosecuted by the state attorney’s office, and he was adjudicated guilty, he would have likely received community service or a comparable sanction for this first-time misdemeanor offense. Adjudication of guilt to a misdemeanor vandalism charge would have had no legal relevance on any subsequent contact Cruz had with law enforcement, and it would not have impacted Cruz’s legal right to buy, own or possess a firearm.

3. The PROMISE program is largely consistent with Florida’s civil citation criteria, which applies to youth who commit misdemeanor acts outside of school. A significant deviation is the “offense reset” every school year. Additionally, PROMISE data and a student’s participation are not integrated with the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) Prevention Web tracking of civil citation juvenile pre-arrest diversion. Therefore, in Broward County, a juvenile could have multiple in-school PROMISE diversions and multiple out-of-school civil citation diversions, without either system being aware of the multiple diversions.
4. Under state law in effect prior to July 1, 2018, the state’s civil citation pre-arrest diversion program allowed juveniles to participate in pre-arrest diversion up to three times. Current law allows the number of pre-arrest diversions to be set by the stakeholders in each of Florida’s 20 judicial circuits.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

All juvenile pre-arrest diversion programs, to include all school-based diversion programs that address criminal conduct, must be part of and operated consistently with the pre-arrest diversion program criteria established by the state attorney and other stakeholders in each judicial circuit. Any school-based diversion program must be defined in school policy and approved by the district school board.

Criteria:

While each circuit has authority to establish criteria for diversion programs, circuits should consult with each other in an effort to create as much consistency statewide as possible. Program criteria, at minimum, should include:

- Establishment of an assessment protocol and referral process.
- Requirements for follow-up and notification of noncompliance to the state attorney’s office.
- Limitation on the maximum number of referrals for eligibility to participate in a pre-arrest diversion program.
- Requirement for diversion program referrals to be cumulative and eliminate a “reset” each school year for offenses counted for diversion programs.
- Requirement that all pre-arrest diversion programs report data to DJJ in Prevention Web* or another common database in an effort to eliminate information silos. (*Legislative appropriation will be required to modify DJJ’s Juvenile Justice Information System to accept additional data).
- Specify that nothing in the criteria shall limit a law enforcement officer from making an arrest or interfere with a law enforcement officer’s authority to enforce the law. Law enforcement shall retain discretion to decide if an arrest should be made.
Behavioral threat assessments are one of the most important opportunities to provide a safer school environment and head off concerning behavior before it manifests into actual harm.

The object of the threat assessment process is to use a behavior-based approach to identify concerning behavior, assess it and act on it as early as possible. The most important concept to understand about behavioral threat assessments is that identifying concerning behavior, not necessarily an actual threat, is what should initiate the threat assessment process—the behaviors are usually present before the threats or actual harm occurs. It is not possible to “predict” the next active assailant, but we can make better use of behavioral indicators to intervene. This was certainly true in the case of Nikolas Cruz.

Because it is important to initiate the threat assessment process when concerning behavior manifests, those in a position to observe and act on the behavior must be trained in behavioral indicators, and each school must have a robust Threat Assessment Team (TAT). Current law resulting from Senate Bill 7026 requires TATs at every Florida school; however, they are not fully developed, and there is a need for consistency, training and overall improvement in the threat assessment process.

The threat assessment process and TAT’s role is to assess and identify the threat, not provide treatment for the underlying behavioral issues. Therefore, adequate services and consequences must be available to address verified TAT findings.

Currently, there is not a standard threat assessment process in Florida, and there is no automated threat assessment system known to the Commission. The current threat assessment process in Florida is school- or district- specific and there is little to no information sharing as a result of the threat assessment process. There are existing threat assessment models established by the United States Secret Service, the State of Virginia and others that Florida can look to as we implement and improve our K-12 threat assessment process.

Broward County Public Schools (BCPS) has a mandated set of procedures for violence prevention and threat assessment. Initiated in 2002, the district’s approach to violence
prevention and threat assessment contains three components. The first two components are learning to recognize warning signs to help prevent violence in the schools before they escalate and training adults in the schools to receive information and take reports from students about potentially threatening situations. The third component of the district’s procedures comprises the three-stage Threat Assessment process: (1) Initial Response, (2) Level 1 Screening and (3) Level 2 In-Depth Assessment.

The BCPS threat assessment process is formal and, when completed, contains many forms and other writings that become part of the student record. The student record is, of course, covered by FERPA and is confidential. In this chapter we will discuss the BCPS threat assessment process and generally discuss non-confidential aspects of the process related to Cruz. A full discussion, including the confidential material is set forth in Appendix G of this report and available to those who are authorized to view the confidential material.

The Commission received a presentation at its July 2018 meeting on the BCPS threat assessment process from Dr. Mary Claire Mucenic, the District’s Director of Exceptional Education Learning Support. Dr. Mucenic oversees the threat assessment process for BCPS. Detailed information about the BCPS threat assessment process is available by viewing Dr. Mucenic’s presentation to the Commission and her PowerPoint presentation that is available through the agenda link on the Commission’s website.

In sum, BCPS’s threat assessment process is school-based and not operationally overseen at the district level. School administrators initiate the threat assessment process and assign a TAT for each incident. School personnel receive training before they may sit on a TAT. The positions, but not specific people, are established for each TAT. The positions include a school administrator, teacher, counselor, mental health professional and law enforcement officer. The individual people are assigned to each TAT based on their knowledge of the student and the situation under review. Once completed, the threat assessment packet remains at the school as part of the student’s record. The BCPS threat assessment process and paperwork is not automated, and the forms are all on paper. The District averages two
threat assessments per day and, as of July 2018, had completed approximately 390 behavioral threat assessments for the 2018 calendar year.

At the July 2018 meeting, the Commission received a presentation from BCPS on its threat assessment process. The Exceptional Student Learning Support department oversees the threat assessment training process for BCPS. Detailed information about the BCPS threat assessment training process is available by viewing this presentation to the Commission that is available through the agenda link on the Commission’s website.

The Broward County Public School System initiated one threat assessment process involving Cruz on September 28, 2016. The assembled (TAT) included Assistant Principal Denise Reed, Assistant Principal Jeff Morford, a teacher, a mental health professional and a law enforcement officer—Deputy Scot Peterson. Assistant Principal Reed initiated the paperwork to start the threat assessment process because Assistant Principal Morford was not familiar with the threat assessment process. Cruz fell under Morford’s responsibility, but, because of Morford’s unfamiliarity with the process, Reed assisted in starting the process and conducting the initial interview of Cruz. After the TAT was assembled, Morford was responsible for the threat assessment process, not Reed. The initial threat assessment of Cruz was a Level 1 assessment.

Based on Commission interviews with MSD personnel, Cruz was provided specific directions regarding Cruz’s daily school activities, including prohibiting Cruz from bringing a backpack to school. All threat assessment team members signed Cruz’s threat assessment plan. For authorized consumers, see Appendix G for specific information regarding the threat assessment.

At some point, the Level 1 assessment transitioned into a Level 2 assessment. However, no one interviewed by the Commission knows how or why the Level 2 was initiated, but there is evidence that it happened based on forms in the file.
It is unknown if the Henderson Behavioral Health team or BSO had access to the specific information in the MSDHS threat assessment file, including text messages or the Level 2 Teacher Information Forms.

Interviews and evidence suggest the Level 1 threat assessment was closed September 28, 2016, and the Level 2 threat assessment commenced shortly thereafter. It appears Morford unilaterally initiated the Level 2 process, but, as set forth below based on Morford’s own statements, he was not competent in conducting threat assessments or administering the TAT. After a scheduled meeting with Cruz to discuss his school status and options for services, Cruz received misinformation regarding his options. Based on interviews with multiple witnesses, Cruz became upset with the options presented to him. It appears, however, that Cruz decided that he needed to disengage from services and remain at MSDHS based on the misinformation he received. Subsequent to Cruz’s decision to remain at MSDHS, Morford closed the Level 2 threat assessment.

In her interview, Assistant Principal Reed stated that she helped Morford initiate the threat assessment process involving Cruz because he was unfamiliar with the process or how to even find the forms. According to Reed, “Jeff is old school. He only did operations. He never did any discipline at where he was at his previous location and so Jeff said I don’t even know where to find a threat assessment.” Reed conducted the threat assessment interview of Cruz despite Cruz not falling under her supervision because she said to Morford, ”Jeff, you’ll be so nasty, let me sit and interview him because you won’t get anything out of him.” According to Morford, he has only participated in one threat assessment during his 31 years as a teacher and administrator, and that was the threat assessment of Cruz in September 2016. Despite this being the only threat assessment that he has participated in during his 31-year career, it occurring in 2016, and it involving someone now known to him to be a mass shooter, Morford claims he has no recollection of the threat assessment process and can offer no explanation how it was handled. Morford also has no explanation how the Level 1 assessment became a Level 2 assessment.
Interviews reveal that the TAT packet for Cruz was never reviewed beyond Morford and was not reviewed at the district level. MSDHS Principal Ty Thompson stated that he does not review TAT results. When asked if he expects his administrators to inform him if “someone threatens to shoot up the school,” Thompson replied, “Usually it’s not. Very rarely does that come up. Threat assessments don’t always—it’s not part of the protocol to bring it to me.” Thompson further stated, “To be honest with you, no, I’m not made aware of all threat assessments that come in.” Thompson could only guess at the number of threat assessments initiated at MSDHS annually and really had no idea of the process.

Findings:

1. The 2016 threat assessment of Cruz was mishandled by Assistant Principal Jeff Morford. Morford was not familiar with the threat assessment process and he was incompetent in leading the TAT. Further, Morford’s statement that he does not recall the Cruz threat assessment in 2016 and cannot answer detailed questions about what occurred is not credible.

2. MSDHS Principal Ty Thompson was disengaged from the threat assessment process at MSDHS, and he failed to establish reporting procedures that would ensure he was knowledgeable about threats on campus.

3. The BCPS threat assessment instrument is comprehensive and has the necessary components, but its implementation is flawed, at least at MSDHS. School administrators lack adequate training on and knowledge of the threat assessment process and how to conduct effective behavioral threat assessments.

4. The BCPS threat assessment process is a purely reactive, decentralized, school-based process, which is focused around behavioral threat assessment teams at each school that have little to no oversight or accountability.

Recommendations:

The BCPS should investigate Morford’s conduct surrounding the Cruz threat assessment process and take whatever action it deems appropriate based on its investigation. If Morford’s conduct is found to have not violated policy, the policy should be modified.
District should also investigate whether Principal Ty Thompson’s disengagement from the threat assessment process and failure to ensure he was knowledgeable about threats on campus violated District policy.

BCPS should immediately evaluate the implementation of its threat assessment process and training and determine if there is a districtwide problem with how threat assessments are conducted or whether the problem is isolated to MSDHS. Immediate remedial action is necessary. The BCPS threat assessment process is reactive; it needs to be proactive so that the TATs obtain information about concerning behavior before they manifest into actual threats. The TATs should seek out information and not merely wait for reports from staff or students. This applies to TATs across all Florida schools.

The guiding principle for the threat assessment process should be behavior, not an actual threat. The traditional reactive threat assessment process is one that focuses more on actual threats as opposed to identifying concerning behaviors and intervening early. The most successful threat assessment process is proactive and often requires tying together disparate behaviors so they may be evaluated in the aggregate, viewed holistically and acted upon at the earliest possible time.

The TATs should have dedicated positions/members. Rotating TAT members does not allow for consistency, and personnel do not gain the necessary experience when rotated on and off the TATs. However, temporary members should be used to supplement the team, if needed, to provide specific information or knowledge.

There should be District oversight of the TAT process and District-level review of all Level 2 assessments. Principals should be required to be informed of every threat assessment, and the principal should approve the disposition of every assessment.

The Florida DOE should develop a standardized, statewide behavioral threat assessment instrument and create a statewide threat assessment database that is accessible to all districts and appropriate stakeholders. Florida should consider the model used by the State of Virginia, which is widely recognized as the leader in school-based behavioral threat assessment.
The legislature should pass a bill requiring this process be implemented by FDOE by a certain date. FDOE should be provided oversight authority for the threat assessment process.

All TATs should be comprised of specific (static) members, with at-large positions in each case for school personnel with personal knowledge of the child. TATs should be required to meet at least monthly and be proactive, not just reactive. The TATs should receive regular training on threat assessments.

TATs should be required to convene within 24 hours of receiving a referral when school is in session. If school is not in session, the TAT must refer the matter to law enforcement for evaluation, and the TAT must meet no later than the end of the first day school is back in session to consider the matter and ensure it is resolved.

All school personnel should receive mandated training on behavior indicators that should be referred to the TAT for assessment. Reporting observed behaviors to the TAT should be mandatory. There should be sanctions for non-reporting.

There must be adequate resources to which the TAT can refer a child—the TAT is a problem identifier and not a problem solver.
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Nikolas Cruz was a member of Exceptional Student Education (ESE) from approximately age 3. Cruz had an Individual Education Plan (IEP) that outlined his student goals and also provided him with counseling services provided by the school board.

12.1 Requirement of Free and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)

The federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), a part of Public Law 9412 reauthorized in 2004 and similar state statues and rules set requirements for the education of students with disabilities. The primary purpose of IDEA is to ensure that students with disabilities are provided a free and appropriate public education (FAPE). The IDEA requires that the resultant FAPE is provided within the least restrictive environment (LRE). IDEA sets out requirements, and it sets out procedures that must be followed to ensure the requirements are met.

The Florida Department of Education is responsible for ensuring that the requirements of IDEA are carried out and that each educational program for children with disabilities administered in the state meets the educational requirements of the state (section 300.600(b)(1) and (2) of Title 34, Code of Federal Regulations).

In Florida, children with disabilities who need specially designed instruction and related services are called exceptional students. The special help they are given at school is called exceptional student education (ESE). The purpose of ESE is to help each child with a disability progress in school and prepare for life after school. ESE services include specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of the child. ESE services may also include technology devices, therapy, special transportation or other supports. There is no charge for ESE services. A team of people makes decisions about the child’s needs and ESE services. The child’s parents are part of this team.

Section 1003.57(1)(b)4., Florida Statutes, requires that district school boards submit to the Florida Department of Education (FDOE) proposed procedures for the provision of special instruction and services for exceptional students once every three years. Approval of this document by FDOE is required by Rule 6A-6.03411, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.), as

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a prerequisite for district’s use of weighted cost factors under the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP). This document also serves as the basis for the identification, evaluation, eligibility determination and placement of students to receive exceptional education services, and is a component of the district’s application for funds available under the IDEA.

12.2 ESE/IEP

The main steps in the ESE decision-making process are referral, individual evaluation and eligibility determination. A referral is a request for a formal review of all the information available about the child’s learning needs, strengths, problems and interests. A team of people, including the parent(s), reviews the information. The team uses a problem-solving process during the review in order to find out what type of instruction works best for the child. The team will decide whether additional evaluation is needed to determine if the child is eligible for ESE services.

An evaluation includes all the procedures used to gather information about the child. These procedures may include interventions, interviews, observations, and, sometimes, individual tests that are given by a specialist, such as a school psychologist. The team, including the parent(s), makes decisions about which particular evaluation procedures will be used. The parent(s) must sign a consent form before the evaluation process can begin.

Following the evaluation, the school holds a meeting called an eligibility staffing. The parent(s) and the rest of the team discuss the information collected about the child. Then the team determines whether the child is eligible for ESE services. To receive ESE services, the child must meet the criteria listed in Florida’s State Board of Education Rules.

If the child is eligible for ESE services, the next step is to hold a meeting to write an individual educational plan (IEP). The child’s parents are invited to this meeting because they are part of the IEP team. The IEP team decides which special services and supports the child needs in order to make progress and achieve his or her annual goals. The IEP team also decides where the child will receive services. Most children with disabilities spend the majority of their school day in general education classrooms. Some children leave the
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general education classroom for part of the day to receive services in an ESE classroom. A few children spend all day in a special classroom or in a special school.

A child cannot receive ESE services for the first time until the IEP is written and a parent has given written consent. The IEP team decides how a child’s progress will be measured and reported. At least once every 12 months, the IEP team meets to talk about the child’s progress and to develop a new IEP. However, because a child’s needs may change at any time, the IEP may also be revised at other times. The IEP team generally makes changes to the IEP at an IEP team meeting. However, sometimes the parent(s) and the school district may agree that the IEP can be changed without a meeting. Whenever changes are made to the IEP, the changes agreed to are documented in writing. Parents may request a copy of the revised IEP.

Findings:

The Broward County School District engaged the Collaborative Educational Network, Inc. (CEN) to conduct a review of the ESE program activities related to Nikolas Cruz. CEN is a subject matter expert in this area. A redacted version of the report was made public, but some information related specifically to Cruz remains confidential. The CEN report concluded that the district mostly adhered to procedural and substantive requirements when implementing Cruz’s exceptional education program.

However, where the District failed was when it provided Cruz erroneous information concerning his options for services at MSDHS. The onus was on the District to seek a court determination if it wanted to force Cruz to attend an alternate school.

Due to this misinformation, Cruz remained at MSDHS until February 2017 when he transferred to an adult learning center. Cruz subsequently sought to return to high school and to reengage ESE services, but the District failed to implement the necessary processes that would have returned Cruz to high school. Cruz remained in the adult learning center environment without ESE services until the shooting.
The following recommendations were proposed by CEN to address specific areas of improvement needed by BCPS:

1. Review and revise as needed the focus of staff development regarding guidelines and procedures for the placement of students in ESE center school to incorporate training and practice in facilitating emotionally charge meetings to ensure staff have a complete understanding of the requirements as they apply to all possible scenarios.

2. Review and revise as needed the policies, procedures and staff development implemented to ensure students enrolled in OCLC sites who are suspected of having a disability and needing special education services are referred and evaluated within established timelines.

3. Review and revise current training and guidance regarding revocation of consent, with attention to less common situations such as when: an adult student revokes consent for their own services against advice of the parent and continued informal contact with designated school staff could result in the student’s decision to reestablish services; a student is known to have social/emotional or behavioral needs and therefore, as a general education student, should have access to the counseling and mental health services available to all students through the district’s multi-tiered system of supports; or a parent or adult student orally states their desire to revoke consent but does not submit the request in writing as required, so that staff remain neutral and are able to act without either promoting or hindering the revocation.

4. Review and revise as needed procedures and current guidance documents regarding reentry into ESE after consent has been revoked to more explicitly consider situations such when: there is a history of supporting data indicating that the student has been a high-needs ESE student; IEP team members strongly disagreed with the decision to revoke consent based on the data available at the time of revocation; or there is substantial evidence indicating the student needs ESE services and no recent evidence from the general education record indicating the student no longer has a disability and needs special education services.
5. Review existing data systems to identify redundancies and inefficiencies and determine the most effective way to integrate multiple systems, maximizing accuracy and shareability across users.

6. Establish a protocol for reviewing the records of students transferring to alternative education programs to include discipline and ESE records in addition to course and credit information. The process must be designed to prohibit potentially discriminatory practices while ensuring the receiving program has the educational information needed to provide effective and appropriate placements and services.

7. Establish a protocol for communicating with all relevant staff in a receiving school or program when a student with social/emotional or behavioral needs transitions from an ESE center school or ESE separate class setting in a traditional school building to a less restrictive general education setting. In addition to the annual goals and positive behavioral supports included within an IEP, a behavior intervention plan or similar document that more explicitly details the actions to be taken in response to student behavior and includes a formal system for monitoring and/or tracking student performance should be considered for transitioning students.

8. Develop an audit process to be implemented for all records that pertain to discipline and safety, including but not limited to consequences and interventions imposed in response to disciplinary infractions and threat assessments. The purpose of the process is three-fold: (1) to determine the extent to which the actions proposed are implemented as stated in the relevant documentation; (2) identify and correct flaws in communication systems that may impede implementation; and (3) hold accountable the staff members responsible for implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

There should be a Florida workgroup established to determine necessary changes to federal law regarding ESE and then coordinate with the Florida congressional delegation to request the identified changes. State law changes can follow if federal law is revised.
CHAPTER 12. CRUZ’S EDUCATIONAL SERVICES

School personnel must be properly trained on their ESE obligations under federal and state law so that the requirements are not under- or overapplied.

Threat Assessment Teams and IEP committees must coordinate information and courses of action regarding ESE students.

Students with IEPs that involve severe behavioral issues should be referred to and evaluated by the threat assessment team.
Assessing district and individual campus safety is an integral part of effective school hardening. Schools and districts have to know their strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities before they can make informed decisions about what to fix and establish enhancement priorities.

Between 2001 and 2014, Florida law required that each school district assess physical site security on a districtwide basis and submit an annual report to FDOE. The report concerning districtwide site security was not an automated report. During the same period—2001 to 2014—the State recommended to each district that it was a best practice to assess each school, but these school-specific assessments were not required. FDOE did not track whether districts did school-specific assessments because it was a “best practice” and not a requirement.

In 2014, the Florida legislature authorized expenditures to create an electronic Florida Safe Schools Assessment Tool (FSSAT), and it automated the assessment reporting process. Each district was required to submit the electronic districtwide FSSAT annually. A school-specific version of the FSSAT was also created, but completion was optional.

The districtwide FSSAT assessment tool has seven general focus areas: Efficiency and Effectiveness; Health and Safety Planning; Discipline Policies and Code of Student Conduct; School Climate and Community Outreach; Safety Programs and Curricula; Facilities and Equipment; and Transportation. The school-specific assessment has three focus areas: School Data; School Infrastructure; and School Security and Threat Management.

**Findings:**

1. When we look at the districtwide FSSATs submitted between 2015 and 2017, it appears that the FSSATs submitted in 2015 (the first year of the automated system) were lengthy reports, many over 100 pages.
2. There was no MSDHS-specific assessment submitted during this period.
3. The FSSATs submitted in years 2016 and 2017 by school districts across Florida appear to be perfunctory submissions, with most in the 25-page range that contained simple self-serving “yes” responses to questions.
4. In 2015, four districts did not submit a districtwide FSSAT; in 2016, five districts failed to submit an FSSAT; in 2017, seven districts did not submit FSSATs; and the 2018 reports were due October 31, 2018, but several districts did not submit reports.

5. As to the optional school specific assessments, in 2015, the first year of the automated FSSAT, only 116 schools out of 3,900 were shown as completed in the FSSAT system; the number declined from there, with only 16 assessments reported in 2017—16 out of 3,900 schools in the year before the MSDHS shooting.

6. There were no consequences for non-compliance with the FSSAT process.

7. FDOE did not, and still does not, have regulatory authority over the districts. FDOE is the entity to which the districts report the data, but FDOE does not oversee the districts' submissions, or lack thereof. FDOE did provide training to the districts on completing the FSSAT.

8. There are numerous concerns with the FSSAT instrument in addition to the lack of submission accountability and perfunctory responses. The instrument itself is problematic in that it asks questions that are mostly long narratives for which the call of the question is a self-serving yes or no response. There is minimal call for a substantive narrative response to FSSAT questions.

9. In addition to the overall FSSAT deficiencies, the districtwide and MSDHS-specific FSSATs submitted by the BCPS contain inconsistent statements and lack the necessary information to effectively assess physical site security within the Broward County school district or at MSDHS.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The legislature should require that the FSSAT be the primary instrument used by the school districts to assess physical site security.

The Florida legislature should provide FDOE with compliance authority over the districts to ensure that each school, and each district as applicable, submits an annual FSSAT.
CHAPTER 13. FLORIDA SAFE SCHOOLS ASSESSMENT TOOL

FDOE should be tasked with, and funded for, providing each district with training on how to assess physical site security and how to properly complete the FSSAT.

Each site assessment should be required to be conducted in conjunction with law enforcement.

The annual districtwide FSSAT should specifically set forth the physical site security priorities for the district in descending order of priority.

The FSSAT should also explain what progress was made in implementing the previous year's FSSAT priorities.

It should be required that any significant deficiencies identified during the FSSAT assessment process that adversely affect the safety and security of any school campus or facility must be reported in a timely manner to the school board, and a remedial plan should approved by the board.

The legislature should provide statutory sanctions for non-compliance with the annual FSSAT submission requirement.

The legislature should require that the school-specific FSSAT be approved by the superintendent or his/her designee before submission to FDOE. The designee must be a deputy/assistant superintendent or the district’s school safety specialist.

The current school-specific and districtwide FSSAT should be revised with stakeholder input, especially from law enforcement and industrial security experts.
14.1 Federal and State Privacy Laws Affecting Information Sharing—School, Medical and Mental Health Records (Florida Educational Privacy Requirements, FERPA, and HIPAA)

**Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)**

On August 8, 2018, the Commission listened to testimony from Francisco M. Negron, Jr., the Chief Legal Officer for the National School Boards Association. Mr. Negron’s testimony provided the Commission with background knowledge on the following information.

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), first passed in 1974, is federal law found collectively in 20 U.S. Code § 1232g and 34 CFR Part 99. FERPA applies to all educational institutions in the United States. This legislation primarily addresses how schools deal with student educational records and personally identifiable information. While the purpose of FERPA has always been to ensure student privacy rights, adjustments to the law over the years have leaned toward improving necessary information-sharing practices in times of emergencies or threats, as happened after the Virginia Tech University shooting.

FERPA does not create a private right of action to compel compliance by educational institutions. Instead, FERPA ties institutional compliance to its privacy requirements through federal funding. The ultimate threat for non-compliance by educational institutions is that the U.S. Department of Education may respond by withholding federal funding. To date, the Department of Education has never withheld funding for FERPA violations.

As a general matter, FERPA prohibits the sharing, accessing or disclosure of private student educational records. Student educational records are defined as records or documents directly related to a student that are maintained by an educational agency or by some party acting on behalf of the school or institution. Educational records do not necessarily include conversations or observations, unless those things are included somewhere within an educational record. Educational records also do not include records kept in in the sole possession of their maker, or records that are temporary, serve as a memory aid, or are made available to a temporary substitute. Ultimately, whether a document or record
qualifies as an educational record under FERPA depends on how and for what purpose the record is maintained. A school district may set policies to include defining what may constitute an educational record. Law enforcement records are not educational records, and records created for a law enforcement function (to include School Resource Officer (SRO) or security personnel records) are not educational records. In contrast, discipline records that may incorporate SRO documents may be educational records if not created or maintained for a law enforcement purpose. If an SRO on a threat assessment team acts as both a school official and a law enforcement officer, the SRO can share educational record information.

Once a determination is made that personal identifying information (PII) is part of an educational record, FERPA provides for when a school or school district may disclose sensitive student PII. While student educational records are generally confidential, there are exceptions that allow disclosure in situations such as consent, the existence of a legitimate educational interest, an exception for health and safety concerns and for certain compelled legal processes such as a court order. A school may disclose PII from student education records with the consent of the student and the student’s parent/guardian. Otherwise, a school is able to disclose PII from student education records without consent to school officials with a legitimate educational interest; this ability to disclose PII also extends to contractors, volunteers, or those who may serve as school officials while performing a school service or function. When a school provides PII to these non-employee partners, the outside party must agree to abide by FERPA and to protect the disclosed information. Schools will often have procedures in place to ensure these processes are completed safely and appropriately.

As noted above, SROs have unique challenges between educational and law enforcement purposes. SROs on threat assessment teams may dually serve as a law enforcement officer and a school official. SROs who serve on a school threat-assessment team are prohibited under FERPA from re-disclosing educational records they review to other law enforcement

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personnel unless there is an articulable emergency, triggering the health and safety exception under FERPA, or unless there is a lawfully compelled legal process. Threat assessment members can only use PII from educational records for the purpose of conducting threat assessments. If, however, threat assessment team members (or the school district) determine there to be an articulable and significant threat to health and safety, FERPA allows a law enforcement officer on the threat assessment team to share PII on behalf of school officials.

FERPA’s health and safety exception is critically important for the Commission’s work. Found in 34 CFR Part 99.36, FERPA’s health and safety exception defines the “appropriate parties” with whom PII can be shared, including law enforcement. This can be done if knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the safety of the student or other individuals. “Appropriate parties” are those to whom such knowledge is necessary to protect the health and safety of students, including parents, medical professionals and law enforcement. School districts have the capability to determine who may fall under that definition. A determination that specific facts trigger the health and safety exception is left to the school district pursuant to federal law, requiring the totality of the circumstances guide such a determination. However, the facts that trigger the health and safety exception must include an “articulable and significant threat” to the safety of students or other individuals. Generally, the health and safety exception will apply time, place and manner considerations on the execution of an articulable threat. This means that understanding time, place and manner considerations can be useful in determining an articulated and significant threat. The health and safety exception is generally limited to the period of the emergency, and does not allow for a blanket release.

Schools and school districts may historically be circumspect in sharing PII out of a concern of making incorrect determinations as relating to the health and safety exception; however, to date, the federal government has never revoked funding for prior FERPA violations. The Department of Education typically applies a “good faith” standard when interpreting the actions of school officials—so long as there is a rational basis for a school district’s actions, the federal government has not substituted its own judgments for the judgment of the
school district. FERPA allows for school districts to enter into memoranda of understanding that outline and define how processes should work to resolve potential threats. These MOUs can include how law enforcement will be involved. The MOU can define (1) what information will be shared, and (2) under what circumstances such information may be shared, highlighting the articulated exception used. Further, while disclosure of records under the health and safety exception requires an “impending or imminent threat,” such as a natural disaster, a terrorist attack, a campus shooting or the outbreak of a disease, school districts have the flexibility to define such terms in an MOU.

**Florida K-12 Education Privacy Requirements**

On August 8, 2018, the Commission listened to testimony from Brent McNeal, Deputy General Counsel at the Florida Department of Education. Mr. McNeal’s testimony provided the Commission with background knowledge on the following information.

The above-noted federal law, FERPA, largely controls the discussion on educational records. In Florida, FERPA has largely been codified into state requirements as well. Florida student privacy requirements (including the incorporation of FERPA into state law) can be found in Chapter 1002, Florida Statutes, establishing student and parental rights and educational choices.

Beginning in 2009, the Florida legislature explicitly implemented FERPA into Florida law. Chapter 1002, Florida Statutes, requires the Board of Education to administer rules for the implementation of FERPA. Section 1002.22, Florida Statutes, provides for a cause of action for parents and students to bring forth an injunction in civil court for violations of rights. Attorney’s fees may flow from a granted injunction. Section 1002.221, Florida Statutes, provides that education records are confidential and exempt from public records, and that such records may not be released as public records without written consent except as otherwise allowed by FERPA. That same statute provides schools or districts with the ability to enter into interagency agreements for the purpose of releasing education records for determining or delivering services to a juvenile. In Section 1003.53, Florida Statutes, school districts may cooperate with appropriate agencies for dropout prevention and
academic intervention programs. Rule 6A-1.0955, Florida Administrative Code, also requires school boards to adopt policies on records, including provisions for the disclosure of PII where prior consent is not required, as well as provisions for disclosures in health and safety scenarios. Section 1002.222, Florida Statutes, limits the kind of information a school or district can collect, prohibiting the collection of biometric information and certain information associated with individual civil liberties.

**HIPAA**

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) is another federal law that heavily influences the sharing of sensitive information. On August 8, 2018, the Commission listened to testimony from Tracey Jaensch, a Regional Managing Partner of FordHarrison LLP, and a subject matter expert on HIPAA. Ms. Jaensch’s testimony provided the Commission with background knowledge on the following information.

The primary purpose of HIPAA is to protect electronically sent and stored medical records. Generally speaking, there are two parts of HIPAA: a privacy component and a security component. HIPAA controls protected health information (PHI) in any form, including oral communications. HIPAA was enacted into law in 1996, as found in Public Law 104-91, and subsequently the Hi-Tech Act amended HIPAA in 2009. The relevant regulatory provisions can be found at 45 CFR Parts 160, 162 and 164. There is no private right of action for HIPAA violations, though the federal government enforces HIPAA breaches and can levy significant monetary fines.

