

Direct Action Protest Management

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Abstract

In the past five years, mass protest activities in Seattle, Quebec, Cancun and Miami have taxed criminal justice resources beyond their limits. The aftermath of these large protests and the subsequent criminal justice responses have been closely scrutinized and often criticized in the media and the courts. Research regarding these incidents is useful in planning the law enforcement and correctional responses to future events that draw large numbers of widely varied types of protesters. Criminal justice awareness of evolving protestor tactics is paramount in dealing with these historically violent, large-scale events. Many protestors have become highly adept and well trained in their methods, the criminal justice realm must respond in kind.

Introduction

North America has been host to four global economic summits over the past six years. In addition to international ministerial attendees, delegates, and heads of state, each of these four meetings has drawn mass protests of a historically unprecedented nature. The first of these ministerial meetings was the infamous World Trade Organization (WTO) Conference in Seattle, Washington in late 1999. "The Battle in Seattle" was a turning point in the history of American civil disobedience and it marked drastic transition from the practice of traditional peaceful protest tactics that were popular in the 1960's and 70's.

In addition to the riotous situation that took place in Seattle, other global economic conferences drew equally violent protests in Quebec, Canada in April 2001 for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Conference and in Cancun, Mexico in September 2003 during another WTO Conference. Each of these conferences experienced escalating levels of violence and tactical planning on the part of certain protest groups, albeit not on the same chaotic scale as had been experienced in Seattle.

Since Seattle, many other American cities have experienced similar protests against various economic, capitalistic and governmental entities. New York City, Washington D.C. and Miami have all been exposed to new forms of mass protest techniques. The difference between Seattle and other cities is that the violent protestor factions have lost the "element of surprise" which proved very effective in Seattle. However, this does not mean that these groups have been dissuaded by more adequate law enforcement precautions. Conversely, it means that these groups are increasing their levels of training and tactics to counter law enforcement's increased vigilance and proactive response.

From November 17 through 21, 2003, the City of Miami, Florida served as host for another Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Ministerial Conference. Due to the similarities between the FTAA and the WTO and each organization's goal towards a more global economy, it was rightfully expected that the FTAA conference would draw similar large-scale protests as had been experienced in Seattle. These assumptions proved accurate as thousands of protestors converged on Miami during the conference. To even the casual observer, it was readily apparent that the FTAA was nearly the antithesis of the WTO in terms of the criminal justice system's preparation for and response to the event.

This research will compare and contrast some of the similarities and differences between the WTO and FTAA events. The FTAA aspects of this research are of great importance in Florida as Miami continues to vie to be named the world FTAA secretariat or headquarters. (Florida FTAA, Inc.) This research will answer many questions regarding the criminal justice system's response to these types of mass pre-planned protest events. Such events engender questions such as, who attends these events and what are their motivations and tactics? Additionally, what are some of the lessons learned by law enforcement, corrections and the courts in having dealt with these new age or contemporary protest incidents? Finally recommendations towards the quest for a "happy medium" somewhere between WTO and FTAA criminal justice responses will be discussed.

In Seattle, for the first time, an American police department experienced the theretofore-unknown protest tactic that has come to be known as "direct action" on a mass scale. The WTO conference was a tremendous learning opportunity for law enforcement as well as a catalyst for future protests of a highly similar nature. Prior to the WTO conference, law enforcement had learned how to deal with "traditional" forms of mass protest, as that phenomenon was nothing new. People were expected to congregate, organize, march and attempt to have their voices heard or to express their dissent through strength in numbers and the presentation of a unified front under the protection of the First Amendment. These types of protests were usually monitored by law enforcement in the interest of maintaining order.

Passive resistance had become increasingly common in the late 1980's and early 1990's where protestors intentionally did no harm and very little to antagonize responding police officers. Mass arrests often accompanied the passive/resistant type of protests, however responding police agencies, who would normally remove the protestors from a certain blocked or obstructed area, used minimal amounts of force. This tactic became especially popular with pro-life and other religious-based movements. Misdemeanors, usually trespassing, were the prevailing criminal activity. A component of this movement usually involved the refusal to identify oneself upon arrest, resulting in a disruption of routine criminal justice processes such as arrest and booking and subsequent court appearances. This type of deliberate "clogging" or disruption of "the system" became a precursor to more defiant methods that were employed during later protests.

