

Differences in Public Expectations of Disaster Response Personnel

Thomas Shipp

Abstract

This paper discusses the public's expectations during disaster preparation, response and recovery. The term disaster has evolved over time which has resulted in changing expectations and responses as a result. It goes on to compare how expectations are developed during a disaster as behavior patterns emerge. These new expectations may create gaps between the governments capability to respond to the disaster. These gaps may be due to a variety of reasons, such as: capabilities to respond being overwhelmed by a "catastrophic" compared to a "routine" disaster, the public's lack of disaster experience, and emergent societal behavior patterns.

Introduction/Literature Review

History

Disaster response is an ever changing prospect due to the pressures and expectations applied by the public, media, and emergency planners. The response will be influenced by a variety of factors such as; the type and size of the disaster, local through state and federal capability to handle the response, media representations, emergent societal trends and public expectations. This paper will discuss influences that have changed disaster response and the public expectations related to that response.

Disaster events have been around and evolving ever since the "Big Bang". The determination of what is considered a disaster has been changing. Originally, disasters were viewed as Acts of God with the implication that nothing could be done about them. Over time and with a different perception, these events would be termed Acts of Nature or Acts of Man with implications that some of the events could be avoided or mitigated (Furedi, 2007). Consider some of the effects of earthquakes or great fires in history and the resulting building codes that have prevented the same level of damage or casualties in modern times.

There are societal perceptions that also play into the classification of an event as a disaster. In December of 1952, London was enveloped in smog for five days. The smog was created by a cold weather front and pollutants from the burning of coal for heating. Having experienced thick fog and smog events in the past Londoners didn't consider this as a significant event at the time (Furedi, 2007). It has been estimated that 4,000 to 12,000 people died as a result of that single smog event, which would qualify, by today's standards, as a disaster.

Today

Today, the term “disaster” is being used to describe an expanding range of impacts from low level damage events that are easily handled by local emergency service departments up to events with wide spread damage beyond a state’s capability to handle. This has led into a trend to define disasters using terms between “routine” up to “catastrophic”. An example of “routine” versus “catastrophic” would be the four individual hurricanes that hit Florida in 2004 as compared to Katrina that hit the Gulf Coast in 2005. These events are viewed differently partly due to their individual size and scope, but also due to how each response was handled, the public expectations, locations, and the resulting media representations.

Each of the four hurricanes in 2004 was viewed as “routine” because, in Florida, hurricanes, of this magnitude are expected by the public, media, and response personnel. There are emergency management plans in place to handle the normal situations that will arise from this level of event, much like building codes developed to prevent the spread of fire. With this magnitude of event the experienced public feels more secure that their expectations for service will be met by prepared governmental agencies. Based on the public’s experience their expectations are reasonable and are met due to the planning and training by governmental agencies. This can be compared to a public less experienced with disaster response and the expectations they may have that are not based on experience.

There are times when even in “routine” disasters the public’s expectations may not be met. This may be due to a variety of reasons; unreasonable expectations, lack of information or experience of the public or responders, unprepared response plans, long waiting times, etc. An example of this gap between the public’s expectations and the government’s capability to respond involves a small business impacted by a disaster event. The owner may expect a grant from the government to overcome the associated temporary income shortfall; however, the government’s capability may only extend to offering loans. The same owner may expect those loans to be easy to qualify for, without the realization that it is a loan and there must be a reasonable expectation that the company is viable enough pay the loan back (Furlong & Scheberle, 1998). For a variety of reasons, this business owner’s expectations may not be met. There are several factors that can lead to the development of unreasonable expectations, such as; an elected official’s unsupported promises, expectations based on previous disaster responses not being comparable to the current situation, and emergent societal behavior trends. These factors will continue to feed the public’s lack of understanding about the event and the government’s capabilities.