Only specified covered entities and their business associates are required to comply with HIPAA. Covered entities only include health plans, healthcare providers and healthcare clearinghouses. Healthcare providers are only subject to HIPAA if they send and receive electronic healthcare records. Applicable business associates include those who receive private health information from covered entities for a specified purpose, such as a provider’s law firm or accountant, which may require sensitive PHI to accomplish tasks for the provider. Many entities are specifically not required to comply with HIPAA, including employers, certain forms of insurance, law enforcement agencies and, potentially, schools,
depending on what services are provided by the schools and who pays for those services. It is possible, though unlikely, that a school or school district that chooses to provide student PHI to a law enforcement agency could trigger HIPAA requirements.

Generally speaking, HIPAA requires written consent to share PHI; however, the associated rules do provide for the sharing of PHI without consent. PHI disclosures must be the minimum amount necessary to provide information for a specified purpose. Providers can provide PHI to law enforcement, family members or others if the provider believes that the patient presents a serious and imminent threat to themselves or others. This disclosure is allowable if provided to someone who can reasonably serve to lessen or mitigate the threat. In such cases, covered entities are presumed to act in good faith if acting on actual or apparent knowledge.10 If an official inquiry is relevant to an investigation, it must be targeted and sufficiently narrow to satisfy the purposes sought.

**State Privacy Laws**

Beyond the above-noted provisions, Florida law provides for individual privacy rights in a number of relevant areas. On August 8, 2018, the Commission listened to testimony from Paul Rozelle, Senior Associate Counsel with the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. Mr. Rozelle’s testimony provided the Commission with background knowledge on the following information.

Much of the debate between privacy rights and government expectations of transparency can be found in Florida’s public records laws, primarily cited in Chapter 119, Florida Statutes. The Florida Constitution also balances a similar set of concerns in its articulated right to privacy, as found in Article I, Section 23, and its right of access to public records, as found in Article I, Section 24(a). Chapter 119, Florida Statutes, provides for the further contours of these rights. Chapter 119 broadly defines a public record, but also provides for exemptions and confidentiality of certain documents. Confidential records do not have a constitutional right of public access, and a governmental agency may only release that information with specific authorization—either the individual to whom the information

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10 45 CFR 164.512(j)(4).
applies, or from a specific statutory authorization. Exemptions to inspect public records differ from confidentiality; exempt records belong to an agency, and an agency may choose to disclose records. An agency can choose to release exempt records, but has little choice in not releasing confidential records.

Several types of records relevant to the Commission’s mission have confidentiality or exempt statuses under Florida law. For instance, psychiatric records are confidential under Section 456.059, Florida Statutes. However, a psychiatrist may disclose psychiatric records to warn the victim or a law enforcement agency of a threat if the psychiatrist believes that a patient has the means to carry out a threat against identifiable persons, and if the psychiatrist believes the patient will more likely than not carry out the threat.

Hospital records are generally confidential under Florida law, but can be disclosed in certain circumstances, including to the Department of Children and Families for the purposes of providing services or for investigative cases. Generally speaking, medical records may not even be discussed without authorization, save for certain exceptions. Mental health clinical records are confidential and exempt under Section 394.4615(1), Florida Statutes. Clinical records are those which pertain to a patient’s hospitalization or treatment.11 However, records that include information relevant to threats of harm to another person may be released with an articulable threat of specific harm. Similarly, Baker Act records under Chapter 394, Florida Statutes, are confidential and exempt from public disclosure; however, the separate incident report(s) documenting the underlying law enforcement contact is not confidential or exempt.

Arrest and crime reports are not generally confidential. However, juvenile criminal records do have certain privacy protections, as outlined in Chapter 985, Florida Statutes. Criminal histories pertaining to juveniles are generally confidential and exempt from disclosure, with certain exceptions. These exceptions include felony offenses committed by a juvenile. Juvenile criminal justice records are also available to criminal justice agencies for criminal justice purposes. Additionally, juvenile criminal justice records may also be made available to law enforcement, the Department of Juvenile Justice, the Florida Department of

11 Fla. Stat., 394.455(6).
Corrections or other licensed professionals for the purpose of providing programs and services to a juvenile, pursuant to Section 985.04(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Moreover, juvenile criminal justice records have unique seal and expunction requirements; such records are generally expunged upon the subject turning 21 years of age with certain exceptions that may delay or prohibit expunction.

Findings:

1. Based on the testimony before the Commission and discussion among Commission members, it is evident that there is significant misunderstanding and overapplication of several privacy laws, including FERPA and HIPAA. The misunderstanding and overapplication of privacy laws is a barrier to necessary and successful information sharing.

2. Many aspects of educational privacy laws fail to consider appropriate exceptions for an incident such as this where full public disclosure of prior conduct, especially misconduct is beneficial and necessary. The inability for public disclosure of probative information and the attendant information void leads to misinformation and distrust that erodes the public’s confidence in the system and its officials. If there is to be an erosion of public trust, it must be based on fact and not speculation because information is hidden from the public eye.

3. It is unclear what actually constitutes an educational record under FERPA, including whether recorded video surveillance is an educational record.

14.2 School Incident Reporting to FDOE and Crime Reporting to Law Enforcement

Florida Statute 1006.13 outlines the policy on zero tolerance for crime and victimization.

The statute details the following:

1. District school boards shall promote a safe and supportive learning environment in schools by protecting students and staff from conduct that poses a serious threat to
school safety. A threat assessment team may use alternatives to expulsion or referral to law enforcement agencies to address disruptive behavior through restitution, civil citation, teen court, neighborhood restorative justice or similar programs. Zero-tolerance policies may not be rigorously applied to petty acts of misconduct and misdemeanors, including, but not limited to, minor fights or disturbances. Zero-tolerance policies must apply equally to all students regardless of their economic status, race or disability.

(2) Each district school board shall adopt a policy of zero tolerance that:

(a) Defines criteria for reporting to a law enforcement agency any act that occurs whenever or wherever students are within the jurisdiction of the district school board.

(b) Defines acts that pose a serious threat to school safety.

(c) Defines petty acts of misconduct.

(d) Minimizes the victimization of students, staff or volunteers, including taking all steps necessary to protect the victim of any violent crime from any further victimization.

(e) Establishes a procedure that provides each student with the opportunity for a review of the disciplinary action imposed pursuant to s. 1006.07.

(f) Requires the threat assessment team to consult with law enforcement when a student exhibits a pattern of behavior, based upon previous acts or the severity of an act that would pose a threat to school safety.

14.3 School Incident Reporting to FDOE – SESIR

In order to track statewide student criminal conduct data, school districts are required to submit data to the Florida Department of Education (FDOE) through the School Environmental Safety Incident Reporting (SESIR) System. Some data elements are
ultimately reported federally. This aggregate data at the state level allows FDOE to analyze patterns and trend lines to identify significant changes over time and follow up with school districts to provide further support at the local level. SESIR collects discipline data on 26 incident types of crime, violence and disruptive behaviors that occur on school grounds, on school transportation and at off-campus school-sponsored events, during any 24-hour period, 365 days per year. Districts utilize standardized SESIR codes and definitions to report incidents to FDOE.

The following SESIR codes and definitions were developed to enable school districts to accurately code data used to report incidents that are against the law or represent serious breaches of the Code of Student Conduct. This includes those incidents considered severe enough to require the involvement of a School Resource Officer (SRO) or incidents reported to law enforcement. The definitions were not meant to match exactly with the Uniform Crime Report, nor are they intended to be an additional reporting system for law enforcement. When school districts are interpreting student behavior for SESIR reporting, consideration should be given to both developmental age-appropriate behavior and to those students with an Individual Educational Plan (IEP) or a 504 Plan.

**Incidents that MUST be reported to SESIR and law enforcement:**

- Battery
- Homicide
- Kidnapping
- Sexual Battery
- Weapons Possession

**Incidents that MUST be reported to SESIR and ARE EXPECTED to include consultation with law enforcement:**

- **Alcohol (ALC) - Level IV**
  Possession, sale, purchase or use of alcoholic beverages.
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Use means the person is caught in the act of using, admits to use or is discovered to have used in the course of an investigation.

- **Arson** (ARS) - Level I
  (intentionally setting a fire on school property) To damage or cause to be damaged, by fire or explosion, any dwelling, structure or conveyance, whether occupied or not, or its contents.

- **Breaking and Entering/Burglary** (BRK) - Level II
  (illegal entry into a facility) Unlawful entry with force, or unauthorized presence in a building or other structure or conveyance with evidence of the intent to damage or remove property or harm a person(s).

- **Disruption on Campus-Major** (DOC) - Level III
  (major disruption of all or a significant portion of campus activities, school-sponsored events and school bus transportation) Disruptive behavior that poses a serious threat to the learning environment, health, safety or welfare of others. Example: Bomb threat, inciting a riot, initiating a false fire alarm. (Do not use this code for students defying authority, disobeying or showing disrespect to others, using inappropriate language or gestures or classroom disruption.)

- **Drug Sale/Distribution Excluding Alcohol** (DRD) - Level II
  (illegal sale or distribution of drugs) The manufacture, cultivation, sale or distribution of any drug, narcotic, controlled substance or substance represented to be a drug, narcotic or controlled substance.

- **Drug Use/Possession Excluding Alcohol** (DRU) - Level III
  (illegal drug possession or use) The use or possession of any drug, narcotic, controlled substance, or any substance when used for chemical intoxication. Use means the person is caught in the act of using, admits to use or is discovered to have used in the course of an investigation.

- **Hazing** (HAZ) - Level III
  Any action or situation that endangers the mental or physical health or safety of
a student at a school with any of grades 6 through 12 for purposes of initiation or admission into or affiliation with any school-sanctioned organization. "Hazing" includes, but is not limited to: (a) pressuring, coercing or forcing a student to participate in illegal or dangerous behavior, or (b) any brutality of a physical nature, such as whipping, beating, branding or exposure to the elements.

- **Physical Attack (PHA) - Level II**
  Physical attack refers to an actual and intentional striking of another person against his/her will, or the intentional causing of bodily harm to an individual.

- **Robbery (ROB) - Level II**
  (using force to take something from another) The taking or attempted taking of anything of value that is owned by another person or organization, under the confrontational circumstances of force, threat of force or violence and/or by putting the victim in fear.

- **Larceny/Theft (STL) - Level III**
  (taking of property from a person, building, or a vehicle) The unauthorized taking, carrying, riding away with, or concealing the property of another person, including motor vehicles, without threat, violence or bodily harm. (The item(s) value must be $300 or more to report in SESIR.)

- **Sexual Assault (SXA) - Level II**
  An incident that includes a threat of: rape, fondling, indecent liberties, child molestation or sodomy. Both male and female students can be victims of sexual assault. The threat must include all of the following elements: 1) intent; 2) fear; and 3) capability.

- **Sexual Offenses (Other) (SXO) - Level III**
  (lewdness, indecent exposure) Other sexual contact, including intercourse, without force or threat of force. Subjecting an individual to lewd sexual gestures,
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sexual activity or exposing private body parts in a lewd manner. (Law enforcement must be notified to investigate.)

• **Threat/Intimidation (TRE) - Level III**
  (instilling fear in others) A threat to cause physical harm to another person with or without the use of a weapon that includes all of the following elements: 1) intent—an intention that the threat is heard or seen by the person who is the object of the threat; 2) fear—a reasonable fear or apprehension by the person who is the object of the threat that the threat could be carried out; and 3) capability—the ability of the offender to actually carry out the threat directly or by a weapon or other instrument that can easily be obtained.

• **Trespassing (TRS) - Level II**
  (illegal entry onto campus) To enter or remain on school grounds/campus, school transportation, or at a school-sponsored event/off campus, without authorization or invitation and with no lawful purpose for entry.

• **Vandalism (VAN) - Level III**
  (destruction, damage, or defacement of school or personal property) The intentional destruction, damage or defacement of public or private/personal property without consent of the owner or the person having custody or control of it. (Damage must be $1000 or more to report in SESIR.)

• **Other Major (OMC) - Level III**
  (major incidents that do not fit within the other definitions) Any serious, harmful incident resulting in the need for law enforcement intervention not previously classified. Examples: Student producing or knowingly using counterfeit money, participating in gambling activities, possessing child pornography or possessing drug paraphernalia.

**Incidents that MUST be reported to SESIR, but MAY NOT need to include consultation with law enforcement:**
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- **Bullying** (BUL) - Level IV
  (intimidating behaviors) Systematically and chronically inflicting physical hurt or psychological distress on one or more students or employees that is severe or pervasive enough to create an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment or unreasonably interfere with the individual’s school performance or participation.

- **Fighting** (FIT) - Level III
  (mutual combat, mutual altercation) When two or more persons mutually participate in use of force or physical violence that requires either 1) physical restraint or 2) results in injury requiring first aid or medical attention. (Do not report to SESIR lower level fights such as pushing, shoving, or altercations that stop upon verbal command. Use local codes.)

- **Harassment** (HAR) - Level IV
  (insulting behaviors) Any threatening, insulting, or dehumanizing gesture, use of data or computer software or written, verbal or physical conduct that 1) places a student or school employee in reasonable fear of harm to his or her person or damage to his or her property, 2) has the effect of substantially interfering with a student’s educational performance, opportunities, or benefits or 3) has the effect of substantially disrupting the orderly operation of a school including any course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such a person and serves no legitimate purpose.

- **Sexual Harassment** (SXH) - Level III
  (undesired sexual behavior) Unwanted verbal or physical behavior with sexual connotations by an adult or student that is severe or pervasive enough to create an intimidating, hostile or offensive educational environment, cause discomfort or humiliation or unreasonably interfere with the individual’s school performance or participation (6A-19.008(1) SBE Rule). An incident when one person demands a sexual favor from another under the threat of physical harm or adverse consequence.
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- Tobacco (TBC) - Level IV
  (cigarettes or other forms of tobacco) The possession, use, distribution or sale of tobacco or nicotine products on school grounds, at school-sponsored events or on school transportation by any person under the age of 18.

**Findings:**

1. SESIR reporting for MSDHS during the 2016-2017 school year reflected little to no activity reported for the reportable incidents.
2. BSO reports for the same period reflect reports of trespassing, battery, robbery and theft at MSDHS.
3. According to a June 20, 2018, Sun-Sentinel article, SESIR data shows 193 weapons found districtwide in the 2016/17 school year, which reflected a 10-year low with the number of weapons seized being half of that of the previous year. The article says the district admitted it changed its reporting criteria and stopped reporting some weapons incidents. The article states Superintendent Runcie has acknowledged underreporting.
4. Only certain incident types are required to be reported to law enforcement under SESIR and under Senate Bill 7026’s revisions; reporting to law enforcement is mandatory for second or subsequent misdemeanor crimes, but more serious offenses like robbery are still not required to be reported to law enforcement.
5. FDOE has no way to determine underreporting by districts or schools because it is not present on campuses and cannot know the daily events that occur. Expulsion and suspension trends are way down, and this raises serious questions about underreporting.
6. FDOE monitors SESIR reporting, and, when it sees concerning incident trends, it has no authority to compel changes at schools with a high number of incidents.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. There needs to be extensive training provided to all stakeholders on the appropriate application of FERPA, HIPAA and other often-misunderstood and overapplied laws. The overapplication of these laws and the barriers thus imposed must cease.
Knowledge of the laws’ exceptions are as equally important as their initial applicability.

2. HIPAA and 42-CFR are subject to interpretation, which can be unnecessarily detrimental. The State of Florida should research and offer a correct interpretation for providers to follow and provide resources for providers to access when information sharing is in question.

3. The Florida legislature should consider changes to Florida school privacy laws that are not preempted by federal law to better allow information sharing in appropriate circumstances, and to encourage changes to federal law.

4. The Florida congressional delegation should evaluate FERPA, HIPAA, 42-CFR and other federal laws and sponsor changes to those laws that will allow broader information sharing and public disclosure.

5. SESIR reporting requirements to FDOE and law enforcement should be evaluated and increased. Several types of incidents—such as robbery—that are not currently required to be reported to law enforcement should be required reportable offenses.

6. School Districts must ensure that each school accurately reports all required SESIR incidents and that underreporting is eliminated. School districts should be held accountable for accurate reporting, and the districts should hold their administrators accountable.

7. The legislature should provide FDOE with SESIR oversight authority and authorize FDOE to impose sanctions on districts that do not accurately report required data. FDOE should be provided inspection authority of districts’ records and be required to conduct audits to ensure compliance.
While not specifically assigned to the Commission, the MSDHSPSA addresses several other issues related to school safety and school violence that provide law enforcement, courts and schools with the tools to enhance public safety. Approximately 400 million dollars was allocated to implement various parts of Senate Bill 7026. The Commission heard presentations on many of these issues, and some findings and recommendations in this report may have an impact on the future implementation and responsibilities as assigned in law. The following is a summary of these aspects of the MSDHSPSA and updates on implementation.

**Office of Safe Schools**

The MSDHSPSA codifies the Office of Safe Schools (OSS) within the Florida Department of Education (FDOE) as the central repository for the best practices, training standards and compliance regarding school safety and security. Their mission is to support districts in providing a safe learning environment for students and educators. The primary goals of the office include prevention, intervention and emergency preparedness planning.

Specifically, under the MSDHSPSA, the OSS shall:

- Establish and update the school security risk assessment tool.
- Provide ongoing professional development to district personnel to include technical assistance and guidance on school safety and security recommendations, addressing any findings.
- Develop and implement a School Safety Specialist Training Program to include providing an active shooter training program.

The OSS has been established, with a Director appointed and 4 employees assigned to the office.
Physical Security of School Buildings

The MSDHSPSA provided $98,962,286 for grants to schools to fund fixed capital outlay costs associated with improving physical security of school buildings as identified by their security risk assessment (FSSAT).

Grant guidelines were issued by FDOE on August 21, 2018. The application submission deadline for grant funds was December 1, 2018. The average award per school is approximately $27,467. Grants will be awarded no later than January 15, 2019.

Centralized Integrated Data Repository

MSDHSPSA directs that the Office of Safe Schools will work with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to create a centralized “data repository” and analytics resources to improve access to information from sources including social media, the Department of Children and Families, the Department of Law Enforcement, the Department of Juvenile Justice and local law enforcement agencies.

***In May 2018, FDOE established three workgroups that consist of members from the Department of Children and Families, the Department of Law Enforcement, the Department of Juvenile Justice and the Agency for Health Care Administration. The three groups are User and Data Governance, Technology and Legal. These groups are reviewing existing tools available for data sharing.

A social media monitoring tool is being considered to help school districts monitor threats of violence against students, employees and schools. The system will scan social media to identify signs of bullying, self-harm or threats of violence against students, employees and schools.

The tool should be available in mid-2019. The social media monitoring tool searches social media postings for keywords based on specific geographical areas compared to the FortifyFL app, which receives anonymous tips from anyone who downloads the app. The tool will generate immediate notifications to school districts and local law enforcement.
Fortify Florida

MSDHPSA required the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to collaborate with the Department of Legal Affairs to procure a mobile suspicious activity reporting application. The “Fortify Florida” app, officially known as “FortifyFL,” allows students to anonymously report unsafe, potentially harmful, dangerous, violent or criminal activities, or the threat of these activities to the appropriate law enforcement agencies and school officials, using any electronic smart device.

The FortifyFL mobile application went live in October 2018. There are 6,922 public and private schools identified in the app that are assigned for response to 222 law enforcement agencies. Numerous tips have been received through the app, and one arrest has been made as a result of a tip.

Coach Aaron Feis Guardian Program

The law permits a sheriff and school district to establish a Coach Aaron Feis Guardian Program. The legislation allows school districts to decide whether to participate in the Guardian Program if it is available in their county. A guardian must complete 132 hours of comprehensive firearm safety and proficiency training, pass a psychological evaluation, submit to and pass drug tests and complete certified diversity training. The Guardian Program is completely voluntary for a sheriff to establish, for a school district to participate in, and for an individual to volunteer to be a part of.

Currently, 25 sheriffs throughout Florida have agreed to train volunteers as guardians. Some sheriffs have refused to authorize the program. Application requests total approximately $9,307,862.04.

Safe School Officers

MSDHPSA requires each district school board and school district superintendent to cooperate with law enforcement agencies to assign one or more safe-school officers at each school facility. The safe-school officer requirement can be satisfied by appointing any
combination of a school resource officer, a school safety officer or a school guardian. Data is being compiled to determine compliance with this requirement.

**School Safety Specialists**

MSDHSPSA requires each district school board to designate a district school safety specialist to serve as the district's primary point of public contact for public school safety functions.

As reported by the safety specialists, most school districts have confirmed they are implementing active shooter training exercises at their schools. Most districts have presented their risk assessments to their school boards, and most districts have reported that the district school safety specialist coordinates with appropriate public safety agencies.

The law also provided funds to develop training for the school safety specialist regarding active shooters. It is anticipated that a vendor for the training will be contracted by January 2019. Training dates will be scheduled to maximize participation. Six FEMA Independent Study courses have been identified as prerequisites. The training will be based on national and state best practices on school safety and security, to include roles and responsibilities, threat assessment, crisis management, staff and student safety preparedness, post-incident recovery and family reunification.

**Threat Assessment Teams**

MSDHSPSA requires each school district to designate a threat assessment team at each school, and requires the team to operate under the district school safety specialist's direction.

Many districts have reported that they have threat assessment teams that are trained in evaluating behavioral and academic concerns and are providing school staff training regarding such support. Compliance with the threat assessment team requirement is still being evaluated, and implementation of effective teams across the state is still in progress.
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FSSAT

The law requires FDOE to contract for the assessment and further development of the Florida Safe Schools Assessment Tool, which assists school districts in conducting physical site security assessments to identify threats and vulnerabilities.

FDOE contracted a consultant to provide a detailed and comprehensive technical review of FSSAT that will include the intent, history, current use and future use of FSSAT. The Commission and others will be working with the consultant on FSSAT recommended revisions.

Fiscal Year 2018-19 FSSAT assessments were due by August 1, 2018, for all districts’ school sites. All schools have completed their assessments, but not without prodding from FDOE. District assessments were due by October 31, 2018. Some have not complied. Across-the-board compliance with the FSSAT is an area that must be improved.

Mental Health Assistance Allocation

MSDHSPSA created the mental health assistance allocation to assist school districts in establishing or expanding school-based mental health care.

Plans must be focused on evidence-based mental health care treatment. School districts shall submit approved plans, including approved plans of each charter school in the district, to the commissioner by August 1 of each fiscal year. FDOE provided technical assistance to districts on June 1, 2018, and hosted regional meetings. Approved plans can be viewed at: http://www.fldoe.org/safe-schools/mental-health.shtml. Every district met the August 1 deadline.

Requires Department of Children and Families to contract for community action treatment teams to provide behavioral health and support services.

Youth Mental Health Awareness Training

Beginning with the 2018-2019 school year, the Department of Education was required to establish an evidence-based youth mental health awareness and assistance training
program to help school personnel identify and understand the signs of emotional disturbance, mental illness and substance use disorders and provide such personnel with the skills to help a person who is developing or experiencing an emotional disturbance, mental health or substance use problem.

As of December 2018, FDOE facilitated training for nationally certified Youth Mental Health First Aid trainers representing school districts in all 19 SEDNET regions throughout the state. FDOE collaborated with the National Council and established a six-hour training option for school district personnel as “first-aiders.”

The law directs school boards to require student disclosure of mental health referrals at registration; allow an expelled student who is admitted to another district to be referred for mental health services; require the student code of conduct to include policies for referring violent or disruptive students for mental health services; require students expelled for firearms or certain threats to be referred for mental health services; and require student crime watch programs to allow anonymous reporting;

**Student Crime Watch**

At the time of this report, some districts have reported crime watch programs and school safety hotlines are in place and available in all schools. Some districts have procedures in place to inform the public about their crime watch/school safety hotlines. Compliance with this requirement is ongoing.

**Active Shooter Training and Drills**

The law requires the school district to develop emergency plans with public safety agencies and include active shooter and hostage situations, which must be conducted as often as other drills; plans should identify those individuals required to contact first responders and require periodic testing of communications systems.

Forty-six school districts have confirmed through FSSAT that they have policies and procedures for active assailant drills at their schools. Active shooter training ranges from videos for students to law enforcement-led courses for staff. Districts report that drills are
conducted with first responder agencies. School districts are conducting their active shooter training drills either monthly, quarterly or once per semester. Some shared that they plan to conduct smaller drills on a monthly basis and more in-depth and intensive exercises each semester. All school districts are working with local agencies and first responders in planning for a response in the event of an active shooter.

**Sharing of Confidential Information**

The law requires all state and local agencies that provide services to students “experiencing or at risk of an emotional disturbance or mental illness” to share confidential information and records if the information is “reasonably necessary to ensure access to appropriate services for the student or to ensure the safety of the student or others.”

**Firearms**

Senate Bill 7026 authorizes a law enforcement officer who is taking a person into custody for an involuntary examination under the Baker Act to seize and hold a firearm or ammunition from the person for 24 hours after the person is released, even if the individual does not have a risk protection order against them or is the subject of a firearm disability.

The law prohibits a person who has been adjudicated mentally defective or who has been committed to a mental institution from owning or possessing a firearm until a court orders otherwise.

It creates a process for a law enforcement officer or law enforcement agency to petition a court for a risk protection order to temporarily prevent persons who are at high risk of harming themselves or others from accessing firearms when a person poses a significant danger to himself or herself or others, including significant danger as a result of a mental health crisis or violent behavior. It also allows a court to issue a risk protection order for up to 12 months and requires the surrender of all firearms and ammunition if a risk protection order is issued while also providing a process for a risk protection order to be vacated or extended. This Risk Protection Order process is in effect across Florida.
Senate Bill 7026 requires a three-day waiting period for all firearms—not just handguns—or until the background check is completed, whichever is later. It provides exceptions for concealed weapons permit holders and also provides exceptions for the purchase of firearms other than handguns for individuals who have completed a 16-hour hunter safety course, hold a valid Florida hunting license or are law enforcement officers, correctional officers or service members (military and national guard).

The law also prohibits a person less than 21 years of age from purchasing a firearm and prohibits licensed firearm dealers, importers and manufacturers from selling a firearm, except in the case of a member of the military or a law enforcement or correctional officer when purchasing a rifle or shotgun. (Persons under 21 years of age are already prohibited from purchasing a handgun under federal law.)

It also prohibits bump-fire stocks from being imported, transferred, distributed, sold, kept for sale, offered for sale, possessed or given away within the state.

Florida statute now prohibits a person from making, posting or transmitting a threat to conduct a mass shooting or an act of terrorism.

Funding allocations resultant from the passage of Senate Bill 7026 includes:

- More than $69 million to the Department of Education to fund the mental health assistance allocation.
- $1 million for the design and construction of a memorial honoring those who lost their lives on February 14, 2018, at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School.
- More than $67 million for sheriff’s offices who decide to establish a school guardian program.
- More than $97 million to aid the safe schools allocation.
- More than $98 million to implement a grant program for improving and hardening the physical security of school buildings.
$18.3 million to the Department of Children and Families for additional mobile crisis teams to ensure reasonable access among all counties.

The Commission will continue to monitor the implementation of Senate Bill 7026 and update the progress in subsequent report.
Active Shooter: An individual using a firearm in an ongoing event to wound or kill persons usually in a public area, office, school, church or commercial location.

Active Shooter Policy: The standing order for law enforcement officers on their duty and how to respond when an individual is firing a weapon at victims.

Active Shooter Training: The training associated with events related to an active shooter event.

AR-15: A type of semi-automatic rifle.

Assistant Principal (AP): The deputy or second level administrative position at a school

Campus Monitor: An employee of the Broward County School system that is unarmed and assigned general duties including observation and reporting related to on campus activities.

Baker Act: An evaluation of an individual by law enforcement and mental health professionals that identifies individuals immediately at risk for self-harm or harming others.

Body-worn Camera or Body Camera (BWC): An audio-video recording device worn by law enforcement officers.

Breaching tool: A device utilized by law enforcement to defeat the locks on doors in order to force entry.

Broward County Sheriff’s Office (BSO): The law enforcement agency reporting to the elected sheriff established under the Florida constitution.

Building 12 (The freshman building): The three story classroom building on the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Campus in which the targeted attack occurred on February 14, 2018.

Bump Stock: An after-market device that can be added to a semi-automatic rifle that increases its rate of fire.

Captain: A senior supervisor in a law enforcement agency above the level of lieutenant.
Chief: A title for a member of the command staff of a law enforcement organization.

Code Red: The alert that warns administrators, teachers and students that an attack is occurring which requires the campus to lock down and students not in safe areas to flee.

Command Post: The physical location at which the equipment and the incident commander is located.

Computer-aided dispatch (CAD): The method of dispatching and recording the dispatch of emergency services aided by computer hardware and software.

Crime Suppression Team (CST): A specially trained law enforcement unit with the ability to respond to violent situations.

Deputy: A sworn law enforcement officer.

Deputy Chief: A command staff position in a law enforcement agency below the level of chief.

Detective: A sworn law enforcement officer assigned investigative duties.

Dispatcher or Dispatch: The individual at a law enforcement base station or a 911 center that is listening to and broadcasting information to law enforcement or other first responder personnel.

Drywall: Common wall construction made up of panels of matrix material held in place by wood or metal supports.

Emergency Medical Services (EMS): Paramedics, ambulances and other medical resources that respond to emergencies and then transport victims to hospitals.

Exceptional Student Education (ESE): Federal and state educational programs for students aged 3 to 21 that have certain disabilities or are gifted.

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA): a federal law that protects the privacy of student educational records.
**Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP):** The funding formula that is adopted annually by the Florida legislature that allocates funding to county school districts.

**Fire Alarm Panel:** The centralized base panel that is attached to remote fire alarm sensors that provides information on the location and type of the alarm.

**Florida Congressional Delegation:** Refers collectively to the elected members of the United States House of Representative and United States Senate that represent the citizens of the State of Florida.

**Florida Identification Card:** An official card issued by the State of Florida that provides identification including age in lieu of a driver's license.

**Florida Safe Schools Assessment Tool (FSSAT):** A mandatory mechanism required by state law by which the school districts conduct and report physical site security assessments.

**FortifyFL:** A state wide app that facilitates public reporting of school security concerns to law enforcement and school districts.

**Geographic Position System:** An electronic device that identifies a specified physical location by latitude and longitude.

**Glow Stick:** A small tube that can be carried and caused to glow in different colors utilized to mark a location.

**Hard Corner:** The part of a class room or other school space that cannot be observed from outside of the room when the door is locked.

**Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA):** A federal law that protects the security of certain patient health information.

**Hot Zone:** An unsafe area in an active shooter event.

**Improvised Explosive Device (IED):** A homemade bomb.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

**Individual Education Plan; 504 Plan (IEP):** A plan prepared by professionals, the student and the student’s parents that sets out goals and mechanisms to achieve those goals for a student involved in Exceptional Student Education programs.

**Interoperability:** The capacity for different agency radio systems that allows the agency personnel to talk to each other.

**Junior Reserves Officer Training Corps (JROTC):** A youth development high school program sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense.

**Juvenile:** Defined in the criminal justice system as a person less than 18 years of age.

**K9:** A specially trained dog that works with a sworn police officer to form a team used in law enforcement activities.

**K-12:** The public and private school system including kindergarten through twelfth grade.

**Leakage:** Identified by the United States Secret Service; the term identifies the phenomena of telling, posting on line, or writing by an attacker about an attack in advance.

**Lieutenant (Lt):** A supervisory position in a law enforcement agency above a sergeant and below command staff.

**Long gun:** A term for a rifle.

**Mass Casualty Incident (MCI):** A designation applied to an event where multiple persons are injured or killed.

**Medic; SWAT medic; TAC medic:** An individual trained and certified in advanced first aid able to apply life saving techniques in field settings under difficult conditions.