Law enforcement had become adept at responding to and containing violent, spontaneous protests or riots as these types of situations became increasingly more frequent in the early to mid 1990's. What made the WTO Conference different from such situations such as the Los Angeles "Rodney King" riots was the lack of a precipitating event and usual spontaneity of the violence that took place. In Seattle,

there was very little spontaneity on the part of select groups of protestors, to the contrary, they came from near and far, fully equipped and prepared to do battle.

What differentiated the Seattle experience from prior, more traditional forms of protest or civil unrest was the planning and execution of protest tactics by certain groups of protestors. "The Seattle Police Department acknowledges that, it was taught a hard lesson by a well-trained and equipped adversary." (Seattle Police Department [SPD], 2000, p.3) Many protestors, whom have since been categorized or self-proclaimed as anarchist "affinity groups" and "black blocs," came to Seattle with one intention and that was to shut down the WTO conference by whatever means necessary. This type of "direct action" activity had never been experienced on a large scale in the United States prior to this incident.

Direct action protest involves intentional and overt acts of violence, vandalism and civil disobedience with the intent to overwhelm the law enforcement, correctional and judicial capabilities of the criminal justice system as a means to an end in bringing wide-scale attention to the causes of those involved. Simply stated; "These are not your father's protestors." (Miami Police Department [MPD], 2004 p.2) This type of protest activity has been very successful in bringing national and international media attention to the locations and intended targets of these protests. In an interview with a black bloc member who participated in the WTO protest he is quoted "Before November 30 (1999), next to no one had heard of the WTO. Now, almost everyone has heard of it and has a bad taste in their mouth about it." (Infoshop.org, 2000)

The World Trade Organization ministerial conference was a nightmare for the Seattle Police Department (SPD), resulting in the ousting of the chief of police as well as extremely negative international media coverage. If one word could sum up SPD's planning for the WTO, "complacency" would be very applicable; "In retrospect, SPD commanders put their faith in historical precedent – the Seattle tradition of peaceful protest – in assessing the needs for policing the WTO event." (SPD, 2000, p.4)

The SPD was aware that protests and demonstrations would take place during the WTO event; however, they grossly underestimated the nature and scope of violence that would plague the city during four days of the conference. Additionally SPD commanders were lulled into a false sense of security and accomplishment during the first day of the conference, November 29, 1999 as very few incidents of violence or vandalism took place and adequate personnel and resources were available to respond to these incidents. This was a masterfully planned tactic that was utilized to great advantage by the direct action network on the following day. The SPD was highly criticized for the lack of planning and inadequate response to the blatant criminal activity that took place.

Direct action protest activity during the WTO conference inflicted \$3 million in property damage to businesses and buildings in the downtown Seattle area. Additionally, downtown retailers realized an estimated \$17 million in lost sales during the conference. Direct costs incurred by the city of Seattle as a whole reached approximately \$9.3 million, of which \$6.8 million was identified as being spent solely by the SPD. In addition, mutual aid police departments incurred an additional \$6 million in WTO related expenses. Finally, legal suits against the City of Seattle totaled twenty-seven in number and an estimated \$68 to \$150 million in claims. (SPD, 2000, p.50)

In November 2003, the City of Miami, Florida hosted the Free Trade Area of the Americas Ministerial Conference. The FTAA conference was the polar opposite of the WTO in that local, state and federal law enforcement were extremely well prepared to handle the mass protests that were expected to converge upon the conference. In addition, unlike in Seattle, all aspects of the criminal justice system were involved in the planning stages for FTAA from day one. Inclusion of all entities as well as open communication and an extremely well defined command structure (MPD, 2004, p.1) were all ingredients towards the success of the FTAA conference. Yet, this cannot be construed to lead one to believe that the FTAA conference was not without its share of problems, as there were many both during the event and in its aftermath.