It is when an event reaches the magnitude of a Katrina, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, or the 2010 Haiti earthquake that the preparations or actions to handle the event come into question even more. It is these larger, unanticipated, events that hit an unprepared area that are the next step in disaster management planning development. Unfortunately, the planning, training, and resources needed to be ready for this level of event are rarely allocated due to the rarity of their occurrence. It is difficult for emergency managers to justify the associated expenses on a consistent basis.

Reasons for Gaps between Expectations and Capabilities

There can be a difference between the government's intention and its capability to meet expectations. This can happen at the local, state, or federal level of government response. Basically, the government, through its response personnel, still wants and intends to meet expectations, but an event can reach a magnitude beyond their capability to effectively respond. This difference, or gap, is reached sooner in catastrophic level disasters. This means the gap in public expectations and the government's capabilities to meet them is reached sooner as well. Even when the expectations and intentions are similar, the capability may not be there to achieve those goals.

This level of event is also the point at which even an experienced public's normally reasonable expectations exceed the government's capability. It is the difference in these expectations and capabilities that will help explain how the public responds to the disaster event.

The public will balance self-reliant behavior with expectations that the government will take care of their longer term needs. Although the government often starts meeting the public's needs during the first 24 hours, they have relayed the message, to the public, over the years that they should be self-reliant for basic needs in the first 72 hours after a disaster event. Regardless of the size of the incident, public calls for assistance during the actual disaster event, such as the landfall of a hurricane, are probably not reasonable.

To better understand government's capability to respond, one must understand the governmental response structure. In Florida, there is a progression of steps that will usually be followed as part of the hazard response planning either before, during, or after a disaster. These steps are: preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. The response planning anticipates that the local level of government will maintain complete operational control of their jurisdictions (FDEM, overview).

Each successive level of government needs to be prepared to help the lower level of government in a disaster response when the response system is inadequate or will be overwhelmed in the first 24 hours. Due to our system of government there are procedures in place to ensure how response personnel, financial or logistical assistance, and material will be requested by each level of government from the next higher level. These procedures, which at the federal level often involve the request for military support due to their unique response capabilities, are in place to maintain and ensure the primacy of the civilian or local control. The military can also respond directly to requests by civilian authorities through statutory allowances granted by Congress. (Anderson, 1970)

These requests for military support from local or state governments to the federal government should not be confused with a state governor's authority, on their own, to mobilize the National Guard following a disaster. (Anderson, 1970)

The gap between expectations and capability usually occur in the response and recovery steps. The response phase is when the immediate basic needs of the individual citizens are priority. This involves saving lives through search and rescue, providing injury related care, and attending to the basic needs of survivors such as food, water, and shelter. If after the first 72 hours these factors are being accomplished or are well under way, the response phase will probably be seen as a success. This

phase will continue even as the recovery phase is begun. The recovery involves the post-disaster rebuilding process of returning life to normal, such as; clearing the streets, turning the electricity and water on, informing the public about assistance programs, and beginning to rebuild what was lost (FDEM overview). Depending on the size and type of the event and the extent of the damage, this phase can last for years.

It is during the two phases of response and recovery that the public goes through some collective behaviors that may alter their expectations. The first part of this behavior pattern is the “milling” process, during which the public begins dealing with unfamiliar situations outside of their normal experiences and begin to search for new standards of behavior. In this type of situation and without normal communication and transportation systems, the public begins to interact socially in smaller groups. They exchange bits of information that may be incomplete or simply wrong, which leads to “rumor communication”. As these rumors are spread, discarded or modified, they eventually develop into a specific set of ideas. This last process is known as “keynoting”, which allows the public to stop the milling process. It provides a potential direction for the group’s activities while in the absence of government direction. The newly developed behavior pattern is unpredictable and will affect the public’s expectations (Schneider, 1992). The longer the public stays in the milling process, the wider the gap between expectations and the government’s capability or plans. The quicker the government can provide direction, structure, and return to normal situations the less time there is for the milling and keynoting process to alter expectations beyond normal planning.