**Memorandum of Understanding (MOU):** An agreement between two or more agencies that assigns responsibility for activities between the agencies.

**Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public Safety Commission (MSDPSC):** Twenty person commission established in Florida law to study and report on the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting and other mass violence incidents.
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (MSDHS): The high school in the Broward County Public School system that came under attack on February 14, 2018 resulting in the death of 17 persons and the wounding of 17 others.

Office of Safe Schools (OSS): A division of the Florida Department of Education.

Officer: A sworn police officer.

Patch: An electronic system that allows two or more different law enforcement radio systems to cross communicate.

Preventing Recidivism through Opportunities, Mentoring, Interventions, Supports and Education (PROMISE): A program designed to reduce school based arrests for minor offenses and provide second chances to school aged children.

Principal: The senior most administrative official in a school.

Public Access Line (PAL): A system operated by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation that provides around the clock opportunity for the public to report concerns.

Public Address System (PA): A system of interconnected microphones and speakers that allows information to be widely broadcasted.

Rescue Task Force (RTF): An ad-hoc group of trained medical personal that provide initial on-scene medical care in the hot and warm zones of a mass casualty event.

Safe Schools Allocation: An amount of funds set aside in the State of Florida budget that is allocated to county school systems.

Student with Emotional/Behavioral Disabilities (SEDNET) - Multiagency network that creates and facilitates a network of key stakeholders committed to assisting in the care for students with or at-risk of emotional and/or behavioral challenges.

Sergeant: A supervisory law enforcement position.
**School Environmental Safety Incident Reporting System (SESIR):** A mechanism for schools in Florida to report crime, violence and disruptive behaviors on school grounds and transportation.

**School Radio:** A radio system used by school personnel to exchange information with each other consisting of portable devices and a base station.

**School Resource Officer (SRO):** A sworn law enforcement officer assigned to work on a K-12 school campus.

**Security Specialist:** A non-sworn unarmed employee of the Broward County School system assigned general security duties.

**Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT):** A unit of a law enforcement agency that receives specialized training to carry out duties related to specific types of events.

**Tactical Operations Center (TOC):** A specialized command post to guide tactical police operations.

**Targeted attack:** A violent event planned and carried out with weapons and/or explosive devices by one or more persons frequently resulting in the wounding of individuals and loss of life.

**Threat Assessment Team (TAT):** A program required in every Florida school that is to identify and ameliorate threats from students.

**Throttling:** A technical term that is applied when a radio system is degraded because it has more transmissions occurring than it can handle.

**Tourniquet:** A medical device utilized to stop bleeding on an arm or leg.

**Triage area:** An area designated at the scene of a casualty event for first aide and for determining order of patients dispatched to hospitals.

**Uber:** A service that provides customers a ride from point to point similar to a taxi cab service.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

**Vest or Ballistic Vest**: Protective gear worn by law enforcement officers on the upper body.

**Warm Zone**: A clear, but not secure area in an active shooter event.
Additional Information and Resources


Information about “School Violence: Prevention” from the United States Department of Health and Human Services Center for Disease Control.
Information on the Safe Communities Safe Schools model. (2018). Available from [https://cspv.colorado.edu/](https://cspv.colorado.edu/)


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND RESOURCES


Information about the Broward County Sheriff’s Office. (2108). Available from http://www.sheriff.org/Pages/Home.aspx
Information about the Broward County Office of Regional Communications and Technology. (2018) Available from [https://www.sheriff.org/LE/Pages/CommunicationsDispatch-911.aspx](https://www.sheriff.org/LE/Pages/CommunicationsDispatch-911.aspx)


## APPENDIX A. SUBJECT LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Department</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alhadeff, Alyssa</td>
<td>Student (Deceased)</td>
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<td>Alfin, Dave (Detective)</td>
<td>Coral Springs Police Department</td>
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<td>Blaine, Katherine</td>
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<td>Ceciliano, Ivo</td>
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<td>Cooper, Deborah</td>
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<td>Cruz, Lynda Kumbatovich</td>
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<td>Cruz, Zachary</td>
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<td>Dajani, Brad</td>
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# APPENDIX A. SUBJECT LIST

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<tr>
<td>Dale, Jack (Colonel)</td>
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<td>Deschamps</td>
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Karpf, Laurie  M.D. Psychiatrist
Kozlowski, Bruce (Sgt.)  Coral Springs Police Department
Kratz. Michael (Deputy)  Broward Sheriff’s Office
Laman, Kyle  Student (Wounded)
Lasseter, Grant (Captain)  Broward Sheriff’s Office Fire Rescue/SWAT
Lees, Greg (Deputy Chief)  Coconut Creek Police Department
Leonard, Michael (Officer)  Coconut Creek Police Department
Loughran, Cara  Student (Deceased)
Lippel, Stacey  MSD Staff/ Teacher (Wounded)
Luthin, Martha  Henderson Behavioral Health Employee
MacLean, James (Officer)  Coral Springs Police Department
Mangapuram, Kheshava  Student (Wounded)
Marchese, Louis (Deputy)  Broward Sheriff’s Office
Mayor, Samantha  Student (Wounded)
Mazzei, Nicholas (Sgt.)  Coral Springs Police Department
McCoy, Chris (Lt.)  Broward Sheriff’s Office
McKenna, Chris  Student
McKeone, Brad (Deputy Chief)  Coral Springs Police Department
McNally, Michael (Chief)  Coral Springs Fire Department
McNeal, Brent  Florida Department of Education
Medina, Andrew  MSD Staff/Campus Monitor
Menescal, Daniela  Student (Wounded)
Miller, Brian (Sgt.)  Broward Sheriff’s Office
Mock, Brad (Captain)  Coral Springs Police Department
Molamphy, G. (Sgt.)  Broward Sheriff’s Office
Mondesir, Neil (Deputy)  Broward Sheriff’s Office
Montalto, Gina  Student (Deceased)
Monzon, Gil (Detective)  Coral Springs Police Department
Morford, Jeff  MSD Staff/Assistant Principal
## APPENDIX A. SUBJECT LIST

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<td>Pianelli, Michael (Deputy)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollack, Meadow</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polan, Jim (Colonel)</td>
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<td>Polo, Danny (Detective)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Popock, Brett (Officer)</td>
<td>Coral Springs Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Porter, Winfred</td>
<td>MSD Staff/Assistant Principal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pumariega, Carlos (Captain)</td>
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<td>Pustizzi, Tony (Chief)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ramos, Anna</td>
<td>MSD Staff/Campus Monitor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ramsay, Helena</td>
<td>Student (Deceased)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reed, Denise</td>
<td>MSD Staff/Assistant Principal in Charge</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reid, William (Sgt.)</td>
<td>Coral Springs Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robson, Steven (Captain)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title/Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rosario, Maximo</td>
<td>MSD Staff/Assistant Principal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rosende, Edward (Captain)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rospierski, Ernest</td>
<td>MSD Staff/Teacher</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rossman, Richard (Sgt.)</td>
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<td>Rozelle, Paul</td>
<td>Pinellas County Sheriff's Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rubenstein, Lauren</td>
<td>MSD Staff</td>
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<td>Schachter, Alex</td>
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<td>Schamis, Ivy</td>
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<td>Schentrup, Carmen</td>
<td>Student (Deceased)</td>
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<td>Schmidt, George (Officer)</td>
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<td>Schroy, Brett (Detective)</td>
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<td>Schaub, Timothy (Detective)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scott, Rick</td>
<td>Governor, State of Florida</td>
</tr>
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<td>Seward, Richard (Deputy)</td>
<td>Broward Sheriff's Office</td>
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<td>Sherlock, Chris (Deputy)</td>
<td>Broward Sheriff's Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simerka, Amanda</td>
<td>Ex-Employee of Camelot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sincoff, Steven</td>
<td>Henderson Behavioral Health Employee</td>
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<td>Sklar, Ian (Sgt.)</td>
<td>Broward Sheriff's Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Snead, James “JT”</td>
<td>Friend of Nikolas Cruz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soberon, George (Captain)</td>
<td>Coral Springs Police Department</td>
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<td>Stambaugh, Joshua (Deputy)</td>
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<td>Staubly, Brian</td>
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<td>Swadkins (Deputy)</td>
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<td>Taylor, David</td>
<td>MSD Staff/Campus Monitor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thompson, Ty</td>
<td>MSD Staff/Principal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treijs, G. (Deputy)</td>
<td>Broward Sheriff's Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Valdes, Roberto (Detective)</td>
<td>Broward Sheriff's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valentin, Gensis</td>
<td>Student (Wounded)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX A. SUBJECT LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Van Der Eems, Richard</td>
<td>Broward Sheriff's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volpe, Gennaro (Deputy)</td>
<td>Broward Sheriff's Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vullo, Giovanni (Sgt.)</td>
<td>Coral Springs Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wang, Peter</td>
<td>Student (Deceased)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wexler, Steven</td>
<td>Secret Service Agent, Retired</td>
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<tr>
<td>Whittington, Chad (Officer)</td>
<td>Coral Springs Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wikander, Ben</td>
<td>Student (Wounded)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wilford, Madeleine</td>
<td>Student (Wounded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilkins, Brian (Officer)</td>
<td>Coral Springs Police Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yurchuck, David (Deputy)</td>
<td>Broward Sheriff's Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Level 1 Recommendations: policies and practices that can be implemented quickly and require little or no funding

### Campus Access (Public)

Campuses should have single ingress and egress points to the extent that is consistent with this level’s criteria of minimal cost. (If cost is significant then it should be considered later in the hardening process).

Interior access should be limited by co-locating Attendance, Guidance, Main Office and other public business offices. (many schools have these functions spread throughout multiple locations on campus)

Clear signs should direct visitors to appropriate entry points. All entry/exit doors should indicate a closed campus and direct visitors to report to the front office.

Install a door alert or notification system to the main entry for visitor control. Non-essential visitors should be limited and when allowing visitors they should be required to show positive identification, state their purpose for entering the school, be issued a visitor badge and, when appropriate, have a staff escort during the entire time the person is inside the school.

Visitor management. All campus perimeter ingress and egress points shall be staffed when opened for student arrival and dismissal.

Each school should have a written campus access policy that is distributed to all personnel.

Staff members should be trained to challenge, if appropriate, or report anyone unauthorized to be on campus or any vehicle not parked in an authorized area.

### Campus Buildings (First Responders)

Ensure all campus doors and buildings are clearly marked with easily identifiable markings known to first responders. Mark exterior classroom windows so first responders can
APPENDIX B. TARGET HARDENING

identify classrooms from the exterior of the building.

Building numbers should be placed on the roof for aerial support.

Provide keys/access to on duty law enforcement so they can quickly enter the school.

**Campus Monitoring**

All school districts should allow law enforcement at its discretion to live monitor all existing camera systems at all schools within the district.

Multiple school staff members should be trained on the operation of campus monitoring systems.

**Building Exterior Doors**

There should be locks on all exterior/classroom doors and other areas where students assemble in mass (cafeterias, libraries, auditoriums). All doors should self-close and lock upon closing.

**Interior Classroom Doors/Windows**

All classroom doors should be able to be locked from inside or there must be an enforced policy that all doors remain locked at all times without exception.

Classroom doors should either have no windows or every door should be equipped with a device that can readily block line of sight through the window, but does not indicate occupancy.

First floor outside windows should be able to be blocked from line of sight.

Policies should include that doors be checked regularly throughout the school day to ensure they are secure.

**Communication**

There should be effective two-way communications between lockdown spaces and school administrators, SRO or law enforcement.
### APPENDIX B. TARGET HARDENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level II: May Require some low to moderate funding and a moderate implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ingress/Egress</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fenced campuses with single ingress and egress points (could be a level III based on campus size and complexity). All fencing should be constructed in a way or high enough to prevent easy climbing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use protective bollards at campus entrances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communications</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be redundant two-way communications systems in every classroom and student assembly area. All interior building hallways and exterior common areas where students or staff move about should be equipped with speakers tied to the school’s intercom system. This includes portable classrooms. Two-way communication systems are preferred but at least one-way notification systems are paramount.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common Areas (Locks)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All common use closed areas in a school should have electronically controlled doors that can be locked remotely or locally with appropriate hardware on single and double doors to resist forced entry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Install door sensors and cameras on all doors vulnerable to unauthorized access use by</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
students and staff to ensure all doors are locked at all times.

**Video Coverage**

Enhance current video surveillance systems to eliminate any interior/exterior gaps in camera coverage including front door access control.

Consider video surveillance systems capable of internet access that include first responder and emergency communications centers access via the internet during an emergency.

**Funding for High Tech Infrastructure**

DOE should ensure that each of the districts are fully aware and partaking in the E-rate program (also referred to as Schools and Libraries program) to fund and utilize current high speed broadband as it relates to school security i.e. enhancing camera and audio capability as technology is being implemented.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level III: May require moderate to significant funding, but no law or regulation changes and moderate to long term implementation</th>
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<tr>
<th>Doors/Windows (Some mentioned in Level II)</th>
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Install electronically controlled door systems.

Install ballistic resistant glass covering on classroom interior door windows.

Install door alert systems that can be monitored from a central location to determine if a door is closed or propped open.

Install classroom door windows that are small enough to restrict access and located a sufficient distance from the door handle to prevent a person from reaching through to unlock the door from the interior.

Install a ballistic glass vestibule or double door system at the single point of entry to limit entry for visitors and prevent or delay a perpetrator’s entrance to campus.
APPENDIX B. TARGET HARDENING

Parking and Bus Lots

All parking areas should be outside of the single point of entry perimeter.

Ensure that there is adequate lighting that allows for clear observation of all entry points and parking lots.

Bus loading and unloading areas should have physical separation from visitor parking, parent drop off and walkers.

Install GPS locators on all school buses

During a Lockdown

If a Code Red or other active assailant response is initiated, make sure that message is displayed on all computer screens connected to the school’s computer network.

Establish a system that notifies staff, district officials, parents and students off campus by email, text, and/or phone about an active assailant response being implemented.

Provide school personnel with a device that could be worn to immediately notify law enforcement of an emergency,

Other: May require significant funding and/or changes in laws or regulations and long term/multi-year implementation. If feasible, the following should be considered:

All school radio traffic should be recorded

Metal detectors and x-ray machines at campus entrances.

Implement real time crime centers or their equivalent with live video monitoring capability of all cameras on all school campuses.

Gunshot location sensor should be tied into camera system

Use tactical tablets that are directly fed to the E911 system.

RFID and Near field communications (NFC) card readers should replace all door locks on campus.
Install electronic message board in every classroom

New buildings or major renovations must include sensors that alert the office staff when exterior doors are not secured with electronic monitoring that automates the process of identifying the cause of the open door.

Shipping and receiving areas should be designed to allow access without breaching the single point of entry containment system and have electronic monitoring.

Interior corridors between classrooms should have the ability to electronically seal the movement of intruders but allow staff to move easily with electronic access control.

Faculty should be trained in “Stop the Bleed” procedures with adequate kits for all schools. This should be covered in First Aid Training with properly trained school personnel.
DATE: August 30, 2018

MEMO TO: Captain Christopher Mulligan
        Parkland District/DLE

FROM: Daniel Losey, Director
      Professional Standards Committee
      Department of Professional Standards

SUBJECT: DIVISION OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS CASE # 2018-0041
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF FINAL DISPOSITION

A final disposition of IA Case # 2018-0041 has been affirmed by the Sheriff’s designee. Attached to this memorandum is a copy of the action to be imposed against Deputy Edward Eason, CCN 10558. The discipline for Deputy Eason is: **Three Day (24 hours) Suspension**

After signing, please give a copy of this memo, with attachment, to the employee and forward THIS ORIGINAL MEMO ONLY to the Department of Professional Standards for filing even if the employee intends to appeal. Please provide verification of served discipline within 30 days after appeal time has expired (if applicable), in one of the formats indicated below:

- **X** Suspension: Please have timekeeper print the PeopleSoft Timecard Report for the employee indicating TRC code SNP for the day(s) of suspension and forward a copy to the Department of Professional Standards.

- **___ Written Reprimand:** Forward this memo to the Dept. of Professional Standards.

  
  **Received by Supervisor**

  **Date**

  **Received by Employee**

  **Date**

**Dates Suspension Served**

  **DL/dda**

  **Enc**
DATE: August 30, 2018

MEMO TO: Colonel John Dale, Executive Director
Department of Professional Standards

FROM: Daniel Losey, Director
Professional Standards Committee
Department of Professional Standards

SUBJECT: Division of Internal Affairs Case # 2018-0041
Final Disposition

On 06/20/2018, the Professional Standards Committee reviewed IA Case # 2018-0041. The Committee sustained the following allegations involving Deputy Edward Eason, CCN 10558, and recommended disposition as indicated:

Allegations: SPM 2.4 Meeting BSO Standards, to wit: DLE SOP 3.6.1 (B) Reporting Requirements

Subsequently, the Professional Standards Committee recommended:

3 Day Suspension

On 08/15/2018, Deputy Edward Eason and his representative attended a Pre-Disciplinary Conference. Deputy Eason had an opportunity to provide documents, information and testimony related to this case. The final recommendation is as follows:

X Professional Standards Committee recommendation

Command recommendation

Upon your approval, the final action will be imposed.

APPROVED
Colonel John Dale
Dept. of Professional Standards

DATE 8/30/18

NOT APPROVED
Colonel John Dale
Dept. of Professional Standards

DL/dda

cc: Major Nathan Osgood, Patrol Region North/DLE
Captain Christopher Mulligan, Parkland/DLE
Deputy Edward Eason, Parkland/DLE
Andi Nelson, Esq., IUPA
INTERNAL MEMO

Date: August 30, 2018

To: Colonel John D. Dale, Executive Director
   Department of Professional Standards & Investigations

From: Director Daniel Losey, Chairman
       Department of Professional Standards Committee

Subject: Deputy Edward Eason, 10558
         IA Case # 2018-0041
         Pre-Disciplinary Conference

Explanation:

On February 21, 2018, BSO Internal Affairs began an investigation regarding Deputy Edward Eason, CCN 10558, handling of an incident on February 5, 2016.

On February 5, 2016, Deputy Eason was dispatched to call a complainant who alleged that her son advised her that another juvenile posted a photo of himself, with a gun, on Instagram. The juvenile posted that he was going to shoot his school. After calling the complainant Deputy Eason did not complete an Incident Report but made certain entries into the CAD (Computer Added Dispatch) notes more specifically, Deputy Eason noted that a female caller, who wanted to remain anonymous, reported that a kid named Nikolas Cruz from Douglas High School, had knives and a BB gun in his Instagram photos. Deputy Eason went on to note that there were no threats and the information was forwarded to School Resource Deputy Peterson at the school.

The result of the Internal Affairs Investigation alleged that Deputy Eason violated SPM 2.4, Meeting BSO Standards; to wit: DLE SOP 3.6.1 (B) Reporting Requirements.

On June 20, 2018, this investigation was presented to the members of the Professional Standards Committee for their recommendation. The members of the Professional Standards Committee recommended that the allegation be Sustained and that Deputy Eason receive a Three (3) Day Suspension.

After reviewing all of the above information I also reviewed Deputy Eason’s disciplinary history. Significantly, in 2010 Deputy Eason was suspended for One (1) Day for his failure to properly follow upon a call for service. Later in 2010 Deputy Eason was suspended for Two (2) Days for his failure to properly handle another call for service. Specifically, Deputy Eason failed to complete an Incident Report when a report was necessary.
In Consideration of all of the particular facts in this case and Deputy Eason's prior disciplinary history I concur with the recommendation by the Professional Standards Committee.

DL/dda
Pre-Disciplinary Conference

The following is a Pre-Disciplinary conference for Deputy Edward Eason, CCN 10558 regarding Division of Internal Affairs case number 2018-0041. Today’s date is August 15th, 2018 and the time is 3:00pm.

I, Director Dan Losey, will be conducting this hearing and present also are Andi Nelson, Capt. J. Jordan, Sgt. Oliva, Sgt. Kearney, Lt. B. Lindquist

1. Did you or your representative have access to the Internal Affairs Investigative Report and the entire case file? Yes

2. Do you understand the factual nature of the allegations and the discipline recommended? (SPM 2.4 Meeting BSO Standards, to wit: DLE SOP 3.6.1(B) Reporting Requirements; 3 Day Suspension)

3. Do you have any additional witnesses whose version of the events should be considered? Yes

4. Any additional document(s) or other matters which should be considered? No (Identify each document and matter and their importance).

5. Do you have any complaints concerning the investigation or disciplinary process? No (Have employee identify each complaint and basis for such).

6. Would you like to make any additional statements, comments or explanation that need to be considered prior to the final determination of disciplinary action? Yes

This pre-disciplinary conference concludes on August 15th, 2018 at ____________________

DISCIPLINARY RECOMMENDATION

X Concur

____ Not Concur; Recommended Discipline: ____________________.

Director Dan Losey (initial)
**BROWARD COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE**  
**INTERNAL AFFAIRS**  
**INVESTIGATIVE REPORT**

**IA #: 2018-0041**  
**DATE: May 30, 2018**

**INVESTIGATION INITIATION DATE:** February 23, 2018  
**PERIOD TOLLED:** N/A  
**180th DAY:** August 22, 2018  
**INVESTIGATOR:** Sergeant Hector Oliva, CCN 10526  
**COMPLAINANT:** Sheriff's Policy Manual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT EMPLOYEE</th>
<th>Edward Eason, CCN 10558</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**SHERIFF'S POLICY:**  
1. SPM 2.4, Meeting BSO Standards; to wit: DLE SOP 3.6.1(B), Reporting Requirements

**COMMAND:** Department of Law Enforcement / Parkland District

**DATE OF HIRE:** October 16, 2000  
**RANK:** Deputy Sheriff / DLE  
**DATE OF MOST RECENT PROMOTION:** N/A  
**PROBATION STATUS:** N/A  
**BARGAINING UNIT:** International Union of Police Associations (IUPA)
INTRODUCTION:

On February 5, 2016, Deputy Eason responded to 6255 NW 80th Terrace, Parkland, FL, in reference to a complaint made by a third party that Nikolas Cruz planned to shoot up a school (17-1602-000212). Per the complainant, Nikolas Cruz had posted a picture on Instagram of him in possession of a firearm. This was reported to be a one month time delay and it did not specify which school. Per CAD entry, Deputy Eason made contact with an anonymous female who reported that Nikolas Cruz from Douglas High School has knives and a BB gun in his Instagram photos. Deputy Eason wrote that no threats were noted and he forwarded the information to the SRD Deputy Scot Peterson, CCN 4308.

On February 17, 2018, Detectives Kami Floyd, CCN 17022, and Bruce Link, CCN 10154, obtained a sworn statement from the caller (Ms. Joelle Guarino). She advised that her son saw the Instagram post, which had a picture of a gun and stated that something similar to "I am going to get this gun when I turn 18 and shoot up the school." Per Ms. Guarino, Deputy Eason had contacted Ms. Cruz, who stated that Nikolas Cruz did not have anything like that on his Instagram page. Ms. Guarino did not take a snap shot of the post when her son showed it to her and it was no longer posted for them to show Deputy Eason. Deputy Eason coded the call "Bravo" and did not prepare an incident report.

ALLEGATION(S):

1. It is alleged that on February 5, 2016, Deputy Edward Eason did not complete an Incident Report regarding an unusual circumstance in which the caller was concerned for the safety of life, in violation of SPM 2.4, Meeting BSO Standards; to-wit: DLE SOP 3.6.1 (B), Reporting Requirements.

THE FOLLOWING SHERIFF’S POLICIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITH RESPECT TO THE ALLEGATION(S):

1. SPM 2.4, Meeting BSO Standards

   A. Employees will perform their duties properly and assume the responsibilities of their position.

      • DLE SOP 3.6.1, Incident Report / Supplement

   B. Unless unusual circumstances are present, and no violations of law/criminal activity exist, the following types of incidents will not require an Incident Report:

      1. Animal Complaint Complaints of barking, injured, or loose animals (including reptiles)
      2. Police
3. Civil Assistance/Civil Matters
4. Traffic (Noncriminal)
5. Open Door/Window: No evidence of entry
6. Emergency Messages
7. Alarm
8. Bar/Business or Other Sensitive Area Check
9. Foot Patrol
10. Disabled Vehicle
11. Complaint Refusal/Lack of Information/No Violation Observed:
   Canceled by complainant in noncriminal calls; complainant is Gone on Arrival (GOA) and there is no indication of a crime or suspicious/unusual circumstance; false reports; wrong or no such address; no violation or unusual circumstance observed; etc.
12. Off-Duty Assist
13. Field Contact
14. Crash Investigation: Settled on the scene

INVESTIGATION:

On February 21, 2018, this case was assigned to me by Executive Lieutenant Barry Lindquist, CCN 13979, from the Division of Internal Affairs.

I obtained and reviewed the Incident Details in reference to Incident Number L17160205000212. The incident date is listed as February 5, 2016, at 11:44:50 hours. The incident is classified as a Suspicious Incident. The call was received by Communications Operator III George Ramos, CCN 17444. Communications Operator III Jamie Benson, CCN 5328, dispatched the call and assigned it to Deputy Edward Eason, CCN 10558 (17B3). The comments in the call summary state the following:

11:44:50 hours – The complainant’s son told her that the neighbor’s son said on Instagram that he was going to shoot his school and there are pictures of the juvenile with guns. The complainant advised this happened about a month ago. The complainant advised that the juvenile subject was expelled from Westlake Middle School and now goes to another school, possibly a high school but the name is not known. The complainant advised that the subject lives 3 houses down from hers, on the opposite side of the street. The complainant is not home at this time. Have a unit call her. (Entered by Communication Operator George Ramos)

11:45:12 hours – (Communications Operator Jamie Benson dispatches the call to 17B3/Deputy Eason. The incident signal is updated from “Information” to “Suspicious Incident”)

11:46:28 hours – (17B3/Deputy Eason advises that he’s en route to the Parkland District Office to call the complainant)
11:51:00 hours – (17B3/Deputy Eason advised that he has arrived at the Parkland District Office)

12:43:24 hours – (Deputy Eason entered the following comment into the CAD notes) The female, who wanted to remain anonymous, reported that a kid named Nikolas Cruz from Douglas High School, has knives and a BB gun in his Instagram photos. No threats were noted and information was forwarded to SRD (School Resource Deputy) Peterson at the school.

12:59:00 hours – (Deputy Eason adds the following comment into the CAD notes) The photos were posted over a month ago.

The disposition for the call is B (Bravo) – No written report.

I obtained and reviewed the sworn, recorded witness statement taken by Sergeant Jonathan Brown, CCN 11100, of the BSO Criminal Investigations Division Homicide Unit, from Deputy Eason. The statement was taken at the Public Safety Building on Friday, February 16, 2018, in reference to criminal case 17-1802-000525, as part of a criminal investigation regarding the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (MSDHS) which involved the subject, Nikolas J. Cruz, white male, date of birth September 24, 1998. The following is a synopsis of the statement:

Deputy Eason advised that he has worked for the Broward Sheriff’s Office for approximately eighteen years. Eason added that he had been assigned to the Parkland District for approximately five years as a road patrol deputy, and as a SRD (School Resource Deputy) periodically. Eason explained that he was last an SRO at West Glades Middle School, where he was assigned for the first two months of the 2017-2018 school year. Eason stated that on February 5, 2016, he was assigned to the Parkland District as a road patrol deputy. Eason confirmed that he wore a uniform, drove a marked unit, and he was dispatched to calls via the radio and the computer CAD system.

Sergeant Brown explained to Deputy Eason that there was a lot of material that was being investigated regarding the criminal investigation of the shooting incident at MSDHS. Brown advised that the investigation was very in-depth and encompassed a lot. Brown further explained the purpose of the statement was to go back and figure out what happened in Cruz’s history.

Sergeant Brown asked Deputy Eason if he remembered a call he received on February 5, 2016 at approximately 11:44 AM, while showing him the CAD notes to refresh his memory, and Eason replied, “I do not.” Brown asked if Eason did not remember the call at all, and Eason replied that it had been over two years ago and he did not remember. Brown further asked if the CAD notes refreshed his memory and Eason replied, “No.” Eason advised that he received between one and twelve to fifteen calls on any given day in Parkland.

Sergeant Brown asked Deputy Eason if he knew the SRD (School Resource Deputy) at MSDHS and Eason replied that he did and identified the SRD as Deputy Scot Peterson, CCN 4308. Eason stated that he knew Peterson for approximately five years and Eason had assisted Peterson on various calls
at the school. Eason advised that road patrol received many calls involving the school and deputies usually contacted Peterson immediately if there was a call regarding the school. Eason added that the contact was to let Peterson know and to assist him in handling issues at the school.

Sergeant Brown read the CAD comments to Deputy Eason and asked Eason if he received calls like that frequently, where the caller provided information about a student or an incident related to the school. Eason replied that over the years, he had received dozens of calls like that, directly or indirectly. Eason stated that if any information was obtained from a caller, regarding the school, he would usually call the SRD and give them the information. Eason added that the SRD could then conduct an investigation at their school. Eason advised that Deputy Peterson was very interested with anything related to his school. Eason stated that in the case of the February 5, 2016, call, he did not recall, but he would have called him, to notify him and give him the information received. Eason advised that on that occasion, the caller wished to remain anonymous. Brown asked Eason again if he remembered that particular call, and Eason replied, “No, I don’t.” When asked by Brown what Peterson did with the information he was provided by deputies, Eason replied he would do an investigation at the school and handle it with the school board. Brown asked Eason how he regularly notified a SRD of any information obtained and Eason replied that it was usually a phone call, usually while he was still on the dispatched call. Eason advised that he also emailed Peterson in the past, but he did not remember emailing him on that occasion. Brown asked Eason what Peterson’s usual response was to any information provided and Eason replied that he wanted the information and he was usually very interested in those details. Eason added that Peterson had a good relationship with the students and staff, he wanted the information and would follow up with that information later.

Sergeant Brown asked Deputy Eason if he ever met or knew of Nikolas Cruz, and Eason replied that he did not, that he knew of. Brown asked Eason if he remembered talking to anyone about the call and he replied, “I don’t remember anything about the call.” Brown asked Eason if he would ever do some follow-up for a call after providing information to Deputy Peterson, and Eason replied that it was rare, but he would do something off campus to assist, if Peterson needed him to. Eason added that Peterson had never reached out to him for that type of assistance.

It should be noted that prior to concluding the statement, Sergeant Brown asked Deputy Eason if he had provided the statement on a voluntary basis, and Eason’s response was, “Yes.” Eason also confirmed that he had not been coerced or persuaded in any way, to provide the statement.

[End of synopsis]

I also obtained and reviewed the sworn, recorded witness statement taken by Detective Jeffrey Curtis, CCN 15795, of the BSO Criminal Investigations Division Homicide Unit, from Deputy Scot Peterson. The statement was taken at the Public Safety Building on Friday, February 16, 2018, in reference to criminal case 17-1802-000525, as part of a criminal investigation regarding the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (MSDHS) which involved the subject, Nikolas J. Cruz, white male, date of birth September 24, 1998. Also present was
Detective John Curcio, CCN 16048. The following is a synopsis of the portion of the statement that is relevant to my investigation:

Deputy Peterson confirmed that he knew Deputy Eason, and that Eason was a Parkland deputy. Detective Curtis asked Peterson if he recalled Eason telling him or talking to him about contact Eason made with a person that lived a couple of houses away from Nikolas Cruz, concerning suspicious online posts, and Peterson replied, “No.” Curtis elaborated that he would have learned about that incident in February 2016, and Peterson replied, “I don’t recall, I don’t recall that.”