Unlike Seattle, the Miami Police Department (MPD) and its mutual aid partners for the FTAA conference have been highly criticized for what can be categorized as being overly prepared and too aggressive in the handling of the FTAA protests. "For a brief period in time, it appeared as if Miami was a "police state. Civil rights were trampled and the socio-political values we hold most dear were undermined." (Independent Review Panel [IRP], 2004, p.2) Nearly every federal, state and local police agency from Broward County southward had some type of involvement in the security and law enforcement aspects of the FTAA. Additionally, local corrections and court officials were equally prepared and equipped to deal with nearly any contingency. The planning process and subsequent criminal justice response in regards to FTAA is now known as "The Miami Model" by both pro and anti protest factions.

The success of the Miami Model cannot be ignored. In total, South Florida law enforcement and corrections agencies spent nearly \$24 million on supplies and personnel costs for FTAA preparations, training and deployment. \$8.5 million of this expense was reimbursable by the Federal Government under the auspices of Homeland Security. (Marrero, 2004) Property damage to the City of Miami was trivial in comparison to Seattle. Finally, the FTAA ministerial conference was successfully concluded, a day early in fact, as opposed to the WTO conference that was disrupted so significantly that the attending delegates could reach no agreements or accords.

The preparation and responses of the Seattle Police Department and the Miami Police Department to the mass protests that took place in the two cities are a study in contrasts. The "damned if you do, damned if you don't" cliché certainly applies to the approaches taken by both agencies. Neither agency escaped these incidents unscathed and both have been widely criticized in the media and, more significantly, within the court system. This research should provide a synopsis of the two extremes in which these incidents were dealt with the goal of providing criminal justice leadership with useful information in developing balanced policies and procedures for dealing with these types of high-profile incidents.

Methods

This research focuses on the self-professed lessons learned during the two mass protest events in the United States as well as a detailed analysis of direct action protest tactics. The associated criminal justice problems and challenges that have or may result before, during and after a planned or anticipated mass protest will also be discussed. A review of all related After Action Reports that have been compiled by the

effected and participating agencies has been conducted. Additionally, print media accounts of both events have been reviewed for applicable content. An informal telephone interview with a participating WTO commander was also conducted.

Internet research was extensively utilized and it must be noted that subject matter, especially in the area of direct action networks, affinity groups and anarchist activity is extremely prolific and a highly valued intelligence resource for criminal justice entities. Finally, personal experience in planning and deployment for and during the November 2003 Republican Governor's Association Conference in Boca Raton, Florida (simultaneous to FTAA) was also utilized in the research of this subject matter.

The After Action Reports of participating agencies and, in the case of the Miami FTAA, the Independent Review Panel (IRP) Inquiry Report, provide detailed accounts of the successes and failures of criminal justice entities during the two subject events. To the contrary, Internet accounts of participating protestors, especially affinity and anarchist groups are extremely slanted and must be considered accordingly. It is valuable to note, since Seattle, 1999, these groups are not clandestine in any manner and their future plans and calls for action are readily available to anyone with Internet access. A brief listing of some of the more popular sites will appear in appendix form at the conclusion of this report.

Results

As previously noted, the most glaring attribute of the WTO protests was the tactical protestor preparation that was utilized to catch the police department off guard, undermanned and bewildered. The WTO incident was largely attributed not to a failure to gather and analyze intelligence, but to a failure to pay heed to what was being learned from the intelligence. There was no question prior to WTO that protests were going to occur but "the Department's planning assumptions and analysis underestimated the capability of criminally disruptive forces." (SPD, 2000, p.5) In summary, SPD failed to plan for a "worst case scenario" and they certainly came close to experiencing just that. "In retrospect, we relied too much on our collective memory of recent history 'fighting the last war' and placed too little credence on intelligence that ultimately proved to be accurate 'the new war'." (SPD, 2000 p.9)

The failures or criticisms of Miami's reaction to FTAA starkly contrast to those of WTO. Miami was extremely well prepared and equipped to deal with a worst-case scenario. Intelligence, which was readily available, proved to be an ominous predictor of what could be expected in Miami and police commanders prepared accordingly. In defense of Seattle, it must be mentioned that WTO took place prior to September 11, 2001 and FTAA obviously took place over two years after "9-11." The ultimate "worst-case" scenario had taken place in the years between the two events and The United States of America will never "get caught sleeping" again. This factor played an unquestionable role in the decision-making process as well as inter-agency commitment and cooperation that were realized at FTAA.