When the planning for an event is exceeded and the gap between expectations and capability starts to widen the normal rigidity of the bureaucracy planning must also allow for flexibility. This will allow for the response plan to adapt to changing circumstances or expectations. An example is when the military responds locally to calls for service, before they are activated through the formal chain of command. This has happened due to local agency capabilities being overwhelmed before formal requests for assistance have been completed. It is expected that this emergent trend will continue and expand. This flexibility also helps prevent negative comments or evaluations in reporting.

Another influence on the public’s expectations and disaster planning is the media’s representation of the disaster. Traditionally communities pull together by helping their neighbors and themselves in an effort to return to normal conditions. Their individual responses are usually calm and controlled. However, if the media portrays the event by over emphasizing unusual, dramatic, or exceptional behavior then the myths of panic, rampant looting, or other criminal activity will be reinforced. This will cause the public to expect and prepare for that type of activity. It may also cause disaster response planners to waste manpower and other resources that could be better utilized in more productive areas.

While media outlets have experts on a variety of areas, they rarely have experts in disaster related phenomena. Disaster response managers have suggested reporters need more experience and training before trying to report on the complexities of disaster response and planning (Tierney, Bevc & Kuligowski, 2006). The training time and prioritization issues of the reporters involved have created a situation that so far has made this an unrealistic expectation. However, both the reporters and planners

recognize the benefits this time investment could create. It would not only improve both groups understanding of the other's needs it would also facilitate a higher level of trust (Tierney, Bevc & Kuligowski, 2006).

Political or government agency leaders have a difficult role to fulfill when responding to disasters.

Many citizens are wary of crises' at the same time; they are naïve about the intricacies of crises. Citizens expect to be safeguarded by their state; the idea that wholesale crisis cannot be prevented comes as a shock. That crises are not exclusively the fault of exogenous forces does little to reconcile public frustration. Postmortem investigations often unveil erroneous policies or bureaucratic mismanagement. This erosion of public trust in the capability of state institutions to perform their classic custodian functions is accompanied by increasingly assertive and tenacious media coverage of risks, disasters, and other critical events. The aftermath of today's crises tends to be as intense and contentious as the acute crisis periods are, with leaders put under pressure by streams of informal investigations, proactive journalism, insurance claims, and judicial (including criminal) proceeding against them. Leadership in the face of this sort of adversity is, in short, precarious. (Boin and Hart, 2003)

Whether it is the media, political figures, or the public, it is difficult to develop trust with disaster response planners during an emergency.

Methods

The study analyzes survey answers from Officers currently employed by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC). The survey targeted Officers that were deployed to at least one hurricane during the 2004 Hurricane season and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. This range of participants includes; male and female, ranks from Officers to Majors, and length of service ranges from nine to thirty plus years.


The survey was conducted once, distributed electronically, and used the following questions. The survey was distributed to 91 members of which 66 members responded, which corresponds to a 72.5% response rate. The members were not manipulated and interventions were not used.

The intent of the survey was to identify and differentiate between observed public expectations from the two consecutive hurricane seasons. The first season covers expectations of a public experienced in dealing with disaster response of hurricanes less than Category Five. The second season was targeted at dealing with expectations of a public less experienced/informed about hurricane disaster response capabilities and a Category Five Hurricane.


All of the charts shown side by side will display the response related to the 2004 hurricane season on the left side and Hurricane Katrina on the right.

Results

What was your rank at the start of the 2004 hurricane season?




What was your rank during the Hurricane Katrina response?




This is a comparison of the rank breakdown of members responding to the two hurricane seasons. Sixty-six members responded to the 2004 question and 65 responded to the Katrina question. Even with the one respondent difference, the percentages are very similar.

What were your assigned duties as part of the 2004 hurricane response details? Select all that apply.




What were your assigned duties as part of the Hurricane Katrina response details? Select all that apply.




These charts show the similarities between responsibilities of the members (65 and 64 respondents) between the two events.