[End of synopsis]

I obtained and reviewed the sworn, recorded witness statement of Ms. Joelle Guarino. The statement was taken by Detective Bruce Link, CCN 10154, of the BSO Criminal Investigations Division Special Victims Unit. This statement was taken on February 17, 2018, at Ms. Guarino’s home residence, located at 6255 NW 88 Terrace, in the City of Parkland, in reference to criminal case 17-1802-000525, as part of a criminal investigation regarding the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (MSDHS) which involved the subject, Nikolas J. Cruz, white male, date of birth September 24, 1998. Also present was Detective Kami Floyd, CCN 17022, of the BSO Criminal Investigations Division Special Victims Unit. The following is a synopsis of the statement:

Ms. Guarino confirmed that she made the 9-1-1 call on February 5, 2016 at 11:44 AM, in reference to case number 17-1602-000212. Detective Link read Guarino the CAD comments of the call and she confirmed that the synopsis was correct and she remembered making the call. When asked what prompted her to make the call, Guarino replied that her son showed her an Instagram or Snapchat that Nikolas Cruz had written where he stated that he was going to get a gun and shoot up the school. Guarino stated that after seeing that, she called 9-1-1, and a deputy came out to her home. Guarino added that she told the deputy what she knew about Nikolas, and she recalled that the deputy went down to the Cruz residence to speak with Nikolas and his mother. Link asked Guarino if she knew who Nikolas was prior to her showing her the post and she replied that she knew Nikolas since he was a baby. Guarino stated that the deputy walked to the nearby Cruz residence and Nikolas’ mother told him essentially that Nikolas was a great kid and he would never post anything like that on Instagram. Guarino added that she did not take a picture of the online post and her son did not save it, so there was no record of it. Guarino further added that it was one of those posts that would show up then disappear a short time later, but she reiterated that she saw it herself. Guarino described the post as also showing a picture of a gun and something to the effect that Nikolas was going to get that particular gun when he turned 18 years old, and shoot up the school. Guarino recalled that the deputy came back to her residence and told her that the post was protected by the First Amendment right of free speech. Guarino stated that she asked if she could stop Nikolas from buying a gun when he turned 18 years old, but the deputy responded that his right to later purchase a firearm was protected by his Second Amendment rights and there was basically nothing that could be done at that time. Guarino stated that after speaking with the deputy and realizing nothing could be done, the deputy left.
Detective Link asked Guarino if she had any interaction with Cruz’s family after that and she replied that she was in fear of Nikolas Cruz and she also kept her kids away from him. Guarino added that she kept her distance, but she’d wave and try to keep Nikolas calm, because he’d been so destructive through the years. Guarino further added that Nikolas had destroyed her property, hurt her children, and hurt her dog, so she kept away from him. Guarino confirmed for Detective Link that her son, Zachary Guarino, was the person that showed her Nikolas’ post, and that Zachary was 16 years old at that time. Guarino advised that her son had been attending Center Academy, a private school in the area, and she believed that Nikolas was attending Stoneman Douglas High School at the time. Guarino confirmed that the picture of the gun in the post looked like a picture that Nikolas found online, and she also confirmed that Nikolas was absolutely the person that had made the online post. Guarino confirmed again that it came from his Snapchat or Instagram account, and that she did not take a picture of the post.

[End of synopsis]

On February 23, 2018, I contacted Lt. Michael Devita, CCN 7523, and requested the daily roster for Deputy Eason’s shift from February 5, 2016 (Bravo Shift/6:00 AM-6:00 PM). I received the Parkland District Payroll/Daily Roster via email and saw that Eason was assigned the call sign of 17B3 that day. I also saw that Deputy Richard Seward, CCN 11290, was the OIC (Officer in Charge) that day due to the only sergeant assigned to the shift, Sergeant Jeanne Tedesco, CCN 10385, being absent on annual leave and Restricted Administrative Assignment.

On February 27, 2018, I met with Communications Operator III George Ramos, CCN 17444, at the South Regional Dispatch Site in Pembroke Pines, FL and obtained a sworn, recorded employee witness statement in reference to this incident. The following is a synopsis of his statement:

Operator Ramos confirmed that he has been employed by BSO since October 2014, and he has been assigned to the South Regional Dispatch Site for approximately 3 years. Prior to starting the statement, I showed Ramos the CAD notes for case number 17-1603-000212, handled by Deputy Eason, to help refresh his memory. I asked Ramos if he recalled the incident relating to the CAD notes and he replied, “Not particularly, no.” I asked Ramos if he had any independent recollection of taking that call, and he replied, “No.” I asked Ramos if it was accurate to say that he did take the 9-1-1 call that day, which was listed in the CAD notes, and he replied, “Yes.” Ramos also confirmed that the comments written in the call did look like comments that he would have written. I asked Ramos to explain the process when he put that information into the system and he explained that he would take the information from the caller, enter the notes into the system, and the dispatcher would be responsible for dispatching it to the deputy. Ramos confirmed the dispatcher in this case that was responsible for dispatching the call to the deputy, was Operator Jamie Benson. I asked Ramos if it was unusual for him to receive calls like the one documented in the CAD notes, and he replied that it was not unusual. Ramos added that calls about threats made against people and schools are common. I asked Ramos if the call he received, based on the CAD notes, was anything that he would have notified a supervisor about and he replied, “No.” Ramos also confirmed that the CAD
notes stated that the deputy handled the incident over the phone, as requested by the caller.

[End of synopsis]

On February 28, 2018, I met with Communications Operator III Jamie Benson, CCN 5328, at the North Regional Dispatch Site in Coconut Creek, FL and obtained a sworn, recorded employee witness statement in reference to this incident. The following is a synopsis of her statement:

Operator Benson confirmed that she has been employed by BSO for 29 years, and she has been assigned to the North Regional Dispatch Site for approximately 4 years. Prior to starting the statement, I showed Benson the CAD notes for case number 17-1603-000212, handled by Deputy Eason, to help refresh her memory. I asked Benson if she had any recollection of that incident, and she replied, “No, not at all.” Benson stated that her dispatch site handled calls from all over Broward County. I asked Benson if it was unusual for her to receive calls like the one documented in the CAD notes, and she replied that now it was common, but it was not common in 2016. I asked Benson if the call she dispatched, based on the CAD notes, was anything that she would have notified a supervisor about and she replied, “Now in 2018, definitely, but 2016, it was delayed, it was second, third hand from a friend or neighbor. No, unless it was in progress.”

[End of synopsis]

On February 28, 2018, I met with civilian witness Joelle Guarino, at her place of employment, located at 11776 W. Sample Road, Suite 102, in Coral Springs, FL and obtained a sworn, recorded witness statement in reference to this incident. The following is a synopsis of her statement:

Ms. Guarino confirmed that she recalled providing BSO Detectives with a sworn statement on February 17, 2018, in reference to the criminal investigation of the Parkland shooting. I asked Guarino on record if it was possible that she mixed up some facts during her first statement, due to statements she made to me over the phone about the deputy possibly never having gone to Nikolas Cruz’s residence. Guarino explained during that phone call that she had mixed up different responses by BSO deputies, due to having called them more than once for issues with Cruz. Guarino replied that she remembered the deputy responding to her home on February 5, 2016, but she did not think the deputy went to the Cruz residence. Guarino recalled that she was really afraid and she remembered the deputy telling her there was nothing he could do. Guarino recalled that she called 9-1-1 and the deputy responded out to her home. I asked Guarino to tell me again what happened on that date and she replied that when the deputy arrived, she told him what her son had shown her in reference to the online post and she also told the deputy the history of Nikolas Cruz (in reference to the issues she’d had with him over the years). Guarino stated that she hoped that the deputy could prevent Cruz from being able to buy a gun when he turned 18, but the deputy replied that he did not have the power to do that. Guarino added that she was “kinda pleading with him to help,” but the deputy told her the law, which she understood, that Nikolas was not an immediate danger, because
he was only 17 and did not own any firearms at the time. Guarino added that she understood the deputy’s explanation. Guarino further added she remembered the deputy asking her if she wanted him to go by the nearby Cruz residence, but she did not remember if the deputy ever went there.

I asked Ms. Guarino to clarify for the record why she had called for a deputy to respond to her residence, and she replied that her son had shown her an online post made by Nikolas Cruz that said that he couldn’t wait to turn 18 to buy a gun, with a stock photo of a gun attached. Guarino added that Nikolas also made an online post that said something about wanting to shoot up the school. When I asked, Guarino clarified that it was two separate online posts made by Nikolas and that they were not posted on the same day. Guarino advised that she did not call to report the posts until she spoke with co-workers about them and they urged her to call the police to report it. Guarino stated that the first post from Nikolas about purchasing a gun happened a while prior to her calling the police, but the second post about shooting up the school occurred approximately one to two days prior to her calling the police. I asked Guarino what the deputy told her when he showed up and she replied that she asked him about the Baker Act. Guarino explained that she specifically asked if Nikolas could be Baker Acted and the deputy replied that the Baker Act would only apply if Nikolas was an immediate threat to himself or others. Guarino added that because this was a threat made in advance and essentially an empty threat because Nikolas did not have the means to shoot anyone, Guarino felt that the deputy did all he could do in that situation. Guarino confirmed that she told the deputy that she wished to remain anonymous. Guarino added that the deputy asked her if she wanted him to speak with Nikolas’ family, but she replied that she did not remember what she specifically told him. Guarino stated that she wanted the deputy to do something, but he had already told her that there was nothing he could do in that situation.

Ms. Guarino confirmed that the deputy was very courteous, she felt that he listened to her situation, and she was very happy with the service he provided that day. I asked Guarino if she felt that the deputy handled the situation properly, she replied, “I do, yeah, for sure.” Guarino confirmed that the deputy identified himself when she spoke with him, but she did not remember his name because of the time delay. I read Guarino the comments entered in the CAD notes by Deputy Eason, to confirm their accuracy based on Guarino’s recollection, and she was sure that the photo posted by Nikolas was that of a real gun, not a BB gun, as listed by Eason in the notes. She added that it wasn’t a gun belonging to Nikolas, it was a picture of a gun, similar to one found in an internet search. I asked Guarino if that post with the gun was made approximately one month prior, as stated by Eason in the CAD notes, and she replied that it was “somewhere around there.” I asked Guarino if she had anything to add in reference to her interaction with the deputy, and she replied that it was the law that was frustrating. Guarino added that she thought the deputy did a good job and, “For what he had to deal with, I thought he did a good job.” I asked Guarino if she ever demanded or requested a police report from the deputy, and she replied, “No, I didn’t.” I asked Guarino if the deputy provided her with a case number, and she first replied that he did not, but changed her response to, “But then again, it’s two years ago. I could have, I don’t remember.” I asked Guarino how many times she had called 9-1-1 for any issues related to Nikolas Cruz, and she replied that she remembered a total of three occasions. Guarino explained that two were for this incident, and a rock throwing incident between Nikolas and her son several years prior. Guarino added that the third incident was related to
her son’s vehicle being damaged by a rock, and she suspected that Nikolas was the culprit. However, Guarino stated that she could never prove that Nikolas was the person that caused the damage. I asked Guarino again if it was possible she might have confused some of the details of this call with the previous rock throwing incident, and she replied, “Yes.”

[End of synopsis]

After meeting with Ms. Guarino, I conducted a search of Instagram and Snapchat in an attempt to locate the posts made by Nikolas Cruz that had been viewed by Guarino and her son, but I confirmed that those posts were no longer available.

On February 28, 2018, I met with Deputy Richard Seward, CCN 11290, at the Peppertree Plaza, located at 5438 West Sample Road in Margate, FL, and obtained a sworn, recorded employee witness statement in reference to this incident. The following is a synopsis of his statement:

Deputy Seward confirmed that he has been a law enforcement officer for the last 30 years. Seward has been employed with BSO for approximately 17 years, and prior to that he was a City of North Lauderdale police officer for approximately 13 years, before the city police department was absorbed by BSO. Seward also confirmed that he has been assigned to the Parkland District since March of 2013. On record, I confirmed with Seward that prior to initiating my statement, I had shown him the Parkland District Payroll/Daily Roster for February 5, 2016, in an effort to refresh his memory. Seward confirmed that the shift supervisor, (now retired) Sergeant Jeanne Tedesco, CCN 10385, was on Restricted Administrative Assignment at that time and she was not working that day. Seward also confirmed that he was the OIC (Officer in Charge) that day, in lieu of Sergeant Tedesco. I asked Seward if that was a duty that he regularly had in the district, and he replied that he typically filled in for the extra 4 hours on Tedesco’s 8 hour days. Seward also confirmed that he supervised that shift as the OIC for approximately 1 year due to Tedesco’s restricted status. I asked Seward what his duties were as the shift OIC, and he replied his responsibilities were conducting roll calls and “handling” the radio. I asked Seward if he also completed supervisory paperwork or reviewed reports as part of his OIC duties, and he replied that he did not. Seward added that he may have possibly completed a Supervisory Use of Force Report, but he definitely did not review the Incident Reports of other deputies. On record, I confirmed with Seward that prior to initiating my statement I had shown him the CAD notes for case number 17-1602-000212, from February 5, 2016, in an effort to refresh his memory. I asked Seward if he remembered that particular call being broadcast over the radio, and he replied, “I do not. No recollection.” I asked Seward if anything about the call stuck out in his memory after reading the call notes, and he replied, “No sir.” I asked Seward if Deputy Eason had ever talked to him about that call, and he replied that he did not.

[End of synopsis]

On February 28, 2018, I met with Lieutenant Michael Devita, CCN 7523, at the BSO Parkland District Office in Parkland, FL and obtained a sworn, recorded employee witness statement in
reference to this incident. The following is a synopsis of his statement:

Lieutenant Devita confirmed that he has been employed by BSO for almost 25 years and he has been assigned as the Parkland District Executive Lieutenant since February of 2015. Devita also confirmed that he was the District Executive Lieutenant on February 5, 2016. On record, Devita confirmed that he had provided me with a copy of the Parkland District Payroll/Daily Roster for February 5, 2016, after I previously requested it from him. Devita confirmed that Sergeant Tedesco was on Restricted Administrative Assignment that day and thus, Deputy Seward was the OIC (Officer in Charge) for the shift. I asked Devita if the usage of OIC’s was common in the Parkland District, and he replied that they were, because each shift was only assigned one sergeant. Devita added that Seward was chosen as an OIC due to his vast experience, police knowledge, and his influence on the squad. Devita further stated that Seward was seen as an older brother by the deputies on the shift and Seward was used as an OIC often. Devita stated that Seward’s position as an OIC had the same responsibilities as the shift sergeant. I asked Devita if that included reviewing reports, and he elaborated that he did not allow OICs to review or approve reports. Devita reasoned that he felt that responsibility should remain with a sergeant, even if it was the criminal investigations sergeant and not the regular shift sergeant.

On record, I confirmed with Lieutenant Devita that prior to initiating my statement I had shown him the CAD notes for case number 17-1602-000212, from February 5, 2016, in an effort to refresh his memory. I asked Devita his opinion, on whether or not an Incident Report should have been completed by Deputy Eason, based on the information available in the CAD notes. Devita replied that the comments typed by the 9-1-1 call taker were very disturbing, but he was trying to look at that call from a frame of mind prior to the recent shooting incident. Devita stated that it appeared that Eason went through some investigative steps and he indicated that he notified the school resource deputy at Stoneman Douglas High School, after Eason discovered that Nikolas Cruz was a student there. Devita added that there was certainly no harm in Eason writing a report, and it was Devita’s personal policy for a deputy to write a report if they were on the fence about completing one. Devita stated that in that instance, the complainant wanted to remain anonymous, which presented some difficulty with completing an accurate report. Devita added that he was having a hard time indicating if Eason absolutely should have written a report in that instance. Devita further added that Eason did take some steps to investigate and noted the information in the CAD notes, but an Incident Report with some additional investigative steps would have been prudent and a much better decision for Eason at that time. Devita stated that Eason trying to make contact with Cruz or his parents to explain a public concern, would have likely been outlined in such a report and it would have shown a little more diligence in the deputy’s actions. Devita advised he would expect to see that effort, but it was hard to say when Eason did not have a cooperative reporting person that wished to have their information in the report. Devita added that it presented some problems for the deputy in this case. Devita stated that to be fair, without using hindsight, he would like to have seen more of an investigative effort on the part of Eason, and that would’ve been outlined in a report. Devita added that he did not feel like Eason “shrugged” his duties that day either. Devita further added that if he had seen the CAD notes two weeks after the call took place, he would understand why a report would not have been completed, due to the complainant wanting to remain anonymous and the
Instagram posts no longer existing. I advised Devita that this situation needed to be looked at from the perspective of two years prior, without hindsight, and Devita agreed while stating, “That’s why I’m trying to be fair here.” Devita added that we had all felt this tragedy and we have to keep a level head and look at things as they were back then.

[End of synopsis]

On February 23, 2018, I called Deputy Eason’s IUPA representative, Andi Nelson, and requested that she ask Eason if he would voluntarily attempt to obtain a copy of his February 2016 cellular phone bill. I advised Nelson that it could be beneficial for Eason to provide evidence of any communication between him and Deputy Peterson during that timeframe, to further that Eason had notified Peterson of the information he obtained during case number 17-1602-000212.

On March 1, 2018, I obtained and reviewed Deputy Eason’s archived BSO emails from Information Technology Manager Guillermo Marsal, CCN 8029. I examined the emails in their entirety and determined that there had been no email communication between Eason and Deputy Peterson, in reference to the information obtained by Eason from case number 17-1602-000212. Additionally, there were no emails that mentioned Nikolas Cruz, or any other information about him.

On March 2, 2018, I obtained and reviewed Deputy Peterson’s School Resource Officer Monthly Report for February of 2016. Peterson did not note any information obtained from Deputy Eason about Nikolas Cruz or any of the information gathered during case number 17-1602-000212.

I conducted a search of all the calls received or initiated in the Parkland District on February 5, 2016, between the hours of 6:00 AM and 6:00 PM (Deputy Eason’s shift). A review of those calls determined that the district received or initiated eleven service calls during that twelve hour time period. A review of those individual calls revealed that Deputy Eason responded to a total of three documented calls during his shift that day. All three of those calls (case numbers 17-1602-000212, 17-1602-000213, and 17-1602-000216) were handled by Eason and coded out B-Bravo, indicating that a written report was not completed. Additionally, a review of the Parkland District Payroll/Daily Roster indicated that 7 deputies were working on road patrol on February 5, 2016, for all or some of the hours of the 6:00 AM to 6:00 PM shift. It should be noted that another deputy was also working that shift, however, he was on light duty and was working at the front desk of the Parkland District.

I searched Evidence.com for case number 17-1602-000212, but no video evidence existed. I examined the current list of BSO deputies that had been issued body worn cameras (BWC), and determined that Deputy Eason was issued his BWC on August 8, 2016, approximately six months after the date of Ms. Guarino’s call.

On March 15, 2018, I met with Information Technology Manager Guillermo Marsal, CCN 8029, at the Division of Internal Affairs and obtained a sworn, recorded employee witness statement in reference to this incident. The following is a synopsis of his statement:
Guillermo Marsal confirmed he was the Network Manager of Operations for the Broward Sheriff’s Office for the last 21 years, and he has been employed by the agency for approximately 22 years. Marsal also confirmed that he previously received my request for Deputy Eason’s archived emails from the timeframe around February 5, 2016, and that he was able to successfully provide me with that information. Marsal stated he provided me with Eason’s archived emails from the timeframe I requested (February 5, 2016 and the following 30 days), as well as Eason’s current emails. Marsal explained that the files were called “PSD files” and they were copies made from previous tape or disc backups. I asked Marsal to explain the email archiving process utilized at BSO and he advised that all employee emails are backed up every evening at 8:00 PM, where they remain indefinitely. Marsal further explained that backups completed within the last 60 days can be accessed on disc, and any emails older than 60 days old can be accessed from quarterly tape backups. Marsal confirmed that the historical emails he retrieved at my request were taken from a tape backup, due to the approximate 2 year delay. I asked Marsal if there was any way that emails could have been sent or received that would not have been archived, and he replied that it was possible. However, Marsal explained that it in order for any emails not to have been archived, there was a specific process that needed to be completed. Marsal further explained that the employee would have to delete the email from their Inbox or Sent mailbox, and then also delete it from the Deleted Items mailbox before 8:00 PM (for each individual email) in order for it to not be archived.

[End of synopsis]

On April 6, 2018, I called former Deputy Peterson, and requested that he provide me with a witness statement for my investigation. Peterson stated that he would need to consult with his attorney prior to providing me with a voluntary statement. I advised Peterson to consult with his attorney and to please call me to confirm whether or not he would be providing me with a statement. After not hearing back from Peterson, on April 10, 2018, I sent him a certified letter again requesting that he provide me with a voluntary statement. On May 14, 2018, I received the certified letter back from the U.S. Post Office, due to the letter being unclaimed.

On April 6, 2018, I called Joelle Guarino to request that her son Zachary Guarino, provide me with a witness statement. Ms. Guarino did not answer, so I left a voicemail advising her of my request. It should be noted that I called Ms. Guarino because I did not have a contact phone number for Mr. Guarino. After not hearing back from Ms. Guarino, I called her again on April 13, 2018, and May 3, 2018, and also left her voicemails on those occasions. On May 15, 2018, I received a call back from Ms. Guarino, when she advised me that she would ask Mr. Guarino to call me, but she added that he was apprehensive about providing me with a witness statement. On May 16, 2018, Mr. Guarino called me and declined to provide me with a statement.

On May 17, 2018, I obtained a sworn, recorded Garrity statement from Deputy Edward Eason, CCN 10558, at the Division of Internal Affairs. Also present was Sergeant Al Rengifo, CCN 9981, from the Division of Internal Affairs, and Eason’s representative, Andrea Nelson, from the International Union of Police Associations (IUPA). The following is a synopsis of his statement:
At the beginning of the statement, I advised Deputy Eason on the record, that his previous statement to homicide detectives was only 2 days after the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting incident. (I further advised him that it was assumed that he had not been given ample opportunity to refresh his memory about the call he handled 2 years earlier, prior to that statement.) I further advised him that because he'd now had time to think about that call and potentially refresh his memory, there would be no issues regarding a Truthfulness charge, relating to the statement he previously provided, if he now recalled details about the call he handled on February 5, 2016. I then asked Eason, “Having had time to refresh your memory, do you now recall any details of the call that you handled that day on February 5, 2016, case number 17-1602-000212?” and he replied, “No sir.” I then asked Eason what he did recall about that call, if anything, and he replied, “I don’t recall anything about that call from February 2016.” After Eason stated that he did not recall the incident at all, I provided him a copy of the complete CAD notes from that incident. The CAD notes depicted all of the call’s notes, including the following notes added by Eason:

Time: 12:43:24.000 Console: 00 Operator: Eason, Edward FEMALE WHO WANTED TO REMAIN ANON REPORTED A KID NAMED NIKOlaus CRUZ FROM DOUGLAS HS HAS KNIVES AND BB GUN IN HIS INSTAGRAM PHOTOS. NO THREATS NOTED AND INFO FORWARDED TO SRD PETERSON AT SCHOOL.

I asked Deputy Eason to confirm that he had written those notes and he stated, “My name is on the notes,” and he added, “It appears that I wrote it, yes.” I advised Eason to explain his comments, due to that being the only record of what transpired on the call, and Eason read the notes out loud, verbatim. I asked Eason what his notes meant to him, and he replied that he responded to a call, there was no evidence of a credible threat, and he relayed that information to the Stoneman Douglas School Resource Officer, Deputy Scot Peterson. I asked Eason if calls like that were frequent or if it was an unusual call, and he replied, “Frequent.” I asked Eason how often he received calls like that, and he replied that threats made through social media calls were very common. I followed up by specifically asking him if those calls included threats made against schools or threats of shootings, and he replied, “Well, with weapons in general, yes, pretty common on social media.” I asked him to specify if those calls were involving students from Stoneman Douglas High School and he replied, “From that school and outside of school, maybe graduated already.”

I asked Deputy Eason to walk me through how he would normally handle a similar call where potential violence was threatened or questionable statements were made by a student and he replied, “I’d make contact with the complainant, find out what information they have and what evidence they have supporting the facts that they’re telling me, and from there, depending on the evidence, conduct an investigation, talking to all the parties, notifying other people involved -- in this case, notifying the SRO at the school.” I asked Eason if he normally notified the SRO at the school of a similar call, if the school was in Parkland, and he replied, “Yes.” I further asked him if he would also notify the SRO of a school outside of Parkland, and he also replied, “Yes.” I asked Eason if he would notify a supervisor for a similar call, and he replied, “If there’s no evidence supporting a threat, a credible threat, I might, I might not, depending on the case.” Eason added that it would be case by case for notification of a supervisor. I asked Eason if he would normally complete an incident report for a
similar incident, and he replied, “With no credible threat and an anonymous caller, a caller who wanted to remain anonymous, usually no.” I reminded Eason that he documented in his notes that he forwarded the information obtained in the call to SRD Scot Peterson and that an archive I obtained of his BSO emails did not reveal any communication with Peterson, about this incident. I asked Eason how he forwarded the information to Peterson, and he replied, “Well, it’s a small district. I could drive to his school, talk to him in person, or if I was at the station, a lot of times they would come in, the SRO’s to complete paperwork or print out paperwork, especially towards the end of the week. I might have saw him in person and explained to him then what’s going on.”

I reminded Deputy Eason that I had previously requested that he voluntarily provide me with his personal cellular phone records, to determine if he had any communication with Deputy Peterson via telephone calls or texts, after obtaining the information from Ms. Guarino. Eason advised that he was able to obtain the records, but he did not bring them with him. Eason stated that he had already reviewed the records and they did not document any telephone communication between him and Peterson in February 2016. Eason elaborated that if anything was work related, he would usually use the phone at the Parkland District Office to make telephone calls. Eason confirmed that he would provide me with those historical phone records through his representative, on a later date. I reminded Eason that providing me with those records was voluntary, and he confirmed that he understood.

I asked Deputy Eason why he did not complete an incident report for the call, and he stated, “Well between, there was no credible threat, no evidence of a credible threat, and the caller wanted to remain anonymous due to being, you know, a close neighbor and a prior history with the family.” I asked Eason if he thought it would have been reasonable to document the information he obtained in an incident report, and he replied, “With the information at that point, no.” I asked Eason how he would handle a similar situation in the future and he stated, “Well, with everything going on in the media now, you know, we do event reports on that.” (I asked Eason to answer the same question, but in a theoretical world where the Parkland shooting did not happen and he replied, “It wouldn’t have changed anything from what happened two years ago, if there was no incident at the high school.”) Eason confirmed that now, because the Parkland incident shooting happened, he would complete an incident report, as a precaution.

Sergeant Rengifo asked Deputy Eason what he considered a credible threat and Eason replied, “A credible threat if there’s evidence supporting the carry-out of a threat. Like, if somebody says, ‘You know what? I have a gun,’ you know -- boyfriend, girlfriend, it happens all the time. They say, ‘I’m gonna come to your house and shoot you,’ that’s a credible threat. If someone comes there saying, you know, that, you know, ‘I’m in fear,’ but they didn’t make a threat. They said, ‘You’ll be sorry.’ That’s kind of vague. But you have to have, you know, a cre-, you have to have an apparent ability to do so, and the item to carry out the crime or the incident.” Rengifo also asked Eason if he had ever been assigned to an investigative unit within BSO, and Eason confirmed that he had not. I asked Eason if he recalled ever dealing with Nikolas Cruz before or after the call he responded to on February 5, 2016, and Eason replied, “Not that I recall, no.” I asked Eason if he recalled meeting Ms. Guarino in person or handling the call over the telephone, and he replied, “I don’t recall. Yeah,
so, it was, it was a long time ago.”

IUPA representative Nelson stated that she would provide me with news articles relevant to this case, that she requested that I add to my report. I confirmed that I would add the articles if she sent them to me. Nelson also confirmed that she would send me Eason’s historical phone records via email, at a later date.

[End of synopsis]

On May 25, 2018, I contacted IUPA representative Nelson, who requested that I disregard her previous request to attach news articles to my report, which were relevant to this case. On May 30, 2018, Deputy Eason responded to the Division of Internal Affairs and physically showed me his historical phone records from February 2016. I confirmed that the records indicated that Eason did not contact Deputy Peterson with his personal cellular phone, for a three day timeframe after the February 5, 2016, call for service. Eason declined to provide me with a copy of the mentioned historical phone records for my case file, due to privacy concerns.

BRIEF:

- On February 14, 2018, suspect Nikolas Cruz committed a mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, where 17 students and teachers were murdered.
- A criminal investigation was immediately initiated and any incidents where law enforcement personnel had contact with or obtained information about Cruz, were reviewed.
- A suspicious incident call handled by Deputy Edward Eason on February 5, 2016, was identified as one of those calls.
- A review of the CAD notes revealed that Deputy Eason spoke with the caller, Ms. Guarino, who stated that her son showed her questionable online posts made by Nikolas Cruz that depicted a firearm. The posts were deleted and no longer available at the time of Eason’s response.
- Deputy Eason indicated in the CAD notes that no threats were noted and that the information he obtained from Guarino was forwarded to Deputy Scot Peterson (MSDHS School Resource Officer).
- On February 16, 2018, BSO Homicide Detectives interviewed Deputy Eason in reference to the criminal investigation and asked him about the February 5, 2016, incident. Eason replied that he did not remember any details about that call due to it being from 2 years prior.
- On February 16, 2018, BSO Homicide Detectives interviewed Deputy Peterson in reference to the criminal investigation and asked him about the February 5, 2016, incident. Peterson was asked if he was provided any information by Deputy Eason, in reference to the information obtained during his investigation, and Peterson replied that he did not recall that.
- On February 17, 2018, Ms. Joelle Guarino was interviewed by BSO Criminal Investigations Detectives in reference to her being the complainant of the February 5, 2016, incident. Guarino advised that she spoke with Deputy Eason in depth about the questionable online posts made by Nikolas Cruz. Guarino added that she wanted to know how Cruz purchasing a gun could be prevented, but she was told by Eason that there was nothing that could be done.
at that time.

- On February 27, 2018, Communications Operator III Ramos, provided me with a sworn statement, due to having received the 9-1-1 call from Ms. Guarino on February 5, 2016. Ramos stated that he did not remember speaking with Guarino or entering the call.
- On February 28, 2018, Communications Operator III Benson, provided me with a sworn statement, due to having dispatched the call entered by Operator Ramos to Deputy Eason. Benson stated that she did not remember dispatching the call to Eason.
- On February 28, 2018, Ms. Guarino provided me with a sworn statement, due to being the complainant of the February 5, 2016, incident. Guarino stated that she wanted the deputy to do something, but she realized that there was nothing she could do based on the circumstances at that time. Guarino confirmed that she told Deputy Eason that she wished to remain anonymous, and that she was very happy with the service that Eason provided that day.
- On February 28, 2018, Deputy Seward provided me with a sworn statement, due to being the OIC (Officer in Charge) of the Parkland District on February 5, 2016. Seward stated that he did not recall anything about the incident.
- On February 28, 2018, Lieutenant Devita provided me with a sworn statement, due to being the Executive Officer of the Parkland District on February 5, 2016. Devita stated that Eason did take some steps to investigate and noted the information in the CAD notes, but an Incident Report with some additional investigative steps would have been prudent and a much better decision for Eason at that time.
- On March 15, 2018, Information Technology Manager Marsal provided me with a sworn statement, due to providing me with Deputy Eason’s email history from the timeframe around February 5, 2016. The email history was obtained in an attempt to locate communication between Eason and Deputy Peterson about the information gathered during the February 5, 2016, incident. A check of those emails did not reveal any communication between Eason and Peterson.
- Deputy Peterson’s February 2016 School Resource Officer Monthly Report was obtained and reviewed, but there was no information listed about Nikolas Cruz or any other details about the February 5, 2016, incident.
- A review of the February 5, 2016, incident on Evidence.com did not reveal any BWC videos attached to that case number. I reviewed the BWC database and determined that Deputy Eason was not issued a BWC until August 8, 2016.
- I asked former Deputy Peterson to provide me with a voluntary witness statement and he replied that he would need to consult with his attorney prior to providing that statement. Peterson never responded back to me and a certified letter sent to his residence was returned, due to being unclaimed.
- I asked Ms. Guarino’s son, Zachary Guarino, to provide me with a voluntary witness statement, but he declined to provide me with a statement.
- On May 17, 2018, I conducted a sworn, Garrity interview with Deputy Eason and when I asked him about what he recalled about the February 5, 2016, call he handled, he stated, “I don’t recall anything about that call from February 2016.”
- Deputy Eason stated that calls like that were frequent and that threats made through social media
calls were very common. I followed up by specifically asking him if those calls included threats made against schools or threats of shootings, and he replied, “Well, with weapons in general, yes, pretty common on social media.”