The greatest lesson learned during WTO, which proved to be endlessly valuable for all subsequent mass protests against any imaginable cause or entity was the discovery or "debut" for lack of a better term, of direct action protest tactics. Direct action tactics are not peaceful, passive or patriotic. Simply stated, these tactics are

virulent, intentional, premeditated and directed usually towards one specific target, that being law enforcement officers and the criminal justice system.

Direct action protest tactics rely upon the participation of various interest groups and large numbers of protestors in order to be effective. The more violent factions of these groups, such as the notorious black blocs, seldom operate independently. Instead, they rely upon the presence of true non-violent and passive resistant protestors for cover and concealment in order to carry out their acts of criminal aggression. At both WTO and FTAA, black bloc members and affinity groups relied upon the presence of union members and other traditional protestors in order to carry out their violence. These arrangements should not be construed as agreements between the groups; it is simply a matter of one or two groups taking advantage of the large numbers of a third. In fact, union leaders and other legitimate organizations are becoming more wary of the tactics of direct action protestors and are beginning to take steps to assist the authorities in helping to control their illegal behavior.

Recent protest participants can best be divided in three logical threat levels or categories: green, yellow and red. Green level protestors are the true non-violent protestors that mainly consist of labor unions or groups, retirees and members of recognized organizations such as the Sierra club, ACLU and the like. Yellow protestors are most often those associated with affinity groups or more radical organizations such as Green Peace. Yellow level protestors are usually willing to risk arrest and will resist lower levels of crowd control tactics employed by the police. The greatest threat group is the red level protestor. These protestors are bent on committing acts of violence and vandalism. These anarchist groups actively train to counter police tactics and they come extremely well equipped to the venues where they practice their chaotic craft. Usually, they will be equipped with protective gear, such as gas masks and body armor in anticipation of directly confronting law enforcement officers.

The greatest challenge to police officers, supervisors and commanders is the fact that the yellow and red groups intentionally utilize the greater numbers of green protestors as cover and human shields in order to commit their criminal acts in as covert a manner as possible. However, when separated from other levels of protestors, the red factions will actively engage and challenge law enforcement officers in actions of physical assault and resistance. This is what they train for and come prepared to do. Just as police field forces are designated to perform certain tasks on the front lines, many red level groups have equally specialized factions to perform specific tasks such as "unarresting" a comrade. This tactic involves the physical assault of police officers in the act of making an arrest with the goal of freeing and dragging the offender into the crowd to safety.

The first of two discernable factions of the direct action movement are affinity groups, so named for their purported allegiances to certain causes such as anti-globalization, environmentalism, pro-life, racial equality, anti-war and virtually any other topic of controversy. Affinity groups and their members often serve as decoys and distractions for more violent types of protestors. These groups will profess to be non-violent and they espouse this ideal in their literature and on their websites. They specifically call for non-violent action against their intended targets when recruiting or advertising for a call to action. The Internet is their primary means of communication.

Some of the more common tactics that have been utilized by affinity groups are dramatic and clever forms of passive resistance. The use of “sleeping dragons” is a preferred method of diverting public safety attention to themselves and away from more aggressive protestors. Sleeping dragons are primarily utilized to form blockades or to impede pedestrian or vehicle movement. A sleeping dragon is a method of restraining oneself to a fixed object or to other people in a manner that conceals the restraint device in some manner, usually PVC pipe. Combating this tactic is very time consuming for public safety personnel as both the concealment and restraining devices must be removed or defeated in order to relocate or remove a protestor. The fact that the restraint device is not visible or is often fortified contributes to the risk of injuring the protestor while the device is cut off or otherwise removed. Sleeping dragons were widely used at WTO and none were observed at FTAA. (MPD, 2004 p.35-36)