Did the citizens you were in contact with understand our role was search and rescue, public assistance, security, etc.?




Did the citizens you were in contact with understand your role was search and rescue, public assistance, security, etc.?




These charts show the similarities between the citizens understanding of the members (65 and 63 respondents) responsibilities/roles between the two sample seasons.

If the citizen's expectation was beyond our responsibility, role or capability to handle, how did you manage their expectations? Select all that apply.




If the citizen's expectation was beyond our responsibility, role or capability to handle, how did you manage their expectations? Select all that apply.




Although there was one less respondent to the Katrina chart (63-62) and the question allowed multiple responses per member, the charts are very similar. Basically the variations between the two sets of responses were limited to a difference of 2 +/- on three of the four possible answers.

Question 6 and 14 asked "What other roles or services did the citizens expect you to fulfill?" which required a narrative response. Several of the narrative responses were similar between the events, such as; restoration of power, general information, and the basics of food, water, and security. Some of the "other expectations" were debris removal, animal control, salvaging personal effects, transportation services, help contacting family members, etc. Katrina responses were broader in scope and involved the "other expectations" mentioned above.

Based on your experience, were these other expectations reasonable?




Based on your experience, were these other expectations reasonable?




The follow up questions in the survey asked if those “other expectations” were considered reasonable by the members. Although there was one less respondent to the Katrina chart, 58 compared to 57, they do show a difference, 7.4%, in whether the expectations were deemed “reasonable”. The public expectations during Hurricane Katrina were viewed as less reasonable.

On an average day, how often did you provide accurate information to the public to correct misperceptions or to control rumors?




On an average day, how often did you provide accurate information to the public to correct misperceptions or to control rumors?



The same number of members responded to each question represented on the above charts. There is a 7.9% increase in the percentages of members that needed to provided accurate information to citizens in the 4-10 times a day categories. The largest increase was in the 4-6 category. The 1-2 times a day category shows the majority of corresponding decrease from 2004 hurricanes to Katrina.

Based on your experience, were the public's expectations different between the 2004 hurricanes and Hurricane Katrina?



The above chart shows the most significant difference between the two event populations. Most of the previous charts showed differences in responses about the population groups, but the differences were fairly small.

The follow up question to the above chart asked "If yes, how and why do you think they were different? Some members were specific and mentioned differences between individuals and neighborhoods. These differences included socioeconomic and urban versus rural attitudes. Other members answered the question using a broader view providing comments comparing the size of the events and general reactions by the public to those events.

Discussion

The first questions in the survey were to help set a base line and identify if there were;

1. Changes within in the sampled group
2. Differences/similarities of responsibilities
3. Differences/similarities in understanding, by the public, of the members roles
4. Differences/similarities in how the members handled the public's "other expectations"

These questions and responses are reflected in the first four chart comparisons. In all four there were strong similarities between the charts, reflecting similarities between the surveyed group and between the 2004 hurricanes and Hurricane Katrina.

The set of charts following the first four started exposing the differences between the public's expectations involved in the different events. There were also narrative questions that showed some differences. For example, question 6 and 14 asked "What other roles or services did the citizens expect you to fulfill?" Several of the narrative responses were similar between the events. However, Hurricane Katrina responses were broader in scope and involved requests about restoration of power, general information, debris removal, animal control, salvaging personal effects, transportation services, help contacting family members, etc.

The follow-up questions in the survey asked if those “other expectations” were considered reasonable by the members. The public expectations during Hurricane Katrina were viewed as less reasonable as shown in a 7.4% difference in how the surveyed members viewed those expectations compared to expectations from the 2004 hurricanes.

There was also an upward shift in the number of times the members had to provide accurate information to the public to prevent rumors or correct misconceptions. The shift primarily occurred by decreasing the number of times a member provided accurate information, in the 1-2 times a day category, comparing 2004 to the 2005 season. During Hurricane Katrina, members reported a 7.9% increase, compared to 2004 numbers, in providing accurate information in the 4-10 times a day categories.