I asked Deputy Eason to walk me through how he would normally handle a similar call where potential violence was threatened or questionable statements were made by a student and he replied, “I’d make contact with the complainant, find out what information they have and what evidence they have supporting the facts that they’re telling me, and from there, depending on the evidence, conduct an investigation, talking to all the parties, notifying other people involved -- in this case, notifying the SRO at the school.”

I asked Deputy Eason if he would normally complete an incident report for a similar incident, and he replied, “With no credible threat and an anonymous caller, a caller who wanted to remain anonymous, usually no.”

I asked Deputy Eason how he forwarded the information to Peterson, and he replied, “Well, it’s a small district. I could drive to his school, talk to him in person, or if I was at the station, a lot of times they would come in, the SRO’s to complete paperwork or print out paperwork, especially towards the end of the week. I might have saw him in person and explained to him then what’s going on.”

I asked Deputy Eason why he did not complete an incident report for the call, and he stated, “Well between, there was no credible threat, no evidence of a credible threat, and the caller wanted to remain anonymous due to being, you know, a close neighbor and a prior history with the family.”

I asked Deputy Eason if he thought it would have been reasonable to document the information he obtained in an incident report, and he replied, “With the information at that point, no.”

I asked Deputy Eason how he would handle a similar situation in the future and he stated, “Well, with everything going on in the media now, you know, we do event reports on that.”

Deputy Eason confirmed that now, because the Parkland incident shooting happened, he would complete an incident report, as a precaution.

Deputy Eason was asked what he considered a credible threat and Eason replied, “A credible threat if there’s evidence supporting the carry-out of a threat. Like, if somebody says, ‘You know what? I have a gun,’ you know -- boyfriend, girlfriend, it happens all the time. They say, ‘I’m gonna come to your house and shoot you,’ that’s a credible threat. If someone comes there saying, you know, that, you know, ‘I’m in fear,’ but they didn’t make a threat. They said, ‘You’ll be sorry.’ That’s kind of vague. But you have to have, you know, a cre-you have to have an apparent ability to do so, and the item to carry out the crime or the incident.”

I viewed Deputy Eason’s personal phone records from the timeframe around February 5, 2016, and confirmed that he did not have any telephone call or text contact with Deputy Peterson for the two week period after that date. Eason declined to provide me with a copy of the records, due to privacy concerns.

END OF REPORT.
I, THE UNDERSIGNED, DO HEREBY SWEAR OR AFFIRM, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, THAT TO THE BEST OF MY PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION, AND BELIEF, I HAVE NOT KNOWINGLY OR WILLFULLY DEPRIVED, OR ALLOWED ANOTHER TO DEPRIVE, THE SUBJECT OF THE INVESTIGATION OF ANY OF THE RIGHTS CONTAINED IN ss. 112.532 AND 112.533, FLORIDA STATUTES.

THE UNDERSIGNED INVESTIGATOR ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE FOREGOING REPORT CONSISTING OF 19 PAGES, EACH OF WHICH HAS BEEN INITIALED BY THIS INVESTIGATOR, IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE REPRESENTATION OF THE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED.

Sgt. Hector Oliva #10526
INVESTIGATOR

5-31-18
DATE

THE FOREGOING REPORT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Lt. Barry Lindquist CCN 13979
REVIEWING SUPERVISOR

5/31/18
DATE
DATE: July 30, 2018

MEMO TO: Colonel John Dale, Executive Director
Department of Professional Standards

FROM: Daniel Losey, Director
Professional Standards Committee
Department of Professional Standards

SUBJECT: Division of Internal Affairs Case # 2018-0042
Final Disposition

On 06/20/2018, the Professional Standards Committee reviewed IA Case # 2018-0042. The Committee sustained the following allegation involving Deputy Guntis Treijs, CCN 9714:

Allegations:
- SPM 2.4 Meeting BSO Standards; to wit: DLE SOP 3.6.1(B)
  Reporting Requirements

Subsequently, the Professional Standards Committee recommended:

Written Reprimand

Deputy Treijs was apprised of the Committee’s recommendation, and has waived a Pre-Disciplinary Conference.

Upon your approval, the final action of the Committee will be imposed.

APPROVED
Colonel John Dale
Dept. of Professional Standards

DATE 07/18

NOT APPROVED
Colonel John Dale
Dept. of Professional Standards

DL/om

cc:
- Major Nathan Osgood, Patrol Region North/DLE
- Captain Jan Jordan, Parkland/DLE
- Deputy Guntis Treijs, Parkland/DLE
- Andi Nelson, IUPA
- Gary Lippman, Esq., IUPA
DATE: August 6, 2018  
MEMO TO: Lt. Chris Mulligan  
Parkland District/DLE  
FROM: Daniel Losey, Director  
Professional Standards Committee  
Department of Professional Standards  
SUBJECT: DIVISION OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS CASE # 2018-0042  
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF FINAL DISPOSITION

A final disposition of IA Case # 2018-0042 has been affirmed by the Sheriff’s designee. Attached to this memorandum is a copy of the action to be imposed against Deputy Guntis Treijs, CCN 9714. The discipline for Deputy Treijs is:

**Written Reprimand**

*After signing, please give a copy of this memo, with attachment, to the employee and forward THIS ORIGINAL MEMO ONLY to the Department of Professional Standards for filing even if the employee intends to appeal. Please provide verification of served discipline within 30 days after appeal time has expired (if applicable), in one of the formats indicated below:*

__Suspension__: Please have timekeeper print the PeopleSoft Timecard Report for the employee indicating TRC code SNP for the day(s) of suspension and forward a copy to the Department of Professional Standards.

__X__ **Written Reprimand**: Forward this memo to the Dept. of Professional Standards.

Received by Supervisor  
Lt. Chris Mulligan, CCN 9407

Received by Employee  
CCN 9714

__Date__  
8/9/18

DL/om  
Enc
From:       Gary Lippman <glippman@iupa.org>
Sent:      Monday, July 30, 2018 9:40 AM
To:        Morales-Neloms, Olga
Cc:        Treijs, Guntis; Jeff Bell; Andi Nelson
Subject:   IA Case #2018-0042 (Deputy Sheriff Treijs)

Dear Ms. Morales-Neloms:

Deputy Sheriff Treijs has authorized me to advise that he is waiving his right to a pre-determination hearing with regard to the referenced case.

Thank you for your attention to this matter,

Gary E. Lippman, Associate General Counsel
International Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO
900 S. State Road 7
Plantation, FL 33317
Office:    954-960-3257
Mobile:    561-414-8542
glippman@iupa.org
Deputy Treijs,

On 06/20/2018, the Professional Standards Committee reviewed IA Case # 2018-0042, in which you were the subject employee. The Committee made the following recommendations:

Allegation:  
SPM 2.4  Meeting BSO Standards; to wit: DLE SOP 3.6.1(B) Reporting Requirements – Sustained

Recommended Discipline:  Written Reprimand

Per SPM, you are entitled to a pre-disciplinary conference regarding the above case. Your union representative or you may respond via email if you wish to request or waive your hearing. You must respond in writing. If you are requesting a hearing and would like a copy of your investigative report, you will need to email the records custodian for the Division of Internal Affairs, Betzaida Mendia, and she will advise you when to pick it up. Their office is located at the Public Safety Bldg., 1st floor. If you have any other questions, please call the office.

Thank you,

Olga Morales-Neloms  
Administrative Assistant to Director Daniel Losey  
Dept. of Professional Standards  
P: 954-327-3912  
F: 954-321-4352
DATE: June 21, 2018

TO: Deputy Guntis Treijs, CCN 9714
    DLE/Parkland

FROM: Lt. Barry Lindquist, Executive Officer
      Division of Internal Affairs

SUBJECT: RETURN TO FULL DUTY WORK STATUS
         CASE #IA2018-0042

This memorandum will serve as notification that you are returned to full duty work status, effective immediately.

You are directed to report to: Lt. Chris Mulligan at the Parkland District on Thursday, June 21, 2018, for assignment.

RECEIVED BY: DLS Tracey 9714 6/21/18
Employee CCN Date

cc: Colonel John Dale, Executive Director, Department of Professional Standards
    Colonel Jim Polan, Executive Director, Department of Law Enforcement
    Major Nathan Osgood, Patrol Region North
    Lt. Chris Mulligan, Parkland District
    Human Resources
### APPENDIX C. BROWARD COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIONS

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I hereby acknowledge the above list represents all the property taken from my possession and that if my property is taken and listed as Prisoner Property or Safekeeping I must contact the Broward Sheriff’s Office Evidence Unit within Sixty (60) days of seizure. If I do not make contact within Sixty (60) days all my items will be considered abandoned and disposed of Pursuant to Florida Statute Chapter 705. Evidence Unit can be contacted at (954) 765-4351. 

Signature: [Signature]

RECEIVED BY: [Signature]

NOTE: For further distribution of this form, refer to Sheriff's Policy Manual.

EVIDENCE CONFISCATION

Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission Initial Report

Appendices
APPENDIX C. BROWARD COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIONS

BROWARD COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

IA #: IA2018-0042
DATE: May 31, 2018

INVESTIGATION INITIATION DATE: February 23, 2018

PERIOD TOLLED: N/A

180th DAY: August 22, 2018

INVESTIGATOR: Sergeant Alexandra Holmes, CCN 11989

COMPLAINANT: SPM

SUBJECT EMPLOYEE: Guntis Treijs, CCN 9714

SHERIFF’S POLICY: SPM 2.4 Meeting BSO Standards; to-wit: DLE SOP 3.6.1 (B) Reporting Requirements

COMMAND: Department of Law Enforcement Parkland District

DATE OF HIRE: August 30, 1999

RANK: Deputy Sheriff

DATE OF MOST RECENT PROMOTION: N/A

PROBATION STATUS: N/A

BARGAINING UNIT: International Union of Police Associations (IUPA)
INTRODUCTION:

On November 30, 2017, Deputy Treijs was instructed by dispatch to make telephone contact with a caller, later identified as Mrs. Mary Hamel Theall, in Massachusetts, in reference to Subject Nikolas Cruz collecting guns and knives and advising that he is going to one day kill himself. The caller indicated that she is afraid that someone is going to get hurt and this might be “Columbine” in the making. The caller indicated that N. Cruz has multiple guns and has several social media accounts. Treijs entered into the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) notes that the caller advised him that N. Cruz is living with a friend and that he told the caller that he wants to join the service and “kill people.” He authored that N. Cruz is borderline Autistic and it was unknown where N. Cruz was currently located.

Deputy Treijs stated that he informed Mrs. Theall to contact the Lake Worth Police Department to file a police report, since it was believed that was the last place Subject N. Cruz was seen.

On February 19, 2018, Detective Kami Floyd, CCN 17022, obtained a sworn, recorded telephone statement from, Mrs. Theall, who said that she observed the following on Subject N. Cruz' Instagram page: a photo N. Cruz with a gun on a fence in a backyard and a post stating that he wanted to kill himself. After not receiving any further information from Deputy Treijs, Theall contacted the FBI approximately one month later with the information.

ALLEGATION:

It is alleged that Deputy Guntis Treijs, CCN 9714, did not complete an Incident Report regarding an unusual circumstance in which the caller was concerned for the safety of life, in violation of SPM 2.4 Meeting BSO Standards; to-wit: DLE SOP 3.6.1 (B) Reporting Requirements

THE FOLLOWING SHERIFF’S POLICIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITH RESPECT TO THE ALLEGATION:

SPM 2.4, Meeting BSO Standards

A. Employees will perform their duties properly and assume the responsibilities of their positions.

- DLE SOP 3.6.1 Incident Report / Supplement

B. Unless unusual circumstances are present, and no violations of law/criminal activity exist, the following types of incidents will not require an Incident Report:

1. Animal Complaint Complaints of barking, injured, or loose animals (including reptiles)
2. Police  
3. Civil Assistance/Civil Matters  
4. Traffic (Noncriminal)  
5. Open Door/Window: No evidence of entry  
6. Emergency Messages  
7. Alarm  
8. Bar/Business or Other Sensitive Area Check  
9. Foot Patrol  
10. Disabled Vehicle  
11. Complaint Refusal/Lack of Information/No Violations Observed: Canceled by complainant in noncriminal calls; complainant is Gone on Arrival (GOA) and there is no indication of a crime or suspicious/unusual circumstance; false reports; wrong or no such address; no violation or unusual circumstance observed; etc.  
12. Off-Duty Assist  
13. Field Contact  
14. Crash Investigation: Settled on the scene

INVESTIGATION:

The following list of involved persons is being provided for clarity purposes regarding their involvement:

Mary Hamel-Theall, White/Female, DOB 1/24/49  
671 Purchase Street, New Bedford, Massachusetts  
(Caller, Long time friend of Lynda Cruz)

Lynda Cruz, White/Female, DOB 9/25/1949  
Deceased  
(Mother of Nikolas and Zachary Cruz)

Nikolas Cruz, White/Male, DOB 9/24/1998  
Unknown address at the time of the call for service  
(Subject of call for service)

Zachary Cruz, White/ Male, DOB 2/21/2000  
6469 Easter Kay Way, Lake Worth, Florida 33462  
(Son of Lynda Cruz, Brother of Nikolas Cruz)

Katherine Blaine, White/Female, 2/10/1953  
184 Elm Drive East, Levittown, New York, 11756  
(Lynda Cruz’s first cousin)
**Roxanne Deschamps**, White/Female, DOB 4/9/75
6469 Easter Kay Way, Lake Worth, Florida 33462
(Friend of Lynda Cruz. Took custody of Nikolas and Zachary Cruz when Lynda Cruz passed away)

**James Snead**, White/Male, DOB 1/11/1970
7200 Loxahatchee Road, Parkland, Florida 33067
(Allowed Nikolas Cruz to live with him sometime after he moved out of Roxanne Deschamps house)

7200 Loxahatchee Road, Parkland, Florida 33067
(Son of James Snead. Friend of Nikolas Cruz)

On February 21, 2018, I was assigned this case by Executive Lieutenant Barry Lindquist, CCN 13979, from the Division of Internal Affairs.

I obtained and reviewed the Incident Details in reference to Incident Number L1717113000001602. The incident date is listed as November 30, 2017, at 12:01:06 hours. The incident is classified as a Suspicious Incident with a listed address of 6166 NW 80 Terrace, Parkland. The call was received by Communications Operator I Dion Lebert, CCN 18201. Communications Operator III Janice Johnson, CCN 5548, dispatched the call and assigned it to Deputy Guntis Treijs, CCN 9714, (17B2). The comments on the call state the following:

12:01:06 hours - Call the complainant in reference to a subject named “Nikolas Cruz” collecting guns and knives and advised that he is going to one day kill himself. He wants to go into the army and kill himself. Advised that she is afraid that someone is going to get hurt and this might be Columbine in the making. Advised that the subject has multiple guns. Now advised that the subject is no longer living at the listed address. Advised that subject has several social media accounts. Requested the police department to assist. For additional information call the complainant [Notes entered by CO Lebert].

12:03:13 hours - Holding the call for Deputy Treijs per Sergeant Brian Miller, CCN 4643.

12:36:22 hours - The caller Mary [later identified as Mary Hamel Theall] advised that Subject “Nicolas” is living with his friend “Billy.” Nicolas told Mary that he wants to join the service and “kill people.” Caller advised that she resides in Massachusetts. “Nicholas” caused a disturbance in Lake Worth, where he last resided two days ago. Nicolas is borderline autistic. It is unknown where “Nickolas” is currently located. According to the caller, Nicolas owns weapons and ammunition that he keeps in his friend’s house [Notes entered by Deputy Treijs].

It should be noted that the dispatcher spelled the subject’s name as “Nikolas Cruz.” Deputy Treijs
spelled the subject’s name three different ways, Nicolas, Nicholas, and Nickolas.

The disposition for the call is B – No written report.

I obtained and reviewed the sworn, recorded witness statement taken by Sergeant Jonathan Brown, CCN 11100, of the BSO Criminal Investigations Division Homicide Unit, from Deputy Trejs. The statement was taken at the Public Safety Building on Friday, February 16, 2018, in reference to criminal case 17-1802-000525, as part of a criminal investigation regarding the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (MSDHS) which involves the subject, Nikolas J. Cruz, white male, Date of Birth; September 24, 1998. Also present was Detective Melissa Wallach, CCN 17289. The following is a synopsis of the statement:

Deputy Trejs advised that he has worked for the BSO since 1999. Trejs stated that he initially worked with the Child Protection Investigation Section (CPIS) and then attended the police academy in 2002. Trejs said that he later was assigned to various districts, which included unincorporated Deerfield Beach, Lauderdale-by-the-Sea, Broward College, and Cooper City. Trejs advised that he is currently assigned to road patrol in the City of Parkland. Trejs stated that his immediate supervisor is Sergeant Andrew Smith, CCN 13484. Trejs said that he transferred to Parkland approximately 2 and a half years ago in October of 2015. Trejs explained that as a road patrol deputy, he patrols his assigned areas, answers calls for service, drives a marked unit, and wears a BSO issued uniform. Trejs advised that he receives calls for service through a police radio and computer, via dispatch.

Sergeant Brown explained to Deputy Trejs that there is a lot of material that they are investigating regarding the criminal investigation of the incident at MSDHS. Brown advised that they were going “way back” and that a lot of people are being interviewed in order to determine what happened along the way regarding Subject N. Cruz.

Sergeant Brown referred to a Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) that was generated from a call for service on November 30, 2017, at 1201 hours, the location of the call was 6166 NW 80 Terrace in the city of Parkland, and it was classified as a suspicious incident dispatched to Deputy Trejs. Brown read the comments and asked Trejs if he remembers that particular call for service. Trejs advised that he did remember the call and that he called back the reporter “Mary” [Mrs. Theall], who was out of state. Trejs said that he used his personal phone to call the complainant. Trejs explained that Theall had an unknown accent and that he had a poor phone connection, because he had a “flip phone” at the time. Trejs recalled that Theall was concerned about a relative, “Nikolas Cruz,” which she stated that she has not seen in years. Trejs advised that Theall told him that Subject N. Cruz at some point was a Parkland resident, but had moved. Trejs could not recall what type of relative, but believed she was a cousin or a relative of his adopted mother. Trejs said that Theall told him that N. Cruz had weapons, wanted to join the military, and wanted to kill people. Trejs stated that he asked Theall several times if she knew where N. Cruz was and she only reported an unspecified location in Lake Worth, Florida. Trejs advised that Theall did not know where N. Cruz lived and could not provide a date of birth. Trejs said that N. Cruz was a common name and that he did not know exactly where he would have been at the time. Trejs explained that Theall was concerned about N.
Cruz and the statements he made to her, but that there was no specific information that he could follow-up on.

Deputy Treijs advised that Mrs. Theall relayed to him that Subject N. Cruz had weapons, wanted to join the military, and that he was also borderline Autistic. Treijs denied that Theall provided him with any paperwork, literature, emails, or anything that described the threat that she was talking about and stated that “it was just a phone conversation.” Treijs said that there was somewhat of a language barrier and that she had to repeat herself several times. Treijs denied that Theall either provided or advised that she could provide any proof or evidence. Treijs stated that she did not provide any specific information on a location or type of scenario regarding a threat. Treijs said that Theall could not provide a location for N. Cruz.

Deputy Treijs opined that Mrs. Theall was trying to relay to him that Subject N. Cruz owns weapons and that he is joining the military. Treijs said that he interpreted that Theall was a concerned relative, but that according to her, his last location was somewhere in Lake Worth. Treijs advised that he directed her to make a report with Lake Worth, but could not recall whether she said she was going to make the report or not. Treijs stated that this was the extent of their phone conversation.

Deputy Treijs believed that Mrs. Theall had last spoken to Subject N. Cruz over the phone within just a few days of her contacting the police.

Deputy Treijs advised that he checked OSSI, but thinks the spelling of “Nikolas” that he used was different. Treijs explained that there were “so many of them” he “couldn’t pinpoint” what location or where he would be. Treijs said that if he would have found “Nikolas” in OSSI it would have given him a “reference point” with a current address, but Mrs. Theall indicated that Subject N. Cruz had moved from Parkland. Treijs said that if OSSI would have provided him with an address in Parkland or anywhere else, he would have been able to follow-up or “make face to face” contact with him. Treijs stated that if he would have contacted N. Cruz, he would assess the case, his condition, follow-up on the weapons issue and his mental state. Sergeant Brown asked Treijs what he would have done if he would have made contact with N. Cruz and after assessing him, he thought there was a threat, and he was able to back it up by actually seeing firearms. Treijs explained that if those were valid concerns and if he met the criteria for Baker Act, it would be a Baker Act situation and he would secure the firearms. Treijs advised that if N. Cruz did not meet the Baker Act criteria, but he felt that he was still a threat he would contact his supervisor and attempt some type of crisis intervention with him. Treijs agreed that he would have completed a written police report that he would have forwarded for follow-up.

Deputy Treijs said that it was a very common name, there were multiple Cruz’, and Mrs. Theall did not have a date of birth. Treijs said that he did not see any other reports associated with the name. Treijs could not remember whether he checked the name in any other databases. Treijs said that he could have looked up the name in the Driver and Vehicle Information Database (DAVID), but that would have been an additional step taken and he did not have a date of birth.
Sergeant Brown asked Deputy Treijs what he would have normally done if he had discovered that Subject N. Cruz lived in Parkland and responded to the house, but he was not home. Treijs advised that he would have normally come back later or passed the information on to the next shift to go back to the residence. Treijs also advised that he would have spoken to neighbors to see if they would know where he lived. Treijs denied having any other information from Mrs. Theall. Treijs stated that he had exhausted all the leads that he had at that point.

Sergeant Brown asked Deputy Treijs if he knew who “Nikolas Cruz” is. Treijs stated that now he knows who he is. When Brown asked Treijs if he knew who Subject N. Cruz was at the time of the call, he advised that at that point, all he had was a name. Brown then asked Treijs whether he had ever came across a “Zachary Cruz.” Treijs advised that he did not know that Z. Cruz was N. Cruz’ brother until “after the fact” and did not know at that point. Treijs advised that he did recall handling a call with a “Nikolas” or a “Zachary Cruz” in Parkland, prior to the call from Mrs. Theall. Treijs said that there was one incident he handled approximately a year ago involving the stepmother and N. Cruz. Treijs stated that he is now putting everything together and believes that it could be the same person. Treijs denied that when he received the call from Theall on November 30, 2017, he recalled having any dealings with N. Cruz in any call. Treijs said that if he would have recognized dealing with N. Cruz at the time of the call in November, he would have been able to verify the correct spelling of the first name, which is different than it is normally spelled. Treijs said he would have been able to pull up his old report, which would have given him additional information and his date of birth.

Deputy Treijs advised that in the original call with Subject N. Cruz he wrote a report, but he did not make an arrest [This call for service was dispatched on July 18, 2017, reference case 17-1702-001328]. Treijs recalled that the call was domestic related. Treijs said that the call involved the stepmother and the two stepsons, N. Cruz and Mr. Z. Cruz. Treijs advised that the stepmother reported that “he” wanted to walk the dog and she did not want to let him out at night. Treijs reported that his stepmother grabbed the leash and when he released it, it snapped back and that was the extent of it. Treijs said that there were no injuries or weapons involved in the incident. Treijs advised that he believed that he learned that N. Cruz was under house-arrest or was not supposed to be out at night as part of his release “condition.” Treijs said that the call was in the Townpark area and that he did enter the house. Treijs advised that he recalled briefly speaking with Z. Cruz, but he said that he did not notice anything unusual. Treijs denied seeing any firearms inside the residence. Treijs advised that if he would have seen any firearms at that scene and would have felt that something was abnormal or that there was some type of threat he needed to deal with he would have secured the weapons for safekeeping. Treijs denied that he believed he was dealing with a violent subject, who had a potential for violence. Treijs said that they were both calm and sitting. Treijs reported that N. Cruz said that he wanted to walk the dog and his mom said no. Treijs reported that there was no arrest made. Treijs advised that Deputy Kenneth Barone, CCN 9368, was the responding backup deputy and that there may have been one other backup deputy. Treijs acknowledged that he completed a written report.
Deputy Treijs explained that the reason he completed a written report on this incident was because the incident occurred in Parkland's jurisdiction, he responded to the call, and completed an investigation.

Deputy Treijs opined that he does not receive too many calls like the one that he received from Mrs. Theall.

Deputy Treijs agreed that he knows who Deputy Scot Peterson, CCN 4308, is. Treijs reported that he has personally investigated threats at the school. Treijs said that he has written reports that were forwarded by a sergeant to the school resource officer. Treijs said that based on the reports, Peterson contacts the principal who makes a determination whether to keep the school open or close it for the following day. When Treijs was asked whether he believes that the leads he sends to Peterson are being followed up on he replied, “Absolutely,” and he advised that they are taken very seriously. Treijs recalled one occasion when Sergeant Bryan Nord, CCN 13551, and he spent half the night tracking down where some threats were coming from. Treijs reported that they located a juvenile, after going from house to house following up on leads. Treijs said that the incident was resolved, documented, and that the school board was notified about it. Treijs stated that he did not remember calling Peterson on this particular call or ever providing him with information about Subject N. Cruz.

When Deputy Treijs was asked whether he did any follow up on the call he received from Mrs. Theall, he reported that he made an entry into the CAD notes indicating that “Cruz” is not in Parkland and that his last known location was in Lake Worth. Treijs said that he did not feel that he had any information to act on, because he did not have a date of birth, and it was an out of state general concern about somebody who wants to join the military, is Autistic, owns weapons, and was most likely living in Palm Beach county at the time.

End of synopsis.

I obtained and reviewed a Domestic Disturbance Incident Report reference case number, 17-1707-001328, authored by Deputy Treijs on July 18, 2017. The incident location is listed at 8442 Lakeview Trail, Parkland, Florida 33076. The report is materially consistent with Treijs’ statement, except that it appears that Treijs confused Subject N. Cruz with Z. Cruz during his statement. The report reflects that the mother, Mrs. Lynda Cruz, was involved in a domestic disturbance with her son Z. Cruz. It should be noted that there is no mention of Subject N. Cruz in the report. Also, the listed back-up deputy is Deputy Gary Michalosky, CCN 13549, not Deputy Barone as stated by Treijs.

I obtained and reviewed the sworn, recorded witness statement of Mrs. Mary Hamel Theall. The statement was taken by Detective Kami Floyd, CCN 17022, of the BSO Criminal Investigations Division Special Victims Unit. The statement was taken over the telephone on Monday, February 19, 2018, in reference to a follow-up investigation of criminal case 17-1802-000525, regarding the shooting at MSDHS. The following is a synopsis of the statement [It
should be noted: this was a telephonic statement, because Theall resides in New Bedford, Massachusetts]:

Mrs. Theall agreed that she was the person who made the 9-1-1 call on November 30, 2017, at 1201 hours to the BSO using the telephone number (774) 688-9121. Detective Floyd read the comments of the call to Theall and she agreed that she provided the listed information. Theall advised that she contacted the police after Subject N. Cruz was posting photos on his Instagram account pointing a gun. Theall believed that N. Cruz looked like ISIS and said that he always liked to walk around like that and that he thought he was in the military. Theall said that she gave the BSO his Instagram account and she asked for it to be looked into.

Mrs. Theall said that there were four Instagram posts that she saw. Theall explained that during the time that she contacted the BSO Parkland district, there were only three posts that she knew of. Theall described one of the posts as being of a backyard with a gun against the fence, pointing out towards the backyard. Theall explained that that she did not know whose house he was at. Theall said that she knew it was not his backyard in Parkland, where he originally lived with his mother and brother, because they did not have a wooden fence. Theall said that Subject N. Cruz did not really have anything on that particular Instagram account. Theall said that the Instagram account that she was so concerned about was the one in which he was wearing an Army hat that was almost like a skull cap and a mask over his face. Theall stated that there were guns there and that he did have one gun with an orange tip, which she knew was not a real gun. Theall advised that N. Cruz treated the gun as if it was real, because he used to walk around the neighborhood and he would have the gun. Theall said that she would tell his mother, “Lynda, he can’t walk around with it. He’s gonna get killed.” Theall advised that Cruz’ mother died on November 1, 2017, and that she saw the post and called police after she had already passed away.

Detective Floyd asked Mrs. Theall if she was able to “say” where Subject N. Cruz was living when she called the police. Theall advised that she “believed” she did. Theall said that she told “them” that at one time he was living with “Rocxanne;” the woman who took him and his brother in [Later identified as Mrs. Rocxanne Deschamps]. Theall advised that Deschamps did nothing but help him. Theall stated that during the Instagram conversation she had with N. Cruz, he told her that he did not like Deschamps, because she was making him pay for things. Theall said that N. Cruz believed Deschamps should spend all her money on him and he should not have to do anything like that. Theall said that she responded back to N. Cruz on Instagram and told him that Deschamps was a wonderful and honest person for doing what she was doing. Theall advised that she told N. Cruz that Deschamps would help him and told him to do whatever she tells him and that he would be fine.

When Detective Floyd asked Mrs. Theall if anyone called her back after she contacted the police regarding her concern, she initially stated, “No.” Floyd then verified a second time by asking Theall if she ever spoke with any deputies from Parkland. Theall then recalled that she was told that she could not speak to a detective right away and she had to first talk to a deputy and they would call her back. Theall advised that she did speak to someone, but could not recall their name and believed that it may have been “Chase” [later identified as Deputy Treijs]. Theall advised she had the name written
down somewhere and recalls writing the word “Spanish” next to the name. Theall advised that their conversation led her to believe that the deputy knew Mrs. L. Cruz and the family. Theall said that she believed that he would help her, because it turned out that he was one of the “guys” who would respond to the Cruz’ house all the time and knew what was going on.

Mrs. Theall said that nothing ever happened. Theall said that when she found out that he was going to kill people, she knew that it had to stop, so she called the FBI [It should be noted that Theall contacted the FBI on January 5, 2018, approximately one month later after reporting the information to the BSO]. Detective Floyd asked Theall what the deputy’s response to her was before they hung up. Theall initially said that the deputy said, “Thank you very much,” and that they would call back if they had any questions. Theall then advised that she was “so confused” and that she did not know if it was the FBI or the deputy from Parkland who said that to her.

Detective Floyd pointed out that there was some confusion as to where Subject N. Cruz and his brother were living. Floyd asked Mrs. Theall whether she ever spoke to any law enforcement agencies from either Lake Worth or Palm Beach County. Theall advised that she believed she did call Lake Worth prior to calling the BSO Parkland District, but when she stated that it was regarding Parkland, she was directed to call the BSO, which is what she believes she did. Theall believed that is when she spoke to Deputy Trejls, who told her that they would call her back if they had any questions.