Another form of passive resistance is the use of bi-pods or tri-pods to elevate non-violent protestors in a manner where they impede vehicle or foot traffic. Bi-pods and tri-pods are most often fashioned from lumber, such as 2X4's. More creative users will affix themselves to the device in a manner that provides the protestor the option of “hanging” themselves by the neck if the device is not methodically defeated by public safety personnel. Again, these devices are time consuming to defeat but are easy to erect given enough people to raise them. The use of chain saws and adequate numbers of public safety personnel is nearly the only method of defeating the device.

In addition to the use of innovative passive resistant methods and devices, affinity group members and other yellow level protestors often serve as logistical support units for their more violent counterparts. An extremely common tactic is the use of videographers and imbedded media personnel from non-mainstream media outlets who fall within the yellow category given their non-violent yet semi-anarchist views. Additionally, affinity groups often supply their own readily recognizable medics as well as legal watchdogs to monitor instances of police confrontation and use of force.

An additional affinity group tactic is “Jail solidarity” whereby arrestees refuse to identify themselves in order to ensure their prolonged detention for minor crimes with the goal of overloading the correctional system. Jail solidarity may also involve switching of clothing with other arrestees as well as refusal to eat jail food for alleged animal friendly purposes. According to the King County, Washington Facility Commander, “the party doesn’t stop once they’re in jail.” (C. Nelson, personal communication, March 2, 2005) Affinity group members often stage protests outside of jail facilities where their fellow protestors are being detained. This type of activity took place during both WTO and FTAA.

To this point it has been well established that the most dangerous form of direct action protestor is the “red level” anarchist. These factions do little to nothing to mask their beliefs and intentions prior to attending a mass protest event. Their websites clearly boast of their past “victories” and calls for action towards future causes. “In media interviews and on Internet web sites, they espouse a romantic self-image as avengers fighting for a noble cause. In reality, they are criminal thugs whose only intent and message is to commit violence in order to deny the rights of others with whom they disagree.” (MPD, 2004, p.2)

As noted earlier, some anarchist groups are often referred to as black blocs. This is due to the fact that they wear black clothing in order to blend in with others in their group to avoid identification. Many factions are known as padded blocs, whose

sole purpose is to directly confront law enforcement officers, seemingly for the sport of it. "Their modus operandi is to attack police officers with projectiles including rocks, bottles, slingshot-fired marbles and steel bolts, paint, unidentified liquids suspected to be human excrement, powerful fireworks and ignited road flares." (MPD, 2004, p.2) A more recent tactic is to throw white powder on officers and claim it to be anthrax, thus effectively removing officers from the lines while they undergo precautionary decontamination procedures. These anarchist protestors are seemingly ambivalent about the fear of arrest and prosecution.

In reviewing the aftermath of both WTO and FTAA, certain lapses in preparation and training can be identified on both ends of the spectrum. It has been accurately established the Seattle PD failed to plan for the red level protestors that have been discussed in previous paragraphs. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Miami PD has been widely criticized for not being more sympathetic to the green level protestors who posed little to no threat during FTAA. A prevailing thought in the aftermath of FTAA was that Miami "police preparation emphasized anarchists, anarchists, anarchists." "The emphasis on anarchists contributed to a police mindset to err, when in doubt, on the side of dramatic show of force to preempt violence rather than being subject to criticism for avoidable injury and destruction based on a reserved presence of police force." (IRP, 2004 p.6)

The similarities between Seattle and Miami include mass arrests with low levels of successful prosecutions, excessive force and police misconduct complaints, violation of civil rights claims and subsequent civil litigation. All of these factors should be carefully considered in future criminal justice plans for responding to these types of events. During WTO, 601 arrests were made followed by an additional 30 arrests in the aftermath as a result of continued investigation after the conference. Of these 631 arrests, 26 were for felonies, the remaining for misdemeanors of which only 51 were prosecuted. (SPD, 2000, p.48) During FTAA, 213 arrests were made by all participating agencies. As of May 2004, only three of these arrests had resulted in a conviction and 30 cases remained with no disposition. (IRP, 2004 p.12)