The members reported that they observed differences, 32.8%, in public expectations between the 2004 hurricanes and Hurricane Katrina. This is the largest percentage difference between the events. It is supported by answers to the follow up question that asked “How and why were the expectations different”? This is where many of the responses supported the idea that the behavior patterns, including the “milling “ process, “rumor communication” and “keynoting”, are involved in the creation of expectations. The following responses are good examples of this process at work.

“The total devastation was more wide spread and the basic infrastructure was completely wiped out for entire counties. The State of Mississippi nor the citizens were ready for this wide spread destruction. Due to the lack of information and the rumors of complete degradation in New Orleans people felt like they were on an island or in a different time.”

“They had very little information”

“Citizens of the State of Florida know how to act before, during, and after a hurricane. I believe the citizens and public safety personnel of Mississippi did not know what to expect from the storm and its aftermath. They seemed to be in a daze with little understanding of much of what was transpiring”

“The citizens of Florida were more familiar with the procedures / process following the 2004 hurricanes. The public’s expectations after Katrina were far greater than those in Florida. They expected more, wanted more, needed more because they were not as prepared to handle what they were experiencing. FDEM was far more prepared and had the citizens of Florida much more prepared to handle the 2004 hurricanes than those that went through Katrina. Superior preparation resulted in quicker recuperation.”

In this type of situation and without normal communication and transportation systems, the public begins to interact socially in smaller groups. They exchange bits of information that may be incomplete or simply wrong. The newly developed behavior pattern is unpredictable and will affect the public's expectations (Schneider, 1992).

There can be a difference between the government's intention and its capability of meeting expectations. This difference is reached sooner in catastrophic level disasters. This means that the gap between public expectations and the government's capabilities to meet them is reached sooner as well. Even when the expectations and intentions are similar, the capability may not be there to achieve those goals.

A Hurricane Katrina level event is the point at which even an experienced public's normally reasonable expectations exceed the government's capability. It is the difference in these expectations and capabilities that will help explain how the public responds to the disaster event. Remember, the majority of the public impacted by Katrina was not experienced. Some of the below narrative responses from the survey show some of the expectations.

"Katrina was worse, but expectations were the same"

"Public expectation was the same with all hurricanes."

"They expected more services"

These responses show that the public didn't alter their expectations in relation to the size and scope of the event.

Recommendations

As mentioned earlier, it is these larger, unplanned for events, that hit an unprepared area that are the next step in disaster management planning development. Unfortunately, the planning, training, and resources needed to be ready for this level of event are rarely allocated due to the rarity of their occurrence. It is difficult for emergency managers to justify the associated expenses on a consistent basis. Below is another quote from the survey.

"Katrina was a massive hurricane which affected several states. I believe the public expected agencies to be better prepared in their response."

I would recommend the continued planning, training, and allocation of resources to prepare for events whether they are termed Acts of Nature or Acts of Man. This preparation will be limited by realities such as prioritization of agency and personnel time as well as financial considerations. That preparation should include accurately informing the general public, before and during an event, of the government's capabilities and expectations. This will help mitigate the development of expectations through the behavior patterns associated with disasters. A low to medium tech

communication plan should be developed for use during a disaster to communicate with the public that is cut off from normal communication channels. This communication plan could include public service announcements on the radio to informational flyers to be handed out with emergency supplies. The longer the public stays in the milling process, the wider the gap between expectations and the government's capability or plans. The quicker the government can provide direction, structure, and return to normal living conditions the less time there is for the milling and keynoting process to alter expectations beyond normal planning.

The preparation of accurately informing the general public, before and during an event, of the government's capabilities and expectations should include and also be applied to the media representatives and political figures. This preparation should help build understanding and trust between them, the public and emergency managers, before an event. This trust and understanding should result in more accurate statements and reporting, to the public, during the event. This communication plan and preparation is all in an effort to manage expectations in relation to the size of the event and the capability to of the government to respond.