Detective Floyd asked Mrs. Theall how long after contacting the BSO did she make the report to the FBI. Theall advised that she was “really confused about that.” Theall said that she was under the impression that she called the FBI sometime after Thanksgiving, but before Christmas. Theall said that she believed she called the FBI sometime in December, but the report on the television said that she reported it on January 5, 2018. Theall stated that she did not remember waiting that long to call the FBI.

Detective Floyd verified that the reason why she initially made the phone call and became concerned was because of the three postings she observed on an Instagram account. Theall pointed out that there was one posting in particular with all the ISIS “stuff” and the fact that Subject N. Cruz wanted to kill himself. Theall explained that N. Cruz posted on Instagram that he wanted to kill himself, but then he took it off. Theall confirmed that she saw the post prior to her phone call. Theall said that when she “heard,” she started an Instagram account, because she did not even know what Instagram was. Theall said she saw N. Cruz’ account and believed that something was going to happen. Theall said that she then called the FBI when she found out N. Cruz was saying that he wanted to kill people. Theall said that she recalls saying, “This is gonna be Columbine all over again.”

Mrs. Theall reported that she and Subject N. Cruz’ mother were friends for almost sixty years. Theall advised that she had met N. Cruz and his brother and that they were like nephews to her. Detective Floyd then verified that Theall had made a total of three calls, one to Lake Worth, Parkland, and the FBI regarding her concerns.
End of synopsis.

I obtained and reviewed the Call Summaries completed by the BSO CID regarding the shooting at MSDHS. I particularly reviewed the notes reference case number 11-1711-001602. The summary was materially consistent with the aforementioned Communication Incident Summary and Detective’s Floyd interview of Mrs. Theall.

On February 22, 2018, Deputy Treijes responded to the Division of Internal Affairs and his duty status was changed to Restricted Administrative Assignment.

On February 23, 2018, I obtained a sworn, recorded statement from Senior Mobile Systems Technician Christopher Deosaran, CCN 17277, at the Division of Internal Affairs. The following is a synopsis of the statement:

Technician Deosaran advised that he has been employed with the BSO for the past four years and has been in his current position as the agency administrator for OSSI report writing and PremierOne Motorola CAD system, and other applications for the past three years.

Technician Deosaran reported that once a deputy is on duty, they would log into the computer and the main two applications they use are OSSI MCT, which is used for report writing, and running tags and driver’s licenses and PremierOne Mobile Client, which is how the deputies receive their calls from dispatch. It provides them with dispatcher notes, incident history of the call, location, and any other flags that may appear that they may need to be aware of for officer safety.

I pointed out to Technician Deosaran that prior to the statement, we conducted a few searches through the OSSI MCT applications. I asked Deosaran if there was a way to conduct just a name search. Deosaran stated yes, and explained that the deputy would have to open the MFR (F12 tab), create a new incident and when you start typing a name, the program reaches out to our server, which has a repository of all the names that have ever been in the system, and queries it to find out which are the closest matches to what was entered. Deosaran advised that this is just a way that the program can be used to run a search if all you had was a name, but it is not supposed to be used that way. Deosaran said this would allow you to see persons with similar names, their ages, and address. Deosaran agreed that a search through the driver’s tab could not be completed, unless the deputy has a name and date of birth or a driver’s license number.

I pointed out to Technician Deosaran that when we conducted the search, we queried the name “Nikolas Cruz.” Deosaran agreed that the search revealed several different spellings and there was a total of seven names that appeared. Deosaran explained that there was a hard query on the last name, which is Cruz, which has to be definite. And then the first name is a soft query, so it gives you the different variations of spelling, but it returns several results with the different ages and addresses. Deosaran agreed that the listed names would be the same names that would display if the search was conducted through the Records Management System (RMS). Deosaran explained that the laptop version of MCT queries retrieves the information from RMS.
Technician Deosaran acknowledged that I previously asked him to conduct a search for Deputy Treijs search history on OSSI. Deosaran explained that he provided reports from searches that were done in the OSSI driver tab, which would require you to know the first name, last name, and date of birth, or you would have needed to swipe a driver’s license. Deosaran said he ran Treijs queries from November 15 to December 15 in state and out of state and provided those reports. Deosaran explained that if Treijs would have conducted a search through the MFR tab that would not show up in any report. Deosaran advised that it is not logged, because that report was never completed and submitted and the only reason that he got that drop-down list of names would be to help him complete his report using the name candidate in the system.

Technician Deosaran advised that DAVID is another application where the deputies can perform a name search, but advised that they are supposed to use the one that is directly connected to OSSI. Deosaran could not think of any other application that he administers in which a name search could be conducted.

End of synopsis.

The screenshots below are the step-by-step process described by Technician Deosaran on how to conduct a name search using the OSSI MCT.
3. Enter information as if creating a report.

4. Type a name to search

5. Results
On February 23, 2018, I obtained a sworn, recorded statement from Communications Operator III Janice Johnson, CCN 5548, at the Regional Communications North Site located at 4900 West Copans Road, Coconut Creek. The following is a synopsis of the statement:

CO Johnson advised that she has been employed by the BSO for 30 years and is currently working as a Communications Operator III. Johnson described her job duties as receiving emergency and non-emergency phone calls, dispatching units, providing Emergency Medical Dispatching (EMD), which is giving pre-arrival medical instructions to the public prior to fire rescue’s response. Johnson clarified that she only dispatches for police units. Johnson explained that she is not assigned a particular area and that the dispatchers get rotated around. Johnson verified that she often dispatches for Channel 8A, which includes the City of Parkland, North Lauderdale, and Tamarac. Johnson stated that Parkland is not as busy as the other two districts, but informed me that she does get busy dispatching for the other two cities.

I pointed out to CO Johnson that prior to the statement, I had her review the Incident Details on Incident Number L1717113000001602. Johnson advised that she did not recall dispatching that particular call. I asked Johnson whether she has ever dispatched any similar calls. Johnson said that they do get all sorts of calls and some which are similar in nature, but did not believe that it was very often. I asked Johnson if due to the comments of the call, she believes this would be something that she would remember or not. Johnson advised that it would not be something that she would remember, because there are so many calls and the dispatchers never know the outcome of calls. Johnson said that the work is fast paced and that it would not stand out to her, unless the call was of a child drowning or something similar.

CO Johnson estimated that according to the Incident Details, it appeared that the unit may have been busy on the call for approximately 16 minutes. I asked the dispatcher if that is a normal amount of time to be busy on a call. Johnson advised that it depends on the type of call that the deputy is
handling. Johnson said that it appears from the printout that she contacted the sergeant about the call at 1203 hours and was told to hold the call for 17B2 (Trejs). Johnson did not know why the sergeant held the call for 17B2, if the call was in 1703 zone. Johnson opined that the unit assigned to that zone may have been at court, the service center, or busy on another call.

CO Johnson advised that she is not used to looking at a call through the Incident Details or the Communications Incident Summary and requested that a Duty Officer printout the call and provide the Incident Detailed Report. Johnson verified that the comments at the end were entered by Deputy Trejs and then he coded out the call for service, Bravo, which means no report written.

End of synopsis,

On February 23, 2018, I obtained a sworn, recorded statement from Sergeant Brian Miller, CCN 4643, at the Parkland District Office. The following is a synopsis of the statement:

Sergeant Miller, CCN 4643, advised that he has been employed by the BSO for almost 32 years. Miller said that he has been assigned to the Parkland District for over a year and is currently a dayshift road patrol sergeant.

I pointed out to Sergeant Miller that prior to the statement, I showed him the Incident Details for Incident Number L171713000001602. Miller said that he did not recall this incident being dispatched. Miller could not recall why he advised the dispatcher to hold the call for Deputy Trejs (17B2) if the incident was in 1703 zone. Miller stated that he did not have an independent recollection of the call, but stated that the zone unit may have been busy on something else or out of the district.

I asked Sergeant Miller if after reading the comments on the call, did he believe that more follow-up should have been completed. Miller said that after reading the initial call or comments, he did not understand what the connection was to Parkland. Miller advised that it referred to a Lake Worth location. Miller stated that he is unaware if the information on how the call was connected to Parkland was given to the deputy. Ultimately Miller believed that more information was needed, because he did not see the connection to Parkland, based on what was written in the comments. Miller did verify that the address listed on the summary location is an address in Parkland, but added that it was a telephone call from someone who was in Massachusetts. Miller opined that it sounded like the incident or the threats occurred in Lake Worth.

I asked Sergeant Miller if after reading the deputy’s comments, he believed that he should have written an Event/Incident report or if he believed that the comments listed in the CAD were sufficient to document the call. Miller stated that the threats that were made were very severe and that he would normally suspect that Deputy Trejs, in particular, would write a report with that type of information. Miller added that Trejs works very hard in the district and usually writes a very good report and does a very good investigation. Miller advised that when someone is referring to the Columbine High School shooting, that event alone is very severe, considering the number of people
that were killed. Miller said that based on what he was reading, he did not know if the deputy knew that the subject was from the Parkland area or went to school there.

I asked Sergeant Miller that if a report would have been generated, who would have followed up on it. Miller said that if it would have been tied to a school in Parkland, they would have definitely informed the school resource officer or if there was a crime it would have been forwarded to the district criminal investigations sergeant.

I pointed out to Sergeant Miller that during a search on OSSI of the name Nikolas Cruz, seven names auto populate with different, similar spellings. I asked Miller if he believed that seven names, would have been too many names for a deputy to follow-up on in order to identify the Nikolas that was being referred to in the complaint. Miller advised that the deputy would have the ability to follow-up on seven names and that if he is familiar with Parkland, he would be able to review and determine which address was in Parkland. Miller verified that one of the addresses on the Nikolas Cruz name search was the same address that was listed as the location on the Incident detailed report.

Sergeant Miller acknowledged that he provided me with the Parkland District Payroll/Daily Roster for November 30, 2017.

Sergeant Miller pointed out that the comments on the dispatch call were extensive and he would be surprised if the dispatcher would have read that much information over the radio. Miller believes that the dispatcher would have read some of the comments and would assume that the deputy would read the details when it came up on his CAD.

I pointed out to Sergeant Miller that the incident did have a location address and asked if the deputies have the capability of doing a history search on the incident location. Miller stated that they do have the capability and that they will frequently do that for alarm calls and to see the history of the addresses. Miller stated that he could have asked the dispatcher for the history on the address.

End of synopsis.

On February 23, 2018, I obtained a sworn, recorded statement from Communications Operator I Dion Lebert, CCN 18201, at the Regional Communications North Site located at 4900 West Copans Road, Coconut Creek. The following is a synopsis of the statement:

CO Lebert advised that she has been employed by the BSO for one year and two months and is currently a 9-1-1 call taker. Lebert said that her duties are to answer calls for service and document incidents. I pointed out to Lebert that prior to the statement, I had her review the Incident Details on Incident Number L1717113000001602. Lebert stated that she remembered receiving that particular 911 call. Lebert informed me that she does not receive similar calls very often, so she remembered this particular call. Lebert stated that after the shooting occurred at MSDHS, she recalled that she was called by “this person” prior to the shooting. Lebert said that she remembered some things that stood out, but that she did not remember the subject’s name. I asked Lebert what were some of the
things that she remembered prior to reading the Incident Details. Lebert advised that she distinctly remembered that the female caller was telling her that the subject’s parent died.

I asked CO Lebert how she would normally spell the name Nikolas, if she had to spell it. Lebert initially spelled N-i-c-k-h-o-l-a-s and then corrected herself and spelled N-i-c-h-o-l-a-s. I then asked Lebert whether she recalled if the caller actually spelled the name for her on this particular call, but she could not recall. I pointed out to Lebert that in the comments, she typed the name as N-i-k-o-l-a-s. I asked Lebert whether she would have typed the name that way or does she believe that the caller may have spelled it out that way. Lebert explained that both scenarios are possible. Lebert said that it is possible that she could have typed it that way, if she was working fast, because sometimes they are typing just trying to get the call in and not spelling accurately. Lebert also said that it is also possible that the caller might have spelled it for her, since sometime callers will do that if they are not hearing them clearly or if the call taker wants the caller to clarify, they will request the caller to spell the name.

CO Lebert said that she recalls that the caller was very frantic. Lebert described that the caller was speaking rapidly and she sounded very concerned. Lebert could not recall whether the caller had an accent. Lebert recalled that the caller told her that the person was either not at the address at the time or no longer living there and she mentioned something about the person in Lake Worth or Palm Beach. Lebert explained that once she speaks with the caller and types everything up, she sends it to the dispatcher, and she is done with the call and proceeds to take additional calls.

End of synopsis.

On February 23, 2018, the New York Times posted the article, “Tipster’s Warning to F.B.I on Florida shooting Suspect: ‘I Know He’s Going to Explode’ ” on the Internet. The article had a direct link to the transcription of the telephone call Mrs. Theall made to the FBI on January 5, 2018, at 1431 hours. The transcription is unclassified and has been redacted. The following is a synopsis of the transcript:

The caller later identified as Mrs. Theall states that Subject Nikolas Cruz, is 18 years of age, but has the mental capacity of a 12 to 14 year old and he has Instagram accounts. His mother passed away on November 1, 2017. The caller says that N. Cruz started off by saying that he wanted to kill himself, so what she did was call the “Parkland Police Department” [BSO Parkland District] where he lives. Theall states she talked to an officer, but the name is redacted. Theall states that she gave him all the information, but did not hear anything back about it.

Mrs. Theall states that just recently, Subject N. Cruz “switched” his Instagram comments and wrote that he wants to kill people. Theall says that he posted that on his Instagram page, but he removed the post two days later. Theall advises that if they look at his Instagram pages, they will see all the guns and added that “he’s so into ISIS.” Theall says that she is afraid that something is going to happen, because N. Cruz does not have the mental capacity. Theall says that he gets so outraged if someone talks to him about certain things. Theall reports that N. Cruz pulled a rifle on his mother before she
passed away. Theall advises that a whole other problem is that he is going to receive $25,000 from his mother’s life insurance. Theall says that N. Cruz got his mother’s debit card and withdrew money out of her account after she passed away and purchased “all these rifles and ammunition” and posted pictures of them on Instagram. Theall states that the family, a distant cousin, and herself are very concerned and wanted someone to know about it, and determine whether it was something worth looking into. Theall states that she knows her conscience is clear if he takes off and just starts shooting places up.

Mrs. Theall is asked by the Intake Specialist if Subject N. Cruz said that he would do those things or just said he wanted to. Theall reports that on his Instagram account he wrote, “I want to kill people.” Theall says that she can identify his Instagram accounts, so that they can look at them and see the pictures. Theall says that the account where he put, “I want to kill people,” and then took it down is “nikolas_cruz__.” Theall said that he had another account “nicholascruzmakarov” that they should also look at. Theall then provided a third account of “cruz_nikolas” and stated that is the account that has cut up animals. Theall says that it currently had a picture of a frog, but knows that at one point there was a picture of a bird. Theall advises that there was a time that a bird hit the ground after flying into a glass window. Theall says that N. Cruz brought the bird into the house, placed it on his mother’s kitchen counter, and started cutting it up. Theall reports that N. Cruz has all kinds of hunting knives. Theall states that she did not know what particular knife he used. Theall advises that when N. Cruz’ mother asked him what he was doing, he replied, “I want to see what’s inside.” Theall says that this would be a red flag.

Mrs. Theall advises that Subject N. Cruz wanted to “kill all these animals and do something in Arabic.” Theall describes that N. Cruz would dress up like a ninja or an “ISIS guy.” Theall says that on one of N. Cruz’ Instagram accounts, he had pictures of all his rifles. Theall is asked by the Intake Specialist if N. Cruz talked about doing anything else. Theall replies, “No,” and advises that N. Cruz has expressed different things and then removes the post, but has left the pictures. Theall says that she texted him on one of the accounts asking him how he was and requesting him for a phone number, because she needed to speak to someone. Theall says that she went back on the account, because she had not heard back from him. Theall says that at the top of the page it stated, “Leave me the F alone.” Theall did not think this was still posted, but believed he was speaking to her.

Mrs. Theall states that it was “just so much” and that she knows “he’s going to explode.” Theall says that the parents of his friend, who also has an Instagram account took Subject N. Cruz in and allowed him to live with them. Theall says that the family allowed him to bring his guns and everything to the house, because they had them locked up. Theall advises that N. Cruz said that when he received his $25,000, his friend’s father was going to invest it for him. Theall says this was also a flag to her, because the friend’s father did not know N. Cruz “from a hole in the wall.” Theall describes that N. Cruz gets “crazy” when you ask him for money. Theall provided N. Cruz’ friend’s father’s name, address, and phone number, which was redacted from the transcript. Theall states that she and the family have tried to call the friend’s father, but he refused to return any of their phone calls. Theall says that they just want to see how N. Cruz is doing and to make sure he understood his problems.
Mrs. Theall is asked by the Intake Specialist if Subject N. Cruz talks about ISIS or just dresses up like one. Theall states that he dresses that way. Theall then goes on to describe the photos in each of N. Cruz’ Instagram accounts. Theall says that he has one Instagram account that has “a thing for Arabic words.” Theall provides another Instagram account of “crazynikolas_new.” Theall says that the “cruz_nikolas” account has pictures of him “dressed up in,” but she does not finish the sentence. Theall reports that N. Cruz wants to join the Army. Theall says that he shows the gun he purchased, a Maverick 88 slug for $219. Theall says that there is a photo in which he shows all his knives and a gun he owns. Theall says that he does show one gun that has an orange tip, which she believes is an air pistol. Theall then mentions the cutting up of frogs and another gun photo. Theall says that in the “nikolas_cruz_makarov” account there is a photo in which he is wearing a “Make America Great Again” hat and his face is covered with a scarf. Theall talks about photos on his Instagram account of a dirt road, bloody frogs, American Eagle ammunition, something that looks like a target in a frame, his rifle, a whole bag with all kinds of rifles and “stuff on it,” and scopes. Theall states that her main concern is that he is going to receive $25,000. Theall opines that he is not going to invest it and that instead he is going to buy guns.

Mrs. Theall reports that the last rifle Subject N. Cruz purchased was online and it was shipped to an address in Parkland, Florida, that is redacted in the transcript. Theall states that she believes that N. Cruz was working at his old job at the Dollar Tree, which is near a Walmart in the City of Parkland. Theall says that it is alarming to see the photos and to know what he is capable of doing and what could happen. Theall advises that he was no longer in school and that he never graduated. Theall reports that N. Cruz has been “thrown out of all these school, because he would pick up a chair and just throw it at somebody, a teacher, a student, because he did not like the way they were talking to him.” Theall then states, “I just think about, you know, getting into a school and just shooting the place up.”

Mrs. Theall agrees to answer any further questions if someone calls her back. Theall states that she wanted to get the information off her “chest” in case something does happen and she does believe that “something” is going to happen.

End of synopsis.

On March 2, 2018, I obtained a sworn, recorded statement from Mrs. Mary Hamel Theall. The statement was taken over the telephone, since Theall resides out of the State of Florida. Theall advised that her sister-in-law, Mrs. Emily Hamel, would be in the room with her while she provided her statement. The following is a synopsis of the statement:

I explained to Mrs. Theall that it appeared that there may have been a mix-up of information regarding the initial information she provided to the BSO and the FBI. Theall agreed that she had initially contacted the BSO, next the FBI, and ultimately provided a statement to Detective Floyd.

Mrs. Theall explained that she was initially attempting to contact the “Parkland Police Department” (BSO Parkland District), but ended up contacting another police department, “something Worth,”
who provided her with the phone number to the BSO. Theall advised she had the phone number written down and provided it [It should be noted during an Internet search, the number provided by Theall was registered to the Fort Worth City Police Department located in Texas, (817) 392-4200]. Theall said that she believes that she may have started to tell the police department about the incident, but she was stopped and provided with the number to the BSO Parkland District, (954-753-5050). Theall advised that when she called the BSO and asked to speak to a detective, she was told that she could not do that. Theall stated that she was informed that someone would call her back, so she provided all her information and someone did call her back.

Mrs. Theall agreed that she contacted the BSO on November 30, 2017. Theall said that her initial concern was that Subject N. Cruz was saying that he wanted to kill himself and posted it on his Instagram page. Theall advised that Mrs. L. Cruz’ cousin, Mrs. Katie Baine (later identified as Mrs. Katherine Blaine), was the person who reported it to her and believes that she was the one who told her that N. Cruz posted it on his Instagram account and then removed it. Theall clarified that she never saw the post and only received the information from Blaine. Theall stated that her first concern was that this situation had to stop, because she knew how N. Cruz was and surmised what he was going to do.

Mrs. Theall advised that she called the BSO and voiced her opinion to the deputy who she spoke to [later identified as Deputy Treijs]. Theall stated that she started the conversation by stating, “I know you’ve been to Lynda Cruz’s house on numerous occasions” and informed Treijs that Mrs. L. Cruz passed away on November 1, 2017. Theall said that Treijs responded by stating, “Lynda’s dead?” Theall informed me that it was this statement, which led her to believe that Treijs knew exactly what she was talking about, that he had been to the house, that he knew the situation, and that he was going to help her. Theall said that she proceeded to tell Treijs that Subject N. Cruz wanted to kill himself and believes that she told him about the guns. Theall then said that she was unsure of what she told Treijs and would have to hear the tape again [It should be noted the 911 tape was no longer available at the initiation of this investigation due to the time delay]. Theall believed that she told Treijs that N. Cruz was going to do something bad. Theall could not recall whether it was the BSO or the FBI, who told her that they would call her back if they had any more questions.

Mrs. Theall clarified that she created a personal Instagram account after Mrs. Blaine told her that Subject N. Cruz had posted some concerning things on his Instagram page. Theall said that after she created her Instagram account, the first few posts she saw on one of N. Cruz’ accounts was a photo where he had guns, he shows a picture of a gun that he wants to buy, and another photo where he has a mask on and an “Army hat.” Theall stated that she saw an Instagram post where N. Cruz was wearing a mask and said that N. Cruz always thought he was Al-Qaeda. Theall explained that at the time she called the BSO, she had already created her Instagram account, because that was how she was able to provide the deputy with all the information. Theall stated that she passed on the Instagram information to Deputy Treijs and also to the FBI.

Mrs. Theall initially denied that she made contact with Subject N. Cruz during this time or prior to calling the BSO. Theall was confused and could not recall whether she made contact with N. Cruz
either right before or right after Thanksgiving Day (Thursday, November 23, 2017), when he was living with Mrs. Deschamps. Theall initially talked about how Deschamps had sent her a message on Instagram and she (Theall) asked Deschamps how N. Cruz was doing and if everything was okay. Theall then started talking about an Instagram conversation between her and N. Cruz. Theall said that she asked him if everything was okay. Theall said that N. Cruz replied to her and said that he did not like Deschamps and that she was taking all of his money. Theall said that she tried to explain to him that Deschamps was doing “a wonderful thing to take care of him and his brother.” Theall told N. Cruz that Deschamps was not trying to take his money away, that she did not have any money to do what she was doing, but that she was trying to help him. Theall reported that she told N. Cruz to work with Deschamps, do what she tells him to do, and that everything would be okay, but he never answered her back. Theall repeatedly stated that she did not know whether that conversation she had with N. Cruz was before or after she talked to the BSO. Theall advised that she was unsure about the exact timeline. Ultimately, Theall stated that she did not believe that she had had the Instagram conversation with N. Cruz, when she spoke to Deputy Treijs. Theall reported that prior to the Instagram conversation, it probably had been a few years since she last had any contact with N. Cruz.

I asked Mrs. Theall if she provided the call taker with an address in Parkland. Theall stated that she did not have the address where Subject N. Cruz lived. Theall said that what she told Deputy Treijs was what he already knew, the address when N. Cruz was a student, which was 6166 Northwest 80 Terrace, Parkland, Florida. Theall stated that she visited the residence on numerous occasions in the past. Theall estimated that the Cruz family lived at the 6166 Northwest 80 Terrace address for at least 20 years. Theall advised that Mrs. L. Cruz sold the house and moved into a townhouse in Parkland in January of 2017, but did not have that address with her. I asked Theall again if she believed that she might have given the Parkland address when she initially called the BSO, because she did not know where N. Cruz was and that was the only address she knew of. Theall believed that what she told Treijs was that N. Cruz left Mrs. Deschamps’ house and was back in Parkland. Theall did not believe that she provided the address, because Treijs knew the address and had been there on numerous occasions. Theall said that she “knew” that someone knew what she was talking about, was there, and could understand what she was saying. Theall reported that when N. Cruz left Deschamps’ house he stayed with someone by the name of “Brian” in Parkland for two days, before he ended up moving into Mr. James Snead’s house.

Mrs. Theall stated that before Mrs. L. Cruz passed away she requested that Mrs. Deschamps take in Subject N. Cruz and his brother if something happened to her. Theall advised that N. Cruz and his brother moved in with Deschamps on November 1, 2017. I asked Theall whether N. Cruz had already left Deschamps’ house when she called the BSO. Theall reported that on November 29, 2017, Deschamps’ called the police, because of an altercation between N. Cruz and her son. Theall advised that Deschamps did not want to allow N. Cruz to bring any weapons into her house, so he decided to leave. Theall pointed out that she did not know that information until after she had called the BSO. Theall clarified that when she called the BSO, she believed that N. Cruz was still living with Deschamps.

Mrs. Theall explained that she and Mrs. Deschamps were acquaintances and that they never spoke
until after Mrs. L. Cruz passed away. Theall said that she and Deschamps did exchange text messages. I asked Theall whether she knew any of Deschamps’ personal information. Theall stated that she did have her phone number and that was how she was able to text message her. Theall advised that she believed Deschamps’ lived in Lantana and that she had the address written down. Theall clarified that she did not know that information when she spoke to Deputy Treijs. Theall said that all she knew on November 30, 2017, when she called the BSO was that Deschamps took the Cruz boys to live with her, but did not know the address and did not even think about providing the phone number. Theall said that the only thing she was focused on when she called the BSO was that N. Cruz was going to either hurt himself or someone else. Theall said she did not know what information she gave, but she would have provided the information if she had it.

I pointed out to Mrs. Theall that in the notes the deputy wrote that she informed him that Subject N. Cruz was staying with “Billy.” Theall corrected me and advised that the friend’s name was Brian. Theall advised that Brian lived somewhere in Parkland, but advised that she did not know that when she called the BSO on November 30, 2017. Theall said that she only knew that Brian had a room that he rented. When I asked Theall why she believed that Cruz was staying with Brian she advised that she had “no idea.”

Later in the statement, I asked Mrs. Theall whether she knew that Mrs. Deschamps had kicked Subject N. Cruz out of her house at the time that she called the BSO. I pointed out to Theall that she allegedly told Deputy Treijs that N. Cruz was staying with Brian. Theall advised that she did not believe she knew that information when she called the BSO. Theall said that she received that information after she spoke to the BSO, which would have been around the first week of December 2017. I advised Theall that Treijs documented that she reported that N. Cruz was living with a friend, Billy. Theall corrected me again by saying Brian. I explained that she may have told Treijs the name Brian, and he may have misunderstood and wrote the name Billy. I again asked Theall if she told Treijs that N. Cruz was living with a friend, does she believe that she would have known that N. Cruz was no longer living with Deschamps. Theall then agreed and advised that she was getting very confused regarding the time lines. Theall denied that she knew Brian’s last name or address. I then asked Theall how she would have known that N. Cruz was staying with Brian and if Deschamps would have been the one to tell her that. Theall was unsure if someone told her that or if she would have just assumed it, because he did not go to Mr. Snead’s house right away. Theall ultimately advised that she did not remember why she would have told Treijs that N. Cruz was living with Brian. When I asked Theall if she knew where Brian lived she advised in Parkland. I then asked Theall how she knew that and she stated that she believed Mrs. L. Cruz told her that Brian rented a room in Parkland and was friends with N. Cruz.

When I asked Mrs. Theall if she spelled out the name Nikolas to the call taker, she advised that she did not believe she did. Theall explained that she was really upset at the time and said that she did not know what she said to the call taker, besides that she wanted to speak to a detective. I then asked Theall if she ever spelled the name out for Deputy Treijs. Theall advised that she did spell it out for him, because she gave him as many Instagram accounts as she could remember (The account names were not in any of Treijs’ CAD notes). Theall advised that the name Nikolas did not have a common
spelling name and that he was named after Mrs. L. Cruz’ grandfather. Theall later stated that she believed that she may have spelled out the name to both the call taker and Deputy Treijs, because she provided the name of the Instagram account, which was “Nikolas Cruz.” Theall advised that there were several other Instagram accounts, but this one had the information and a picture of the gun that he wanted to buy. Theall said that she told the deputy to go on Instagram, so she could prove what she was talking about. Theall later said that she believed that she told Treijs about the one Instagram account that she knew of at the time. I asked Theall what were the photos that she was concerned about when she called the BSO. Theall reported that the first Instagram photos she saw was the one with the picture of the rifle he was going to purchase, the one where Subject N. Cruz was wearing the Army skull cap and he had a mask on, and the one he was holding the knives.

I asked Mrs. Theall what changed that caused her to contact the FBI. Theall reported that Mrs. Blaine told her that Subject N. Cruz posted on Instagram that he wanted to kill people and then removed the post. Theall advised that she saw the additional photos that N. Cruz posted. Theall said that her first thought was that she had not heard anything from the BSO, so she called the FBI and gave them the information on Instagram accounts and told them that N. Cruz was “nuts.”

Mrs. Theall stated that there are so many things going through her head right now of what she had said and does not know what she said to the BSO, to the FBI, or both. Theall said that she was so concerned about the situation with Subject N. Cruz.

I asked Mrs. Theall whether she knew Subject N. Cruz’ date of birth. Theall advised that it was September 28 and that he was 19 years old. Theall denied that Deputy Treijs ever asked her for Cruz’ date of birth. I asked Theall what types of questions Treijs asked her. Theall stated that she did not know and that basically she was doing all the talking. Theall stated that when Treijs said, “Oh, Lynda’s dead,” that it was a shame, and that he was sorry to hear that; she figured that he had all the information. Theall stated that he knew the address, he knew that he had been to the house on numerous occasions, and that he knew it was a bad situation. When I asked Theall why she believed that Treijs had been to the house on numerous occasions she advised, because he knew Mrs. L. Cruz by her first name. Theall reported that L. Cruz was on a first name basis with a lot of deputies that responded to the house. I asked Theall that besides Treijs knowing L. Cruz’ first name, did he tell her (Theall) that he had been to the residence on numerous occasions or that he was familiar with the family and she responded, “No.” Theall advised that she told Treijs that she was calling about “Nikolas Cruz,” and that if he wanted to verify it, to check the records, because “you” (the police) have been called to the house on numerous occasions and he would be able to see the deputies that were called to the house and the reasons that they were called. Theall advised that was when she stated that N. Cruz’ mother passed away and Treijs stated her first name.

Mrs. Theall agreed that Deputy Treijs asked her for her personal information and she provided it. I asked Theall whether she had a phone number for Subject N. Cruz at the time she called the BSO. Theall advised that N. Cruz did not have a phone and that he was using his mother’s phone. Theall said that the phone did have service, but that N. Cruz did not answer anyone’s calls and the mailbox was full.
Mrs. Theall advised that she wrote down the deputy’s name that she spoke to, but did not have the information with her. Theall advised that she remembers writing the name Chase and in parenthesis she wrote down the word “Spanish” and believes it may have been because he had a Spanish name. Theall denied that there was a language barrier or a bad phone connection when they talked.

I asked Mrs. Theall whether she ever suggested a way for Deputy Treijs to identify Subject N. Cruz or how to make contact with him. Theall advised that she told him about the Instagram account and the previous calls to the house. Theall advised that she assumed Treijs knew what school N. Cruz was attending, because he worked in the City of Parkland. When I asked Theall if N. Cruz was enrolled in school at the time that she called the BSO, she advised that she did not know.