Excessive force and police misconduct allegations can take the form of both internal complaints as well as civil lawsuits. Some of the more common complaints during WTO and FTAA were related to unnecessarily long periods of keeping arrestees in restraints. As one might expect many complaints allege excessive or unnecessary force on the part of participating officers. One of the more damning allegations that occurred during FTAA involved the allegations of a 11th Circuit Court Judge who claimed to have witnessed the commission of "no less than 20 felonies" by police officers assigned to the FTAA event. The judge later declined to speak to Internal Affairs investigators from MPD about his allegations. (MPD, 2004 p.29)

As noted previously, Seattle had at least 27 civil suits brought against the city in the aftermath of WTO. While no number has been finalized in regards to FTAA litigation, some cases have already been resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. As recently as February 2005, three suits were settled between Miami-Dade County and three female FTAA arrestees for unlawful strip searches. (Wilson, 2005) Other FTAA litigation includes a recent federal court ruling that Miami-Dade County's "Parade and Assembly" ordinance is unconstitutional. This ordinance was the basis of numerous FTAA related arrests and as such, the thirty unresolved FTAA criminal cases might be dismissed, as might any previous convictions upon appeal.

Discussion

The research presented to this point would leave the impression that global economic summits or other large-scale meetings are the only targets of modern day protest tactics. This is a dangerous assumption to make. Recent history proves that a variety of venues are likely targets of direct action protest activity. For instance, The Republican National Convention in New York City was the site of intended direct action activity in the summer of 2004 where over 4,000 police officers were deployed to maintain order. On a smaller scale, direct action protests have begun to surface in Palm Beach County Florida due to the development of the Scripps Bio-medical research park. Environmentalist affinity group activity has resulted in two separate incidents of arrests in the past eight months with more expected as development begins. Virtually any venue where controversial matters are the subjects of high profile attention is a potential target for direct action activity.

I will justifiably stop short of labeling direct action activity as “domestic terrorism” although the argument can rightfully be made that abortion clinic bombings are a form of protest that does rise to the terrorist level. The difference between direct action activity and terrorism is obviously the lack of intent to kill by direct action proponents, mayhem, yes, murder, no. No matter how one wishes to classify those that partake in direct action and other forms of violent protest, the experiences of the criminal justice realm in Seattle and Miami are invaluable to leaders within the various components of the system.

It should be obvious at this point that neither Seattle or Miami can be credited with developing the “best practice” in planning and deploying anti-violence tactics in response to recent protest activity in the new millennium. As alluded to earlier, somewhere between the two methods lies the delicate balance between police and constituent security and safety concerns and the rights of those to assemble and have their viewpoints seen and heard. The Miami Model, by the admission of those who developed and deployed it, was not a utopian response. However, it can obviously be looked upon as the lesser of two evils as property damage, arrests and protest related injuries were far less than those experienced at WTO in 1999.

The strong points of the Miami model include intense preparation, insight and communication among the forty-five different agencies that participated in securing the event. The efforts of the Miami Police Department, the lead agency for FTAA, were very commendable as the operation was a tactical success. There is little doubt that many protesters were dissuaded from attending the event and those that chose to soon found out that they were outnumbered nearly two to one by law enforcement personnel. Another attribute of the Miami Model was the inclusion of nearly every facet of government in planning the event. Special ordinances were either enacted or existing ones strengthened by local legislators in order to curtail violent forms of protest. For instance, signs were limited in size and sticks used to display them were limited to smaller diameters in order to prevent the fashioning of makeshift weapons. Contingency plans were made with the judiciary in order to keep the courts running as normally as possible and other public safety entities such as fire rescue and EMS were vital partners in the development of sound planning.