Captain Tom Shipp began his career with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission in 2002. For 6 years he was assigned and patrolled counties in the North West Florida, working both coastal and inland areas. In 2008 he promoted to Lieutenant in the Office of Policy, Planning, and Professional Standards. In 2010 he promoted to his current position in the Boating and Waterways section. The Boating Safety unit deals with boating accident reporting, education and outreach, temporary certificate contracts, and the Boating Advisory Council. Tom earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Biology from Ottawa University.

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Appendix A

The intent of the survey is to identify and differentiate between observed public expectations from two consecutive hurricane seasons. The first season covers expectations of a public experienced with disaster response capabilities when dealing with general hurricane impacts. The second season is targeted at dealing with expectations of a public less experienced/informed about hurricane disaster response capabilities and a Category Five Hurricane the size of Katrina.

Questions

Were you deployed to a hurricane response during the 2004 hurricane season?

- Yes
- No

What was your rank at the start of the 2004 hurricane season?

- Officer
- Sergeant/Investigator
- Lieutenant
- Captain
- Major

Which hurricanes were you deployed during 2004? Select all that apply.

- Charley
- Frances
- Ivan
- Jeanne

What were your assigned duties as part of the 2004 hurricane response details?
Select all that apply.

- Search and Rescue/First Responder
- Security (curfew, neighborhood patrol, etc.)
- Supplying Immediate Basic Needs (distribution of food, water, etc.)
- Public Assistance (short transportation rides, driveway access tree limb removal, generator safety information, etc.)
- Emergency Operations Center/Logistics

Did you have daily contact with citizen's that were impacted by the hurricane?

- Yes
- No

Did the citizens you were in contact with understand our role was search and rescue, public assistance, security, etc.?

- Yes
- No

What other roles or services did the citizens expect you to fulfill?

Brief Narrative:

Based on your experience, were these other expectations reasonable?

Yes

No

If the citizen's expectation was beyond our responsibility, role or capability to handle, how did you manage their expectations? Select all that apply.

Redirected them to the agency or location that could handle their issue.

Explain to them their responsibilities as an individual.

Educate them on disaster response and the expected timeline for recovery/return of services.

NA

On an average day, how often did you provide accurate information to the public to correct misperceptions or to control rumors?

Never or less than once a day average.

1-2

3-4

4-6

6-10

More than 10 times a day

Were you part of the disaster response sent out of state to Hurricane Katrina?

Yes

No

What was your rank during the Hurricane Katrina response?

Officer

Sergeant/Investigator

Lieutenant

Captain

Major

What were your assigned duties as part of the Hurricane Katrina response details?

Select all that apply.

Search and Rescue/First Responder

Security (curfew, neighborhood patrol, etc.)

Supplying Immediate Basic Needs (distribution of food, water, etc.)

Public Assistance (short transportation rides, driveway access tree limb removal, generator safety information, etc.)

Emergency Operations Center/Logistics

Did you have daily contact with citizen's that were impacted by Hurricane Katrina?

Yes

No

Did the citizens you were in contact with understand our role was SAR, public assistance, security, etc.?

Yes

No

What other roles or services did the citizens expect you to fulfill?

Brief Narrative:

Based on your experience, were these other expectations reasonable?

Yes

No

If the citizen's expectation was beyond our responsibility, role or capability to handle, how did you manage their expectations? Select all that apply.

Redirected them to the agency or location that could handle their issue.

Explain to them their responsibilities as an individual.

Educate them on disaster response and the expected timeline for recovery/return of services.

NA

On an average day, how often did you provide accurate information to the public to correct misperceptions or to control rumors?

Never or less than once a day average.

1-2

3-4

4-6

6-10

More than 10 times a day

Were the public's expectations different between the 2004 hurricanes and Hurricane Katrina?

Yes

No

If yes, how and why do you think they were they different?

Narrative