Mrs. Theall could not recall whether she ever received a case number from Deputy Treijs. Theall believed that Treijs told her that he was going to “look into it,” but was not positive that he actually said that and she only assumed he would, since he knew the situation. Theall stated that she assumed that the deputy was going to write a report regarding what she told him. Theall said that she did not know whether she asked Treijs to follow-up with her. Theall reported that the next time someone contacted her was after the MSDHS shooting.

I asked Mrs. Theall if Deputy Treijs ever told her that they did not know where Subject N. Cruz was, that he could not follow-up, or that she needed to call the Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office, because that was the last place he was known to reside. Theall denied that Treijs ever told her that. Theall reported that Treijs just listened to her. Theall denied that Treijs provided her with any instructions after she reported her concern.

End of synopsis.

It should be noted that throughout the interview Mrs. Theall made contradicting statements about how she obtained the information and what information she provided to Deputy Treijs and the FBI as synopsized below:

- When Mrs. Theall was asked if she spelled the name Nikolas to the call taker, she initially said, “No,” and then said that she did not know. Ultimately Theall said that she did spell the name to the call taker when she provided her with the Instagram account information; however, the dispatcher did not document any Instagram Account information in her notes. Theall stated that she provided Deputy Treijs with the one Instagram account that she knew of at the time that she contacted the BSO and later stated that she provided Treijs with as many Instagram accounts as she could remember.

- Mrs. Theall originally reported that she created an Instagram account only after Mrs. Blaine told her that Subject N. Cruz posted on Instagram that he wanted to kill himself. However, Theall reported that she had a conversation on Instagram with N. Cruz about his feelings towards Mrs. Deschamps. Theall reported that although she was confused about the timeline
she believed that the conversation on Instagram occurred after she spoke to the BSO. This is a contradicting statement, since N. Cruz would have already moved out of Deschamp's residence when Theall contacted the BSO.

- Mrs. Theall advised that she started the conversation with Deputy Trejjs by stating “I know you’ve been to Lynda Cruz’ house on numerous occasions” and informed him that she passed away. Theall advised that when Trejjs stated, “Lynda’s dead?” this statement alone led her to believe that he knew the family, had been to the house, and knew the situation.

- Mrs. Theall initially stated that when Subject N. Cruz moved out of Mrs. Dechamps house he went to stay with a friend only known as Brian. Theall then advised that when she spoke to Deputy Trejjs, she believed that N. Cruz was still living with Dechamps. Theall stated that she was unaware of the altercation and 911 call at Deschamps' residence or that N. Cruz was no longer living there. Later in the same statement, I pointed out to Theall that Trejjs documented that she advised him that N. Cruz was living with a friend Brian. Theall insisted that she did not believe she knew that information until after she spoke with Trejjs. I again pointed out to Theall that if she told Trejjs that N. Cruz was staying with Brian, that would mean that she was aware that N. Cruz was no longer living with Deschamps and she agreed. Also, a review of Trejjs CAD notes state that Theall reported that N. Cruz caused a disturbance in Lake Worth, where he last resided two days ago; however, Theall stated that she did not know about this incident until after she spoke to Deputy Trejjs. During the statement, Theall advised two separate times that Brian lived in Parkland. Theall stated at one point that she did not know Brian lived in Parkland until after she spoke to Deputy Trejjs (November 30, 2017), but later in the statement, Theall advised that Mrs. L. Cruz was the person who told her that Brian rented a room in Parkland (It should be noted Mrs. L. Cruz passed away on November 1, 2017).

End of synopsis.

I obtained and reviewed the sworn, recorded witness statement of Mrs. Katherine Blaine. The statement was taken by Detective Bruce Link, CCN 10154, of the BSO Criminal Investigations Division Special Victims Unit. The statement was taken over the telephone on Saturday, February 17, 2018, in reference to a follow-up investigation of criminal case 17-1802-000525, regarding the shooting at MSDHS. The following is a synopsis of the statement [It should be noted: this was a telephonic statement, because Blaine resides in Levittown, New York):

Mrs. Blaine stated that Subject N. Cruz was her cousin’s, Mrs. L. Cruz, adopted son. Blaine reported that she had never met N. Cruz before. Blaine agreed that L. Cruz passed away on November 1, 2017. Detective Link points out to Blaine that according to the CAD report for case 17-1711-000039, it shows that she called 9-1-1, and asks her if she recalls. Blaine tells Link that she does not remember making that call. Blaine advised that she did recall calling the hospital in Broward County. Blaine explained that she initially called L. Cruz’ cellphone and someone answered and asked her if
she was L. Cruz’ friend or blood relative. Blaine reported that they told her that L. Cruz was in the hospital that she “had coded during the night. They brought her back during the night and that she was coding again at that very moment.” Blaine advised that they told her that they had her son N. Cruz there and that they did not believe that L. Cruz was going to survive. Blaine advised that she requested the person on the phone to give her Mrs. Hamel’s phone number, because she knew her and L. Cruz kept in touch for over 60 years. Blaine advised that N. Cruz told the person on the phone about “Rocxanne” (Mrs. Dechamps), because she did not know her.

Detective Link points out to Mrs. Blaine that according to the report she stated that the kids had guns and that she was requesting law enforcement to respond to the home, to check on them, and to take their guns away. Blaine advised that she did not remember making the phone call and denied mentioning anything about guns. Link asks Blaine whether she knew that they had guns and if she was concerned about it. Blaine reported that Mrs. L. Cruz told her that Subject N. Cruz had pellet guns and bb guns, and wanted to enlist in the military, but that he had the mental capacity of a 14 year old.

Mrs. Blaine reported that Mrs. L. Cruz mentioned problems with her sons, but it was mostly about Mr. Z. Cruz stealing things and being verbally disrespectful. Blaine said that Z. Cruz had been arrested a couple of times and was on probation. Blaine advised that Z. Cruz refused to get up and go to school.

Mrs. Blaine advised that Mrs. L. Cruz told her that Subject N. Cruz did hit her once, because he wanted to go to Walmart and she told him “No” and that they were going home. Blaine stated that N. Cruz swung his hand out and either knocked out or loosened three of her teeth. Blaine said that L. Cruz had to go to the dentist for it. Blaine estimated that the incident occurred three months before L. Cruz passed away.

Mrs. Blaine said that Mrs. L. Cruz told her that Subject N. Cruz bought a gun, but she thought it was a “hunting gun.” Blaine said she believed the “police type of gun” (No further description) was at a boy named “Hunter’s” house. Blaine explained that Hunter was N. Cruz’ friend and that they would go to Hunter’s father’s cabin to go hunting. Blaine reiterated that she believed the real guns were at Hunter’s father house.

Mrs. Blaine advised Detective Link that she did not remember making any 9-1-1 calls warning or requesting law enforcement to go and check on the boys and to remove their guns. Blaine said that she even checked her phone bill for calls that were made on that date.

Mrs. Blaine ultimately advised that she had not seen Mrs. L. Cruz in approximately 22 years and she never met the boys (Subject N. Cruz and Mr. Z. Cruz). Blaine said that after reading and hearing from Mrs. Hamel and other people, she thinks that there were problems that L. Cruz was not sharing with everybody. Blaine believed that Hamel knew a lot of the problems that were going on, because she had visited Florida and talked to L. Cruz all of the time, over multiple years. Blaine reported that she did not talk to L. Cruz for a period of 16 to 17 years. Blaine states that Hamel had talked to L.
Cruz, visited her, and had met N. Cruz and Z. Cruz. Blaine advised that Hamel would tell her things that L. Cruz never told her. Blaine reported that L. Cruz did not tell the whole family what was going on and believed she may have been embarrassed.

End of synopsis.

I obtained and reviewed the sworn, recorded witness statement of Mrs. Roxanne Deschamps. The statement was taken by Detective Bruce Link, CCN 10154, and Detective Kami Floyd, CCN 17022, of the BSO Criminal Investigations Division Special Victims Unit. The statement was obtained at her residence located at 6469 Easter Kay Way, Lake Worth, Florida 33462 on Saturday, February 17, 2018, in reference to a follow-up investigation of criminal case 17-1802-000525, regarding the shooting at MSDHS. The following is a synopsis of the statement:

Mrs. Deschamps advised that she had a very close relationship with Mrs. L. Cruz, and stated that she was like her “mom.” Deschamps stated that L. Cruz was the first person she met when she moved to Florida and lived beside her. Deschamps believed that she has known Subject N. Cruz for more than 11 years.

Mrs. Deschamps advised that Subject N. Cruz moved in with her on November 1, 2017, when Mrs. L. Cruz passed away. Deschamps advised that they called her from the hospital and she went to get “the kids” at the hospital just before L. Cruz passed away. Deschamps advised that she recalled calling police about the possible guns being buried in her backyard. Deschamps explained that her mom caught N. Cruz digging in the backyard with a shovel. Deschamps said that they waited until he was at work to figure out where he was digging. Deschamps advised that N. Cruz worked at the Dollar Tree and she would drive him to and from work. Deschamps said that she found a hole and an empty gun box that he brought with him from his old house. Deschamps opined that N. Cruz was preparing to receive and bury a gun. Deschamps stated that she found out about the gun he purchased from Dick’s Sporting Goods and told him that he could not have any guns in the house. Deschamps said that she did not trust N. Cruz and was aware that he had beat his mom and put guns to her head “too many times.” [During a review of the Call for Service summaries there did not appear to be a call for service where it was reported that N. Cruz put a gun to anyone’s head. It should be noted that when Deschamps called PBSO (case number 17157013) on November 28, 2017, she reported that N. Cruz had used a gun against people in the past, including putting a gun to others head.] Deschamps said that she believed she could control it if there were no guns around and she had her son that was bigger than N. Cruz. Deschamps advised that they called the police after they did not find anything in the hole, because she wanted to know what her options were. Deschamps believed that N. Cruz was going to bring a gun and therefore wanted him out of the house. Deschamps reported that he was already starting to get angry, because she did not want him to have his gun or bring his guns that he already had at his friend’s house. Deschamps said that she was told that she could not “kick him out,” because his property was there and that he could have his guns in the house if he wanted them. Deschamps felt that there was nothing she could do, but just wait there to be killed.

Mrs Deschamps advised that on November 28, 2017, there was a big fight and her son was trying to
stop Subject N. Cruz from hitting the walls and he decided to leave on his own. Deschamps said that they were worried that he was coming back with the gun that he bought and was going to go pick up.

Mrs. Deschamps denied that she ever saw the gun or that Subject N. Cruz ever brought it to her home. Deschamps said that she allowed him to bring the pellet gun, but he could not have it in his possession. Deschamps advised that the pellet gun was stored in her son’s closet and his door was locked. Deschamps agreed that on that night N. Cruz punched her son in the face. Deschamps said that she did ask the police to take N. Cruz to jail, but that her adult son did not want them to and only wanted him to leave. Deschamps advised that they found a place with one of his friends for him to go. Deschamps said that she always kept in contact with N. Cruz.

Mrs. Deschamps believed that Subject N. Cruz returned on December 20, 2017, with “James.” Deschamps said that James is the father of “J.T.,” N. Cruz’ friend that he goes hunting with.

End of synopsis.

On May 15, 2018, I obtained a sworn, recorded statement from Mrs. Katherine Blaine. The statement was taken over the telephone, since Blaine resides out of the State of Florida. The following is a synopsis of the statement:

Mrs. Blaine agreed that Subject N. Cruz is the adopted son of her cousin, Mrs. L. Cruz. Blaine denied that she ever had any direct contact with N. Cruz and advised that she never met him. Blaine reported that the last time she spoke to L. Cruz was over the telephone the day before she passed away. Blaine said that they were discussing L. Cruz being sick.

Mrs. Blaine explained that she has known Mrs. Theall, for approximately 58 years, since they were children. Blaine advised that she did not keep in touch with Theall over the years, but that Mrs. L. Cruz did. Blaine said that L. Cruz and Theall were longtime friends. Blaine reported that she started to communicate with Theall after L. Cruz passed away. Blaine advised that she knew L. Cruz kept in contact with Theall, so when she passed away she asked the nurse for Theall’s number. Blaine said that she called Theall and notified her that L. Cruz had passed away, but advised that Subject N. Cruz had already notified her. Blaine reported that her and Theall have maintained contact, since L. Cruz passed away.

I pointed out to Mrs. Blaine that on November 30, 2017, Mrs. Theall called the BSO regarding some concerns she had. I then asked Blaine whether she knew what Theall’s concerns were at that time. Theall said that the concerns were that Subject N. Cruz “would just snap a lot. He could snap very quickly and just get violent.” Blaine explained that during that time, she and Theall had also been communicating with Mrs. Deschamps who was taking care of N. Cruz and Mr. Z. Cruz. Blaine said that Deschamps had told her that her mother had seen N. Cruz trying to bury a gun in the yard. Blaine advised that Mrs. L. Cruz had told her and believes that she may have told Theall too, that N. Cruz was “just in love with guns and knives.” Blaine advised that when they found out that he was “trying to bury it,” they knew he could “snap” and were nervous about that. Blaine reported that L.
Cruz had also mentioned that one time N. Cruz was mad and had actually pointed the gun at her and pointed the gun at Z. Cruz. I asked Blaine again if she knew why Theall called the BSO on November 30, 2018. Blaine advised that Theall knew N. Cruz much better than she did, and Theall was concerned that he would, “you know, blow up and use his guns.”

Mrs. Blaine advised that she did see three or four of Subject N. Cruz’ Instagram accounts. Blaine explained that she already had an Instagram account and looked up N. Cruz and Mr. Z. Cruz just to check-up on them and see what they were getting into. Blaine advised that she had seen one of N. Cruz’ Instagram account approximately two months before Mrs. L. Cruz had passed away. Blaine advised that the first Instagram account she saw had a picture of N. Cruz holding knives, there were guns on a bed, his face was covered with what looked like T-shirts with slits cut in them for his eyes. Blaine reported that she told L. Cruz about it and she responded by saying that he wanted to go into the Army and join the infantry. L. Cruz told her that it was just his way of horsing around. Blaine advised that after L. Cruz passed away she started noticing “nastier stuff.” Blaine advised that N. Cruz posted, “I want to kill people,” approximately two weeks before the shooting at MSDHS [It should be noted that when Mrs. Theall contacted the FBI on January 5, 2018, she reported that N. Cruz has posted that he wanted to “kill people,” which was approximately one month before the shooting at MSDHS]. Blaine advised that N. Cruz was living with Mr. Snead at the time. Blaine said that she attempted to contact Snead several times and was unsuccessful until she threatened to contact the “authorities.” Blaine advised that she warned Snead about N. Cruz’ behavior, potential for violence, and the content if his Instagram accounts. Blaine said that Snead told her that he would talk to N. Cruz and that he was sure that he was “just acting out a little.”

Mrs. Blaine agreed that she was the person who initially told Mrs. Theall about Subject N. Cruz’ Instagram accounts and advised that they both started to monitor his accounts. Blaine agreed that prior to N. Cruz posting that he wanted to kill people, she physically saw a post where he wrote that he wanted to kill himself and then removed the post. Blaine agreed that she and Theall talked about that particular post.

I asked Mrs. Blaine whether she knew who Billy or Brian was. Blaine advised that Mrs. L. Cruz had an older friend named Billy who was approximately 70 years old. I asked Blaine whether she knew who Subject N. Cruz went stay with after he left Mrs. Deschamps residence. Blaine said that she believed that he went to stay with “some kid that was a little older.” Blaine believed that N. Cruz stayed there for one or two days. Blaine said that she believed the unknown “kid” was renting a room and assumed that it was somewhere near the city of Parkland, because N. Cruz knew him. I asked Blaine how she knew that N. Cruz went to stay with a friend. Blaine said that she believed that was what Deschamps told her, but it was something that she had heard. Blaine advised that N. Cruz was only there for a short time and then left to go live with the Snead family. Blaine believed that N. Cruz’ friend at the Snead’s residence is named Jameson, but is referred to as J.T.

Mrs. Blaine advised that Mrs. Theall told her that when she contacted the BSO in November she reported that she told him who she was and that she was calling about the Cruz’s. Blaine said that Theall told her that the person she talked to actually knew Mrs. L. Cruz, because they had been to her
house so many times. Blaine stated that Theall told her that when she notified the person that L. Cruz had passed away he seemed shocked. Blaine advised that Theall told her that the person seemed to acknowledge all the calls that were made by L. Cruz over the years regarding Subject N. Cruz and Mr. Z. Cruz. Blaine said that Theall told her that she reported how N. Cruz “is”, that he had guns, that he did not have anyone to keep him calm, and that he should take the guns away before he did something stupid. I asked Blaine whether Theall told her that she said something about the Instagram accounts and she said yes. I asked Blaine whether Theall knew where N. Cruz was staying when she called the BSO on November 30, 2017. Blaine said that she believed that Theall still thought that he was at Mrs. Deschamps residence.

I asked Mrs. Blaine whether she knew what pictures were posted on Subject N. Cruz’ Instagram account when Mrs. Theall called the BSO on November 30, 2017, versus the pictures that were posted when she called the FBI in January of 2018. Blaine stated that they were, “Pretty much the same” and did not have a lot of differences. Blaine agreed that the photos of N. Cruz with guns and the knives, and him covering his face were posted prior to November 30, 2017. Blaine clarified that before Mrs. L. Cruz passed away she did not see N. Cruz’ posting, “I want to kill people,” or “I want to kill myself.” Blaine said that she did not see those post until after L. Cruz past away. Blaine believed that the post which stated that he wanted to kill himself was removed approximately one or two days after it was posted.

Mrs. Blaine said that she thinks that whoever handled both of Mrs. Theall’s calls “dropped the ball.” Blaine advised that she did not think enough was done to stop the shooting at MSDHS. Blaine advised that she believed that it could have been prevented if the police would have got involved. Blaine stated that Subject N. Cruz could have been sent in as a Baker Act. Blaine advised that Theall gave them the information that N. Cruz said that he wanted to kill himself and that he had guns. Blaine said that information should have been enough for the police to go to the house and investigate it.

End of synopsis.

I reviewed the video recorded witness interview of Mrs. Rocxanne Deschamps. The statement was taken by Detective Bryan Tutler, CCN 10849, of the BSO Criminal Investigations Division Homicide Unit. The interview was conducted at the Public Safety Building on February 14, 2018, in reference to a criminal investigation regarding the shooting at MSDHS, reference case 17-1802-000525. During the statement Deschamps reports that Subject N. Cruz went to live with Mr. James Snead after she “kicked” him out (Timestamp 5:05 minutes).

I obtained and reviewed Detective Timothy Metz, CCN 11626, Case Supplemental Report reference case 17-1802-000525. On page 4 of the report Metz documents that he obtained video recorded statements from Mr. Jameson (J.T) Snead (Friend of Subject N. Cruz), Mr. James Snead, and Mrs. Kimberly Snead (Jameson’s parents). Metz documented that they advised that N. Cruz moved into their residence located at 7200 Loxahatchee Road, Parkland, Florida 33067, with them on November 27, 2017, after the person he was living with in Lake Worth (Mrs. Deschamps) forced him to move
out.

I contacted Sergeant Eric Keith, ID 6231, from the PBSO Internal Affairs Division and requested him to search for any calls for service made by Mrs. Theall or her phone number (774) 688-9121 in November of 2017. Keith replied by email and advised that he checked with their Communications Division and they were unable to locate any calls.

I also sent an internet request to the Fort Worth Police Department to see if there was a call made by Mrs. Theall in November of 2017. I received an email back from Fort Worth Police Department stating that they reviewed their files and determined that there were no responsive documents regarding my request.

A search of the RMS master names database as pictured below revealed the following spelling variations of the name Nikolas Cruz: (2) “Nicholas Cruz”, (2) “Nicholas Cruz”, and (3) “Nikolas Cruz.” After further review it appears that one of the Nicholas Cruz’ was not entered into the database until February 20, 2018, and therefore would not have been in the system when Deputy Treijs would have attempted to complete a name search in OSSI. There were two Nikolas Cruz’ with the same date of birth, but two separate addresses in the City of Parkland 6166 NW 80 Terrace and 8442 Lakeview Trail. It should be noted that one of the listed addresses, 8442 Lakeview Trail, is the same address that was listed as the location for the Domestic Disturbance that Treijs responded to on July 18, 2017, reference case 17-1702-001328. The other listed address 6166 NW 80 Terrace, is the same address that was listed as the location for the Suspicious Incident reference Incident Number L1717113000001602, on November 30, 2017. It should be noted that Subject N. Cruz was no longer living at either of the two listed Parkland addresses on November 30, 2018, when Mrs. Theall contacted the BSO.

A search in RMS for the last name Cruise revealed 15 males, none of which had the first name Nikolas or any variation of the name. It should be noted that due to recent changes to the OSSI MCT, a history for the address would not have been readily available to Treijs, because the calls for service
would have been prior to data migration that occurred on March 28, 2017.

I requested the Transaction Archive Reports (TAR) and DAVID Audit for Deputy Treijs in order to locate whether he made any queries for Subject Nikolas Cruz or several variations of that name. The TAR and DAVID Audit did not return any related searches.

I conducted several searches on DAVID for the name Nikolas Cruz and several variations of the name which revealed the following:

(5) Nikolas Cruz – One that had a City of Parkland address.
(44) Nicholas Cruz – None with a City of Parkland address.
(29) Nicolas Cruz – One that had a Lake Worth address. One that had a West Palm Beach address.
(2) Nickolas Cruz – None with a City of Parkland address.

It should be noted there were zero results for the name Nikolas Cruise or any variation of the name. The one Nikolas Cruz with the Parkland address is the Subject in the MSDHS shooting. The address history does have the address of 6166 NW 80 Terrace, which was provided during the call made to the BSO.

A search of the RMS Master Location database revealed that the 6166 NW 80 Terrace address was used in three Incident Reports, two that involved Subject N. Cruz. The address was also attached with the names Nikolas Cruz, Zachary Cruz, and Lynda Cruz.

I obtained and reviewed PremiereOne and CAD regarding the Calls For Service for November 30, 2017, in the City of Parkland. During the Bravo Gold shift (0600 – 1800 hours) there were 45 Incident Numbers generated. There were 26 calls for service that were dispatched and 19 calls that were self-generated (school zones, vacation watches, and traffic stops). Deputy Treijs personally handled 10 service calls. He was dispatched to 7 of the calls for service. Treijs had three self-generated calls; 1 school zone, 1 vacation watch, and 1 traffic stop. Treijs did not complete any Incident Reports on this date.

I contacted Application Programer/Analyst, Courtney Harvey, CCN 9945, from the Information Technology Division. Harvey provided an Internet Browser log from November 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017, for Deputy Treijs. The log revealed that Treijs did have access to streaming video. According to the log it did not appear that Treijs visited the Instagram website on November 30, 2017. It did appear that the Instagram website was visited on December 12 and 22, 2017; however, it is unknown what was accessed or whether it was a redirection from a different website.

On May 24, 2018, I obtained a Garrity statement from Deputy Guntis Treijs, CCN 9714, at the Division of Internal Affairs. His IUPA representative, Associate General Counsel Gary Lippman and Sergeant Aldemar Rengifo, CCN 9981, from the Division of Internal Affairs was also present. The following is a synopsis of the statement:
Deputy Treijs agreed that the statement that he provided to Sergeant Brown was true and accurate. Treijs clarified that in his statement he referred to Subject N. Cruz as being involved in the Domestic Disturbance that he handled in July of 2017, but it was actually his brother, Mr. Z. Cruz who he made contact with.

Deputy Treijs reported that he has conducted “civilian” Child Protective Investigations for a little less than three years. Treijs agreed that he also conducts investigation as a Road Patrol deputy. Treijs advised that he has been assigned to Road Patrol since 2003.

Deputy Treijs advised that he did recall handling the call for service on November 30, 2017, with the caller, Ms. Theall. Treijs stated that Theall reported that her relative, Subject N. Cruz, possessed firearms and wanting to join the military and kill people. Treijs explained that he and Theall had a conversation, but that was the information that he mostly remembered. Treijs advised that he asked Theall what her relationship to N. Cruz was, his location, his name, and age or date of birth. Treijs reported that Theall could only provide partial information. Treijs advised that she provided the name, but did not know his date of birth. I asked Treijs whether Theall was able to provide a location. Treijs advised that the location was Lake Worth, “because that’s where he was last located. That was where he was.” Treijs said that Theall was unable to provide a specific address in Lake Worth or a phone number. Treijs said that she provided that name of the city and that was all “she knew about it.” I asked Treijs whether he believed that he asked sufficient questions in order to attempt to identify the individual. Treijs said that he asked “biographic questions” that she should have had, but she gave him the answers she knew, “his name and not the date of birth.”

I asked Deputy Treijs what investigative measures he took. Treijs advised that based on the information that he had, he attempted to search for the name on OSSI. Treijs reported that without a date of birth he received multiple responses. Treijs said that because Subject N. Cruz had just moved two days earlier, he did not search anything further “knowing that he just moved from Broward.” [It should be noted N. Cruz moved from Broward after his mother passed away on November 1, 2017, and went to stay with Mrs. Deschamps in Lake Worth.] Treijs said that what he understood was that N. Cruz had recently relocated to Lake Worth, he was known to be in Lake Worth, and that he was in Lake Worth. Treijs said that it was verified by Theall that N. Cruz was in Lake Worth and that she knew that he was there.

Deputy Treijs advised that he conducted a Person Search on OSSI, by entering the first name, last name. I pointed out to Treijs that he advised that too many names populated and asked him approximately how many names it revealed. Treijs explained that there was a list of names on the screen he saw, but he did not count them. Treijs said that that the page he opened up was not a full screen, but advised that the page was full. Treijs denied that he scrolled down the list of names to see whether anybody had a Parkland address. Treijs said that he did not do any further research because the person was no longer living in Parkland and the caller did not have an address. I pointed out to Treijs that there was a Parkland address that was attached to the call, 6166 Northwest 80th Terrace, and asked him whether he attempt to conduct a history search on that address. Treijs said the reason he did not conduct a search of the history of the address was because, “based on the fact” that he did
not live there, the address was no longer active, and that was “not his address anymore.” I asked Trejs whether it could have helped him identify who the person was, if there were prior calls to that residence. Trejs agreed that if there were prior calls, prior reports would have showed if that person was listed in a report. I asked Trejs whether he thought about checking the address history at the time or if there was a reason this was not completed. Trejs said that he did not conduct the address search, because “the concern was about the jurisdiction,” which was in Palm Beach. Trejs said that the fact that the individual was previously living in Broward was old information. Trejs advised that he did not respond to the address provided on the CAD. Trejs agreed that the new occupants or neighbors could have possibly provided information on where the family moved to. Trejs advised that he did not respond to the listed address because he was told that his current location was in West Palm Beach. Trejs clarified that during his conversation with Theall she indicated that N. Cruz was not in Broward County, so he believed that he was not in Broward County. Trejs agreed that he did not try to identify N. Cruz or gather any further information, because he believed it was out of his jurisdiction. Trejs pointed out that when N. Cruz had the conversation with Theall she was in West Palm Beach. I asked Trejs whether Theall reported that N. Cruz was living in West Palm Beach or whether that was his last known location. Trejs advised that West Palm Beach was N. Cruz’ last known location per Theall; she knew that because there was some type of recent incident involving N. Cruz and the Lake Worth Police Department [During a review of the call for service summaries it was documented that on November 28, 2017, PBSO (case number 17157013) responded to the Deschamp’s residence due to an Assault. On this date N. Cruz voluntarily moved out of the residence].

Deputy Trejs agreed that Mrs. Theall told him that Subject N. Cruz went to stay with his friend Billy. Trejs advised that he did not know where Billy lived and Theall did not specify a location. I asked Trejs whether Theall ever told him that N. Cruz went to live with Mrs. Deschamps after his mom, Mrs. L. Cruz passed away. Trejs advised that he never heard the name Deschamps before, and said that Theall never told him that. When I asked Trejs if he believe that Theall gave him any information that he could have followed up on he replied, “Not based on what she gave me.”

Deputy Trejs agreed that he had access to streaming video on his work computer, which includes site like YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram. Trejs denied that he has an Instagram account. I pointed out to Trejs that in his internet browser log, it appears that the Instagram website was visited on December 12th and the 22nd. Trejs advised that he did not recall ever visiting the Instagram website. I asked Trejs whether he recalled being on another website and possibly being redirected to the Instagram website. Trejs advised that would be the only way it could have occurred, because he does not even know what the Instagram website looks like. Trejs reported that he is not familiar with social media. Trejs denied that Theall provided him with any Instagram information for Subject N. Cruz’ accounts. I pointed out to Trejs that the CAD notes on the call stated that N. Cruz had several social media sites and asked him whether he attempted to obtain any information regarding that statement. Trejs recall that Theall stated, “It’s all over internet.” Trejs advised that Theall did not provide him with the account information or website. I asked Trejs whether he asked Theall for the social media website, the account, or where he could find it. Trejs advised that he did not get the specifics.
I asked Deputy Treijjs whether he ever provided Mrs. Theall with the telephone number to the Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office or Lake Worth, since he believed that it was in their jurisdiction. Treijjs said that he did not have the number, but advised that he told her “twice” that she needed to call to Lake Worth. Treijjs advised that Theall understood what he told her.

I asked Deputy Treijjs if he recognize any of the people that Mrs. Theall was talking about from previous calls for service. Treijjs advised that he remembered the name Mrs. L. Cruz from his previous call. Treijjs verified that he recognized the name when he talked to Theall during the phone call. Treijjs agreed that he knew who Theall was talking about when she notified him that L. Cruz passed away. Treijjs said that he knew L. Cruz, because he had a call the previous year and she was referring to the stepson. I asked Treijjs whether he made the connection that Theall was talking about L. Cruz’ son, Subject N. Cruz. Treijjs said that he did remember the call for service involving L. Cruz and the “other son” (Mr. Z. Cruz). I asked Treijjs if he knew who L. Cruz was, and Theall was talking about her son, does he believe that he could have identified who her son was based on him knowing that he had been to the residence before. Treijjs advised that he never saw N. Cruz or had any dealings with him. Treijjs agreed that he may have told Theall that he was familiar with the family and had responded to a call there before as she had suggested. Treijjs pointed out that his previous involvement with the family was one call for service.

Deputy Treijjs agreed that during his statement to Sergeant Brown he mixed up Subject N. Cruz and Mr. Z. Cruz. I pointed out to Treijjs that during his statement he said that he recalled both sons being at the scene, but in the report, it only mentioned Z. Cruz. I asked Treijjs whether he recalled N. Cruz being on-scene. Treijjs replied, “No,” and explained that there was another juvenile at the home, but described him as a black male, approximately 16 or 17 years old.

I pointed out to Deputy Treijjs that according to his statement, he stated that Mrs. Theall had an accent and that he had a bad phone connection. I asked Treijjs if after reviewing the statements he believed that Theall has an accent. Treijjs explained that he had trouble understanding her and had to keep asking her to repeat herself. Treijjs advised that it could have been either because of an accent or the manner in which she spoke. Treijjs stated that she appeared agitated and it was hard to understand everything that she was saying. Treijjs reported that back then he had a flip phone which stopped working. Treijjs agreed that if he had a bad phone connection he could have used a different phone.

I asked Deputy Treijjs what he thinks Mrs. Theall was attempting to report to him, what her concern was, and what he believed that she wanted him to do for her. Treijjs said that Theall was concerned about her relative, Subject N. Cruz. Treijjs said that Theall wanted assistance, but she only provided limited information about his whereabouts. Treijjs insisted that Theall did not know N. Cruz’ date of birth and advised that he asked her “twice” for it. Treijjs said that he did ask for an approximate age and Theall told him that he was an adult. I asked Treijjs if that information could have helped him in trying to narrow down the list of people on OSSl and he agreed.