On the other hand, perhaps the greatest flaw in the Miami Model was a level of overkill when it came to police presence and response to minor incidents or skirmishes. "The overwhelming riot-clad police presence, when there was no civil disturbance, chilled some citizen participation in permitted and lawful demonstrations and events." (IRP, 2004, p.7) Additionally, significant training hours were spent in field force training and violent protest countermeasures but very little training or education took place involving "the protection of citizen right to free expression." (IRP, 2004, p.5) Law enforcement officers assigned to FTAA were victimized by their own zeal and the stealth tactics of direct action protestors who were successful in inciting police responses towards groups of innocent, well-intended protestors such as labor union members and retirees.

To put it succinctly as possible, Seattle had a heavy heart and a light hand while Miami had both a heavy heart and hand. Seattle wishes it could have done more to prevent what took place and Miami realizes it should have done a bit less. The good news is that both these cities have recognized their shortcomings and both have made significant recommendations and the accompanying changes necessary for better preparations and responses to future events. Many of these changes are very simple and can be easily applied at little to no cost. For instance, Seattle has fully adopted the Incident Command System for future large-scale events while Miami learned that too many officers in riot gear was both a tactical error and an unnecessary expense. The bad news is that the direct action network has also learned from its mistakes at WTO and more recently, FTAA. The "armchair quarterback" musings of these groups can be read on their websites, bulletin boards and weblogs.

Conclusions

There certainly are no easy answers in developing policies, plans and procedures for large-scale protests or other high profile events. Hopefully, the case studies of the two subject incidents in this research will provide valuable insight that should prove useful in the development of future plans. It is apparent that "you can't please everyone" when it comes to deploying plans, manpower and other resources in response to a mass protest situation as evidenced by the opposing criticisms of the lead agencies involved in these two examples.

Fortunately for police and corrections administrators, the "dirty work" has been done when it comes to this topic and plenty of written information is readily available if one chooses to review it. Those who have been on the "battlefield" have made numerous recommendations on how they would handle future incidents. This information and the accounts of what did and did not work for those involved, in my opinion, are of tremendous value to those responsible for decisions in developing plans to deal with protests of all sorts.

This research has identified many criticisms of WTO and FTAA law enforcement leadership. The reason for including this information was certainly not to "cast stones" but to serve as a bellwether for similarly situated leaders in the future. The viewpoints of critics were not included to determine wrong from right but only ensure that readers of this research are well aware of differing perspectives regarding law enforcement's

performance during these extraordinary situations. What has not been mentioned in this research is the highly warranted praise that has been heaped upon all levels of the chain-of-command for the courageous and unselfish behavior of those in the field and on the front lines of these incidents. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the fact that the positive comments from such entities as Miami-Dade's Independent Review Panel were as abundant as any criticisms contained in their findings.

Perhaps the greatest value of this research is the inclusion of direct action protest tactics in the body of the report. Furthermore the delineation of the availability of information regarding these groups, their causes and most importantly, their future plans will hopefully be of great value to those who review this document. This was a tremendous eye-opener for me during my agency's planning for the Republican Governor's Association Conference in the nine months prior to November 2003. This information was my motivation behind the selection of this topic, as I believe it to be important to Florida's criminal justice leadership.

There is no doubt that the existence of and potential for additional mass protest events are a "Florida issue" and this viewpoint should not be limited to South Florida and the Miami area. By virtue of our climate and massive geographical area, it has already been established that at least one direct action training camp has been established in Arcadia / Desoto County. (The Ruckus Society) Florida's criminal justice leadership would be wise to remain vigilant towards both actual mass protest event opportunities as well as the peripheral activities of those involved in direct action protest activities.

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Appendix

Listing of direct action network / affinity groups / anarchist websites as of March 11, 2005:

www.infoshop.org

www.ruckus.org

www.gloablizethis.org

www.stopftaa.org

www.crimeth.com

www.monkeyfist.com

www.zmag.org

www.actupsf.com

www.directdemocracynow.org

www.protest.net

www.actupny.org

www.indymedia.com

www.ainfos.org

www.riseup.net

www.greenaction.org

www.lcanimal.org

www.blackrhinoceros.org

<http://orlandodirectaction.us>

www.actiontendency.net

www.alternet.org

www.voxfux.com

<http://ayp.subvert.info>