I asked Deputy Treijjs if Mrs. Theall specifically told him that Subject N. Cruz wanted to kill himself.
Trejls advised that Theall did not advise any specific threats and said that she told him that he wanted to join the military and kill people. Trejls agreed that he saw the CAD notes which stated that N. Cruz wanted to kill himself. I asked Trejls whether he specifically asked Theall why she said that he wanted to kill himself. Trejls replied, “Yes,” and explained that Theall told him that she had a conversation with N. Cruz when they were on the phone. Trejls stated “but those were not the specific threat; he was grieving his steppmother.” Trejls agreed that he asked Theall whether N. Cruz said that he wanted to kill himself. Trejls said that Theall was concerned about him because of the recent death of his steppmother, L. Cruz. Trejls reported that Theall repeated that she was concerned about him, that he was grieving his mother, and that he wanted to join the military. Ultimately, Trejls agreed that one of Theall’s concerns was that N. Cruz wanted to kill himself. I asked Trejls if he believed that those were serious allegations or concerns. Trejls replied, “On its face, yes.” Trejls advised that he did not notify a supervisor or make any notifications to anyone else regarding these allegations, because the call was received from out-of-state and it was regarding a person who was not in the BSO jurisdiction.

I asked Deputy Trejls whether he would do anything differently in the future while handling a similar call. Trejls said that he would have added more notes to his call, be more specific, he would have emphasized things, and he would have done a recap of the conversation. Trejls agreed that he would complete a police report for a similar type of call with these types of allegations. I asked Trejls, would he attempt to do more investigative work in order to identify person. Trejls advised, “Well, I would have attempted to not so much identify the person, but the location. Yes, that would have been -- that would have been, I think, important.”

Deputy Trejls agreed that he said that Mrs. Theall gave him limited information. Trejls agreed that during the conversation with Theall he was able to identify the family she was referring to was the Cruz family, which he wrote a Domestic Disturbance Incident Report for. Sergeant Rengifo pointed out to Trejls that even though he is saying that Theall gave him limited information, he knew who she was referring to, so that information was available on OSSI. Trejls agreed that he knew “the person” Theall was talking about, but advised that he did not know the location. Trejls agreed that he had been to the Cruz residence when Mrs. L. Cruz was alive and they were living there. Trejls advised that he believed that N. Cruz was no longer living there, based on the information Theall provided.

Sergeant Rengifo pointed out to Deputy Trejls that he mentioned that he did not believe that there was a specific threat, but he also said that when he spoke to Mrs. Theall on the phone, she mentioned that Subject N. Cruz was grieving, he had firearms, and he wanted to kill himself. Rengifo asked Trejls how much more specific did he think the threat should be for a report to be written, a supervisor to respond, or somebody to be notified and not just refer her to another agency. Trejls advised that specific information would be to “know where he is.” Trejls agreed that besides checking OSSI he did nothing further to identify where N. Cruz was located following the conversation he had with Theall. When Rengifo asked Trejls whether he believed that he conducted a preliminary investigation suitable enough for the allegations that were being made over the telephone he replied, “I could have done more.”
End of synopsis.

It should be noted as previously stated by Technician Deosaran that a search through the driver’s tab in OSSI could not be completed, unless the deputy has a name and date of birth or a driver’s license number. During Deputy Treijs statement he advised that he conducted a Person Search on OSSI for the name Nikolas Cruz. Deosaran verified that a Person Search could not be conducted without a date of birth and provided the following screen shot.

BRIEF

- On November 30, 2017, Deputy Treijs was dispatched to make telephone contact with Mrs. Theall in reference to Subject N. Cruz collecting guns and knives and advising that he is going to one day kill himself. Theall indicated that she was afraid that someone was going to get hurt and that this might be “Columbine” in the making.

- Deputy Treijs entered into the CAD notes that Mrs. Theall advised him that Subject N. Cruz was living with a friend and that we wanted to join the service and “kill people.” Treijs documented that N. Cruz caused a disturbance in Lake Worth, where he was residing two days ago. Treijs documented that N. Cruz is borderline Autistic and that it was unknown where N. Cruz was currently located.

- Deputy Treijs stated that he informed Mrs. Theall to contact the Lake Worth Police
Department to file a police report, since it was believed that was the last place Subject N. Cruz was seen. Treij did not complete a report regarding the information he received from Theall.

- Subject N. Cruz moved from Parkland after his mother, Mrs. L. Cruz passed away on November 1, 2017, and went to stay with Mrs. Deschamps in Lake Worth. On November 28, 2017, N. Cruz left Deschamps’ residence. It is unclear whether N. Cruz went to stay with an unknown friend “Brian” or “Billy” at an unknown location for two days or if he immediately went to stay with the Snead family in Parkland. It should be noted that on November 30, 2018, when Mrs. Theall contacted the BSO, N. Cruz was no longer living at either of the two Parkland addresses that were listed in OSSI.

- Throughout her multiple interviews, Mrs. Theall provided the listed information several different times to multiple people during different time frames. Theall has made contradicting statements about the timeline, how things occurred, and about the information she provided to the BSO and the FBI.

- A search of the RMS system revealed that there were a total of 6 variations of the name Nikolas Cruz in the database at the time of this incident. A search of the listed address revealed that there were three Incident Reports, two that involved Subject N. Cruz. The address was also attached with the names Nikolas Cruz, Zachary Cruz, and Lynda Cruz.

- Deputy Treij advised that during the conversation with Mrs. Theall he knew that she was referring to the Cruz family, because he recalled responding to their residence for a Domestic Disturbance.

- Deputy Treij agreed that besides checking OSSI he did nothing further to identify where Subject N. Cruz was located. Treij advised that based on the information Mrs. Theall provided he believed that N. Cruz was no longer in Broward County and that his last known location was in Lake Worth.

END OF REPORT.

I, THE UNDERSIGNED, DO HEREBY SWEAR OR AFFIRM, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, THAT TO THE BEST OF MY PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION, AND BELIEF, I HAVE NOT KNOWINGLY OR WILLFULLY DEPRIVED, OR ALLOWED ANOTHER TO DEPRIVE, THE SUBJECT OF THE INVESTIGATION OF ANY OF THE RIGHTS CONTAINED IN ss. 112.532 AND 112.533, FLORIDA STATUTES.
THE UNDERSIGNED INVESTIGATOR ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE FOREGOING REPORT CONSISTING OF 39 PAGES, EACH OF WHICH HAS BEEN INITIALED BY THIS INVESTIGATOR, IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE REPRESENTATION OF THE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED.

INVESTIGATOR signature

CCN

DATE 6/1/18

THE FOREGOING REPORT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Lt. Barry Lindquist CCN 13979

REVIEWING SUPERVISOR signature

CCN

DATE 6/11/14
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Clarksburg, WV 26306

November 9, 2018

Sheriff Bob Gualtieri
Commission Chair
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
Public Safety Commission
Pinellas County Sheriff's Office
P. O. Drawer 2500
Largo, FL 33779-2500

Dear Sheriff Gualtieri:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission with information about the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Public Access Line (PAL) and actions taken to improve the processing and dissemination of information received by the public.

The FBI receives thousands of calls a day from the public through PAL, a unit operating within FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division. PAL operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, providing an around-the-clock way for the FBI to receive and evaluate potentially critical information from the public and take appropriate action. PAL serves as a central intake point for tip information from the public about potential or ongoing crimes. Following the February 14, 2018 shooting incident in Parkland, Florida, the FBI conducted a special review of PAL to better understand the operational system and to recommend potential changes to PAL’s protocols and procedures.

The FBI made changes and advancements to PAL processes, procedures, systems, and staff to transition PAL from a call-intake center to an Operations Center. In developing the plans for this transition, FBI personnel visited operations centers of various law enforcement agencies to identify best practices and staffing models. Although PAL will continue to perform the call-intake services associated with the FBI’s tip line, as an Operations Center, PAL will have the staff and functionality to analyze and disseminate information in a timely manner to the field.

Call processing procedures have also been improved—by implementation of a Two-tier Customer Service Representative (CSR) Call Processing Structure intended to better identify and streamline resources to address calls involving threat-to-life, counterterrorism, and other criminal matters falling within the FBI’s investigative jurisdiction. Tier 1 CSRs are
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri

responsible for handling nuisance calls, providing general information about the FBI, and the
general transfer of calls to field offices. Tier 2 CSRs process calls where the information
provided has a Potential Lead Value (PLV) (e.g., threat-to-life, counterterrorism, and criminal
matters within the FBI’s purview). CSR-written synopses for Tier 2 calls are now automatically
scored using a Key Threat Word List, which is updated periodically. Calls designated as having
No Lead Value (NLV) but that contain at least one key threat word must be reviewed by a
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) prior to closing the tip.

The FBI has also added a mechanism for additional review of calls to PAL and
has updated PAL Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The SOPs were reviewed and changed
to ensure standardization of references and resources used by CSRs and SSAs. One
comprehensive and concise SOP was developed and implemented, and is now searchable and
available to CSRs and SSAs in real-time. FBI updated PAL’s information technology system to
better document the steps CSRs and SSAs take to process and review calls prior to final
disposition. A new product is scheduled to be deployed next month which will utilize
speech-to-text technology to identify key threat words used by the caller in the digital transcript
of a call. A Quality Management Team (QM Team) was created to review 100% of calls related
to threat-to-life and counterterrorism matters, and to review a statistically-relevant percentage of
all other calls. The QM Team also assesses CSR phone, technical, and decision-making skills.

Training and staffing are also top priorities as the FBI works to advance PAL
capabilities. Additional resources have been identified to augment PAL staffing. In 2018, the
FBI surged temporary staff to CJIS to supplement existing resources and provide additional
training. The FBI is increasing permanent staff at PAL by adding 12 SSAs and 50 professional
staff positions. The FBI has enhanced training in many areas—PAL employees received Threat
to Life and Guidance on School Shooting trainings to enhance their abilities to identify these
types of situations and best direct the call and information provided by the caller. The FBI
Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) provided a number of training sessions to PAL personnel,
including sessions relating to threat assessments of potential school shooters and identification of
pre-attack mental health indicators. Other trainings provided to PAL include: escalating threats;
database queries; and referrals of tips to other Federal, state, and local law enforcement.

The FBI is continually working to refine and improve its operations to protect
public safety. Thank you for your support of the FBI, its mission, and its people.

Sincerely,

Douglas E. Lindquist
Assistant Director
CJIS Division
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
Public Safety Commission

Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission
Meeting Agenda
Broward College North Campus - Building 60, OMNI Auditorium
1000 Coconut Creek Boulevard
Coconut Creek, FL 33066

Tuesday, April 24, 2018

8:30 a.m. Welcome and Opening Remarks
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri, Commission Chair

8:45 a.m. Introduction of Commission Members and Staff

9:00 a.m. Sunshine Law—Overview and Requirements and Required
Commission on Ethics Financial Disclosure and Gift Filing
Jason Jones, PSC General Counsel

9:30 a.m. Commission Governance—Roberts Rules of Order
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri
https://robertsrules.org/robertsrules.pdf

9:35 a.m. Overview of Commission’s Statutory Mandate, Investigative Scope
and Priorities
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri

10:00 a.m. Break

10:15 a.m. MSDHS Shooting Investigation Briefing
Broward County Sheriff’s Office

11:15 a.m. Commission Discussion on Initial Investigative Topics and Decision
on Areas to be Included In January 2019 Initial Report

12:00 p.m. Lunch Break (provided on site for commission members and staff)

1:00 p.m. Commission Discussion on Witnesses Interviews and Evidence to be
Acquired

1:30 p.m. Commission Discussion to Establish Investigative Timeline

2:30 p.m. Future Meetings and Administrative Matters

3:00 p.m. Public Comment (must complete comment card and remarks are
limited to 3 minutes each)

3:15 p.m. PUBLIC MEETING ENDS
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
Public Safety Commission

3:20 p.m. Commission Media Availability

3:30 p.m. CLOSED SESSION Travel to Stoneman Douglas High School (Commission staff will caravan)

4:15 p.m. CLOSED SESSION Tour Stoneman Douglas High School Shooting Site

(Commission Members and Staff Only: The interior of Building 12 remains an active crime scene and the tour will not include the interior of the building. Any commission member may elect not to attend the tour).
Facilitated by Broward County Sheriff’s Office

5:00 p.m. Adjourn

IN MEMORY OF:
Alyssa Alhadeff
Scott Beigel
Martin Duque Anguiano
Nicholas Dworet
Aaron Feis
Jaime Guttenberg
Christopher Hixon
Luke Hoyer
Cara Loughran
Gina Montalto
Joaquin Oliver
Alaina Petty
Meadow Pollack
Helena Ramsay
Alexander Schachter
Carmen Schentrup
Peter Wang
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
Public Safety Commission

Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission
Meeting Agenda
BB&T Center
Sunrise, FL
June 7 and 8, 2018

June 7, 2018

8:30 a.m. Welcome and Opening Remarks
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri, Commission Chair

8:35 a.m. Review and Approval of Minutes from April 24, 2018 Meeting
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri

8:40 a.m. Overview of SB7026 Requirements
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri

9:30 a.m. Overview of Pre and Post-Arrest Juvenile Diversion Programs
Mark Greenwald, Director of Research and Data Integrity, DJJ

10:30 a.m. Break

10:45 a.m. State Law and DOE Perspective on School Discipline and Diversion
Jacob Oliva, DOE Executive Vice Chancellor, K-12 Public Schools

12:00 p.m. Lunch Break (provided on site for commission members and staff)

1:00 p.m. Broward County School’s Discipline System and Diversion Programs, Including the Promise Program
Michaelle (Mickey) Pope, Executive Director, BCS

2:50 p.m. Florida School Construction and Physical Site Security Requirements
Linda Champion, Deputy Commissioner, DOE

3:20 p.m. Break

3:35 p.m. Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED)
Edward Upthegrove, Florida Office of Attorney General
Art Hushen, CPTED Lead Instructor for Florida OAG

4:15 p.m. Active Assailant Prevention and Response Best Practices for Schools
Bob Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Secretary, DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection

5:15 p.m. Public Comment (must complete comment card and remarks are limited to 3 minutes each).

5:30 p.m. Adjourn
IN MEMORY OF:
Alyssa Alhadeff
Scott Beigel
Martin Duque Anguiano
Nicholas Dworet
Aaron Feis
Jaime Guttenberg
Christopher Hixon
Luke Hoyer
Cara Loughran
Gina Montalto
Joaquin Oliver
Alaina Petty
Meadow Pollack
Helena Ramsay
Alexander Schachter
Carmen Schentrup
Peter Wang

Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
Public Safety Commission

June 8, 2018

8:00 a.m. Security Risk Assessment Requirements, Florida School Security and Assessment Tool (FSSAT) and School Safety Plans
Linda Champion, Deputy Commissioner, DOE

8:30 a.m. Active Assailant Training and Drills Before and After MSD Shooting
Jacob Oliva, DOE Executive Vice Chancellor, K-12 Public Schools

9:00 a.m. Florida Safe School Funding (DOE)
Linda Champion, Deputy Commissioner, Finance and Operations

9:30 a.m. The Law and Regulations Regarding SROs in Florida and Applicable Training Requirements (Presentation- Part 1, Part 2)
Dean Register, Director of Professionalism, FDLE

10:00 a.m. Break

10:15 a.m. SROs in Florida: Their Role and Operational Best Practices
Tim Enos, Florida Association of School Resource Officers

10:45 a.m. BCSO Perspective—SROs in Broward County, Staffing, Funding, Contracts between the School Board and Law Enforcement Agencies
Major Nichole Anderson, BCSO School Resource Officer Program

11:15 a.m. Broward County Schools Perspective—SROs in Broward County,
Jeff Moquin, Chief of Staff, Broward School Board

11:45 a.m. Lunch (provided on site for commission members and staff)

12:45 p.m. Explanation of the ESE System in Florida and SEDNET
Jacob Oliva, DOE followed by Nikki Zenn SEDNET

1:45 p.m. ESE in Broward County Schools and School Counseling System
Dr. Antoine Hickman, Executive Director, Broward County Schools

3:00 p.m. Commission Discussion/Feedback

3:30 p.m. Public Comments (3 minutes for remarks/comment card)

4:00 p.m. Adjourn
**Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission**

Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission
Meeting Agenda
BB&T Center
Sunrise, FL
July 10-12, 2018

**IN MEMORY OF:**

**July 10, 2018**

8:30 a.m. Welcome and Opening Remarks
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri, Commission Chair

8:40 a.m. Review and Approval of [Minutes from June 7-8, 2018](#)
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri

8:45 a.m. **PROMISE Program Follow Up**
TBD

10:15 a.m. Break

10:30 a.m. A. **Overview of School Fire Codes and Regulations**
Julius Halas, Director, State Fire Marshall

B. **National Fire Protection Association Standard for Hostile Event Response**
Otto Drozd, Fire Chief, Orange County Fire Rescue Dept.

12:00 p.m. Lunch (provided on site for commission members and staff)

1:00 p.m. **Broward County School’s Behavioral Threat Assessment Process**
Dr. Mary Claire Mucenic, Director, Exceptional Student Learning Support, Broward County Public Schools

2:00 p.m. **Behavioral Threat Assessment – U.S. Secret Service**
Lina Alathari, Ph. D., Chief, National Threat Assessment Center

3:30 p.m. Break

3:45 p.m. **State of Virginia School Behavioral Threat Assessment Process**
Donna P. Michaelis, Manager, Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety

5:15 p.m. Public Comment (must complete comment card and remarks are limited to 3 minutes each).

5:30 p.m. Adjourn
July 11, 2018

8:30 a.m. Overview of Broward County 911 System – Broward County Government
Bertha Henry, County Administrator, Broward County Government

9:30 a.m. *Broward County 911 System – Broward County Sheriff’s Office*
Angela Mize, Assistant Director, Regional Communications

10:30 a.m. Break

10:45 a.m. *Broward County 911 System – Coral Springs Police Department*
Shawn Backer, Deputy Chief, Coral Springs Police Department

12:00 p.m. Lunch (provided on site for commission members and staff)

1:00 p.m. *Technical Aspects of Radio Systems* and *SLERS*
Cindy Cast, Radio Systems Manager, Miami-Dade County
Chair, Domestic Security Communications Focus Group
Nick Simoncini, Telecommunications Consultant, FDLE

2:30 p.m. Break

2:45 p.m. Overview of Broward County Law Enforcement Radio System – Broward County Government
Bertha Henry, County Administrator, Broward County Government

3:45 p.m. *Broward County Law Enforcement Radio System – BSO Perspective*
Angela Mize, Assistant Director, Regional Communications

4:45 p.m. Public Comment (must complete comment card and remarks are limited to 3 minutes each).

5:00 p.m. Adjourn
**Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission**

**July 12, 2018**

8:30 a.m.  **Broward County Law Enforcement Radio System – Coral Springs Perspective**  
Shawn Backer, Deputy Chief, Coral Springs Police Department

9:30 a.m.  **Q&A on the Technical Aspects of Radio Systems**  
Cindy Cast, Radio Systems Manager, Miami-Dade County

10:00 a.m.  **Break**

10:15 a.m.  **Gun Purchase and Possession Disqualification Laws and Background Checks**  
Robin Sparkman, Chief, Firearm Eligibility Bureau, FDLE

11:15 a.m.  **Overview of the Operational Aspects of Florida Mental Health System and the Mental Health System in Broward County**  
Ute Gazioch, Director of Mental Health and Substance Abuse, DCF

12:30 p.m.  **Lunch (provided on site for commission members and staff)**

1:30 p.m.  **Broward County Mental Health System and Funding – Managing Entity Presentation**  
Silvia Quintana, Chief Executive Officer, Broward Behavioral Health Coalition

2:00 p.m.  **Overview of Florida’s Baker Act Law**  
Hon. Steve Leifman, Miami – Dade County Judge

3:00 p.m.  **Public Comment (must complete comment card and remarks are limited to 3 minutes each).**

3:15 p.m.  **Commission Discussion/Feedback**

3:30 p.m.  **Public Meeting Ends/Break**

**CLOSED SESSIONS**

3:45 p.m.  **Presentation on Investigative Results of Cruz Interaction with Henderson Behavioral Health**  
Chris Lyons, Detective, Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office

4:45 p.m.  **Testimony by Henderson Regarding Treatment of Cruz**  
Pamela Galan, Chief Operating Officer, Henderson Behavioral Health

5:15 p.m.  **Adjourn**
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
Public Safety Commission

Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission
Meeting Agenda
BB&T Center
Sunrise, FL
August 8-9, 2018

August 8, 2018

8:30 a.m. Welcome and Opening Remarks
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri, Commission Chair

8:40 a.m. Review and Approval of Minutes from July 10-12, 2018
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri

8:45 a.m. Presentation on Established School Hardening Best Practices
Guy Grace, Littleton, CO School District

Handouts Provided
The Popular Mechanics Guide to Safer Schools
Littleton Public Schools Community Mailer
PASS Safety and Security Guidelines for K-12 Schools

10:15 a.m. Break

10:30 a.m. Continuation: Established School Hardening Best Practices
Guy Grace, Littleton, CO School District

11:00 a.m. Overview of FERPA, Its Requirements and Exceptions
Francisco Negron, Jr, Chief Legal Officer, National School Board Association

12:30 p.m. Lunch (provided on site for commission members and staff)

1:30 p.m. Overview of Florida K-12 Educational Privacy Requirements
Brent McNeal, Deputy General Counsel, Florida DOE

2:00 p.m. HIPAA—Overview of Federal Healthcare and Mental Health Care Privacy Laws
Tracey Jaensch Esq., Ford Harrison LLP

3:00 p.m. Break

3:15 p.m. Overview of Florida Privacy Laws Affecting Information Sharing
Paul Rozzell, Esq.

4:15 p.m. Overview of Law Enforcement Records Management and Data Sharing in Broward County
Adam Hofstein, Lieutenant, Broward County Sheriff’s Office

APPENDIX E. COMMISSION MEETING AGENDAS
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission

5:15 p.m. Public Comment (must complete comment card and remarks are limited to 3 minutes each).

5:30 p.m. Adjourn

August 9, 2018

8:30 a.m. National Data on Active Assailant Incidents
Nevin Smith, FDLE

10:30 a.m. Break

10:45 a.m. DCF Adult Protective Services – Overview of Transition from Child to Adult Protective Services and Presentation on Response to Call Regarding Cruz
Rebecca Kapusta, Assistant Secretary for Operations, DCF

11:15 a.m. Commission Discussion on January Report Factor Recommendations for SRO Duties and Ratios

11:45 a.m. BSO’s Summary of Cruz Contacts
*added day of meeting

12:00 p.m. Public Comment (must complete comment card and remarks are limited to 3 minutes each).

12:15 p.m. Public Meeting Ends/Lunch (provided on site for commission members and staff)

CLOSED SESSION

1:15 p.m. Overview of Chronology Regarding Cruz’s Life from Birth through February 13, 2018

3:30 p.m. Break

3:45 p.m. Continuation of Chronology Review

5:00 p.m. Adjourn
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
Public Safety Commission

Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission Meeting Agenda
BB&T Center
Sunrise, FL
September 5-6, 2018

September 5, 2018

8:30 a.m. Welcome and Opening Remarks
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri, Commission Chair

8:40 a.m. Approval of Minutes from August Meeting
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri

8:45 a.m. Data Sharing – State and Regional Fusion Centers
Jessica Davenport, Senior Management Analyst Supervisor, Florida Fusion Center
Major Brian Rafky, Director of Southeast Florida Fusion Center

9:45 a.m. Commission Discussion Regarding Findings and Recommendations on the Role of the SRO and SRO Staffing Ratios
Dean Register, Director of Professionalism, FDLE
Tim Enos, Executive Director, Florida Association of School Resource Officers
Jane Fletcher, Assistant Deputy Commissioner for Accountability, Research and Measurement, DOE

10:30 a.m. Break

10:45 a.m. Continuation—Commission Discussion and Recommendations on SRO Staffing

12:00 p.m. Lunch (provided on site for commission members and staff)

1:00 p.m. Commission Discussion on Content and Format of the January Report

2:00 p.m. Commission Discussion Regarding Findings and Recommendations on items such as the Florida Mental Health and Baker Act Systems, School-Based Behavioral Threat Assessments and Threat Assessment Teams, State and Federal Laws (FERPA, HIPAA, etc.) Affecting Information Sharing and Law Enforcement Records Management and Data Sharing Systems

3:00 p.m. Break
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School  
Public Safety Commission

3:15 p.m. Continuation of Commission Discussion Regarding Findings and Recommendations

4:00 p.m. Presentation on Exterior Video and Former Deputy Peterson’s Response  
Detective Zack Scott, Broward County Sheriff’s Office

5:00 p.m. Public Comment (must complete comment card and remarks are limited to 3 minutes each).

5:15 p.m. Adjourn

September 6, 2018

8:30 a.m. Commission Discussion, Findings and Recommendations Regarding School Site Security and School Hardening

10:30 a.m. Public Comment (must complete comment card and remarks are limited to 3 minutes each)

10:40 a.m. Public Meeting Ends/Break

CLOSED SESSION

11:00 a.m. Commission Review and Discussion of the Past and Current FSSAT and Findings and Recommendations Regarding the FSSAT Instrument and Site Assessment Process

12:30 p.m. Lunch (provided on site for commission members and staff)

1:30 p.m. Overview of Chronology Regarding Cruz’s Life from Birth through February 13, 2018

3:30 p.m. Break

3:45 p.m. Continuation of Chronology Review

5:00 p.m. Adjourn
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
Public Safety Commission

Tuesday, November 13, 2018

8:30 a.m. Welcome and Opening Remarks
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri, Commission Chair

8:40 a.m. Approval of Minutes from September Meeting
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri

9:00 a.m. Public Meeting Ends

CLOSED SESSION

9:00 a.m. Broward County Public Schools FSSAT Follow-Up Presentation

10:30 a.m. Break

10:45 a.m. Henderson Behavioral Health Follow-Up Presentation

12:15 p.m. Video Presentation Regarding MSDHS Shooting

12:45 p.m. Lunch (provided on site for commission members and staff)

OPEN SESSION (Pending completion of business in the closed session)

1:45 p.m. Summary of Social Media Posts and Witness Interviews Showing Prior Unreported Knowledge of Cruz’s Behavior*
Chris Lyons, Detective, Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office

2:45 p.m. Presentation on 911 Calls Received; Law Enforcement and Fire/EMS Radio Transmissions; and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) Entries on February 14, 2018*
Annie White, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, FDLE

3:45 p.m. Break

4:00 p.m. Continue Presentation on 911 Calls, Radio Transmissions and CAD
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
Public Safety Commission

Entries*

5:00 p.m. Presentation on BSO and CSPD Active Assailant Policies and Training, Including Training Received by Former SRO Deputy Scot Peterson
Chuck Massucci, Special Agent, FDLE

6:00 p.m. Public Comment (must complete comment card and remarks are limited to 3 minutes each)

6:15 p.m. Adjourn

Wednesday, November 14, 2018

8:30 a.m. Presentation Regarding Physical Site and Site Security at MSDHS and Results of Teacher Interviews*
Walter Bonasoro, Detective, Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office

10:30 a.m. Break

10:45 a.m. Presentation on Cruz’s Cell Phone Content and Internet Searches
John Suess, Sergeant, Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office*

12:00 p.m. Lunch (provided on site for commission members and staff)

1:00 p.m. Presentation on the Law Enforcement Response to MSDHS*
Sgt. John Suess

Law Enforcement Response - Animation
Sgt. John Suess

2:45 p.m. Break

3:00 p.m. Continue Law Enforcement Response Presentation*

5:00 p.m. Public Comment (must complete comment card and remarks are limited to 3 minutes each)

5:15 p.m. Adjourn

Thursday, November 15, 2018

8:30 a.m. Continue Law Enforcement Response Presentation*
10:30 a.m.  Break
10:45 a.m.  Continue Law Enforcement Response Presentation*
12:00 p.m. Lunch (provided on site for commission members and staff)
1:00 p.m.  Presentation on the Fire/EMS Response to MSDHS and Results of
Interviews Regarding Medical Care*
        Chuck Massucci, Special Agent, FDLE
2:00 p.m.  Testimony of Former Deputy Scot Peterson**
3:00 p.m.  Break
3:15 p.m.  Former Deputy Peterson Testimony Continued**

**Superintendent Runcie’s Testimony may begin at 2:00 p.m., followed by Sheriff
Israel at 3:45 p.m. The times and order of appearance for this portion of the agenda
is subject to change depending on Peterson’s appearance and participation.

4:15 p.m.  Testimony by Superintendent Robert Runcie
5:15 p.m.  Testimony by Sheriff Scott Israel
6:15 p.m.  Public Comment (must complete comment card and remarks are
limited to 3 minutes each)
6:30 p.m.  Adjourn

Friday, November 16, 2018

8:30 a.m.  Testimony by Chief Clyde Parry
10:00 a.m.  Break
10:15 a.m.  Overview of DOE Office of Safe Schools and Statewide Compliance
with SB7026
        Damien Kelly, Director, DOE
11:15 a.m.  Commission Discussion on Information Received From the FBI on
its Internal Review
12:00 p.m. Lunch (provided on site for commission members and staff)
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
Public Safety Commission

1:00 p.m.  Commission Review of Recommendations and Findings for January Report

4:45 p.m.  Public Comment (must complete comment card and remarks are limited to 3 minutes each)

5:00 p.m.  Adjourn

*Over the course of the presentations regarding MSDHS site security, 911 calls, the law enforcement response, and the medical response, audio recordings, videos and photographs will be used because it is important that commissioners hear and see the evidence firsthand to gain a full and accurate understanding of what occurred. Videos and photographs have been redacted and victims’ images will not be shown. Non-victim voices will be heard and non-victim images may be seen. Despite redaction, family members and members of the public may find some of the recordings and/or photographs troubling and they should decide on their attendance accordingly.
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
Public Safety Commission

Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission
Meeting Agenda
Donald L. Tucker Civic Center
Tallahassee, Florida
December 12-13, 2018

Wednesday, December 12, 2018

8:30 a.m. Welcome and Opening Remarks
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri, Commission Chair

8:45 a.m. Approval of Minutes from November Meeting
Sheriff Bob Gualtieri

8:50 a.m. Presentation with Discussion on Initial Report Findings and
Recommendations
Facilitated by Chair Gualtieri

10:30 a.m. Break

10:45 a.m. Continued Discussion on Initial Report Findings and
Recommendations

12:00 p.m. Lunch (provided on site for commission members and staff)

1:00 p.m. Continued Discussion on Initial Report Findings and
Recommendations

3:00 p.m. Break

3:15 p.m. Continued Discussion on Initial Report Findings and
Recommendations

4:00 p.m. Public Comments (must complete comment card and remarks are
limited to 3 minutes each)

CLOSED SESSION

4:15 p.m. Discussion on Confidential Information Provided in the Initial Report
Findings and Recommendations

5:15 p.m. Adjourn
Thursday, December 13, 2018

8:30 a.m. Finalize Findings and Recommendations highlighting those issues requiring legislative action

10:15 a.m. Break

10:30 a.m. Finalize Findings and Recommendations highlighting those issues requiring legislative action

12:00 p.m. Lunch (provided on site for commission members and staff)

1:00 p.m. Discussion of Any Relevant Issues Not Included in Commission’s Initial Report and Any Necessary Follow Up

3:00 p.m. Break

3:15 p.m. Review Legislation Establishing Commission and Determine Next Steps Moving Forward

5:00 p.m. Public Comments (must complete comment card and remarks are limited to 3 minutes each)

5:15 p.m. Adjourn